1. Primicias vs Ocampo, G.R. No. L-6120, June 30, 1953.

Facts:
Petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Manila with two statutory offenses,
namely, (1) with a violation of Commonwealth Act No. 606, in that he knowingly chartered a
vessel of Philippine registry to an alien without the approval of the President of the Philippines
and (2) with a violation of section 129 in relation to section 2713 of the Revised Administrative
Code in that he failed to submit to the Collector of Customs the manifests and certain
authenticated documents for the vessel "Antarctic" and failed to obtain the necessary clearance
from the Bureau of Customs prior to the departure of said vessel for a foreign port.
On April 23, 1952, before the trial of said criminal cases, petitioner filed a motion praying that
assessors be appointed to assist the court in considering the questions of fact involved in said
cases as authorized by section 49 of Republic Act No. 409 which provides that "the aid of
assessors in the trial of any civil or criminal action in the Municipal Court, or the Court of First
Instance, within the City, may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil
Procedure." This motion was opposed by the City Fiscal.
On April 28, 1952, the court issued an order denying the motion holding in effect that with the
promulgation of the Rules of Court by the Supreme Court, which became effective on July 1,
1940, all rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts of the Philippines
previously existing were not only superseded but expressly repealed. The Supreme Court, having
been vested with the rule- making power, expressly omitted the portions of the Code of Civil
Procedure regarding assessors in said Rules of Court. Believing that this order is erroneous,
petitioner now comes to this court imputing abuse of discretion to the respondent Judge.
Issues:
Whether or not the right of the petitioner to a trial with the aid of assessors is an absolute
substantive right, and the duty of the court to provide assessors is mandatory.
Ruling:
Yes, a trial with the aid of assessors is an absolute substantive right. The trial with the aid of
assessors as granted by section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 2477 of the old
Charter of Manila are parts of substantive law and as such are not embraced by the rule-making
power of the Supreme Court. The aid may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of
Civil Procedure, and this right has been declared absolute and substantial by this Court in several
cases where the aid of assessors had been invoked. The intervention of the assessors is not an
empty formality which may be disregarded without violating either the letter or the spirit of the
law. It is another security given by the law to the litigants, and as such, it is a substantial right of
which they cannot be deprived without vitiating all the proceedings.
The contention of respondents we reckon is predicated on the assumption that the provisions on
assessors of the Code of Civil Procedure had been impliedly repealed. Such is not the case. We
have already pointed out that the basic provisions on the matter partake of the nature of
substantive law and as such they were left intact by the Supreme Court.
t is therefore the opinion that the respondent Judge acted with abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner his right to the aid of assessors in the trial of the two criminal cases now pending in the
Court of First Instance of Manila.
 2. SALVADOR A. ESTIPONA, JR., Petitioner, vs. HON. FRANK E.
LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi
City, Branch 3, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

FACTS: Estipona was charged with an offense under RA 9165. He wants to enter into a plea
bargaining agreement but Judge Lobrigo did not allow him to do so because Section 23
specifically prohibits plea bargaining in drugs cases. Estipona argues that Section 23 is
unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

Is Section 23 of RA 9165, which prohibits plea-bargaining in drugs cases, unconstitutional?

HELD: Yes, Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for two reasons. First, it violates the
equal protection clause since other criminals (rapists, murderers, etc.) are allowed to plea bargain
but drug offenders are not, considering that rape and murder are more heinous than drug
offenses. Second, it violates the doctrine of separation of powers by encroaching upon the rule-
making power of the Supreme Court under the constitution. Plea-bargaining is procedural in
nature and it is within the sole prerogative of the Supreme Court.

3.G.R. No. 156284. February 6, 2007

AUGUSTO GOMEZ, as Special Administrator of the Intestate
Estate of Consuelo Gomez, petitioner, vs. MARIA RITA GOMEZ-SAMSON,
MARCIAL SAMSON, JESUS B. GOMEZ, and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PASIG and
MARIKINA, RIZAL, respondents
FACTS:
Augusto Gomez, as special administrator of the intestate estate of his aunt Consuelo Gomez,
filed 2 civil cases against the defendants.
Augusto claims that, in the two Deeds of Donation he is impugning, the signatures of the donee
(Consuelo) were jotted down before the bodies of the Deeds were typewritten. Respondents
maintain that the bodies of the Deeds were encoded first, and then, a clashing presentation of
expert witnesses and circumstantial evidence ensued. Augusto's expert claims she is certain of
the answer: the signature came first. Respondents' expert, on the other hand, says that it is
impossible to determine which came first accurately.
The only direct evidence presented by Augusto on this matter is the testimony of Zenaida Torres,
Document Examiner of the NBI. Respondents, on the other hand, presented their own expert
witness, Francisco Cruz, Chief of Document Examination of the PC-INP Crime Laboratory.
Other direct evidence presented by respondents includes testimonies positively stating that the
Deeds of Donation were signed by Consuelo in their completed form in the presence of Notary
Public Jose Sebastian. These testimonies are that of Jose Sebastian himself, and that of several of
the respondents including Ariston Gomez, Jr., who allegedly drafted said Deeds of Donation.
Trial Court dismissed the complaints of Augusto. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC's
decision.
Petitioner Augusto claims that no credence should have been given to the testimony of the notary
public (who notarized the assailed Deeds of Dontion), Jose Sebastian, as said Jose Sebastian is
the same judge whom the Court had dismissed from the service in Garciano v. Sebastian.
Augusto posits that the dismissal of Judge Sebastian from the service casts a grave pall on his
credibility as a witness.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner Augusto may impeach Jose Sebastian as a witness.
HELD: NO.
It is well to note that, as stated by the Court of Appeals, Jose Sebastian was originally a witness
for petitioner Augusto. As such, Rule 132, Section 12, of the Rules of Court prohibits petitioner
from impeaching him: SEC. 12. Party may not impeach his own witness.
— Except with respect to witnesses referred to in paragraphs (d) and (e) of section 10, the party
producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his credibility.
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon
adequate showing of his adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having misled
the party into calling him to the witness stand. The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or
the witness who is an adverse party, may be impeached by the party presenting him in all
respects as if he had been called by the adverse party, except by evidence of his bad character.
He may also be impeached and cross-examined by the adverse party, but such cross-
examination must only be on the subject matter of his examination-in-chief.
This rule is based on the theory that a person who produces a witness vouches for him as being
worthy of credit, and that a direct attack upon the veracity of the witness "would enable the party
to destroy the witness, if he spoke against him, and to make him a good witness, if he spoke for
him, with the means in his hands of destroying his credit, if he spoke against him."
Neither had there been declaration by the court that Jose Sebastian was an unwilling or hostile
witness. Jose Sebastian is also neither an adverse party, nor an officer, director nor a managing
agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse
party.
Be that as it may, even if Jose Sebastian had been declared by the court as an unwilling or hostile
witness, the third paragraph of Section 12 as quoted above, in relation to Section 11 75 of the
same Rule, only allows the party calling the witness to impeach such witness by contradictory
evidence or by prior inconsistent statements, and never by evidence of his bad character. Thus,
Jose Sebastian's subsequent dismissal as a judge would not suffice to discredit him as a witness
in this case.
Jose Sebastian has never been convicted of a crime before his testimony, but was instead
administratively sanctioned eleven years after such testimony. Scrutinizing the testimony of Jose
Sebastian, we find, as the trial court and the Court of Appeals did, no evidence of bias on the part
of Jose Sebastian. On top of this, Jose Sebastian's testimony is supported by the records of the
notarial registry, which shows that the documents in question were received by the Notarial
Registrar on 2 July 1979, which was four months before the death of Consuelo on 6 November
1979.

4.People v Alicando GR No. 117487 (December 2, 1995)

Facts: Accused was convicted with a crime of rape with homicide of a 4 year old girl. He was
arrested and during the interrogation he made a confession of the crime without the assistance of
a counsel. By virtue of his uncounseled confession the police came to know where to find the
evidences consisting of the victim’s personal things like clothes stained with blood which was
admitted to court as evidences. The victim pleaded guilty during the arraignment and was
convicted with the death penalty. The case was forwarded to the SC for automatic review. 
Issue: Whether or not due process during the custodial investigation was accorded to the
accused.

Held: Due process was not observed in the conduct of custodial investigation for the accused. He
was not informed of his right to a counsel upon making his extrajudicial confession and the
information against him was written in a language he could not understand and was not
explained to him. This is in violation of section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing the
constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. The lower court also violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of
guilt of the appellant without conducting a search inquiry on the voluntariness and full
understanding of the accused of the consequences of his plea. Moreover the evidences admitted
by the court that warranted his convicted were inadmissible because they were due to an invalid
custodial investigation that did not provide the accused with due process of the law. Thus the SC
annulled the decision of the imposition of the death penalty and remanded the case back to the
lower for further proceeding.

5.JEFFREY MIGUEL Y REMEGIO v. PEOPLE, GR No.

227038, 2017-07-31
Facts:
The prosecution alleged that at around 12:45 in the morning of May 24, 2010, a Bantay Bayan
operative of Barangay San Antonio Village, Makati City named Reynaldo Bahoyo (BB Bahoyo)
was doing his rounds when he purportedly received a report of a man showing off his private
parts at Kaong Street.
BB Bahoyo and fellow Bantay Bayan operative Mark Anthony Velasquez (BB Velasquez) then
went to the said street and saw a visibly intoxicated person, which they later identified as herein
petitioner, urinating and displaying his private parts while standing in front of a gate enclosing an
empty lot.
BB Velasquez then repeated the request for an identification card, but instead, petitioner emptied
his pockets, revealing a pack of cigarettes containing one (1) stick of cigarette and two (2) pieces
of rolled paper containing dried marijuana leaves, among others. This prompted BB Bahoyo and
BB Velasquez to seize the foregoing items, take petitioner to the police station, and turn him, as
well as the seized items, over to SPO3 Rafael Castillo (SPO3 Castillo).
After examination, it was confirmed that the aforesaid rolled paper contained marijuana and that
petitioner was positive for the presence of methamphetamine but negative for THC-metabolites,
both dangerous drugs.[8]
Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge, and thereafter, presented a different version of the
facts. According to him, he was just urinating in front of his workplace when two (2) Bantay
Bayan operatives, i.e., BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez, approached and asked him where he lived
Thereafter, he was taken back to the barangay hall where they showed him two (2) sticks of
marijuana joints allegedly recovered from him.[9]
RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
The RTC found that BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez conducted a valid warrantless arrest, as
petitioner was scandalously showing his private parts at the time of his arrest.
Therefore, the resultant search incidental to such arrest which yielded the seized marijuana in
petitioner's possession was also lawful.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed[13] to the CA.
the CA affirmed petitioner's conviction.[15
It held that the search made on petitioner which yielded the seized marijuana was validly made
as it was done incidental to his arrest for exhibiting his private parts on public.
Issues:
whether or not the CA correctly upheld petitioner's conviction for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs.
valid warrantless arrest was made on petitioner on account of the alleged public display of his
private parts... inadmissible
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
In this relation, it is worth noting that his arresting officers, i.e., BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez,
are mere Bantay Bayan operatives of Makati City. Strictly speaking, they are not government
agents like the Philippine National Police (PNP) or the National Bureau of Investigation in
charge of law enforcement; but rather, they are civilian volunteers who act as "force multipliers"
to assist the aforesaid law enforcement agencies in maintaining peace and security within their
designated areas.[22]
In this light, the Court is convinced that the acts of the Bantay Bayan or any barangay-based or
other volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups - relating to the preservation of peace
and order in their respective areas have the color of a state-related function.
As such, they should be deemed as law enforcement authorities for the purpose of applying the
Bill of Rights under Article III of the 1987 Constitution to them.[26]
In this case, the prosecution claims that the BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez simply responded to a
purported report of a man showing off his private parts at Kaong Street which led to petitioner's
arrest. On the other hand, petitioner maintains that he was just urinating in front of his workplace
when the Bantay Bayan operatives suddenly approached and questioned him, and thereafter,
frisked and arrested him.
On the basis of the foregoing testimonies, the Court is inclined to believe that at around past 12
o'clock in the early morning of May 24, 2010, petitioner went out to the street to urinate when
the Bantay Bayan operatives chanced upon him.
Clearly, these circumstances do not justify the conduct of an in flagrante delicto arrest,
considering that there was no overt act constituting a crime committed by petitioner in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
Neither do these circumstances necessitate a "hot pursuit" warrantless arrest as the arresting
Bantay Bayan operatives do not have any personal knowledge of facts that petitioner had just
committed an offense.
All told, the Bantay Bayan operatives conducted an illegal search on the person of petitioner.
Consequently, the marijuana purportedly seized from him on account of such search is rendered
inadmissible in evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule under Section 3 (2), Article III of the
1987 Constitution.
Principles:
In criminal cases, "an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing
tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial
court's decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to
examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper
provision of the penal law."[20]
In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion
by the government.
In People v. Lauga, this court held that a "bantav bayan," in relation to the authority to conduct a
custodial investigation under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, "has the color of a state-
related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional
rights[.]"
Section 2,[27] Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be
carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of
probable cause, absent which, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the
meaning of said constitutional provision.
evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for
any purpose in any proceeding.
One of the recognized exceptions to the need [of] a warrant before a search may be [e]ffected is a
search incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful
arrest before a search can be made - the process cannot be reversed.[

6.GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM v.

15TH DIVISION OF CA, GR No. 189206, 2011-06-08
Facts:
The subject of this petition for certiorari is the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 82647 allowing the quashal by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati of a subpoena
for the production of... bank ledger.
This case is incident to Civil Case No. 99-1853, which is the main case for collection of sum of
money with damages filed by Industrial Bank of Korea, Tong Yang Merchant Bank, First
Merchant Banking Corporation, Land Bank of the Philippines, and Westmont Bank
(now United Overseas Bank), collectively known as "the Banks" against Domsat Holdings, Inc.
(Domsat) and the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).  Said case stemmed from a
Loan Agreement, [2] whereby the Banks agreed to lend United States (U.S.)
$11 Million to Domsat for the purpose of financing the lease and/or purchase of a Gorizon
Satellite from the International Organization of Space Communications (Intersputnik).
The controversy originated from a surety agreement by which Domsat obtained a surety bond
from GSIS to secure the payment of the loan from the Banks.  We quote the terms of the Surety
Bond in its entirety.
When Domsat failed to pay the loan, GSIS refused to comply with its obligation reasoning that
Domsat did not use the loan proceeds for the payment of rental for the satellite. GSIS alleged that
Domsat, with Westmont Bank as the conduit, transferred the U.S. $11 Million loan... proceeds
from the Industrial Bank of Korea to Citibank New York account of Westmont Bank and from
there to the Binondo Branch of Westmont Bank. [5] The Banks filed a complaint before the RTC
of Makati against Domsat and GSIS.
In the course of the hearing, GSIS requested for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum to the
custodian of records of Westmont Bank to produce... document

1.

Ledger

2.

All applications for cashier's/ manager's checks... s and bank transfers funded by the account of
DOMSAT Holdings, Inc.
3. Ledger covering the account of Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. with Westmont Bank (now
United Overseas Bank), any and all documents, records, files, books, deeds, papers, notes
and other data and materials relating
4. All applications for cashier's/manager's checks funded by the account of Philippine Agila
Satellite
The RTC issued a subpoena decus tecum on 21 November 2002. [
On 26 June 2003, another Order was issued by the RTC denying the motion for reconsideration
filed by the banks. [11]  On 1 September 2003 however, the trial court granted the second motion
for reconsideration filed by the banks. The previous... subpoenas issued were consequently
quashed
The trial court invoked the ruling in Intengan v. Court of Appeals, [13] where it was ruled that
foreign currency deposits are absolutely confidential and may be examined... only when there is
a written permission from the depositor.
Issues:
Respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when it favorably considered respondent
banks' (second) Motion for Reconsideration dated July 9, 2003 despite the fact that it did not
contain a notice of hearing and was therefore a mere scrap of paper.
Respondent judge capriciously and arbitrarily ignored Section 2 of the Foreign Currency Deposit
Act (RA 6426) in ruling in his Orders dated September 1 and December 30, 2003 that the
US$11,000,000.00 deposit in the account of respondent Domsat in Westmont Bank is covered by
the... secrecy of bank deposit.
Since both respondent banks and respondent Domsat have disclosed during the trial the
US$11,000,000.00 deposit, it is no longer secret and confidential, and petitioner GSIS' right to
inquire into what happened to such deposit can not be suppressed
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals resorted to a liberal interpretation of the rules to avoid miscarriage of
justice when it allowed the filing and acceptance of the second motion for reconsideration.  The
appellate court also underscored the fact that GSIS did not raise the defect of... lack of notice in
its opposition to the second motion for reconsideration.  The appellate court held that failure to
timely object to the admission of a defective motion is considered a waiver of its right to do so.
It is our considered opinion that Domsat's deposit of $11,000,000.00 in Westmont Bank is
covered by the Bank Secrecy Law, as such it cannot be examined, inquired or looked into
without the written consent of its owner.
The ruling in Van Twest vs. Court of
Appeals was rendered during the effectivity of CB Circular No. 960, Series of 1983, under Sec.
102 thereof, transfer to foreign currency deposit account or receipt from another foreign currency
deposit account, whether for payment of legitimate obligation or otherwise, are... not eligible for
deposit under the System.
Petitioner, therefore, had inappropriately invoked the... provisions of Central Bank (CB) Circular
Nos. 343 which has already been superseded by more recently issued C
B Circulars
CB Circular 343 requires the surrender to the banking system of foreign exchange, including
proceeds of foreign borrowings.  This requirement,... however, can no longer be found in later
circulars.
even if this procedural infirmity is discarded for the broader interest of justice, the petition sorely
lacks merit.
GSIS insists that Domsat's deposit with Westmont Bank can be examined and inquired into.  It
anchored its argument on Republic Act No. 1405 or the "Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits,"
which allows the disclosure of bank deposits in cases where the money deposited is the... subject
matter of the litigation.  GSIS asserts that the subject matter of the litigation is the U.S. $11
Million obtained by Domsat from the Banks to supposedly finance the lease of a Russian satellite
from Intersputnik.  Whether or not it should be held liable as a... surety for the principal amount
of U.S. $11 Million, GSIS contends, is contingent upon whether Domsat indeed utilized the
amount to lease a Russian satellite as agreed in the Surety Bond Agreement.  Hence, GSIS
argues that the whereabouts of the U.S. $11 Million is the... subject matter of the case and the
disclosure of bank deposits relating to the U.S. $11 Million should be allowed.
GS
IS also contends that the concerted refusal of Domsat and the banks to divulge the whereabouts
of the U.S. $11 Million will greatly prejudice and burden the GSIS pension fund considering that
a substantial portion of this fund is earmarked every year to cover the surety bond... issued.
The Banks maintain that Republic Act No. 1405 is not the applicable law in the instant case
because the Domsat deposit is a foreign currency deposit, thus covered by Republic Act No.
6426.  Under said law, only the consent of the depositor shall serve as the exception for... the
disclosure of his/her deposit.
Republic Act No. 1405 provides for four (4) exceptions when records of deposits may be
disclosed.  These are under any of the following instances: a) upon written permission of the
depositor, (b) in cases of impeachment, (c) upon order of a competent court... in the case of
bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials or, (d) when the money deposited or invested is
the subject matter of the litigation, and e) in cases of violation of the Anti-Money Laundering
Act (AMLA), the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) may inquire into... a bank account
upon order of any competent court. [22]  On the other hand, the lone exception to the non-
disclosure of foreign currency deposits, under Republic Act No. 6426, is disclosure upon the
written permission of the deposito
Thus,... Republic Act No. 1405 is considered a law of general application.  On the other hand,
Republic Act No. 6426 was intended to encourage deposits from foreign lenders and investors.
[24] It is a special law designed especially for foreign currency... deposits in the Philippines.  A
general law does not nullify a specific or special law.  Generalia specialibus non derogant. [25]
Therefore, it is beyond cavil that Republic Act No. 6426 applies in this case.
The basis for the application of subpoena is to prove that the loan intended for Domsat by the
Banks and guaranteed by GSIS, was diverted to a purpose other than that stated in the surety
bond.  The Banks, however, argue that GSIS is in fact liable to them for the... proper applications
of the loan proceeds and not vice-versa.  We are however not prepared to rule on the merits of
this case lest we pre-empt the findings of the lower courts on the matter.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.
Principles:
Thus,... Republic Act No. 1405 is considered a law of general application.  On the other hand,
Republic Act No. 6426 was intended to encourage deposits from foreign lenders and investors.
[24] It is a special law designed especially for foreign currency... deposits in the Philippines.  A
general law does not nullify a specific or special law.  Generalia specialibus non derogant. [25]
Therefore, it is beyond cavil that Republic Act No. 6426 applies in this case.
Applying Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, absent the written permission from Domsat,
Westmont Bank cannot be legally compelled to disclose the bank deposits of Domsat, otherwise,
it might expose itself to criminal liability under the same act.

7.
8. LORENZANA VS. LELINA G.R. No. 187850, 17
August 2016;
 9. Republic v. Spouses Gimenez, G.R. No. 174673, January
11, 2016

FACTS:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the two Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated

May 25, 2006 and September 13, 2006.

The Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), instituted

a Complaint  for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages against
the Gimenez Spouses before the Sandiganbayan. “The Complaint seeks to recover ill-gotten
wealth acquired by [the Gimenez Spouses] as dummies, agents[,] or nominees of former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda Marcos[.]” 

During trial, the Republic presented documentary evidence attesting to the positions held,

business interests, income, and pertinent transactions of the Gimenez Spouses. The Republic
presented thetestimonies of Atty. Tereso Javier, Head of the Sequestered Assets Department of
PCGG, and of Danilo R.V. Daniel, Director of the Research and Development Department of
PCGG. Witnesses testified on the bank accounts and businesses owned or controlled by the
Gimenez Spouses.

The Republic eventually manifested that it was “no longer presenting further
evidence.”Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gave the Republic 30 days or until March 29, 2006
“to file its formal offer of evidence.”

On March 29, 2006, the Republic moved “for an extension of thirty (30) days or until April
28, 2006, within which to file [its] formal offer of evidence.” This Motion was granted by the
Sandiganbayan in a Resolution of the same date. On April 27, 2006, the Republic moved for an
additional 15 days or until May 13, 2006 within which to file its Formal Offer of Evidence.
This Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated May 8, 2006. Following
this, no additional Motion for extension was filed by the Republic.

In the first assailed Resolution dated May 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan noted that the
Republic failed to file its Formal Offer of Evidence notwithstanding repeated extensions and the
lapse of 75 days from the date it terminated its presentation of evidence. Thus, it declared that
the Republic waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence.

Ignacio Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence. He argued that the
Republic showed no right to relief as there was no evidence to support its cause of action. Fe Roa
Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of failure to prosecute. Through her own
Motion to Dismiss, she joined Ignacio Gimenez’s demurrer to evidence.

On June 15, 2006, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration [of the first assailed
Resolution] and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence. The pertinent portions of the
Republic’s offer of documentary exhibits attached to the Motion: EXHIBITS A TO G (and series
consist of the Income Tax Returns, Certificate of Income Tax Withheld On Compensation,
Statement of Tax Withheld At Source, Schedule of Interest Income, Royalties and Withholding
Tax, Statement of Assets, Liabilities & Net Worth of Ignacio B. Gimenez from 1980-1986
proving his legitimate income during said period) among others.

In the second assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied the
Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration and granted the Gimenez Spouses’ Motion to
Dismiss. According to the Sandiganbayan: While it is true that litigation is not a game of
technicalities and that the higher ends of substantial justice militate against dismissal of cases
purely on technical grounds, the circumstances of this case show that the ends of justice will not
be served if this Court allows the wanton disregard of the Rules of Court and of the Court’s
orders. Rules of procedure are designed for the proper and prompt disposition of cases.

The court also noted that the documentary evidence presented by the Republic consisted
mostly of certified true copies. However, the persons who certified the documents as copies of
the original were not presented. Hence, the evidence lacked probative value.

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and admit its Formal Offer of Evidence, the plaintiff’s
Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence is DENIED. The
Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence filed by the defendant Ignacio B. Gimenez and
adopted by defendant Fe Roa Gimenez is GRANTED. The case is then DISMISSED.

ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that the petitioner’s evidence has no
probative value and granting respondents Ignacio Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez’s Motion to
Dismiss on demurrer to evidence

HELD:

Petitioner claims that the following exhibits were acquired in relation to the PCGG’s functions
prescribed under Executive Order No. 1, Section 3(b), and form part of the official records of the
PCGG: “Certifications as to the various positions held in Government by Fe Roa-Gimenez, her
salaries and compensation during her stint as a public officer, the BIR Income Tax Returns and
Statement of Assets and Liabilities showing the declared income of spouses Gimenezes; the
Articles of Incorporation of various corporations showing spouses Gimenezes’ interests on
various corporations; and several transactions involving huge amounts of money which prove
that they acted as conduit in the disbursement of government funds.“

On the other hand, respondent Ignacio Gimenez argues that petitioner’s documents are not
“official issuances of the Philippine government.”They are mostly notarized private documents.
Petitioner’s evidence has no probative value; hence, a dismissal on demurrer to evidence is only
proper. Respondent Fe Roa Gimenez claims that the Sandiganbayan did not err in holding that
the majority of petitioner’s documentary evidence has no probative value, considering that most
of these documents are only photocopies.

The evidence presented by petitioner before the Sandiganbayan deserves better treatment.

Furthermore, for purposes of presenting these as evidence before courts, documents are classified
as either public or private. Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of Courtprovides:
SEC. 19. Classes of Documents.— For the purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers,

whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered
therein.

All other writings are private.

Emphasizing the importance of the correct classification of documents, this court pronounced:
The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be
presented as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign
character, or because it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or
a competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because it is a public record
of a private writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no further
authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is
any other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a
notary or other person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or
set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities
prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication in the manner allowed by law or
the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court.

The distinction as to the kind of public document under Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of
Court is material with regard to the fact the evidence proves. In Philippine Trust Company v.
Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.,138 this court ruled that:
. . . not all types of public documents are deemed prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated:
....
“Public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer” include those specified
as public documents under Section 19(a), Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the
acknowledgement, affirmation or oath, or jurat portion of public documents under Section 19(c).
Hence, under Section 23, notarized documents are merely proof of the fact which gave rise to
their execution (e.g., the notarized Answer to Interrogatories . . . is proof that Philtrust had been
served with Written Interrogatories), and of the date of the latter (e.g., the notarized Answer to
Interrogatories is proof that the same was executed on October 12, 1992, the date stated
thereon), but is not prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Additionally, under Section
30 of the same Rule, the acknowledgement in notarized documents is prima facie evidence of the
execution of the instrument or document involved (e.g., the notarized Answer to Interrogatories
is prima facie proof that petitioner executed the same).

The reason for the distinction lies with the respective official duties attending the execution of
the different kinds of public instruments. Official duties are disputably presumed to have been
regularly performed. As regards affidavits, including Answers to Interrogatories which are
required to be sworn to by the person making them, the only portion thereof executed by the
person authorized to take oaths is the jurat. The presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed therefore applies only to the latter portion, wherein the notary public
merely attests that the affidavit was subscribed and sworn to before him or her, on the date
mentioned thereon. Thus, even though affidavits are notarized documents, we have ruled that
affidavits, being self-serving, must be received with caution. (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)

In Salas v. Sta. Mesa Market Corporation, this court discussed the difference between mere
copies of audited financial statements submitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and certified true copies of audited financial
statements obtained or secured from the BIR or the SEC which are public documents under Rule
132, Section 19(c) of the Revised Rules of Evidence:
The documents in question were supposedly copies of the audited financial statements of SMMC.
Financial statements (which include the balance sheet, income statement and statement of cash
flow) show the fiscal condition of a particular entity within a specified period. The financial
statements prepared by external auditors who are certified public accountants (like those
presented by petitioner) are audited financial statements. Financial statements, whether audited
or not, are, as [a] general rule, private documents. However, once financial statements are filed
with a government office pursuant to a provision of law, they become public documents.

Indeed, in Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc, this court held that mere collection of documents by
the PCGG does not make such documents public documents per se under Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court:

The fact that these documents were collected by the PCGG in the course of its investigations
does not make them per se public records referred to in the quoted rule.

Petitioner presented as witness its records officer, Maria Lourdes Magno, who testified that
these public and private documents had been gathered by and taken into the custody of the
PCGG in the course of the Commission’s investigation of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses. However, given the purposes for which these documents were submitted, Magno was
not a credible witness who could testify as to their contents. To reiterate, “[i]f the writings have
subscribing witnesses to them, they must be proved by those witnesses.” Witnesses can testify
only to those facts which are of their personal knowledge; that is, those derived from their own
perception. Thus, Magno could only testify as to how she obtained custody of these documents,
but not as to the contents of the documents themselves.

Neither did petitioner present as witnesses the affiants of these Affidavits or Memoranda
submitted to the court. Basic is the rule that, while affidavits may be considered as public
documents if they are acknowledged before a notary public, these Affidavits are still classified as
hearsay evidence. The reason for this rule is that they are not generally prepared by the affiant,
but by another one who uses his or her own language in writing the affiant’s statements, parts of
which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the
adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. For this reason,
affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on
the witness stand to testify thereon. (Citations omitted)

Notably, the Sandiganbayan’s evaluation of the evidence presented by petitioner was

cursory. Its main reason for granting the Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence was
that there was no evidence to consider due to petitioner’s failure to file its Formal Offer of
Evidence. It brushed off the totality of evidence on which petitioner built its case.

Even assuming that no documentary evidence was properly offered, this court finds it clear from
the second assailed Resolution that the Sandiganbayan did not even consider other evidence
presented by petitioner during the 19 years of trial. The Sandiganbayan erred in ignoring
petitioner’s testimonial evidence without any basis or justification. Numerous exhibits were
offered as part of the testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses.

Petitioner presented both testimonial and documentary evidence that tended to establish a
presumption that respondents acquired ill-gotten wealth during respondent Fe Roa Gimenez’s
incumbency as public officer and which total amount or value was manifestly out of proportion
to her and her husband’s salaries and to their other lawful income or properties.

The Sandiganbayan should have consideredAtienza v. Board of Medicine, et al. where this court
held that it is better to admit and consider evidence for determination of its probative value than
to outright reject it based on very rigid and technical grounds.

A liberal application of the Rules is in line with the state’s policy to recover ill-gotten
wealth. In case of doubt, courts should proceed with caution in granting a motion to
dismiss based on demurrer to evidence.An order granting demurrer to evidence is a judgment
on the merits. This is because while a demurrer “is an aid or instrument for the expeditious
termination of an action,” it specifically “pertains to the merits of the case.”

To erroneously grant a dismissal simply based on the delay to formally offer documentary
evidence essentially deprives one party of due process. PETITION GRANTED.

10 . G.R. No. L-7969             October 5, 1912

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.
CHUA MO, defendant-appellant.
Jos. N. Wolfson, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Harvey, for appellee. 
JOHNSON, J.:

This defendant was charged with the illegal possession of opium, in violation of the provisions of
the Opium Law. 

After hearing the evidence, the Honorable A.S. Crossfield, judge found the defendant guilty of
the crime charged in the complaint, and sentenced him to pay a fine of P300 and the costs of the
action, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. 

From that sentence the defendant appealed. The defendant alleged in his defense in this court that
the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila did not have jurisdiction to try him; that the
testimony adduced during the trial of the cause fails to show where the offense was committed. 

The complaint filed in the present cause alleges that "on or about the 19th of March, 1912, in the
city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Chua Mo, voluntarily, illegally and criminally was the
owner and had in his possession and under his control" a certain quantity of opium. 

The judge of the lower court, after hearing the evidence, made the following findings of facts:

From the evidence presented at the trial, I find that internal revenue agents went to the
place described as 717 Calle Sacristia in the city of Manila, and entering the premises
there found the defendant, etc.

It appears, therefore, that the complaint charges that the crime was committed in the city of
Manila. The judge who tried the cause found from the evidence presented that the crime was
committed in the city of Manila. An examination of the evidence adduced during the trial shows
simply that the internal revenue agents, on or about the 19th of March, 192, entered the residence
at 717 Calle Sacristia, etc., etc. There is nothing in the record which shows where or in what
political division of the Philippine Islands the said residence at No. 717 Calle Sacristia is located.
The judge of the lower court evidently took judicial notice of the fact that Calle Sacristia was one
of the public streets of the city of Manila. We have then the question presented whether or not a
trial judge can take judicial notice of the fact that a certain public street is located in a certain city
or  political division of the Philippine Islands. Section 275 of the Code of Procedure in Civil
Actions (Act No. 190) provides:

Matters judicially recognized.—The existence and territorial extent of states, and of the
several islands forming the Philippine Archipelago, their forms of government, and
symbols of nationality, the laws of nations, the admirality and maritime and history of the
United States and of the Philippine Islands, the seals of the several departments of the
Government of the United States, and of the States of the Union, and of the Philippine
Islands, public and private, and officials acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments of the United States and of the Philippine Islands, the laws of nature, and the
measure of time, the geographical divisions and of political history of the world, and all
 similar matters of public knowledge shall be judicially recognized by the court without
the introduction of proof; but the court may receive evidence upon any of the subjects in
this section stated, when it shall find it necessary for its own information, and may resort
for its aid to appropriate books, documents, or evidence.

In the case of Marzon vs. Udtujan (20 Phil. rep., 232), this court held, under the provisions of
section 275 above quoted, that the trial court had a right to take judicial notice of the fact that a
certain municipality or barrio was within its jurisdiction. 

In the present case the question presented is whether or not the trial court had a right to take
judicial notice of the fact that certain house, upon a certain street, was within a city in its
jurisdiction. Said section 275 above quoted provides that trial courts may take judicial notice,
among other things, of the geographical division of the state. Cities and municipalities are
created by public law. Their limits are also prescribed by public law. The streets are laid out,
surveyed and established by virtue of public authority. In the present case the complaint alleged
that the crime was committed in the city of Manila. The court, in his findings of fact "from the
evidence, found that the crime was committed in the city of Manila." We are of the opinion and
so hold that the lower court was authorized, under provisions of section 275, to take judicial
notice of the fact that the house located at No. 717 Calle Sacristia, was located within the city of
Manila. 

Mr. Justice Gray, of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Jones vs. United
States (137 U.S., 202) in discussing the right of the court to take judicial notice of territorial
extent, said:

All courts of justice are bound to take judicial notice of the territorial extent of the jurisdiction
exercised by the government whose laws they administer . . . as appearing from the public acts of
the legislature and executive, although those acts are not formally put in evidence nor are in
accord with the pleadings." (U.S. vs. Reynes, 9 How., 127; Kennett vs. Chambers, 14 How., 38;
Hoyt vs. Russell, 117 U. S., 401-404; Coffee vs. Grover, 123 U.S., 1; State vs. Dunwell, 3 R. I.,
127; State vs. Wagner, 61 Me., 178; Taylor vs. Barclay, 2 Sim., 213.)

So far as the facts of the political organization and operation of the State are determined by law,
they are judicially notices as a part of the law. The chief difficulty comes in distinguishing
between what is contained solely and abstractly in the law and what depends more or less on
specific official acts done under the law or upon the application of the terms of the law to
concrete things. Courts should be permitted to give a liberal interpretation to the law permitting
them to take judicial notice of the facts mentioned in such laws, especially when a technical
interpretation would have the effect of defeating the very purpose and object of the law.
(Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 2575.)

In the case of Master vs. Morse (18 Utah, 21) it was held that courts might take judicial notice
that a certain city had been surveyed into lots, blocks and streets and that judicial notice would
be taken of such divisions. 1awphil.net
In the case of "The Apollon" (9 Wheaton, 362-374) the Supreme Court of the United States held
that "public facts of geographical divisions might be taken judicial notice of."

In the case of Peyrox vs. Howard (7 Peters, 324-342), the Supreme Court of the United States
held that the court would take judicial notice of the fact that the port of New Orleans was within
its jurisdiction, as depending on the ebb and flow of the tide. 

In the case of Board vs. State (147 Ind., 476) the supreme court of the State of Indiana held that
trial courts might take judicial notice of the area and boundary lines of a county.

The cases holding that courts may take judicial notice of the fact that certain towns are within the
limits of the jurisdiction of the courts are almost innumerable. (St. Louis I. M. and S. Ry. Co. vs.
Magness, 68 Mo., 289; People vs. Etting, 99 Cal., 577; People vs. Faust, 113 Cal., 172; State vs.
Powers, 25 Conn., 48; Perry vs. State, 113 Ga., 936; Gilbert vs. National C. R. Co., 176 Ill., 288;
Ham vs. Ham, 39 Me. 263; Commonwealth vs. Desmond, 103 Mass., 445; Baumann vs. Trust
Co., 66 Minn., 227.)

In the case of Gardner vs. Eberhart (82 Ill., 316), the supreme court of Illinois held that the trial
courts had authority to take judicial notice of the subdivision of towns and city property into
blocks, lots, etc. (See also Sever vs. Lyons, 170 Ill., 395.)

We believe, considering the ample provisions of said section 275 and the jurisprudence already
established by reputable courts, that we have authority for holding that the lower court
committed no error in taking judicial notice of the fact that the place where the crime was
committed was within its jurisdiction. Therefore the sentence of the lower court is hereby
affirmed, with costs. So ordered.