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Information Environment, Fatigue, and Culture in the Maritime Domain

Margareta Lützhöft, Michelle R. Grech and Thomas Porathe
Reviews of Human Factors and Ergonomics 2011 7: 280
DOI: 10.1177/1557234X11410391
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410391 XXXXXX10.1177/1557234X11410391<itali
c>Reviews of Human Factors and Ergonomics</italic>, Volume 7Information Environment, Fatigue, and Culture
CHAPTER 7
Information Environment, Fatigue, and Culture in

the Maritime Domain
Margareta Lützhöft, Michelle R. Grech, & Thomas Porathe
Maritime shipping operates within a complex operational setting and incorporates many types
of workplaces and work roles. The maritime domain has been a bit slower than other complex
domains in its research and development of human factors and ergonomics application.
The problem remains that the operator is continuously being excluded from the loop, which
increases the probability of shipboard errors and accidents. This chapter begins by providing
a general introduction to the maritime domain and its unique characteristics and is followed
by a section on the information environment on the bridge. The section on the information
environment on the bridge highlights the importance of integrating the end user into the
bridge system and how technology must provide intuitive information at the right level of
complexity at the right time. The main focus of this chapter is then split into two areas of
current high significance: fatigue on board and maritime culture (also incorporating safety
culture issues). Fatigue on board is of major concern, and most studies indicate that a systems
approach must be adopted. This approach should account for aspects such as the number of
personnel, trip length, frequency and duration of port visits, and shift planning. Within the
area of maritime culture, multiculturalism and the way it is managed on board ships, including
shipboard practices, affect safety. In the area of safety culture, three recommendations are
central: (a) increase compliance with regulations, (b) implement a safety management system,
and (c) implement a behavioral safety system. In general, this review indicates that more data
are needed on human-technology-organizational issues in the maritime domain.
S hips as transport vehicles are increasingly sophisticated and technically optimized.

Major future performance gains, in terms of maritime effectiveness and efficiency, are to
be found less through the continued development of the ships’ structural design and
more through systems engineering of the ships. This development places additional
focus on the ships as useful workplaces, where the crew’s performance plays a crucial role
for the success of maritime transport. An understanding of the management, technical,
and organizational climate on board modern ships is thus a prerequisite, which this
chapter is intended to support. It highlights the areas that make shipping distinctive and
have not been covered in earlier volumes of Reviews of Human Factors and Ergonomics.
It will mainly cover commercial and merchant shipping.
Keywords: maritime human factors, integrated bridge system, ECDIS, human error, fatigue, maritime culture, bridge information environment,
safety management system, sleep, watch schedules, multiculturalism, organizational culture, maritime safety culture
Reviews of Human Factors and Ergonomics, Vol. 7, 2011, pp. 280-322. DOI 10.1177/1557234X11410391. Copyright 2011 by Human Factors
and Ergonomics Society. All rights reserved.
280
Information Environment in the Maritime Domain 281
This chapter begins by providing an introduction to shipping, emphasizing its com-

plex operational setting and bringing to focus areas that distinguish it from other indus-
tries. This introduction is followed by a lead-in section on the information environment
on the bridge to set the scene for later sections. The chapter is then split into two sections
with reviews conducted on areas believed to be of current high significance within this
domain: fatigue on board, and maritime culture and safety culture. Shore-based or
shore-centric maritime operations, such as vessel traffic services and cargo handling,
have been excluded.
It should finally be noted that some of the aspects covered in other chapters of Reviews
of Human Factors and Ergonomics do apply to the maritime domain and should be taken
equally into account for a more complete picture and understanding of merchant ships
at sea. Examples include information design and navigation (Laughery & Wogalter,
2006; Taylor, Brunyé, & Taylor, 2008), control room or workplace design, and various
approaches to workplace ergonomics from other domains (Durso & Manning, 2008;
Morrow, North, & Wickens, 2006; Sussman & Raslear, 2008).
Brief History Of Maritime Human Factors
Early work in maritime human factors can be traced back to World War II, when most
of the focus was on naval vessels. The reasoning behind this work was to improve
human performance, which was seen as critical during time of war. In the 1940s and
1950s, the U.S. Navy initiated studies in the area of fatigue and watch scheduling at sea
led by Klietman and Jackson (1950), prominent scientists in this area.
Europe’s focus at this time was more in the area of bridge design. This focus on bridge
design was a response to so-called radar-assisted collisions, which became a frequent
occurrence during this time (Perrow, 1999) (Radar-assisted collisions occurred when the
officer of the watch relied solely on radar for navigation purposes. This phrase was
adopted following the collision between the Andrea Doria and the Stockholm in 1967, in
which it was indicated that the officer of the watch on both ships “misused” the radar. In
reality, at the time, the radar was not designed with any human factors integration con-
sideration, which may explain the misuse errors). With the introduction of new tech-
nologies on board ships, such as radar, a reliance on technology by shipboard crew was
one of the inevitable consequences. With minimum training provided in the use of these
technologies, lack of human factors engineering in new technology design, and ad hoc
implementation, the seafarers stood no chance in avoiding errors. This European focus
on human factors in bridge design continued throughout the 1960s (e.g., Walraven &
Lazet, 1964), and later, it was also heavily researched in the United States. For example,
in 1968, a series of studies was conducted in the United States aimed at developing
human factors guidelines for bridge design (Mara, 1969). These studies were some of the
first initiatives that addressed human limitations and system requirements on design
of bridge equipment on merchant ships. The area is covered in more detail in the
Information Environment on the Bridge section.
282 Reviews of Human Factors and Ergonomics, Volume 7
Human Factors in the Maritime Domain

The importance of human factors has long been recognized in the aviation and nuclear
industries. The maritime domain recognized the importance of this later, and only in
the past 30 years has serious work been carried out in the area. This work was mainly
triggered by public unrest at the large number of ship accidents that resulted in environ-
mental disasters and a large number of fatalities. The initial focus was the labeling of
contributory causes of maritime accidents as the general term “human error.” This
labeling was very much the norm in the ’80s and early ’90s, when the statement “80%
of all accidents at sea are caused by ‘human error’” was commonly used (International
Maritime Organization, 1994). Although this general terminology created confusion in
this area, the advantage was that it sent the message across about the importance of
studying human factors, enabling the International Maritime Organization to actually
start addressing the “human element” issue.
Human factors in the maritime domain is a term often confused with human error. A
recent report takes a more analytic approach to patterns of error with the aim of identi-
fying systematic problems (Macrae, 2009). Macrae (2009) focuses on what needs to be
done to avoid future problems without the “blame” attitude commonly adopted,
whereby the focus is exclusively on errors at the sharp end. The main issues identified in
Macrae’s study include planning failures, failure to identify or act, and failure to keep an
adequate watch. Macrae also identified a number of interesting contributing issues sel-
dom discussed elsewhere, such as breakdown in team communication and lack of
onboard supervision and monitoring. In addition, lack of adequate equipment and/or
inadequate use of existing aids and problems with workplace (bridge) layout were high-
lighted. This research shifts the discussion to another level, as these issues have their
origins and their potential solution at the organizational level, as is discussed further in
this chapter.
The World of Shipping: An Overview

In today’s world, shipping is considered one of the most international industries
(International Chamber of Shipping, 2009). This role has been further strengthened by
the rapid growth in world trade and the emergence of new national entities, especially
in the past 40 years. In terms of the transportation of goods, shipping today carries
around 90% of the world trade, surpassing both surface and air transport (International
Maritime Organization, 2009). Shipping’s main objective is to transport goods; how-
ever, this action is surrounded by other areas of activities that are required to support it,
such as port operations, staffing power, and customs procedures. In turn, there are also
institutions and policies affecting both the carriage and support activities, such as labor
unions, government regulations, and international agreements and conventions. Figure 7.1
represents the various stakeholders involved and shows the complex nature of this
industry.
As shown in the figure, the various stakeholders are interlinked with the owner or oper-
ator required to interact with most organizations. For example, owners or operators of
vessels must ensure that the ship meets classification requirements, adhere to the
Figure 7.1. The complexity of shipping stakeholders. From the “Maritime Directory” (http://
www.maritimeindustryfoundation.com/nguide.html). Copyright by the Maritime Industry Foundation.
Reprinted with permission.
International Maritime Organization and International Labor Organization rules and

regulations, and comply with flag-state (maritime administration) requirements. The crew
is also required to be trained and qualified in accordance with the International Maritime
Organization’s Standard for Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping Convention
requirements. In this regard, a ship can be owned in one country, operated from another
country, and registered by a third country, and crew can hail from any country.
Shipping has some unique aspects that to some extent distinguish it from other trans-
port domains. Some of these include the following:
•• the potentially harsh physical environment in which operations are carried out;
•• the remoteness of the working environment, which creates limited shore-based social
contact and isolation, especially during extensive periods on duty; and
•• the traditionally hierarchical nature of shipboard teams blending civil-type structures
with quasi-military norms.
The shipping industry also operates in a very competitive environment where ship
owners are compelled to seek economic efficiencies. For example, the decision to reduce
the crew’s wage bill by hiring multinational crews from developing countries is now
considered the norm (Lane, 1996). The implications of this trend are discussed in the
Maritime Culture section of this chapter. An additional economic trend is the reduction
in crew numbers on board, which has resulted in an increased workload and, conse-
quently, fatigue for seafarers, further discussed in the Fatigue section.
The reduction in shipboard crew has resulted in rapid technological developments to

automate certain functions; however, this automation was achieved with little consider-
ation to human factors, mentioned in the Information Technology on the Bridge sec-
tion. With the combination of new technology being introduced at a rapid pace and the
challenge of making a team of multinational crews, the shipping system is an excellent
example of current challenges in complex workplaces.
Regulatory Situation and Maritime Safety

The maritime domain is an environment that is governed by international conventions,
resolutions, and regulations adopted primarily by the International Maritime Organiza-
tion. The focus in the maritime domain to rely mostly on rules and regulations to
improve safety at sea makes it inherently a reactive, risk-adverse industry, in contrast to
industries such as the aviation domain that have taken a more proactive approach to
improve safety.
The International Maritime Organization, established in 1948 through a conference
by the United Nations, is mainly concerned with adopting regulations to improve inter-
national maritime safety and the prevention of pollution from ships. The most notable
of these conventions include the International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea,
adopted in 1974; the Standards for Training Certification and Watchkeeping for
Seafarers, adopted in 1978 and amended in 1995; and the Marine Pollution Convention,
from 1973 and amended in 1978. Regulations, conventions, and related guidelines are
developed by various working groups and attended by representatives of member states,
often from maritime administrations. Other organizations also participate in these
workshops, such as maritime nongovernmental organizations, classification societies,
and many other independent maritime organizations.
Maritime administrations are responsible for ensuring compliance with the International
Maritime Organization safety conventions of which they are signatory by using what is
known as “flag-state control.” Flag-state control consists of surveys, certifications, and
inspections by flag-state surveyors and inspectors to ensure their ships are in compli-
ance. In most cases, flag states delegate certain parts of compliance checks to so-called
classification societies. Compliance with these safety conventions are also applied to
non-flag-state ships in what is known as “port-state control.” Classification societies
were originally established to ensure that the ships maintained their class status.
Maintaining a ship according to its class influenced the amount of insurance premium a
shipping company paid.
The Work on Board: Shipboard Organization

The work on board a ship is normally categorized into departments: deck, engine, and
service and catering. These departments incorporate the master (captain) and officers
who supervise work on board, the ratings (deck and engine crew members), and sup-
port and catering staff. The master is responsible for overseeing the running of the ship
with the assistance of the chief engineer, responsible for the engineering department,
and the chief officer, responsible for the deck department. The master is ultimately
responsible for the safety of crew, ship, and cargo but, like any other manager, is also
responsible for financial budgeting, personnel, and security issues. The chief officer
plans and supervises deck maintenance work, cargo placement, securing, and ballasting
and is responsible for the stability of the ship. The other deck officers perform passage
planning for safe navigation and an efficient trip as well as supervise the loading and
discharging of cargo.
Ratings (deck and engine crew) perform maintenance work, check cargo operations,
and maintain a security watch. Furthermore, security work and watches are taking more
time and resources in recent years. The chief engineer is responsible for the engine main-
tenance and the engine crew. The position also entails serving as fire chief and head of
safety. Engineering officers plan and perform maintenance work. Some watches are kept
in the engine room, especially on passages in restricted waters, when passing locks and
entering and leaving port. Engine ratings mainly perform maintenance work and repairs.
Little research has been performed on the changing nature of tasks performed on board
and how much time they consume. A few exceptions are Eldh’s (2004) study of a pas-
senger ship; Lützhöft, Ljung, and Nodin’s study (2008) on deck officers; and Lundh’s
(2010) study on engine crew. This chapter will now move on from the crew to their
workplace and a discussion of the bridge as an information environment.
Information Environment On The Bridge
There are almost 100 years between the two pictures shown in Figure 7.2. On the left is
the barren bridge of SS Osmed, sometime before she was sunk by a U-boat in 1940. On
the right is the integrated bridge of a modern ship. The contrast is striking.
An integrated bridge system is now standard on most new ships. Satellite positioning
systems are integrated with chart systems and track pilots to allow the ship to navigate,
to a large extent, automatically. The systems are complex and the functioning and han-
dling are not always fully understood by the watch keepers (Gale, 2009). Among the
regulating bodies of the maritime industry, the future paradigm for electronic or
enhanced navigation, e-Navigation, is presently in development. The challenge for the
future is that while the systems become more integrated and complex, the handling and
understanding have to be adapted to the human element, the seafarers on board.
Whereas the problem previously might have been one of uncertainty or lack of infor-
mation, the problem now is more one of information overload. The role of the officer of
the watch has, in many cases, changed from one of actively conning the ship to instead
passively monitoring semiautomatic systems. Problems that follow are out-of-the-loop
syndrome and de-skilling, which have been the root of much concern.
Concerns
In a presidential address to the Nautical Institute in 1976, Beck foreshadowed the future
of navigation and technology. He forecasted that the navigator in the future would
“address his vessel through a typewriter keyboard, and will have neither the time nor the
scope to navigate as we now know the term” (p. 8). He also forecasted the decline of
Figure 7.2. Knowledge in the head . . . and knowledge in the world. Photographs courtesy of
John E. Persson (left, used with permission) and M. Lützhöft (right, used with permission).
skills as we now know it. “Lack of what is called job-satisfaction, or the difficulty of
keeping alert, or even awake, means that once the man is outside the circuit of actually
navigating he must remain out” (Beck, 1976, p. 9). In the same journal some 30 years
later, Hadnett (2008), of the Port of London Authority, reacted to the de-skilling of
navigators in dependence on modern bridge technology leading to “over-confidence in
situation awareness, encouraging individuals to take far greater risks than was previ-
ously the case where a good look out and a safe speed were intrinsic parts of watch-
keeping” (p. 283). Hadnett concluded,
The drive to improve safety at sea by the introduction of electronic navigational equipment
to enhance situation awareness and assist the watch-keeper has unwittingly compromised
safety standards by reducing the core competence that were demanded of previous genera-
tions and engendering the undesirable human trait to select the easiest option. (p. 289)
The concerns of Hadnett were partly confirmed by a survey (Syms, 2003), which included
452 seagoing masters and officers from 30 countries on the application of the
International Regulations for Avoiding Collisions at Sea (COLREGS). Replies to a ques-
tion on the reasons for making maneuvers contrary to the provisions of the COLREGS,
ranked in order, were
•• ignorance or disregard of the rules,
•• reluctance to slow down or deviate from track,
•• poor lookout,
•• poor traffic awareness,
•• lack of experience, and
•• wrong action taken by other vessel.
A more detailed analysis with similar results was presented by Liu and Wu (2003) the
same year. Their study included an examination of 100 collision reports from the mari-
time authorities of the United Kingdom, United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
and Sweden. Causes of accidents involving collisions studied by Liu and Wu involved a
combination of factors. These in turn were similar to factors identified by Lee and
Parker (2007), which include the following:
•• Poor lookout. Factors include lack of competence, improper lookout methods, and
improper use or nonuse of all available shipboard navigational tools. Reasons include
lack of knowledge, experience, or training; crewing problems; lack of safety culture; high
workload; and inattention.
•• Improper use of radar and automated radar and plotting aids. Reasons include misin-
terpretation of information showed on screen, improper setting of range scale, and no
radar plotting. Underlying factors include lack of knowledge, experience, or training;
and fatigue.
•• Error of judgment. Underlying factors include lack of experience, knowledge, training,
or information-processing ability. Fatigue and workload also played a role.
•• Communication problems. The most frequently made mistakes were lack of communi-
cation and misinterpretation of information. Underlying human factor issues were the
reluctance of navigators to exchange information.
•• Failure to take early actions. The causes of this unsafe act were poor lookout and the
torpor induced by monotony of watch keeping.
•• Apparent improper ship handling. Failure to comply with good seamanship and failure
to display signals had a close relationship to knowledge, skill, training, and experience.
•• Failure to take appropriate action during low visibility was an important influencing
factor in ship collisions. Accidents were the consequences of failure to sound signals,
arrange appropriate lookout, and reduce speed as well as failure to communicate with
other ships.
The American Bureau of Shipping (Baker & McCafferty, 2005) conducted a 3-year
review of accident databases from Australia, Canada, Norway, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. The following conclusions were drawn:
•• Human error continues to be a dominant factor in approximately 80% to 85% of mari-

time accidents.
•• Failures of situation awareness and situation assessment overwhelmingly predominate,
being a causal factor in the majority of those accidents attributed to human error.
•• Human fatigue and task omission seem closely related to failures of situation awareness
and the human errors and accidents that result.
In 2010, Baker, Coady, and McSweeney, continued the studies of accident reports and
investigated seven selected accidents during the past hundred years. They concluded that
seafarers often commit multiple errors that can result in accidents. These often involve
errors or attributes such as complacency, inaccurate perceptions of risk, tolerance of risk,
decision making in the presence of operational uncertainty or ambiguity, and inaccurate
assessment and understanding of the operational situation. (p. 429)
They summarized their findings on human errors at sea with the following four
points:
(a) Human errors rarely occur alone, and the occurrence of one (e.g., perception of risk)
influences the occurrence of another (e.g., inaccurate situation awareness).
(b) Human errors are, for the most part, largely contextually driven cognitive errors, mak-
ing it very difficult to either anticipate them or examine their occurrence.
(c) A mariner’s objectives often compete, which complicates the acts of situation assessment
and decision making. Directions such as “go fast but safe” may not be able to be satisfied,
and the mariner is then faced with a cognitive complication and an opportunity to err.
(d) Finally, cognitive errors, such as inaccurate situation assessment, can result from, for
lack of better terms, the state of motivation or fitness for duty of the mariner at any
point in time—in proximate terms, mariner fatigue.
A review of maritime incidents, accidents, and related literature published in a report

by the U.K. Maritime Coastguard Agency (Rowley, 2006) identified the following
human element issues:
•• Overreliance on automation
•• Lack of in-depth understanding
•• Suboptimal ergonomic design
•• Suboptimal human-computer interface design
•• Inherent system latency interfering with error recovery efforts
•• Lack of awareness of automation failsafe modes
•• Maintenance and calibration errors
•• Poor support to the development and maintenance of situation awareness
•• Information overload issues
•• Display inconsistencies between different manufacturers
•• Poor appreciation of automation characteristics and limitations by operators
•• Automation not designed around operators’ abilities and limitations
•• Standardization
•• Human factors
•• Training
•• Subsequent changes made to original automated system designs
Looking at the preceding summaries, one notices that the factors originating in the
organizational system but that shape the individual, such as lack of experience, lack of
training, and fatigue, lead to poor competence and situation awareness. Factors tied to
the contextual environment of the bridge, such as instrument ergonomics, also lead to
poor situation awareness and bad decision making.
Positive Outcomes
In this sample of studies presented in the preceding paragraphs, it seems that the early
concerns expressed by Beck (1976) and Hadnett (2008) are quite to the point. One could
easily get the impression that modern educational systems for mariners and the devel-
opment of technological systems within the shipping industry are on a path to disaster.
However, as a contrast to the many alarming reports of human error at sea, the statistics
of shipping accidents and incidents speak a clear language: The number of accidents is
going down. To provide a perspective, it is interesting to note that in the 3 years 1833 to
1835, on average, 563 ships per year were reported wrecked or lost in the United
Kingdom alone (Crosbie, 2006). Today, in the world fleet of tankers, bulk carriers, con-
tainerships, and multipurpose ships, which have risen from about 12,000 ships in 1996
to more than 20,000 in 2009, the number of ships totally lost per year (ships weighing
more than 500 gross tons) declined from 225 in 1980 to 150 in 1996 and to 68 in 2009—
and these are worldwide figures (International Union of Marine Insurance, 2010).
Finally, let us look at the heart of the integrated bridge system, the electronic chart
display and information system (ECDIS), which together with the satellite positioning
system allows the officer of the watch to see the ship plotted onto a chart and have it
automatically follow a preplanned course from one port to another. Experiments with
electronic charts systems started in the end of the 1970s (e.g., Computer Aided Operations
Research Facility Research Staff, 1978; Rogoff, 1980). In 1989, the International Maritime
Organization issued the first provisional performance standards for ECDIS (International
Maritime Organization, 1989). In 1995, the U.S. Coast Guard Research and Development
Center presented a human factors study made on two commercial ECDISes placed on a
simulator bridge (Smith et al., 1995). The authors concluded the following:
•• ECDIS had the potential to improve on the safety of navigation, compared with con-
ventional procedures.
•• There was strong evidence that the use of ECDIS increased the accuracy of navigation,
as measured by a smaller cross-track distance of the ship from the planned track line,
and reduced the proportion of time spent on navigation, with a corresponding increase
in the proportion of time spent on the higher-risk collision avoidance task. In addition,
ECDIS was shown to improve geographic “situational awareness” and to reduce naviga-
tion “errors” (p. viii).
Smith et al. (1995) also concluded that the availability of ECDIS on the bridge sub-
stantially reduced the mariner’s workload for navigation. Mariner ratings of workload
decreased significantly with ECDIS, which requires a smaller proportion of time spent
on navigation. Spontaneous comments such as “Navigation goes away as a task” were
made by the participants (p. viii). A year later, the U.S. Coast Guard presented another
study, this time including both sea and simulator trials. The conclusions from that study
were that ECDIS could provide equivalent or greater safety than the paper chart and
more traditional methods of navigation. Another key finding was that navigation work-
load was reduced, allowing the mariner to concentrate on collision avoidance or other
tasks of similar importance. In the area of user interface design, it was found that the
mariner wanted an “uncluttered” display during route monitoring, with more features
immediately available if needed (Gonin, Dowd, & Alexander, 1996; p. iii).
A number of simulator studies have since been completed that compare the tradi-
tional bridge with modern forms of integrated bridge systems. Sauer et al. (2002) pub-
lished an experimental study comparing navigation with a display integrating chart and
radar in one display with navigation involving spatially separate electronic chart and
radar displays. The results indicated a slight advantage for the integrated display. A simu-
lator study published in 2004 by Donderi, Mercer, Hong, and Skinner compared a tradi-
tional bridge setup including paper charts and radar with electronic charts that had
separate radar and integrated radar overlay. In a navigational scenario, Donderi et al.
found slightly better performance with the use of ECDIS, with participants preferring
integrated radar overlay.
A Norwegian simulator study compared performance of high-speed navigation in

very confined waters with the use of ECDIS compared with traditional paper chart navi-
gation (Gould et al., 2009). ECDIS navigation was found more efficient, but no signifi-
cant differences in subjective workload were found. A similar study found only a small
advantage for the integrated bridge with ECDIS and separate radar, as compared with
paper chart and radar (Nilsson, Gärling, & Lützhöft, 2009). In a thesis from 2004,
Lützhöft presented findings from several ethnographic studies with the title “Technology
Is Great When It Works.” She reported on empirical findings of problems of human-
system integration, including that operators have to put in a lot of work to create a work-
ing system and the need for a user-centered design approach to the development of new
onboard systems (Lützhöft, 2004).
From these studies, we can draw the conclusion that new high-technology integrated
bridge systems seem to have improved performance and efficiency of navigation but
may not lead to the expected decrease of workload. The reason may be found in less suc-
cessful development of human-system interaction.
Future
With an integrated bridge system knowing so much about the whereabouts of the ship,
one may wonder how the system can allow humans to err and accidents to happen. The
question of automation and humans working together has been the topic of many stud-
ies in other complex industries (e.g., Dekker & Woods, 2002). In the maritime domain,
this topic is an interesting area that we will just touch on here. For example, in a study
presented in 2010, an automatic system that suggested optimal routes through confined
waters was investigated with good results (Cummings, Buchin, Carrigan, & Donmez,
2010). In other studies, 3-D charts or a human-centered view of navigational informa-
tion claimed to reduce cognitive workload (Fukuto, Imazu, Okazaki, & Otake, 2007;
Porathe, 2006). This is something that is necessary to keep the human in the loop and
ready to intervene should automatic systems fail.
Summary
The number of accidents at sea has significantly decreased in recent decades. This fact
is most satisfying. However, accidents still occur and the studies presented in this section
show that the great majority of those accidents in some way are related to problems in
the human-system interaction. When one takes a closer look at accidents, one generally
finds both active failures by the operator (human error) but most often also underlying
latent failures by organizations (Reason, 1997). These latent failures are often tackled by
barriers in the form of rules or a safety management system (SMS). At the sharp end,
that is, usually at the level of the operator, human error can be addressed by training,
but in general, the principle should not be to fit the human to the system but to fit the
system to the human. One way forward is to make bridge systems even more integrated
and automatic to prevent the human operator from erring, eventually leading to auton-
omous ships. The maritime domain may not be ready for this step yet, neither techno-
logically nor in other ways, and in the meantime, the risk is that there will continue to
be the type of accidents described previously.
Instead, the maritime domain should strive to integrate the human into the bridge
system, keeping the operator in the loop with an open and transparent interface that
shows intuitive information at the right level of complexity at the right time. At the same
time, the system should actively train the operator in taking part in the operation and
also allow the operator to simulate abnormal situations. This recommendation is more
easily said than done, but the efforts made when maritime human factors experts coop-
erate with the industry show positive and promising results (Petersen, 2010).
Fatigue On Board
Fatigue is often considered a generic term, of which sleepiness is one of the major sub-
components (Eriksen, Gillberg, & Vestergren, 2006). The International Maritime
Organization defines fatigue as the “reduction in physical and/or mental capacity as the
result of physical, mental, or emotional exertion which may impair nearly all physical
abilities” (International Maritime Organization, 2001). Working on a ship’s bridge
means irregular work hours, including night work. Two common shift schedules are the
“6-on/6-off ” and the “4-on/8-off ” systems. In the former system, a watch-keeping offi-
cer will work 6 hr and be free for 6 hr, with shift changes typically taking place at mid-
night, 6 a.m., noon, and 6 p.m. In the 4-on/8-off schedule, the officer works for 4 hr and
is free for 8 hr, and the watches run from 4 a.m. to 8 a.m. and from 4 p.m. to 8 p.m.,
from 8 a.m. to noon and from 8 p.m. to midnight, or from noon to 4 p.m. and from
midnight to 4 a.m. In all cases, the shift runs around the clock, and a seafarer may stay
on board for weeks or months at a time.
There are two types of two-watch ships (the 6-on/6-off schedule), one with two nau-
tical officers and one with three nautical officers, where the captain is generally free from
watch-keeping duties. The major problem with two-watch ships occurs when only two
nautical officers work on board. This arrangement means that there is never a rested
officer available for backup and to perform other tasks, such as administrative and safety
work on board. Therefore, there is no relief available for an officer who needs to take a
bridge watch after a long port stay or if a backup is needed in difficult navigational
situations.
Fatigue is discussed in the maritime domain as a potential risk both in the short term
and in the long term. Short-term risks are mainly groundings and collisions attributed
to a sleeping watch keeper. Long-term risks include ill health, to be discussed later. The
short-term risk problem is evident in another transportation industry, road traffic, in
which sleepy drivers’ accidents have been estimated to be involved in at least 15% to 20%
of road accidents (Horne & Reyner, 1996). Norwegian data of in-depth accident investi-
gations showed that sleepiness was involved in 29% of crashes, which was more than
alcohol-related accidents (11%; Moe, 1999). Recently, a 100-car study, in which approxi-
mately 100 cars were monitored during a year, showed that sleepy driving resulted in
4 to 6 times higher accident and near-accident risk compared with baseline driving,
when the driver was in an alert state with a high level of attention (Klauser, Dingus,
Neale, Sudweeks, & Ramsey, 2006). The prevalence of sleep-related accidents (including
near-accidents) was estimated to be 22% to 24%.
In contrast, in the maritime domain, it is difficult to find data on groundings and

collisions since maritime accident investigations seldom collected data that would suf-
fice to judge possible effects of fatigue on the crew. A few exceptions exist in which re-
reviews of accident analyses were made, in the United Kingdom and Sweden (Lindquist,
2003; Marine Accident Investigation Branch [MAIB], 2004). In both reports, it was
emphasized that many factors contribute to accidents, and the number of accidents is
too small to make strong statements about causality. Nevertheless, some trends were
seen. The MAIB suggested that the factors that contribute to collisions and groundings
include watch-keeping patterns, working hours, and sleep problems. The majority of the
groundings occurred between midnight and 6 a.m. on ships following a 6-hr-on/6-hr-
off working pattern (MAIB, 2004).
The MAIB (2004) report stated that “The continual disruptions to sleep and circa-
dian rhythms can lead to the accumulation of fatigue, the longer individuals are sub-
jected to them” (p. 10). When mariners were asked about accident cause, fatigue was
implicated in 17% of cases; investigating officers found a higher rate of 23%. Using a
more objective fatigue indicators score, Smith (2007) found a contribution rate of 16%
for critical vessel accidents and 33% for personal injury accidents (23% if outcomes are
combined).
Smith and colleagues listed similar aspects—long work hours, variation of shifts, and
reduced staffing—as exacerbating issues (Smith, Allen, & Wadsworth, 2006). The impact
of shift work on the individual depends on the two primary factors of circadian rhythms
and sleep disruption. Shift work inevitably involves working during the night, when the
body’s biological rhythms are in their trough and the biological conditions for perfor-
mance and alertness are poor. The risk of occupational accidents, especially within the
transportation industry (sea, road, rail, and air), increases substantially during night-
time (Folkard, Lombardi, & Tucker, 2005). Shift work also means sleeping when the
biological clock is promoting activity instead of sleep. Thus, shift work is often associ-
ated with short sleep and poor-quality sleep (Axelsson, Åkerstedt, Kecklund, & Lowden,
2004). Sea watch systems lead to increased levels of sleepiness, and sleep is often dis-
turbed by noise and rough seas (Åkerstedt & Gillberg, 1990). A field study with the
4-on/8-off and 6-on/6-off shift systems showed that none of the crew had high sleep
efficiency (Härmä, Partinen, Repo, Sorsa, & Siivonen, 2008).
Few studies have been able to capture the long-term effect of onboard shift work, and not
many studies mention the long tours on board worked by many seafarers, up to 6 to 8 months
and sometimes more. One study found trends that seafarers adapt to noise but become more
stressed during a tour on board (Wadsworth, Allen, McNamara, & Smith, 2008).
According to a survey and field study by Burke, Ellis, and Allen (2003), tour length is
an important factor in stress and fatigue at sea. Results showed that the effects of work
and work-related issues on seafarers across the work period vary as a function of time
into tour, including indications that longer tours are less detrimental. Half of the partici-
pants in the field study felt that adjusting to life on the ship took about 2 to 3 days, which
negatively affected their job performance on board (Burke et al., 2003). Also, working
practices (such as working hours and tour length) had a negative effect on well-being
during the early stages of leave (Smith, Lane, & Bloor, 2003). This finding corresponds
with results showing that fatigue increases most during the 1st week of tour and that
recovery on average does not occur until the 2nd week of leave (Smith et al., 2006).
Additionally, there is an element of unpredictability in shipping, including unpredict-

able arrival and departure times as well as unpredictable sailing schedules. Unpredictable
schedules make it difficult to plan sleep and work. This problem is also seen in the truck-
ing and aviation domains (Boivin, 2000).
Earlier Reviews of Fatigue

This section briefly summarizes earlier reviews of fatigue. A review based on operator
fatigue and the countermeasures of fatigue for the entire transport industry, including
the maritime industry, was conducted by Boivin (2000). The results include compre-
hensive lists of countermeasures and their appropriateness to the various industries.
A review by the Seafarers International Research Centre (SIRC) focused on fatigue,
health, and injury in both seafarers and offshore installation workers (Collins, Matthews,
& McNamara, 2000). The general conclusions revolved around the (then) lack of data
and studies and identified a number of areas where more research is needed, such as the
impact of long work hours, the effects of combinations of stressors, and the effects on
health.
Houtman et al. (2005) performed a review in combination with a desk study and
interviews with onboard and shore-based personnel. The study included representatives
of stakeholders from authorities, unions, and other relevant organizations. The authors
present four prioritized recommendations: (a) properly implementing the International
Safety Management (ISM) Code, (b) optimizing the organization of work on board vessels,
(c) lengthening the rest periods, and (d) reducing administrative tasks on board. The study
also provided an assessment of the expected consequences and costs of such changes.
This review was followed by a second report from the SIRC (Smith et al., 2006), which
included a review, a field study, and an accident data analysis. This study also found that
to understand fatigue at sea, negative risk factors must be considered in combination
rather than alone.
Gander (2005) published a review on fatigue management. It included extensive rec-
ommendations on how to manage fatigue, divided into several areas, such as fishing
vessels and cargo vessels. All recommendations were, however, extracted from previous
research.
Finally, Allen, Wadsworth, and Smith (2008) reviewed the literature between 2000
and 2008. Their conclusion was that multiple factors are associated with fatigue at sea
and that the issue may be more prevalent than shipping is ready to accept.
A common conclusion by the authors of the aforementioned reviews is that samples
are often small, many studies do not take all factors into account, and studies typically
are relatively short. When studying results in this section, the reader is reminded that the
number of crew members has been reduced in later years, so results apply in an increas-
ingly lesser degree to present-day seafarers.
Which Onboard Personnel Have Been Studied?

A large number of maritime fatigue studies do exist but for varying types of individuals,
work situations, and ships. This variety is the reason more research is needed, as studies
of any one situation (e.g., watch system, ship type, or trade pattern) are not large or com-
prehensive enough to provide valid results. Studies have been conducted with the follow-
ing populations: navy personnel, including Coast Guard; merchant mariners; fishermen;
and offshore workers. The results of several of these studies are discussed in the following
sections. Studies made on fishermen and maritime pilots are not reviewed here.
Very few fatigue studies exist regarding marine engineers. Their situation may be dif-
ferent in that although some carry out shift work, many work with an on-call system.
This means that an engineer will work through the day and be on call for handling
alarms at night. With disregard for the number of calls during the night, they are often
expected to work the next day. The most common on-call system is that two engineers
share the workload by being on duty every other night. This system has been shown to
lead to a higher degree of disturbed sleep, even during nights when no alarms sound.
The reason was assumed to be apprehension about possible alarms that would disturb
their sleep (Torsvall, Castenfors, & Åkerstedt, 1987).
Types of Studies
The most common method is to ask the onboard personnel to fill in a survey, diary, or
logbook left or sent on board (Sanquist, Raby, Forsythe, & Carvalhais, 1997; Wadsworth,
Allen, Wellens, McNamara, & Smith, 2006). A methodological issue is that it is difficult
to control when data are entered by a participant into a diary. One study identified a
number of fill-in strategies (Lützhöft, Thorslund, Kircher, & Gillberg, 2007), for
instance, filling in once an hour, after a watch, or after a few days. A positive side is that
diaries provide longitudinal data, especially much-needed information on periods
before and after the turn on board. Interviews are used as standalone methods or to
complement questionnaire data (e.g., Frodé, Pettersson, & Rudolfsson, 2006; Houtman
et al., 2005; Louie & Doolen, 2007).
Very few published ship simulator studies exist (Eriksen et al., 2006; Gould et al.,
2009). Gould et al. (2009) studied the effects of sleep deprivation on high-speed naviga-
tion using different navigation methods (paper charts and electronic charts). Sleep
deprivation did not impede performance in either navigation method, hypothesized to
be attributable to a very realistic trial in which, for instance, coffee was allowed. Finally,
there are a few examples of onboard case studies in which one or a few ships have been
studied (Allen, Wellens, McNamara, & Smith, 2005; Tirilly, 2004) or a certain group,
such as pilots, has been studied (Cook & Shipley, 1980).
Methods of Measuring Fatigue

Although there is no standardized methodology for measuring fatigue in individuals
operating a vehicle or a ship, some recording techniques have been commonly used.
Most common is to use subjective ratings, which is a simple way of measuring fatigue.
Subjective measures of fatigue are used in field studies as well as in simulator studies.
These measures often include, for example, a sleep diary, a working diary, and symp-
toms of fatigue, whereby ratings on a scale are used (Åkerstedt & Gillberg, 1990; Burr,
Palinkas, & Banta, 1993; Härmä et al., 2008; Raby & Lee, 2001; Sanquist et al., 1997;
Smith et al., 2006).
Two of the scales that have been used in shipboard studies are the Crew Status Survey
(CSS; Grech, Yoe, Neal, Humphreys, & Smith, 2009) and the Karolinska Sleepiness Scale
(KSS; Lützhöft et al., 2007). The KSS is a nine-step scale that ranges from 1 (very alert)
to 9 (very sleepy, great effort to keep awake, fighting sleep) (Åkerstedt & Gillberg, 1990).
KSS has been validated against physiological measures of sleepiness, with a correlation
between the subjective ratings and electroencephalogram (EEG) or electrooculogram
(EOG) (Åkerstedt & Gillberg, 1990). The CSS measures fatigue with one item on a
7-point scale ranging from 1 (fully alert, wide awake, extremely peppy) to 7 (completely
exhausted, unable to function effectively, ready to drop) (Gawron, 2000). The CSS has also
been shown to have good convergent validity with the Epworth Sleepiness Scale, on
which participants rate their probability of falling asleep in certain situations (Charlton
& Baas, 2001).
Common quantitative, objective measurement methods include the following:
(a) Actimeter or actigraph, a wrist-worn device that measures acceleration, that is, move-
ment of the wrist and thus activity of the person. The activity is transformed into sleep
quality and is also used for objective indication of sleep length. The actigraph is carried
on the nondominant hand and records the activity pattern throughout an experiment
(Arendt, Middleton, Williams, Francis, & Luke, 2006; Ferguson, Lamond, Kandelaars,
Jay, & Dawson, 2008; Gander, Berg, & Signal, 2008). In an experimental study, results
showed that the actigraph overestimated sleep (Pollak, Tryon, Nagaraja, & Dzwonczyk,
2001). The quality of sleep measured by actigraphy is called sleep efficiency or quality
of sleep. It is measured as a percentage by dividing actual sleep time (the time in bed
reduced by awake periods) by total sleep time (time in bed from falling asleep to getting
up). Sleep quality lower than 80% can be classified as disturbed.
(b) Reaction time. The psychomotor vigilance test is a universally accepted measure of neu-
robehavioral performance, as it is suitable for assessing the functional repercussions of
sleep loss and fatigue. The test is widely used in sleep deprivation, shift work, fatigue,
and stimulant drug research (Doran, Van Dongen, & Dinges, 2001; Thorne et al., 2005).
Reaction time after maritime night shifts has been shown to be significantly longer than
after day shifts (Lützhöft et al., 2007).
Objective, physiological methods include the following:

(c) An objective technique for measuring fatigue is based on the recording of EEG (i.e.,
electrical brain activity), in most cases, in combination with EOG (i.e., eye movements)
(Lal & Craig, 2002). The physiological methods EEG and EOG have been established as
suitable tools for objective characterization of fatigue, as delta and beta activity of the
brain increases, and blink characteristics change in several ways, as a function of fatigue
(Åkerstedt & Gillberg, 1990; Lal & Craig, 2002; Schleicher, Galley, Briest, & Galley, 2008).
The Karolinska drowsiness test is a short EEG test session that involves looking at a dark
circle for 5 min, sometimes followed by closing the eyes for a few minutes (Åkerstedt &
Gillberg, 1990).
(d) Eye movements, such as blinking or gaze, can be measured with special equipment. Blink
duration as well as the proportion of long-closure blinks increases when participants are
sleepy (Caffier, Erdmann, & Ullsperger, 2003). This finding has also been demonstrated in
field and simulator studies of driving and flying (Häkkinen, Summala, Parinen, Tiihonen,
& Silvo, 1999; Ingre, Åkerstedt, Peters, Anund, & Kecklund, 2006; Morris & Miller, 1996).
Gaze control measures are sensitive to information processing in general and fatigue in
particular (Schleicher et al., 2008; Sirevaag & Stern, 2000). Among these measures, blink
duration, delay of lid reopening, blink interval, and standardized lid closure speed have
been identified as the best indicators of subjective as well as objective sleepiness (Schleicher
et al., 2008). So far, this technique has, to the best of our knowledge, been used in only
one study to measure fatigue on board ships (Lützhöft, Dahlgren, Kircher, Thorslund, &
Gillberg, 2010). Research results recommend oculomotor measures in combination with
subjective ratings (Sirevaag & Stern, 2000).
The Effects of the Ship Environment on Sleep

Shift work on board has a number of effects on humans (Collins et al., 2000). The most
obvious effect is the disturbed circadian rhythm, found, for instance, in a study of
60 naval officers (20 on day work and 40 on night shifts). Melatonin and cortisol (sleep-
related hormones) profiles were examined, and results showed that 52% of the partici-
pants retained their normal profiles after 24 hr, which means that they were misaligned
to a night shift sleep-wake cycle. It is hard to stay awake at night and sleep during the
day, which will lead to compromised work performance. Furthermore, 12% of the offi-
cers showed the beginnings of adaptation after night duties, 19% showed abnormal
sleep rhythms, and 17% showed very low levels of melatonin. The “abnormal” group
was judged not suitable for shift work. It was harder to ascertain whether the “low-level”
group was suitable for shift work (Goh, 2000).
Sleep fragmentation is when sleep is broken up in several sleep episodes. It is com-
mon for watch keepers on board to sleep twice in a 24-hr period, and depending on the
watch system and the circadian rhythm, they might sleep longer (some hours) and nap
(usually 1 hr or less) or sleep a few hours twice. Sanquist et al. (1997) found in a logbook
study that sleep periods were frequently less than 5 hr. Lützhöft et al. (2007) measured
sleep lengths with actigraphs and found frequent sleep lengths less than 4 hrs, typically
3.5 hr (in the 6-on/6-off system). Härmä et al. (2008) recorded lengths of 4.06 hr in the
6-on/6-off watch system and 4.50 hr in the 4-on/8-off watch system.
Reyner and Baulk (1998) found in two ferry crews that the crew with a split schedule,
and thus split sleep, had lower sleep duration and lower quality sleep during the work
week than when at home. The split-sleep group also experienced greater sleep distur-
bance and shorter sleep than a group working one shift per 24 hr. Performance measures
were not taken. The implications are that as yet, it is not clear whether the impairment
levels found in the split-sleep regimen are applicable to the shipboard environment. The
main reason is that the anchor sleep on board is seldom taken at night or for a sufficient
duration.
The ship environment introduces conditions that are seldom present in other work-
places. First, seafarers stay at the workplace to sleep, which means that daily work and
noise are all around (but there is also a shorter “travel time” to bed). Second, weather
introduces movement (wind, waves) and noise (wind, ice). Third, the ship travels across
time zones; but in this area, there is no known research in the maritime domain.
Noise and motion most probably combine with each other to produce low-quality
sleep. Lützhöft et al. (2007) found that sleep efficiency was less than 80% in both 6-on/6-
off and 4-on/8-off watch types. Similarly, Arendt et al. (2006) reported less than 80%
efficiency when comparing a fixed and rotating system (variations on the 4-on/8-off
system), but it was worse for those on a rotating shift. Sanquist et al. (1997) found on a
4-on/8-off watch ship no significant difference among the watches (i.e., the watches
worked between 4 and 8, 8 and 12, and 12 and 4, respectively). Louie and Doolen (2007)
surveyed 43 watch-keeping officers in the 4-on/8-off watch system and found good self-
ratings of sleep quality.
Smith et al. (2003) found that ship and oil rig workers (offshore workers) rated their
sleep quality lower than did onshore workers. Rutenfranz et al. (1988) used a scale from
1 to 100 with the end measures called very bad and very good, similar to sleep quality or
efficiency measured as a percentage. The results ranged from 50 to 80 in a three-watch
system, similar to the sleep quality measures of less than 80% found with actigraphs.
Slightly better were the actigraph results from the Cardiff Research Programme that
show levels of 89% for offshore workers (Smith et al., 2006). In sum, we may note that
all watch keepers in all watch systems on board ships seem to experience disturbed sleep.
Prior studies showed effects of noise and movement on sleep, and some studies have
been performed on noise and movement in particular. In 1997, two men slept in a sleep
laboratory for 1 night while subjected to the sound of a 65-dB(A) diesel engine recorded
in a cabin on a ship (Tamura, Kawada, & Sasazawa, 1997). The results suggested dis-
turbance of rapid eye movement and shallow sleep cycles. Tamura further studied
habituation to noise (Tamura, Horiyasu, & Sano, 2002). In that study, 4 participants slept
4 undisturbed nights in a sleep laboratory, followed by 8 nights of exposure to the
recording of a 60-dB(A) diesel engine. The result showed habituation to some extent as
measured subjectively but no habituation as measured by actigraphy (Tamura et al.,
2002). A recent study performed in ship simulators subjected participants to three levels
of noise intensity (50 to 60 dB, 87 dB, and 95 dB) during 15 to 18 min, and findings
included a significant effect on tiredness. As noise increased, tiredness increased.
Similarly, in a large study on supply and dive ships, effects of noise (and motion) on
performance and sleep were found (Smith & Ellis, 2002). High levels of noise meant
increased alertness and greater focusing of attention but also slower reaction times,
more lapses of attention, and lower sleep efficiency. A later study found similar effects of
noise on performance but none on sleep efficiency (Smith & Ellis, 2002). The same study
found no effects of motion on performance or sleep (Ellis, Allen, & Burke, 2003).
Haward, Lewis, and Griffin (2009) showed that ratings of tiredness and sleep prob-
lems were highly correlated with motions. In the case of tiredness and sleep problems,
more than 75% of the crew reported problems at the lowest motion magnitudes, with
noise and vibration cited as causes of sleep problems in addition to motion. Grow and
Sullivan (2009) found correlations between movement and degraded sleep. Finally,
Calhoun (1999) also noted that vibrations have a negative effect on sleep.
The workdays on ships are longer than at most workplaces ashore, and hours worked
per day on board ships show an increase across the years. Rutenfranz et al. (1988) found
9.4 to 10.4 work hours per 24-hr day (on 4-on/8-off watches). Sanquist et al. (1997)
found on average 11.5 hr per day on 4-on/8-off ships, whereas Hjort (2008) recently
found 11 to 15 hr per day on two-navigator 6-on/6-off watch ships. One problem is the
trade-offs between the actual hours worked, the legal work hour limitations, and the
recorded hours. One officer reported wishing to fill in the logbook with his actual work
hours, but the master became very upset and stated that he could not do that since it
would show noncompliance with the working time rules (Hjort, 2008). Smith et al.
(2006) emphasized that excessive working hours are a problem in the seafaring industry,
and audits show that a number of crew falsify records. Such studies indicate that the cur-
rent stronger push for the inspection of recorded and worked hours may have both posi-
tive and negative effects (“MCA Crackdown,” 2010).
The Cardiff Research Programme (Smith et al., 2006) has shown that fatigue is asso-
ciated with many factors leading to acute and/or long-term symptoms. High work stress,
demands, short tour, and poor sleep were associated with both acute fatigue and long-
term accumulated fatigue (Smith et al., 2006). The factors related to only acute fatigue
were longer time on shift, working more than 12 hr, variable work hours, and switching
from sea watches to port watches (Smith et al., 2006). This study showed more fatigue
among shorter tours with many port calls than on longer tours (Smith et al., 2006).
There is also a trade-off between sleep and social interaction, as shown by Tirilly (2004).
Social contact episodes were centered on meals and in the evening between about 6 p.m.
and midnight. Thus, sleep may be fragmented because of both work schedules and
socializing. There are, however, few results on this, and Tirilly’s study was performed on
one oceanographic vessel and one fishing vessel.
Suggested Solutions and Their Possible Effects

This section starts with some low-level suggestions mainly aimed at the operational
level, followed by organizational solutions, and ends with conclusions.
Operational solutions. Some solutions concern what may be called the sleep envi-
ronment. This solution includes a good bed with individual sleeping equipment (mat-
tress, pillow), a dark and quiet environment, and a cool temperature. These factors are
all conducive to good sleep and are not very expensive or complicated to organize (Grow
& Sullivan, 2009; Lützhöft et al., 2007).
A common suggestion is to use various types of alarms on the bridge that wake watch
keepers. This solution does remove some of the risks of collision or grounding attribut-
able to actually falling asleep. However, it is not a realistic long-term solution, as it does
not eliminate the underlying sleep loss and fatigue (Lützhöft et al., 2007) that leads to
compromised cognitive functioning and therefore suboptimal actions and decisions.
There are models that can be used to calculate sleepiness and needed sleep and to
plan shift work. One model that is being updated with ship watch-keeping data is the
Sleep-Wake-Predictor software (Åkerstedt, Connor, Gray, & Kecklund, 2008). This
model can be used to predict sleepiness levels and indicates when sleepiness exceeds
risky limits. The model uses input about hours of work and the times at which work was
performed, and hours of sleep and when the sleep was taken.
Possible legislative measures include better incident and accident reporting, as pres-
ent reporting systems are inadequately designed to record factors relevant to fatigue
(Smith et al., 2006). One study suggested increasing the pressure on seafarers regarding
the following of regulations, but this suggestion will need the support of shore organiza-
tions, as seafarers on board cannot influence their ship’s schedule and hours of work
(Houtman et al., 2005). Finally, Houtman et al. (2005) suggested that a proper imple-
mentation of the ISM Code can provide support to those on board in particular.
Organizational solutions. Smith et al. (2006) summarize that fatigue at sea can be
addressed at three levels: legislation, company policy, and personal awareness and man-
agement. It is likely that success will be achieved only if all three are cooperatively
involved. Boivin (2000) suggests selecting adaptive personnel, considering crew prefer-
ence and age, organizing work and rest schedules, limiting overtime, implementing a
fatigue management program, and taking into account workload, circadian factors, and
trade. Organizational issues, such as the number of personnel, trip length, frequency and
duration of port visits, and shift planning, are issues that must be managed in coopera-
tion with shore organizations. More research is needed to judge the consequences of
other measures, such as shipping companies’ implementation of fatigue management
programs, which was suggested by Houtman et al. (2005), and Abernathy and Kelly’s
(2006) suggestion of education and coaching.
Conclusions. Studies show that many factors in combination must be considered to

understand fatigue at sea, such as poor-quality sleep, environmental factors, high job
demands and high stress (Smith et al., 2006), and that working more than two 6-hr shifts
within a 24-hr period should be avoided since it leads to very high levels of sleepiness.
The effect of split sleep is uncertain, but one study indicates that it may be feasible; how-
ever, it is not known how well the results will transfer to real life and work situations
(Mollicone, Van Dongen, Rogers, & Dinges, 2008). Arendt et al. (2006) showed that rota-
tion of shifts is not recommended.
Studies show that all watch keepers in all watch systems on board ships seem to expe-
rience disturbed sleep, indicating that not all fatigue issues can be solved by scheduling
alone. There should always be two persons on the bridge during watch keeping (Lützhöft
et al., 2007), generally an officer and a lookout. A two-watch ship may work if there is a
captain who does not normally take watches and if the two watch keepers can use their
free watches for sleep and rest (Lützhöft et al., 2007). These conclusions taken together
indicate that there are serious difficulties with a continued use of the two-watch system
on ships with only two nautical officers (Härmä et al., 1998; Lützhöft et al., 2007) and
that more crew are needed on board.
One report scrutinized the increased cost of adding crew members as well as the
number of additional crew members needed in total and concluded that it may be help-
ful to optimize the organization of work on board vessels, lengthen the rest periods, and
reduce the administrative tasks on board (Houtman et al., 2005). This conclusion again
implies that many solutions lie on an organizational, rather than an individual, level.
One attempt at addressing organizational issues, albeit not regarding fatigue, is the
research on culture and safety culture, which is discussed in the next section.
Culture In The Maritime Domain
Cross-cultural research has demonstrated the influence of culture on both organizational

practices and individual work behaviors, such as the way people communicate, make
decisions, and evaluate risks (Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000). The implication of this research
for the maritime and other industries is that culture affects the work environment. It is fair
to say that the maritime domain has a deeply rooted, embedded culture following centu-
ries of shipping traditions and its value on traditional behavior, with norms and practices
driven mainly by a set of universal rules and regulations (Shea, 2005). Although there has
been rapid “internationalization” within the shipping industry, it still maintains a tradi-
tional onboard and shore-based organizational structure (Alderton, Bloor, & Kahveci,
2004). It should be noted, however, that this structure has not stalled or affected technical
progress within the maritime domain, which is happening at a very rapid pace as was
demonstrated in the section Information Environment on the Bridge.
Multiculturalism in the Maritime Domain

As indicated in the introduction, the maritime industry carries with it some unique
characteristics not present in other industries. The literature identifies the multicultural
element, fewer onboard crew numbers, the closeness of their work and living conditions
with other crew members, and the traditional onboard hierarchy as some of the more
significant characteristics (Alderton et al., 2004; Barnes, 1984; Dyer-Smith, 1992; Inter-
national Labour Organization, 2002a, 2002b; Jensen et al., 2006; Lane, Obando-Rojas, Wu,
& Tasiran, 2002). Although not a new phenomenon (International Labor Organization,
2002), the shipping industry is considered to be a workplace of many nationalities, and
this is becoming more common not only on board ships but also in shore-based estab-
lishments, such as shipping companies, support organizations, and maritime education
institutions (Alderton et al, 2004).
Two main factors have been identified as influencing ship owners’ and managers’
decisions to opt for multicultural crew: (a) the economic factor encouraging employ-
ment of crew from low-cost crewing countries and (b) the global shortage of national
seafarers, especially officers (Kahveci & Sampson, 2001). Most in the industry argue that
the “cost factor” is more the case (Lane, 2000; Progoulaki, Knudsen, & Theotokas, 2006).
Lane notes that what makes multinational crew distinctive today is the extent to which
cost is used as a strong rationale for recruitment (Lane, 2000; Lane et al., 2002).
More than two thirds of merchant ships worldwide have now adopted multinational
crewing strategies comprising crews of two or more nationalities (Horck, 2006;
Komadina, Čišič, & Hlača, 2006; Lane et al., 2002; Warwick Institute for Employment
Research, 2005). Most seafarers hail from Asian countries, such as the Philippines, Indonesia,
India, China, and Vietnam. There is also a high proportion of seafarers recruited from the
Baltic states, such as Poland, Romania, and the former Soviet Union (Warwick Institute for
Employment Research, 2005). Considering the various mix of nationalities, national
culture has had a major impact on shipboard work within the maritime domain, par-
ticularly as globalization is now part and parcel of this domain (Couper, 2000; European
Union-DG VII 1999; Komadina, Čišič, & Hlača, 2006; Østreng, 2001; Tayeb, 1994;
Warwick Institute for Employment Research, 2005).
Research suggests that meaningful and relatively long-lasting distinctions exist among
various national cultures (Helmreich & Merritt, 2004; Hofstede, 1980, 1997, 2001; Tayeb,
1994; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1993). Hofstede’s significant work in the area
of culture has been referenced substantially (Hofstede, 1980, 1997, 2001). According to
Hofstede, culture can be classified into four dimensions with countries hierarchically
ordered, and this classification characterizes individual behavior as well as organiza-
tional and social practices. There has been another dimension added over time, long-
term orientation, but the ones mentioned in the following are believed to be the most
influential within the maritime domain (Pyne & Koester, 2005):
(a) Individualism-collectivism refers to the way in which individuals feel duty bound to pur-
sue their group or organizational goals (collectivism) rather than their own individual
goals (individualism).
(b) Power distance is related to the way people perceive differences in their status and the
way they expect and accept power as compared with their subordinates or superiors.
(c) Uncertainty avoidance is defined as the extent to which members of a culture tend to feel
threatened by uncertain or new situations.
(d) Masculinity-femininity is related to the way gender roles are defined in some countries.
This relates to assertiveness and competitiveness versus modesty and caring.
If one looks at power distance, for example, Hofstede’s distinction alludes that people
coming from high–power distance countries are less likely to approach or question their
superiors directly, and the contrary applies to those coming from low–power distance
countries. In high–power distance cultures, subordinates would be less likely to report
errors they notice coming from their superiors. Occupational differences can also reveal
differences in power distance. For example, in the maritime domain, it is still uncom-
mon even today for crew members to question the master of their vessel. Power distance
may provide a number of challenges in multicultural crews, especially if they come from
diverse power distance cultures.
Hofstede’s work in this area has generated a lot of debate with several views expressed,
ranging from support to disagreement (Baskerville, 2003; Knudsen & Froholdt, 2009;
McSweeney, 2002). The main concern regarding Hofstede’s work is related to the use of
these dimensions in explaining individual behavior (Froholdt & Knudsen, 2007;
Knudsen & Froholdt, 2009). Kundsen and Froholdt’s (2009) main concern, for example,
is that choosing one single model of culture and treating it as indisputable within the
context of seafaring can be problematic, especially because Hofstede’s model can be used
to create and reinforce “stereotypical views of other cultures” (p. 109). Knudsen and
Froholdt argue that “we must be constantly aware or at least open to all possible kinds of
groupings and not just national groupings that Hofstede draws upon” (p. 109). Other
researchers have expressed reservation about the existence of such dimensions in rela-
tion to national culture (Magala, 2004; McSweeney, 2002).
Similarly to Knudsen and Froholdt, McSweeney (2002) indicated that “what Hofstede
identified is not national culture, but an averaging of situationally specific opinions
from which dimensions or aspects of national culture are unjustifiably inferred” (p. 22).
Thus, although Hofstede’s work in this area provides some general indication about
national culture, the applicability of these dimensions to distinguish between people
coming from different countries must be treated with caution. So although national
culture is said to influence occupational contexts and practices, the reverse is also true in
that national diversity also creates differences in occupational and organizational cul-
tures (Magala, 2004).
Still, a large body of research supports the notion that there are distinctions among
various national cultures and that these dimensions are useful to compare general ten-
dencies in different countries, as they describe social systems that produce the most
dominant values in the majority of people residing within that system (Tayeb, 1994;
Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1993). Indeed, within the maritime domain,
Hofstede’s power distance dimension is used commonly for examining and explaining
distinctions among seafarers (European Union-DG VII, 1999; Pyne & Koester, 2005).
Cultural Studies in the Maritime Domain

The multicultural nature of the maritime domain, with its global and diverse workforce
and its international setting, requires that a careful study of culture is essential for stake-
holders who operate in this sphere. Research on multicultural crews has attracted
increasing attention from other research organizations (i.e., aviation) and has prolifer-
ated into the maritime domain, where research on shipboard complexities arising from
multicultural crews has recently been carried out (Horck, 2005, 2008). This research
looks at how multicultural crews influence ship safety and performance (European
Union-DG VII, 1999; Horck, 2005, 2006; Kahveci & Sampson, 2001; Knudsen &
Froholdt, 2009; National Maritime Polytechnic, 2006; Progoulaki et al., 2006; Theotokas
& Progoulaki, 2007).
Maritime reports point to multiculturalism as bringing with it both advantages and
disadvantages (Horck, 2004; Kavechi, Lane, & Sampson, 2001; Lane, 2001; Østreng,
2001; Progoulaki, 2003; Sampson & Zhao, 2003). Problems revealed among culturally
diverse crews include communication between ship’s crew and third parties ashore or on
other vessels (European Union-DG VII, 1999; Horck, 2008); lack of linguistic skills, such
as English language fluency (National Maritime Polytechnic, 2006); power relations
issues (Pyne & Koester, 2005); discrimination and racism; and shortfalls in management
skills of senior officers (Amante, 2004; Progoulaki et al., 2006; Theotokas & Progoulaki,
2004). Some of these studies are reviewed next.
Horck has carried out extensive studies on the issue of culture within the maritime
context (Horck, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008). Most of his studies focus on multicultural
diversity and its effect on communication, highlighting risk problems, such as crew’s low
level of spoken English. This issue is the basis of most of his work. He argued that the
maritime industry does not appear to be coping well with diversity, indicating that lack
of guidance in this area is the main concern (Horck, 2006). In recent years, “lack of com-
munication” leading to, for example, misunderstandings on board ships has been found
to be a contributory factor, both directly and indirectly, in maritime accidents. Horck
argued that a lack of cultural awareness and poor mastery of the English language can
explain the reason for communication problems leading to onboard safety decrements
and shipboard accidents.
Horck’s research in this area contributes to a better understanding of the risks involved
(i.e., smaller and less skilled crew) and the mitigation strategies required—mainly, appro-
priate and relevant education in cultural awareness and English language. Horck (2005)
indicates that through an appreciation of the role of culture in organizations comes a bet-
ter understanding of management and organizational behavior around the world.
Similar findings were evident in Theotokas and Progoulaki’s (2007) study, which
focused on Greek shipping companies (incorporating ship management and ship-owning
companies) and Greek seafarers. This study examined how both shipping companies
and seafarers perceive culture and its effects on the way crews are managed and ships
operated. With Greek-owned ships today employing a large proportion of multicultural
crew, their study aimed at examining the influence of national culture on staffing strate-
gies and typical management practices. In addition, the study sought to establish what
effect culture had on the performance of multicultural crews with respect to effective-
ness, cooperation, and effective communication on board and between ship and shore.
Their findings show that problems encountered on board ships are related to “cul-
tural and linguistic incompatibility, as well as inadequate and inappropriate training”
(Theotokas & Progoulaki, 2007, p. 399). They found that crew managers and seafarers
both lacked a clear perception of culture and hence concluded that cultural management
is one way to improve communication and team performance at all levels.
Most research shows that cultural diversity is not the problem per se within the mari-
time domain. The main problem lies in the way multiculturalism is managed and how
well multinational crews are able to function cohesively. Three large studies carried out
within the maritime domain support this notion (European Union-DG VII, 1999;
Kahveci et al., 2001; National Maritime Polytechnic, 2006).
The National Maritime Polytechnic (2006) study sought to identify the problems
encountered by Filipino seafarers in their relationship with the rest of the crew from
other nationalities. A survey was conducted in which a total of 1,140 questionnaires
from seafarer respondents representing 160 shipping companies were gathered. The
findings showed that around two thirds (66%) of respondents claimed that they had no
serious problems working with crews from other nationalities. This was mostly attrib-
uted to having established “smooth interpersonal relationships with the rest of the crew”
(National Maritime Polytechnic, 2006, p. 3). The 31% of respondents who indicated
having experienced problems on board ships staffed by mixed-nationality crews identi-
fied communication, language, and attitude-related issues as their main concerns.
Another study, conducted by the SIRC across a period of 2 years, examined what sort
of impact mixed-nationality crews had on shipboard communities (Kahveci et al., 2001;
Kahveci & Sampson, 2001). A number of SIRC researchers sailed on board various ships
and lived alongside multinational crews. The study involved a combination of observa-
tion and interviewing techniques, and a total of 242 seafarer interviews from 14 ships
were collected. Findings from this study revealed that mixed-nationality crews worked
extremely well in forming a cohesive shipboard society and hence fared no worse than
single-nationality crews. Furthermore, despite concerns related to perceived cultural and
linguistic barriers among mixed-nationality crews, the results showed that many seafar-
ers actually preferred sailing with mixed-nationality crews.
In this regard, there are now widely shared views among ship owners and ship man-
agers as to which nationalities best integrate to ensure an optimal and effective mixed-
nationality workforce. Some ship companies have become very selective and even have
policies in place on the mix of nationalities they employ on board their ships (Lane,
2001; Lane et al., 2002). Ship owners and ship managers also try to avoid “majorities” or
“minorities” on board by having as many nationalities as possible (Lane et al., 2002).
Lane alludes to this policy as being “an attractive policy as it promotes the idea that unity
is best built out on diversity” (Lane, 2001, p. 4).
The Maritime Communication project is an extensive research program funded by
the European Union and is based on a literature review of accident reports, interviews
with various maritime organizations, and onboard observations examining ship compa-
nies’ perspectives toward multicultural and multilingual crews (European Union-DG
VII, 1999). Part of the study aimed to examine the rationale behind the practice of
engaging mixed-nationality crews on board ships and to further identify the nationality
problems, if any, that these companies face in the use of such crews and the ways through
which these problems are addressed and controlled. The data were collected via postal
surveys and semistructured interviews with managers, shipping companies, and ship-
board crew hailing from different countries.
From a number of factors (tradition, language, cost, abilities training, right mix,
trade, and other), participants were asked to indicate their preference in relation to
employing various nationalities. The findings showed that some of the decisions taken
in relation to crewing strategies were based on cultural criteria, such as tradition and
seafarer English language skills, and these factors were identified as being crucial in mul-
ticultural crew shipboard performance (European Union-DG VII, 1999).
The problem, however, is that currently, nationality mix on board is mainly based on
experience and anecdotal evidence, with little research directed toward this issue. Although
to some extent Hofstede’s power distance model is used to determine how nationalities can
be mixed, Knudsen and Froholdt (2009) dispute whether a cohesive nationality mix should
be based on Hofstede’s power distance model. They argue that the most popular national
mixes occur when there is a large experience of collaboration following steady familiariza-
tion, as supported by the National Maritime Polytechnic and SIRC studies. The SIRC study
findings showed that stereotyping diminished with increased contact between crews (Lane,
2001). Thus, seafarers were less likely to have stereotyped understandings of the nationality
groups with whom they had sailed regularly and were more likely to generalize about
national groups with whom they had little contact.
Knudsen and Froholdt (2009) recommended that the solution to ensuring a cohesive
functional nationality mix is to encourage more permanent employment and higher
retention rates. The SIRC study established that stability (providing job security) in
recruitment practices also provided the ideal context for the linguistic development of
crews (Kahveci & Sampson, 2001). An added advantage highlighted in relation to per-
manent employment and a more stable crew on board is the positive effect this has on
safety culture (Anderson, 2003; Pun, Yam, & Lewis, 2003), whereby crew are open to
communication and willing to report incidents and near misses. The issue is whether the
drive for cheap labor is a barrier to the establishment of crews serving together for long
periods.
Organizational culture. Organizational culture is a multidimensional construct that

encompasses a wide range of aspects and refers to the way operational practices are car-
ried out in an organization. National culture, although not the only variable of impor-
tance, contributes significantly to explaining key differences in organizational culture
and behavior (Progoulaki, 2003; Tayeb, 1994; Treven, Mulej, & Lynn, 2008). It is now
widely recognized that people’s motivations, behaviors, and work attitudes, whether
positive or negative, are influenced by the organizational culture and organizational
practices in which they work (Ashkanasy, Broadoot, & Falkus, 2000; Tayeb, 1994). This
influence poses a challenge for maritime organizations and their effective functioning
with cultural variety existing within and between units of the same organization.
In general, within other domains, research in the area of organizational culture has
been quite extensive (Ashkanasy et al., 2000; Tayeb, 1994). However, few studies have
been carried out within the maritime domain in this area, and most research focuses
mainly on communication issues (European Union-DG VII, 1999; Horck, 2006; Hughes,
2000; Pyne & Koester, 2005). One study involved a “bottom-up” research approach
focusing on the way organizational culture is influenced by individuals, teams, and the
organization as a whole and what approaches and tools are needed to make an organiza-
tion more effective in reaching desired goals (Ekow Manuel, 2009). Ekow Manuel’s
(2009) findings showed that “organizational learning” within the maritime field has
been mainly legislative driven with little regard for the individual behavioral aspect.
This finding is supported by Progoulaki (2006), who examined “social responsibility”
within the maritime industry, including shipping companies, within the context of deal-
ing with the management of multicultural crews (Progoulaki, 2006; Progoulaki et al.,
2006). Progoulaki expressed the view that most companies operate within the limits of
international rules and regulations, aiming mainly to increase profits with little regard
for the social well-being of their employees (e.g., in terms of providing the right level of
onboard communication technology, ensuring planning process of work rotations, and
providing flexibility and support in family matters). She indicated, though, that a few
companies integrate “supportive behavior” within their organizational framework,
which she referred to as “socially responsible” companies. Socially responsible compa-
nies go beyond compliance with rules and regulations and embrace new ways of running
their business by setting their own high standards in terms of balancing employee well-
being, environmental issues, and stakeholder interests with its operations.
Although her study was limited in scope and hard to generalize, she found that com-
pany social responsibility is part and parcel of managing multiculturalism. She con-
cluded that “more needs to be done, in order to achieve a socially acceptable behavior of
all the industrial actors to its seagoing personnel” (Progoulaki et al., 2006, p. 1). Det
Norske Veritas (2004a) put together a report proposing activities that socially responsi-
ble shipping companies need to direct toward the crew. These activities include provid-
ing crew with the ability to communicate with relatives and friends while at sea, onboard
welfare and recreation services, crew training in cultural awareness, health and safety,
and tackling of environmental concerns.
Maritime safety culture. Safety culture is a specific element of organizational culture

that incorporates management and organizational factors and also individual percep-
tions toward safety in their work environment (Cooper, 2000; Pidgeon, 1991; Reason,
1997; Westrum, 1995; Zhang, Wiegmann, & Von Thaden, 2002; Zohar, 1980). Despite
increased efforts to enhance safety at sea, seafaring is still considered a risky profession
with mortality rates considerably higher than in populations ashore (Hansen, 1996; Hansen,
Nielsen, & Frydenberg, 2002; Jaremin, 1997; Nielsen, 1997, 1999; Rodrýguez, 2007).
Incidence rates (number of accidents during the working day, leading to lost work
time related to the number of workers exposed) measured by Rodrýguez (2007) for
European shipping revealed a substantial difference in this value between shore-based
and maritime transport figures. For shore-based jobs, the average figure was 6,136.4
accidents, whereas for maritime transport, it was 9,623.6 accidents leading to lost time
for every 100,000 workers. Cost associated with safety and environmental losses have
also been on the rise (Ornitz, 2001; U.S. Coast Guard, 1997). For example, the total
annual cost of incidents for all vessels is calculated to be in the region of $581 million—
and this is quoted as being a conservative figure, with this amount increasing on a yearly
basis (Ornitz, 2001).
Most accidents at sea involve an unsafe act (or failure to act) by an individual, referred
to as “active failures,” but they also involve conditions created by the organization,
referred to as “latent failures” (Reason, 1997). A number of studies have demonstrated
that factors that reside within organizations, such as organizational practices (quality of
SMS, adequacy of training, safety equipment), communication, and crew involvement
in safety-related issues, can predict safety-related outcomes, such as accidents and inci-
dents (Choudhry, Fang, & Mohamed, 2007; Goulielmos, Mitroussi, & Gatzoli, 2008;
Neal et al., 2000; Zohar, 1980). Industries such as aviation have taken theoretical knowl-
edge and approaches they have developed for a large number of years and successfully
put them to practical use. One example is the successful implementation of crew resource
management training, focusing on effective crew coordination, communication, and
human factors (Helmreich & Merritt, 2004).
Det Norske Veritas conducted an analysis of the maritime industry’s attitude toward
safety (Det Norske Veritas, 2004b). As a result of this study, it categorized companies into
three safety-related areas:
1. Those with an evasive culture: companies that do not take safety culture seriously and
try to evade safety rules;
2. Those with a compliant culture: companies that adhere to the minimum safety stan-
dards; and
3. Those with a safety culture: companies that believe in and are committed to continuous
improvement.
This classification highlights the challenges for this industry, which in general tends
to take two directions in response to major accidents with the intention of avoiding risk.
One is the blame aspect, wherein the focus is on punitive action as a deterrent (Hänninen,
2007). The second is the introduction of new rules and regulations (Knudsen, 2009).
Although safety is something the maritime industry is strongly committed to in concept,
it has not yet created a culture that is fully supportive of safety.
Hänninen (2007) pointed out that an unsatisfactory reporting culture exists in the
maritime industry, leading to an inadequate flow of information. This finding is sup-
ported by a study conducted by the Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State
Control (2008), which reported that one of the most common deficiencies in current
SMSes concerns the reporting of nonconformities and occurrences of accidents. Other
studies supporting these claims indicate that some mariners are still reluctant to expose
their mistakes (Anderson, 2003; Lappalainen & Salmi, 2009). This lack of reporting is a
barrier for the establishment and improvement of a safety culture within the maritime
domain. One way to achieve continuous improvement in safety culture is to ensure the
proper reporting and effective use of near-misses, deficiencies, and nonconformities
data (Kuo, 2000, 2007; Reason, 1997). It is evident that there is room for improvement in
the reporting of deficiencies and nonconformities in this domain.
The ISM Code: Is It Working?

The maritime industry today does recognize the importance of management and orga-
nizational factors to shipboard safety, specifically following the aftermath of the Herald
of Free Enterprise accident (Sheen, 1987), whereby in 1990 the United Kingdom put
forward a proposal to the International Maritime Organization to set up an SMS
(International Maritime Organization, 1998). In 1998, the ISM Code was made manda-
tory and incorporated within the Safety of Life at Sea Convention as a new chapter
(Chapter IX). Regulated by the International Maritime Organization, this code requires
ship operators to produce and implement a formal, documented SMS and covers the
organizational and provisional requirements that companies must implement to con-
trol safety and to prevent pollution risks. One of the main aims of the code is to link
every ship to a ship operator ashore (Shea, 2005). This code applies to and affects most
activities carried out on board ships as well as ashore.
It is now widely recognized that the ISM Code is one of the most important measures
adopted by the International Maritime Organization, as it was designed to ensure that ship
managers make safety a priority (Mejia, 2001). A number of reviews and evaluations of the
effectiveness of the ISM Code have now been conducted. One of the initial empirical stud-
ies conducted to systematically evaluate the effectiveness of the ISM Code implementation
was Anderson’s (2002, 2003), with the use of questionnaire surveys. Anderson analyzed a
total of 3,000 questionnaires from seafarers, ship operators, and other maritime stakehold-
ers. Initial findings indicated that the ISM Code created problems in a number of areas,
with the following issues identified: “too much paperwork,” “too many forms to fill in,”
“too many manuals,” “not enough time,” “not enough people,” “no support from com-
pany,” “no confidence in junior officers,” “the SMS is alien to the company,” and that the
code represents “just a paperwork exercise” (Anderson, 2002, p. 42).
Surprisingly, Anderson (2002, 2003) found major differences in perception of the ISM
Code between cultural-national groupings: Those from the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development countries expressed negative views, and those from devel-
oping countries (i.e., India, Philippines) tended to be more positive in their views of the ISM
Code, thereby highlighting the diversity of the industry. Anderson found additional issues
that became evident following the analyses of the surveys, including the following:
•• Seafarers were not involved in the design and preparation stages of the SMS.
•• Most seafarers were unfamiliar with the requirements of the ISM Code and were pro-
vided with no training prior to implementation.
•• Seafarers’ first contact with the ISM Code was when the manuals appeared on board.
•• There was a lack of a “common standard” between shipping companies, flag-state
administrations, classification societies, and port-state control authorities.
As a result of this study, Anderson published guidance documents specifically targeted

toward shipboard crew to provide a clearer and simpler understanding of the require-
ments of the ISM Code (Anderson & Kidman, 2002a, 2002b). Anderson concluded that on
the whole, the ISM Code, despite its implementation challenges, has been moderately
effective in the safety arena. First, it provided the maritime domain with a measurable
safety indicator, where previously one was virtually nonexistent. It also provided the
industry with a basic level of safety requirements, raising the global threshold of safety.
Following Anderson’s initial review, a number of studies were conducted to evaluate
the ISM Code at various stages of implementation. In May 2006, the International
Maritime Organization assessed the impact and effectiveness of the ISM Code’s imple-
mentation on safety culture (International Maritime Organization, 2006). The conclu-
sions were similar to Anderson’s, indicating that the ISM in general was a positive step in
improving safety; however, the issue of excessive paperwork was highlighted as the big-
gest impediment. The International Maritime Organization study also revealed some
serious limitations with the current accident and incident statistics data, specifically, that
it was hard to compare these data on a global scale because they lacked a homogeneous
standard. An added problem was that it was difficult to obtain such data.
Following this study, a number of recommendations were put forward, which
included that (a) seafarers must be motivated in using the reporting and monitoring
systems specified in the ISM Code and (b) seafarers should be trained and actively
involved in reviewing the company SMS. Most of the findings of these earlier studies
were mainly based on quantitative methods, such as structured questionnaires, the
results of which have been analyzed statistically (Anderson, 2002, 2003; Bhattacharya,
2006; International Maritime Organization, 2006; Mejia, 2001). Hence, because very few
qualitative methods used, to some extent, the direct impact of the ISM Code on mari-
time safety is hard to evaluate (Lappalainen, 2008; Lappalainen & Salmi, 2009).
Although these studies are limited in providing a general indication of the impact of
the ISM Code, Lappalainen and Salmi (2009) pointed out some of the benefits that came
about as a result of these studies:
•• The studies covered a global perspective,

•• The findings reinforced the view that the ISM Code achieved its objectives and that the
majority of the world’s maritime industry supports the ISM Code, and
•• The findings uncovered difficulties and deficiencies in the implementation of the ISM
Code.
As a follow-on to these initial “exploratory” studies, the Developing Maritime Safety

Culture project was initiated (Lappalainen, 2008). This study was funded by the
European Commission together with other partners and evaluated the impact of the
ISM Code on maritime safety culture, focusing mainly on Finnish shipping. To compre-
hensively study cultural factors, such as attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and values of
maritime personnel, the researchers chose to adopt interviews as the main research
method for this study. The outcome of this project was to recommend best practices in
safety culture for shipping companies that included improving operations through the
development of their SMSes. The findings were extracted from data gathered through
interviews with 94 participants (68 seafarers, including pilots; 14 shore-based managers;
and 12 maritime administration personnel) from seven Finnish shipping companies

and the Finnish maritime administration.
Although the results were based on interviews with Finnish maritime personnel,
some recommendations could be generalized. Several suggestions were put forward
(Lappalainen, 2008) and include the following:
•• the need for simplification of system documentation,
•• provision of further guidance in the application of the ISM Code,
•• development of suitable safety performance indicators, and
•• harmonization of the interpretation of the ISM requirements.
The general view now is that to continue improving the ISM Code, it is important to
continue assessing its impact and effectiveness on safety culture, and this evaluation
should incorporate a detailed and comparative assessment of different ship types, flag
states, and crew nationalities.
Maritime Safety Culture Studies

There is a substantial body of literature dealing with the relationship between safety
culture and safety of operations within various industries. Within the maritime domain,
the literature in this area is sparse and fragmented, with scope and depth varying widely.
In this regard, very few studies in the literature relating safety culture and safety of
operations were identified to provide some empirical evidence that safety attitudes
within the maritime domain have a positive relationship to safety of operations and vice
versa (Ek, 2006; Ek & Akselsson, 2005; Shea, 2005). Shea (2005) aimed to explore the
nature of organizational culture and climate on board ships and established whether
links existed between the organizational culture and climate and the safety culture
through the occurrence of maritime accidents. Shea distinguished between culture and
climate, indicating that
organizational culture is pervasive and largely driven by factors not often discussed by
employees. Organizational climate however is the environment in which employees find
themselves working. Thus culture dictated the procedures necessary to accomplish a task,
while climate is largely responsible for the state of mind of the person accomplishing it.
(p. 49)
Shea (2005) used a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods through

both interviews and questionnaires to collect data from a total of 700 seafarers partici-
pating in the survey. He found information on positive and negative behaviors of ship-
board crew and linked them to organizational climate and safety culture. The findings
suggested that positive behaviors, such as open communication between officers and
ratings, resulted in a decreased accident rate, supporting a safer ship culture. On the
other hand, negative behaviors, such as unapproachable and uncommunicative officers
and little interest in operation of the ship, increased the likelihood that an accident
would occur on board ships, negatively affecting ship safety culture. The data also
showed that seafarers preferred working as members of a team, and when this
environment existed on board a ship, the ship had a safer organizational culture than on
a ship where it did not.
Another study (Ek & Akselsson, 2005) examined the characteristics of safety culture
within a maritime setting also using safety culture and organizational climate as perfor-
mance indicators. The aims of this study were to identify (a) areas in the safety culture
that were found to be problematic, (b) whether the perceptions of safety culture and
organizational climate were influenced by the individual’s hierarchical level on board,
and (c) whether relationships exist between the safety culture and the organizational
climate dimensions. This study focused on six passenger ships, and the data were gath-
ered with the use of both semistructured interviews and questionnaires. The question-
naires incorporated both safety culture (highlighted in Table 7.1) and organizational
climate dimensions. A total of 508 seafarers completed the safety culture questionnaire,
and 328 seafarers completed the organizational climate questionnaire.
The results of the study revealed that in general, most crew indicated a positive per-
ception toward safety culture for all safety culture dimensions. The safety culture dimen-
sions attitude toward safety and safety-related behaviors received high scores, whereas
learning, justness, and flexibility received somewhat lower scores. The authors concluded
that it will
most likely take some time before the maritime area reaches the level of maturity concern-
ing reporting that can be found, for example, in air traffic control in countries in northern
Europe. It is possible that the blame culture that has existed for so long in the maritime
area, and still does exist, could be a hindrance on the path towards good reporting. (Ek &
Akselsson, 2005, p. 174)
The findings also confirmed that a positive relationship exists between organizational
climate and safety culture, and this relationship was evident in all ships investigated.
Although these studies were useful in highlighting the link between organizational cli-
mate and safety culture, more work is needed in the area of shipboard organizational
culture to identify all the issues that are likely to affect maritime safety culture.
Overcoming Barriers to Creating an Effective Maritime

Safety Culture
The general study of safety culture within the maritime domain might benefit substan-
tially if agreement is reached, first of all, on its definition and, most importantly, on its
measurable constructs. In combination, both proactive and reactive approaches can
help to ascertain the effects of safety programs (Cooper, 2000). A consensus view is that
a multi-instruments approach should be adopted as a tool for establishing and measur-
ing safety culture (Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000).
Table 7.1 provides the key elements to achieving a proactive maritime safety culture
as proposed by a U.K. submission paper to the International Maritime Organization (Ek
& Akselsson, 2005; International Maritime Organization, 2003b; Lappalainen, 2008).
Each row provides the requirements that need to be established within the maritime
domain to ensure an effective safety culture. As shown in the table, some of these
requirements have common elements within each submission and are similar to those
already established in other domains, such as aviation.
The U.K. submission paper to the International Maritime Organization stressed the
need for organizations to measure performance in terms of safety culture effectiveness
to improve safety culture (International Maritime Organization, 2003b). The submis-
sion argued that promoting safe behavior is the key to ensuring an effective safety cul-
ture and added that if the desired behavior is not forthcoming, then “it may be the
environment (tools, equipment, procedures, etc.) the individual populates that requires
changing and not the individual” (International Maritime Organization, 2003, p. 2).
This human-centric philosophy, then, also conforms to the much-needed human factors
integration approach within the maritime domain (Elischer & Grech, 2008).
Promoting management commitment and employee participation in safety can
enhance the maritime organization safety culture and, in the process, promote profit-
ability (Ornitz, 2001). The observations of behavior is one of the key elements on the
program, as they can be analyzed to identify antecedents and their consequences to
ensure that the right intervention strategies and improvements within the organiza-
tional safety culture are being implemented (Jalonen & Salmi, 2009; Sudhakar, 2005).
Summary
Some of the factors mentioned earlier that have been found to affect culture and thus
safety within the maritime domain include multiculturalism and the way this is man-
aged on board ships, in occupational contexts, and in shipboard practices. To summa-
rize, many of the studies reviewed found communication and poor mastery of the
English language to be a critical issue for multinational crews, with findings pointing to
a need for cultural management awareness and training to enhance interpersonal
communication.
Unfortunately, within the maritime domain, this area of research has been substan-
tially limited. The large number of sociocultural variables involved within this industry
would be expected to have a substantial impact on individual behavior. Although the few
studies are a positive step in the understanding of maritime organizational culture, more
work is needed to examine the environmental forces, both internal and external to the
organization, that influence behavior in such a complex operational environment.
Studies should incorporate a framework that integrates national and organizational
variables to explain variation in work-related positive or negative behaviors at both the
individual and the team level. Empirical work in this area within the maritime domain
is important, as it would provide a better understanding of the relationship between
national culture, organizational practices, and crew behavior.
With regard to maritime safety culture, there are three important developmental
areas, some needing more attention than others:
1. Compliance. This area ensures that safety training programs, work conditions, proce-
dures, and processes comply with regulations. Safety rules should be understood and
adhered to, and all incidents must be reported and investigated quickly for actions to
be taken and for increased learning. The maritime domain does this part very well, per-
haps to some extent overwhelming shipboard crew with too many rules and regulations
requiring a high level of paperwork.
Table 7.1. Key Elements to Achieving a Proactive Maritime Safety Culture as Proposed
by International Maritime Organization (2003), Ek and Akselsson (2006), and
Lappalainen (2008)
International Maritime Ek and Akselsson

Organization (2003) (2006) Lappalainen (2008)
Stakeholder participation Organizational learning Motivated and encouraged

personnel on board to actively
initiate safety improvements
(personnel empowerment)
Commitment and visibility Reporting culture Commitment from company
senior management
Productivity/safety Just culture An established and actively
relationships working process of continuous
improvement
Trust Flexibility
Shared perceptions Safety-related behaviors
Communication Communication
Safety resources Attitudes toward safety
(commitment to safety)
Industrial relations and job Working situation
satisfaction
Training Risk perception
2. SMS. This area involves the documented process and formalized system of controlling
against risk or harm, and we have seen that it has been regulated within the maritime
domain with the ISM Code. Although this code has proven to be successful in general,
the section on maritime safety highlighted some issues in relation to its implementa-
tion, which included the high workload from increased paperwork and current staffing
strategies; the lack of guidance and involvement of seafarers in its development and
implementation, leading to unfamiliarity with aspects of the ISM Code; and the current
shortfalls in incident and near-miss reporting systems.
3. Behavioral safety system. This system introduces a process for measuring and teaching
individuals to be proactive. More work needs to be done in this area within the mari-
time domain first in terms of measuring this construct to establish what needs to be
done.
All three systems are important, as they provide a comprehensive process for build-
ing a solid foundation for an effective safety culture. Within the maritime domain, some
of these development areas just mentioned have been implemented in conjunction or
separately, some with a high level of success and some not so successfully.
Overall Summary and Recommendations
In general, more data are needed on human-technology-organizational issues in the

shipping system. In particular, studies are needed with larger populations and measures
of long-term effects. Nevertheless, there is a great value in many of the naturalistic
studies performed. First, they provide information about the real circumstances of
onboard work, and second, they provide rapport and credibility with the end users.
The number of accidents at sea has decreased in recent decades. However, accidents
still occur and many of them are related to human-system interaction. In some cases,
“human error” can be addressed by training, but a general principle should be not to fit
the human to the machine but to fit the machine, system, or procedure to the human. As
technology is still not mature enough for uninhabited ship systems, there will always be
an operator somewhere who needs to understand the situation and be in control. If we
keep adding technology and wish to keep the human on board, we must strive to keep
the human in the loop.
Regarding fatigue, studies show that many factors in combination must be consid-
ered to understand it, such as poor-quality sleep, environmental factors, high job
demands, and high stress. Furthermore, it would seem that working more than 2 × 6 hr
per 24 hr should be avoided, since doing so leads to very high levels of sleepiness. It is
likely that many of the solutions must be instigated and supported on an organizational
level, from shipping company to regulatory levels. Boivin (2000) suggested a number of
areas, such as selecting adaptive personnel, considering crew preference and age, orga-
nizing work and rest schedules, limiting overtime, implementing a fatigue management
program, and taking into account workload, circadian factors, and trade. Houtman et al.
(2005) recommend four measures: properly implementing the ISM Code, optimizing
the organization of work on board vessels, lengthening the rest periods, and reducing
administrative task on board. Organizational issues, such as the number of personnel,
trip length, frequency and duration of port visits, and shift planning, are common rec-
ommendations and must be managed in cooperation with shore organizations.
Within the maritime domain, the area of culture, even in our broad meaning, has
been substantially limited. More research is needed to examine the influence of sociocul-
tural variables in this complex operational environment. Empirical work in this area
within the maritime domain is important, as it would provide a better understanding of
the relationship between national culture, organizational practices, and crew behavior.
Most of the studies reviewed found communication to be a critical issue for multina-
tional crews, with findings pointing to a need for cultural management awareness and
training to enhance interpersonal communication. With regard to maritime safety cul-
ture, three areas need more attention than others: compliance—ensuring that training
programs, work conditions, procedures, and processes comply with regulations; the
SMS—the documented process and formalized system domain with the ISM Code; and
finally, a behavioral safety system—having a process for measuring, teaching, and
enabling safe actions by seafarers.
To conclude, in our technical section, we say that human errors at sea rarely occur
alone and are, for the most part, largely contextually driven cognitive errors. In our
fatigue section, we show that it is likely that many of the solutions must be instigated and
supported on an organizational level, from shipping company to regulatory levels. In the
culture section, the U.K. submission to the International Maritime Organization stressed
the need for organizations to measure performance in terms of safety culture effective-
ness to improve safety culture. The submission argued that promoting safe behavior is
the key to ensuring an effective safety culture and added that if the desired behavior is
not forthcoming, then “it may be the environment (tools, equipment, procedures, etc.)
the individual populates that required changing and not the individual” (International
Maritime Organization, 2003, p. 2).
Adopting a holistic and systemic framework, we show that on all levels of shipboard
work, more efforts must be made and changes introduced, but carefully. Recent efforts
made in cooperation between maritime human factors experts and the industry show
positive and promising results (Petersen, 2010). In most cases, change should revolve
around a human-centered approach, whether it is technical or procedural support that
is introduced.
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ABOUT THE AUTHORs
Margareta Lützhöft is a master mariner, trained at Kalmar Maritime Academy in

Sweden, and sailed for 13 years in Swedish ships. After leaving the sea, she studied for a
bachelor’s degree in cognitive science and a master’s in computer science. In December
2004, she received a PhD in human-machine interaction. She presently works as an
associate professor at Chalmers University of Technology, leading the Maritime Human
Factors research group in the Department of Shipping and Marine Technology, within
the Lighthouse Competence Centre.
Michelle R. Grech, a chartered engineer, has spent most of her career working within
the maritime domain as a project engineer, marine surveyor, and maritime human fac-
tors researcher. She completed her PhD in human factors from the University of
Queensland in 2005. She currently works for the Defence Science and Technology
Organisation (DSTO) in Australia in the maritime human factors area. She is involved
in conducting, managing, and providing expertise in human systems integration (HSI)
and human factors (HF) research to meet the needs of the Royal Australian Navy. She
has coauthored a book titled Human Factors in the Maritime Domain, published in 2008.
Thomas Porathe is a maritime human factors researcher in the Department of Shipping

and Marine Technology at Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden. He has a PhD
in information design and has for the past 10 years been working on projects involving
the information environment on the ship bridge. His main research interest concerns
mental rotations, map design, and the use of egocentric 3-D views in nautical chart
displays.

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Information Environment, Fatigue, and Culture in

S hips as transport vehicles are increasingly sophisticated and technically optimized.

This chapter begins by providing an introduction to shipping, emphasizing its com-

Brief History Of Maritime Human Factors

Human Factors in the Maritime Domain

The World of Shipping: An Overview

International Maritime Organization and International Labor Organization rules and

The reduction in shipboard crew has resulted in rapid technological developments to

Regulatory Situation and Maritime Safety

The Work on Board: Shipboard Organization

Information Environment On The Bridge

•• Human error continues to be a dominant factor in approximately 80% to 85% of mari-

A review of maritime incidents, accidents, and related literature published in a report

A Norwegian simulator study compared performance of high-speed navigation in

In contrast, in the maritime domain, it is difficult to find data on groundings and

Additionally, there is an element of unpredictability in shipping, including unpredict-

Earlier Reviews of Fatigue

Which Onboard Personnel Have Been Studied?

Methods of Measuring Fatigue

Objective, physiological methods include the following:

The Effects of the Ship Environment on Sleep

Suggested Solutions and Their Possible Effects

Conclusions. Studies show that many factors in combination must be considered to

Culture In The Maritime Domain

Cross-cultural research has demonstrated the influence of culture on both organizational

Multiculturalism in the Maritime Domain

Cultural Studies in the Maritime Domain

Organizational culture. Organizational culture is a multidimensional construct that

Maritime safety culture. Safety culture is a specific element of organizational culture

The ISM Code: Is It Working?

As a result of this study, Anderson published guidance documents specifically targeted

•• The studies covered a global perspective,

As a follow-on to these initial “exploratory” studies, the Developing Maritime Safety

and 12 maritime administration personnel) from seven Finnish shipping companies

Maritime Safety Culture Studies

Shea (2005) used a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods through

Overcoming Barriers to Creating an Effective Maritime

International Maritime Ek and Akselsson

Stakeholder participation Organizational learning Motivated and encouraged

Overall Summary and Recommendations

In general, more data are needed on human-technology-organizational issues in the

ABOUT THE AUTHORs

Margareta Lützhöft is a master mariner, trained at Kalmar Maritime Academy in

Thomas Porathe is a maritime human factors researcher in the Department of Shipping

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