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therefore, only develops the techniques and the degree of combination of the social process of
production by simultaneously undermining the original sources of all wealth – the soil and the
worker.’ (Marx/Engels 1982 [1867], Capital Vol. I, chapter 15, p. 638) Here, Marx critically opposes
bourgeois economics and Social Democratic notions which regard labour as the sole source of all
wealth, instead highlighting a tendency inherent in the mode of production—even if he was unable to
anticipate many of its concrete consequences: soil degradation, urban sprawl, overfishing, food
containing antibiotics and/or chemical additives that pose a health risk, water shortages or
contaminated water supplies, desertification, forest decline, climate change, or the loss of rain forests
and biodiversity.
Marx’s deliberations in fact state the opposite of what commentators claimed, whether from an
affirmative or critical standpoint. Capitalism has developed the social forces of production and
prosperity to such a degree and in such a one-sided manner that they are uncontrollable under
capitalist conditions. There is a degree of social cooperation at the global level based on appropriation
or conservation of nature, facilitated by technology and science. Nature has been socialised: humans
no longer interfere with nature here and there, but rather control the entire planet as well as all life
living on it. The level of global knowledge allowing for a rational and sustainable relation to nature
was reached long ago, when the development of science and technologies attained a degree of
sophistication that could have made it possible to bring the accumulation process to a halt and
selectively provide a certain number of products and services based on actual need. No growth would
be necessary, but rather satisfaction of demand at a democratically-specified level in accordance with
society’s relation to nature. Furthermore, a democratically-controlled reduction of the scale of
production, services, or consumption is not only conceivable but plausible.
Yet this is impossible under the existing relations of production and ownership geared towards
further bursts of growth, innovation and competitiveness. The goal of overcoming the accumulation
dynamic is not represented in mainstream politics, nor is the demand for at least a reduction of
growth. Instead, growth is to become ecologically and socially sustainable and climate-neutral. The
supposed key to reaching this goal is a transformation in the fields of energy, urban planning and
land use, as well as changes in production, consumption patterns and lifestyles. It is an attempt at
squaring the circle, so to speak, namely reconciling a sustainability-oriented relation to nature and
capital’s accumulation dynamic. The underlying assumption is that capitalist growth can be decoupled
from resource consumption and fossil energy replaced by renewable energies. Experiences with
previous capitalist crisis solutions suggest that this strategy will lead to a new level of valorisation and
realisation dynamic and a reproduction of the crisis on an enlarged scale. Should the Green Economy
become a success story, meaning should capital valorisation really be possible and profits exceed the
levels of previous phases of capital accumulation, then this would result in a continuous process of
investment and growth complete with corresponding profits. The outcome would most likely be the
opposite of the desired effects, however: new machines, more consumption, and more waste—using
more rather than less nature. Any consequences for the natural environment will be mitigated
through capital-intensive strategies of geo-engineering and substantial changes in society’s relation to
nature, including the genetic manipulation of ‘life’—such as the development of crops requiring less
water.
If such a negative impact on nature and society is to be avoided, we require new resource cycles and
incentives for recovering used resources, developing more compact settlement patterns, new forms
of food production and raw material extraction. Such a mode of regulating capitalist accumulation in
harmony with the natural metabolism is currently not in sight. One reason why it is unlikely to
materialise is that it would require natural and resource management on a global scale, effectively
overseeing a process of competition for the most rational use of scarce resources.
MARX’S CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE
Green Socialism is supposed to create the space of freedom allowing for new forms of
decision-making based on democracy and a democratic relationship between society and nature. It is
not simply a matter of conserving nature. With view to many rapidly-advancing destructive processes,
even comprehensive social change would come very late if not too late. Any potential emancipatory
society will first have to deal— for decades, if not centuries—with the ecological damage left behind
by capitalist and state-socialist modernisation projects. Yet Marx also included a positive aspect in his
list of categorical imperatives, going beyond mere conservation and damage control. Not only are all
relations in which individuals are enslaved and degraded to be overcome; the tasks of the living also
include handing, or ‘bequeathing’ the earth to succeeding generations in an improved state
(Marx/Engels 1991 [1894], Capital Vol. III, Chapter 46, p. 911).
The development of the original sources of wealth does not imply the infinite exploitation of nature
and labour, but rather a reconciliation of the two, of social labour and nature. The bourgeois project
of the Enlightenment, by contrast, was quite limited. It sought to dominate nature so as to take away
people’s fear of its ferocity and ensure their self-preservation; nature was to be subordinated to
human purposes. This is facilitated by knowledge of its laws and principles, while technical means
allow for the latter’s practical application. Nature and society oppose one another in a dualistic and
irreconcilable manner. Nature and its inherent laws appear to be without alternative and must
therefore be subordinated and dominated by society. The latter in turn appears entirely void of
natural processes and thus comprehensible only out of its own nature. The dualistic and unreconciled
relationship between nature and society is reproduced by those who view nature as an obstacle to be
conquered through technical means: fast cars, skyscrapers, cosmetic surgery. Here, nature is
understood as an assemblage of resources whose constantly advancing development, appropriation
and exploitation humans are entitled to. It is thus little more than a sign of precautionary foresight in
the context of this kind of exploitative appropriation of nature to be vigilant of the potential depletion
of resources and corresponding conflicts and to explore new resources and develop substitutes.
Environmentalists and ecologists oppose this approach. Their aim is to conserve the natural world,
individual species, ecological systems, or defend nature as such. In their view, individuals and society
must respect nature and perhaps even adapt to natural cycles. It is an ambivalent position: on the
one hand, the destruction of the natural world is to be slowed down or even avoided altogether; on
the other, the argument can appear to proceed from a kind of anti-Enlightenment stance if demands
are put forward—on behalf of harmony or an equilibrium with nature—that people should adopt a
lifestyle governed by ‘nature’. The dichotomy of nature and society is also retained here, as
environmental protection is ultimately subordinated to the dynamic of accumulation and
modernisation. This is particularly noticeable wherever the surgical manipulation of the human body
or the genetic modification of living beings become the strategic object of corporate interests and
arguments on behalf of the integrity of Creation or the subject are largely unable to prevent such
practices. What is obscured here is that nature is socialised, that the so-called natural laws also
represent specific, historical, collective practices of society, and that, reversely, humans not only relate
to the outer natural world in dominant ways but also to their own inner nature: that they control their
impulses, modulate their vocal chords or train or move their body in a certain way, not to mention
dietary habits, sickness, birth and death. Nature and society are thus inextricably linked to one
another, albeit not fully merged. They form a relation, or, more precisely: countless relations between
nature and society. There is not one global society-nature relation. Rather, distinct modes of
production and distinct constitutive social classes or genders or social groups establish distinct
relations with nature. Nature is defined in different ways in these distinct relations (energy, food, time
and space, relation to one’s own body). That is why conflicts between humans always extend beyond
the social realm and affect nature (as well as humans’ concrete relation to it); domination is practiced
as rule over both people and nature. Yet not all these relations can be understood exclusively as
domination, as they also contain instances of reconciliation.
Green Socialism seeks to bring to bear the instances of reconciliation and overcome both forms of
domination. One precondition of this is overcoming the drive for accumulation. This includes
entering—on the basis of newly-established social relations to nature—into a new kind of metabolism
with nature, preserving it and processing and appropriating it in a way that it is handed on to future
generations in a better state than it was before. In other words, it means adjusting modes of living to
the socially identified and historically specific boundaries of nature. That such boundaries exist on a
planetary scale is itself a rather recent insight that moreover constitutes a new relation of global
society to nature. The exact course of these boundaries is contested, while the corresponding
discussions, it should be added, are not entirely unrestricted considering the efforts by corporate or
state actors to block learning processes, discourses and possible action in this regard. Discussions
must take place in a form that includes (at least virtually) all those affected by the consequences in
having a say in what is defined as sustainable and sufficient.
The common goal would be a way of life that ensures equality—also in relations to nature.
1 | Equality, first and foremost, must rule out the possibility of one group profitably exploiting raw
materials such as metals or foods to the detriment of another group. Alongside this kind of imperial
creation of inequality is a structural inequality as well: poor people frequently have no access to clean
drinking water, are particularly vulnerable to unhealthy foods, and exposed to insufficient services or
unhealthy working conditions. Inequality is further created in temporal terms, namely through the
depositing of toxic waste in places where no one is harmed immediately but long-term damage is
likely.
2 | Another aspect is the level of equality. Many practices only reveal the damage they cause after
reaching a certain degree of proliferation: equality at a high level would entail far-reaching negative
ecological consequences in terms of the number of cars, vastly expanding air travel, high meat
consumption, or the expansion of ski tourism. Given that such lifestyles are based on major capital
investment, exploitation and profit, and can therefore be reconciled with social considerations only to
a very limited degree, an adjustment of economic laws and principles is necessary. The result may be
that equality entails abstention from specific habits for a certain segment of the population, or at least
a sustainable change in their preferences. That said, equality will never be achieved in all regards.
Ultimately, certain positional goods which may be associated with inequality will always remain: the
location of a house, the size of an apartment, the unpleasant aspects of certain types of work. There
will still be a need for certain raw materials, the extraction of which damages the natural environment
and thus affects individual living conditions. The same is true with regard to various forms of
industrial processing. If the relation between human beings and nature cannot be changed in a way
that eliminates all inequality, it is still crucial to cause as little damage as possible, take rehabilitation
measures, offer those affected alternative options and rule out the possibility that ecological
detriments affecting individuals determine their fates.
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND SOCIETY’S RELATION TO NATURE
This brings us to the ‘problem of democracy’ and the question of whether democracy can reasonably
be applied to the relation to nature in the first place. Today’s way of life is mediated by the market
and in many ways represents the product of a corporate dictatorship: a few select professionals
develop products on behalf of profit-oriented companies which then produce and market them.
Individual needs are secondary, although they are elaborately surveyed by consumption and
marketing research and constantly invoked and encouraged with view to consumption preferences.
What matters is solvent demand. Green Socialism is not about replacing the market diktat with state
coercion. This Social Democratic conception has long become obsolete—as has the market itself, as it
were. The alternative to both of these forms of coordination—although known for a long time by the
name of socialism—has only been tested in embryonic forms so far: the democratically-regulated
self-coordination of individuals, i.e. forms in which they collectively decide on matters like demand,
the products which may satisfy this demand, the required amount and form thereof, the working
conditions under which they are produced and distributed. That said, the question arises whether the
relation to nature can actually be democratised in the first place and, secondly, if such forms of
democratic self-coordination can prevent environmentally harmful consequences.
Green Socialism entails special and novel challenges for democracy. This is true with regard to nature
just as much as society and politics. If nature is conceived as an external restraint, democratic
decision-making processes must necessarily be subordinated to it. If, by contrast, nature is seen as a
mere resource, democracy becomes equally irrelevant—or, at best, attains marginal importance
whenever there is a democratic decision concerning the appropriation or use of resources or the
construction of infrastructure. However, social interests must take centre stage in these instances, as
well; and it is likely that the domination of nature will engender the formation of new power blocs.
The common liberal-democratic notion displays no aspiration to expand democracy in any specific
way to apply to nature, nor to prevent the valorisation of nature. It insinuates that democracy is the
result of a contractual relationship between individuals. They enter into this contract for the sake of
their own self-preservation. Society constitutes itself as a political community in which everyone is
subject to the same set of laws as well as virtually being the latter’s authors. The law specifies the
rights of individuals vis-à-vis one another and towards the state; it prevents individuals from abusing
their rights and restricting those of others. The rule of law and democracy tie even the state itself to
the law. This practice has far-reaching implications for the constitution of a certain, dominant relation
to nature.
1 | Regardless of the fact that corporations have a major impact on people’s lives due to their
decisions pertaining to investment, jobs, products, marketing channels and consumption forms,
which essentially constitute society’s relation to nature, such practices are considered private
decisions and ways of life. Democratic decisions may influence the underlying framework conditions
at best.
2 | It is implied that the scope of national legislation comprehensively codifies citizens’ entire range of
conduct. This is not the case. In protecting the freedom of owners, the state intervenes in their mode
of living and market behaviour only to a very limited extent. Consumers cause the import of foods or
raw materials through their market-mediated demand. During the actual purchasing act, they are only
rarely held accountable for the ecological and social consequences of their Actions.
3 | Parliaments can only intervene in society through legislation, taxation or subsidies. Given their
limited temporal horizon, they are hardly able to adequately factor long-term ecological effects into
their decisions. Furthermore, parliamentary democracy implies that every decision passed by the
popular sovereign can be reversed through the formation of a new political majority. This represents
democracy-political idealism, for, effectively, society’s relation to nature and therefore the basis of all
decisions, is—irreversibly—changed. Consequently, the task at hand would be to collectively
determine the form of this irreversibility.
4 | The state is the state of capital—not exclusively, but according to its law of gravity. It issues laws
and provides resources to support knowledge, technologies, infrastructures, a certain trained relation
to one’s own body, to health and to our species’ reproduction, with the purpose of promoting the
private appropriation of socially produced wealth. This way, society’s relation to nature and processes
of capital valorisation are conflated, thereby appearing to be without alternative.
Proceeding from these four aspects concerning (1) the constitution of a democratic community, (2)
the processes of will-formation and decision-making, (3) the latter’s scope, and (4) the processes of
implementation, there is little we can expect from democracy in its current state in terms of changing
society’s relation to nature. As it were, it appears that a new relation between society and nature will
require a reconstitution of democracy itself—one which transcends the liberal boundaries between
politics, economy and nature so as to democratise complexity itself.
ON THE DEMOCRATISATION OF SOCIETY’S RELATION TO NATURE
To begin with, demand, technologies, investments and production, i.e. the appropriation and
processing of nature, distribution and consumption forms of products need to become the subject of
democratic decision-making, framed in terms of the consequences for and shaping of the natural
environment. Corresponding procedures must include decisions about certain future paths of
technological and infrastructural development, just as much as those about the mode of operation
and products, meaning their material, energy, aesthetic and utility aspects. Like parliaments,
economic-democratic institutions represent crucial nodes in such a democratic complex.
Furthermore, the spatial-ecological context of decisions must also be considered: even those affected
only from a distance must be able to participate in such decisions. The notion that the appropriation
of nature or construction of infrastructure represent decisions of universal relevance must be firmly
implanted throughout society.
Furthermore, the temporal scope of decisions must be extended. The appropriation or processing of
nature (e.g. waste management) must be reconsidered with a view for the longer term. The current
temporal scope of decisions pertaining to the future encompasses 20 to 80 years and is based on
countless uncertainties, whereas decisions concerning the choice of certain technologies encompass
centuries or even millennia to come. In such cases, it must be possible to challenge decisions and put
them to a vote, given that any chance of reversal is ruled out. Finally, the state—with its
abstract-general forms of control and its administrative mechanisms—must be replaced with
institutions of self-administration, bound by democratic decisions and subject to comprehensive
public scrutiny, which implement decisions in a transparent bottom-up manner according to the
subsidiarity principle. Democracy is decoupled from the state and represents a self-determined
procedural mode of self-coordination. Everyone participates in decisions concerning the places of
production, their respective mode of operation, technology, research and development, amounts and
forms of products, services, the mode and volume of work, in accordance with their own experience
in the process of appropriating nature. There would have to be collective decisions on what is needed
and how much is sufficient, what can be improved in which way, which amount of labour can be
performed in which way and by whom. Decisions ought to be based on historical and ecological
sustainability, that is to say they must pursue the ultimate goal of improving the planet. That said, all
this is always based on the criteria of the present. Expectations concerning the rationality of
democratic decision-making ought to remain reasonable. Democratic decision-making cannot
eliminate the unknowability of the unknown. It does, however, provide a modicum of assurance that
certain forms of appropriation and exploitation of nature will cease to occur. In the event of new
experiences or insights, past decisions may of course be reversed or certain lifestyle habits reviewed,
even if this means accepting the loss of resources already allocated or spent. Given that there would
no longer be any powerful interests with the ability to blackmail (ownership of means of production,
power to issue credit, legislative and military-police means) and there would be a generally high level
of education, obstacles would be reduced. Irrational results of decision-making as occur today may
well be expected, raising the simple question of the extent of irrationality and the containment
thereof. Under democratic conditions of Green Socialism, everyone would at least tend to be involved
in the decision-making process, everyone could contribute to avoiding mistakes and have a positive
impact. Universal prosperity emerges from individual security, possibilities for co-determination and
democratic control, and the egalitarian organisation of social labour. Irrational decisions and
corresponding costs cannot be ruled out, but everyone would bear such costs collectively. Given that
all members of society would be aware of this circumstance, they would likely make an effort to
prevent any decisions to the detriment of nature both near their home and in distant places. And they
would be able to do so precisely because they would not have to worry about their existence, life, civil
liberties or participation rights.
Translated by Jan-Peter Herrmann
References
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 1982 (1867), Capital Vol. I, London
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 1991 [1894]), Capital Vol. III, London
Note
I would like to thank Ulrich Brand, Christina Kaindl, Tadzio Müller, Rainer Rilling, Thomas Sablowski
and Rahel Wolf for their helpful comments.