1

RE-INTERPRETING ARISTOTLE: QUALIFIED

UNIVERSAL IN NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

HS 506
MA+PhD, 1st year

By KALPARNAB GUPTA
Roll No. 21N080003

Supervisor: Prof. Siby K George

Department of Humanities and Social Sciences
INDIAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY BOMBAY
April, 2022
 2
1

Abstract
The paper argues for qualified universal in Aristotle’s Nicomachean ethics. Aristotle makes
distinction between theoritical knowledge and practical knowledge. Practical rationality
demands actions to be performed by the moral agent and hence are different from inferential
deductions in theoretical knowledge. I argue that search for universals in theory and practice
are bound to be different and in practical knowledge our search would be more of a qualified
type. In Aristotle, everything is being driven to some purpose or teleos and actions are not
random or out of chance. Eudaimonia is the ultimate teleos and individual actions are
synchronized keeping this in view. That Aristotle was against universalism is further negated by
the fact he spent considerable amount of time formulating and appropriating the definitions of
various virtues. Also his prohibitions don’t admit of any situational considerations and hold true
always without any exception. Aristotle highlights concrete and particular aspects of the
situations but it can’t be taken as a call for dismantling of structures. Rather it is a call to make
our outlook more comprehensive and the law more encompassing.

Keywords
Qualified Universal, Aristotelian phronesis, Theory and Practice, Nicomachean Ethics, Moral
Relativism.

Introduction
Modern interpreters of Aristotle have taken Aristotelian ethics as an epitome of non-
universality. Nussbaum, Gadamer and Heidegger are the stalwarts among others who followed
this suit. Moral Universalism is a meta-ethical position which holds that moral judgments exist
absolutely and universally, irrespective of race, religion, gender, nationality etc. It is contrasted
with moral relativism which advocates that truth or falsity of moral judgments are relative and
they vary depending upon traditions and cultures. Recent decades have seen a proliferation of
literature on relativism. This owes greatly to the advancement of science and technology which
has brought a drastic improvement in communication. Several cultures have been brought
together to interact with each other which was possible never before. The world has turned
into a global village. It is no surprise that multiculturalism and moral relativism would occupy
prominent positions in such a scenario. As Chris Gowans observes, relativism has also been
considered a "normative position, pertaining to how people ought to regard or behave towards
those with whom they morally disagree"1. Relativism is also connected with aspects like
tolerance. Relativism in ethics has garnered support and endorsement of philosophical trends
like hermeneutics, post-modernism, and post-structuralism.

1Gowans, Chris, "Moral Relativism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2021 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/moral-relativism/>
 3
1

We, however, in this paper argue that the Aristotelian ethical position can't be classified as
moral relativism. Nor can his predicaments in Nicomachean ethics be taken as a scheme for the
refutation of universals in ethics. Aristotle's distinction between theoretical and practical
knowledge is rather directed at the intrinsic dissimilarities between the two types of knowledge.
Practical knowledge is different from theoretical knowledge because unlike the inference in
theoretical deductions, practical knowledge demands actions to be performed by the moral
agent. Such distinctions have nothing to do with the contention that Aristotle refuted
universalism in ethics. We will also be dealing at length with why aspirations for universalism is
of primary concern in ethical matters. In Aristotle, everything is being driven to some purpose
or teleos and actions are not random or out of chance. Eudaimonia is the ultimate teleos and
individual actions are synchronized keeping this in view. Further Aristotle spends considerable
amount of time formulating the definitions of virtues. Again, the prohibitions set by him hold
true always. It does not admit of any context or situational considerations. All these points to
the fact that Aristotle is not against universalism. Rather his search is the search for qualified
universals. It is true that Aristotle highlights the particular and concrete aspects of a situation
but it is only to make the law more encompassing and the outlook more comprehensive. The
comments of Aristotle in his book should not be taken as a criticism of ethical universals and
call for abandoning of structures. Rather it is a call against the crystallization of rigid structures
and taking account of the situational particularities.
The paper is divided into seven sections. In section 1 the difference between theory and
practice is highlighted. Aristotle distuiguishes episteme from phronesis and techne. The purport
behind this distinction is analyzed. In Section 2 we discuss why people aspire for ethical
universals. The problems which may arise due to absence of Universality in ethics is also taken
under consideration. In Section 3 we dwell on some important aspects of practical rationality.
Section 4 discusses teleos in Aristotelian ethics. For Aristotle we are being driven to a goal or
purpose. This goal is Eudaimonia or happiness. Section 5 includes a rough listing of some
definitions and prohibitions. Formulations of these definitions runs counter to the claim that
Aristotle was against ethical universality. In Section 6 we refute the arguments of two most
important philosophers of twentieth century, Gadamer and Heidegger. We argue that claims
made by them are infact far removed from Aristotelian ethical conception. Finally, in section 7,
before conclusion, we formulate a rough sketch of qualified universal in Aristotle.

1. Difference between theory and practice

Aristotle makes clear-cut division between theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge. It
seems evident enough in his Nicomachean Ethics. In fact Aristotle goes on to give an elaborate
account of phronesis only after sharply distinguishing theoretical knowledge from it. He
classifies intellectual virtues under several heads. For him there are things that are “capable of
being otherwise” and also there are things that are “not capable of being otherwise”. Moral or
ethical actions pertain to the first kind. Not only phronesis or practical wisdom, the first type
also includes the art of making things or “techne”. In such things, there is no fixed form or
 4

standard which is to be attained. These type of things are contrasted with those things which
can be known with exact precision and accuracy. Aristotle classifies knowledge of those things
as “Episteme”. These are the things that belong to the domain of natural and mathematical
sciences. “Necessity” and “Eternality” are the characteristics of such things. Another feature of
such kinds of knowledge is demonstrability. This means not only the conclusion but also the
intermediate steps or principles which make the conclusion certain should also be known.
Otherwise, the knowledge can’t be considered “scientific”. Rather, it will just be a matter of
chance, probability and coincidence.
Though such distinctions between theory and practice have already been drawn by Aristotle,
Nussbaum makes it more prominent in her writings. According to her, the aspirations and
methodology of Aristotle in his ethical framework are strikingly different from that of Plato. She
further maintains that Plato's search for universality and generality is totally absent in Aristotle.
Aristotle is concerned with "ultimate particulars" while Plato presses for "generality in value".
After contending that Aristotle's ethical project is non-scientific deliberation, Nussbaum goes
on to elaborate on the motivation behind seeking universality in ethics. She says that the
primary aim behind this is to take hold of the concrete situations and manipulate them
according to our needs.
The (Platonic) scientist would like to propose that we press this demand for universality
as far as we can, trying to get ourselves a system of practical rules that will prepare us
before the fact for the demands of the new situation, and also trying to get ourselves to
see the new situation in terms of this system, as merely a case falling under its authority.
Then we will never be taken by surprise.2
But a system of practical laws formed in such a manner can never be comprehensive because
the new situation won't be exactly the same as the previous situation. Further, the world of
change and mutation affects every agent in the world. So, framing a context-independent set of
universal and objective laws is never possible. Instead what needs to be stressed is the
concreteness and particularity of situations. For Aristotle, as Nussbaum maintains, practical
wisdom is not about applying abstract principles in actual practice but is about taking pragmatic
decisions in the "immediacy of the situation" and if the situation demands then revision of the
principles even at the highest level should also be done. "Practical wisdom, then, uses rules

2Nussbaum, Martha.C.The Fragility of Goodness, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1986),

40.
 5

only as summaries and guides; it must itself be flexible, ready for surprise, prepared to see,
resourceful at improvisation."3
Nussbaum's interpretation of Aristotle sets up an insurmountable dichotomy between theory
and practice. Whether such strict bipolarity is at all intended by Aristotle would be interesting
to analyse. For example, Jesus Vega in his paper opines, against the widespread interpretation
of Aristotle, that distinction between theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge is far from
being a dichotomist one.

If immanently referring us to action ( technē , phronēsis ), it is called practical rationality

(technical and moral-political); if immanently referring us to universal and necessary
concepts or essences ( nous , epistēmē , sophia ), it is theoretical rationality (scientific
and philosophical). Yet there is no absolute dichotomy between both forms of
rationality, but instead a dialectical gradation resulting from reapplying the same
conceptual criteria throughout different levels—thus generating apparently dichotomist
oppositions.4

3Nussbaum, Martha.C.The Fragility of Goodness, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1986),

305.

4 Vega, Jesús. “Aristotle on Practical Rules, Universality, and the Law.” (2013), 2-3.
 6

But before delving deep into this let us have a look at the motivation behind seeking
universality in ethics.

2. Aspiration for Universality in Ethics

Search for universality in ethical scenarios can be considered to be an essence of the human
nature in general. If one is reluctant to accept such broad and sweeping claim about human
nature, one can at least say that it has been the case with enlightenment thinkers. The gifted
German thinker of 18th century, Immanuel Kant can be invoked in this regard. Kant wanted to
formulate objective and universal ethical laws just like the laws of mathematics and natural
sciences. As Maclyntyre observes,

The test of a genuine moral imperative is that I can universalize it–that is, that I can will
that it should be a universal law, or, as Kant puts it in another formulation, that I can will
that it should be a law of nature.The point of this latter formulation is to stress that not
only must I be able to will that the precept in question should be recognized as a law
universally, but I must also be able to will that it should be acted on universally– in the
appropriate circumstances.5
Be in the ethical domain or in the domain of natural science, universalism has always been an
obsession with the enlightenment psyche. Kant being a representative of enlightenment is not
an exception. Leaving aside this aspect, the framing of universal laws is also found to be useful
for judicial and bureaucratic purposes. In absence of any standard norm or rule, the functioning
of democratic institutions, which are considered to be an essential aspect of liberal democracy,
would be impossible. Also, the judicial system, which is based on the notion of universalizable
categories of reward, punishment and justice, would be wrought with irreconcilable
contradictions. When universal law is absent, every individual would be able to justify their
actions by whatever means possible. This is because every perspective has a justification.To
understand this better let us take the help of an example.
A man works as a cashier in one of the commercial banks. One day he is found stealing money
and is caught red-handed. Now, he says that his son is seriously ill and is admitted to a hospital.
He needs money for an urgent operation that needs to be performed to save the life of his son.
But he doesn't have enough money. So he stole money to save the life of his son. He further
adds that there is nothing unethical about it because such large sums of money are usually
deposited in the bank by corrupt capitalists and businessmen and so there is no harm in
stealing money. And saving life in itself is a precious job. The cashier claims that he applied
phronesis or practical wisdom, as envisaged by Aristotle, quite creatively on the spot.

5 Maclntyre, Alasdair. A Short History of Ethics, (London: Routledge, 1967),123-24.

 7

If there is no universal law or standard for judging the actions of the cashier and his situational
context and also struggles of his personal life are also to be taken into account then the process
of judgment becomes an uphill task and the whole institution comes under serious crisis. But
here we are neither upset with the possibility of this organizational and bureaucratic failure nor
are we concerned to defend the prevailing system of rendering justice. Instead, we are
interested to give a close inspection on the notion of universality.
Despite Kant's obstinacy, one wonders whether universality in ethics should be exactly the
same as universality in natural and mathematical sciences. This is because unlike the former,
the latter deals with " universal and necessary connections (forms or essences) that refer to the
ontological structures of the world" 6. On the other hand, practical action always takes place
with the mediation of a deliberative agent. This agent can never be neutralized because it is an
individual and not an abstract formula or mechanism. Thus, universality in the ethical domain
can be inquired but it should necessarily be different from that what is found in exact sciences.
Perhaps we should make here a distinction between two kinds of universals. In the ethical
domain we can hope for some kind of a qualified universal.

3. Features of Practical Rationality

There are some features that are characteristic of practical rationality. The first of them is the
ability to produce change. As Taylor observes, " In general, the task of the practical intellect,
whether exercised in poiesis or in praxis, is the initiation of change." 7 Unlike theoretical
knowledge, practical rationality is concerned with those things which are liable to change.
Secondly, action is of primary importance in case of practical matters. Unlike theoretical
reasoning, having a set of justified beliefs is not sufficient here. One must have the motivation
to act and he should act. Practical intellect should furnish us with the decisions to act. Suppose
one wants to be healthy. It is not enough to know which foods should be taken and from which
food one should abstain. Practical wisdom commands one to take the food as desired.
Reeve highlights this aspect of practical rationality in more concrete terms as he says , "Unlike
the conclusion of a theoretical syllogism, which is a proposition, the conclusion of a practical
one, as we saw, is an action." 8 In ordinary syllogism, conclusion is generally inferred from the
validity of major premise, which is universal, and the minor premise which involves particulars.
For example, take the following,

Major premise: All men are mortal.

6 Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason, (London: Penguin, 2007), 45.

7 Taylor, C.C.W. Pleasure, Mind, and Soul, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008),205.

8Reeve, C.D.C. Aristotle on Practical Wisdom Nicomachean Ethics VI, (London: Harvard
University Press, 2013), 13.
 8
1

Minor premise: Sourav is a man.

Conclusion: Sourav is mortal.
As Irving Copi observes, " In a standard-form syllogism, the major premise is always stated first,
the minor premise second, and the conclusion last."9 But the structure of the practical syllogism
is different. Here, the conclusion is always an action. " The conclusion of the argument, which is
not to be confused with this last thing, is not a further proposition but an action that makes the
decree true."10. Practical syllogism involves an agent and the process of deliberation requires an
action to be performed by this agent. For example: If a man understands that eating chicken is
beneficial to health, he goes straightway and eats chicken, so long there is nothing that stops
him from doing so. Again if he learns that eating fast food is injurious to health, he stops eating
those foods at once. Unlike theoretical reasoning, action is intricately linked with practical
reasoning.
Whether phronesis involves deliberation towards ends or it suggests deliberation about means
to attain those ends is a topic which is intensely debated among scholars. Some are of the
opinion that the end is determined by some other faculty whereas phronesis contains
deliberation only about means. This is known as the Humean interpretation of Aristotle. For
Hume, the end of an action is determined by passions whereas reason is concerned with finding
out the most suitable means to achieve this end. Thus, reason, for Hume, is only a slave of
passion. It cannot pretend to serve any higher office. Taylor too observes,
The function of reason in Hume's theory is the discerning of the relations between ideas,
which in the practical sphere amounts to deliberation; reason can determine that if a
certain thing is done, a certain outcome will result, or that if such and such is to be
achieved, such and such must be done, but reason itself is incapable of determining that
a given end is to be pursued.11

But Allan reacts against this Humean interpretation of Aristotle. He cites enough textual
references and shows that phronesis is not restricted to skill in deliberation towards a
predetermined end but it includes a correct conception of that end itself. According to him, not
only the means to achieve an end but the determination of end falls under the purview of
practical wisdom. If that is the case then aren't ethical actions and ethical life turn to be
random and ambiguous? This is because even if the ends remain fixed we can say that some

9Copi, Irving M, Carl Cohen and Kenneth MacMohan. Introduction to Logic, (New York:
Routledge, 2016), 207.

10 Reeve, C.D.C. Aristotle on Practical Wisdom Nicomachean Ethics VI, (London: Harvard
University Press, 2013), 8.
11 Taylor, C.C.W. Pleasure, Mind, and Soul, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 208.
 9

trace of universality can be found. But if the end too is context-dependent and varies according
to the situation, then the problem becomes further difficult even to intervene into. But does
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics support relativism in ethics? Are ethical actions completely
random for Aristotle? To solve such doubts we need to give a closer look on the purpose or
teleos behind ethical life.

4. Teleos in Aristotle: Eudaimonia

"Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some
good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim."
( NE Book I 1094a1-a5). Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics begins with the above sentence. This
"good" has further been elaborated in the upcoming passages of the text. If one desires to
understand Aristotle's ethical outlook he must have an in-depth understanding of the term
"good" as used by him in the text. MacIntyre proposes three viewpoints of understanding the
term "good". Firstly, "good" can't be dependent on subjective considerations. It presupposes a
sort of universal agreement when it is accepted as a standard by the people. A cricket bat
would be considered good when it is generally accepted by the cricketers as good and it would
cease to be good when such agreement is absent. Secondly, if an object is good, it necessarily
follows from the definition that the object is the object of desire. Such relationships are not
contingent, they are characterized by necessity. Thirdly, if actions are not motivated towards
attainment of good then we need to work on the definition of good.
The definition of good requires us to ponder over the nature of the hierarchy of goods and seek
for ourselves the highest or the supreme good. Now, what is this supreme good? Aristotle
himself makes it clear when he says, " If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we
desire for its own sake and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else,
clearly this must be the good and the chief good." (NE 1094 a 20-26) Most of the objects in our
day-to-day life like money, power, honor etc are desired for the sake of something else but this
supreme good is desired not for anything else but for itself. This, according to him, is happiness
or Eudaimonia. Virtues are the means for attaining this end. Happiness is never desired for the
sake of something else. It can be desired only for itself. Happiness is self-sufficient and thus it
qualifies to be the supreme good.
If Eudaimonia is one of the essential features of Aristotelian ethics, the other important feature
is the doctrine of the Golden Mean. It states that we need to take the mean between two
extremes. Virtue lies in meticulously choosing this mean. Aristotle himself gives a list of some of
those means in his Nicomachean Ethics. Courage is the mean between rashness and cowardice.
Liberality is the mean between prodigality and meanness. Modesty is the mean between
bashfulness and shamelessness. With regard to honor and dishonor, mean lies in proper pride,
the excess being empty vanity and the deficient being undue humility. Many of the excess and
the deficient states are nameless, for example in case of anger etc, but nevertheless, they do
exist. It may seem to us that here, at last, we found the Universality in the Aristotelian ethical
 10

framework that we were desperately searching for so long. If Eudaimonia is the end and Golden
Mean is the required method to attain that end then ethical actions become completely
determined. But is that so? We need to wait a bit before making this hasty generalization.

Maclntyre points out that this mean, which has been called Golden Mean, is subjective and
situation-dependent. He says," Aristotle does not, as he might seem to, think that there is one
and only one right choice of emotion or action, independent of circumstances. What is courage
in one situation would in another be rashness and in third cowardice." 12 The mean is subjective,
as it involves deliberation by an agent and such deliberation can't be made immune to
circumstances. Again, Eudaimonia is the ultimate end to be attained but it seems too distant a
goal and there seems a lack of clarity regarding the requisite methodology for its attainment.
Can such a distant goal determine ethical actions in our day to day life? Can Eudaimonia guide
any moral agent to make decision when concrete situation emerges with all its particularity and
uniqueness? If such questions are answered in the affirmative, then we can say that a kind of a
rough sketch of Qualified Universal has been formulated. On the other hand, if such questions
are answered in the negative then we can say that there is much ambiguity in Aristotelian
ethics. But the next sction would clearly remove these amiguities and bring us closer to the
formulation of qualified ethical universals.

5. Definitions and Prohibitions

Carla Davia argues against the claims of Aristotelian scholars that descriptive and prescriptive
ethical judgments for Aristotle only hold true for most of the part and exceptionless
generalizations in ethical matters are impossible. He instead points out that Aristotle spends a
considerable amount of time formulating appropriate definitions of different virtues. Further,
these definitions are not nominal. Rather they try to grasp the essential features of these
ethical phenomena and these can be applied universally irrespective of situations. Davia takes
three such definitions from Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics:
Happiness is some activity of the soul in accordance with complete virtue. (EN I.13, 1102a5-6; cf.
EE II.1, 1219a38-9)
[Ethical] virtue is a habit of choice, being in a mean relative to us, determined by
logos and as a practically wise person would determine it. (EN II.6, 1106b26-
1107a2; cf. EE II.10, 1227b8-10)

Choice would be a deliberative desire for things in our power.(EN III.3, 1113a10, cf. EE II.10,
1226b16-17)

12 Maclntyre, Alasdair. A Short History of Ethics (London: Routledge, 1967), 104.

 11
1

Happiness, virtue, and choice defined here are said to hold universally and there is no reason
why they should hold only for "most part". Further, prohibitions in Aristotle are also universal.
Though he aspires for mean in virtue, in some cases prohibitions are explicit. He outrightly
rejects any possibility of mean in case of envy, jealously etc. Such passions are universally
condemned.
But not every action nor every passion admits of a mean; for some have names that
already imply badness, e.g. shamelessness, envy, and in the case of actions adultery,
theft, murder; for all of these and such like things imply by their names that they are
themselves bad, and not the excesses or deficiencies of them. It is not possible, then,
ever to be right with regard to them; one must always be wrong. ( NE VII 3758)
Jesus Vega opines that the conception of Aristotelian ethics as a "paradigm of a non-
deontological conception"13 needs to be rectified.This is because the Aristotelian account of law
gives us contradictory evidence to this claim. Aristotle postulates a set of general laws and he
considers them essential for the proper organization and functioning of the city-state. However,
such laws are practical rules and need to be distinguished from theoretical rules. Vega in fact
makes distinctions between four different types of universals. They are logical universality,
axiological universality, naturalist universality, and practical universality. Rules fall under the
domain of practical universality. In the previous sections, an elaborate distinction between
theoretical and practical has already been made. Also, the essential attributes of practical
rationality have been highlighted. Vega too opines that Aristotle "establishes a conclusive limit
to any formalist or logicist understanding of legal rules"14.
Formulating precise definitions of the categories comprise one of the essential aspects of
Aristotle, whose traces can be found spread across his voluminous writings. Davia points out
this in his paper one by one. A definition is made by abstracting general points from several
particulars. It highlights the essence found in discrete cases. A definition implies a sort of
universality and those who don't believe in universals won't attempt to formulate a definition.
But in Aristotle we see considerable attention is spent in "developing, clarifying, and confirming
of universal definitions,and ethical rules are determined in light of the relevant definitions.” To
begin with he makes a distinction between nominal definition and essential definition. The
nominal definition captures the essential features of a thing. From this nominal definition one
goes on gradually building the essential definition. This is the approach followed in Book I of
Nicomachean Ethics where Aristotle inquires about the nature of supreme good and claims that
it is none other than happiness. In the subsequent books too he goes on defining courage,
temperance, friendship, pleasure and pain etc. Such definitions can in no way be considered

13 Davia, Carlo. "Universality in Aristotle's Ethics."Journal of the History of Philosophy." (2016),54

(2):181
14 Vega, Jesús. “Aristotle on Practical Rules, Universality, and the Law.” (2013), 2.
 12

static and comprehensive. Rather they are preliminary or nominal definitions. As Davia
maintains, the entirety of Nicomachean ethics is "concerned first and foremost with developing
universal definitions of ethical concepts."15

Even Nussbaum too had to mention Aristotle's commitment to giving definitions of excellence
though she thinks that such definitions are "not necessarily incompatible with his claim that
ethical reasoning is not and cannot be an episteme or techne." 300 Aristotle formulates these
definitions by seeking similarities among several individuals. To make the matter more precise
we take the definition of an ethical virtue namely "pride"
I mean, e.g., if we were to seek what pride is we should inquire, in the case of some
proud men we know, what one thing they all have as such. E.g. if Alcibiades is proud,
and Achilles and Ajax, what one thing do they all have?

-- Posterior Analytics II.13, 97b15-20

That definition is always universal and one should proceed from particular to universal is also
mentioned by him.
Every definition is always universal; for the doctor does not say what is healthy in the
case of some individual eye, but either in the case of every eye, or determining some
species of eye. And it is easier to define the particular than the universal—that is why
one should cross from the particulars to the universals.
-- Posterior Analytics II.13, 97b25-30
From these universal definitions, Aristotle goes on to derive a number of prescriptive and
descriptive judgments. Only some of them hold true for the most part, others hold true always.
The set of prohibitions falls in the latter part. Negative commands hold true always. He
explicitly states that envy, adultery etc are always wrong. For those judgments which hold true
for the most part, such provisions have only been kept to increase the scope of the judgment
and make it more comprehensive. It doesn't mean that there is uncertainty and randomness
with respect to each and every issue in ethical matters. Neither does it mean that everything
can be justified in the name of "concreteness of ultimate particulars." As Davia says, " It is
possible for an account to be necessarily true and yet possess some degree of inexactness."
16Aristotelian account of ethics is such an account. As is evident from our discussions in the

previous sections, universals in the case of natural and mathematical science and in the case of
ethical actions need to be different. So our search for universals in Nicomachean Ethics needs
to be more of a qualified and refined nature.

6. Contentions of Gadamer and Heidegger Refuted

15Davia, Carlo. "Universality in Aristotle's Ethics."Journal of the History of Philosophy." 2016,54

(2):193
16 Ibid
 13
1

Hans Georg Gadamer(1900-2002) was a German philosopher who played a decisive role in the
development of 20th-century philosophical hermeneutics. He is also remembered for his
innovative engagement with Plato and Aristotle. In Gadamer, we see the propensity of linking
phronesis and Aristotelian ethics with his hermeneutical project. He relates Aristotle’s
description of ethical phenomena to the hermeneutical investigation. Phronesis, according to
him, offers a kind of model of hermeneutics. This is because both concern the relationship
between the universal and the particular. According to Gadamer, a moral agent in the
Aristotelian ethical framework always needs to " determine what the concrete situation asks of
him"17 Thus, general rules or laws though referred to are never prioritized over particular
situations. This is exactly akin to hermeneutics because "hermeneutical problem too is clearly
distinct from "pure" knowledge detached from any particular kind of being."18 Interpretation of
a text is itself a historical process and it depends on the historical situatedness of the
interpreter just like a moral act depends on the concreteness and particularity of the situation.
Gadamer says that the distinction made by Aristotle between mathematical knowledge and
moral knowledge is quite clear and hermeneutics is aligned with the second rather than the
first.

Further, moral knowledge is also distinguished from techne. This is because the making of
objects is different from making of oneself. Further, techne can be learned and forgotten. But
this is not the case with moral knowledge. The application of moral knowledge for him appears
to be problematic because " we can only apply something that we already have, but we do not
possess moral knowledge in such a way that we already have it and then apply it to the specific
situation."19 Moral knowledge demands action and that too in the immediacy and the
spontaneity of the situation. Application in hermeneutics does not consist in " relating some pre
given universal to the particular situation" and it is " neither a subsequent nor merely an
occasional part of the phenomenon of understanding, but codetermines as a whole from the
beginning."20 Gadamer opines that in the interpretation of any text it should not be thought of
as something which has already been given to us objectively and universally. Interpretation can
never be made independent of the context and situatedness of the interpreter. He also
comments that interpretation should not be frozen at some particular point in time and if need
arises then a radical departure should be made from the canonical interpretation.
While Gadamer makes interesting points about Aristotelian ethics, his main interest lies in
hermeneutics. He invokes Aristotle at this juncture only to justify his hermeneutical approach.
So, we should be careful enough while reading Gadamer.Gadamer would outrightly reject any
claim of universality in Nicomachean ethics. But If we go by Gadamer's viewpoint then we need

17 Gadamer, Hans-Georg.Truth and Method, (London: Continuum, 2004), 311.

18 Ibid
19 Ibid, 315.
20 Ibid, 321.
 14
1

to desert our findings which we made in the earlier sections of the paper. Nevertheless, he
remains an influential commentator on Aristotle.
Martin Heidegger(1889-1976) was an influential German philosopher who made enormous
contributions to existentialism and phenomenology. His book "Being and Time" had a great
impact on continental philosophy. He is also known for his creative interpretation of Greek
thinkers. In order to explain phronesis and Aristotelian ethics, Heidegger makes use of
phenomenological apparatus. According to him, phronesis is a mode of orienting oneself
towards the world and of "caring-seeing-knowing". He makes distinctions between phronesis,
techne and episteme in an unusual manner. If techne is the predisposition towards objects and
episteme towards eternal principles, phronesis is concerned with the life of oneself and others.
Heidegger emphasizes that phronesis is intricately linked with "being in the world".

Being-in-the-world is the recurrent theme in Heidegger's relational ontology. It holds that the
world is a large-scale network of interconnected objects having relational significance.
Heidegger invokes the notion of Dasein to understand and explain phronesis. Daniel Smith
draws many parallels between Heidegger's understanding of Aristotle and his Being and Time.
One among them is the question of authentic existence. Phronesis, according to Heidegger, is
the proper way of being and engaging in the world. As Daniel Smith observes,
We might even describe Being and Time's call to authentic being-in-the-world as a call
to cultivate a "phronetic ethos," an ethos the disclosive movements of which seek to
retrieve Dasein from its inauthentic dispersion in the "they-ness" of the everyday world
and gather it into an authentic being-whole.21
Though Heidegger should be credited for his unique and creative interpretation of phronesis,
this appears to be far removed from the traditional understanding of the term. In his eagerness
to find connections between phronesis and the ontology of Dasein, Heidegger treads through
the paths unknown to the ancient Greeks. Thus, both Heidegger and Gadamer interpret
Nicomachean Ethics in line with their own philosophical projects and it has little to do with the
original interpretations of Aristotle.

7. Qualified Universal in Aristotle

From our discussions in previous sections, we are now in a position to provide a rough
definition of qualified universal found in Aristotelian ethics. Earlier we maintained that
universal in moral matters is bound to be different from universal in natural and mathematical
sciences. Thus, the search for universal in Nicomachean ethics is a search for qualified universal.
Again, qualified universal is constituted of two elements. They are- the qualificative constituent

Smith, Daniel L. "Intensifying Phronesis: Heidegger, Aristotle, and Rhetorical Culture."

21

Philosophy & Rhetoric, 2003, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2003), pp. 92

 15
1

of qualified universal and its non-qualificative constituent. The particularity and concreteness of
a situation, which makes it different from other situations is an aspect of the non-qualificative
part. Whereas there are aspects of a situation that are identical to other such situations.
Highlighting the concrete and particular aspect, Nussbaum claims that Aristotle is against laws
in moral matters. But it runs contrary to his approach followed in Nicomachean and Eudemian
Ethics. In fact, Aristotle spends a considerable amount of time formulating and appropriating
his definitions in these two books.

That Aristotle is against randomness is further contradicted by the fact that both the means and
the end of actions are fixed and already determined. The ultimate end to be achieved is
Eudaimonia. It is the final goal and all the actions should be directed toward it. Further, the
mean taken is the Golden Mean. It is suggested that this mean would vary from person and
person as it is dependent upon subjective interests. But Aristotle prohibits many actions
altogether. Envy, jealousy and some such mental states are prohibited under all circumstances.
They are not situation dependent.
Aristotle said that some ethical propositions hold true for the most part. From this the
statements like " All ethical propositions hold true for the most part" or " There isn't any ethical
proposition which holds true at all times" can't be logically deduced. In fact if they are indeed
deduced then they violate the fundamental rules of formal logic. This is because such
conclusions are based on wrong equivalence of four kinds of categorical proposition: A, E, I and
O. These statements in formal logic stands for Universal Affirmative, Universal Negative,
Particular Affirmative and Particular Negative Propositions respectively and they can never be
equivalent. Nussbaum, stressing on the particularity and concreteness wants to make us
believe that Aristotle us against formulating rules. But we can’t agree with her contention
taking into account the greater framework of Aristotle’s philosophy.It is true that Aristotle
highlights the particular and concrete aspects of a situation but it is only to make the law more
encompassing and the outlook more comprehensive. The comments of Aristotle in his book
should not be taken as a criticism of ethical universals and call for abandoning of structures.
Rather it is a call against the crystallization of rigid structures and taking account of the
situational particularities.

Conclusion
The paper is a defence of universality in ethics in context of the Aristotelian framework.
Modern interpreters of Aristotle have found great support of non-universality in Nicomachean
ethics. Prominent hermeneuticians, phenomenologists and post structuralists have folllowed
this suit. We argue that such interpretation is bound to be mistaken if we take account of his
vast corpus of writings. We, however, foucus here only on Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle spent
considerable amount of his time giving definitions of the various vitues. One can proceed to
formulate definitions only when he has some belief in universality. This is beacuse a definition is
formed by abstracting generalities from various particulars. Also Aristotle has a long list of
 16

prohibitions. These prohibitions hold true always and don’t admit of any exceptions. Aristotle
infact highlights the difference between theoretical and practical knowledge. Such distinctions
are crucial and should be readily accepted by anybody. Unlike inferential deductions in
theoretical knowledge, practical rationality demands actions to be performed by the moral
agent. Practical syllogism is necessarily different from theoretical ones and so universals in
moral matters should be a search for qualified universal. Our convictions are further
strengthened by the fact that Aristotelian ethics is driven towards some purpose or teleos and
hence they can’t be random. Eudaimonia is the ultimate goal to be attained and our actions
should be aligned. Aristotle, in his book, highlights the concreteness and particularities of the
situations, which Nussbaum makes more explicit in her writings. But such criticisms are made
only to increase the scope of our laws. It is to make our make our outlook more comprehensive
and the laws more encompassing. Aristotle’s comments can never be taken as a call of
abandoning structures because if taken in that way it would be inconsistent with his wider
philosophical framework.

Bibliography

Aristotle, and Jonathan Barnes. The complete works of Aristotle: the revised Oxford translation.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984.
Nussbaum, Martha.C.The Fragility of Goodness, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1986.
Gadamer, Hans-Georg.Truth and Method, London: Continuum, 2004.

Reeve, C.D.C. Aristotle on Practical Wisdom Nicomachean Ethics VI, London: Harvard University
Press, 2013.
Russell, Daniel. The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2014.

Taylor, C.C.W. Pleasure, Mind, and Soul, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Maclntyre, Alasdair. Whose Justice? Which Rationality? , Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1998.
Maclntyre, Alasdair. A Short History of Ethics, London: Routledge, 1967.

Copi, Irving M, Carl Cohen and Kenneth MacMohan. Introduction to Logic, New York: Routledge,
2016.
Russell, Bertrand. History of Western Philosophy, New York: Routledge, 2004.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason, London: Penguin, 2007.
Thilly, Frank. A History of Philosophy, New Delhi: Books and Books Published, 2019.
 17
1

Smith, Daniel L. "Intensifying Phronesis: Heidegger, Aristotle, and Rhetorical Culture."

Philosophy & Rhetoric, 2003, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2003), pp. 77-102
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40238138

Davia, Carlo. "Universality in Aristotle's Ethics."Journal of the History of Philosophy." 2016,54

(2):181-201.
Vega, Jesús. “Aristotle on Practical Rules, Universality, and the Law.” (2013).
Gowans, Chris, "Moral Relativism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2021 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/moral-relativism/>.