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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
13 June 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT Critique of an Operational War Game

on Maps Conducted on the Southwestern Axis
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is a

translation from Russian of a TOP SECRET publication of the Headquarters of
the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Countries. It presents the
reports of the Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Staff of these armed forces
at the critique of a war game held for the purpose of training senior
command and staff officers of the Soviet, Bulgarian, and Hungarian armed
forces in the conduct of combined operations using both conventional and
nuclear weapons-aga-inst-NATO forces-in Turkey_, Greece, Austria, northern
Italy and adjacent waters. The publication presents the scenario of-the--
war game, the lessons learned in it, the deficiencies noted; and the
organization, dispositions, and axes of action of both sides. It includes
eleven diagrams depicting the respective orders of battle, the situation at
various phases, .and the course of events.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies.
William E. Nel en
Deputy Director for erations
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence

The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence

Department of the Arny
Director of Naval Intelligence

Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence

U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
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- Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY USSR/WARSAW PACT
DATE OF DATE 13 June 1975

INFO. 1970
SUBJECT
Critique of an Operational War Game on Maps Conducted

on the Southwestern Axis
SOURCE Documentary
Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of a TOP SECRET
publication of the Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw
Pact Countries which presents the reports of Marshal of the Soviet Union
I. I. Yakubovskiy, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces, and
General of the Army S. M. Shtemenko, Chief of Staff of the Combined Armed
Forces, at the critique of a war game held for the purpose of training
senior command and staff officers of the Soviet, Bulgarian, and Hungarian
armed forces in the conduct of combined operations using both conventional
and nuclear weapons against NATO forces in Turkey, Greece, Austria,
Northern Italy and adjacent waters. The publication presents the
following: the scenario of the war game, the lessons learned in it, the
deficiencies noted, the assumed relative conventional and nuclear
strengths; and the organization, dispositions, and axes of action of both
sides. It includes eleven diagrams depicting the respective orders of
battle, the situation at various phases, and the course of events.
End of Summary
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HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMBINED ARMED FORCES
TOP SECRET
--MATERIALF THE-
CRITIQUE OF THE OPERATIONAL WAR GAME ON MAPS
CONDUCTED ON THE SOUTHWESTERN AXIS
(July 1970)
Moscow - 1970
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In accordance with the combined measures plan of the Combined Armed

Forces of the member states of the Warsaw Pact, from 1 to 9 July 1970 an
operational war game on maps was conducted in Budapest with the
participation of operations groups from the staffs of the Bulgarian
People's Army, the Hungarian People's Army, and the Armed Forces of the
USSR. - - - --- - ---- - - ------
Marshal of the Soviet Union I. I. Yakubovskiy, Commander-in-Chief of

the Combined Armed Forces, directed the war game.
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REPORT of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces,
Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade I. I. Yakubovskiy,
at the Critique of the Operational War Game
Comrades!
Our operational war game has been completed. First of all, allow me
to express sincere gratitude to the Central Committee of the Hungarian
Socialist Labor Party and to the Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant
Government for affording us the opportunity of conducting this war game
here, in Budapest, the capital of the hospitable and fraternal Hungarian
People's Republic.
High-level staffs and operations groups from the Bulgarian People's

Army, the Hungarian People's Army, the Soviet Armed Forces, and also
representatives-of-the -C-zechos-lovak People'-s-Army, participated in the _ _
game.
Allow me to welcome the leaders and representatives present here from

the fraternal armies, and through them salute the armed forces of the
People's Republic of Bulgaria, Hungarian People's Republic, Soviet Union,
and Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.
The current war game occupies an important place in the operational

training plans of the Combined Armed Forces of the member states of the
Warsaw Pact. Its aim was to study the most urgent problems of preparing
and conducting combined operations by allied troops and navies in the
Southwestern Theater of Military Operations and to further improve the
preparedness of senior personnel of the general staffs, formation
commanders, and operational staffs of the allied armies and navies.
This war game, like other combined measures, will also help to further
strengthen the combat brotherhood of the fraternal armies, to improve
mutual understanding, to work out problems of coordination, and to develop
unity of views on the conduct of combined military actions under modern
conditions. The war game has allowed us to see both the achievements and
the bottlenecks in training formation commanders and staffs. The materials
and the experience of the game will permit us to derive the necessary
practical conclusions for combined work to support further strengthening
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and development of the armed forces of our countries.
Finally, the war game has great military-political importance. It

strengthens friendship among armies of the member states of the Warsaw Pact
and raises the training level of senior personnel and the combat readiness
of the Combined Armed Forces as a whole to a new plateau.
Comrades!
The war game was conducted during a period preceded by events of great
significance. Nineteen hundred and seventy has been noteworthy first of
all because it is a year of glorious anniversaries. During the spring of
this year the peoples of the socialist commonwealth countries and all
progressive mankind celebrated the hundredth anniversary of the birth of V.
I. Lenin, the leader and teacher of the world's proletariat. The name of
Lenin, a thinker and revolutionist of genius and the greatest
internationalist, has been inscribed forever in the annals of the world
revolutionary movement and in world history. Leninist ideas have most
deeply influenced, and continue to influence, the entire course of world
development.
Vladimir Ilich's name is linked to all life, plans and affairs of the
Soviet people, of the peoples of the socialist countries, and of the
workers of the whole world. Under the banner of Leninism, our people
confidently proceed on the way to socialism and communism.
Leninism today is the unswervingly developing world system of

socialism and the foremost achievement of the countries of the socialist
commonwealth in the construction of a new society.
Leninism is today the powerful international communist and worker

movement that is strengthening the bonds of international solidarity of all
working people; it is a revolutionary theory that is constantly being
developed.
The establishment, strengthening, and development of the Warsaw

Pact -- the reliable bulwark of the peace and security of our peoples, has
been a practical embodiment of Leninist ideas.
Leninist ideas today inspire hundreds of millions of people of our

planet in the struggle for the revolutionary transformation of the world
and for the happiness and radiant future of all humanity.
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Historical experience and contemporary life have testified to the fact

that the successful building of socialism and development of the world-wide
revolutionary process is possible only when based on the granite foundation
of Marxism-Leninism.
That is why the centennial celebration of V. I. Lenin's birthday has

become an event of world-wide political importance, the veritable triumph
of Leninist ideas. It has taken the form of a military review of today's
revolutionary forces and is a powerful mobilizing stimulus in the people's
struggle against imperialism and for peace, freedom, and social progress.
The results, summed up during the Lenin anniversary, testify to the

fact that the countries of the world.socialist system are successfully
carrying out the great Leninist ideas for the building of socialism and
communism under the wise leadership of the communist and worker parties.
This year the peoples of our countries celebrated the 25th anniversary
of the glorious victory of the Soviet Union in World War II, which brought
freedom-from fascist-slavery-to -many-countries.-
The 25th year of freedom from fascism was celebrated in the spring of
the year by the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic
and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic; and next year it will be
celebrated by the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Polish People's
Republic, and the Socialist Republic of Romania.
In the autumn of last year the working people of the German Democratic
Republic celebrated with great rejoicing the 20th anniversary of the
foundation of the first German workers' and peasants' state in history.
The destruction of German fascism determined the subsequent course of
world history, creating new and extremely favorable opportunites for the
building of socialism in a large number of countries and for the rapid
growth of revolutionary forces throughout the world.
Over the past quarter century the world socialist system was born and
firmly established, and has now become a decisive factor in world
developments.
During this time the military alliance of European socialist countries

-- the Warsaw Pact, whose fifteenth anniversary was recently celebrated in
our countries -- was formed and grew.
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These important historical dates -- the centennial of the birth of

Vladimir Ilich Lenin, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the great victory
over fascism, and the fifteenth anniversary of the Warsaw Pact -- have
caused a new rise in the political and economic activity of the working
people of our countries in the struggle to realize the grandiose plans of
building socialism and communism.
The peoples of the socialist countries look to the future with

optimism. They are filled with desire to achieve further steady
strengthening of the economic and defensive power of their states and of
the entire world socialist system, and to achieve new victories in building
communism.
By conducting a peace-loving policy, the People's Republic of

Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic,
the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Soviet
Union and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic are doing everything possible
to transform the European continent into a reliable and strong bulwark of
peace,-so-that-never again may the-flame of -another-world-conflagration
blaze up on its territory.
The communist and worker parties and governments of the Warsaw Pact
countries are persistently and consistently carrying out a policy that aims
to ensure the security of Europe and peace throughout the world.
Facts show that in the last few years the concept of creating a
genuine system of collective security in Europe has been gaining an
ever-increasing number of adherents.
Imperialist circles are looking upon this sensible and appropriate

tendency with obvious displeasure. They are doing everything to undermine
the cause of peace and to prevent the relaxation of tension on the European
continent. In particular, the resolution of the May session of the NATO
Council, wherein the USA and its allies again shelved the idea of convoking
a general European conference, also testifies to this.
The most aggressive segments of modern imperialism have not given up

hopes of "replaying" the historical battles of the twentieth century, of
getting revenge, turning back history, and toppling socialist countries
from the heights of world influence.
The dirty war of American imperialists in Vietnam has been extended

over the entire peninsula of Indochina. The military alliance between the
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USA and Japan is being strengthened even more. At the end of June, Japan
extended the American-Japanese "security" pact for another ten years. In
the Near East, the Israeli aggressors, inclined to adventurism and
encouraged by the USA and other NATO countries, have not given up their
intentions.
The situation also remains tense on the European continent.
Back in the December session (1969), Pentagon representatives, who set

the tone in the NATO bloc, imposed on their partners a number of
resolutions aimed at expanding US strategic positions in the Mediterranean
Sea and in the Balkans.
The subject of strengthening the "southern flank" was again discussed

in May this year in the Rome session of the NATO Council.
In accordance with the terms of its resolution at the session, NATO

not only contemplates providing increasing aid to Israeli extremists and
the Athenian--dictatorial junta, but-also-contemplates exerting - ---
military-political pressure on the Arab states, which are conducting a just
struggle to drive Israeli aggressors out of their lands.
NATO leaders have also taken aim at Cyprus. They are nurturing the
project of "including" this island in the North Atlantic Alliance and of
converting it into their unsinkable aircraft carrier.
They have also set themselves the task of further increasing the power
of the NATO bloc in the Mediterranean Sea by establishing this year a
"permanent naval large unit" patterned after the mobile large unit
operating in the North Atlantic.
Thus the growing aggressiveness of the USA and other NATO countries is
becoming more obviously apparent in Southeastern Europe and the Near East.
In addition, developing events in Western Europe must put us on our

guard.
West German militarists, relying upon the support of the USA, are not
concealing their attempts to change the status quo that has developed in
Europe as a result of the Second World War. England, together with the USA
and the Federal Republic of Germany, is aspiring to strengthen its role and
to achieve the creation of "European nuclear forces".
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Comrades!
The actions of Peking leaders are aggravating the complex and

dangerous world situation. They have embarked on the militarization of
their country and have, for all practical purposes, opened a fighting front
against the Soviet Union and the world socialist system, and against the
international communist movement and revolutionary fighters in all the
world.
At the same time, in Peking they have stopped criticizing the

aggressive nature of NATO and other military blocs of imperialism.
Furthermore, Peking is expanding political and economic contacts with the
USA and FRG. The latter have been exploiting the adventurist policy of the
Chinese leadership to carry out their own adventurist projects as events in
Indochina testify.
Fraternal communist and worker parties and peoples of the socialist

countries are correctly unmasking and censuring Mao Tse-tung's current
policy.
As you can see, today's military-political situation continues to be

complex and tense. It is fraught with surprises dangerous to the cause of
peace. Therefore unifying and coordinating the defensive measures of the
countries of the socialist commonwealth are a vital necessity at present.
The communist and worker parties and the governments of our countries
show tireless care in strengthening the defense capabilities of the
socialist commonwealth states. You, comrades, are yourselves not only
witnesses, but also active participants in the continuous improvement and
strengthening of the Warsaw Pact organization.
The Warsaw Pact organization is the peace-loving defensive alliance of

the socialist countries. The Warsaw Pact is based on a community of
interests, purposes, and tasks for the collective defense of the
achievements of socialism, of each country belonging to it, and of the
commonwealth as a whole.
"The socialist commonwealth", stated Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, General
Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, at the pre-election meeting
of June twelfth this year, "constitutes today a combination of states whose
strength cannot be matched by any alliance or coalition which existed in
the past or exists at present."
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Nobody will ever be permitted to tear out a single link from the
commonwealth of socialist states.
Our combat alliance, bound by the bloodshed in the past war and
cemented in the postwar period, has enough forces and means to stop any
ventures of imperialist aggressors.
I. THE MILITARY-POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE

AREA OF THE WAR GAME
Comrades!
Our war game was carried out on the Southwestern Axis, which is, like
the Western Axis, of great importance. The historical experience of past
wars is testimony to this. It was right here, in the Balkans, that the
hotbed of World War I emerged. Important events also took place here -
during World War II. Hitlerite leaders took into account the great
strategic importance of the Balkans, and before attacking the Soviet Union,
occupied a number of countries in this area.
The British government, headed by Churchill, also aimed to seize the

Balkan area first when planning the question of a second front in Europe.
During World War II the Soviet Armed Forces had to exert great efforts
to liberate the Balkan countries. As you know, large-scale operations of
strategic importance took place in this theater. It will suffice to recall
that the Soviet Army, together with troops of the fraternal peoples,
carried out such large-scale operations here as those in Jassy - Kishinev,
Transylvania, Debrecen, Balaton, Budapest, Belgrade, Vienna, etc.
Countries of the socialist commonwealth whose territory constitutes

the large continuous Balkan strategic area are found within the boundaries
of the Southwestern Theater.
Italy, Greece, and Turkey, which are countries of the aggressive NATO
bloc and occupy a favorable strategic location at the junctions of Europe,
Asia, and Africa, also lie within the limits of the given theater. The
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most important land and air routes from Europe to Asia and Africa go
through the territory of these countries. The shortest routes to vitally
important areas of the socialist countries and to communication routes
linking these countries with the Soviet Union also go through them.
The importance attached to the Southwestern Theater by NATO leaders is

also evidenced by the large grouping of troops disposed here, consisting of
38 divisions and separate brigades and five reserve divisions; of these, 16
divisions are in constant readiness. Their grouping contains more than
3,500 tanks, 1,000 .combat aircraft, and 9,000 guns and mortars, including
approximately 400 nuclear weapons delivery means.
The Mediterranean Sea is especially important. Together with other

seas and gulfs, it cuts deeply into the land portion of the theater,
providing the probable enemy with conditions favoring the extensive use of
naval forces.
Mediterranean communication routes link European countries with

Africa, the Near East, Southeast Asia, and with world petf6leum supplies
and other types of strategic raw materials.
It is not accidental that the Mediterranean Sea is constantly

patrolled by the US Sixth Fleet, which has up to 100 nuclear weapons
delivery aircraft and six to eight nuclear submarines with "Polaris"
missiles. The Italian and Greek navies are also based here, as are parts
of the English, French, and Turkish navies.
NATO troops and navies in this area are intended to exert pressure on
the socialist countries of Europe and on developing countries of the Near
East and Africa. They can be used to deliver missile/nuclear and air
strikes against European socialist countries and deep into areas of the
Soviet Union.
NATO leaders have assigned a particularly large role to the Balkan -

Turkish strategic area, which includes the straits of the Bosporus and the
Dardanelles as one of the most convenient areas for unleashing aggression
against socialist countries.
At the same time, they are aware that the loss of this area would
result in the military isolation of the troop groupings of the North
Atlantic bloc and CENTO. In this event, the Black Sea navies of the
socialist countries would be able to exit into the Mediterranean Sea.
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Such a course of events might create a crisis situation for the entire
southern flank of NATO.
That is why the main forces of the Turkish First Army, Greek First
Army, and Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force are concentrated in this area.
This grouping numbers 20 divisions and separate brigades -- of which 11
divisions are in constant readiness -- 1,800 tanks, and over 5,000 guns and
mortars, which include more than 250 nuclear weapons delivery means.
The NATO command, and especially the US, are systematically carrying
out measures to strengthen the armed forces of Turkey and Greece and to
prepare the territory of these countries to serve as military bridgeheads.
Aviation and naval bases, airfields, nuclear weapons storage sites,

protected command posts, and a developed communications and control system
have been established in their territory, and the network of roads and
pipelines is being improved.
American militarists have time and again used their_bases in Turkey

and Greece for aggressive actions against the national liberation movement
cf the Arab peoples and for reconnaissance against the People's Republic of
Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, and other socialist countries.
In order to further strengthen their situation in the South European

Theater, the leaders of the North Atlantic bloc have been devoting much
attention to Austria lately. They look upon the territory of this
nominally neutral country as a connecting link between armed forces
groupings in the Central European and the South European theaters of
military operations.
Austrian governmental and military circles are pleased with the

increased role of their country in the plans of the North Atlantic bloc and
are counting on a military alliance with this bloc. This was particularly
evident during the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968.
Also worthy of note is the fact that every year the NATO command
carries out a large number of military measures in the South European
Theater. In 1970 alone it contemplated carrying out 14 different troop and
staff exercises here.
That is why we must constantly keep an eye on NATO military

preparations in this area and raise the combat readiness of our Combined
Armed Forces.
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The physical-geographical aspects of the Southwestern Theater of

Military Operations, as you know, are characterized by a great variety of
conditions which affect the conduct of military actions. The relief of the
theater is primarily mountainous with a limited network of roads. This
gives rise to well-known difficulties in preparing and conducting
operations, using weapons, using the branches of armed forces, controlling
and coordinating troops, and in providing them with comprehensive support.
But at the same time, theater conditions permit large groupings of troops
to be deployed and permit operations to be conducted on an
operational-strategic scale.
In an armed conflict in the given theater, principal efforts can be

developed along the three most important operational axes: Northern Italy
Greece, and the Bosporus - Dardanelles axes.
d it was on these axes that we conducted the war game.
X X X
During the war game, important operational-strategic problems such as

bringing the armed forces up to full combat readiness, covering frontiers,
and carrying out operational and mobilization deployment of air and naval
forces were worked out. These problems were worked out in place and were
studied by the appropriate chiefs of the general staffs.
Permit me to dwell briefly on the various conditions associated with

the deployment of armed forces.
II. DEPLOYING FORCES IN A PERIOD OF THREAT AND

UPON THE INITIATION OF WAR
Ever since wars began to to be waged by mass armies over extensive
areas, ever-increasing importance has been attached to the deployment of
troops in a theater of military operations. The timely and rapid
deployment of troops has become one of the decisive factors of successful
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military actions under modern conditions.
Historical experience teaches us that anticipating or delaying the

deployment of troop groupings in a theater of military operations has not
only predetermined the outcome of initial operations, but has also
determined the subsequent course of a war. Thus, during World War II,
fascist Germany, having anticipated enemy deployment of armed forces,
obtained a number of temporary military advantages and, from the very first
days of military actions, seized the strategic initiative.
The fully mobilized and deployed German-fascist forces made a quick

transition to decisive actions, disrupted the mobilization measures of
those countries they attacked, methodically destroyed troops which had been
committed to action hastily, and, in the final analysis, achieved their
intended goals.
Under modern conditions, the operational-strategic deployment of armed

forces will be carried out in a situation completely different and more
complicated than-that in-the-past:---Therefore,--its-preparation-and - - ---
accomplishment involves a number of fundamental propositions. These
include bringing the armed forces up to full combat readiness and their
transition from a peacetime to a wartime status, covering state borders,
deploying the armed forces and operational-strategic groupings,
strengthening air defense within-the -framework-of a_common-air defense
system, organizing control and rear services systems, and implementing
measures concerning comprehensive support. All of this complex work must
be accomplished rapidly, efficiently; and purposefully in accordance with a
preestablished plan.
As you can see, this is a very crucial and important time period.
Under modern conditions, to what degree and with what scope must we
resort to the deployment of armed forces?
We think that in modern war, regardless of how it may be unleashed or

conducted, the deployment of armed forces must be planned and carried out
to the total extent.
What is this conditioned by? First of all, it is conditioned by the

fact that modern war might begin either with a non-nuclear variant or with
the limited or unlimited use of nuclear weapons. Stefaming from this, it
might last a prolonged time or else be relatively brief. And this means
that the armed forces must be ready, in equal degree, to conduct any war:
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nuclear or non-nuclear, prolonged or brief.
To conduct a prolonged war, especially without the use of nuclear

weapons, requires s-everalIifon armed troops which no one, not even the
most powerful state, is in a position to maintain in peacetime. Historical
experience has shown that when a war begins, an army can be very quickly
raised through mobilization. For example, during the first weeks of two
world wars the numerical strength of the armed forces of both sides was
increased four- to fivefold and subsequently several tenfold.
In 1940 the armed forces of the US, which were not fully mobilized,
amounted to slightly more than 400 thousand men, but by the end of World
War II their numbers exceeded 12 million.
During World War II, Germany, France, Italy, England, and Japan
mobilized fully and deployed anew 755 divisions, calling up 48 million
reservists from their reserve.
This-experience-points-out that to conduct-war--successfully-under--

modern conditions it will be unavoidably necessary to increase the
peacetime grouping of troops when a period of threat begins, if there is
such a period, or when war begins.
We must also keep in mind that peacetime armed forces, particularly

the ground forces, navy, and aviation, cannot be employed effectively
without carrying out appropriate regroupings. In any theater of military
operations, on all strategic axes, it will be necessary to move forward
army and front formations, air defense troops, aviation, and rear services,
and to deploy naval forces in the maritime theaters.
One of the distinguishing features of modern armed forces is, first

of all, the high combat readiness of those units which are designated to
conduct initial operations at the very onset of war. For example, at
present the rocket forces and air defense forces of our countries are
deployed and on combat alert. Specific ground forces groupings and a
portion of the naval and air forces are at a high level of readiness and
are on combat alert. However, the available combat-ready groupings of all
branches of the armed forces will undoubtedly be inadequate to conduct
total war. Therefore all of them will be reinforced by moving forward
additional forces and means and incorporating them into their complement.
Furthermore, immediately upon the outbreak of war and during the war it
will be necessary to create new operational and strategic groupings in the
various theaters of military operations and on the axes.
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It was also this way in our game. The First Southern and Southwestern
Fronts were established within the boundaries of the People's Republic of
Bulgaria and the Hungarian People's Republic. The Second Southern Front
was moved forward from the territory of the Soviet Union. The Third
Southern Front was established in the Socialist Republic of Romania.
Another characteristic will be that the groupings established will

have a coalition complement, incorporating large units and formations of
various national affiliations. In the game, as you know, armies and
divisions of various nationalities were incorporated into the complement of
front formations.
We must emphasize that the rapid establishment of coalition troop

groupings demands efficient peacetime planning from general staffs and
their comprehensive support when formations of the national armies initiate
forward movement.
All of these complex problems can be successfully solved only when

there-is-the-closest contact-amongthe-general staffs of the allied armies
while it is still peacetime. Not only will the timely deploymentof ---
groupings in the theaters depend on this, but also their readiness to
immediately accomplish combat.tasks.
A fundamentally new characteristic condition of the deployment of

troop groupings will be the permanent threat of their complete .or partial
destruction by massive enemy nuclear and air strikes. Successfully
carrying out the deployment of armed forces under such conditions will
require, to a greater degree than before, flexibility in organization,
readiness and capacity among the troops to deploy undei conditions of
massive casualties and vast destruction, disrupted control, and
disorganized work of the rear services and transport.
The scope and nature of the measures for deploying armed forces will
depend greatly on the status of the armed forces when they initiate
deployment, the time available, the enemy methods of unleashing war, and
the preparedness levels of the theaters.
Troop deployment may take place at different times. In some cases it

will be carried out before war begins, even during the period of threat.
Thus, in the initial situation, the "Easterners" and "Westerners"

deployed and established groupings just prior to the initiation of combat
actions.
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Deploying troops ahead of time is often far from possible and

expedient, because of stipulations for strategic camouflaging the
measures carried out, protecting against weapons of mass destruction, and
ensuring surprise in the initiation of combat actions. The probable enemy
is capable of initiating war with the surprise massive use of nuclear
weapons.. Then a more difficult situation for fully mobilizing and deploying
forces would develop and, in general, there would be no period of thrat.
Under these conditions deployment would have to be initiated while already
repelling an enemy attack.
In a number of areas, carrying out mobilization measures will be

difficult or will be disrupted; a portion of the military equipment
reserves and materiel-technical means will be destroyed; communication
routes will be severed to a considerable degree; and airfields,
communications centers, and communications lines will be out of order. The
ground forces, aviation, navy, and civilian population will have suffered
heavy losses.
Under these conditions, deployment -will begin under the cover -of the -
strategic rocket forces and air defense forces, which will have entered
into action immediately, and all other forces and means will be brought up
to full combat readiness. Simultaneously we will begin to reestablish the
combat effectiveness of units and large units, to create operational and
strategic reserves, and to fully mobilize our troops and move them forward
to the theaters and areas of military operations.
We must e hasze the special ortance ofp

non-nuclear actions. We cannot count on these to be prolonged periods.
But they will give rise to a relatively favorable situation which must be
exploited to the maximum to carry out secret full troop mobilization and
deployment.
Very stringent requirements are applicable to mobilization deployment

under modern conditions. Most important of all is to curtail to the utmost
the time period for its implementation.
These are of great importance: precise organization of the entire

process of full mobilization, a well-developed warning system that has been
tested in peacetime; and-the-timely-establishment of stocks of equipment,
armament, and materiel in the areas of full mobilization.
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The combat coordination of units and large units should be carried out
at the same time as full mobilization in accordance with a previously
developed program, both before initiating forward movement (transportation)
and upon arriving in areas of intended operations.
I will now proceed to a critique of the plans and work of participants

in the war game.
III. PLANS AND WORK OF THE PLAYERS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THFK INITIAL
SITUATION OF 2000 HOURS 29, JUNE AND THE (STAVKA
DIRECTIVE ON THE OFFENSIVE L
(Diagrams 2, 3, and 10)
In conformity with the initial situation, participants in the war game

were involved to the maximum in those conditions which might develop by the
outset of war. Here, to your own satisfaction, we set up the period
preceding a war, a period characterized by drastically aggravated tension,
and complexity and vagueness on the military-political plane. A thorough
analysis of all activities of the "Westerners" over the latter period led
to the conclusion that in the immediate future they would unleash
aggression against the "Easterners". However, the fundamental question
remained unclear: with what means and by what method would the NATO bloc
initiate war -- with the massive use.of nuclear weapons or only with
conventional means? If the enemy uses nuclear weapons, then on what scale
and at what stage of military actions would he do so? Therefore "Eastern"
Combined Armed Forces had to complete preparations without delay to repel
the aggression of the "Westerners" and to conduct decisive actions both
with the use of conventional means and with the use of nuclear means.
The commands and staffs of "Eastern" fronts, navies, air forces, and
air defense were confronted with the problem of accomplishing in a brief
period of time a multiplicity of urgent tasks of operational-strategic
scope. It was necessary to bring forces and means of the first strategic
echelon up to full combat readiness, to accomplish the mobilization
deployment of the armed forces, to move forward and deploy the necessary
groupings of ground and naval forces in the areas of intended operations,
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to rebase aircraft and rear services, \to reinforce air defens , and to
solve a variety of other problems.- At'the same time, "Eastern" formation
commanders and staffs were now faced with having to fully and concretely
analyze the opposing enemy; to determine his objectives and combat
capabilities, and his intentions and probable method of unleashing military
actions. Only after this would it be possible to adopt sound plans for the
conduct of initial operations with the aim of seizing the
operational-strategic initiative on the southern flank of NATO and of
quickly and decisively defeating enemy strike groupings on land, at sea,
and in the air.
It became necessary to review and organize a system of stable control

and coordination within national formations and particularly among
coalition troop groupings. Implementing comprehensive support of the
initial operations of the armed forces deployed within the confines of the
given theater was also a difficult task.
The successful initiation, conduct and possible outcome of the armed

conflict in-the Balkansdepended_greatlyon the timely_-and _skilful.-.- -
accomplishment of these and other tasks.
In the interests of working out the training objectives and fulfilling

the tasks assigned to the fronts and navies, we chose one of the possible
variants in which military actions could be initiated using conventional,
classical means of destruction with a subsequent transition to the use of
nuclear weapons.
In this situation, the participants in the game were required to adopt

plans providing for the successful fulfilment of the tasks of defeating the
main enemy forces both without the use and also with the use of nuclear
weapons.
For commanders and staffs the complicated and creative work process is
that of adopting operational plans. Data for the adoption of a plan are
prepared by the intensive work of the entire staff, but only the commander
himself adopts the plan, since he bears complete responsibility for its
accomplishment.
Therefore, as we turn our attention to the plans adopted by formation

commanders, I wish to remark that these plans also exemplify the level of
training, teamwork, and quality of work of all the generals, admirals,
officers, staffs, and operations groups that participated in this game.
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Plan of the Southwestern Front
Commander -- Colonel General Comrade B. P. Ivanov
By Stavka directive the Southwestern Front was assigned the task of

preparing and conducting an offensive operation on the Vienna and
Klagenfurt axes in order to destroy "Western" forces in Austrian territory
and break out into the northern areas of Italy.
The front commander correctly estimated the situation that had

developed~1ia adopted a practical plan in conformity with the Stavka
directive. The front commander's concept envisaged destroying opposing
enemy forces and reserves either using nuclear weapons or using only
conventional means of destruction. His plan took into account the
probability that military actions would begin without the use of nuclear
weapons. The front correctly solved the problem of the direction of the
main attack and its shift in the course of the operation. In fulfilling
the immediate task, the main efforts of the front were concentrated on the
Vienna axis and--subsequently shifted over to-the-left wing -on the - -
Klagenfurt axis. In conformity with the plan adopted, two strike groupings
were established in the front; their actions ensured that "rose" forces
were speedily routed before the "yellow" Third Army came up from the deep
rear area.
The Thirteenth Army and the Sixth Army Corps (a total of six
divisions) were designated to strike .on the Vienna axis and the Second Army
(five divisions) was designated for the Klagenfurt axis.
At the same time, there were some deficiencies in the plan.
When assessing the enemy it is necessary to determine not only his

forces but also the specific nature of the actions from the beginning of
the war, and also the scale and the probable time of making the transition
to the use of nuclear weapons. All of this would have allowed making a
more judicious selection of action methods and the operational disposition
of the troops.
We must mention that the final object of the actions of the front, to
break out into northern Italy, was not adequately understood, as a result
of which both during the first phase and subsequently, the front was, if I
may so word it, "pulled" to the north all the time and not to the south
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where the fulfilment of the task was to be completed.
We must also mention that division breakthrough sectors and artillery

densities were determined without properly taking into consideration the
nature of the enemy defenses and forces. All divisions were assigned
identical breakthrough sectors two kilometers wide and artillery densities
were established at no less than 100 guns and mortars per kilometer of
front.
The plan did not fully reflect the problems of coordination with
adjacent fronts, particularly with the Central Front and Eastern Military
District ofte Czechoslovak People's Army, which subsequently led to
inadequately coordinated actions of right flank forces with their righthand
neighbor. Of course, fundamental problems of coordination between fronts
are resolved by the Stavka, whose role was played by Control. But Control,
for training purposes, expected the front command to take the initiative in
posing these problems. Regrettably, the front command and staff did not
show this initiative. Overall, as I have already remarked, the plan was
practical.-
The plan of the commander of the First Air Army -- Commander:

General-Leytenant of Aviation Comrade S. 1. Kharlamov -- was in line with
the situation. The plan devoted much attention to weakening the enemy
aviation grouping through delivery of strikes against airfields and also to
organizing and maintaining coordination with Long Range Aviation, forces
and means of the Air Defense of the Hungarian People's Republic,
combined-arms armies, and the Sixth Army Corps. Operations groups and
aviation representatives were sent to their staffs.
The plan was notable for its precise formulation and was backed up by
appropriate estimates.
Plan of the Second Army
Commander -- General-Mayor Yozhef Kalazi
The army command correctly estimated the situation, role, and place of
the army in the front offensive operation. This permitted it to adopt a
plan that was in conTormity with the directive of the commander of the
Southwestern Front.
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Delivery of the main attack on the left flank of the army by a force
of three divisions was correct and meets our approval. But in the
interests of quickly defeating the "rose" forces before the approach of
"yellow" reserves from deep in the rear area and before forces were built
up in the deep rear area, it would have been more advantageous to have had
the 13th Tank Division in the first echelon instead of the 14th Motorized
Rifle Division; this was later done by the army commander. The
breakthrough sectors of the divisions were also widened.
The army intelligently solved the problems of reconnaissance, defense

of troops against means of mass destruction, and of engineer and rear
services support.
I also wish to remark that when the army rocket brigade was shifted a
considerable distance away from the main grouping, to the right flank of
the army, more reliable air cover should have been organized for it,
security should have been allocated, and it should have been provided with
engineer support.
Plan of the Sixth Army Corps
Commander -- General-Mayor Comrade Bela Lakatosh
The plan of the corps commander was in conformity with the task
assigned by the front and was correct and complete.
It should only be remarked that establishing corps artillery groups of

limited complement (one or two artillery battalions) is hardly worthwhile.
Such small groups will not be able to accomplish their specific tasks.
When there is a shortage of artillery it is better to attach battalions to
the motorized rifle divisions. At thesame time it would be advantageous
if all aviation allocated to support corps actions was employed in a
centralized manner in accordance with the corps plan and not distributed to
the divisions.
It was also hardly advisable to use a nuclear missile with a surface

burst against the airfield in the Vienna (Wiener Neustadt) area on which
there were no combat aircraft and which was in an area in which corps
troops were to arrive within several hours. We believe that the delivery
of surface nuclear bursts during an offensive should be carried out with
the permission of the senior commander to ensure the safety of our own and
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adjacent troops.
The plan concerning Air Defense Forces of the Hungarian People's

Republic -- commanded by General-Mayor Comrade Yanosh Shtotsk -- was in
conformity with the situation that had developed and the tasks assigned to
it in the operational directive.
A special plan on the problem of coordinating the forces and means of
Air Defense of the Hungarian People's Republic, the Southwestern Front, and
the First Army was worked out in detail and formulated in the StaTF~T Air
Defense of the Hungarian People's Republic.
At the same time we must point out that the plan did not define the
procedure for reestablishing a disrupted grouping and did not give full
consideration to "Western" aircraft which might operate by flying across
the country.
Thus the Southwestern Front, with the Second Army and Sixth Corps in
its complement,--adopted-plans that were-appropriate-to-the situation-and ---
which ensured the successful accomplishment of the tasks assigned to them.
Plan of the First Southern Front

Commander -- Colonel General K. D. Kosev
The First Southern Front deployed for actions on the Greece axis, an
axis to which both sides attached great importance.
The front, occupying a central location on the Balkan peninsula, was

to play aniportant role in defeating the "orange" forces. It had to
break out into the principal areas of Greece, establish conditions for the
commitment to battle of the Third Southern Front on the Athens axis, and,
in coordination with this front, make Greece withdraw from the war.
The front commander, having correctly estimated the enemy grouping,

the nature oits actions, and the role of the front, adopted a plan which
was in conformity both with the directive of the Stavka of the Supreme High
Command and with the conditions of the situation. 'The concept of having
the adjacent flanks of two armies deliver the main attack is worthy of
approval. The fulfilment of the immediate front task by the concentrated
attacks of the Eighth and Ninth Armies ensured the rapid splitting of the
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opposing enemy groupings, exit to the sea, and exploitation of this success
to force Greece out of the war as quickly as possible. The plan specified
fulfilling the tasks both with conventional and with nuclear weapons.
We note with satisfaction that in the front the characteristics of the

theater of military operations and the composition, status, and special
features of the opposing enemy are known.
The planning of front troop actions for the breakthrough of the

Metaxas fortified zone is worthy of note. The plan defined the specific
methods of troop actions; it was backed up by the required estimates and
was comprehensively supported. This is precisely the way.to approach this
important and complex problem.
It is well-known that the probable enemy is placing great hopes on his

fortified zones and areas. These zones and areas are very tough "nuts".
To "crack" them without nuclear weapons is not so simple. A breakthrough
here requires thorough and comprehensive organization: neutralization by
artillery and aircraftthe--creation-of as-s-ault detachments-and groups,
meticulous organization of the coordination of all forces and means, and
comprehensive support. I draw your attention to this subject because both
Southern Fronts were confronted with the problem of breaking through
fortified zones and areas.
Not only in the Balkans will our troops have to encounter fortified
areas. When studying this problem it is useful to exploit the wealth of
combat experience of the Soviet Army, which repeatedly broke through a
number of fortified areas during World War II.
The efforts of the front commander to accomplish the immediate task as

soon as possible by delivering the attack with a powerful first echelon
meets with my approval. But in this case, in our opinion, the solution to
the problem of increasing forces was inadequately thought through. For all
practical purposes, the commitment of fresh forces to exploit the success
on the main axis during the first three days of the operation was not
contemplated.
In the front, inadequate attention was devoted to cover for the rocket
brigades. ihe Second Army of the Southwestern Front also committed a
similar error. It is necessary to keep in mind that the enemy will
continuously strive to keep "in his sights" the rocket brigades, where the
principal nuclear power of a front and army is concentrated. Therefore, it
is necessary to cover rocket brigades from the air, to camouflage them
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thoroughly from reconnaissance, and to protect them against enemy sabotage

and reconnaissance groups.
Inadequate attention was also devoted to the reconnaissance and

"final" reconnaissance of enemy targets against which nuclear strikes were
to be delivered. This is a very important matter, particularly in regard
to mobile targets. On the eve of war and during the non-nuclear phase, the
enemy will secretly change the location of almost all mobile targets.
As you know, on the Southwestern Theater four fronts of various

nationalities went to the offensive: the Soviet Southwestern and Second
Southern, the Bulgarian First Southern, and subsequently the Romanian Third
Southern. The successful actions of the fronts greatly depended on precise
coordination among them. In the First Southern Front these problems were
resolved with sufficient care and completeness and were set forth in a
specially developed plan.
In determining the main tasks-and-methods ofiutilizing the composite

aviation corps, the plan was basically sound and does not give rise to any
particular objections.
Overall, the work in the front to produce the solution and plan the
operation, and the plan adopted ensured the successful accomplishment of
all missions assigned to the front.
The plan of the Air Defense of the People's Republic of Bulgaria --

Colonel General Comrade Kh. S. Dobrev commanding, contemplated
concentrating main efforts on covering the most important administrative
and political centers, economic areas, principal groupings of the First and
Second Southern Fronts, and naval forces. In this case, the air defense
system combined zonal and installation protection. The plan has been
recognized as correct.
The problems of coordination among the forces and means of the Air
Defense of the Country, three fronts, and the navies, were solved
effectively. This very important condition ensures that massive enemy air
raids are repelled successfully.
One comment. The air defense system must be viable. Therefore,

measures must provide for its protection against means of mass destruction
and for its restoration in case it is disrupted, yet these measures had
been planned to an extent that was far from complete.
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Plan of the Second Southern Front
Commander -- Colonel General Comrade A. G. Shurupov
The Second Southern Front was designated to operate on the coastal

axis of the "Eastern" southern wing.
The front had to accomplish quite a complex task: to defeat the enemy
in Eastern Thrace, seize the Black Sea straits zone, and support the exit
of allied navies into the Mediterranean Sea.
The situation was correctly estimated in the front and, based on this
estimate, the commander of the Second Southern Front adopted a sound
overall plan. The essence of this plan was to ave the main attack
delivered by the adjacent flanks of two armies in the center of the front
offensive zone, thereby ensuring that the enemy in Eastern Thrace was split
into two isolated groupings and that these groupings were thoroughly
defeated. This method of accomplishing the immediate task is wholly_
impractical. The cited plan was in conformity with the requirements of the
directive of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command and the situation that
had developed.
However, the plan had some deficiencies. Thus, a second echelon

(strong reserve) was not established in the Tenth Army, as a result of
which during the operation the army commander had nothing with which to
augment his forces to exploit a success.
The methods of fulfilling the subsequent task of the front, in

particular the forced crossing of the strait of the Dardanelles, were
carelessly defined. Incidentally, this strait is not only the "key" to
Western Turkey, but also the last obstacle on the way to the Mediterranean
Sea. Without a doubt the enemy will fight furiously for it. Therefore, in
order to seize it, it will be necessary to designate beforehand sufficient
forces in ground troops, airborne units, aviation, and other forces and
means. But, according to the front plan, only the 51st Motorized Rifle
Division and the 55th Tank Brigade were allocated to seize the strait. The
remaining forces of the army, disposed in a single echelon, were stretched
along the coast. It would hardly be possible for the front to succeed in
quickly seizing the strait and successfully making a forced crossing
without committing additional forces. Later on, as we know, the situation
required calling upon the 86th and 87th Motorized Rifle Divisions on this
axis.
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It was decided to carry out the amphibious landing and airborne drop
beginning the morning of the fourth or fifth day of the operation without
taking into account the possible progress of the breakthrough to the
Catalca fortified area. Under these conditions it would have been more
practical to determine the date when the landing and drop were to be
employed in direct accordance with the speed of the breakthrough of this
fortified area.
The Third Army was employed correctly. Its efforts were directed
towards destroying enemy aviation and supporting the actions of the Tenth
and Eleventh Armies.
The problems of coordinating with aircraft of the Red Banner Black Sea
Fleet should have been worked out more fully, particularly when conducting
joint actions in the fleet against enemy tactical and carrier aviation.
Overall, the plan of the Second Southern Front was completely

practical.
I shall go on to examine the plans of the commanders of the allied

navies.
The allied navies were assigned the following missions: defeating the
strike groupings of "Western" naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea,
destroying their forces in the Black Sea, supporting the offensives of the
fronts, disembarking the amphibious landing force, and moving naval forces
into the Aegean and Mediterranean seas.
Plan of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet

Commander -- Vice Adniral Comrade V. S. Sysoyev
The commander was completely correct in directing the main forces of

-the fleet to destroy enemy nuclear missile submarines and strike aircraft
carriers in the Mediterranean Sea. A portion of the fleet's forces was
designated to destroy enemy ships in the Black Sea. Such utilization of
the fleet's forces is sound.
The plan as a whole ensured the missions assigned to the fleet were
fulfilled in close coord' wi forces of the People's Republic
of Bulgaria and with ong Range Aviation.
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The plan covered with adequate completeness the problems of organizing

all types of defense and security for the fleet forces. Measures for the
preparation and debarkation of the amphibious landing force were planned
after careful thought.
The plan also had deficiencies. Reserve naval forces were not
established. Targets to be struck in the Mediterranean Sea were
distributed without adequate thought between Long Range Aviation and naval
missile-carrying aviation. Long Range Aviation was directed to take action
against targets located at distances more than 2000 kilometers away from
its base area.. It could get to these targets only at altitudes of nine to
ten thousand meters, i.e., at altitudes which were most advantageous for
the actions of all enemy air defense means. It would have been better to
designate it to strike mobile and less distant objectives, like the
aircraft carrier "FORRESTAL", for example.
The advisability of using Long Range Aviation against a large unit of

amphibious ships on which there was only a single battalion of enemy
marines-a-1so-gave rise-to doubts._----- -_----_ -.
The problem of aircraft flights across the territory of Bulgaria was

not adequately coordinated with the Air Defense Command of the People's
Republic of Bulgaria.
Plan of the Navy of the People's Republic of Bulgaria -- Vice Admiral

Comrade I. S. Dobrev commanding -- I have no substantive remarks. The plan
called for: directing principal efforts toward destroying enemy forces in
the southwestern part of the Black Sea in close coordination with forces of
the Soviet Union's Red Banner Black Sea Fleet, providing fire support to
troops of the Second Southern Front, and also providing a base to a unit of
the strike forces of the Soviet fleet moved into the zone of the Bulgarian
naval forces. The plan was correct.
The plan of the naval commander, which I found worthy of approval, was
to create a detachment of fire support ships to assist the troops of the
Second Southern Front in the breakthrough of the Qatalca area and also to
shift overland a brigade of strike forces (torpedo boats and a
rocket-artillery battalion) from the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmora for
the purpose of providing assistance to front troops during the forced
crossing of the straits.
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At the same time, more attention should have been devoted to

protecting naval forces against enemy weapons of mass destruction and to
incorporating measures for restoring their combat effectiveness.
X X X
In summing up the plans of the formation commanders and the work of

the staffs relating to the initial situation, that is, on the planning of
the operations and the preparations for action of troops and naval forces
in the non-nuclear phase of the war, I shall dwell on several theoretical
propositions.
Modern military art has adequately worked out the nature and methods
of action of all branches of the armed forces in a war which is initiated
with the use of conventional weapons and then develops into a nuclear war.
Under such conditions, military actions will obviously develop in the form
of a strategic operation in a theater of military operations.
The actions of the armed forces engaged in such an operation must be

integrated by overall strategic plans, by a common concept and plan, and
must be conducted under unified leadership.
A strategic operation initiated using only conventional means of

destruction will be significantly different in its content and nature from
an operation conducted in an unlimited nuclear war, just as it also differs
from strategic operations of the World War II period.
But what are the characteristic features inherent in a modern

strategic operation initiated with conventional means?
Obviously it too will be conducted throughout the entire depth of the

theater. However, the methods and degree of its actions against deep
strategic enemy installations will be different. Strikes against the enemy
will begin to intensify as large units and combat means are committed to
battle. In other words, such an operation will be characterized by the
successive destruction in depth of enemy troop groupings and installations.
Initially the economy, deep rear area, and control system of government and
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highest military authority will be least subjected to this action.
Under these conditions the belligerents can carry out certain

mobilization measures, but military actions will begin with the forces at
hand. However, it will be far from possible for all forces to participate
fully in the non-nuclear phase, owing to the necessity of keeping them
ready to use nuclear weapons. And this reduces the combat capabilities of
formations of the ground forces, aviation, and navy.
The most important feature is the fact that the strategic rocket
forces and operational-tactical rocket troops will not participate, as a
result of which the role of ground forces and aircraft will increase
substantially.
The principal role in defeating enemy groupings in land theaters will

devolve upon fronts. Fronts having all arms of troops and aviation will
fulfil their tasks in close coordination with Long Range Aviation, air
defense forces, and naval forces.
The main purpose of front offensive operations will be to defeat the

enemy's principal rocket, aviation, and ground forces groupings; to disrupt
his mobilization measures, to seize the most important
operational-strategic areas in the theater, and to force individual
countries of the e coalition to'withdraw from t war.
As is well-1known, a front is assigned an immediate and subsequent

task. In so doing, the most pressing'task of a front, and of the air and
naval forces acting jointly with it, will be to decrease as rapidly as
possible, and to the utmost, the nuclear potential of the enemy. The tasks
of a front in an operation initiated with conventional means, will
coincde, in respect to depth, with those also assigned to it in an
operation where nuclear weapons are used. We expect the average rate of
speed of an offensive without the use of nuclear weapons to be lower, and
the time required to fulfil tasks to be greater, than in an operation using
nuclear weapons.
For operations under both non-nuclear and nuclear conditions the

principle of unity of aims and tasks remains mandatory.
When preparing the initial offensive operation, commanders and staffs

of formations will not have available all necessary data on whether the
enemy will use nuclear weapons, and if he should use them, when, on which
line, and on what scale. Therefore, the initial offensive operation must
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be prepared with provision for constant readiness to disrupt enemy nuclear

attacks, to carry out our own initial nuclear strike, and to achieve our
purposes both with conventional means and with nuclear weapons.
The concept and plan of the operation should include methods of
accomplishing the tasks facing the front with the use of both conventional
means of destruction and nuclear weapons. The axis of the main strike of
the front (army) should also coincide for both variants. In both cases all
problems concerning the use of nuclear weapons, troop control and
comprehensive support measures, should also be resolved.
There should be a single operations plan. It should set forth the
planned non-nuclear and nuclear actions of the troops.
Regardless of whether nuclear weapons are employed or not, the initial

nuclear strike must be meticulously planned, and this plan is constantly
refined during the operation.
Destroying the_ enemy in operationsinitiated without the use of

nuclear weapons requires ensuring the necessary superiority over the enemy
in conventional weapons and the establishment of dense troop groupings.
However, this involves the threat that they will be struck by enemy nuclear
weapons. The important condition for the preparation and successful
conduct of an operation is to continuously protect troops, aircraft, and
naval forces against weapons of mass destruction.
At the beginning of the non-nuclear period, attacking troops will have

to break through previously prepared enemy defenses on several axes. A
breakthrough requires meticulous preparation and the reliable
neutralization of the enemy by artillery and aircraft. Aggressive actions
by tank and motorized rifle troops of the first echelon, continuous fire
support, and timely intensification of efforts on the decisive axes are
also required.
The duration of the fire preparation will depend on the

characteristics of the enemy defenses, the availabilty of artillery and
aircraft, and the methods of action employed by~the above. Experience
shows that it will be conducted for a period of 35 to 45 minutes with a
density of 75 to 110 guns and mortars per kilometer of frontage. All fire
means, including tanks and antitank guided missiles, must participate in
the fire preparation.
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In several theaters we may encounter fortified enemy zones (areas), as

was the case in our game. Troops of the First and Second Southern Fronts
had to break through the Metaxas fortified zone and the gatalca fortified
area. The breakthrough of fortified areas without nuclear weapons requires
conducting powerful fire preparation with intervals for breaking up and
destroying permanent strongpoints by fire. In specific cases a preliminary
artillery preparation is also carried out.
Overall, the role of artillery increases sharply when operations are

conducted with the use of conventional means of destruction. It will
become the principal means of firepower of the ground forces and it will
fulfil its missions in close coordination with front aviation, tanks, and
the fire means of motorized rifle and tank large uits.
Front aviation, the only long range means in the hands of the
formation coimander, will play a very important role.
Front aviation participates jointly with air defense forces in

covering troops and rear services installations against enemy air strikes
and aerial reconnaissance, combats his missile/nuclear means and
operational reserves, provides support to the combined-arms and tank
armies, supports the landing and conduct of combat actions by airborne
landing forces, and carries out aerial reconnaissance.
Of course, front aviation will fulfil a number of tasks in support of

Long Range and Miltary Transport Aviation.
As you see, the tasks are numerous. Meanwhile, a portion of front

aviation must be constantly ready to use nuclear weapons. Therefore, its
actual capabilities must be taken into consideration when organizing an
offensive.
I want to particularly emphasize the importance and complexity of the

task of achieving air supremacy in the non-nuclear phase.
According to the plans of the Supreme High Command, achieving air

Isupremacy in the theater of military operations is accomplished by means of
an air operation or specific massive strikes by front and Long Range
Aviation delivered jointly with naval missile-carrying aviation against
enemy aviation groupings. Air forces of allied countries will participate
in the achievement of air supremacy.
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But actions to destroy enemy aviation groupings should not be limited

to the conduct of an air operation or a massive strike. It is important
that the command of a front keep a constant eye on the air situation and
take necessary timely steps in the fight against enemy aircraft on
airfields and bases and in the air.
The air defense of the member states of the Warsaw Pact is, in
significance and scale, a mission of vast importance. Not only groupings
of armed forces,but also important administrative and political centers and
military and industrial areas in the deep rear areas of our countries, have
become the targets of air strikes.
The air defense of the member states of the Warsaw Pact constitutes,
as is well-known, a unified system. Air defense troops of each state,
while accomplishing the task of covering their own territory, may have a
portion of their forces engaged in reinforcing the air defense of the
border areas of adjacent states within whose boundaries the air situation
has developed unfavorably.
In our game, air defense forces, while covering the most important
installations of their own countries, covered at the same time deployed
troop groupings, aircraft, and naval bases and forces.
Air defense forces can also participate in specific ways in covering

troop groupings from the moment military actions begin. The movements of
forces and means of air defense forces following the attacking troops must
be carried out within judicious limits, without weakening the air defense
of the territory of the given country.
The air defense forces of our countries, equipped with modern combat
equipment, must be constantly kept at an extremely high level of combat
readiness, and be well-trained in conducting battle throughout the entire
range of altitudes, but particularly at low altitudes under conditions of
varied and intensive radioelectronic jamming.
The most important task of air defense troops of the fronts is to

cover groupings of rocket troops and artillery, second echelons, control
organs, and the most important rear services installations. The first line
of zonal cover is established by front and army surface-to-air missile
units. This being the case, surface-to-air missile units will most often
be echeloned in depth in their battle dispositions. Antiaircraft artillery
regiments are used to provide close-in cover to installations important to
an army.
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I will now dwell briefly on the employment of naval forces.
We must keep in mind that the basic purpose of allied naval actions is
to destroy the enemy's naval nuclear forces, first and foremost his nuclear
missile submarines and carrier strike large units, and also his naval
surface forces.
An important task of the navies is to support the fronts in
accomplishing their combat tasks. Naval forces coordinating with troops
advancing on a coastal axis will cover their flanks from the sea, wage
combat against enemy communication routes, and deliver strikes against
naval bases, ports, airfields, and aircraft in_coast7iareas.
As you can see, in the non-nuclear phase navies will be used

extensively to accomplish very important tasks. However, we will emphasize
that the success of naval actions under these conditions will depend
greatly on precisely organized and continuously supported combined actions,
both among the allied naval forces themselves as well as among the navies
and with ground forces formations. - -- -
One of the most important problems for allied navies in the Black Sea
will be their participation in seizing the straits zones, in coordination
with ground forces.
Conducting an amphibious landing operation requires meticulous and

secret preparations. During the preparation of this operation it will be
necessary to work out with special precision the problems of coordination
among navies, ground forces, and air defense forces.
The success of an amphibious landing operation will depend greatly on

the teamwork and meticulous work of staffs at all levels, on their
cohesion, on the coordinated actions of all forces participating in the
operation, and on reliable communications.
These have been some of the propositions which I wanted to call to

your attention in preparing and conducting an offensive operation initiated
without the use of nuclear weapons.
I will remark that these propositions were taken into account by the
participants and were.reflected, in essence, in the plans drawn up. We
believe that during this stage of the war game we succeeded in working out
the problems of planning and conducting military actions initiated without
the use of nuclear weapons.
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I will now proceed to examine those plans dealing with the situation
of 1800 hours on 4 July.
IV. PLANS OF THE PLAYERS ON THE SITUATION OF 1800 HOURS 4 JULY

(Diagrams 4 and 5)
After three days of war without the use of nuclear weapons, the armed
forces of the "Easterners" had firmly seized the initiative. Heavy losses
had been inflicted on NATO ground, air and naval forces groupings in
frontier battles and in combat actions at sea and in the air. The nuclear
attack means and air defense system of the enemy had also been weakened.
In the Western Theater the Central Front of the "Easterners" had made
a considerable penetration into West German territory.
Troops of the Southwestern Front completed destroying the Vienna

grouping and successfully attackethe Austrian Alps. The First and Second
Southern Fronts broke out to the shores of the Aegean Sea and to the
defensive lines of the straits zone. Allied navies, with supremacy on the
Black Sea, supported the attacking ground forces and successfully waged
combat against enemy shipping groups.
In the situation that had developed, "Easterners" had the absolute

capability of completely destroying the enemy piecemeal on all operational
axes without having to resort to nuclear weapons. As a result of the
military defeat of the "Westerners" that had become apparent, a
military-political crisis arose in the NATO bloc. Because of the
conditions that had developed, the leaders of this bloc arrived at the
decision to use nuclear weapons.
As you know, the strategic rocket forces of the Soviet Union are
capable of delivering an inevitable nuclear strike against the enemy, a
strike which can predetermine the subsequent course and outcome of a war in
favor of the world socialist system.
Operational-tactical nuclear means of fronts and navies will also have

an important role in accomplishing the defeat of enemy groupings. The
skilful and timely use of these means from the beginning of the phase of
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decisive actions will predetermine to a large extent the successful

completion of the destruction of the enemy. We had neared this very phase
in the second stage of the game.
Fronts and navies were required, first of all, to adopt a plan for the
use of nuclear weapons in accordance with instructions of the Stavka and
the situation that had developed, to bring rocket troops and tront and
naval aviation up to the highest level of combat readiness, and to refine
the plan for delivering the initial nuclear strike. Furthermore, it was
necessary to take additional protective measures against enemy nuclear
strikes.
Taking into consideration the importance of the problem being worked

out, I will dwell on several propositions related to the transition to
actions where nuclear weapons are used.
The transition to the use of nuclear weapons is a new stage in the

development of operations. It is perfectly obvious that each side will
take all measures- to make sure that--the-use of nuclear weapons changes the
situation radically to its advantage. The subsequent course and outcome of
the operation will depend decisively on the skilful use of nuclear weapons
and the prevention of massive casualties.
The transition to actions using nuclear weapons is most likely in a

situation that is critical to the enemy.
The most important task of a front in this phase is to deliver the

initial nuclear strike in a timely manner, to retain the combat
effectiveness of the troops, and to ensure the rapidity of their actions
following the initial nuclear strike.
During the phase of immediate preparation to use nuclear weapons, the

task of detecting enemy nuclear attack means and the times of their
possible readiness to strike becomes particularly acute.
But this is quite a difficult matter. Nuclear means will be carefully
hidden up to the moment they are used. The enemy needs a very short time
to prepare an initial nuclear strike and there are very few easily detected
indications by which we could determine without error immediate
preparations for their use.
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The staffs of fronts, navies, and armies must continuously keep a

close watch on changes in the positions of enemy nuclear strike facilities,
and on the readiness for use of their own nuclear weapons means, and in
accordance with the formation commander's plan, they must give timely
orders for bringing these weapons up to higher levels of readiness.
The organization and delivery of an initial nuclear strike during an

operation initiated using only conventional means of destruction differs
considerably from the conduct of such a strike immediately at the beginning
of a nuclear war. This difference is determined by the drastic changes in
the status and condition of the enemy targets to be struck and in our means
which use nuclear weapons. By this time the troops of both sides will be
fully deployed, in immediate contact, and in movement.
It is advisable to have all operational-tactical missile launchers and

all delivery aircraft ready to deliver the initial nuclear strike. It is
also desirable to call upon as many tactical missiles as possible for the
initial-strike-.- -
Missiles with nuclear warheads earmarked for the initial launching, and
also front and mine-torpedo aviation designated to participate in the
initial nuclear strike, should be at least at the levels of readiness which
ensure the delivery of a strike within 20 to 40 minutes after receipt of
the command.
The need for a front to deliver a powerful initial nuclear strike

stems from the fact that this strike must destroy enemy operational and
tactical means of nuclear attack and aircraft and also inflict damage on
his tank and artillery groupings and disorganize his control and
materiel-technical supply. The initial nuclear strike accomplishes many
fundamental tasks and, in essence, the course and outcome of the entire
front operation depends on it.
Strategic nuclear forces may destroy some particularly important

targets in the zone of a front. For example, in our game we planned to use
112 nuclear warheads delivered by Stavka means in the zones of three
fronts.
The distribution of targets between rocket units and front aviation is

continuously refined.
The makeup of the initial nuclear strike has become vitally important.
The strike can be carried out by a one-time massive use of all nuclear
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warheads allocated or by using them in succession as targets are detected.
As shown by estimates, the duration of a strike, depending on the

level of combat readiness of nuclear warhead delivery means, can range from
one to 1.5 hours.
But the situation can also develop in such a way that at the time the
strike is delivered, the main enemy grouping has not yet been detected with
adequate completeness. In this case, it will be necessary, after the
initial strike, to deliver grouped and individual strikes against the enemy
targets detected.
Before making the transition to nuclear actions, special attention is

devoted to ensuring the security of friendly forces.
We must pay the utmost attention to the concealed displacement of

rocket troops, to the engineer preparation and camouflage of their sites,
to reliable cover from the air, to protection and defense against sabotage
groups, -and to the timely -replacement-of-losses.- All these-factors- a-re -
also applicable to the basing of aircraft. These problems must be
constantly kept in view by commanders and staffs at all levels.
These have been some of the propositions related to the transition to
the use of nuclear weapons by troops during the conduct of an offensive
operation. But the enemy is also capable of delivering a massive nuclear
strike against our troops, naval forces, and rear services installations.
This would give rise to a very difficult situation which would require the
adoption of measures to quickly reestablish control, particularly over
rocket troops and aviation, determination of losses and restoration of
combat effectiveness of the troops, adoption of a series of new plans, and
assignment of new tasks to formations and front (army) large units.
Under these conditions particularly strict centralization over the use

of nuclear means is needed so as to destroy the most important enemy
installations, first and foremost his nuclear means, and to ensure
successful development of the operation. The initial nuclear strike has to
be delivered by the remaining rocket units and aicraft t-nfthis situ-tion
it is hardly possible to expect tat all m be-ready to deliver a
simultaneous strike. Therefore, the initial strike may take the form of
successive grouped strikes.
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With respect to troop actions after a front has delivered a nuclear

strike, it is important to ensure, first of all, that all large units,
units, and subunits which have not lost their combat effectiveness
immediately resume the offensive. Their aggressive actionsmust aim to
fulfil as soon as possible the assigned combat tasks. In this case, the
initiative and self-reliance of commanders and staffs at all levels
acquires an important role: that of contributing to the most rapid
completion of the defeat of the opposing army.
Let us examine how problems of transition to the employment of nuclear

weapons were resolved.
By--the- end of the -third -day-of the offensive a very complex-situation

had developed in the zone of the front which required the adoption of
serious measures to shift efforts as rapidly as possible to the Klagenfurt
axis and to eliminate the enemy surrounded in Vienna.
With the aim of concentrating the main efforts of the Thirteenth Army
on developing the offensive on the Linz axis, it should have requested the
Stavka to assign the destruction of the Krems grouping to forces of the
Western Military District of the Czechoslovak People's Army and transferred
the 62nd Motorized Rifle Division of the Thirteenth Army to it on the line
it was holding.
On the left wing of the front the enemy should not have been allowed
to deliver a concentrated strike with six divisions and measures should
have been taken to defeat them piecemeal, which would have required
committing additional forces to combat; and before the "yellow" corps
approached, we should have inflicted a defeat on the two to three enemy
divisions which were in conflict with troops of the Second Army.
Finally, the front should have refined its plan and prepared the
rocket troops and aviation to deliver the initial nuclear strike.
Unfortunately, the front staff did not make a deep analysis of the
situation that had arisen, and as a result of this the original plan was
not aggressive and did not aim to destroy the enemy within a short time.
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The plan contemplated, in case combat actions continued without

nuclear weapons, developing the offensive in the general direction of Linz
with forces of the Thirteenth Army, and the Second Army was given the task
of going over to the defense and of repelling over a period of two full
days the counterattacks of the approaching enemy corps.
While making the transition to the use of nuclear weapons, this army
ought to have continued the offensive.
The only requirement for the Sixth Army Corps was to eliminate by 6
July the enemy in Vienna and then advance in the zone of the Second Army.
As you can see, the plan was rather "original". As is well-known, the
defense is a coerced type of combat action and we make the transition to it
only when there is no other way out. Why did the Second Army, after
defeating the enemy in frontier battles and having advanced almost 100
kilometers, give up aggressive actions at the first hindrance and go over
to the defense? It did not even commit to the affair all of its forces,
though-the 66thr-Division had-been--transferred-to-it-. --Undoubtedly-the -army,
especially' on its right flank, was fully able to continue the offensive and
thoroughly defeat the enemy. Going over to the defense signified losing
the initiative in combat, which of course cannot be permitted.
Having estimated the situation with preconceptions, the front, as

usual, concentrated the main efforts of fighter-bomber aviation on
supporting troops of the Thirteenth Army. But the situation urgently
required allocating additional air resources to support troops of the
Second Army, which was done later on.
Following receipt of instructions from Control and a more thorough

analysis of the situation, aggressive tasks were assigned to the Second
Army and other forces.
The commander of the Second Army correctly grasped the situation that
had developed. His plan of delivering a concentrated attack with a force
of four divisions is worthy of approval. His efforts to extensively use
enveloping detachments in conjunction with tactical airborne landings to
deliver strikes on the enemy flanks and rear produced positive results.
The plan of the commander of the Sixth Army Corps was also in
conformity with the situation that had developed and was correct.
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The plan for the air defense of the Hungarian People's Republic
contemplited conducting subsequent combat actions in the existing groupings
in coordination with air defense troops of the Southwestern Front and
fighter aviation of the First Air Army.
We must also recognize as worthwhile measures to build up the radar

zone to the west of the state border and restore the partially disrupted
surface-to-air missile troop grouping.
Overall, the plan was in accord with the situation and ensured air
defense missions were fulfilled.
I must place on the negative side the fact that the rebasing of
aircraft to forward fields was to be carried out by limited forces.
-- - -- Plan--of-the First-Southern-Front-- -
After two days on the offensive, forces of the First Southern Front
had broken through the Metaxas fortified zone, inflicted a defeat on large
units of the "orange" Second and Third Corps, broken out to the Struma
River and the shores of the Aegean Sea, and advanced from 50 to 100
kilometers on specific axes. Conditions favoring the rapid exploitation of
success had developed on the Southwestern Axis.
The troop commander adopted a completely correct plan -- to

concentrate the main efforts on the adjacent flanks of two armies.
However, the buildup of efforts in the first two to three days of the
operation was carried out with inadequate resoluteness. More forces should
have been brought in on the axis of the main strike.
The decision was also made to deliver a supplementary strike on the

left flank of the front by a force of two divisions and a tank brigade for
the purpose of encircling the "orange" grouping in the zone of the Eighth
Army. I have no specific objections to this. The attack was delivered, of
course, along the shortest axis. But one must take into account that here
the enemy was relatively strong and the terrain was very difficult.
Under the given conditions of the situation, the plan might have been
different.
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In our opinion, a strong strike (two divisions and a tank brigade)

might also have been delivered on the right wing of the Ninth Army. A
decisive strike to the south, towards the sea, with a subsequent turn to
the west would not have led to pushing the enemy out, but would have cut
the main "orange" grouping close to its base and might have proved much
more effective. The axis referred to is favorable in that it was almost
free of enemy and led to the rear of his main grouping. Speaking of the
possiblities of such a variant, I would like to draw your attention to the
necessity of skilfully choosing favorable axes for the delivery of strikes.
In conjunction with aggressive actions in the situation that had

developed, we must also not forget to defend the coast against amphibious
landings, which occurred initially but were later rectified by the front
troop commander. To dash forward is a good thing; not indiscriminately,
but when one secures oneself from the flanks and rear.
I have no substantive comments regarding problems of logistical

support.--A noteworthy recommendation is-that-of exploiting -to -the maximum- -
all types of transport to increase the supply of materiel south of the
Rhodope Mountains.
The plan for employing the composite aviation corps upon transition to
the use of nuclear weapons must be recognized in principle as worthwhile.
It ensured aircraft were used comprehensively to support the accomplishment
of the principal tasks of the front.
I have only one comment. Aircraft were charged with the task of
destroying a battery of "Hawk" surface-to-air missiles. It is well-known
that missiles of this type, which both we and the enemy possess, are very
threatening and dangerous weapons to aircraft. Therefore it is hardly
advisable to direct aircraft against them. This task is best assigned to
rocket troops.
Overall, the plan of the front, adopted on the basis of a profound

understanding of the task, was correct and was in conformity with the
directive of the Stavka.
Air Defense of the People's Republic of Bulgaria
The Commander of Air Defense Forces correctly estimated the situation

that had developed with respect to the fact that beginning the morning of 5
July, the air defense system had to be ready to repel massive strikes by
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"Western" aircraft employing nuclear weapons.
Stemming from this, the plan contemplated conducting actions against

the air enemy with the former grouping. It also projected strengthening
cover of the coastal axis and the Burgas naval base. A portion of the
forces was allocated to secure flights across Bulgarian territory of Long
Range and naval missile-carrying aviation and to cover amphibious landings
in the embarkation areas and during sea crossing.
Foreseeing an enemy missile/nuclear strike, provisions were made for

measures increasing the viability of the troops.
Such a plan is worthwhile.
At the same time, the plan should have provided for measures creating
radar coverage for altitudes below 500 meters along the main axis and for
measures restoring the air defense system when it is disrupted by enemy
nuclear strikes.
The Second Southern Front, having successfully broken through the

enemy defense and won the~frontier battle without using nuclear weapons,
advanced on the axis of the main strike to a depth of 80 to 90 kilometers
during two days of uninterrupted combat actions. A grave defeat was
inflicted on the "orange" Third Corps and "black" Fifth Corps. Front
forces, having firmly seized the initiative and having conserved their
second echelons and reserves, possessed the capability of breaking out
rapidly to the straits zone without resorting to nuclear weapons.
The front correctly estimated the situation that had developed and
adopted a practical plan.
The delivery of a powerful initial strike with 99 nuclear warheads

assured rapid destruction of the principal grouping of "black" nuclear
attack means and ground forces.
Augmenting troop efforts by committing the second echelons of the

armies permitted rapidly exploiting the results of nuclear strikes and
breaking out to the straits. The subsequent commitment to battle of the
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;'
Twelfth Army from the second echelon of the front afforded the opportunity
of vigorously exploiting success on the Bosporus axis.
The problem of rear services support of the troops was correctly

solved during this phase.
I will call your attention to only one circumstance. The front

commander realized the fate of the front operation would be determined by
the capture of the straits zone. As you know, the front was to seize two
straits. As concerns the capture of the Bosporus, adequate forces and
means were directed at it. But seizing the Bosporus did not solve the
entire problem. You see, the exit of our navies into the Sea of Marmora
did not afford them operational scope. To move naval forces into the
Mediterranean Sea, the Dardanelles "knot" also had to be decisively cut.
In the front, the importance of accomplishing this task was realized; but
in our opinion, considerably more efforts should have been concentrated
here.
The-plan- to-use--the -Third Army-for-the-purpose-of-both-deli-vering the---

initial nuclear strike and subsequently supporting attacking troops of the
front merits a positive evaluation. Overall, the plan was in conformity
with the situation and the nature of the task of the front in the given
phase. I must only remark that it was not advisable to assign the air army
the task of destroying stationary underground depots of nuclear weapons.
Such tasks are best assigned to rocket troops.
Situation at sea and plans of the commanders of allied navies.
Having repelled the "Western" strikes, the "Eastern" allied navies

destroyed enemy nuclear groupings in the Mediterranean Sea and ship forces
in the Black Sea in coordination with combat duty forces and Long Range
Aviation. As this took place, a portion of the forces of the Soviet fleet
remained ready to use nuclear weapons. At the same time, preparations were
made to debark the amphibious landing and additional measures were carried
out to protect forces and installations against enemy nuclear strikes.
In accordance with the situation as it had developed by 1300 hours on

4 July, the commanders of the navies made the following plans.
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Red Banner Black Sea Fleet
The main concept of the plan was to concentrate efforts to defeat-

strike aircraft carriers and to destroy enemy nuclear missile submarines in
the Mediterranean Sea.
The naval forces grouping ensured accomplishment of this task. Forces

of the fleet were intelligently distributed to fight the enemy in the Black
Sea and the Sea of Marmora and also in the Bosporus.
The measures taken to prepare for the amphibious landing also do not
give rise to any objections.
Overall, the plan of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet is evaluated
favorably, although it did have some shadowy provisions.
Thus, the extent of enemy mine emplacements along the Anatolian coast,
in the -area- of the Bosporus,-and -along the bases-of--allied-navies -was --- -
underestimated. As a result, minesweeper forces were not sent to operate
in these areas and no provision was made for regrouping them.
I have reason to doubt the feasibility of using surface

missile/gunnery ships on the third day of war for a strike against the
carrier strike group in the Mediterranean Sea.
Navy of the People's Republic,of Bulgaria
The plan called for further conduct of combat actions with

conventional means with the expectation of making a transition to the use
of nuclear weapons.
For these purposes, the plan envisaged moving naval forces out of the
probable areas of nuclear strikes with subsequent delivery of missile and
torpedo strikes in coordination with the Soviet fleet against enemy surface
ship groupings in the Black Sea. The plan also included searching for
submarines in the navy's area, defending naval lines of communication, and
accomplishing all types of combat support.
The mine situation at sea was also thoroughly analyzed. Much

attention was devoted to the minesweeping trawling of channels and
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minesweeping of lines of communication.
The organization of fire support of the ground forces by ship gunnery

is worthy of approval.
Thus, the plan for subsequent actions was completely sound. Two
comments:
--- the use of sweeper forces was planned without taking probable
losses into consideration;
-- closer coordination with antisubmarine forces of the Soviet fleet
should have been organized, especially to detect and pursue enemy
submarines.
At this point, the second phase of the war game ended.
During the given phase, problems relating to the transition by troops

from non-nuclear to nuclear actions were worked out.
I must state that we are also pleased with the work of all game
participants in this important phase.
I will now proceed to analyze briefly the actions of the players in

the concluding situation.
V. PLANS AND WORK OF THE PLAYERS ON THE SITUATION OF 1800 HOURS 7 JULY
(Diagrams 6, 7, 8, 9, 11)
During the third phase, game participants were faced with the complex
task of developing offensive operations under conditions of unlimited use
of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the main focus of attention was
concentrated on the solution of such critical problems as breaking through
fortified areas, making forced crossings of large water obstacles,
negotiating mountainous areas (Alps) completing the defeat of enemy naval
forces, eliminating the aftereffects of enemy nuclear strikes, and
restoring the combat effectiveness of our own troops.
The situation which had developed by 1800 hours 7 July, i.e., on the
sixth day of war, was extremely complex and acute.
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For the most part, the commander and staff of the Southwestern Front
estimated the situation correctly.
Front troops were in a favorable situation after the stubborn battles

of 5 and 6 July. The main body of the "yellow" Third Army had been
destroyed. Troops of the Thirteenth Army had broken out to the operational
depth and the main body of the Second Army threatened to encircle the main
forces of the Third and Fifth Army Corps in the Graz area. However, the
success of the operation had not yet been determined. Front troops had to
develop an offensive under the exceedingly complex conditions of
mountainous terrain, with an extremely limited network of roads and
numerous defiles and narrow mountain passes.
The commander and staff underestimated these complex conditions.
The commander correctly decided to develop a further offensive with

the main forces and negotiate the Alps. However, we cannot accept the
excessive speed of advance of the troops of up to 70 to 80 kilometers a
day.
In their planning they obviously did not take into consideration the
very difficult terrain, the enemy capability of creating extensive
demolitions, and the impossibility of bypassing them, which could have held
up the advancing troops for an extended time.
We also cannot accept the soundness of the method chosen to break

through defensive lines in the mountains -- from the march. To break
through a defensive line in the mountains, even one occupied by small enemy
forces, often requires suitable preparation and search for bypass routes,
and this demands time.
Obviously, in the headquarters of the Southwestern Front the methods

of breaking through a defense in ordinary circumstances were mechanically
applied under difficult mountainous conditions.
The front commander subsequently refined the plan and it ensured

accomplishment of the assigned task.
The plan of the commander of the Second Army provided for the
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splitting of the enemy grouping to the south of Graz and the completion of
its piecemeal destruction simultaneous with the development of the
offensive by two divisions. This plan was completely practical. Nuclear
weapons were also employed skilfully.
The plan of the commander of the Sixth Army Corps does not give rise
to comments.
Air Defense of the Hungarian People's Republic
The plan of the commander of the Air Defense Forces of the Hungarian
People's Republic was correct and in conformity with the situation that had
developed.
Plan of the First Southern Front
The commander and staff correctly assumed that despite heaiy losses
from enemy nuclear strikes, the situation in the zone of the front was
favorable. The troops made a forced crossing of the Vardar River and
advanced from 150 to 200 kilometers on the main axis.
Under these conditions, we required that the front command prevent the
enemy from withdrawing and organizing a defense in~Tiiicult mountainous
terrain, that it increase the rate of advance of its troops, that it not
weaken the defense against landings, and that it complete the destruction
of the "orange" Third Army Corps on the left wing. At the same time it
became necessary for it to restore the combat effectiveness of a number of
large units and units.
The tasks assigned to the troops were realistic and'give rise to no

objections. Under mountainous conditions it is necessary to use tactical
airborne landings more aggressively and also to approach more realistically
the establishment of operations groups for troop control.
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Plan for the Air Defense of the People's Republic of Bulgaria
We consider the plan of the commander of the air defense forces to

regroup his forces and reinforce the surface-to-air missile defense of the f
capital and industrial areas, and to restore the air defense of the Burgas
naval base, to have been correct. Other worthwhile measures were: covering
the advancing troops of the Third Southern Front, covering the
communication routes of the First and Secon outhern Fronts, covering the
embarkation and sea crossing of the amphibious landing force, and also
covering the airborne landing force during its flight over and across the
People's Republic of Bulgaria.
,.
Although the situation in the front was complex, it was also

favorable.
The front had to eliminate the aftereffects of enemy nuclear strikes

and create strike groups for the attack on the Bosporus and Gallipoli axes
in order to seize the straits zone in the shortest possible time.
Overall, I consider the commander's plan for seizing the straits zone
to have been worthwhile. Committing the Twelfth Army to battle on the
Bosporus axis from the front second echelon and also committing the front
reserve, the 87th Motorizedhifle Division, on the Gallipoli axis, was done
in a timely and sound manner.
Using the 99th Airborne Division and an amphibious landing force to

seize the straits zone, and also striving to make a forced crossing of the
straits simultaneously by the forces of four divisions, are worthy of
approval.
But I object to the measures taken to restore the disrupted combat

effectiveness of the troops and destroy isolated enemy groupings.
At the same time I would like to draw attention to problems which were
not correctly dealt with in the plan.
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These pertain, first of all, to the breakthrough of fortified areas

and the forced crossing of straits.
Fortified areas are very serious obstacles. Their high viability,

even under conditions of the use of nuclear weapons, is well-known. Of
course, one must strive to seize a fortified area or break into it
immediately behind the enemy. But if this is not possible, a most thorough
preparation of the breakthrough is required. In the first place, it is
necessary to exploit the least opportunity of bypassing fortified lines or
of landing tactical amphibious and airborne forces; and under the
conditions of the front, this was entirely possible. All measures must be
taken to avoid a frontal breakthrough of a fortified area, since such a
breakthrough involves great sacrifices.
We must avoid stereotyed plans to break through from the march.
I want to emphasize particularly the importance of becoming proficient

with the means of making forced crossings of straits and other large water
barriers. Undoubtedly, this is one of thedifficultt-asks. Troops must ---
negotiate straits, gulfs, and other large water barriers, which abound in
the Southwestern Theater, by surprise methods, on a broad front, by the
most expedient means, and utilizing crossing means to the utmost.
The 45th Motorized Rifle Division should not have been directed to
attack across the swampy floodlands of the Maritza River, with its many
branches and dikes.
It was scarcely advisable for forces of the 51st Motorized Rifle

Division to deliver a strike along the Saros Gulf to destroy remnants of
the enemy. Obviously it would have been more advantageous to use it to
make a forced crossing of the gulf and break out from the west behind the
Gallipoli fortifications.
More accurate estimates for committing second echelons and reserves to

battle were also required.
Plan of the Third Air Army
The fundamental problems related to the use of the army were correctly
solved. However, the conclusions that the enemy air defense system had
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been completely disrupted were premature.

4k,
X X X
After concluding examination of the plans of the front and army

commanders, I wish to draw your attention to the problem of the use of
nuclear weapons.
Reports of several game participants, and also an analysis of the

decisions and plans presented concerning the combat employment of troops,
reveal a casual approach to the use of those terrible weapons and to the
estimate of the situation that will have arisen as a result of the massive
use of nuclear strikes by both sides.-
The availability of great numbers of nuclear weapons does not at all
mean that they can be used without detailed and comprehensive estimates.
These are certainly not ordinary artillery rounds or aerial bombs, but very
powerful means of destruction. Their use must be approached in a most
-serious manner and with comprehensive, precise estimates. When delivering
strikes against the enemy we obviously are thinking only that we "are
clearing a road for the troops", but at times we forget that at the same
time, additional difficulties are also being created for us, especially in
mountains, forests, and river valleys. We also forget about the safety of
our own troops.
It is necessary to take into consideration all of the

casualty-producing elements of nuclear weapons. This was often overlooked
in the game; strikes with megaton warheads were delivered without
considering the aftereffects. And these aftereffects are very grave.
Allow me to remind you of them.
First, when there is an air nuclear burst of a warhead with a yield of

one megaton the radius of the zone of destruction of the shock wave is 8.5
kilometers, and that of the thermal radiation is 11 kilometers. Second,
zones of fires, demolitions, and floodings will result. The radius of the
zone of fires in our example will equal 16 to 17 kilometers. Third, and
most important, we must take into consideration the danger zones of
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radioactive contamination of the terrain, not only in the zone of burst,

but also in the fallout pattern of the radioactive cloud. These zones may
be very large depending on the direction of the wind. Finally, when
surface bursts are delivered, we must estimate the time of decay of levels
of dangerous radiation.
As you can see, when planning the delivery of nuclear strikes it is

necessary to produce the most exact estimates, to take into account their
possible aftereffects, the relief, vegetation, meteorological conditions,
and other factors.
I also want to caution you against underestimating the results of

enemy nuclear strikes. Players did not always make allowances for these.
The enemy delivered many nuclear strikes, but large units and units
continued to attack as if nothing had happened.
Situation at sea and plans of fleet commanders
The situation was characterized by successful actions of allied navies

in the Mediterranean and Black Seas.
The enemy carrier strike and surface ship groupings in the

Mediterranean Sea were routed and five nuclear missile submarines were
sunk.
Allied navies continued their aggressive combat actions, provided fire

support to the coastal flank of the Second Southern Front, and activated an
amphibious landing force. At the same time they carrieTdout measures
eliminating the aftereffects of enemy nuclear attacks and restoring the
combat effectiveness of their own forces.
Having estimated the situation that had developed, the naval

commanders, in our opinion, adopted sound and practical plans.
Plan of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet
The main efforts of the fleet were concentrated on supporting troops

of the Second Southern Front in the debarkation of the amphibious landing
force and capture of the Bosporus straits in coordination with the
Bulgarian Navy, and with the subsequent movement of a portion of the fleet
forces into the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas.
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We must note the well-thought-out organization of cover for the

amphibious landing during the sea crossing, and also the neutralization of
the enemy anti-amphibious defense in the landing area.
The method of moving a portion of the fleet forces through the straits
zone after it was seized was well worked out and the organization of combat
utilization and logistical support of these forces in the Aegean Sea was
well thought out.
Plan of the Navy of the People's Republic of Bulgaria
The plan contemplated having the remaining forces conduct agressive

combat actions in coordination with forces of the Red Banner Black Sea
Fleet to provide support to ground forces and to prevent the evacuation of
the enemy grouping pinned to the sea in the Igneada-Midye area.
I have no reason to object to the way the main forces of the Navy,
which comprised more than 20 units, including submarines, missile and
torpedo boats, and minesweepers, were moved out through the straits into
the Aegean Sea.
The problems of clearing obstacles and sweeping mines from the

straits, and also of organizing bases for forces in the Aegean Sea, were
dealt with expediently.
X X X
This, in short, was the essence of the plans of the players for the
concluding phase of the game, a phase in which a number of the most
important problems of conducting operations under conditions of the use of
nuclear weapons were worked out. We believe that the training purposes of
this phase were also achieved.
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X Xt X
Comrades !
During the game you also solved problems of rear services support
under conditions when the operational rear services of the allied armies
were not fully deployed, and when their work was reorganized during the
operation.
As is well-known, in peacetime the rear services of our formations

will be kept at reduced complements. Therefore the rear services of allied
troops and navies must be ready to immediately build up their means and
organs at the initiation of military operations. The importance of this
requirement stems from the colossal increase in the materiel demanded by
operations. For example, in our _game the Southwestern and Second Southern
Fronts alone required approximately 200'thousand tons of fuel for a period
of13to 14 days, which is eight to ten times more than for any front
operation of the World War II period.
Formation commanders and staffs must carefully take into consideration

the state of the rear services when planning an operation.
In the game we again became convinced of the vast importance of lines

of communication and of the skilful use of transport. The timely
construction of bypasses around large transportation centers and cities,
approaches to bridges and crossings, and reliable technical cover of
communication lines; and the timely restoration of the most important
routes, are indispensable conditions for ensuring the uninterrupted
operation of rear services in present-day operations. It is also very
important to maintain vehicular roads in a passable condition, to establish
stocks of construction materials, and to utilize under a single plan all
forces and means for the restoration of roads.
In the Southwestern Theater communication lines and transport

constitute one of the principal problems in preparing the theater in an
operational rear services context.
The precise organization of rear services work has acquired great

importance, requiring that the positioning and displacement of rear
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services be carried out only in a centralized manner according to the plan

of the staff of the front (fleet) and the army.
An important condition for the uninterrupted rear services support of

troops, especially when formations have a coalition complement, is to have
the rear services organs of the allied armies work in well-organized
coordination. This coordination must be strengthened in every possible way
while we are still in peacetime. I must note that we have already achieved
the necessary unity of views on a great number of fundamental matters.
A problem requiring further research and solution is that of the

reciprocal use of the territory of allied countries for the needs of the
deployed fronts and armies. A rear services zone is often allocated to a
front. Within this zone the front utilizes the entire network of rail and
vehicular roads, territory, structures, etc. All of this requires the
precise coordination of fronts with the general staffs and local and
central government control organs of the allied countries.
The game showed that operational formations which are to move out and
conduct military actions in the theater will need help from the rear
services of friendly states. Thus problems on the mutual use of
foodstuffs, medicines, transport, and on help with the water supply, etc.,
will have to be coordinated with the central rear services of the
government on whose territory troops from other countries will be located.
As you can see, comrades, the problems of rear services support are
very complex. That is why we have made provisions to conduct in Prague
this year a military science conference on rear services in which we shall
discuss .in more detail the most important problems of rear services.
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CONCLUSION
Comrades!
Upon completing the critque I wish to emphasize again that having

performed important and strenuous work, we have successfully concluded a
very important measure in the operational training system of the armies and
navies of the member states of the Warsaw Pact.
Major operational-strategic problems were worked out during the game.
We have all become convinced that these are very complex problems and
all of us must think of how to best resolve them and of how to train
troops, navies, and staffs.
During the game we pointed out many positive features and a number of
deficiencies. Thus there is no need to speak about them once more.
I only want--to emphasize that the commanders,-staffs, and-operations

groups of the fronts, navies, air defense forces, and air forces
successfully coped with their tasks. All participants obtained more
experience in preparing, conducting, and supporting operations under varied
conditions.
All the generals, admirals, and officers exhibited good theoretical

preparation and practical skills, teamwork, and the ability to solve
important, complex, and varied tasks when organizing and conducting
present-day operations. All the game participants worked hard, long and
fruitfully; they completed a large number of operational estimates, and
worked out many useful documents. All worked conscientiously and with
great energy and creativity.
We were not able to examine during every phase of the game how the
chiefs of arms of troops and.services worked and solved their problems.
As a general conclusion, I may state that the chiefs of rocket troops

and artillery, air defense troops, rear services, engineer, chemical, and
communications troops, and all other services fulfilled their tasks.
They should take into consideration in subsequent training and

practical work the comments they got from us and from their own formation
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commanders during the game.
I must also remark on the fact that during the game creative
collaboration and complete mutual understanding were always evident among
the generals and officers of the fraternal armies, navies, and the Staff of
the Combined Armed Forces.
During the entire game there were very close, business-like contacts
among generals, admirals, and officers of the Bulgarian, Hungarian, and
Soviet armies and navies. They provided each other with mutual assistance
and consultation when resolving many problems. This cooperation continues
to improve uninterruptedly year after year through their combined military
work.
Allow me to express deep gratitude to all game participants for their

great diligence and conscientious work. We have commended in orders of the
Combined Armed Forces those comrades who most distinguished themselves.
This should be done in-the -military-districts -and-navies. -- -
I wish to express particular gratitude for their assistance and

fruitful work to the deputy directors of the game, Colonel General Comrade
Semerdzhiyev, and General-Leytenant Comrade Kara Chem, to my assistants in
the game, Colonel General omrade Podgornyy, Generals-Leytenant Comrades
Ostroumov, Pashuk, and Golushko, and Vice Admiral Comrade Vasilyev.
A large number of generals and officers of the Staff of the Combined

Armed Forces participated in the preparation and conduct of the war game
under the guidance of the experienced and well-known General of the Army
Comrade Sergey Matveyevich Shtemenko. They devoted much work and effort to
preparing and conducting the game, for which I express sincere thanks to
them. This was the first large-scale game for the Staff under its new
organization, and the Staff successfully coped with the tasks assigned to .
it.
We also convey our thanks to all workers and employees who

participated in the support and conduct of our military game.
Comrades!
The game which ended has permitted us to discern precisely those tasks
whose solution requires the subsequent concentrated attention of formation
commanders and staffs.
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The deficiencies in the training and work of staffs which were

discovered during the game must be eliminated during the summer training
period.
The Staff of the Combined Armed Forces, national commands, and staffs
of military districts and navies must assimilate all that was positive in
the game and must use it to further improve their own preparations.
Increased demands are now imposed on control organs. Formation

commanders and chiefs of staff must now focus attention on further
improving the training levels of staffs. Staff style and methods of work
must be perseveringly improved, staffs must be trained to skilfully control
troops under various conditions of initiating and conducting war. Great
attention must be devoted to the field training of staffs, to the
inculcation of practical working skills under field conditions, to the
rapid production of operational estimates, to the transmittal down of tasks
to troops, and to the maintenance of communications when control posts are
relocated and under conditions of strong jamming.
It would be useful for- the Staff of the Combined Armed Forces and
naval staffs to exploit the experience they have accumulated in
coordinating allied navies so as to work up documents defining how the
coordination and control of allied navies are tc be organized when combined
tasks are to be accomplished.
The summer season is now at its height. You must take all measures to
fulfil completely and properly the tasks of the summer training period. I
ask you to devote special attention to the preparation of the combined-
arms exercise in which troops of all allied armies will participate. It
will be carried out in October under the direction of the Minister of
National Defense of the the German Democratic Republic in the territory of
the GDR, Polish People's Republic, and Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. In
essence, this will be the summing-up exercise of the year. Ministers of
defense and the Combined Command attach great importance to it.
Within the next few days we will begin a large-scale exercise of air
defense forces of the Warsaw Pact countries. During the short time
remaining it will be necessary to complete preparations for this exercise
in order to carry it out in the best manner possible.
I request that military district commanders and commanders of navies

and air defense forces conduct on-the-spot critiques in which they evaluate
the work and preparations of every staff,headquarters, general, admiral and
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officer, and issue orders on the elimination of deficiencies.
While accomplishing tasks related to the further improvement of the

combat readiness and operational and combat training of troops, we must
also prepare for the new training year.
Thus the Staff of the Combined Armed Forces must already begin
planning the combined measures of the Combined Armed Forces for 1971.
While planning, naturally, we must take into consideration the results of
the present game and of the October operational-tactical exercise.
X X X
Comrades!
We are all now on the territory of hospitable Hungary. The Minister

of Defense of the Hungarian People's Republic, Colonel General Comrade
Layosh Tsinege, the Chief of the General Staff of the Hungarian People's
Army, General-Leytenant Comrade Kara Chem, and the Commander of the
Southe Group ofte Soviet Forces, Colonel General B. P. Ivanov, provided
all of us with excellent conditions which were conducive to the successful
conduct of the game.
For this allow me to personally express special thanks to them on your

behalf and also on mine.
To all game participants, I wish much sucess in their work, a

strengthening of the friendship among our fraternal peoples and armies, and
an increase in the combat power of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw
Pact Countries.
To each of you I wish personal well-being and health.
I thank you for your attention.
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REPORT
of the Chief of Staff of the Combined Armed Forces
General of the Army Comrade S. M. Shtemenko
at the Critique of the Operational War Game
Comrades!
The operational war game which has ended was carried out according to
the combined measures plan for 1970 of the Combined Armed Forces of the
member states of the Warsaw Pact. It is an important measure in the
operational training of the highest staffs of the armies of the Warsaw Pact
countries.
TPOSE INVOLVED IN THE OPERATIONAL WAR GAME.
From-the Bulgar-ian- People!s Army: - - --
-- operations groups of the front headquarters and of a composite air

corps in the role of the field headquarters of the First Southern Front and
of the headquarters of the First Composite Air Corps respectively;
operations groups from the Air Defense, Air Force, and Navy -- in
the role of the air defense and naval headquarters of the People's Republic
of Bulgaria respectively.
From the Hungarian People's Army:
-- an operations group of the General Staff;

-- an army and corps headquarters -- in the role of the headquarters
of the Second Army and Sixth Army Corps respectively;
-- an air defense and air force operations group -- in the role of the
command and staff of the Air Defense of the Hungarian People's Republic.
From the Armed Forces of the USSR:
-- the headquarters of the Southern Group of Forces and the Air Army
-- in the role of the field headquarters of the Southwestern Front and the
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First Air Army respectively;

- - operations groups of the Odessa Military District and Air Army - -
in the role of the field headquarters of the Second Southern Front and the
Third Air Army respectively;
-- an operations group of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet -- in the
role of the fleet headquarters.
THEMES, PURPOSES, AND TRAINING PROBLEMS OF THE WAR GAME
The theme of the o erational war game was: "The Preparation and
Conduct oTFroifOffeniOeopsietions and CombiaActions of Allied Naval
Forces and Air Defense Forces of the Combined Aimed Forces in the
Southwestern Theater of Military Operations."
In preparing this large-scale war game, we established as our

purposes: Studying the methods of operationally deploying groupings of
allied troops and naval forces in a period of threat and from the beginning
of a war, and also working out the problems of disrupting enemy troop
deployments; improving the work of operational staffs -whenpreparing and
conducting front operations with breakthroughs of fortified positions by
troops of allied armies and when preparing and carrying out combat actions
of naval forces and air defense forces of Warsaw Pact countries; and
finally, providing staffs with practice in working out problems of control
and coordination when preparing and conducting combined combat actions.
Furthermore, the game had the goal of further improving coordination

among the staffs of the Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Soviet armies.
Stemming from the training purposes established, the following

training problems were worked out in the game:
1. Bringing troops up to combat readiness, covering state borders,

mobilization deployment of troops and rear services units and installations
(these were worked out by the participants in the war game and reported
directly to the chiefs of the general staffs of the Bulgarian and Hungarian
People's Armies).
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2. The operational deployment of troops and naval forces in the

Theater of Military Operations. Preparing front (army) operations, naval
combat actions, and combat actions of air defense forces.
3. Conducting combat actions using conventional means of destruction

with a subsequent transition to the use of nuclear weapons.
4. Developing an offensive under conditions of breaking through

fortified areas, of making forced crossings of water barriers, and of
overcoming mountain ranges of the Alps.
INITIAL SITUATION
(diagrams 1, 2, and 3)
In accordance with the purposes established for the conduct of the war
game, a concept was worked out and a corresponding military-political and
operational situation was developed.
The essence of the initial situation was that during the second half
of June NATO countries undertook a number of military-political actions
which aggravated the international situation in Europe and simultaneously
began direct preparations to unleash war.
The Supreme High Command of the Combined Armed Forces of NATO in

Europe, under the guise of preparing exercises, concentrated large-scale
groupings of ground forces and aviation in the direction of the state
borders of the Warsaw Pact countries and also redeployed naval forces in
the theaters of military operations.
Up to 29 June the "Westerners" secretly carried out the bringing up to

strength of the permanently-ready forces and completed the deployment of
new military units.
In so doing, the "green" (West German) Sixteenth Army Corps and the
"yellow" (Italian) Third Army were concentrated along the Austrian border,
and the Fourth Army Corps of the "yellow" Third Army under the guise of
exercises, was transferred to the southern part of the FRG.
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Two armies: the "black" (Turkish) First Field Army and the "orange"
(Greek) First Central Army completed regrouping in the direction of their
state borders with Bulgaria.
In the theaters of military operations the enemy increased the number

of nuclear weapons forces, air defense means, and aircraft on alert.
In the Mediterranean Sea there were six "brown" (US) nuclear
submarines on combat patrol, and a "brown" aircraft carrier strike large
unit (two strike aircraft carriers and one antisubmarine aircraft carrier
with escorting and support forces) and a "blue" (British) naval aircraft
carrier strike group (one aircraft carrier and seven escorting ships) had
been deployed.
The "brown" Second Amphibious Squadron and a detachment of combat

ships (one cruiser, two frigates, and one destroyer) were maneuvering near
the Greek coast.
Antisubmarine forces in the Gibraltar and Tunis straits and to the

south of the island of Sardinia increased their activities. On the Israeli
- Arab front both sides increased the activities of their aircraft, and the
Israeli troop grouping on the ceasefire line in Syria and along the
Lebanese border was rdinforced.
In connection with the sharply aggravated situation in Europe, on 28

June the Swiss government announced that it was adhering to its neutrality.
At this time NATO leaders were conducting talks with the Austrian
government concerning the latter's entry into the war on the side of the
North Atlantic Alliance.
In the situation that had developed, the "Easterners" brought their

armed forces up to full combat readiness and fully mobilized their troops
and rear services units and installations.
The headquarters of the Southern Group of Forces and the Odessa

Military District were deployed as the field headquarters of the
Southwestern and Second Southern Fronts. The Bulgarian People's Army
deployed the field headquarters ofThe First Southern Front and the
Romanian Army deployed the headquarters of the Third Southern Front.
The Hungarian and Bulgarian People's Armies organized the cover of

state borders and carried out a partial regrouping of their forces in
readiness to repel possible enemy aggression.
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The Second Southern Front completed its troop concentration in

northeastern Bulgaria. Troops of the third Southern Front were brought up
to combat readiness and positioned in concentration areas.
Allied naval forces in the Black Sea were dispersed and carried out
reconnaissance, and a portion of the Soviet Navy was on combat duty in the
Mediterranean Sea.
Air defense forces of the Warsaw Pact countries reinforced the cover
of the most important installations, troop groupings, and air and naval
forces in the territory of their own countries.
Front, army, and naval staffs by this time had occupied their
previously prepared control posts.
CONCEPT OF THE ACTIONS OF BOTH SIDES

(diagram 1)
"Westerners." On 2 July NATO troops went over to the offensive in the

Central European Theater of Military Operations with forces of the
Northern, Central, and Southern Army Groups.
The Central Army Group delivered the main attack on the Prague-Krakow
axis. Its Sixteenth Army Corps (FRG) advanced into Austrian territory when
combat actions began and delivered an attack from an area to the northwest
of Vienna in the direction of Brno.
The Southern Arm Group ("yellow" Third Army; "rose Austrian First,
Second, an Tir soups), at the outbreak of war and under cover of
"rose" troops, moved the "yellow" Third Army forward from Italy and the FRG
to the eastern borders of Austria, and in coordination with forces of the
right wing of the Central Army Group (Sixteenth Army Corps of the FRG) went
over to the offensive on the Budapest axis with the task of defeating the
allied armies and breaking out to the borders of Romania and the Soviet
Union.
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The offensive of the Southern Army Group was supported by the Fifth
Allied Tactical Air Force and by a portion of the aircraft forces of the
"brown" carrier strike large unit and "blue" carrier strike group deployed
in the Mediterranean Sea.
On the southern wing of the bloc the "orange" First Central Army and
"black" First Field Army, in coordination with the Sixth Allied Tactical
Air Force and a portion of the forces of the "brown" and "blue" carrier
aircraft, went over to the offensive starting on the morning of 3 July with
the task of defeating the troops on the territory of the People's Republic
of Bulgaria, of seizing the line of the Balkan mountains, and of taking
Bulgaria out of the war. Subsequently, when the offensive developed
successfully on the eastern axis, they contemplated making a forced
crossing of the Danube River and breaking out into Romanian territory.
NATO naval forces in the South European Theator of Military Operations

were given the task oE destroying "Eastern"_naval forces in _the_
Mediterranean Sea, of inflicting a defeat on enemy naval groupings in the
Black Sea, and of supporting the actions of friendly ground forces.
NATO planned to initiate combat actions using conventional means of

destruction. Nuclear weapons were to be used upon special orders.
When making the transition to combat actions using nuclear weapons,

the "Westerners" planned to use: in the zone of the Southern Army Group --
302 nuclear warheads; in the zone of the First Central Army -- 170; in the
zone of the First Field Army -- 214; against "Eastern" naval forces -- 121
warheads.
In total, 807 nuclear warheads with an overall yield of 112 megatons.
The "Western" ground forces grouping at the beginning of the offensive

included:
-- on the Southwestern Axis -- six divisions, of these: two infantry,
one motorized intantry and one mountain infantry, two armored divisions;
fourteen separate brigades and regiments, 24 launchers (two "Sergeant" and
22 "Honest John"), 66 nuclear guns, 1950 guns and mortars, and
approximately 1700 tanks and 400 aircraft;
-- on the Southern Axis -- 20 divisions, of these: sixteen infantry,
two mechanized, and two armored divisions, five se arate brigades; five
separate regiments; 20 "Honest John" launchers, 120 nuclear guns, over 3500
guns and mortars, more than 2100 tanks, and over 540 aircraft.
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The "Easterners" planned, in case of enemy .aggression, to switch over

to a decisive offensive, defeat "Western" forces, and force them to
withdraw from the war.
The Central Front contemplated delivering attacks on the Stuttgart and

Munich axes, destroying the enemy in the southern part of the FRG, making a
forced crossing from the march of the Rhine River, and seizing a bridgehead
on its western bank.
When NATO forces violated Austrian neutrality, the "Easterners"

prepared to go over to the offensive on the Vienna and Italy axes.
In the south, upon receiving information on the offensive being
prepared by the "oranges" and "blacks", the "Easterners" in turn went over
to the offensive with a force of two fronts in coordination with allied
navies.
To accomplishtasks-employing nuclear weapons;-the "Easterners" - - --

planned to use 830 nuclear warheads with an overall yield of approximately
127 megatons.
Nuclear weapons would be used upon special orders.
The ground forces groupings of the "Easterners" at the beginning of

combat actions included:
-- on the Southwestern Axis -- 11 divisions, of these: eight
motorized rifle and three tank divisions, 61 tactical and
operational-tactical missile launchers, approximately 2200 guns and
mortars, 2400 tanks, and 330 aircraft;
-- on the Southern Axis -- 25 divisions (not counting the Third
Southern Front), five brigades, 112 launchers for tactical and
operational-tactical missiles, approximately 5000 guns and mortars, 4760
tanks, and 826 aircraft.
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Thus, the concept envisaged the following relationship of forces:
in nuclear weapons 1.2 1 in favor of the enemy

in divisions 1 1.1
in tanks 1 : 1.4
in favor of the "Easterners"
in artillery and
mortars 1 1.2
in combat aircraft 1.1 : 1 in favor of the enemy
on the Southern Axis
in nuclear warheads 1 : 1.1

in divisions 1 : 1.2
in tanks 1 : 2.4 in favor of the "Easterners
in artillery and
mortars 1 : 1.4
in combat aircraft 1 : 1.5
TASKS OF "EASTERN" FRONTS, NAVIES AND AIR DEFENSE FORCES

(diagrams 2 and )
In accordance with the concept and initial situation set up for the
operational war game, the fronts, navies, and air defense forces of the
countries were assigned the following tasks:
Southwestern Front -- prepare and conduct an offensive operation on

the Northern Axis -- Vienna, and on the Southern Axis -- Klagenfurt, with
the objective of destroying the enemy on Austrian territory and breaking
out into the northern areas of Italy.
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Immediate task -- making the main effort of the front on the Vienna
axis, destroy "rose" covering units (First and Second-rps Groups) and
advancing NATO forces, seize the cities of Vienna and Graz and by the sixth
to eighth day of the operation break out on the Linz-Klagenfurt line.
Subsequent task -- developing the offensive on the Northern and

Southern axes, destroy the main body of NATO troops in Austrian territory
and, concentrating the main body of the front on the Southern Axis, by the
twelfth to sixteenth day of the operation, break out into the northern
areas of Italy and seize the Bolzano - Trieste line.
First Southern Front -- prepare and conduct an offensive operation

with the objective of destroying "orange" forces and break out into the
central areas of Greece.
Immediate task -- destroy main forces of the First and Second Army
Corps in Thrace, make a forced crossing of the Vardar River, and on the
fifth to sixth day of -the operation break out on the line-of Edhessa -
Aiyinion - Aegean Sea Coast.
Upon breaking out to the coast, organize with a portion of the forces
a defense against landings in the Salonika-(excluded)/Alexandroupolis
sector.
Subsequent task -- developing the offensive with the main body on the
Veroia - arisa axis and covered from the northwest by a portion of the
forces, destroy approaching reserves and on the ninth to tent day of the
operation seize the Trikkala - Larisa area, establishing conditions for the
commitment to battle of the of the Third Southern Front on the Athens axis
and of a portion of the forces against Ioannina. Bythe same time break
out to the coast of the Gulf of Salonika and organize a defense against
amphibious landings on the Magnesia peninsula - Aiyinion sector.
The Tenth Army (motorized rifle divisions - - four, tank brigades --

one, and artillery brigades -- one) was transferred to the Second Southern
Front effective at 1800 hours 30 June.
The Soviet 89th Motorized Rifle Division was transferred to the First
Southern Front effective 0800 hours 4 July in the area to the southwest of
Knezha.
Second Southern Front -- prepare and conduct an offensive operation

with the objective of destroying the enemy in Eastern Thrace, seizing the
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Black Sea straits zone, and supporting the exit of allied naval forces into
the Mediterranean Sea.
Immediate Task -- delivering attacks on the Gallipoli and Istanbul

axes, and in coordination with the First Southern Front, destroy the main
body of the "orange" Third Army Corps and "black" First Field Army without
permitting their units to withdraw behind the Gallipoli and Qatalca
fortified areas and on the fourth to fifth day of the operation break out
to the Alexandroupolis - Sarkoy - Tarfa line.
Subsequent task -- break through the Gallipoli and Catalca fortified

areas, in coordination with allied naval forces and an amphibious landing
make a forced crossing of the Dardanelles and Bosporus, and developing the
offensive on the general axes of Qanakkale - Balikesir - Istanbul -
Eskisehir, destroy approaching enemy reserves, seize the principal Turkish
naval base of G61cnk, and on the ninth to eleventh day of the operation
break out to the Edremit - Akgakoca line.
To support fulfilment of the subsequent task, the 99th Airborne

Division was transferred on Day 3 to the front in an area to the west of
Kishinev.
To support troops in the forced crossing of the Bosporus straits,
provisions were made for the allied navies to debark in the Sile area an
amphibious force made up of a motorized rifle regiment of the Second
Southern Front, a naval infantry regiment of the Red Banner Black Sea
Fleet, an'T inaval infantry battalion of the Navy of the People's Republic
of Bulgaria.
To support the First and Second Southern Front six regimental sorties
of Long Range Aviation (four by the First Tactical-Air Army and two by the
Twenty-Eighth Tactical Air Army) were allocated for strikes against enemy
airfields.
Readiness to attack -- the Southwestern Front was to be ready by 2000

hours on i July and the First and Second Fronts were to be ready by 2000
hours on 2 July.
The Third Southern Front had the task of concentrating in the southern
part of komania in readiness to advance and be committed to battle on the
Athens axis.
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The Red Banner Black Sea Fleet had the task of destroying, jointly
with on (six regimental sorties) and combat duty forces,
the enemy carrier strike groups and nuclear missile submarines in the
Mediterranean Sea. -- - --- -
In coordination with the navies of the People's Republic of Bulgaria

and the Socialist Republic of Romania, destroy "Western" naval forces in
the Black Sea, and on the sixth to seventh day of the operation debark an
amphibious landing force of the composition indicated above, with the task
of seizing the Sile area and attacking on the pile - Beykoz axis. Support
troops of the Second Southern Front in the forced crossing of the Bosporus
and the crossing of the Dardanelles. When the straits zone is seized,
bring the main forces out into the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas to destroy
enemy ship groupings and support the ground forces attack on the coastal
axes. Provide sealifts in support of the Second Southern Front and provide
for the defense of its own naval communication lines.
The Navy of the People's -Republic -of Bulgaria was -assigned-the task,-
in coordination with the forces of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet and the
Navy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, of destroying enemy naval forces
in the Black Sea and of providing fire support to attacking troops of the
Second Southern Front, of providing base facilities to a portion of the
forces of the Re Banner Black Sea Fleet, and of securing naval
communication lines within its operational zone. When the straits zone is
seized, transfer a portion of its forces into the Aegean Sea.
The Navy of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, jointly with the Red
Banner Black Sea Fleet, supported the debarkation of an amphibious landing
force in the Sile area.
The commander of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet was made responsible
for coordinating the combat actions of allied navies in the Black Sea.
The Air Defense Forces of the Countries had the task of preventing
enemy air strikes against the most important installations in the territory
of their countries and also against troop groupings and naval forces,
during the time they were moving forward and deploying. Special attention
was devoted to ensuring reliable cover for crossing sites on the Danube
River and for passes in the Balkan and Rhodope Mountains.
During the operation these forces, in coordination with the air

defense troops of the fronts, were charged with the task of covering
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troops, naval forces, communication routes, and rear services

installations, and of preventing enemy aircraft from flying deep into the
territory of the countries.
These were the operational considerations which formed the basis of

the concept of the war game and the overall nature of the initial
situation, and also of the tasks assigned to the fronts, navies, and air
defense forces.
X X X
I will-now-proceed-to set forth-the-course-of-the war-game -and--the--

substance of the plans of the participants.
The Plans of Operations Groups and Staffs, brought in from the

Bulgarian and Hungarian armies, which dealt with bringing troops up to
combat readiness and covering state borders; and with the full manning,
mobilization deployment, and materiel support of troops; were reported
directly to the chiefs of the general staffs of these armies. The war game
Control started the briefings with reports of the plans adopted by the
players on the initial situation.
PLANS OF THE PLAYERS ON THE INITIAL SITUATION AND

THE STAVKA DIRECTIVE FOR THE OFFENSIVE
(diagrams 2 and 3)
The players adopted the following plans on the initial situation and
the Stavka directive.
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The Commander of the Southwestern Front decided to deliver the main

attack with six divisions on the Vienna axis and with four divisions on the
Klagenfurt axis, to destroy ''rose" covering units and advancing NATO
troops, and on the sixth day of the operation seize the Linz - Klagenfurt
line.
Subsequently, concentrating the main efforts of the front on the

Klagenfurt - Udine axis, complete the destruction of the AT~main forces
in Austrian territory, break out into the northern areas of Italy, and on
the twelfth day of the operation seize the Bolzano - Trieste line.
He planned to use the 215 nuclear warheads issued to the front as

follows: 155 warheads in the initial nuclear strike and to fulfil the
immediate task, 45 to fulfil the subsequent task, and 15 warheads were
allocated as a reserve.
While front forces carried out combat actions using conventional means
of destruction, heplannedto.fulfil the immediate task on the eighth day
of the operation and the subsequent task on the sixteenth day.
The front was operationally disposed in.a single echelon with one
motorized rifle division allocated as the reserve.
The Commander of the Second Army decided to deliver two strikes to

destroy the "rose" Second Corps Group before the approach of the "yellow"
Fifth Army Corps: the main strike with a force of three divisions on the
Szent - Gotthard - Dobl axis and the secondary one with one division on the
Torony - Bruck axis.
Advance guard battalions of first-echelon divisions were designated to

destroy the enemy in the forward security zone.
He planned to destroy the Fifth Army Corps by attacking with the main
forces of the first-echelon divisions (12th and 13th Tank Divisions) and by
committing the 14th Motorized Rifle Division to battle on the second day of
the operation on the Szent - Gotthard - Graz - Sulz - Leibnitz axes.
He contemplated fulfilling the army's immediate task by breaking out

to the Bruck - Leibnitz line on the third day of the operation.
Following this, the main efforts of the army would be concentrated on

the Graz - Klagenfurt axis with a portion of the forces operating on the
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Bruck - Teufenbach axis for the purpose of destroying reserves of the

"yellow" Third Army and then breaking out on the sixth day of the operation'
into the area of Judenburg - Klagenfurt - Koflach.
The operational disposition was in two echelons (the 10th and the 12th
Motorized Rifle Divisions and the 13th Tank Division in the first echelon
and the 14th Motorized Rifle Division in the second echelon).
The Commander of the Sixth Army Corps planned to deliver a strike

along the adjacent flanks of two divisions in the general direction of
Sopron - Baden, break through the enemy defense and, developing the attack
of the 16th Motorized Rifle Division towards Vienna and of the 18th
Motorized Rifle Division towards St. Veit, destroy territorial defense
troops and units of the Second Corps Group.
After this, and exploiting the attack on the St. P61ten axis, destroy
in a meeting engagement the main body of the "yellow" Fourth Army Corps,
seize the -city of Vienna in coordination-with the-60th Motorized Rifle
Division of the Thirteenth Army, and on the third day of the operation
break out to the St. P6lten (excluded) - Traisen line.
After seizing Vienna and breaking out to the St. Pblten line, the
corps took over the 60th Motorized Rifle Division, became the reserve of
the front, and was concentrated in the area of Baden - Neunkirchen -
Eisensadt.
The 18th Motorized Rifle Division of the corps was transferred to the
Thirteenth Army.
The Commander of the First Air Army concentrated the main efforts of
his aircraft on fulfilling the task of destroying enemy missile/nuclear
means and aircraft on the airfields and of covering and supporting forces
operating on the principal axis.
In delivering the initial nuclear strike he planned to use 20 nuclear

warheads against large units of the "green" Sixteenth Army Corps, "yellow"
Fourth and Fifth Army Corps and against operational reserves.
When conducting combat actions using conventional means, he

contemplated delivering bombing strikes against the Aviano and Linz
airfields in coordination with Long Range Aviation.
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The following allocations were made to support front troops: seven

regimental sorties for the Thirteenth Army, two for the Sixth Army Corps,
and four regimental sorties for .the Second Army with the corresponding use
of nine, two and 11 nuclear bombs.
The Plan of the Commander of the Air Defense Forces of the Hungarian
People's Republic contemplated concentrating the principal efforts on
covering th e adinistrative-political and industrial centers of the country
and also groupings and installations of the Southwestern Front in the areas
of Budapest - Sopron - Pecs.
The Plan of the Commander of the First Southern Front for the
operation consisted of the following: deliver the mainstrike with the
main forces of the Eighth and Ninth Armies on the Godeshevo - Nigrita -
Veroia - Larisa axis, in coordination with the Second Southern Front
destroy "orange" troops in Western Thrace and Northern Greece, and create
conditions favoring the commitment to battle of the Third Southern Front.
A portion of the forces of the Ninth Army were designated to operate

on the Podkova - Komotini axis.
In fulfilling the imediate task, achieve a breakthrough of the

"Metaxas" fortified zone with six divisions (in seven sectors with an
overall extension of 11 kilometers) and having destroyed the "orange" First
and Second Army Corps, break out on the fifth to sixth day of the operation
to the Arnissa - Veroia - Aiyinion line and the shores of the Aegean Sea.
On breaking out to this line, occupy with two divisions a defense against
amphibious landings in the Salonika - Alexandroupolis sector.
Following this, and developing the attack of the main forces on the
Veroia - Larisa axis under the cover of three divisions from the northwest,
destroy approaching "orange" reserves and on the ninth to tenth day of the
operation seize the areas of Pendalofon - Panayia - Grevena - Trikkala -
Larisa - Elasson, creating conditions for the commitment to battle of the
Third Southern Front and its actions on the Athens axis, and with a portion
of the forces move on Ioannina.
At the same time a portion of the forces were to break out to the
shores of the Gulf of Salonika and occupy a defense against amphibious
landings in the Magnesia Peninsula - Aiyinion sector.
The front was disposed in a single echelon. Two motorized rifle

divisions anTdone tank brigade were allocated as the reserve.
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The nuclear warheads issued to the front were distributed as follows:

25 to deliver the initial nuclear strike, 50, 35, and ten respectively to
fulfil the immediate and subsequent, as well as reserve tasks.
The Commander of the First Composite Air Corps concentrated the main
efforts of his aircraft on the axis of the main front strike for the
purpose of destroying, in coordination with Long Range Aviation, enemy
nuclear and aircraft groupings, and of supporting troops of the Eighth and
Ninth Armies when they were breaking through the "Metaxas" fortified zone,
making forced crossings of the Struma and Vardar rivers, and defending
against assault landings.
Strike groupings and principal rear services installations of the

front were covered by the forces of two fighter aviation regiments in
coordination with the Air Defense of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and
fighter aircraft of the Third Army of the Second Southern Front.
To-support the attack of the Eighth and Ninth Armies, 14 and eight
regimental sorties respectively of fighter-bomber aircraft were allocated.
The Plan of the Commander of the Air Defense of the People's Republic
of Bulgaria envisaged concentrating the main efforts on covering the most
important installations of the country and the main troop groupings. It
was planned to fulfil this task in coordination with air defense troops of
the First, Second, and Third Southern Fronts, and also, with forces and
means of allied navies.
In his plan, the Commander of the Second Southern Front contemplated

breaking through the enemy defense in the Mikhalich - Vaysal sector, and by
delivering the main strike with adjacent flanks of two armies on the
Elkhovo - Liileburgaz axis and by attacking towards Uzunkopr0 and Pinarhisar
with a portion of the forces of these armies, split the Thrace grouping of
the "Westerners" and, in coordination with the First Southern Front and
allied Black Sea navies, destroy the main body of the "black" First Field
Army and the "orange" Third Army Corps, prevent them from withdrawing
behind the Gallipoli and gatalca fortified areas, and on the fourth to
fifth day of the operation seize the Alexandroupolis - Tarfa line.
Following this, by committing to battle the second-echelon army,

develop the attack on the Dardanelles and Bosporus axes, break through the
Gallipoli and Qatalca fortified areas, complete the destruction of the
enemy grouping in Thrace, seize the straits zone jointly with the navies
and airborne and amphibious landing forces, and on the ninth to eleventh
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day of the operation break out to the Edremit - Akpakoca line.
The front was operationally disposed in two echelons: the Tenth and
Eleventh Armies in the first and the Twelfth Army in the second. Two
motorized rifle divisions were designated as the reserve.
Plans were to debark the amphibious force, made up of a motorized

rifle regiment of the 90th Motorized Rifle Division, a naval infantry
regiment of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet, and a naval infantry battalion
of the Bulgarian People's Army, in the pile area and to land the airborne
force (99th Airborne Division) in an area ten kilometers to the northeast
of Kartal.
Nuclear warheads were allocated: 84 for the initial nuclear strike,

115 to fulfil the immediate task, 65 for the subsequent task, and 14 as the
reserve.
The Plan of the Commander of the Third Air Amy made provisions for
engaging main forces in destroying and neutralizing enemy missil/nuc-ear
and aviation groupings and in supporting front troops, especially on the
Bosporus axis. A portion of the aviation torces were designated to support
the landing of the amphibious and airborne landing forces and the
overflights of Long Range Aviation.
Plans were to use 30 nuclear bombs in the initial nuclear strike

against three divisions of the "black" First Field Army, one division of
the "orange" Third Army Corps, three "Honest John" battalions, and three
control posts.
Flight resources of the army were allocated: jtodeliver the initial

nuclear strike -- one army sortie, to fulfil the immediate and subsequent
tasks and for the rserve~ - ine, ten, and one army sortie respectively.
The Commander of the Black Sea Fleet concentrated his main efforts on
destroying the enemy nuclear missile submarines and strike carriers in the
Mediterranean Sea. Ships on combat duty in the Mediterranean Sea were
designated to fulfil this task in coordination with naval aircraft and Long
Range Aviation.
Enemy ship groupings, convoys, and amphibious landing forces in the

Black Sea were to be destroyed jointly with the Navy of the People's
Republic of Bulgaria.
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To support the Second Southern Front in the seizure of the Bosporus

strait, plans were to debark an amphibious force in the Sile area.
As the .seizure of the straits zone proceeded, the plan was to move a
portion of the naval forces into the Sea of Marmora and subsequently into
the Aegean Sea.
Combat duty forces, naval missile-carrying aviation, and Long Range

Aviation forces were to use 108 missiles when the transition to the use of
nuclear weapons was made.
The Commander of the Navy of the People's Republic of Bulgaria

directed his principal efforts towards destroying enemy naval forces in the
southwestern part of the Black Sea in coordination with the Red Banner
Black Sea Fleet, providing fire support to troops of the Second Southern
Front, and securing strike groupings and naval lines of communication in
the Navy's operational zone.
A portion of the Navy forces was designated for actions in the Sea of
Marmora; for this purpose, torpedo boats and one battalion of coastal
missile artillery were transferred overland (on trailers) through the zone
of the Second Southern Front.
To debark the amphibious force and move troops of the Tenth Army
across the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, it was planned that 12 small
amphibious landing craft and a naval infantry battalion would be
transferred and operationally subordinated to the Red Banner Black Sea
Fleet.
After working out the plans of front and army operations, the combat
actions of navies and of air defense forces of the countries, and also the
respective orders for the troops, at 1800 hours 3 July staffs and
operations groups were given hypothetical exercise situation No. 1 with the
position and condition of troops on the third day of the operation. The
situation and plans in accordance with the hypothetical exercise No. 1 were
as follows.
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COURSE OF COMBAT ACTIONS FROM THE MORNING

OF 2 JULY UP TO THE CLOSE OF 4 JULY
(diagrams 4, 5, and 10
In the Western Theater of Military Operations
The "Westerners", beginning the morning of 2 July, unleashed war in

Europe by massive air strikes using conventional means of destruction
against the Warsaw Pact countries. At 0430 hours NATO ground forces
groupings went over to the offensive on the Berlin, Dresden, and Prague
axes.
Troops of the Central Army Group had penetrated in the three days
of the ottensive up to 80 kilometers on the Prague axis and up to 40
kilometers-in the Brno--area- -
The "Easterners", repelling the attacks of the NATO troops, in turn

went over to the offensive on 2 July with their main groupings.
Troops of the Central Front on the Nurnberg and Munich axes routed
the opposing enemy and advanced up to a depth of 100 kilometers into FRG
territory. On the Prague axis and in the Brno area they withdrew from
fighting 40 to 80 kilometers.
In the Southwestern Theater of Military Operations
Simultaneous with the transition of NATO troops to an offensive in the

Western Theater,"green" and "yellow" troops invaded Austrian territory.
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On the NATO right wing, "orange" and "black" armed forces prepared to
take the offensive beginning the morning of 3 July.
Their aircraft delivered strikes against naval forces, troops,

airfields and the most important rear services installations of the
"Easterners".
The Southwestern Front, as a result of the incursion into Austria of

"green" and "yellow" forces, went over to the offensive on the northern
(Vienna) and southern (Klagenfurt) axes, routed the "rose" First and Second
Corps Groups, repelled the attacks of forward units of the "yellow" Third
Army and "green" Sixteenth Army Corps and, overcoming tenacious enemy
resistance, continued the offensive towards the Austrian Alps. Large units
of the left wing of the front, having advanced up to 80 kilometers,
encountered the approaching"yellow" Fifth Army Corps and engaged them in
stubborn fighting. At the same time, the front was completing the
destruction of the enemy troops in the Vienna area with a portion of its
forces. - --- -- -- ;:
The "Western" Southern Army Group, having suffered a defeat in the

border zone and not having achieved success by committing to battle the
"yellow" Fourth and Fifth Army Corps, strove by fire and counterattacks to
halt the offensive of the navies of the Southwestern Front and retain
Vienna and Graz. At the same time, it moved forward to the Graz area large
units of the "yellow" Third Army Corps to reinforce the grouping operating
on this axis.
X X X
The First and Second Southern Fronts, after delivering massive air and
artillery strikes, went over to the offensive at 0500 hours 3 July and
within two days had advanced 50 to 80 kilometers.
On the Greece axis the troops broke out to the approaches to the
Struma River and to the shores of the Aegean Sea.
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On the Turkey axis the troops overcame the resistance of large units
of "orange" Third Army Corps and "black" Fifth Army Corps and, having
repelled counterattacks of their second echelons and reserves, broke out to
the defensive line of Uzunkopri - Luleburgaz - Pinarhisar. On separate
axes they penetrated to this line.
The "orange" First Central Army and "black" First Field Army conducted
tenacious defensive battles in the border zone. But under the strikes of
superior "Eastern" forces, the army corps of the first echelons of these
armies were forced to withdraw to a depth of 50 to 80 kilometers within
their own territory and attempted to organize a defense on favorable lines.
"Eastern" aviation, beginning2July,-delivered strikes against

nuclear attack means, airfields, and control posts; and starting 3July,
supported the combat actions of ground and naval forces, delivered strikes
against enemy groupings and approaching reserves, and, in coordination with
air defense forces, repelled enemy air raids.
"Western" aviation delivered massive strikes against troops, naval

forces, airfields, and other important installations of the "Easterners",
and carried out intensified reconnaissance of nuclear attack objectives.
Forces of "Eastern" Air Defense of the Countries carried out, in

coordination with tront air defense troops, combat actions to destroy enemy
aircraft,and repelled their strikes against troops, air defense
installations, and crossings over the Danube River.
"Eastern" allied navies delivered strikes jointly with Long Range

Aviation and combat duty forces against enemy nuclear missile submarines,
aircraft carriers, and other ship ik groupings, and supported ground
forces combat actions on coastal s
"Western" naval forces delivered strikes against attack means, naval
bases, ports and combat ship groupings. A portion of these forces
supported ground forces engaged in combat actions and carried out extensive
mine laying.
"Brown" nuclear missile submarines continued patrolling in the
Mediterranean Sea in readiness to deliver nuclear strikes.
Thus for the "Westerners" a relatively complex situation had developed
by 4 July. As they did not enjoy superiority in conventional means of
destruction and had lost the initiative in operations, the "Westerners"
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concluded that they had not achieved the intended goals. Furthermore, their
main groupings in the Western and Southwestern Theaters were under actual if
threat of destruction.
In this situation, the "Westerners" raised the question of changing

over to the use of nuclear weapons. For the purpose of examining this
question, a summit conference of bloc members was held during the second
half of 4 July. This conference decided to make the transition to the use
of nuclear weapons in all military operations beginning the morning of 5
July.
For their part, the "Easterners", having established through all types
of reconnaissance the direct preparations of the enemy to use nuclear
weapons, brought their nuclear weapons to readiness.
Under the situation that had developed, players adopted the following
plans.
TheCommander of tlieSouthwestern Front initialMy planned-that the -

Thirteenth Army continue attacking on the Vienna axis, but that the Second
Army consolidate on the line it had arrived at and during a two-day period
repel counterattacks of the "yellow" Third Army and Fifth Army Corps
advancing on the Graz axis.
Beginning the morning of 7 July he contemplated renewing the offensive

on the Klagenfurt axis for the purpose of routing the main body of the
Southern Army Group and contemplated fulfilling the immediate task by the
close of 9 or 10 July.
The Sixth Army Corps was charged with eliminating the enemy grouping
encircled in Vienna.
In the transition to actions with the use of nuclear weapons, he

planned to seize the Linz - Klagenfurt line by the close of 7 July.
However, those portions of the plan pertaining to the Second Army and
the Sixth Army Corps were subsequently refined.
Since the forces encircled in Vienna had capitulated, the Sixth Army
Corps was reinforced by the 63rd Tank Division, moved out to the area of
St. Aegyd - Gloggnitz - Sollenau, and beginning the morning of 5 July, with
a complement of three divisions, it went over to the offensive.
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He contemplated carrying out the destruction of the approaching

"yellow" Third and Fifth Army Corps by aggressive operations of the 10th
and 12th Motorized Rifle Divisions and a portion of the forces of the 13th
Tank Division, and by committing to battle the 14th Motorized Rifle
Division on the general axis towards Klagenfurt.
The Plan of the Commander of the Second Army comprised the following:
with the 10th Motorized Rifle Division continue attacking on the Gratwein -
Koflach axis and with a portion of the forces of the 13th Tank Division,
jointly with the the antitank reserve and the army's mobile obstacle
detachment, consolidate on the line arrived at and repel enemy attacks on
the left wing of the army.
With the main forces of the 12th Motorized Rifle Division, a portion
of the forces of the 13th Tank Division, and committing to battle the 14th
Motorized Rifle Division on the general Kalsdorf - Landsberg axis, inflict
a defeat on the on the enemy reserves advancing to the west of Graz and
break out to the-Koflach - Landsberg.-line. __-
Second echelon -- the 66th Motorized Rifle Division was to be

committed to battle during the second half of 5 July on the Wildbach -
Twimberg axis.
The Commander of the Sixth Army Corps planned to regroup a division

during the night of 5 July in an area 50 kilometers to the southwest of
Vienna, resupply units and large units with ammunition and fuel, and
beginning at 1000 hours deliver these strikes: the 18th Motorized Rifle
Division in the Mariazell - Hieflau axis and the 16th Motorized Rifle
Division on the Kapfenberg - Zeltweg axis and by the morning of 7 July
seize the Liezen - Strassburg line.
Subsequently he planned to develop the offensive on the Murau -

Spitall axis. The 63rd Motorized Rifle Division was in the second echelon.
The Commander of the First Air Army planned to have ready at dawn on 5
July the nuclear ech n (26th Bomber Regiment and 25th Fighter-Bomber
Regimenftd liver a strike with 18 warheads against "yellow" ground
forces groupings and nuclear weapons means. Provisions were made for
subsequent air actions to carry out searches for and destroy enemy
missile/nuclear means and to support front troops as they fulfilled their
assigned tasks.
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The forces of two fighter regiments provided cover for the troops and
the principal installation of the front by intercepting the air enemy from
airborne alert zones, with forces to built up by sorties from airfield
alert status.
The Commander of the Air Defense of the Hungarian People's Republic

concentrated his main efforts on covering Budapest, the capital of the
Hungarian People's Republic, the most important industrial-economic
installations, troop groupings, and communication routes.
The restoration of partially disrupted groupings of surface-to-air

missile troops was carried out by repositioning one battalion from a
second-echelon air defense division and by deploying combat equipment of
the training center.
The Commander of the First Southern Front adopted the following plan.
Upon receiving the signal to use nuclear weapons, employ 29 nuclear
warheads-in the initial- strike-against "orange"-nuclear- attack means,
airfields, and ground forces groupings.
Beginning the morning of 5 July, commit to battle the second echelons

of the armies (two tank brigades and one motorized rifle division) on the
Serrai - Veroia general axis and, exploiting the results of nuclear
strikes, destroy the enemy First Army Corps in a meeting engagement and by
the close of 6 July fulfil the front immediate task. Encircle and destroy
with a portion of the forces the main body of the Second Army Corps to the
east of the Struma River and also finish destroying the "orange" Tenth
Infantry Division in the area to the southeast of Komotini.
Upon destroying these two groupings, occupy a defense against

amphibious landings with two divisions on the shore of the Aegean Sea in
the Salonika - Alexandroupolis sector. But in fact one division was to
operate on a frontage of 160 kilometers for the defense against landings.
It was planned that subsequently a second division (56th Motorized Rifle
Division) in the second echelon of the Ninth Army would be ready to fulfil
the task of defense against landings.
Protection against enemy nuclear strikes was provided for by

increasing the readiness level of front rocket troops, by shifting troop
location areas, and by preparing troops to carry out measures to eliminate
the aftereffects of nuclear weapons used by the enemy.
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The Commander of the First Composite Aviation Corps planned to hit

enemy missile/nuclear and aircraft groupings during the initial nuclear
strike with one corps sortie in coordination with front rocket troops and
Long Range Aviation.
He planned to concentrate fighter aircraft on covering rocket troops

and the Eighth and Ninth Armies operating on the axis of the front main
strike.
The plan of the Commander of the Air Defense of the People's Republic
of Bulgaria, provided for concentrating the main efforts of air defense
orces on repelling massive "Western" air raids, and on covering the
overflights of Long Range Aviation and naval missile-carrying aviation, and
covering the actions of the amphibious landing force.
The Commander of the Second Southern Front planned, under the

situation that had developed, to deliver a decisive strike against the
enemy grouping in Thrace, using99-nuclear warheads.
Following the nuclear strike, and by committing to battle the second

echelons of the armies beginning the morning of 5 July to complete
destroying the "black" main forces, and developing the offensive on the
Bosporus and Dardanelles axes, fulfil by the close of 6 July the front
immediate task and create conditions for seizing the straits zone.
Subsequently, by committing to battle the Twelfth Army on the Bosporus

axis and the 86th Motorized Rifle Division on the Dardanelles axis, break
through the Catalca and Gallipoli fortified areas from the march, make a
forced crossing of the straits in coordination with allied navies and an
amphibious landing, and attack on the anakkale - Balikesir and Istanbul -
Hendek axes.
It was contemplated that during the night of 5 July front troops would
carry out an anti-nuclear movement and implement measures to overcome enemy
nuclear minefields.
The Commander of the Third Air Army directed the main effort at the
destruction and neutralization of enemy missile/nuclear means, aircraft on
airfields, and advancing reserves; and also on covering and supporting
troops, particularly those on the Bosporus axis. A portion of his forces
supported the landings and combat actions of the airborne and amphibious
forces. He planned to use 40 nuclear bombs in the initial nuclear strike.
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He planned to have the 30th Fighter Aviation Division, in coordination

with air.defenses of the front and of the People's Republic of Bulgaria,
repel massive enemy air raids and cover front troops.
The Commander of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet concentrated main
efforts on destroying nuclear submarines and carrier strike groups in the
Mediterranean.
Missile-carrying aviation of the fleet, missile and gunnery ships, and

submarines were brought in to destroy ship forces of the enemy navy in the
Black Sea and in the straits zone.
The debarkation of the amphibious force in the pile area was to be

carried out beginning the morning of 7 July in two echelons: the first in
landing means and the second in four transports.
The Commander of the Navy of the People's Republic of Bulgaria

planned,- exploiting-the results of the use of-nuclear-weapons-by-the-Red
Banner Black Sea Fleet, to continue fulfilling the assigned tasks,
concentrating the main efforts of the Navy on participating in the
destruction of the enemy in the southwestern part of the Black Sea,
providing defense for landing detachments, and providing fire support to
troops of the Second Southern Front.
After working out all the problems associated with the plans adopted
according to the situation that had developed at the close of 4 July, the
players were given hypothetical exercise situation No. 2, which in essence
consisted of the following.
COURSE OF COMBAT ACTIONS FROM 5 JULY TO 7 JULY

(diagrams 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10)
During the period from 0345 to 0745 hours 5 July both sides delivered
massive strikes with strategic and operational-tactical means against
rocket units, troop and ship groupings, naval bases, airfields, rear
services installations, and communication routes. As a result of this,
zones of continuous demolitions and high levels of radiation were created
in a number of areas. Under these conditions the following situation had
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developed in the Theater of Military Operations.
The "Easterners", exploiting the results of the massive nuclear

strike, frustrated the counterattacks of enemy troops on the southwestern
and southern axes and, using nuclear weapons, continued to develop the
attack deep into the territory of the FRG, Austria, Greece, and Turkey.
The "Westerners", following the nuclear strikes, committed fresh

reserves to action for the purpose of renewing the offensive on the Prague
and Budapest axes and of carrying out counterattacks against troops of the
First and Second Southern Fronts. However, their attempts were
unsuccessful.
As a result of their heavy losses, they were forced to go over to

defensive actions on the lines they had occupied. Simultaneously they
quickly moved deep reserves forward for the purpose of organizing a firm
defense on the important strategic lines of the Rhine River, Italian Alps,
Linz hills, and in - the zone--of--the-Black -Sea-straits. ---- --- -
At the same time, both sides carried out measures to eliminate the
aftereffects of the use of nuclear weapons and to restore the combat
effectiveness of their troops.
On the Southwestern Axis
The Southwestern Front fulfilled its immediate task, eliminated the

enemy grouping in Vienna, destroyed the main forces of the "yellow" Third
Army, and together with Czechoslovak forces, inflicted a severe defeat on
the "green" Sixteenth Army Corps.
Front troops developed the offensive to the north and south of the
Eastern Alps mountain chain and completed destroying enemy groupings in
areas to the northeast of Linz and to the south of Graz, with the object of
having the main forces break out into the northern areas of Italy. During
three days, front troops used 155 nuclear warheads. Strategic means
delivered 22 strikes in the front zone.
The Southern' Group, in coordination with the Fifth Allied

Tactical Ar Force and concentrating its main efforts on the Klagenfurt
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axis, held the mountain passes in the Eastern Alps. At the same time, it
moved forward up to two divisions to oppose the "Eastern" offensive on the
Italy axis.
On the Southern Axis
The First Southern Front inflicted a defeat on the main forces of the
"orange" First Central Army, made a forced crossing of the Vardar River
and, pursuing the withdrawing enemy, tried to break through the prepared
defensive line of Mounts Vermion and Pieriya from the march and develop the
offensive into the central areas of Greece. With a portion of its forces
it implemented a defense of the Aegean Sea coast against landings and
repelled an "orange" counterattack to the east of Komotini.
Over a period of three days, front troops used 86 nuclear warheads.

Stavka means delivered 19 strikes in the zone of the front.
The "orange" First Central Army, with withdrawing units of the First
and Second Army Corps and two divisions which were approaching, endeavored
to halt the offensive of troops of the First Southern Front on the Mounts
Vermion - Pieriya line and prevent "Easterners" from breaking out into the
central areas of Greece. With forces of the Third Army Corps it conducted
delaying actions for the purpose of securing the evacuation, which had been
initiated by sea, of troops from the Alexandroupolis area.
The Second Southern Front, delivering a massive nuclear strike,

frustrated the counterattack of the "black" Second and Third Army Corps.
Exploiting the results of the nuclear strikes and committing two divisions
to battle, front troops split the "black" First Field Army into three
isolated groupings and carried out combat actions to destroy them. Its
leading units approached the positions of the patalca and Gallipoli
fortified areas.
Over a period of three days front troops used 184 nuclear warheads.
Strategic means delivered 21 strikes in the zone of the front.
The "black" First Field Army, with the main forces of three army
corps, fought hard inside an encirclement in two areas to the north of
Saray and Tekirdag.
With forces of the Fifteenth Army Corps and approaching reserves it
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organized the defense of the Gallipoli and gatalca fortified areas and the
eastern shore of the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits.
The "Eastern" Third Southern Front was in the Samokov - (excluded)

Plovdiv - Pleven - Mikhailovgrad area ready to move forward for commitment
to battle.
"Eastern" aircraft delivered strikes against enemy nuclear attack

means, troop groupings, and in coordination with front air defense troops,
repelled raids of "Western" aircraft, supported the offensive of the
troops, and also destroyed aircraft on airfields and important rear
services installations of the enemy. The First and Third Air Armies
retained their air supremacy.
"Eastern" Air Defense Forces of the Countries continued to carry out
combat actions to repel enemy air raids and restored the combat
effectiveness of units which had been subjected to nuclear strikes.
The navies of the allied "Eastern" countries (diagrams 8 and 10)

completed destroying enemy ship groupings in the Black Sea, prepared the
amphibious assault landing operation which was to debark the assault
landing of the Second Southern Front on the Anatolian coast, and provided
fire support to the attacking troops.
The Red Banner Black Sea Fleet, in coordination with Long Range
Aviation and combat duty forces, destroyed "Western" aircraft carrier
groupings in the Mediterranean Sea with nuclear strikes and engaged in
combat against "brown" nuclear submarines.
"Western" naval forces and aircraft of the Sixth Allied Tactical Air
Force continued providing support to "black" and "orange" ground forces
hoidTing the straits zone and defense lines and coastal axes.
By the close of 7 July this was the situation, in accordance with
which the players adopted the following plans.
The Commander of the Southwestern Front contemplated aggressively

developing the offensive with his main forces on the Klagenfurt - Gemona -
Padova axis, and with a portion of his forces on the Salzburg - Innsbruck -
Verona axis; completing the destruction of the remnants of the "yellow"
Third Army and routing with nuclear strikes the approaching reserves (two
infantry divisions), overcoming from the march the defense line along the
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northern slopes of the Italian Alps, seizing the important industrial

centers of Brescia, Mantova, and Trieste; and by the close of 13 to 17
July, breaking out into the areas of Brescia, Verona, and Padova.
During,the period 7 and 8 July, 23 nuclear warheads were used to

strike advancing reserves and nuclear attack means of the enemy.
The Commander of the Second Army planned, by exploiting the results of

nuclear strikes by aircraft and of artillery fire, to develop a rapid
offensive with forces of the 66th and 12th Motorized Rifle Divisions on the
Hermagor - Kotschach - Tolmezzo - Villach - Tarvisio - Pontebba - Gemona
axes, destroy enemy subunits defending passes through the Carnic Alps, and
seize the main passes from the march.
To seize the passes, the tactical airborne forces were landed in the
areas of Paluzza and Tarvisio.
Upon breaking out into Northern Italy and committing the 63rd Tank _
Division on the Tolmezzo - Maniago axis, to destroy enemy reserves, and by
the close of 9 July to seize the line of Fanna - Udine - Cividale.
The destruction of the surrounded Third Army grouping to the southeast

of Graz was accomplished by the forces of the 14th Motorized Rifle Division
and 13th Tank Division.
Subsequently he contemplated committing the 14th Motorized Rifle

Division to develop the strike on the Aviano - Vicenza axis, and with a
portion of the forces on the Udine - Mestre axis, to .complete the
destruction of enemy reserves and by the close of 11 July to seize the
Bassano - Vicenza - Padova line with the main forces.
The Commander of the Sixth Army Cors contemplated concentrating the

main effort on the Zeltweg - Gmund axis, destroying withdrawing units of
the Fourth Army Corps and the "Legnano" Motorized Infantry Division, and by
the close of 9 July seizing the Irdning - Murau line.
After fulfilling this task, the corps was to concentrate in the area
of Radstadt - Nikolsdorf - Spittal in the second echelon of the front ready
for action on the Belluno - Padova axis.
The Commander of the First Air Army concentrated his main efforts on
the North Italian axis in support of developing the offensive of the Second
Army (Hungarian People's Army).
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Nuclear strikes-on this axis destroyed enemy reserves in offloading

and concentration areas, nuclear means, and delivery aircraft on airfields.
Particular attention was devoted to using helicopters in mountainous

terrain conditions. With their help, special groups to seize and
deactivate nuclear minefields were landed, as were airborne forces.
The Commander of the Air Defense of the Hungarian People's Republic

planned to continue combat actions to repel enemy air strikes,
concentrating his main efforts of the the Southwestern Axis. He planned to
fulfil this task in close coordination with air defense troops of the
Southwestern Front, First Air Army, and Air Defense of the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic and Socialist Republic of Romania.
To restore the system of the Air Defense of the Country he

contemplated carrying out a substantial regrouping of surace-to-air missile
units.
The Commander of the First Southern Front planned, in the situation

that had developed, to continue the offensive during 7 July and
simultaneously carry out necessary measures to eliminate the aftereffects
of enemy use of nuclear weapons.
Beginning the morning of 8 July, he planned to deliver a massive

strike with 17 nuclear warheads and three regimental sorties of
fighter-bomber aviation against "orange" nuclear attack means, ground
forces groupings, and control posts.
Exploiting the results of using nuclear weapons and committing fresh

forces to battle, three strikes were to be delivered: the main one with
the forces of five large units on the Veroia - Larisa axis, the second
attack with three large units on the Katerini - Larisa axis, and the third
attack with two divisions on the Komotini - Alexandroupolis axis; split the
opposing enemy grouping, destroy it piecemeal; and, being covered from the
northwest, seize by 11 to 12 July the areas of Pendalofon - Panayia -
Grevena and Trikkala - Larisa - Elasson, thereby supporting the commitment
to battle of the Third Southern Front. At the same time organize the
anti-landing defense of the Aegean bea on the Magnesia Peninsula - Salonika
sector.
An operational group comprising three large units was established to

destroy the remnants of the Second Army Corps on the Khalkidhiki Peninsula
and units of the Third Army Corps in the Alexandroupolis area, and also to
TS #205587
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rOP FCRFT
organize the defense against landings in the sector of the shores of the
Aegean Sea.
To fulfil the subsequent task, the front was allocated 32 nuclear

warheads and seven aviation corps sorties.
The Commander of the First Composite Aviation Corps planned to direct

his main efforts to destroying enemy missile/nuclear means, supporting
troops of the Ninth Army, and supporting the commitment to battle of the
Third Southern Front. A portion of the forces was designated to support
troops engaged in the defense against landings.
The Commander of the Air Defense of the People's Republic of Bulgaria

planned to continue fulfilling the previously assigned tasks of covering
installations on the territory of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, troops
of the Third Southern Front, communication routes of the First and Second
Southern Fronts, loading of the amphibious landing force in the Burgas
area, sea- crossing, and- covering the -airborne -landing-force -during flight
over the territory of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.
At the same time, for the purpose of restoring disruptions in the air
defense system of the country, he planned to carry out a regrouping of the
air defense forces by reinforcing the surface-to-air missile defenses of
Sofia, of the industrial centers of Plovdiv and Sofia - Pernik -
Kremikovtsi, and of the Burgas naval base.
He contemplated rebasing half of the fighter aviation regiments in

forward airfields in the south of the country.
The Plan of the Commander of the Second Southern Front comprised the
following: during 7 July eliminate the aftereffects of the enemy's use of
weapons of mass destruction and by means of nuclear strikes and aggressive
troop actions destroy isolated enemy groupings in the areas of
Alexandroupolis, Souflion, Kesan, Tekirdag, Silivri, and Vize with the
purpose of setting up conditions for the front main forces to break out
towards the fortified areas.
Beginning the morning of 8 July and following massive nuclear strikes

using 37 nuclear warheads against atalca and Gallipoli fortified areas,
commit to battle the second echelon of the front -- the Twelfth Army on the
Bosporus axis, and the main,forces of the Tenth Army -- on the Gallipoli
axis; break through the fortified areas, break out to the straits, and in
coordination with airborne and amphibious landings and allied naval forces,
TS #205587
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T-__SECRET
make a forced crossing of the straits from the march during a 24-hour
period. At the same time seize the line of Sanakkale - Bandirma - Bursa -
Gebze - ile with a force of four divisions.
Subsequently develop the offensive on the Balikesir and Adapazari

axes, destroy enemy reserves approaching from the deep rear, and by the
close of 12 July break out to the Edremit - Balikesir - Akgakoca line.
Operational dispositions were in two echelons: the Tenth Army

(Bulgarian People's Army) and Twelfth Army in the first echelon and the
Eleventh Army in the second echelon.
To assist front troops in the forced crossing of the Bosporus strait,

plans were made to land the 99th Airborne Division at 0400 hours on 8 July
in an area to the northeast of Kartal, and also to debark at 0500 hours an
amphibious landing force in the area of gile,
The Plan of the Commander of the Third Air Army contemplated- -

concentrating main efforts on securing the commitment to battle of the
front second echelon, supporting and covering troops while they were
breaking through the fortified areas and seizing the straits zone, and also
on destroying the enemy missile/nuclear means, aircraft, and reserves.
He planned to accomplish the securing of the commitment to battle of

the Twelfth Army and the forced crossing of the straits zone by delivering
massive air strikes with the use of three nuclear bombs.
A portion of the army forces was allocated to support the landings and
combat actions of the airborne and amphibious forces.
The Commander of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet, continuing combat
actions to destroy missile submarines in the Mediterranean Sea,
concentrated the fleet main efforts on providing support to troops of the
Second Southern Front by landing the amphibious force, by providing fire
support to the attacking troops, by barring enemy strikes from the sea, and
by transporting troops and equipment across the Bosporus and Dardanelles
straits.
When the straits were seized, the main forces of the fleet were to be
moved out to the Aegean and Mediterranean seas for the purpose of
destroying enemy combat ships and amphibious landing means and further
supporting the attacking troops.
TS #205587
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In the Plan of the Commander of the Navy of the People's Republic of

Bulgaria, the main efforts of the Navy in the Black Sea, and beginning 8
Jy in the Sea of Marmora, were concentrated on providing support to
troops of the Second Southern Front as they destroyed the enemy in Eastern
Thrace and seized the Bosporus anDTardanelles straits.
He planned to use a fire support grouping composed of gunnery surface

ships, submarines, and torpedo and missile boats for the actions on the
main axis in the Black Sea.
Forces of the 21st Brigade (a division of torpedo boats and a missile

artillery battalion) were allocated for actions on the main axis in the Sea
of Marmora.
After troops of the Second Southern Front seized the Bosporus, the
main forces of the navy were moved out to the Aegean Sea from 8 to 13 July.
After hearing the plans concerning the situation of 1800 hours 7 July
and after-documents on the planning of- subsequent combat actions-were
worked out, the war game was terminated.
NOTE:
The full text of this report is stored on magnetic tape for computer
text searching in CIA/CRS/DSB. For access call Extension 5434 and ask for
File No. C 303 U.
TS #205587
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TOP ECRET
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT Critique of an Operational War Game

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is a

Page 1 of 106 Pages

The Director of Central Intelligence

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence

Director of Naval Intelligence

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence

Director, National Security Agency

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Deputy Director for Science and Technology

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Director of Strategic Research

Page 2 of 106 Pages

TOP ECRET :s r20558

THIS DOCUMENT BE REPRODUCED

- Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY USSR/WARSAW PACT

DATE OF DATE 13 June 1975

Critique of an Operational War Game on Maps Conducted

Page 4 of 106 Pages

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMBINED ARMED FORCES

Page 5 of 106 Pages

In accordance with the combined measures plan of the Combined Armed

Marshal of the Soviet Union I. I. Yakubovskiy, Commander-in-Chief of

Page 6 of 106 Pages

High-level staffs and operations groups from the Bulgarian People's

Allow me to welcome the leaders and representatives present here from

The current war game occupies an important place in the operational

Page 7 of 106 Pages

and development of the armed forces of our countries.

Finally, the war game has great military-political importance. It

Leninism today is the unswervingly developing world system of

Leninism is today the powerful international communist and worker

The establishment, strengthening, and development of the Warsaw

Leninist ideas today inspire hundreds of millions of people of our

Page 8 of 106 Pages

Historical experience and contemporary life have testified to the fact

That is why the centennial celebration of V. I. Lenin's birthday has

The results, summed up during the Lenin anniversary, testify to the

During this time the military alliance of European socialist countries

These important historical dates -- the centennial of the birth of

The peoples of the socialist countries look to the future with

By conducting a peace-loving policy, the People's Republic of

Imperialist circles are looking upon this sensible and appropriate

The most aggressive segments of modern imperialism have not given up

The dirty war of American imperialists in Vietnam has been extended

Page 10 of 106 Pages

The situation also remains tense on the European continent.

Back in the December session (1969), Pentagon representatives, who set

The subject of strengthening the "southern flank" was again discussed

In accordance with the terms of its resolution at the session, NATO

In addition, developing events in Western Europe must put us on our

Page 11 of 106 Pages

The actions of Peking leaders are aggravating the complex and

At the same time, in Peking they have stopped criticizing the

Fraternal communist and worker parties and peoples of the socialist

As you can see, today's military-political situation continues to be