Another Look at Hume's Views of Aesthetic and Moral Judgments

Author(s): Peter Jones

Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 78 (Jan., 1970), pp. 53-59
Published by: Blackwell Publishing for The Philosophical Quarterly
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2217913
Accessed: 12/05/2010 16:46

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=black.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Blackwell Publishing and The Philosophical Quarterly are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and
extend access to The Philosophical Quarterly.

http://www.jstor.org
 53

DISCUSSIONS

ANOTHER LOOK AT HUME'S VIEWS OF AESTHETIC

AND MORAL JUDGMENTS
BY PETER JONES

Hume's explicitly causal theory of aesthetic judgment throws light upon

his view of moral judgment and the supposedly obscure relation between
C of the
reason " and "the passions ". Perhaps the clearest exposition
causal theory occurs in Essay XVIII entitled "The Sceptic "1 which con-
tains discussion of both aesthetic and moral principles and judgments.
" There is nothing, in itself, valuable or despicable, desirable or hateful,
beautiful or deformed; but . . . these attributes arise from the particular
constitution and fabric of human sentiment and affection." When these
qualities are at issue:
. . the mind is not content with merely surveying its objects, as they stand in
themselves: It also feels a sentiment of delight or uneasiness, approbation or
blame, consequent to that survey; and this sentiment determines it to affix
the epithet beautiful or deformed, desirable or odious. Now, it is evident, that
this sentiment must depend upon the particular fabric or structure of the mind,
which enables such particular forms to operate in such a particular manner,
and produces a sympathy or conformity between the mind and its objects.
Vary the structure of the mind or inward organs, the sentiment no longer fol-
lows, though the form remains the same. The sentiment being different from
the object, and arising from its operations upon the organs of the mind, an
alteration upon the latter must vary the effect, nor can the same object, pre-
sented to a mind totally different, produce the same sentiment (p. 218).
The over-all position could hardly be clearer: a man surveys a particular
object and, depending upon the constitution of his mind, that object causes
him to feel a particular sentiment, which in turn causes him to utter a
particular epithet referring to the object. Shortly after the passage just
quoted there occurs an argument lifted verbatimfrom Appendix I to An
Enquiry concerningthe Principles of Morals, in which, it will be remembered,
Hume explicitly compares judgments of " moral beauty with natural ":
Beauty is not a quality of the circle. It lies not in any part of the line whose
parts are all equally distant from a common centre. It is only the effect, which
that figure produces upon a mind, whose particular fabric or structure renders
it susceptible of such sentiments. In vain would you look for it in the circle,
or seek it, either by your senses, or by mathematical reasonings, in all the
properties of that figure (p. 219).
In Essay XVIII Hume cites the possible example of a mathematician
reading Virgil, understanding the meaning of every word and " conse-
quently " having " a distinct idea of the whole narration ". Nevertheless
he might know " everything in the poem : But [be] ignorant of its beauty ",
1References to the essays are to the following edition : David Hume, Essays Moral,
Political and Literary, ed. Green and Grose (London, 1875), Vol. I.
54 PETER JONES

because, " where a man has no such delicacy of temper as to make him feel
this sentiment, he must be ignorant of the beauty, though possessed of the
science and understanding of an angel ". In a footnote to this passage,
Hume remarks that " the famous doctrine . . . 'all . . . sensible qualities,
lie not in the bodies, but merely in the senses' . . . need [not] give any
umbrage either to critics or moralists. . . . There is a sufficient uniformity
in the senses and feelings of mankind, to make all these qualities the objects
of art and reasoning, and to have the greatest influence on life and manners.
And as 'tis certain, that the discovery above-mentioned in natural philo-
sophy, makes no alteration on action and conduct; why should a like dis-
covery in moral philosophy make any alteration ? ". The conclusion of the
particular argument reads :
The inference upon the whole is, that it is not from the value or worth of the
object which any person pursues, that we can determine his enjoyment, but
merely from the passion with which he pursues it, and the success which he
meets with in his pursuit. Objects have absolutely no worth or value in them-
selves. They derive their worth merely from the passion (p. 219).
The causal nature of the procedures with which Hume concerns himself is
underlined when he enlarges upon the importance of the " constitution of
the mind ". "No man would ever be unhappy, could he alter his feelings.
. . .But . . . the fabric and constitution of our mind no more depends on
our choice, than that of our body. . . . Whoever considers, without pre-
judice, the course of human actions, will find, that mankind are almost
entirely guided by constitution and temper, and that general maxims have
little influence, so far as they affect our tastes or sentiment " (pp. 221-2).
Habit and education, philosophy and the liberal arts, may "insensibly
refine" the temper but Hume "cannot acknowledge " them "to have
great influence ":
To diminish, therefore, or augment any person's value for an object, to excite
or moderate his passions, there are no direct arguments or reasons, which can
be employed with any force or influence. . . . But though the value of every
object can be determined only by the sentiment or passion of every individual,
we may observe, that the passion, in pronouncing its verdict, considers not the
object simply, as it is in itself, but surveys it with all the circumstances, which
attend it. ... Here therefore a philosopher may step in, and suggest particular
views, and considerations, and circumstances, which otherwise would have
escaped us; and, by that means, he may either moderate or excite any particular
passion (p. 224).
It is important not to misunderstand the last sentence. The only role for
argument and reasoning is at the earliest stage of the causal sequence,
namely, when an object is being surveyed; no reasoning can alter the consti-
tution of the mind, and no reasoning can affect the epithets which come
about causally upon the survey and its consequent sentiment. The most
that another man can do, is to suggest that the object we are surveying be
described or seen in a different light; an alteration in the survey will then
set off a different causal sequence of sentiment and epithet. It will be
evident that there are two stages at which the causal chain might be diverted
to issue in judgments different from those which the majority of men would
make in the circumstances: the constitution of a man's mind might be
 HUME S VIEWS OF AESTHETIC AND MORAL JUDGMENTS 55

unusual; or it might be normal, but his survey of the object unusual. It

might be wondered how we can tell whether a man has surveyed the object
correctly on those occasions when the cause for an unusual epithet lies in
an unusual constitution of the mind. The answer lies in the remedial steps
we may take. The only phenomena upon which our reasonings and argu-
ments are ever going to have effect, are the descriptions he initially offers
of the object of survey. If we find that he agrees with our descriptions but
still pronounces unusual epithets we must suppose that his mind is somehow
unusual, for the simple reason that the causal chain started in the normal
manner. Against this view, however, it may be argued that the constitution
of the mind affects the nature of the survey we give to an object in the first
place, and that there are no descriptions of the object surveyed antecedent,
as it were, to the influence of mind. This objection overlooks Hume's
epistemological principles. Impressions are received passively by the mind
before they undergo any processing by it; and in the present case the element
of passivity in the survey of the object is central; objects, when viewed
under normal conditions, just do cause otherwise similar people to say
similar things about them.
One of Hume's principal concerns in Essay XVIII appears to be to
diminish reliance upon the efficacy in moral and aesthetic matters of
philosophical principles and reasonings and moral precepts; the conclusion
of the essay is that "human life is more governed by fortune than by
reason ". Similar views are expressed in Essay XXIII, " Of the Standard
of Taste ", where, at the outset, it is remarked that "the merit of delivering
true general precepts in ethics is indeed very small" (p. 268). I juxtapose
some passages relevant to the present discussion:
All sentiment is right; because sentiment has a reference to nothing beyond
itself, and is always real, wherever a man is conscious of it. ... No sentiment
represents what is really in the object. It only marks a certain conformity or
relation between the object and the organs or faculties of the mind; and if
that conformity did not really exist, the sentiment could never possibly have
being. . . . Some particular forms or qualities, from the original structure of
the internal fabric, are calculated to please, and others to displease; and if
they fail of their effect in any particular instance, it is from some apparent
defect or imperfection in the organ. . . . There are certain qualities in objects,
which are fitted by nature to produce those particular feelings (pp. 268, 271,
273).
Hume is primarily concerned, in this essay, with the activity of criticism,
but what he says of the role of reason in that activity applies with equal
force in the sphere of morality, as we shall see later. " When objects of
any kind are first presented to the eye or imagination, the sentiment, which
attends them, is obscure and confused; and the mind is, in a great measure,
incapable of pronouncing concerning their merits or defects " (p. 274). It
should be noted that the sentiment is confused, not that there is no senti-
ment; because, of course, there is always a sentiment of some kind, and any
imprecision or vagueness in the perception seems to be carried over into, or
reflected in, the sentiment inalienably attached to the perception. But if
we " acquire experience in those objects " our " feeling becomes more exact
 56 PETER JONES

and nice ". Hume goes on to elucidate five conditions which he holds to be
necessary in order to feel a proper sentiment of beauty in respect of any
particular work of art; the most important of these is exactness of percep-
tion; this is followed by practice, which in turn leads us to make just com-
parisons between similar and dissimilar cases so that we may properly
estimate their degree of excellence; also required are freedom from pre-
judice, and good sense, with which reason is combined in order to discern
the proper relations of the parts of the work, and the purposes they serve.
When unusual judgments follow upon the incomplete fulfilment of these
conditions a man may reasonably be blamed; but where they follow upon
some deviation from the norm in a man's " internal frame or external situa-
tion " (by the last expression Hume means social conditioning) that man
is entirely blameless. Enough has been shown to stress that value judgments
" follow " from perusal of the object in no deductive or, indeed, rational way
at all; they follow causally. We may say that beauty is a "dependent
quality" in the sense that it is an unanalysable sentiment a man feels only
if certain necessary conditions obtain in the object, and if he has a " normal"
mind. It would thus appear that one man can always falsify another's claim
to feel the sentiment of beauty by pointing to the absence of the necessary
features in the object perused, given that the majority of men agree in
their descriptions of that object, and an assumption that the man's " in-
teral fabric " is normal; on the other hand, he can never verify another's
claim to feel a sentiment, because reference is ultimately to what each
person feels. That is : only the public and external falsifies, only the private
and internal verifies. Hume expects common agreement that objects have
certain properties, that human beings tend to feel the same things in the
same conditions, and that priority is given to the judgments of qualified
observers, particularly in the matter of art criticism. A consequence of this
last assumption is that when one's own judgment about a work deviates
from the norm, one's first task is to examine one's own procedures and, if
possible, mental constitution; for although one's own "sentiment" is
" right " that is only because all are right, and that means only that a man
has the sentiments that he is conscious of having.
If we now turn back to An Enquiry concerningthe Principles of Morals
(EPM)2 and more importantly, to the Treatise (T)3 we shall find these very
same views: moral and aesthetic judgments are caused by sentiments of
certain sorts which are themselves caused by objects of certain sorts when
perused by minds of a certain constitution. Reason can operate only before
the causal operation gets under way. "But in order to pave the way for
such a sentiment, and give a proper discernment of its object, it is often
necessary, we find, that much reasoning should precede" (EPM sec. 1,

2References to An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals are to the edition

by L. A. Selby-Bigge (London, 1902).
3References to A Treatise of Human Nature are to the edition by L. A. Selby-Bigge
(London, 1888).
 HUME S VIEWS OF AESTHETIC AND MORAL JUDGMENTS 57

p. 173). But reason is inoperative in the way explained, not only in the
field of moral and aesthetic judgments, but in the much more important
sphere of moral action.
Our affections, on a general prospect of their objects, form certain rules of
conduct, and certain measures of preference of one above another; and these
decisions, though really the result of our calm passions and propensities, (for
what else can pronounce any object eligible or the contrary ?) are yet said, by
a natural abuse of terms, to be the determinations of pure reason and reflection
(EPM sec. VI, pt. 1, p. 239).
Appendix I, containing the famous discussion of the respective contributions
of reason and sentiment in " all decisions of praise or censure ", confirms
the interpretation already given. Reason, which judges either of matters
of fact or of relations, can instruct us in the tendencies and consequences
of qualities and actions; but reason " is not alone sufficient to produce any
moral blame or approbation ". "Morality is determined by sentiment ";
" all the circumstances and relations must be previously known; and the
mind, from the contemplation of the whole, feels some new impression of
affection or disgust, esteem or contempt, approbation or blame ". Hume
then continues with the discussion of beauty, which I have already men-
tioned, stressing that although beauty " depends " on the proportion and
relation of parts, it does not " consist wholly in the perception of relations ".
The well-known conclusion merely spells out the consequences of this view:
Reason being cool and disengaged, is no motive to action, and directs only the
impulse received from appetite or inclination, by showing us the means of
attaining happiness or avoiding misery: Taste, as it gives pleasure or pain,
and thereby constitutes happiness or misery, becomes a motive to action, and
is the first spring or impulse to desire and volition (Appendix I, p. 294).4
It remains only to show how the views I have outlined from the Essays
and Enquiry are equally clear in the Treatise, in order to dispose, once and
for all, of the supposed mystery about the dichotomy between 'ought'
and ' is', and the relation between "reason " and "passion ".
Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend
to any other office than to serve and obey them. . . . Since a passion can
never, in any sense, be call'd unreasonable, but when founded on a false sup-
position, or when it chuses means insufficient for the design'd end, 'tis im-
possible, that reason and passion can ever oppose each other, or dispute for the
government of the will and actions. The moment we perceive the falsehood of
any supposition, or the insufficiency of any means our passions yield to our
reason without any opposition (T. Bk. II, Pt. 3, sec. 3, pp. 415, 416).
The epistemological views underlying this conclusion are both explicit and
well-known. "No object is presented to the senses, nor image form'd in
the fancy, but what is accompany'd with some emotion or movement of
spirits proportion'd to it " (T. Bk. II, Pt. 2, sec. 8, p. 373). Morality " is
4In De Anima Bk. III Ch.9 432b-433a, Aristotle writes: " Further, neither can the
calculative faculty or what is called " mind " be the cause of such movement; for
mind as speculative never thinks what is practicable, it never says anything about an
object to be avoided or pursued, while this movement is always in something which
is avoiding or pursuing an object. No, not even when it is aware of such an object
does it at once enjoin pursuit or avoidance of it; e.g. the mind often thinks of some-
thing terrifying or pleasant without enjoining the emotion of fear. It is the heart that
is moved. . . . Something else is required to produce action in accordance with know-
ledge; the knowledge alone is not the cause ". (I quote from The Works of Aristotle
ed. W. D. Ross (London, 1931), Vol. III.) Was Hume aware of this passage, either
directly, or indirectly through subsequent, perhaps medieval, writers ?
58 PETER JONES

always apprehended under " the notion of practical philosophy, whereas

reason belongs to " speculative " philosophy: and " as long as it is allow'd,
that reason has no influence on our passions and actions, 'tis in vain to
pretend, that morality is discover'd only by a deduction of reason. An
active principle can never be founded on an inactive; and if reason be in-
active in itself, it must remain so in all its shapes and appearances " (T.
Bk. III, Pt. 1, sec. 1, p. 457).
Reason is the discovery of truth or falshood. Truth or falshood consists in
an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real
existence and matter of fact. Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this
agreement or disagreement, is incapable of being true or false, and can never
be an object of our reason. Now 'tis evident our passions, volitions, and actions,
are not susceptible of any such agreement or disagreement; being original facts
and realities, compleat in themselves, and implying no reference to other pas-
sions, volitions and actions. 'Tis impossible, therefore, they can be pronounced
either true or false, and be either contrary or conformable to reason.
This argument is of double advantage. . . . For it proves directly, that actions
do not derive their merit from a conformity to reason . . . and indirectly . . .
that as reason can never immediately prevent or produce any action by contra-
dicting or approving of it, it cannot be the source of moral good and evil, which
are found to have that influence. .. . Reason is wholly inactive (T. Bk. III,
Pt. 1, sec. 1, p. 458).
Hume goes on to remark that "reason and judgment . . . may be the
mediate cause of an action, by prompting or by directing a passion "; but
if it were alone capable of "fixing the boundaries of right and wrong "
virtue and vice must either be matters of fact or relations of ideas. At the
end of the section occurs the observation upon 'ought ' and 'is ' :
For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis
necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a
reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new
relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it
(ibid., p. 469).
The beginning of the next section (section 2) should have left readers in no
doubt about Hume's position: "morality, therefore, is more properly felt
than judg'd of. ... To have a sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a
satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character ".
Perhaps the occurrence of the word ' from ' in the last sentence insufficiently
emphasizes that Hume is talking about a causal relation. He is not lamenting
that a premise is missing in arguments from ' is ' to ' ought ', or that reason-
ing is defective. He is asserting that thereis no logical relation at all between
'is' and 'ought ': reason is totally inoperative at this juncture. In other
words, Hume is arguing that previous philosophers have mistaken a causal
relation between states of affairs for a logical relation between propositions.
Just as morality "consists not in any relations ", so "it consists not in any
matterof fact, which can be discover'd by the understanding ".
Take any action allow'd to be vicious : Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it
in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which
you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions,
motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case.
The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never
can find it, till you turn your reflexion into your own breast, and find a senti-
ment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a
matter of fact; but 'tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself,
not in the object. So that when you pronounce any action or character to be
 HUME S VIEWS OF AESTHETIC AND MORAL JUDGMENTS 59

vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you
have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it (T. Bk. III,
Pt. 1, sec. 1, pp. 468-9).
An "is " proposition and an "ought" proposition are thus "related" in the
following way: when we have an internal impression or idea of an external
state of affairs, a proposition purporting to describe that state of affairs
may be called a proposition about a matter of fact. Although our knowledge
of it is mediated by our individual impressions, nevertheless it is assumed
that the state of affairs is external to ourselves and open for public scrutiny.
Matters of fact are characteristically described by "is" propositions. De-
pending upon the constitution of our minds however, itself a brute fact
about our psychological make-up, the impressions we receive from the
external matters of fact themselves cause us to feel sentiments of one sort
or another; these sentiments are themselves impressions, and are, indeed,
facts about us. But the crucial point is that these sentiments are only facts
about us, and they are caused only by our impressions, the nature of which
is determined by the joint conditions of the external world and our internal
fabric. Propositions which report these internal facts, namely, the sentiments
we feel, are none other than the moral and aesthetic judgments we pass;
and " ought" propositions which constitute the motive to action fall under
this heading and analysis also. The truth is, therefore, that "is " and " ought"
propositions are not themselves related at all; the states of affairs to which
they refer are related causally, the notion of cause being analysed in the
usual Humean way. Reason cannot be a proximate cause of either a moral
or aesthetic judgment, and a fortiori it cannot either be, or be a proximate
cause of, a motive to action; at most, reason may be said to be a " mediate "
cause, in the sense that it enables us to recognize relations between, and
the nature of, matters of fact, and the impressions we derive from this
recognition may set off the causal chain of sentiment and judgment which
constitute the motive to action. In morals, as in aesthetics, it is not rational
to impugn a man's judgments or verdicts, since these have come about
causally (to stress the independence of the process from the agent's will the
term 'automatically' is hardly inappropriate) upon certain antecedent
conditions; it is only rational to question the man's original perceptual
propositions, the "is" propositions, about the external matters of fact open
for public scrutiny.

University of Edinburgh.