The Joy ofAnalysis
LYNNE ROGERS
ICHARD TARUSKIN'S ESSAY "CATCHING UP WITH
Rimsky-Korsakov" is an engaging and rhetorically heated
narrative that describes, from a highly personal perspec-
tive, a scholarly quest and related skirmish. In this story, the
author-protagonist attempts valiantly to redeem a musical hero
misunderstood in the West. At the same time, he offers historical
vindication for the work of two music theorists, who subse-
quently reject his interdisciplinary olive branch. The protago-
nist nonetheless sees reasons to hope in the younger generations
of theorists.
Much of the essay revolves around one of Taruskin's many
important contributions to music history and theory: the un-
earthing of a pedigree for Igor Stravinsky's octatonicism. In
particular, this lineage convincingly links the composer's octa-
tonic practice to that of his teacher Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov.
Even for scholars who wish to address other aspects of
Stravinsky's music, the weight of the evidence supporting the
connection to Rimsky-Korsakov demands cognizance of the
relationship and its repercussions. Furthermore, by advocating
the reassessment of Rimsky-Korsakov in the West, Taruskin
gives us the gift of another major musical repertory to listen to
and contemplate.
But Taruskin's larger aim in this essay goes beyond issues in
the Stravinskian domain. The aforementioned narrative high-
lights what he sees as failings of music theory in general and
of analysis in particular: the neglect of historical evidence and
the willful ignorance of the constructive nature of analytical
findings. In response, Taruskin proposes at the close of his
essay "a theory of theory: that is, a criterion, or a set of criteria,
for what makes music theory and its analytical toolkit cultur-
ally relevant and potentially illuminating." 1 He had earlier
characterized this "theory of theory" as "a definition of the
tasks of music analysis," which we might understand as its
aims or purposes. 2 As a starting point for the discussion of
these tasks, Taruskin paraphrases Carl Dahlhaus in Analysis
and Value Judgment as distinguishing "between analysis that
uncovers technique of composition and analysis that uncovers
form," and asserts his preference for the former. 3
It is ironic then that Dahlhaus does not actually address
analysis as a topic either on the page of Analysis and Value
Judgment that Taruskin cites, or within the section to which the
page belongs. 4 Rather, Dahlhaus ponders from two viewpoints,
I Taruskin (2011,181).
z Ibid. (169).
3 Ibid. (181).
4 Dahlhaus, "Analogy and compensation" ([1970] 1983, 50-53).
208
that of "technique of composition" and that of "form," what he
sees as a discrepancy in the degree of development (i.e., inno-
vation) between the melodic and rhythmic elements of Arnold
Schoenberg's serial music. 5 Taruskin's misreading of this sec-
tion of Analysis and Value Judgment may underline the inten-
sity of his opinion; it also undermines Dahlhaus's implied
authority in restricting the possible tasks of musical analysis
to merely two. Even if Dahlhaus did offer this binary opposi-
tion, surely the assertion that analysis is capable of only two
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goals is too limiting; this ubiquitous and valued—if sometimes
controversial—activity assuredly claims a longer and more varied
catalog of aims.
One such purpose, which has likely been experienced by al-
most all—if not all—readers of this journal, is the scratching of
the musical and intellectual itch, arising from the bite of curios-
ity, to explore that which moves, intrigues, or strikes us in a
particular composition. (In the interest of full disclosure, I feel
compelled to add the related "because it's fun" and "because it's
enjoyable," which might better remain in the closet in the cur-
rent climate.) In this case, analysis may well be a private activity.
The findings of such a solitary pursuit, however, often make
their way eventually to more public forums, and thus feed aims
that we might characterize as "going beyond" the study of an
individual musical work. One such aim for analysis would in-
deed involve identifying compositional techniques as advocated
by Taruskin. Such findings are of interest not only to historians
and theorists, but also to composers and improvisers, who might
employ what they learn in their own works or performances. 6
Analysis is and could be employed, however, for other tasks as
well, including: to enhance pedagogy; to inform criticism; to
assist performance; to provide test cases or offer support for
music-historical or music-theoretical concepts; or to place
music more broadly in cultural, historical, or social contexts.
Analysis can support any of these goals, but the relationship
is not unidirectional. The subjects of these tasks—composi-
tional practice; pedagogy; performance; historical or theoretical
5 Ibid. (52-53). Dahlhaus sees Schoenberg's melodies in this repertory as
dodecaphonic and atonal, and his rhythms as rooted in tonal traditions. He
proposes that the composer might have favored conventional rhythmic
constructs to make themes recognizable as such for the purpose of convey-
ing form, which he sees as a concern for Schoenberg. Thus, Dahlhaus asks
if what appears as a discrepancy between melody and rhythm from the
viewpoint of technique of composition could be understood as being necessary
from the viewpoint of form (italics mine).
6 Such use of analysis is typical, for example, for jazz musicians, who routinely
analyze other composers' and players' arrangements and improvisations both
to understand the traditions and to acquire devices for their own use.
 THE JOY OF ANALYSIS 209
generalizations; extramusical context—could just as easily in-
form analysis, and often do. Indeed, work in the above areas can
contribute to analytical goals that throw the spotlight on the
individual piece and a listener's or analyst's experience of it.
Analysis thus might be used to find more to hear in a musical
work, thereby intensifying one's own relationship to and experi-
ence of it; to explain or account for one's hearing to others; to
inspire others to return to a work to contemplate it anew; or to
guide others who might wish to approximate the analyst's lis-
tening experience.?
Like analytical goals that go beyond the piece, aims with this
narrower but perhaps deeper focus also warrant serious consid-
eration, and indeed serve for many of us as inspiration for schol-
arship. As Marion Guck notes, "presumably we all came to our
present positions through a strong attraction to music and to
specific pieces." 8 To be sure, many of us are passionate about
building historical generalizations or uncovering compositional
practices. Nonetheless, much as we may be moved to consider a
composition as "a statistical sample from a musical population,"
it is the individual work that lies at the root of our most essen-
tial relationship to music. 9
If analysis for the purpose of understanding musical works
and listeners' experiences of them is to be a valid aim within the
contemporary scholarly community, however, and not restricted
to the privacy of an analyst's study, we must continue to address
certain criticisms leveled at analysis that seeks to discover—in
that proverbial phrase—"how it works." As noted earlier, two
such criticisms, both wielded by Taruskin in his essay, fault
much musical analysis for ignoring historical context and disre-
garding the role of subjectivity. These concerns intersect in that
the context in which a piece was composed—cultural, historical,
social—is most often distinct from the context in which it is
contemplated by the analyst. An analyst's own context—created
through musical training, cultural environment, and other fac-
tors—may exert an influence even if, and perhaps more strongly
if, the analyst is unaware of that possibility. 10
These criticisms did not, of course, originate with Taruskin,
but his deservedly renowned skill as a prose stylist renders
them particularly vivid, if sometimes overly polemical. For in-
stance, his binary opposition of analysis used to achieve
"merely a taxonomy of musical configurations" (what theorists
do) versus analysis used to achieve "insight into practice"
(what historians do), ignores much valuable work by both
theorists and historians, although it does add excitement and
7 A number of authors voice or imply these aims. For examples of particu-
larly explicit statements see Agawu (2004, 270-73) and (2009, 12); Dubiel
(2011, 526, 528); and Guck (2006, 201, 207).
8 Guck (1997, 345).
9 Babbitt (1987, 4).
10 Many authors discuss the problem of context in analysis, including Jim
Samson ([1999] 2001, 44), who, even as he notes the value of analysis,
observes "the heavily mediated character of any analytical insight." Judy
Lochhead (2006, 239-52) summarizes strategies with which scholars have
addressed the problem of context and applies a modified version of one
such strategy in her own analysis.
another memorable turn of phrase to his argument. 11
Nonetheless, Taruskin's advocacy for the thoughtful consider-
ation of both context and subjectivity is well taken and will
benefit analysts investigating the structure and expressive
power of individual works, as well as those seeking broader
views of repertories and evidence for compositional devices.
Indeed, some scholars have not only begun to acknowledge
the existence of subjectivity in the analytical process, but have
celebrated it, developing new conceptions of the ways in which
we relate to musical works and the meaning of what we say
about them. 12 Furthermore, we might note that the practice of
analysis contains a significant subjective component whether
its goal is greater understanding of an individual work or its
aims go "beyond the piece." Despite this subjectivity, or per-
haps because it is so deeply informed by culture and training
that it often passes for objectivity, members of our musical and
scholarly community can understand, and sometimes even
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agree on, each other's analytical communications. 13 From this
shared context emerges the notion of musical judgment, a
sense, whether real or contrived, that we frequently employ.
As elusive as the concept of musical judgment is, there ap-
pears to be ample evidence of its existence. With it, we make
decisions about pieces and evaluate the performances and anal-
yses of others. That musical judgment can be applied effec-
tively to create analyses that ring true for others is exemplified
by Arthur Berger's and Pieter van den Toorn's discoveries of
octatonic practices in Stravinsky's works. Their analytical paths
led them to findings that only later received the benefit of his-
torical underpinnings. This suggests that analysis involving
what we might describe as good musical judgment can indeed
reveal musical "truths," including those that historians would
happily endorse. I do not advocate that analysis indulge in the
naiveté of ignoring the influences of either historical context or
subjectivity, but rather that musical judgment be recognized as
a legitimate and probably inescapable component of musical
scholarship.
I think of my own experiences when I was a Master's stu-
dent working on my thesis, likely similar to the experiences of
many reading this essay. Although a result of my work ful-
filled Taruskin's preferred role for analysis—the uncovering of
a technique of composition—this was not even a suspicion
when I began work by listening repeatedly to a much-loved
and increasingly scratchy LP recording of Stravinsky's
II Taruskin (2011, 180).
12 See, for instance, Dubiel (2011) and Guck (2006). Both authors view anal-
ysis as interpretation and the roles of subjectivity and musical experience as
unavoidable and crucial. See also Lochhead (2006), in which the author
discusses the necessity and validity of "experiential evidence" in her analysis
of a late-twentieth-century work for piano and tape, for which the score
does not represent all of the musical sounds. The issues she raises, along
with her thoughtful conclusions, could apply more generally to the role of
aural experience in analysis.
13 Scott Burnham (1997, 325) attributes this shared understanding at least
in part to our "fundamental relation to the materiality of music" and our
experiences as practicing musicians.
 2I0 MUSIC THEORY SPECTRUM 33
"Dumbarton Oaks" Concerto. I heard and sensed at several
points particularly striking sounds that moved me, but puz-
zled me as well. No musical compositions or devices I had
studied to that point prepared me to understand these sounds.
That these effects emerged from a neoclassical work hinting
at the familiarity of an older tradition without actually deliv-
ering on this promise only increased my desire to discover
how Stravinsky created them. With more hearings and later
analysis of the score, I detected an interactive scheme among
certain musical elements that seemed to be responsible for the
features I found so notable and effective. I understand in ret-
rospect that, as Samson puts it, "When we analyse . . . we
construct the object of our analysis according to certain pre-
suppositions," and thus realize that I did not actually unearth
an intact structural treasure merely from a thicket of notes. 14
At the time, however, it felt as if I had, as if I had uncovered
an important mechanism through which the striking passages
and their constructions could make sense. Then, on a micro-
film of Stravinsky's handwritten musical sketches for the
Concerto—my first foray into sketch study—I saw incorpo-
rated in the composer's work on one of the passages the tech-
nique I had discerned through analysis, thus giving a type of
historical confirmation to my analytical findings. Although
my more mature (or, at least, older) self is aware that interpre-
tation and subjectivity played a role in all three of the stages
just described—listening, analysis, and sketch study—I am
nonetheless left with the strong feeling that there was a ker-
nel of validity to the entire process, and that at least part of
this kernel lay in the piece itself. The dual threat of context
and subjectivity could not completely obscure the individual-
ity of the musical work. As Samson notes, "Even reception
studies usually conclude that the work's identity is not infi-
nitely permeable . . . and that determinacy recedes only to
certain 'horizons.'" 15
In subsequent years, I have often repeated this process of
intensifying my listening experiences through analysis and
sketch study, the process itself gaining breadth and depth as it
is informed by primary sources, the work of other scholars—
both historians and theorists—and my own findings. The
greatest personal benefit of my research into Stravinsky's com-
positional techniques and historical context lies not in those
ends but rather in their roles in the illumination and reinter-
pretation of the elements that initially touched me within the
works themselves. For some analysts (myself included), the un-
dermining of the fiction of scholarly objectivity fails to invali-
date the analytical act, no matter what its aims. Rather, thanks
to those scholars—including Richard Taruskin—who lead the
way in challenging and redefining the aims and boundaries of
,
analysis, the identity of the work, and the nature of the ana-
lyst's relationship to music, we can anticipate the vigorous en-
richment of our field.
14 Samson ([1999] 2001, 44).
15 Ibid.
(20II)
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Music Theory Spectrum, Vol. 33, Issue 2, pp. 208-210, ISSN 0195-6167,
electronic ISSN 1533-8339. © 2011 by The Society for Music Theory.
All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy
or reproduce article content through the University of California Press's
Rights and Permissions website, at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/
reprintinfo.asp. DOI: 10.1525/mts.2011.33.2.208