REMEDIAL LAW DOCTRINES FORECAST

GALAPON VS. REPUBLIC

Topic: Evidence

1. Based on the records, Cynthia and Park obtained a divorce decree by mutual
agreement under the laws of South Korea. The sufficiency of the evidence presented
by Cynthia to prove the issuance of said divorce decree and the governing national
law of her husband Park was not put in issue. In fact, the CA considered said evidence
sufficient to establish the authenticity and validity of the divorce in question

“The records show that [Cynthia] submitted, inter alia, the original and translated
foreign divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity. She

palo
also offered into evidence a copy of the Korean Civil Code, duly authenticated through a
Letter of Confirmation with Registry No. 2013-020871, issued by the Embassy of the
Republic of Korea in the Philippines. These pieces of evidence may have been sufficient
to establish the authenticity and validity of the divorce obtained by the estranged
couple abroad but [the CA agrees] with the OSG that the divorce cannot be recognized
in this jurisdiction insofar as [Cynthia] is concerned since it was obtained by mutual
agreement of a foreign spouse and a Filipino spouse.”

2. In this light, it becomes unnecessary to delve into the admissibility and probative
value of Abigail's testimony claiming that Cynthia had been constrained to consent to
the divorce. As confirmed in the Manalo case, the divorce decree obtained by Park, with
or without Cynthia's conformity, falls within the scope of Article 26(2) and merits
recognition in this jurisdiction.

SPS. TUMON VS. RADIOWEALTH FINANCE (2021)

Topic: Writ of Preliminary Injunction

1. Petitioners argue that based on A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, as amended, the RTC should have
issued the WPI to prevent the foreclosure sale. However, a perusal of the records would
reveal that petitioners did not comply with the requirements for its issuance
2. Jurisprudence emphasizes that the guidelines in A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, as amended,
speaks of strict exceptions and conditions. Rule 2 clearly states that, as a rule, no
TRO/WPI shall be issued against the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage
on the allegation that the interest on the loan is unconscionable. However, a TRO/WPI
may be issued if the debtor pays the mortgagee the 12% required interest on the
principal obligation as stated in the application for foreclosure sale, which shall be
updated monthly. Digressing a bit, it should be noted that when these guidelines were
issued in 2007, the legal rate of interest was still twelve percent per annum (12% p.a.).
Pursuant to Circular No. 799, Series of 2013, which became effective on July 1, 2013, the
legal interest rate is now only six percent per annum (6% p.a.)

1
 3. Jurisprudence does not require the presentation of overwhelming evidence to
establish the right to be protected. Mere prima facie evidence of the right to be
protected, or such evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a
given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or defense and
which, if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient
4. Thus, to clarify and summarize the requirements in establishing a clear and
unmistakable right to have a TRO/WPI under Rule 2 of A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, as
amended, be issued, the applicant must: (i) allege in the application for TRO/WPI
that the interest rate on the loan is unconscionable; (ii) support this allegation
with prima facie evidence; and (iii) prove that, upon filing the application, he or
she has paid to the mortgagee at least the legal rate of interest on the principal
obligation as stated in the application for foreclosure sale, which shall be updated
monthly while the case is pending

palo
5. At this juncture, it is also important to highlight that Rule 2 clearly conveys that the
obligation to pay at least the legal rate of interest to the mortgagee is reckoned from
the time the applicant asks for the issuance of a TRO/WPI, which obligation shall
continue while the case is still pending. Thus, any previous payments made by the
applicant - or any "overpayment", assuming that the legal rate of interest is applied on
the loan - shall not be deemed as fulfillment of the condition to pay interest under
Rule 2 of A.M. No. 99-10-05-0
6. Petitioners failed to prove compliance with Rule 2 of A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, as amended;
thus, they failed to establish their clear and unmistakable right to be protected

ANNOTATIONS:
This provision was explained in Borlongan v. Banco de Oro (formerly Equitable PCI Bank) as
follows:

“It is clear that a writ of preliminary injunction is warranted where there is a showing that there
exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed violate
an established right. Otherwise stated, for a court to decide on the propriety of issuing a TRO
and/or a WPI, it must only inquire into the existence of two things: (1) a clear and unmistakable
right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage."

In addition to these requirements, the issuance of a WPI in the context of a judicial or an

extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage requires compliance with the additional rules
in A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, as amended, viz.:

(1) No [TRO or WPI] against the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage shall be issued
on the allegation that the loan secured by the mortgage has been paid or is not delinquent
unless the application is verified and supported by evidence of payment.

2
 (2) No [TRO or WPI] against the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage shall be issued
on the allegation that the interest on the loan is unconscionable, unless the debtor pays the
mortgagee at least twelve percent per annum interest on the principal obligation as stated in
the application for foreclosure sale, which shall be updated monthly while the case is pending.

(3) Where a [WPI] has been issued against a foreclosure of mortgage, the disposition of the
case shall be speedily resolved. To this end, the court concerned shall submit to the Supreme
Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator, quarterly reports on the progress of the
cases involving ten million pesos and above.

(4) All requirements and restrictions prescribed for the issuance of a [TRO or WPI], such as the
posting of a bond, which shall be equal to the amount of the outstanding debt, and the time
limitation for its effectivity, shall apply as well to a status quo order.

palo
VALMORES VS. CABILDO (2017)
Topic: Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts; Mandamus

DOCTRINE OF HIERARCHY OF COURTS

1. Strict adherence to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not absolute; Recently, in
Maza v. Turla, the Court emphasized that it possesses full discretionary power to take
cognizance and assume jurisdiction over petitions filed directly with it for
exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues involved
in the dispute. Citing The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, the Court held that a direct
resort is allowed in the following instances, inter alia: (i) when there are genuine
issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time;
(ii) when the questions involved are dictated by public welfare and the
advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice; and
(iii) when the circumstances require an urgent resolution. The above exceptions are
all availing in this case.
2. Valmores' right to religious freedom is being threatened by respondents' failure to
accommodate his case. When confronted with a potential infringement of
fundamental rights, the Court will not hesitate to overlook procedural lapses in order
to fulfill its foremost duty of satisfying the higher demands of substantial justice.
Likewise, to require Valmores to hold his education in abeyance in the meantime that
he is made to comply with the rule on hierarchy of courts would be unduly
burdensome. It is a known fact that education is a time-sensitive endeavor, where
premium is placed not only on its completion, but also on the timeliness of its
achievement. Inevitably, justice in this case must take the form of a prompt and
immediate disposition if complete relief is to be accorded

MANDAMUS
3. The Rules require the exhaustion of other plain, speedy, and adequate remedies in the
ordinary course of law before a petition for mandamus is filed

3
 4. The enforcement of the 2010 CHED Memorandum is compellable by writ of mandamus
5. Mandamus is employed to compel the performance of a ministerial duty by a
tribunal, board, officer, or person. Petitioner should have a right to the thing
demanded and that it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the
act required; such duty need not be absolutely expressed, so long as it is clear
6. A duty is considered ministerial where an officer is required to perform an act not
requiring the exercise of official discretion or judgment in a given state of facts.
Conversely, if the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to
decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary.
7. MSU is an HEI created by legislative charter under RA 1387, as amended, and was
established "to better implement the policy of the Government in the intensification
of the education of the Filipino youth, especially among the Muslims and others
belonging to the national minorities." Respondents, as faculty members of MSU, fall

palo
under the policy-making authority of the CHED and therefore bound to observe the
issuances promulgated by the latter
8. A plain reading of the memorandum reveals the ministerial nature of the duty
imposed upon HEIs. Its policy is crystal clear: a student's religious obligations takes
precedence over his academic responsibilities, consonant with the constitutional
guarantee of free exercise and enjoyment of religious worship. Accordingly, the CHED
imposed a positive duty on all HEIs to exempt students, as well as faculty members,
from academic activities in case such activities interfere with their religious
obligations
9. Clearly, under the 2010 CHED Memorandum, HEIs do not possess absolute discretion
to grant or deny requests for exemption of affected students. Instead, the
memorandum only imposes minimum standards should HEIs decide to require
remedial work, i.e., that the same is within the bounds of school rules and regulations
and that the grades of the students will not be affected

MANALANG VS. BACANI (2015)

Topic: Appeal; RTC

1. In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the RTC shall decide the appeal of the
judgment of the MTC in unlawful detainer or forcible entry cases on the basis of the
entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda
and/or briefs as may be required by the RTC. There is no trial de novo of the case; The
RTC, in an appeal of the judgment in an ejectment case, shall not conduct a
rehearing or trial de novo

Sec. 18, Rule 70 - Sec. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in
actions involving title or ownership. — x x x The judgment or final order shall be
appealable to the appropriate RTC which shall decide the same on the basis of the
entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or
briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the RTC

4
 2. RTC violated the foregoing rule by ordering the conduct of the relocation and
verification survey “in aid of its appellate jurisdiction” and by hearing the testimony
of the surveyor, for its doing so was tantamount to its holding of a trial de novo. The
violation was accented by the fact that the RTC ultimately decided the appeal based
on the survey and the surveyor’s testimony instead of the record of the proceedings
had in the court of origin
3. The case should be dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a non-summary
action like accion reivindicatoria. CA correctly held that a boundary dispute must be
resolved in the context of accion reivindicatoria, not an ejectment case. The boundary
dispute is not about possession, but encroachment, that is, whether the property
claimed by the defendant formed part of the plaintiff’s property. A boundary dispute
cannot be settled summarily under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings

palo
under which are limited to unlawful detainer and forcible entry

FATHER REYES VS. COURT OF APPEALS (2009)

Topic: Writ of Amparo

1. The Amparo Rule in its present form is confined to these two instances of "extralegal
killings" and "enforced disappearances," or to threats thereof
2. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without
legal safeguards or judicial proceedings."; "Enforced disappearances" are "attended by
the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct
or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the
fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law."
3. Petitioner invokes this extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo for the protection of
his right to travel. He insists that he is entitled to the protection covered by the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo because the HDO is a continuing actual restraint on his right to
travel. The Court is thus called upon to rule whether or not the right to travel is
covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
4. The restriction on petitioner's right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the
criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner failed to establish that
his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a
serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no
readily available legal recourse or remedy. This new remedy of writ of amparo which is
made available by this Court is intended for the protection of the highest possible
rights of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court will
not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this
nature. However, the Court will also not waste its precious time and effort on matters
not covered by the writ.

5
 5. Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to his
apprehension that the DOJ may deny his motion to lift the HDO. Petitioner's
apprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus, he has failed to show any clear
threat to his right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo. The
absence of an actual controversy also renders it unnecessary for the Court on this
occasion to pass upon the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17, Series of 1998 and
Circular No. 18, Series of 2007
6. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a
proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by
analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed
criminal case

DR. BARTOLOME VS. REPUBLIC (2019)

palo
Topic: Application of Rules 103 and 108 in relation to RA 9047, as amended by RA 10172

1. In Republic v. Gallo, the Court outlined the difference between Rule 103 and Rule 108 of
the Rules and the effects brought about by the enactment of R.A. 9048 as amended by
R.A. 10172, on the aforementioned rules. The foregoing rules may be summarized as
follows:

A person seeking: must first file a verified petition with the

1. to change his or her first name
2. to correct clerical or
typographical errors in the civil
register
3. to change/correct the day
and/or month of his or her date
of birth, and/or
4. to change/correct his or her sex,
where it is patently clear that
there was a clerical or
typographical error or mistake
local civil registry office of the city or
municipality where the record being
sought to be corrected or changed is kept,
in accordance with the administrative
proceeding provided under R.A. 9048 in
relation to R.A. 10172. A person may only
avail of the appropriate judicial
remedies under Rule 103 or Rule 108 in
the aforementioned entries after the
petition in the administrative
proceedings is filed and later denied

A person seeking: may file a petition for change of name

1. to change his or her surname or under Rule 103, provided that the
2. to change both his or her first jurisprudential grounds discussed in
name and surname Republic v. Hernandez are present (see
annotation)

A person seeking substantial may file a petition for cancellation or

cancellations or corrections of entries correction of entries under Rule 108. Rule
in the civil registry 108 now applies only to substantial

6
 changes and corrections in entries in
the civil register”

2. In the instant case, petitioner seeks to change his first name, to include his middle,
and to correct the spelling of his surname, i.e., from "Feliciano Bartholome" as stated in
his birth certificate to "Ruben Cruz Bartolome". The Court agrees with the CA and the OSG
that the aforementioned changes and corrections are covered by Section 1 of R.A. 9048
as amended by R.A. 10172
3. While substantial corrections of entries in the civil register are still covered by
Rule 108, typographical or clerical corrections must now be filed under R.A. 9048
as amended. Section 2 of the said law defines clerical or typographical errors
4. The test for whether a correction is clerical or substantial is found in the provision

palo
itself. Misspelled names or missing entries are clerical corrections if they are visible
to the eyes or obvious to the understanding and if they may be readily verified by
referring to the existing records in the civil register. They must not, however, involve
any change in nationality, age or status
5. Clerical errors as "those harmless and innocuous changes such as the correction of
names clearly misspelled, occupation of parents, errors that are visible to the eye or
obvious to the understanding, errors made by a clerk or transcriber, or a mistake in
copying or writing." The Court categorically holds that typographical or clerical errors
in a person's surname must likewise be corrected through the administrative
proceeding under R.A. 9048
6. As herein petitioner's allegedly misspelled surname, "Bartholome," may be readily
corrected by merely referring to the existing records of the civil registrar, such as the
surnames of petitioner's parents and immediate family members, the petition should
have been filed under R.A. 9048 and not under Rule 103 of the Rules. It likewise follows
that the petition should have been filed with the local civil registry office of the city or
municipality where the record being sought to be corrected or changed is kept, in
accordance with Section 3 of R.A. 9048 and not in accordance with the venue provided
in Rule 103
7. In sum, all changes sought by the petitioner fall within the ambit of R.A. 9048.
Petitioner may only avail of the appropriate judicial remedies when the
changes/corrections sought through the administrative proceeding are denied. By
"appropriate," the Court holds that if the prayer to administratively change petitioner's
first name is denied, the same may be brought under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. If
the prayers to administratively correct petitioner's middle name and surname are
denied, the same may be brought under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court

ANNOTATIONS:
Jurisprudence has recognized, inter alia, the following grounds as being sufficient to warrant
a change of name:
a. when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce;

7
 b. when the change results as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption;
c. when the change will avoid confusion;
d. when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name
and was unaware of alien parentage;
e. when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs
of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and
f. when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired
change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest.

SANTOS VS. REPUBLIC (2021)

Topic: Rule 103

palo
1. The nature of Rule 103 petitions for change of name—the only way that the name of a
person can be changed legally is through a petition for change of name under Rule 103
of the Rules of Court. Rule 108 involves cancellations and corrections of entries in the
civil registry. Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given
name or surname, or both, pursuant to Article 376 of the Civil Code. Rule 108, on the
other hand, implements judicial proceedings for the correction or cancellation of
entries in the civil registry pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code
2. Notably, the foregoing rules were modified by the enactment of R.A. 9048, which
amended Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code and vested primary jurisdiction over
the correction of certain clerical or typographical errors and changes of first name
with the civil registrar. In 2012, R.A. 10172 expanded the coverage of the summary
administrative procedure provided under R.A. 9048 to include clerical corrections in
the day and/or month in the date of birth, or in the sex of the person, where it is
patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake in the
entry. Presently therefore, when an entry falls within the coverage of R.A. 9048 as
amended by R.A. 10172, a person may only avail of the appropriate judicial remedies
under Rule 103 or Rule 108 after the petition in the administrative proceedings is
first filed and later denied. Failure to comply with the administrative procedure
generally renders the petition dismissible for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies and for failure to comply with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
3. Petitioner correctly availed himself of the remedy under Rule 103 in order to change
his surname from "Santos" to "Revilla." (However, petitioner failed to prove that there
was any compelling reason to justify the change sought). Rule 108 is inapplicable as
petitioner does not allege or identify any erroneous entry that requires substantial
rectification or cancellation
4. A change of name is a privilege not a matter of right, addressed to the sound
discretion of the court which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a
change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown
5. To justify a change of name, a person "must show not only some proper or compelling
reason but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name."

8
SEGOVIA VS. CLIMATE CHANGE (2017)
Topic: Locus standi; Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts; Writ of Kalikasan; Continuing Mandamus

1. LOCUS STANDI: While the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (RPEC)
liberalized the requirements on standing, allowing the filing of citizen’s suit for the
enforcement of rights and obligations under environmental laws, it bears noting that
there is a difference between a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan, wherein
it is sufficient that the person filing represents the inhabitants prejudiced by the
environmental damage subject of the writ;and a petition for the issuance of a writ of
continuing mandamus, which is only available to one who is personally aggrieved by
the unlawful act or omission
2. DOCTRINE OF HIERARCHY OF COURTS: the writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary

palo
remedy covering environmental damage of such magnitude that will prejudice the
life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. It is designed
for a narrow but special purpose: to accord a stronger protection for environmental
rights, aiming, among others, to provide a speedy and effective resolution of a case
involving the violation of one's constitutional right to a healthful and balanced
ecology that transcends political and territorial boundaries, and to address the
potentially exponential nature of large-scale ecological threats. The magnitude of the
ecological problems contemplated under the RPEC satisfies at least one of the
exceptions to the rule on hierarchy of courts, as when direct resort is allowed
where it is dictated by public welfare. Given that the RPEC allows direct resort to
this Court, it is ultimately within the Court's discretion whether or not to accept
petitions brought directly before it.
3. WRIT OF KALIKASAN: For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must
concur:
a. there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology;
b. the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and
c. the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental
damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
4. A party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan has to show
that a law, rule or regulation was violated or would be violated. In this case, apart
from repeated invocation of the constitutional right to health and to a balanced and
healthful ecology and bare allegations that their right was violated, the petitioners
failed to show that public respondents are guilty of any unlawful act or omission that
constitutes a violation of the petitioners' right to a balanced and healthful ecology
5. Apart from adducing expert testimony on the adverse effects of air pollution on public
health, the petitioners did not go beyond mere allegation in establishing the unlawful
acts or omissions on the part of the public respondents that have a causal link or

9
 reasonable connection to the actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right
to a balanced and healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules,
as required of petitions of this nature; while public respondents sufficiently showed
that they did not unlawfully refuse to implement or neglect the laws, executive and
administrative orders as claimed by the petitioners. Projects and programs that seek
to improve air quality were undertaken by the respondents
6. WRIT OF CONTINUING MANDAMUS: Rule 8, Section 1 of the RPEC lays down the
requirements for a petition for continuing mandamus as follows:
SECTION 1. Petition for continuing mandamus.-When any agency or instrumentality
of the government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust
or station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental
law rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from

palo
the use or enjoyment of such right and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty,
attaching thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the petition concerns
an environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts until the
judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by
reason of the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the respondent, under
the law, rules or regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping
7. Petitioners failed to prove direct or personal injury arising from acts attributable to
the respondents to be entitled to the writ. While the requirements of standing had
been liberalized in environmental cases, the general rule of real party-in-interest
applies to a petition for continuing mandamus.
8. Second, the Road Sharing Principle is precisely as it is denominated - a principle. It
cannot be considered an absolute imposition to encroach upon the province of public
respondents to determine the manner by which this principle is applied or considered
in their policy decisions. Mandamus lies to compel the performance of duties that
are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary, and the official
can only be directed by mandamus to act but not to act one way or the other.
9. At its core, what the petitioners are seeking to compel is not the performance of a
ministerial act, but a discretionary act - the manner of implementation of the Road
Sharing Principle. Clearly, petitioners' preferred specific course of action (i.e. the
bifurcation of roads to devote for all-weather sidewalk and bicycling and
Filipino-made transport vehicles) to implement the Road Sharing Principle finds no
textual basis in law or executive issuances for it to be considered an act enjoined by
law as a duty, leading to the necessary conclusion that the continuing mandamus
prayed for seeks not the implementation of an environmental law, rule or regulation,
but to control the exercise of discretion of the executive as to how the principle
enunciated in an executive issuance relating to the environment is best implemented

10
TREYES VS. LARLAR (2020)
Topic: Improper Venue, Prescription, Necessity of a Prior Determination of Heirship in a
Separate Special Proceeding

IMPROPER VENUE
1. The complaint cannot be dismissed on the ground of improper venue on the basis of
Rule 73 because such Rule refers exclusively to the special proceeding of
settlement of estates and not to ordinary civil actions. Invoking Rule 73 to allege
improper venue is entirely inconsistent with Treyes’ assertion that the Complaint is
not a special proceeding but an ordinary civil action. Likewise, the Court finds that the
improper venue as a ground for the dismissal of the Complaint was already deemed
waived in accordance with the Omnibus Motion Rule. Under the Omnibus Motion

palo
Rule, when the grounds for the dismissal of a Complaint under Rule 16, Sec. 1 (see
annotation part) are not raised in a motion to dismiss, such grounds, except th15e
grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata,
and prescription, are deemed waived. In this case, the issue of improper venue was
not raised in the first Motion to Dismiss; hence, this ground is deemed already waived
and could no longer be raised in the second Motion to Dismiss

PRESCRIPTION
2. The basis of Treyes in arguing that the Complaint is already barred by prescription is
Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules, which states that an heir or other persons unduly
deprived of lawful participation in the estate may compel the settlement of the estate
in the courts at any time within two years after the settlement and distribution of an
estate. Rule 74 pertains exclusively to the settlement of estates, which is a special
proceeding and not an ordinary civil action. This argument of petitioner Treyes
invoking prescription on the basis of Rule 74 is again wholly inconsistent with his
main theory that the instant Complaint is not a special proceeding but an ordinary
civil action for annulment of the Affidavits of Self-Adjudication, cancellation of TCTs,
reconveyance of ownership and possession, and damages
3. Likewise, the provisions of Rule 74, Sec. 4 barring distributees or heirs from
objecting to extrajudicial partition is applicable only: (1) to persons who have
participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and (2)
when the provisions of Sec. 1 or Rule 74 has been strictly complied with, i.e., that
all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial
settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians. Both
requirements are absent here as it is evident that not all the legal heirs of Rosie
participated in the extrajudicial settlement of her estate as indeed, it was only Treyes
who executed the Affidavits of Self-Adjudication

PRIOR DETERMINATION OF HEIRSHIP IN A SEPARATE SPECIAL PROCEEDING

11
 4. The main point of differentiation between a civil action and a special proceeding is
that in the former, a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right
which the party claims he/she is entitled to, such as when a party-litigant seeks to
recover property from another, while in the latter, a party merely seeks to have a right
established in his/her favor
5. In this case, the party does not seek to establish his/her right as an heir because the
law itself already establishes that status. What he/she aims to do is to merely call
for the nullification of a deed, instrument, or conveyance as an enforcement or
protection of that right which he/she already possesses by virtue of law. The private
respondents do not really seek in their Complaint the establishment of their rights as
intestate heirs but, rather, the enforcement of their rights already granted by law as
intestate heirs finds basis in Article 777 of the Civil Code, which states that the rights
of succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent

palo
6. An heir may assert his right to the property of a deceased, no previous judicial
declaration of heirship is necessary; the right of the heirs to the property of the
deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of heirship in a special
proceeding; legal heirs may commence an ordinary civil action arising out of a right
based on succession without the necessity of a previous and separate judicial
declaration of their status as such
7. As early as 1939, the Court en banc, in De Vera, et. al. vs. Galauran, held that: "Unless
there is pending a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person, the legal heirs may commence an ordinary action arising out of
a right belonging to the ancestor, without the necessity of a previous and separate
judicial declaration of their status as such"

ANNOTATIONS:
SECTION 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint
or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the
following grounds:
(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;
(c) That venue is improperly laid;
(d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of
limitations;
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;
(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has been paid,
waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished;
(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is enforceable under the provisions
of the statute of frauds; and
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with,

12
PEOPLE VS. SAPLA (2020)
Topic: Inability of a Solitary Tip to Engender Probable cause

1. Exclusive reliance on an unverified, anonymous tip, cannot engender probable cause

that permits a warrantless search of a moving vehicle that goes beyond a visual
search
2. It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree
of suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by
another person. The police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe
the (acts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act, and not merely rely on the
information passed on to him or her. Law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of
confidential or tipped information. A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may
be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of any other

palo
circumstance that will arouse suspicion
3. Exclusive reliance on information tipped by informants goes against the very
nature of probable cause. A single hint hardly amounts to "the existence of such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place to be searched."
4. The Court now holds that the cases adhering to the doctrine that exclusive reliance
on an unverified, anonymous tip cannot engender probable cause that permits a
warrantless search of a moving vehicle that goes beyond a visual search - which
include both long-standing and the most recent jurisprudence - should be the prevailing
and controlling line of jurisprudence.
5. In this case, the police merely adopted the unverified and unsubstantiated suspicion
of another person, i.e., the person who sent the text through the RPSB Hotline. What
further militates against the finding that there was sufficient probable cause on the
part of the police to conduct an intrusive search is the fact that the information
regarding the description of the person alleged to be transporting illegal drugs, i.e.,
wearing a collared white shirt with green stripes, red ball cap, and carrying a blue
sack, was relayed merely through a text message from a completely anonymous
person. The police did not even endeavor to inquire how this stranger gathered the
information. The authorities did not even ascertain in any manner whether the
information coming from the complete stranger was credible. After receiving this
anonymous text message, without giving any second thought, the police accepted the
unverified information as gospel truth and immediately proceeded in establishing the
checkpoint. To be sure, information coming from a complete and anonymous
stranger, without the police officers undertaking even a semblance of verification, on their
own, cannot reasonably produce probable cause that warrants the conduct of an
intrusive search. In fact, as borne from the cross-examination of PO3 Mabiasan, the
authorities did not even personally receive and examine the anonymous text
message. The contents of the text message were only relayed to them by a duty
guard, whose identity the police could not even recall. Simply stated, the

13
 information received through text message was not only hearsay evidence; it is double
hearsay.
6. Surely, probable cause justifying an intrusive warrantless search and seizure cannot
possibly arise from double hearsay evidence and from an irregularly-received tipped
information. Therefore, with the glaring absence of probable cause that justifies an
intrusive warrantless search, considering that the police officers failed to rely on their
personal knowledge and depended solely on an unverified and anonymous tip, the
warrantless search conducted on accused-appellant Sapla was an invalid and unlawful
search of a moving vehicle

CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY VS. CIR

Topic: Hierarchy of Courts

palo
1. Certiorari under Rule 65 will only lie if there is no appeal, or any other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the assailed issuance of
the CIR. The plain, speedy, and adequate remedy expressly provided by law is an
appeal of the assailed RMO with the Secretary of Finance under Section 4 of the NIRC
of 1997
2. The CIR's exercise of its power to interpret tax laws comes in the form of revenue
issuances, which include RMOs that provide "directives or instructions; prescribe
guidelines; and outline processes, operations, activities, workflows, methods and
procedures necessary in the implementation of stated policies, goals, objectives,
plans and programs of the Bureau in all areas of operations, except auditing." These
revenue issuances are subject to the review of the Secretary of Finance.
3. The premature invocation of the court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of
action. If a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by
giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must first be exhausted before
the court's power of judicial review can be sought. While there are recognized
exceptions to this salutary rule, petitioners have failed to prove the presence of any of
those in the instant case. Petitioners violated the rule on hierarchy of courts as the
petitions should have been initially filed with the CTA, having the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality or validity of revenue issuances.
4. The CTA has undoubted jurisdiction to pass upon the constitutionality or validity of a
tax law or regulation when raised by the taxpayer as a defense in disputing or
contesting an assessment or claiming a refund. It is only in the lawful exercise of its
power to pass upon all matters brought before it, as sanctioned by Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 1125, as amended. This Court, however, declares that the CTA may
likewise take cognizance of cases directly challenging the constitutionality or
validity of a tax law or regulation or administrative issuance (revenue orders,
revenue memorandum circulars, rulings).
5. Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, is explicit that, except for local taxes,
appeals from the decisions of quasi-judicial agencies (Commissioner of Internal

14
Revenue, Commissioner of Customs, Secretary of Finance, Central Board of
Assessment Appeals, Secretary of Trade and Industry) on tax-related problems must
be brought exclusively to the CTA. The law intends the CTA to have exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve all tax problems. Petitions for writs of certiorari against the acts
and omissions of the said quasi-judicial agencies should, thus, be filed before the
CTA. A direct invocation of this Court's jurisdiction should only be allowed when there
are special, important, and compelling reasons clearly and specifically spelled out in
the petition.

palo
15