Australian Journal of International Affairs

ISSN: 1035-7718 (Print) 1465-332X (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/caji20

The return of the Indo-Pacific strategy: an

assessment

William Choong

To cite this article: William Choong (2019): The return of the Indo-Pacific strategy: an assessment,
Australian Journal of International Affairs, DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2019.1639134

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AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2019.1639134

The return of the Indo-Pacific strategy: an assessment

William Choong
International Institute for Strategic Studies (Asia), Singapore

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
Eleven years after it was abandoned, the so-called Indo-Pacific United States; People’s
concept is back with a vengeance in regional security debates. At Republic of China; Australia;
the 2017 Shangri-la Dialogue, there were only five mentions of Japoan; India; Indo-Pacific
the ‘Indo-Pacific’ at the annual defence ministerial forum. In the
following year, the figure had jumped to 92. The Indo-Pacific Four
countries promoting the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP)
concept share many principles, including freedom of navigation
and overflight, connectivity and economic growth, and respect for
the rule of law. There are, however, clear points of divergence
between them, such that there are actually different Indo-Pacific
strategies among the Indo-Pacific Four. Even if the Indo-Pacific
Four manage to resolve these issues (and the possibility of this is
low), it is not likely that ASEAN would endorse the FOIP concept.
The reality remains that Indonesia and ASEAN have taken a
different approach to the Indo-Pacific. The ASEAN approach is to
appropriate elements of FOIP strategy which are more attractive
to ASEAN (for example, connectivity and infrastructure), yet reject
elements of FOIP strategy which ASEAN deems inappropriate (the
exclusion of China and the loss of ASEAN centrality). This does not
augur well for the adoption, in its entirety, of the FOIP concept by
ASEAN.

Addressing the Indian Parliament in August 2007, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe
made an impassioned call for a ‘dynamic coupling’ of the Indian and Pacific Oceans as
‘seas of freedom and of prosperity.’ Both India and Japan, Abe added, had the ability
and responsibility to ensure that a ‘broader Asia’ became ‘seas of clearest transparence’
(Abe 2007). The month after Abe’s speech, the four powers conducted naval exercises
in the Bay of Bengal—underscoring the nascent capabilities inherent among the four
democracies. The group met once as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in 2007. Later
that year, the ‘Quad’ and its associated Indo-Pacific concept dissipated after Abe’s resig-
nation and Australia’s withdrawal the quadrilateral arrangement.
Twelve years after its demise, the Indo-Pacific concept is back with a vengeance in
regional security debates. At the 2017 Shangri-la Dialogue, there were only five mentions
of the ‘Indo-Pacific.’ In 2018, the figure had jumped to 92 (IISS SLD 2017b; IISS SLD
2018). US Secretary of Defense James Mattis mentioned the term (Asia) 26 times. As
per 2007, the same four countries are offering the Indo-Pacific concept – Australia,
India, Japan and the United States. They have stressed the undergirding principles—the

CONTACT William Choong William.Choong@iiss.org International Institute for Strategic Studies, Singapore
© 2019 Australian Institute of International Affairs
2 W. CHOONG

rule of law, no recourse to the use or threat or force, freedom of navigation and overflight.
In June 2019, the United States released its Indo-Pacific Strategy Report (IPSR) in tandem
with the delivery of Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan’s plenary address at the
Shangri-La Dialogue (Department of Defense 2019). While the IPSR is the most detailed
US strategy document of its kind for some time, there was little inherently new in the
document (Panda 2019). While the concept can be seen as a subtle counter to China, it
suffers from the lack of a shared, coherent strategy among the Indo-Pacific Four countries.
In effect, there are different Indo-Pacific strategies being offered by the Indo-Pacific Four,
depending on their conceptualisation of the Indo-Pacific, management of the China
threat, defence cooperation and maritime security, as well as connectivity. At any rate,
Indonesia and ASEAN have started to build their own Indo-Pacific approach, which stres-
ses ASEAN centrality and inclusivity. ASEAN’s assessment is that the Indo-Pacific Four’s
Indo-Pacific concept focuses too much on excluding China and less on integrating Beijing
into the regional architecture. This does not augur well for ASEAN’s wholesale acceptance
of FOIP concepts into the grouping’s approach to the Indo-Pacific.

Potential of the FOIP concept

There have been several key drivers behind the re-emergence of the Indo-Pacific concept.
At the most fundamental level, the four countries behind the concept share commonalities
in their democratic underpinnings. Speaking at the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue, Mattis said
that the ‘common character’ behind the so-called ‘Quad’ (formally, the Quadrilateral
Security Dialogue) is that they are democracies (Mattis 2018). In 2012, Shinzo Abe
touted the ‘democratic security diamond’ when he spoke about the power of four
democracies guarding the maritime commons from the Indian Ocean to the western
Pacific (Abe 2012).
The FOIP concept is emerging at a time in which the region is faced with multiple
sources of instability that could lead to overt conflict. The slow-boiling of four flashpoints
in the Indo-Pacific—the Korean peninsula, the East China Sea, the South China Sea and
the Taiwan Strait—has made major war in the region more likely (Taylor 2018, 5). The
Indo Pacific Four’s FOIP concept adopts a nuanced and sophisticated approach, by pro-
moting principles, and not the specific issues that challenge such principles. The FOIP
concept takes a leaf from Japanese premier Shinzo Abe’s approach – which was a subtle
but indirect swipe at Chinese activities in the South China Sea. Speaking at the Shangri-
La Dialogue in 2014—at a time when China’s reclamation in the South China Sea was
beginning to cause regional concerns—Abe called for three ‘rule of law’ principles to
prevail: clarification of claims based on international law, no resort to the use of threat
of force in enforcing claims and the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes (Abe 2014).
Speaking to reporters in April 2018, State Department official Alex Wong said that
Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy sought to unify all peoples of the Indo-Pacific under
a vision that is ‘free and open,’ prizes free economics and serves to ensure ‘freer people
and nations free from coercion.’ Wong stressed that the strategy is ‘not just about
China,’ but ASEAN and India as well (Wong 2018). While the strategy does not
exclude China explicitly, the expression of the Indo-Pacific principles aforementioned
will not be accepted in toto by China. For example, China’s definition of ‘freedom of navi-
gation’ is different from that of the U.S., which refers to the movement of military vessels
 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 3

in Exclusive Economic Zones and territorial waters (O’Rourke 2018). Similarly, China will
not accept the call for ‘free peoples’—used in US parlance to describe ‘good governance’ in
terms of transparency and ‘fundamental freedoms’ (US Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee 2018). There is a parallel here with China’s experience with the Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship. While China has not rejected joining the TPP, and had even expressed interest in
joining the trade pact, this would require Beijing to carry out substantial reforms in its
state-owned and labour sectors, there presenting a significant barrier to its entry in prac-
tical terms if it wants to join the TPP (Kroeber 2015).
As such, the Indo-Pacific strategy serves an important role, not through deterrence by
punishment, but deterrence by diplomatic dissuasion. The hope is that China could be dis-
suaded from carrying out activities that undermine the regional order mapped out by
FOIP strategy. For its part, China has remained skeptical about the Indo-Pacific
concept. Its foreign minister Wang Yi told reporters that the ‘headline-grabbing’
concept will dissipate ‘like the sea foam in the Pacific or Indian Ocean’ (Yong 2018).

Points of divergence
While the Indo-Pacific 4 countries use the same ‘Indo-Pacific’ term, their conceptualis-
ation of the term and even their geographical definitions of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ vary.
There are other divergences in the approach to China, maritime security and connectivity.
While they generally share the same principles behind the FOIP concept, their individual
Indo-Pacific strategies vary.

Conceptualisation and geographical scope

Australia’s Indo-Pacific strategy is another attempt at ‘relocating’ Australia in the region,
rather than ‘relocating the region to Australia’ (Wilkins 2018). Australia’s adoption of the
Indo-Pacific term came with the release of its Defence White Paper in May 2013. The
Indo-Pacific was conceived as a ‘stable wider region’ and listed as one of the four strategic
interests of Australian defence policy. The document defined the Indo-Pacific as the arc
extending from India through Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia, including sea lines of
communication (Department of Defence 2013, 24). In the 2017 Foreign Policy White
Paper, the geographical scope of the Indo-Pacific was adjusted. The region was now
defined as the region from the eastern Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean, connected by
Southeast Asia, including India, North Asia and the United States (Government of
Australia 2017). The eastward shift could indicate Canberra’s cognisance of the central
role of the alliance with the United States and the importance of the Pacific Islands.
Despite the use of the Indo-Pacific as a concept, Australia’s focus has remained largely
in the South Pacific, with Papua New Guinea at the centre of Australia’s plans, as well
as Southeast Asia (Government of Australia 2017)
The emergence of the Indo-Pacific strategy in India can be attributed in part to the
regional integration produced by the ‘Look East’ and extended neighbourhood policies,
whose adoption in India led to discussions about the need for an Indo-Pacific regional
architecture (Chacko 2014, 434–435). In 2014, India introduced its ‘Act East’ policy—
an extrapolation of its ‘Look East’ policy. It designated the Southeast India Ocean sea-
routes to the Pacific Ocean, South and East China Seas and Western Pacific Ocean and
4 W. CHOONG

their littoral as an area of maritime interest to India (Singh 2016, 163). At the IISS Shangri
La Dialogue in June 2018, Prime Minister Narendra Modi outlined his vision for India as a
prosperous country and rising ‘Indo-Pacific’ power. Modi set India’s Indo-Pacific security
interests in a region stretching from the west coast of the Americas to the eastern littoral of
Africa. He also proposed that India take not only a geographical approach to the Indo-
Pacific, but look at it through civilisational lens—a ‘free, open and inclusive region’ that
embraces all in the common pursuit of progress and prosperity (Modi 2018).
As early as 2007, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe articulated Japan’s interests across the
‘confluence of two seas,’ but after 2013 begun putting this into explicitly Indo-Pacific ter-
minology. The Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) concept was unveiled at the 6th Tokyo
International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI) held in Kenya in August
2016 (Chellaney 2018, 10–11; Yoshimatsu 2018, 10–11). Tokyo established three pillars for
the FOIP concept: the promotion and establishment of fundamental values such as rule of
law and freedom of navigation; the pursuit of economic prosperity through the improve-
ment of connectivity; and commitment for peace and stability via capacity building on
maritime law enforcement capabilities (Yoshimatsu 2018, 11). While Japan’s FOIP strat-
egy sought to integrate India into the strategic equation in the Asia-Pacific, there is a
difference in Japan and India’s approaches. Japan has stressed its enduring reliance on
its alliance with the US, while India has emphasised the FOIP’s inclusive character
(Palit and Sano 2018). Japan’s geographical definition of the Indo-Pacific has also
expanded through the years. In its 2017 Diplomatic Bluebook, the region was marked
out as an area covering the Indian Ocean and the western part of the Pacific Ocean, includ-
ing Southeast Asia, South Asia, and parts of the Middle East and East African littoral
countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018b, 21). In September 2018, Foreign Minister
Taro Kono included South America in the Indo-Pacific (World Economic Forum
2018). Another January 2019 map of the Indo-Pacific added China (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs 2019). The inclusion of China – something not done by Australia, India or the
US—could have been due to Japan’s improving relations with Beijing around the time,
and reflected Japan’s sophisticated strategy of competing with China in the maritime
domain, yet cooperating with Beijing – and other like-minded countries – on regional con-
nectivity projects.
The ‘Indo-Pacific’ appears to have entered the official US foreign policy lexicon in 2010.
Then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton started using it in speeches leading up to the
declaration of the US ‘pivot’ or rebalance to Asia. By 2015, the Obama administration
had entered the second phase of its ‘rebalance strategy,’ which was aimed at increasing
American engagement in the Indo-Pacific (Singh 2016, 163). On 18 October 2017, Sec-
retary of State Rex Tillerson became the first senior US official to switch from using the
term ‘Asia–Pacific’ to ‘Indo–Pacific.’ At the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue, US Secretary of
Defence James Mattis took the opportunity to ‘reinforce the significance of a free and
open Indo-Pacific region’ (Thakur and Sharma 2018, 72). The Trump Administration’s
initial geographical definition of the Indo-Pacific was identical to Japan’s. In November
2017, Tillerson defined the Indo-Pacific as the Indian Ocean, the Western Pacific and
the surrounding nations (Center for Strategic and International Studies 2017). In the fol-
lowing month, the National Security Strategy (White House 2017, 45–46) defined the
Indo-Pacific as the region stretching ‘from the west coast of India to the western shores
of the United States.’ This effectively excluded the western part of the Indian Ocean,
 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 5

the Middle East and the eastern part of Africa, and put the area within Indo-Pacific Com-
mand’s area of responsibility – a geographical definition that put Washington closer to
Canberra’s demarcation, and different from that of India and Japan’s.

China
On China, there are clear divergences among the four members of the Indo-Pacific Four.
India has stressed the inclusivity of the Indo-Pacific concept and has avoided any allusion
to the challenge that Indo-Pacific strategy poses to China. Modi has stressed the civilisa-
tional and historical links between India and Southeast Asia and refused to single out
China for criticism, nor mention the ‘Quad,’ a concept that rankles China (Hall 2018).
Modi used the term ‘inclusive’ four times, stressing that the Indo-Pacific must be a
‘free, open, inclusive region.’ This is not surprising, given that for New Delhi, relations
with Beijing are a top priority. New Delhi faces the challenge of balancing its traditional
non-alignment posture against the strategic benefits of developing its relationship with the
United States to counter Chinese expansion in the Indian Ocean and the perceived failure
of India’s attempt to repair relations with Beijing after the Doklam border dispute. In
order to maintain a stable bilateral relationship, India has to hedge against China as
well as engage it (Horimoto 2018).
Australia has sought to balance its economic co-existence with China against its con-
cerns about China’s challenge to the rules-based order. Canberra’s approach to China’s
rising power contains several vital elements. In its Foreign Policy White Paper published
on November 2017, Canberra noted that stability in the Indo-Pacific depends on the
actions of, and relations between, Australia’s two biggest partners—China and the
United States. Australia underscored the ‘systemic importance’ of the U.S. to the global
economy, and the long-standing extended deterrence provided by US military through
the military alliance. At the same time, Canberra said it would improve relations with
China, a ‘major geopolitical power with the capacity to influence virtually all of Australia’s
international interests’ (Government of Australia 2017, 40). China is Australia’s biggest
trading partner and is Canberra’s largest export market. Australia has raised concerns
about China’s activities in the South China Sea and called on it to reassure regional
countries about its growing power. However, Australia has cautioned against viewing
growing Sino-American rivalry as another Cold War. Speaking in January 2019,
Defence Minister Christopher Pyne said that it was critical that Sino-American relations
are not defined in ‘wholly adversarial terms’ (Power 2019).
Compared to India and Australia, Japan has been more direct in leveraging the Indo-
Pacific concept, given its proximity to China and its ongoing territorial dispute over the
Senkaku/ Diaoyu islands. Japan’s political elites began to see India as a balancer against
China around 2005 (Ishibashi 2018, 516). The FOIP idea could be used as a ‘normative
weapon’ to propagate certain values in dealing with maritime security and infrastructure
and would serve as a check on China’s diplomatic offensives and maritime actions (Yoshi-
matsu 2018, 2). In 2014, Abe challenged what he deemed to be changes to the regional
status quo through ‘force or coercion’ (he was, in essence, using diplomatic code to refer-
ence China’s controversial activities in the South China Sea). Abe used three principles
under the aegis of the rule of law: clarifying territorial claims based on international
law, the non-use of force and coercion and the peaceful settlement of disputes (PMJC
(Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet) 2014). Japan also sought to provide an
6 W. CHOONG

alternative funding source for infrastructure projects to serve as a rival to China’s Belt and
Road Initiative. The $100 billion Partnership for Quality Infrastructure is not comparable
in scale to BRI, but serves as a valuable alternative (Mohan 2018).
The US has been as direct in singling out China as a strategic rival. At the heart of evol-
ving U.S. policy on China are two key priorities – ending China’s trade-distorting policies
and developing the new FOIP concept (Chellaney 2018). In the view of influential prac-
titioners in the US – as well as in Australia, India and Japan—the ‘Indo-Pacific’ term is
not a neutral label, but a ‘manufactured super-region’ designed to hedge against a per-
ceived regional order centred around China (Pan 2014, 453). In late 2017, the Trump
administration’s National Security Strategy labelled China as a ‘revisionist power’
(Rogin 2017; White House 2017, 25). Vice President Mike Pence’s trip to Asia and the
South Pacific in November 2018 allowed Washington to flesh out the FOIP strategy out-
lined by Trump at the APEC summit in 2017. But even before the trip, it had become
increasingly clear that the FOIP’s central organising principle is full-spectrum competition
with China, as well as providing an alternative vision to China’s Belt and Road Initiative,
which many viewed as Beijing’s long-term strategy to create a Sino-centric regional order
(Storey and Cook 2018, 1–2). The 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report singled out China for
undermining the international system from within while ‘eroding the values and prin-
ciples of the rules-based order’ (Department of Defense 2019, 7). Compared to Australia,
India and Japan, the U.S. approach to FOIP has more of a domestic slant. Washington
appears to be focused less on encouraging Beijing to adhere to FOIP principles, and
more on pressurising China to reduce its trade surplus with the U.S., abandon its ‘made
in China 2025’ technology initiative and eliminating tariffs that adversely affect Republi-
can voters (Politi 2018).

Defence cooperation and maritime security

India’s incorporation of the Indo-Pacific concept has been concurrent with the step-up in
defence cooperation between New Delhi and the other three members of the Indo-Pacific
Four. The US and India signed a historic Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement
(LEMOA) in 2016, and the US is currently India’s biggest supplier of defence equipment
(IISS APRSA 2017a, 72). In November 2014, Australia and India signed a Framework for
Security Cooperation, which planned for institution-level diplomatic and security con-
tacts, in addition to military exercises and cooperation in multilateral fora. There are
clear synergies between India’s ‘Act East’ policy and Japan’s FOIP concept. The two
countries signed a Special Strategic Global Partnership in 2014 and bilateral defence
cooperation agreement (Government of India 2014; The Economic Times 2014). The
2015 US-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region
stressed the importance of economic integration and connectivity for regional security
(White House 2015). In the document, India moved from general rhetoric on freedom
of navigation to a more direct statement – closer to the U.S. position – on the need to
maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea (Baruah 2015).
A key point of divergence between India and the other three members of the Indo-
Pacific Four however is Australia’s participation in Exercise Malabar. Established first
in 1992 between India and the United States, the naval drills included Japan as a perma-
nent member in 2015. The 2007 Malabar exercises saw the participation of Australia,
Japan and Singapore, and led to protests from Beijing, which resisted the fledgling 2007
 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 7

Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. Arising from its sensitivity to Chinese concerns, Australia
withdrew from the Quad; it has not been invited back to the Malabar exercises since. India
rejected an Australian request to take part in the joint exercises in 2017, despite support
from the US and Japan for Australia’s inclusion. India rejected Australia’s request again in
2018, reflecting New Delhi’s concern that Australia could back out of the Quad again
(Miglani 2017). India and Australia views also diverge on China’s role in the Indian
Ocean. While Australia tends to accept a more participatory role for China in the
Indian Ocean, mainstream Indian views oppose China’s growing presence there. Put
differently, the adoption of the Indo-Pacific nomenclature by Australia and India
signifies ‘a superficial convergence of interests between the two countries, masking
much deeper divergences in their perceived national interests’ (Tyler and Bhutoria
2015, 225). India’s position is closer to that of Japan and the United States, which have
sought to contain China in the Indian Ocean. The US and India, for example, took part
in anti-submarine exercises off the coast of Goa in September 2018, which are relevant
for countering Chinese submarine operations in the Indian Ocean (D. Scott 2019).
All Indo-Pacific Four countries have expressed strong concerns about China’s buildup
in the South China Sea and have underscored the need for freedom of navigation and
overflight. At a fundamental level, so-called freedom of navigation operations
(FONOPs) missions will not roll back China’s extensive military buildup in the South
China Sea. However, FONOPs and assertions of high seas freedoms will serve to deter
China from carrying out activities which are beyond the pale, such as seising features occu-
pied by other claimant states. Among the Indo-Pacific Four countries, only the US has
conducted FONOPs. Between May 2017 and February 2019, the Trump administration
conducted 11 publicised FONOPs in the South China Sea – more than twice the
number conducted during the Obama administration (IISS APRSA 2019, 133). Compared
to the US, the other members of the Indo-Pacific Four have taken relatively low-key
approaches. Since the 1980s, Australia has carried out low-key transits of naval warships
and aircraft through the South China Sea and Indian Ocean to assert freedom of naviga-
tion. In April 2018, however, three Australian warships enroute to Vietnam in the South
China Sea were challenged by the PLA Navy, in a polite but ‘robust’ challenge (ABC News
2018). The US and Australia have been encouraging Japan to expand the regional role of
its armed forces. In September-October 2018, Japan deployed the helicopter carrier JS
Kaga in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean. It conducted a submarine exercise in
the South China, leading to Chinese accusations of Japan undermining stability (IISS
APRSA 2019, 135). While India treats the South China Sea disputes as a threat to the
freedom of navigation, it deems the Indian Ocean area to be of a higher importance to
New Delhi. It has not conducted a single FONOP in the South China Sea.

Connectivity
The efforts by the Indo-Pacific Four to offer connectivity solutions and options constitute
a not-so-subtle counter to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. However, the Indo-Pacific
Four countries have not, as a quartet, come up with a coherent solution as how to
address infrastructure and connectivity needs in the Indo-Pacific, estimated by the
Asian Development Bank to be at $26 trillion over the period 2016–2030. Australia has
been cautious about the BRI, amid concerns about China’s regional ambitions and the
lack of transparency in BRI projects (Power 2018). However, Canberra’s reticence
8 W. CHOONG

towards the BRI has not stopped the state of Victoria from signing up to support the BRI.
In July 2018, Australia, Japan and the US announced a trilateral partnership to invest in
infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific. In November 2018, the trio announced that they had
finalised their partnership to support such investments. The trilateral partnership would
mobilise investment in projects to build infrastructure and increase connectivity. In a
subtle swipe at the BRI, the three countries said that they were committed to ‘sustainable,
principles-based investment’ that is transparent, ‘upholds robust standards, avoids unsus-
tainable debt burdens’ (DFAT (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) 2019). Still,
Australia appears to be less focused on the wider Indo-Pacific and more on the South
Pacific. The trilateral partnership did not provide a dollar figure for investment. But Can-
berra stressed that it would create an Australian Infrastructure Financial Facility, valued at
$2 billion, to support important infrastructure projects across the Pacific Islands and
Timor Leste (DFAT (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) 2019). This has put Can-
berra in direct competition with China in the South Pacific for infrastructure investments.
India has serious concerns about China’s BRI. China has embarked on a series of infra-
structure projects with partners in India’s neighbourhood, such as Pakistan, Nepal and the
Maldives – projects that leave New Delhi isolated (Kaura 2018). India has focused its
efforts on extending port connectivity among the littoral states of the Indian Ocean and
beyond. India and Japan have teamed up in the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor projects
for Southeast Asia and Africa, ostensibly as a counter to the BRI. The corridor will be
developed through quality infrastructure and complemented by digital connectivity, and
will support the growth of technology and services between Asia and Africa (ERIA
2017, 3–4). Reflecting the lack of a coherent strategy among the Indo-Pacific Four,
Japan and New Delhi are reluctant to commit themselves to any initiative construed as
‘anti-China’ posturing. India, in particular, has refused to participate in the Australia-
Japan-US trilateral partnership announced in July 2018 (Palit and Sano 2018, 4–5).
Underscoring its non-alignment status, India has also participated in infrastructure pro-
jects with Iran and Russia, this putting it at cross-purposes with the US desire to use con-
nectivity projects to further its strategic goals.
Among the Indo-Pacific Four countries, Japan has the most expansive connectivity
vision for the Indo-Pacific. The essence of Japan’s FOIP strategy lies in the potential
Tokyo sees in connecting the two continents of Asia and Japan, as well as the Indian
and Pacific oceans (Thankachan 2017, 85). Significant Japanese capital has gone into
Africa, in particular, in Kenya, Mozambique, Uganda, Ethiopia and Tanzania. Japan is
also the most pragmatic compared to the other Indo-Pacific Four countries. In June
2017, Tokyo reversed its critical position on China’s BRI by announcing that Japan
would cooperate with China on the BRI and provide financial backing for China’s initiat-
ive (Sano 2018). Tokyo’s intention is to find confluences between Japan’s FOIP strategy
and the BRI, such that free, open and transparent elements are incorporated into BRI pro-
jects. This would help foster China’s role as a responsible player in the ‘rules-based’ Indo-
Pacific (Yoshimatsu 2018, 14).
Among the Indo-Pacific Four countries, the US has been by the far the strongest
opponent of China’s BRI. The US is the most determined in putting the BRI in a geopo-
litical frame. Washington has sought to portray itself as providing creditable alternatives to
the BRI. It has implicitly referred to the dangers associated with Chinese infrastructure
loans and the risks of creating debt traps for developing states. In June 2018, US Secretary
 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 9

of State Mike Pompeo announced a $113 million plan to invest in new technology, energy
and infrastructure into the Indo-Pacific. The plan, however, appeared paltry when com-
pared to China’s BRI (Wroughton and Brunnstrom 2018). In November 2018, Vice Pre-
sident Mike Pence said the Better Utilisation of Investments Leading to Development
(BUILD) Act and the new International Development Finance Corp (IDFC), armed
with $60 billion, would aim to invest in infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific. Pence
pitched the IDFC as a ‘white knight’ that will save credit-starved emerging economies
from Chinese debt trap diplomacy (Jaipragas 2018). As Palit and Sano (2018, 4) argue,
US infrastructure investments are largely intended to enhance greater market access for
US exports in the Indo-Pacific. The FOIP strategy will need to grow from beyond its
current mode of ‘somewhat disparate’ infrastructure engagement with a few countries,
to one that encompasses trade and investment linkages for a truly ‘free and open’ econ-
omic geography.

The failure of FOIP?

In its present form, the FOIP strategy is not coherent, as it suffers from a divergence in
approaches amongst the Indo-Pacific Four, ranging from different conceptualisations of
the Indo-Pacific to disagreements over strategy on managing the China challenge, mari-
time security and connectivity. For the FOIP strategy to gain acceptance across the
Indo-Pacific, endorsement by ASEAN is critical. To an extent, the FOIP strategy being
offered by the Indo-Pacific 4 will enjoy some receptivity among ASEAN countries,
given the emphasis on ASEAN centrality. On the other hand, the FOIP strategy faces a
serious challenge from Indonesia’s (and ASEAN’s) recent initiative to define the Indo-
Pacific on its own terms. Indonesia, the titular head of ASEAN by virtue of its population
and geopolitical weight, has shown receptivity to FOIP principles, such as the need for
international law, peaceful dispute settlement, as well as the need for connectivity and
maritime security. On connectivity, Indonesia and other ASEAN member states do not
share the US’ position on BRI, as evidenced by the fact that China secured the attendance
of top leaders from nine of the 10 ASEAN member states (Indonesia’s Joko Widodo was
absent, likely due to his re-election bid) at its 2019 Belt and Road Forum (Tiezzi 2018).
China has a long history of infrastructure investment in Southeast Asia, and its entrenched
regional role means that the Indo-Pacific Four will not be successful in securing ASEAN
support for FOIP principles in return for infrastructure investment. Southeast Asian
countries have generally responded to the BRI in a cautious but positive manner. Their
responses have ranged from seeking better terms for projects to, in rare instances, termin-
ation (IISS APRSA 2019, 94). While the Indo-Pacific Four’s emphasis on connectivity will
be welcomed by ASEAN countries, they do not need to endorse the FOIP strategy in order
to take advantage of the connectivity options being offered by the Indo-Pacific Four.
On maritime security, and in particular, the South China Sea disputes, ASEAN has
expressed support for freedom of navigation and overflight, unimpeded commerce as
per UNCLOS and the non-militarisation of features, but ASEAN as a collective has not
publicly expressed support for US-style FONOPs (Tow 2016, 3). ASEAN has noted that
land reclamations and activities in the area have eroded ‘trust and confidence, increased
tensions and may undermine peace and security’ in the region (ASEAN 2019, 4).
However, the grouping has focused its efforts on concluding negotiations with China
10 W. CHOONG

on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (ASEAN 2019, 4). ASEAN has expressed
concerns about a near-collision between the USS Decatur and a PLA Navy Luyang
destroyer in September 2018, as the former conducted a FONOP near the Spratlys.
While cognisant of the need to uphold certain principles, Singapore’s defence minister
Ng Eng Hen said that the ‘price of any physical incident’ was too high to assert a
certain position (Mahmud 2018).

Indonesia’s Indo-Pacific concept: asserting ASEAN centrality

Compared to the US-led FOIP strategy, which focuses on economics and security issues
through a geopolitical lens, Indonesia’s initiative to craft a unified ASEAN approach to
the Indo-Pacific stresses more on economics, cooperation, ASEAN centrality, as well as
inclusivity. Indonesia’s Indo-Pacific approach dates back to 2013, when then foreign min-
ister Marty Natalegawa proposed an Indo-Pacific Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.
The current Indonesian approach and Natalegawa’s Indo-Pacific treaty share key
elements: an inclusive Indo-Pacific, the important of trust and confidence building and
an ASEAN-led Indo-Pacific (Surydinata 2018, 5). Indonesia’s Indo-Pacific Cooperation
Concept document is not in the public domain, but the general contours of its approach
are discernible from public statements. In May 2018, Indonesia pitched the concept to
other ASEAN member states. The concept has three key elements: building an environ-
ment that supports international law and peaceful dispute settlement, addressing transna-
tional challenges such as terrorism and piracy, and creating new ‘economic growth
centres’ in the Indian and South Pacific ocean in an ‘open and fair’ economic system
(Tham 2018). Speaking at the East Asia Summit in November 2018, President Jokowi
Widodo stressed five key elements—openness, inclusiveness, transparency, respect for
international law and ASEAN centrality (Office of Assistant to Deputy Cabinet Secretary
for State Documents and Translation 2018).
President Jokowi stressed that Indonesia had received positive responses and support
from ASEAN countries for its Indo-Pacific concept. He expressed hope that the draft
concept would be agreed upon, as ‘informal consultations’ on the document continued.
He expressed hope that through Indonesia’s Indo-Pacific concept the centrality of
ASEAN would be maintained (Office of Assistant to Deputy Cabinet Secretary for State
Documents and Translation 2018). Indonesia’s attempt to maintain ASEAN centrality
on the Indo-Pacific concept is understandable. A carte blanche acceptance of the US-led
FOIP strategy offered would lead to a loss in ASEAN centrality. Indonesia’s Indo-
Pacific concept would provide ASEAN the intellectual leadership to discuss the future
of the region (Saiman and Bayuni 2018). Current concerns within ASEAN about the
loss of centrality in regional affairs has an older provenance. In 2009, Australian prime
minister Kevin Rudd pitched the idea of an Asia-Pacific Community that involved six
vital countries (US, China, Japan, India, Indonesia and Russia) but no ASEAN involve-
ment. The proposal did not gain traction due to ASEAN’s concerns about the loss of cen-
trality (Dobell 2009; Laurence 2009).
Extra-ASEAN regional powers such as India, Japan and the United States have
expressed support for ASEAN centrality. In practice, major powers would only profess
ASEAN centrality only when it suits their interests; such powers consider ASEAN
‘central’ not because of its strategic heft, but its relative weakness. This makes ASEAN
 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 11

an ‘occasionally useful instrument’ to advance the interests of major powers while ensur-
ing it cannot block their ‘most vital designs’ (Kausikan 2017). For example, President
Trump missed the EAS meeting in 2018 – a move that belied Washington’s support for
ASEAN centrality. Intriguingly, Indonesia has itself shown marginal interest in ASEAN
by not actively pursuing the South China Sea dialogue process and reducing its budget
for ASEAN affairs (Shekhar 2018). Nonetheless, Indonesia and ASEAN’s assertion of
ASEAN centrality in the evolving Indo-Pacific concept shows that Indonesia is seeking
to put ASEAN on an autonomous path amid the geopolitics between the US-led Quad
and an assertive China (Shekhar 2018)
It is an open secret that FOIP strategy is a bid to manage the perceived challenge of
China, and more specifically, China’s militarisation in the South China Sea. With
regard to this, however, Indonesia and ASEAN have refused to put any Indo-Pacific
concept in a geopolitical frame. Speaking in January 2018, Retno Mursadi said that
cooperation in Indo-Pacific should not be based on ‘suspicion, or worse, perception of
threat’ (MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 2018a). Jokowi’s key emphasis is that
ASEAN’s Indo-Pacific concept should ‘turn potential threats into cooperation, and turn
potential conflict into peace’ (BPMI 2018). He has invited China to cooperate even
closer with ASEAN under the Indo-Pacific concept, as it pertains to maritime security
and search and rescue operations at sea (Anya 2018). Privately, ASEAN diplomats have
alerted ASEAN’s dialogue partners that the ASEAN framework will be distinctive from
the US-inspired FOIP, despite sharing some key principles. The ASEAN approach
would be inclusive and not aimed at any particular power (Chongkittavorn 2018).
ASEAN’s preferred platform for its Indo-Pacific concept would be the East Asia
Summit, which includes China and the United States. The ASEAN approach will focus
on interests, given that it would be easier to cooperate on the basis of mutually beneficial
cooperation, as opposed to values, which can vary due to different political systems
(Saiman and Bayuni 2018). While Indo-Pacific Four countries such as Japan are primarily
concerned about security issues, Indonesia is more interested in economic benefits. During
a visit to Jakarta in January 2017, Shinzo Abe wanted Indonesia to cooperate on maritime
security, particularly in the Natunas where Chinese incursions in Indonesia’s EEZ had
taken place. The proposal was likely rejected, as Jakarta was reluctant to have a foreign
navy patrolling Indonesian waters. In addition, such activities would have drawn a reac-
tion from Beijing (Surydinata 2018, 2).

Conclusion
Among the Indo-Pacific Four countries, there are fundamental divergences in their con-
ceptualisation of the Indo-Pacific and related issues such as the challenge of China, mar-
itime security and connectivity, with the US position on China being the most prominent.
At any rate, Indonesia’s initiative to steer ASEAN’s approach to the Indo-Pacific means
that the grouping will not accept the FOIP strategy carte blanche. While ASEAN will
adapt elements from FOIP strategy that are appropriate, it will not adopt any elements
that erodes ASEAN centrality or excludes China. Whether the FOIP strategy is adopted
by ASEAN or not, individual Indo-Pacific Four countries such as Japan and the US will
continue to engage with Asean and its member countries. But Indonesia and ASEAN’s
latest assertion of ASEAN centrality in their approach to the Indo-Pacific means that
12 W. CHOONG

the possibility of the FOIP strategy being adopted by the grouping in its entirety will be
remote.

Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Dr Tim Huxley, Executive Director at IISS-Asia, for his valuable
inputs to this article. The author would also like to express his gratitude to Jack Broome, a
Gerald Segal Research Intern at IISS-Asia, for his considerable research assistance and contri-
butions to this article.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor
William Choong is the Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow for Asia-Pacific Security at the
International Institute for Strategic Studies (Asia). He helps to run the annual IISS Shangri-
La Dialogue and contributes to research on regional security issues such as the South China
Sea territorial disputes and Japan’s evolution into a ‘normal’ power.

ORCID
William Choong http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2887-8080

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