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1999 Prevent Explosions of Combustible Dusts
1999 Prevent Explosions of Combustible Dusts
Prevent Explosions
of Combustible
Dusts
o sufficiently survey the poten- the ignition temperature level (Table 2).
If not treated
properly, dust
T tial danger of a dust, an engineer
is normally forced to carry out
numerous laboratory tests that
are based on standardized methods. The
results are known as safety characteristics
Data from this simple test are only good
enough to describe the flammability be-
havior at a specific temperature.
Combustion rating
layers and clouds of (Table 1). Depending upon the effort This test measures the ignitibility and
spent, a more or less comprehensive pic- the combustibility of a dried product ac-
combustible ture will result, revealed as a mosaic. The cording to the following criteria:
scope of the tests has to be determined in • Can the product be ignited at all?
materials can close collaboration between the tester and • Is the ignition propagated?
user, working toward the solution of the • Is there a fire or a flameless reaction?
wreak havoc in the problem. The tests are carried out in a ventilated
Here, we will review these tests, and laboratory hood. The air velocity is ap-
plant due to static then show how to apply the results to proximately 0.2 m/s. The superimposed
set up handling procedures that will pro- low-velocity air stream is necessary to
discharges. mote safety. Tests are made for both vent the inert gases generated upon igni-
dust layers and dust suspensions, since tion that may inhibit the combustion be-
However, testing for these show different behavior. Trans- havior of the dust (Figure 1) (1).
combustion ratings forming the safety characteristics to If the combustibility is needed at an
plant conditions is certainly the key for elevated temperature (e.g., an anticipated
and following some safe operation. drying temperature), the test can be per-
formed in a drying oven with a guaran-
basic rules will help DUST LAYERS teed air supply (1). By increasing the dust
Ignition rating sample to an overall length of 25 cm (10
to prevent An unknown product should not ini- in.), the same test procedure can be used
tially be tested in large quantities. The to classify a product as a readily com-
problems. following is used at Ciba Speciality bustible solid of Division 4.1 in accor-
Chemicals as a screening test. A small dance with the U.N. “Recommendations
sample (approximately 100 mg) of a dry on the Transport of Dangerous Goods,”
product is exposed to a hot plate at differ- (2) if the burning rate exceeds a certain
Norbert Jaeger, ent temperatures. A reaction is considered limiting value.
Ciba Specialty Chemicals to have taken place at a given tempera- The combustibility of the product is
Richard Siwek, ture if the test sample shows any of the rated in accordance with the course of the
FireEX following within 5 min: ignition with reaction and characterized as a class
flames, emission of sparks, red hot glow, number according to VDI (Table 3). A
available or spontaneous decomposition without temperature increase from 20° to 100°C
on-line
www.aiche.org
fire. The ignition properties of the product normally results in a change of the burn-
are classified with a rating on the basis of ing class (BC) from 1–3 to 4–6.
CHEMICAL ENGINEERING PROGRESS • JUNE 1999 ©Copyright 1999 American Institute of Chemical Engineers. All rights reserved. Copying and downloading permitted with restrictions.
DUST EXPLOSIONS
DUST CLOUDS
Any time a combustible dust is
processed or handled, a potential for
deflagration exists. The degree of the Heating Block, Temperature-Controlled
deflagration hazard will vary depend-
ing on the type of combustible dust
and processing methods. Evaluating a ■ Figure 4.
Cross-Piece
Falling hammer
combustible dust explosion hazard (Joined to Wall)
test measures
and the necessary prevention tech- sensitivity to
Release Lever
niques employed are determined by shock, important
using test data as described below (4). Height Adjustment in operations such
Guide Rod as grinding.
Modified Hartmann apparatus
This test is designed as a qualita- Brake
tive pretest of the explosion behavior
of dust/air mixtures. A test sample is Falling Weight
placed in a 1.2-L cylindrical glass
tube (Figure 5). By introducing pres- Inset
surized air into the glass chamber, the (Case-Hardened Steel)
dust is blown through an ignition
source (a continuous spark with an
electrical energy of about 10 J).
A positive reaction is recorded if a
dust fire occurs, or if the test equip-
ment’s hinged cover opens. As a rule Base Block (Steel)
of thumb, only dust explosions lead-
ing to an indication 1 in the apparatus Foundation (Concrete)
are true St 1 dusts. (The St scale,
shown in Table 4, will be explained
later.) Otherwise, for St 0 and 2, addi-
tional tests must be made in a Siwek
20-L apparatus.
Explosion Vessel
Explosion Overpressure, bar
Activation of the
Ignition Source
over 100 dusts from various laborato-
Start: Dust
Explosion
found by regression analysis, compares
■ Figure 7. values measured by both furnaces:
Determination
of maximum
explosion pressure MITGG = 1.1 ´ MITBAM - 10°C (4)
and maximum tv
rate of pressure Time t, s
rise. Powder volume resistivity
A material’s powder volume resis-
10 300 tivity rR characterizes its static dissi-
Pmax (dP/dt )max pative properties. Surfaces of materi-
8
(dP/dt ), bar/s
6
LEL LEL air, and will consequently adsorb hu-
4
100 midity. Resistivity is not an absolute
2 property of a powder, but depends
0 0
strongly on its moisture content and
0 250 500 750 1,000 0 250 500 750 1,000
on the method of measurement. From
Dust Concentration, C , g/m3 Dust Concentration, C, g/m3 an electrostatic point of view, dusts
are considered to be conductors inca-
pable of storing charge until their re-
If the MIE is used to assess igni- nace (Figure 11a) or the BAM furnace sistivity exceeds 109 W-m.
tion hazards resulting from electro- (German Federal Institute for the Test-
static charges, it must be found with- ing of Materials (Berlin), Figure 11b). Test requirements
out an inductance in the discharge To compare the MIT values measured Where no safety data are available,
circuit. Only in this way is it possible in both furnaces, these minimum tem- the required tests must be done before
to make a realistic evaluation of the peratures have been investigated for introducing a product into a process.
incendivity of electrostatic discharges
in dust/air mixtures. ■ Figure 9.
Results of a 1J
Minimum ignition temperature typical test 10 mJ < MIE < 30 mJ
showing 300 mJ
(MIT) of dust clouds
boundaries for
This MIT is the minimum tempera- the MIE. 100 mJ
ture at which a dust cloud will au-
toignite. The cloud is exposed to air 30 mJ
and heated to various temperatures in a
10 mJ
furnace (11). Ignition is indicated by
visual observation of a flame. The Positive Results
3 mJ Negative Results (10 "no-goes")
chemical nature of the dust, as well as
its concentration, particle size, mois- 1 mJ
ture, and surface area all affect the re- 600 900 1,200 1,500 1,800 2,100
sult. The MIT can be determined either
mg
in the Godbert-Greenwald (GG) fur-
PROTECTIVE MEASURES
Using preventive measures against
a. Godbert-Greenwald Furnace explosions requires reliably exclud-
ing one of the three requirements nec-
essary to generate an explosion, as
Dust Chamber
shown in the familiar hazard triangle
Heating (Figure 12), that is, eliminating at
Test Plate
least one of the sides of the triangle
(12). An explosion can, thus, be ex-
cluded with certainty by:
Thermocouples • Avoiding the development of ex-
plosible mixtures (combustible dusts,
flammable gases); or
• Replacing the atmospheric oxy-
gen by an inert gas, working in a vac-
uum, or using inert dust; or
b. BAM Oven • Preventing the occurrence of ef-
fective ignition sources.
All three measures fall under what
■ Figure 13.
Filling and
Fuel
emptying
operations can Bulk Bag
pose a serious
electrostatic
hazard if the Motion Leads To
powder is Charge Buildup
Rotary Valve
combustible.
Charge
Accumulates on
Ignition Oxygen Different Surfaces
Source (Air) Silo
■ Figure 12. The familiar hazard
triangle serves as the basis for explosion
protection.
is called preventive explosion protec- Electrostatic charging is certainly sents the most hazardous operation for
tion. For safety, the engineer must en- an ignition source not to be underesti- the following reason: During this pro-
sure that at least one of the three con- mated in powder operations. This is a cedure, the material undergoes disper-
ditions is eliminated or so strongly re- normal occurrence in most such pro- sion (via gravity feed, pneumatic trans-
duced that an explosion is no longer cesses and operations, and, therefore, port, or by some other means) and can,
possible (8, 12–14). our main topic. As such, we will indi- therefore, acquire charge during the
When combustible dusts are han- cate protective measures. In under- separation processes occurring in
dled, avoiding an explosive atmosphere standing these measures, the following transport. The bulk material and,
by keeping the dust concentration out- product and plant properties are keys hence, its associated charge, are then
side the explosive range is rarely possi- for an accurate hazard assessment: packed into a small space. Here, the
ble, due to sedimentation or whirling • MIE of the bulk material (mea- charge is not able to flow to the ground
up of the material. Thus, as a matter of sured without inductance in the dis- quickly enough, even with a conduc-
principle, an explosive atmosphere can charge circuit); tive and grounded receiver. This gener-
only be avoided with certainty by re- • MIT of the bulk material; ates a high space-charge density and
ducing the oxygen concentration, e.g., • rR of the powder; electric field. In addition to charge ac-
inerting. In practice, however, inerting • Particle-size distribution of the cumulation, there can be problems due
often cannot be used. For such situa- bulk material and its median value M; to heat accumulation and the possibili-
tions, the only measures become either and ty of entrainment of smoldering lumps.
avoiding effective ignition sources or • Volume and shape of the silo or To help ensure safety, a decision
using explosionproof equipment. container (volume and shape of the tree is presented for safe handling,
It is acceptable to avoid effective product heap and of the dust cloud). based on the product and plant prop-
ignition sources as the sole protective Unless otherwise stated, the fol- erties listed above (Figure 14). Use
measure, if it is established that the lowing sections are based on the as- this decision tree, along with matrixes
occurrence of these ignition sources sumption that the bulk materials are in Figure 15 to ensure safe filling and
is excluded with certainty under all handled without flammable gases or emptying of containers, vessels, and
normal operating conditions, as well vapors being present. silos of varying volumes.
as for all possible deviations. “Triv-
ial” ignition sources (such as welding Filling and emptying Loading bulk materials into
or smoking ) must be excluded by ad- operations flammable solvents
ministrative actions. In these operations, ignition haz- Whenever it is possible, bulk materi-
This article does not look at igni- ards are of prime importance owing als should be fed into flammable sol-
tion sources that could result from to electrostatic charging. The hazards vents under closed conditions and in an
processes introducing energy into the comprise possible charge accumula- inert atmosphere (Figure 16). This can
product being handled, such as from tion not only on equipment, as well as be accomplished by using a bucket
mechanically generated sparks or hot on drums and containers, but also for wheel, two-valve system, feed screw, or
surfaces. Nor does it discuss products bulk materials that are insulating by conveying by an inert gas. If such a
that may form glowing particles dur- (Figure 13). closed introduction system is not possi-
ing handling (e.g., those with a BC ³ Assuming that the insulating bulk ble, the next best thing is either to cool
4 (see Table 3)). material carries a charge, filling repre- the solvent below its flash point (at least
<1 Any - All parts of the equipment must be conductive* and grounded.
Conductive Value - All containers must be conductive* or dischargeable† and grounded.
Specific Powder Resistivity, MW-m
* Use only conductive containers, 1 MW (<106 W), or those capable of discharge and ground.
† Containers capable of discharge: The leakage resistance to the ground point from any point on the surface
of the container must be less than 100 MW (<108 W).
‡ Charge dissipative (>108< 1011 W) containers having at least on one side a surface resistance ROA measured
according to ASTM method D257-93 (Surface Resistivity) of less than 100 Giga W (1011 W) at 30% relative
humidity and more than 100 MW at 65% relative humidity.
processed product lies above the limit Dust separation eration, the danger of ignition
values specified in Table 5; and The dust explosion hazard must through electrostatic charging is of
• Mixers that have an orbiting, not be underestimated in dust separa- prime importance (Figure 17).
rotating helical screw inside of a tors, especially filters. The probability Electrostatic charging must be in-
conical shell with bottom support of is large of a fine dust atmosphere sen- hibited by the following measures:
the screw can heat up during opera- sitive to ignition. In addition to the • Grounding of all conductive ap-
tion, so care must be exercised with entrainment of ignition sources, paratus parts. If a filter cloth made of
substances capable of spontaneous which must be assessed based on the insulating material is used, particular
decomposition. product properties (e.g., formation of attention must be paid to grounding
smoldering lumps) and upstream op- all conductive parts that could possi-
Table 5. MIT lower limits for
products filled and emptied Table 6. Requirements for safe use of FIBCs.
in mixers while running.
Bulk Material No Explosible Explosible Dust Flammable Gases
MIE Atmosphere or Vapors
MIE*, mJ MIT, °C
MIE* > 1 J A B C
<1 Do not process
3 mJ < MIE* < 1 J B B C
1–3 530
3–10 500
MIE* < 3 mJ C C C
10–30 465 * Measured without inductance in the electrical circuit
30–100 430 Key:
100-300 395 A: No special requirements.
B: Breakdown voltage of the FIBC wall material must not exceed 4 kV to prevent propagating
300–1,000 360 brush discharges.
> 1,000 325 C: The bag material including the slings must be electrostatically conductive. The resistance to
the ground measured at any bag location (inside and outside) must be less than 100 MW
* The MIE values must be determined with (108 W). The FIBC must have a grounding tap. The conductivity and the necessity for
an additional inductance in the discharge grounding must be clearly marked.
circuit.
<0.1
No additional measures required other than
0.1-0.2 the ones from the decision tree (Figure 14).
or
0.5-1.0 Restrict the filling rate to 5 kg/s and use
Median Particle Size, mm
conductive* or dischargeable†/charge
dissipative‡ container that is grounded.
1.0-2.5
or
Apply additional explosion protection measures (e.g., inerting).
2.5-5.0 Otherwise: Seek advice of experts
<0.1 §
No additional
0.1-0.2 measures are §
required if the
material is charged by gravity No additional measures required other than
0.2-0.5 § the ones from the decision tree (Figure 14).
from a conductive and
> 10,000 grounded installation.
0.5-1.0 or §
Restrict the filling rate to 5 kg/s and use
conductive* or dischargeable† /charge
1.0-2.5 dissipative‡ container that is grounded. §
or
Apply additional explosion protection measures if the fines are
2.5-5.0 in concentration of greater than 10 g/m3. §
or Seek advice of experts.
* Use only conductive containers, 1 MW (<106 W), or those capable of discharge and ground.
† Containers capable of discharge: The leakage resistance to the ground point from any point on the surface
of the container must be less than 100 MW (<108 W).
‡ Charge dissipative (>108< 1011 W) containers having at least on one side a surface resistance ROA measured
according to ASTM method D257-93 (Surface Resistivity) of less than 100 Giga W (1011 W) at 30% relative
humidity and more than 100 M W at 65% relative humidity.
§ Fines in concentrations greater than LEL are not to be expected for dust-free forms during normal discharge
or charging operations involving packaging.
bly be insulated from the ground tivity and, thus, require repeat must be installed on the clean air side
(e.g., filter supports, clamps). This checking; and and dust deposits must be avoided in
must be especially checked after re- • All inner walls on which dust can the pipe and fan housing (check peri-
pair and maintenance work; impact at high speed must not have odically or install a dust control unit).
• With a MIE < 3 mJ or in the any insulating inner coatings with a
presence of flammable gases or va- high electrical breakdown-strength Flexible intermediate
pors in the air being cleaned, electri- (breakdown voltage must be less than bulk containers (FIBCs)
cally conducting filter materials 4 kV; check these periodically). FIBCs are used on ever-increasing
must be used, except when inerting In general, with dusts with a MIE scale in the powder handling industry.
is employed. Continuity of the con- < 10 mJ, it is advisable either to im- Depending upon the hazard situation
ductivity and safe grounding must plement explosion protection mea- where they are used, they must meet
be checked. Multiple washings can sures that go beyond the avoidance of different requirements (Table 6) to
have an adverse effect on the conti- effective ignition sources or consult avoid ignition hazards caused by
nuity of the filter material’s conduc- company specialists. Further, the fan electrostatic charging.
* Use only conductive containers, 1 MW (<106 W), or those capable of discharge and ground.
† Containers capable of discharge: The leakage resistance to the ground point from any point on the surface
of the container must be less than 100 MW (<108 W).
Vent Vent
■ Figure 17. Electrostatic ignition sources can
Use Closed plague a dust collector.
Charging System
Literature Cited
10. American Society for Testing and Ma- ■ Figure 18. Electrostatic discharges
1. Verein Deustche Ingenieure, “VDI terials, “Standard Test Method for Mini- from a permanently grounded
2263, Part 1: Dust Fires and Dust Explo- mum Ignition Energy of Dust Air Mix- Type C FIBC.
sions, Hazards — Assessment — Protec- tures,” ASTM, West Conshohocken, PA
tive Measures, Test Methods for the De- (draft, 1997).
termination of the Safety Characteristics 11. American Society for Testing and Ma- gle discharge point. Such a discharge is
of Dusts,” Verein Deustche Ingenieure terials, “Standard Test Method for Mini- strong enough to ignite dust clouds.
(VDI), Dusseldorf, published by Beuth- mum Autoignition Temperature of Dust The generated charge in the prod-
Verlag, Berlin and Cologne (May 1990). Clouds,” ASTM E 1491-92, ASTM, West uct pile cannot fully dissipate to the
2. United Nations, “Recommendations on Conshohocken, PA (1992).
the Transport of Dangerous Goods,” 12. Eckhoff, R. K., “Dust Explosions in the
ground. Small discharges can occur
U.N., Section 33, pp. 323 ff, U.N., New Process Industries,” Butterworth-Heine- along the surface of the pile. These
York and Geneva (1995). mann Ltd, Oxford, U.K. (1991). are too weak to ignite dust clouds if
3. Bartknecht, W., “Dust Explosions, 13. Bruderer, R. E., “Use Bulk Bags Cau- the volume of the bag is less than 2
Course Prevention, Protection,” Springer- tiously,” Chem. Eng. Progress, 89 (5), m3, but strong enough to ignite sol-
Verlag (1989). pp. 28–31 (May 1993). vent vapors. CEP
4. Jaeger, N., and R. Siwek, “Safe Han- 14. National Fire Protection Association,
dling of Easily Ignitable Dusts,” 5th “Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions
World Congress of Chemical Engineer- in the Chemical, Dye Pharmaceutical and N. JAEGER is manager, explosion technology with
ing, San Diego, sponsored by AIChE, Plastics Industries,” NFPA 654, NFPA, Ciba Specialty Chemicals, McIntosh, AL ((334)
436-2709; Fax: (334) 436-5044; E-mail:
New York (1996). Quincy, MA (1994).
norbert.jaeger@cibasc.com). Since 1994, he has
5. Siwek, R., and C. Cesana, “Assessment 15. American Society for Testing and Ma- been working for Ciba’s NAFTA Central Safety
of the Fire & Explosion Hazard of Com- terials, “Standard Test Methods for DC Testing Laboratory, where he is responsible for
bustible Products for Unit Operations,” Resistance or Conductance of Insulating explosion technology and static electricity
International Conference and Exhibition Materials,” ASTM D257-93(1998), prevention. He joined Ciba Geigy in 1987 as a
on Safety, Health and Loss Prevention in ASTM, West Conshohocken, PA (1998). member of its corporate safety and environment
the Oil, Chemical and Process Industries, unit in Basle. From 1988 through 1994, he was the
Singapore, Butterworth-Heinemann Ltd., safety and loss prevention manager for Ciba’s
London (Feb. 12–19, 1993). additives site in Lampertheim, Germany. Jaeger
holds an MS in safety science from the
6. Siwek, R., and C. Cesana, “Instructions Further Reading University of Wuppertal, Germany. He is a
for the 20-L Apparatus,” 3rd revised ed.,
Bartknecht, W., “Explosion Protection, Ba- member of ASTM Committee E27 on Hazard
Kühner AG, Birsfelden, Switzerland (1991). Potential of Chemicals, Subcommittee 05,
7. American Society for Testing and Ma- sics and Application,” in German,
Explosivity and Ignitibility of Dust Clouds, a
terials, “Standard Test Method for Pres- Springer-Verlag (1993).
member of AIChE’s Center for Chemical Process
sure and Rate of Pressure Rise for Com- Dahn, C. J., “How Safe Are Your Pneumatic Safety’s reactive chemicals subcommittee, and a
bustible Dusts,” ASTM E 1126-94, Conveyors?,” Chem. Eng. Progress, 89 member of the working group on dust explosions
ASTM, West Conshohocken, PA (1994). (5), pp. 17–21 (May 1993). of the International Social Security Association.
8. Jaeger, N., and R. Siwek, “Determina- International Electrotechnical Commis-
tion, Prevention and Mitigation of Poten- sion, “Electrical Apparatus for Use in the R. SIWEK is managing director and president of
Presence of Ignitable Dust: Part 2: Test FireEx, Fire & Explosion Consultant, Giebenach,
tial Hazards due to the Handling of Pow-
Methods, Sheet 2-5, Method for Deter- Switzerland (011-41-61-813-9157; E-mail:
ders during Transportation, Charging, fireex.rs@swissonline.ch). In 1972, he joined the
Discharging and Storage,” 31st Loss Pre- mining the Minimum Explosible Concen-
Dept. of Explosion Protection, Corporate Unit,
vention Symposium, Houston, sponsored tration of Dust/Air Mixtures,” IEC, Gene-
Safety and Environment, of Ciba Geigy in Basle,
by AIChE, New York (1997). va (1990). Switzerland, and in 1985 was named head of
9. International Electrotechnical Commis- International Organization for Standard- the open-air test station where most of the
sion, “Electrical Apparatus for Use in the ization, “Explosion Protection Systems company’s large-scale explosion experiments
Presence of Ignitable Dust: Part 2: Test — Part 1: Determination of Explosion In- are carried out. He was appointed the
Methods, Section 3, Method for Deter- dices of Combustible Dusts in Air,” department’s explosion technology manager in
ISO/DIS 6184/1, ISO, Geneva (1985). 1991. Since 1997, he has served as deputy
mining the Minimum Ignition Energy of
director, Business Unit, of the Swiss Institute
Dust/Air Mixtures,” IEC, Geneva (1994). for the Promotion of Safety & Security in Basle.