CASE DIGESTS No.

1. Makati StockExchange vs. Miguel V. Campos GR No. 138814, April 16, 2009

DOCTRINE:Right and obligation are legal terms with specific legal meaning. A right is a
claim or title to an interest in anything whatsoever that is enforceable by law. An
obligation is defined in the Civil Code as a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to
do. For every right enjoyed by any person, there is a corresponding obligation on the
part of another person to respect such right.

An obligation is a juridical relation whereby a person (called the creditor) may demand
from another (called the debtor) the observance of a determinative conduct (the giving,
doing or not doing), and in case of breach, may demand satisfaction from the assets of
the latter.

The Civil Code enumerates the sources of obligations:

Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:

(1) Law;

(2) Contracts;

(3) Quasi-contracts;

(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and

(5) Quasi-delicts.

CASE TITLE:Makati StockExchange vs. Miguel V. Campos GR No. 138814, April 16,
2009

FACTS:

SEC Case No. 02-94-4678 was instituted on 10 February 1994 by respondent Miguel V.
Campos, who filed with the Securities, Investigation and Clearing Department (SICD) of
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), a Petition against herein petitioners
Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. (MKSE) and MKSE directors, Ma. Vivian Yuchengco,
Adolfo M. Duarte, Myron C. Papa, Norberto C. Nazareno, George Uy-Tioco, Antonio A,
Lopa, Ramon B. Arnaiz, Luis J.L. Virata, and Antonio Garcia, Jr. Respondent, in said
Petition, sought: (1) the nullification of the Resolution dated 3 June 1993 of the MKSE
Board of Directors, which allegedly deprived him of his right to participate equally in the
allocation of Initial Public Offerings (IPO) of corporations registered with MKSE; (2) the
delivery of the IPO shares he was allegedly deprived of, for which he would pay IPO
prices; and (3) the payment of ₱2 million as moral damages, ₱1 million as exemplary
damages, and ₱500,000.00 as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

On 14 February 1994, the SICD issued an Order granting respondent’s prayer for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin petitioners from implementing or
enforcing the 3 June 1993 Resolution of the MKSE Board of Directors.

The SICD subsequently issued another Order on 10 March 1994 granting respondent’s
application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, to continuously enjoin, during the
pendency of SEC Case No. 02-94-4678, the implementation or enforcement of the
MKSE Board Resolution in question. Petitioners assailed this SICD Order dated 10
March 1994 in a Petition for Certiorari filed with the SEC en banc, docketed as SEC-EB
No. 393.

On 11 March 1994, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss respondent’s Petition in SEC

Case No. 02-94-4678, based on the following grounds: (1) the Petition became moot
due to the cancellation of the license of MKSE; (2) the SICD had no jurisdiction over the
Petition; and (3) the Petition failed to state a cause of action.

The SICD denied petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss in an Order dated 4 May 1994.
Petitioners again challenged the 4 May 1994 Order of SICD before the SEC en banc
through another Petition for Certiorari, docketed as SEC-EB No. 403.

In an Order dated 31 May 1995 in SEC-EB No. 393, the SEC en banc nullified the 10
March 1994 Order of SICD in SEC Case No. 02-94-4678 granting a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction in favor of respondent. Likewise, in an Order dated 14 August 1995 in SEC-
EB No. 403, the SEC en banc annulled the 4 May 1994 Order of SICD in SEC Case No.
02-94-4678 denying petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss, and accordingly ordered the
dismissal of respondent’s Petition before the SICD.

Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the Orders
of the SEC en banc dated 31 May 1995 and 14 August 1995 in SEC-EB No. 393 and
SEC-EB No. 403, respectively. Respondent’s Petition before the appellate court was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 38455.

On 11 February 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
38455, granting respondent’s Petition for Certiorari.

ISSUES:SICD may render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of said
Petition.

HELD:There is no question that the Petition in SEC Case No. 02-94-4678 asserts a
right in favor of respondent, particularly, respondent’s alleged right to subscribe to the
IPOs of corporations listed in the stock market at their offering prices; and stipulates the
correlative obligation of petitioners to respect respondent’s right, specifically, by
continuing to allow respondent to subscribe to the IPOs of corporations listed in the
stock market at their offering prices.

However, the terms right and obligation in respondent’s Petition are not magic words
that would automatically lead to the conclusion that such Petition sufficiently states a
cause of action. Right and obligation are legal terms with specific legal meaning. A right
is a claim or title to an interest in anything whatsoever that is enforceable by law.  An
obligation is defined in the Civil Code as a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to
do. For every right enjoyed by any person, there is a corresponding obligation on the
part of another person to respect such right.

An obligation is a juridical relation whereby a person (called the creditor) may demand
from another (called the debtor) the observance of a determinative conduct (the giving,
doing or not doing), and in case of breach, may demand satisfaction from the assets of
the latter.

The Civil Code enumerates the sources of obligations:

Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:

(1) Law;

(2) Contracts;

(3) Quasi-contracts;

(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and

(5) Quasi-delicts.

Therefore, an obligation imposed on a person, and the corresponding right granted to

another, must be rooted in at least one of these five sources. The mere assertion of a
right and claim of an obligation in an initiatory pleading, whether a Complaint or Petition,
without identifying the basis or source thereof, is merely a conclusion of fact and law. A
pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to the rights of action or defense
asserted, as distinguished from mere conclusions of fact or conclusions of law.Thus, a
Complaint or Petition filed by a person claiming a right to the Office of the President of
this Republic, but without stating the source of his purported right, cannot be said to
have sufficiently stated a cause of action. Also, a person claiming to be the owner of a
parcel of land cannot merely state that he has a right to the ownership thereof, but must
likewise assert in the Complaint either a mode of acquisition of ownership or at least a
certificate of title in his name.

In the case at bar, although the Petition in SEC Case No. 02-94-4678 does allege
respondent’s right to subscribe to the IPOs of corporations listed in the stock market at
their offering prices, and petitioners’ obligation to continue respecting and observing
such right, the Petition utterly failed to lay down the source or basis of respondent’s right
and/or petitioners’ obligation.

Accordingly, the instant Petition should be granted. The Petition in SEC Case No. 02-
94-4678 should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. It does not matter
that the SEC en banc, in its Order dated 14 August 1995 in SEC-EB No. 403,
overstepped its bounds by not limiting itself to the issue of whether respondent’s
Petition before the SICD sufficiently stated a cause of action. The SEC en banc may
have been mistaken in considering extraneous evidence in granting petitioners’ Motion
to Dismiss, but its discussion thereof are merely superfluous and obiter dictum. In the
main, the SEC en banc did correctly dismiss the Petition in SEC Case No. 02-94-4678
for its failure to state the basis for respondent’s alleged right, to wit:

Private respondent Campos has failed to establish the basis or authority for his alleged
right to participate equally in the IPO allocations of the Exchange. He cited paragraph
11 of the amended articles of incorporation of the Exchange in support of his position
but a careful reading of the said provision shows nothing therein that would bear out his
claim. The provision merely created the position of chairman emeritus of the Exchange
but it mentioned nothing about conferring upon the occupant thereof the right to receive
IPO allocations.With the dismissal of respondent’s Petition in SEC Case No. 02-94-
4678, there is no more need for this Court to resolve the propriety of the issuance by
SCID of a writ of preliminary injunction in said case.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
11 February 1997 and its Resolution dated 18 May 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 38455 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated 31 May 1995 and 14 August 1995 of
the Securities and Exchange Commission en banc in SEC-EB Case No. 393 and No.
403, respectively, are hereby reinstated. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

MINITAV.CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

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CASE DIGESTS No. 5

CKH Industrial and Devt Corp vs. CA, GR. No. 111890, May 7, 1997

DOCTRINE:“Article 1279. In order that compensation may be proper, it isnecessary:(1)

That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at the same time a
principalcreditoroftheother;The requirements of conventional compensation are (1) that
each of the parties can dispose of the credit he seeks to compensate, and (2) that they
agreetothemutualextinguishmentoftheircredits.In the instant case, there can be no valid
compensation of the purchase price with the obligations of Cheng Kim Heng reflected in
the promissory notes, for the reason that CKH and Century-Well the principal
contracting parties, are not mutually bound as creditors and debtors in their own name.

CASE TITLE:CKH Industrial and Devt Corp vs. CA, GR. No. 111890, May 7, 1997

FACTS:Cheng Kim Heng (Cheng), an immigrant of Chinese descent, was the owner of
CKH, a corporation established under Philippine law. CKH corporation owns two parce
of land located in Karuhatan, Valenzuela, and covered by TCT Nos, 8710 and 8711 in
Caloocan City. Cheng Kim Heng was married to Wah, and they had three children Kei,
Choi, and Yam. After Cheng immigrated to the Philippines, he married Rubi Saw.
Cheng brought his first family to the Philippines and they became Filipino Citizens.
Heng died in 1984. Upon Cheng’s death, control over the corporation CKH was
transferred to Rubi Saw,Cheng’ssecondwife.On May 9, 1988 Rubi Saw executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale whereby Rubi Saw, representing CKH corporation agreed to sell
the subject properties to Century- Well, a corporation owned in part by Lourdes
Chong(the wife of Cheng’s son Kei),Kei,andChoi.Both vendor and vendee agreed that
payment would be in a form of manager’s check. Nevertheless, a certain Uy Chi Kim,
representing the vendees managed to persuade Rubi to sign the Deed of Absolute Sale
in consideration of a personal check and P 20,000 cash. He assured Rubi that there
was no cause for her to worry as he was certain he would have the entire amount ready
by the next day when the banks would be open. Rubi in turn surrendered the TCTs to
Chong.
The pertinent portions of the Deed of Sale are hereby reproduced:
WITNESSETH:That for and in consideration of the sum of EIGHT HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P800,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, paid by VENDEE to
VENDOR, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by the latter to its entire
satisfaction, said VENDOR, by these presents, has SOLD, CEDED, TRANSFERRED,
and CONVEYED by way of absolute sale unto said VENDEE, its successors and
assigns, the two parcels of land above described and any and all improvements therein;
Rubi Saw signed on behalf of CKH, while Lourdes Chong signed for Century Well.The
document was notarized the day after the parties signed the same, i. e., March 9, 1988.
Thereafter, Rubi communicated to the vendees for the payment. Demand letters were
sent to them but they refused to pay, this prompting Rubi to file a Complaint for the
annulment of the Deed of Sale for lack of consideration, and injunction to restrain the
Registry of Deeds from registering the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the defendant
vendees.During thetrial,defendantvendeescontendedthat:“the consideration for the two
parcels of land was paid by means of off-setting or legal compensation in the amount of
P700,000 thru alleged promissory notes executed by Cheng Kim Heng in favor of his
sons Choi and Keik, and payment of P 100,000.00 in cash. They claim that the Deed of
Sale does not express the true agreement of the parties, specifically with regard to the
mode of payment and that it was a culmination of mediation of dispute of the first and
second families of Cheng Kim Heng. They alleged that during the operation of plaintiff
CKH, the latter borrowed from Choi Kei the total sum of P 700,000.00.

Uy Chi Kim, on the other hand, answered on his behalf, that his only participation in the
transaction was as a mediator, he being one of the closest friends of Cheng Kim Heng
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision finding that the annulment of the Deed of
Absolute Sale was merited, as there was no payment of the stipulated consideration for
thesaleoftherealpropertiesinvolvedtoRubiSaw.
Court of Appeals reversed the findings and pronouncements of the trial court and found
that there was indeed payment of the purchase price, partially in cash for P100,000.00
and partially by compensation by off-setting the debt of Cheng Kim Heng to his sons
Choi and Kei for P500,000.00 and P200,000.00 respectively, against the remainder of
the stipulated price. Such mode of payment is recognized under Article 1249 of the Civil
Code.

ISSUES:Was there a valid compensation of the obligations of Cheng Kim Heng to his
sons with the purchase priceof the sale? Was there a valid compensation of the
obligations of Cheng Kim Heng to his sons with the purchase price of the sale?

HELD:The foregoing stipulation is clear enough in manifesting the vendor’s admission

of receipt of purchase price, thereby lending sufficient, though reluctant to the private
respondents’ submission that payment had been made by off setting P700,000.00 of the
purchase price with the obligation of Cheng Kim Heng to his sons Choi and Kei. By
signing the Deed of Absolute Sale, petitioner Rubi Saw given her imprimatur to the
provisions of the deed, and she cannot now the challenge its veracity, however, this
does not mean the transaction of Sale was valid.

Agreements affecting the civil relationship of the contracting parties must come under
the scrutiny of the provisions of law existing and effective at the time of the execution of
the contract.We refer particularly to the provisions of the law on compensation as a
mode of extinguishment of obligations. Under Article 1231 of the Civil Code, an
obligation may be extinguished:One of the modes of extinguishment of obligations
under Article 1231 of the Civil Code is bycompensation“Article 1279. In order that
compensation may be proper, it isnecessary:(1) That each one of the obligors be bound
principally, and that he be at the same time a principalcreditoroftheother;The
requirements of conventional compensation are (1) that each of the parties can dispose
of the credit he seeks to compensate, and (2) that they
agreetothemutualextinguishmentoftheircredits.In the instant case, there can be no valid
compensation of the purchase price with the obligations of Cheng Kim Heng reflected in
the promissory notes, for the reason that CKH and Century-Well the principal
contracting parties, are not mutually bound as creditors and debtors in their own name.
A close scrutiny of the promissory notes does not indicate the late Cheng, as then
president of CKH, acknowledging any indebtedness to Century-Well. As worded, the
promissory notes reveal CKH’s indebtedness to Choi and Kei.
Their interest in the promissory notes cannot be off-set against the obligations between
CKH and Century-Well arising out of the deed of absolute sale, absent any allegation,
much less, even a scintilla of substantiation, that Choi and Kei’s interest in Century-Well
are so considerable as to merit a declaration of unity of their civil personalities. Under
present law, corporations, such as Century-Well, have personalities separate and
distinct from their stockholders, except only when the law sees it fit to pierce the veil of
corporate identity, particularly when the corporate fiction is shown to be used to defeat
public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime, or where a corporation
the mere alter ego or business conduit of a person.

In fact, there is no indication at all, that such indebtedness was contracted by Cheng
from Choi and Kei as stockholders of Century-Well. Choi and Kei, in turn, are not parties
to the Deed of Absolute Sale. They are merely stockholders of Century-Well, and as
such, are not bound principally, not even in a representative capacity, in the contract of
sale. Thus, their interest in the promissory notes cannot be off-set against the
obligations between CKH and Century-Well arising out of the deed of absolute sale,
absent any allegation, much less, even a scintilla of substantiation, that Choi and Kei’s
interest in Century-Well are so considerable as to merit a declaration of unity of their
civil personalities. Under present law, corporations, such as Century-Well, have
personalities separate and distinct from their stockholders, except only when the law
sees it fit to pierce the veil of corporate identity, particularly when the corporate fiction is
shown to be used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend
crime, or where a corporation the mere alter ego or business conduit of a person. The
Court cannot, in this instance make such a ruling absent a demonstration of the merit of
such a disposition.
Considering the foregoing premises, the Court finds it proper to grant the prayer for
rescission of the subject deed of sale, for failure of consideration.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court hereby RESOLVED to GRANT the present petition. The
decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 21, 1993, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 173 dated
February 4, 1991, is hereby REINSTATED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of
moral damages and attorney’s fees to Rubi Saw, and the order for payment of costs are
DELETED.
The parties shall bear their respective costs.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red

SOORDERED.Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

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CASE DIGEST No. 20:

5. PNB vs. Heirs of Estanislao Militar, GR. No. 164801, June 30, 2006

DOCTRINE:Banks are expected to exercise more care and prudence than private
individuals in their dealings, even those involving registered lands, for their business is
affected with public interestin the exercise of due diligence required of a banking
institution, to be considered as mortgagee in good faith.

To be considered buyers in good faith. A buyer could have verified the status of the
property they were buying by inquiring from the possessors thereof.

As to the right to file an action for reconveyance on the ground that the certificate of title
was obtained by means of a fictitious deed of sale is virtually an action for the
declaration of its nullity, which does not prescribe.

CASE TITLE:PNB vs. Heirs of Estanislao Militar, GR. No. 164801, June 30, 2006
FACTS:Deogracias, Glicerio, Tomas and Caridad, all surnamed Militar, were heirs of
Estanislao Militar and the registered co-owners of Lot Nos. 3011 and 3017 covered by
OCT No. T-8238-A (0-16879) and OCT No. 94-(0-16878).

On August 16, 1941, Deogracias sold his undivided share in Lot No. 3011 to Pedro
Golez, and in Lot No. 3017 to spouses Sofronio and Lourdes Lumagbas. Golez
annotated the sale at the back of the title thereof while spouses Lumagbas caused the
subdivision of Lot No. 3017 into Lot No. 3017-A and Lot No. 3017-B, with Lot No. 3017-
A registered in their names under TCT No. 8239.

Notwithstanding the sale, Deogracias continued to occupy a portion of Lot No. 3011 and
Lot No. 3017-B until his death on March 17, 1964. Glicerio died on March 22, 1939,
Tomas on August 20, 1959 and Caridad on April 29, 1957. Glicerio and Caridad died
without issue. Deogracias was survived by Teodorico and Remedios, while Tomas was
survived by Wenceslao and Ladislao.

However, in a Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 24, 1975, Deogracias, Glicerio, Tomas
and Caridad purportedly sold Lot No. 3011 to spouses Rodolfo and Nilda Jalbuna. In
another Deed of Sale dated April 25, 1975, Glicerio, Tomas and Caridad purportedly
sold Lot No. 3017-B to the same spouses. Consequently, titles to Lot Nos. 3011 and
3017-B were cancelled and new titles, TCT Nos. 39083 and 39082, respectively, were
issued to spouses Jalbuna.

Subsequently, Lot No. 3011 was subdivided into Lot No. 3011-A and Lot No. 3011-B,
with Lot No. 3011-A registered in the name of spouses Jalbuna and Lot No. 3011-B in
the name of Golez.

On June 5, 1975, spouses Jalbuna mortgaged Lot No. 3017-B to Philippine National
Bank (PNB) as security for a loan. When they defaulted, PNB extrajudicially foreclosed
the mortgage and sold Lot No. 3017-B at public auction, with PNB as the highest bidder.
Title thereto was consolidated in the name of PNB and was issued TCT No. T-61465.
Thereafter, PNB sold the lot to spouses Johnny and Nona Lucero, who were issued
TCT No. 76938. As the new owners of Lot No. 3017-B, they filed an ejectment case
against Tranquilina, Azucena, Freddie and Eduardo, all surnamed Militar, the actual
occupants therein.

On October 2, 1989, Tranquilina, Azucena, Freddie and Eduardo as surviving heirs of

Teodorico and Deogracias Militar, filed a complaint against spouses Jalbuna, PNB, and
spouses Lucero for Reconveyance of Title, Annulment of Sale, Cancellation of Titles
and Damages. Other heirs of Deogracias on the side of Remedios filed a complaint-in-
intervention to join the plaintiffs. They prayed for: 1) the declaration of nullity of the two
(2) deeds of sale dated April 24, 1975 and April 25, 1975 covering Lot No. 3011 and Lot
No. 3017-B, respectively; 2) the cancellation of title covering Lot No. 3017-B in the
name of spouses Lucero; 3) the cancellation of title covering Lot No. 3011-A in the
name of spouses Jalbuna; 4) the reconveyance of Lot 3011-A and Lot No. 3017-B to
the heirs of Deogracias Militar; and 5) actual, exemplary and moral damages.

ISSUES:Whether petitioners are innocent mortgagee or purchasers in good faith and for
value?

HELD: No. Innocent mortgagee or purchasers in good faith and for value, is a factual
matter, which cannot be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally embark on
a re-examination of the evidence adduced by the parties during trial. In Heirs of the Late
Spouses Aurelio and Esperanza Balite v. Lim, we held that factual findings of the Court
of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon us. These findings may be reviewed only
under exceptional circumstances such as when the inference is manifestly mistaken;
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; findings of the trial court
contradict those of the appellate court; or the latter manifestly overlooked relevant and
undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court based on its findings of
facts which are in accord with the documents on record. Thus, we affirm the Court of
Appeals’ finding that petitioners were not mortgagee or buyers in good faith.

Moreover, the burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith and for value
lies upon him who asserts that status.  In discharging the burden, it is not enough to
invoke the ordinary presumption of good faith. The rule is settled that a buyer of real
property in possession of persons other than the seller must be wary and should
investigate the rights of those in possession. Without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly
be regarded as buyer in good faith and cannot have any right over the property.

PNB claims that it conducted the necessary inquiry and investigation on the subject lot
and was convinced that Nilda Jalbuna, as one of the heirs of Estanislao Militar, had
every right to mortgage the same, even if she was not in actual possession thereof.

However, considering that the land was in the possession of persons other than the
mortgagors, PNB should have inquired whether the possessors knew that the lot is
being mortgaged, and the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the lot by the
mortgagors. Indeed, while PNB is not expected to conduct an exhaustive investigation
on the history of the mortgagor’s title, it cannot be excused from the duty of exercising
the due diligence required of a banking institution. In Tomas v. Tomas, we noted that it
is standard practice for banks, before approving a loan, to send representatives to the
property offered as collateral to assess its actual condition and to investigate who are
the real owners thereof. We held that banks are expected to exercise more care and
prudence than private individuals in their dealings, even those involving registered
lands, for their business is affected with public interest. Verily, PNB was remiss in the
exercise of due diligence required of a banking institution, hence it cannot be
considered as mortgagee in good faith.

Neither could spouses Lucero be considered buyers in good faith. As respondents’

neighbors, they could have verified the status of the property they were buying by
inquiring from the possessors thereof. This, they failed to do; hence they cannot be
considered buyers in good faith.

As to whether the action for reconveyance has prescribed, we held in Santos v.

Santos, citing Lacsamana v. CA, that the right to file an action for reconveyance on the
ground that the certificate of title was obtained by means of a fictitious deed of sale is
virtually an action for the declaration of its nullity, which does not prescribe.

In the case at bar, the complaint filed was for the reconveyance of the properties in
question to the estates of Deogracias, Glicerio, Tomas and Caridad, considering that
the deeds of sale were simulated and fictitious. The complaint thus amounts to an
action for declaration of nullity of a void contract, which does not prescribe.

Neither could laches be successfully invoked. Laches is a doctrine in equity which has

been aptly described as "justice outside legality", and applied only in the absence of,
and never against, statutory law. Aequetas nunguam contravenit legis. The positive
mandate of Art. 1410 of the Civil Code conferring imprescriptibility to actions or defense
for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract should pre-empt and prevail over all
abstract arguments based only on equity. Certainly, laches cannot be set up to resist
the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right; thus, respondents can validly vindicate
their inheritance despite the lapse of time.

Finally, while certificates of title are indefeasible, unassailable and binding against the
whole world, they merely confirm or record title already existing and vested. They
cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can they be used for the
perpetration of fraud; neither do they permit one to enrich himself at the expense of
others.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
June 4, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 54831 and its resolution dated August 4, 2004, are
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice