Tiomico v. CA

9/24/21, 9:20 AM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 304
216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Tiomico vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 122539. March 4, 1999.
JESUS V. TIOMICO, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT

OF APPEALS (FORMER FIFTH DIVISION) and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Trust Receipts Law; Court upheld the

validity of the Trust Receipts Law and consistently declared that it
does not violate the constitutional proscription against
imprisonment for non-payment of debts.—As regards the first
issue, the Court has repeatedly upheld the validity of the Trust
Receipts Law and consistently declared that the said law does not
violate the constitutional proscription against imprisonment for
non-payment of debts.
Same; Same; PD 115 is a declaration by the legislative

authority that, as a matter of public policy, the failure of a person
to turn over the proceeds of the sale of goods covered by a trust
receipt or to return said goods if not sold is a public nuisance to be
abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.—Such
pronouncement was thoroughly explained in Lee vs. Rodil (supra)
thus: “Verily, PD 115 is a declaration by the legislative authority
that, as a matter of public policy, the failure of a person to turn
over the proceeds of the sale of goods covered by a trust receipt or
to return said goods if not sold is a public nuisance to be abated by
the imposition of penal sanctions. As held in Lozano vs. Martinez
(146 SCRA 323, 338): x x x certainly, it is within the authority of
the lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious
and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only
acts that the law can punish. An act may not be considered by
society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but because
of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed
and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The State can do
https://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017c15686a035db879a2000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 1/18
this in the exercise of its police power. In fine, PD 115 is a valid

exercise of police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional
provision of non-imprisonment for non-payment of debt.”
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Evidence; Testimony of a

witness should be admitted despite the failure of the proponent to
offer it formally in evidence, as required by Section 34 of Rule 132.
—Anent the second issue, the pivotal question is: Should the testi-
217
VOL. 304, MARCH 4, 1999 217
mony of a witness be admitted despite the failure of the proponent

to offer it formally in evidence, as required by Section 34 of Rule
132? We rule on this issue in the affirmative. x x x As aptly
stressed by the Solicitor General in his Comment, “the absence of
the words, ‘we are formally offering the testimony for the purpose
of . . .’ ” should be considered merely as an excusable oversight on
the part of the private prosecutor. It should be borne in mind that
the rationale behind Section 34 of Rule 132 is to inform the Court
of the purpose of the testimony, to enable the judge to rule
whether the said testimony is necessary or is irrelevant or
immaterial.
Same; Same; Same; The tendency of the rules on evidence, is

towards substantial justice rather than strict adherence to
technicalities.—The tendency of the rules on evidence, is towards
substantial justice rather than strict adherence to technicalities.
To condemn the disputed testimony as inadmissible due to the
failure of the private prosecutor to properly observe the rules on
presentation of evidence, would render nugatory, and defeat the
proceedings before the lower court.
Same; Same; Same; It is not essential to the competence of a

lay witness to express opinions on the genuineness of handwritings
that he did see the person in question write.—On the third issue—
whether or not the witness can testify on subject documents
introduced as evidence despite her admission that she did not see
the accused sign the said exhibits, we likewise rule in the
affirmative. x x x It is not essential to the competence of a lay

witness to express opinions on the genuineness of handwritings
that he did see the person in question write. It is enough that the
witness has so adopted the same into business transactions as to
induce a reasonable presumption and belief of genuineness of the
document. This is due to the fact that in the ordinary course of
business, documents purporting to be written or signed by that
person have been habitually submitted to the witness, or where
knowledge of handwriting is acquired by him in an official
capacity.
Same; Constitutional Law; Due Process; Where a party has

been afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but
failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process.—
The most basic tenet of due process is the right to be heard.
Where a party had been afforded an opportunity to participate in
the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of
deprivation of due process. Due
218
process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity

to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited
without violating the Bill of Rights.
Same; Motions; Lawyers should never presume that their

motions for postponement would be granted.—Records show that
in this case the defense counsel did not even bother to appear for
the scheduled reception of evidence for his client on January 7,
1991, notwithstanding the fact that the trial court did not act
upon, much less grant, the Urgent Motion for Postponement
which he filed on January 4, 1991. Lawyers should never presume
that their motions for postponement would be granted.
Same; Same; Action thereon will not be disturbed by appellate

courts, in the absence of clear and manifest abuse of discretion
resulting in a denial of substantial justice.—A motion for
continuance or postponement is not a matter of right. It is
addressed to the sound discretion of the Court. Action thereon will

not be disturbed by appellate courts, in the absence of clear and
manifest abuse of discretion resulting in a denial of substantial
justice.
Same; Same; Motions for postponement are generally frowned

upon by courts if there is evidence of bad faith, malice of
inexcusable negligence on the part of the movant.—Motions for
postponement are generally frowned upon by courts if there is
evidence of bad faith, malice or inexcusable negligence on the part
of the movant. The inadvertence of the defense counsel in failing
to take note of the trial dates and in belatedly informing the trial
court of any conflict in his schedules of trial or court appearances,
constitutes inexcusable negligence. It should be borne in mind
that a client is bound by his counsel’s conduct, negligence and
mistakes in handling the case.
Administrative Law; Attorneys; A lawyer has a responsibility

to assist in the proper and sound administration of justice.—A
lawyer as an officer of the court is part of the judicial machinery
in the administration of justice. As such, he has a responsibility to
assist in the proper and sound administration of justice. Like the
court itself, he is an instrument to advance its ends and the
speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and inexpensive adjudication
of cases. A lawyer should not only help to attain these objectives.
He should also avoid improper practices that impede, obstruct or
prevent their realiza-
219
VOL. 304, MARCH 4, 1999 219
tion, charged as he is with the primary task of assisting the court

in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Jose R. Ebro, Jr. for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for review by certiorari under Section 2,

Rule 125, in relation to Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules
1
of
Court to correct, reverse and annul the decision2
of the
Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment of the trial
court convicting the petitioner herein for a violation of the
Trust Receipts Law.
Petitioner Jesus V. Tiomico, (Tiomico) opened a Letter of
Credit with the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) for
$5,600 to be used for the importation of two (2) units of
Forklifts, Shovel loader and a truck mounted with crane.
On October 29, 1982, the said machineries were received by
the accused, as evidenced by the covering trust receipt.
Upon maturity of the trust receipt, on December 28, 1982,
he made a partial payment of US$855.94, thereby leaving
an unpaid obligation of US$4,770.46. As of December 21,
1989, Tiomico owed BPI US$4,770.46 or P109,386.65,
computed at P22.93 per US dollar, the rate of exchange at
the time. Failing to pay the said amount or to deliver
subject machineries and equip-
_________________
1 CA G.R. No. 11977, promulgated on May 31, 1995 by the Fifth

Division of Court of Appeals, with Justice Martin, Jr., ponente and
Justices Morales and Ramirez, members.
2 Criminal Case No. 33723, dated Jan. 28, 1991, Branch 133 of the RTC
of Makati, MM penned by Judge Buenaventura J. Guerrero (now Justice
of the Court of Appeals).
220

ments, despite several demands, the International

Operations Department of BPI referred the matter to the
Legal Department of the bank. But the letter of demand
sent to him notwithstanding, Tiomico failed to satisfy his
monetary obligation sued upon.
Consequently, he was accused of a violation of PD 115,
otherwise known
3
as the Trust Receipts Law, under an
Information alleging:
“That on or about the 29th day of October, 1982, in the

Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, executed a Trust Receipt Agreement for and in behalf of
Paramount Calibrators Merchandising of which he is the sole
proprietor in favor of the Bank of the Philippine Islands in
consideration of the receipt by the said accused of three (3) bares
one unit Forklift Model FD-30 Toyota Branch 2-J70 Hp and one
unit Forklift Model LM-301 Toyota Branch 2-J70 Hp, and one
unit shovel loader Model SOT 130 HP, 6 Cyl-LC #2-16860, for
which there is now due the sum of US$5,600.00, wherein the
accused agreed to sell the same and with the express obligation to
remit to the complainant-bank the proceeds of the sale, and/or to
turn over the same if not sold, on demand, but the accused once in
possession of the said items, far from complying with his
obligation, with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
misapply and convert the same to his own personal use and
benefit despite repeated demands, failed and refused and still
fails and refuses to account for and/or remit the proceeds of the
sale thereof, to the damage and prejudice of the said complainant-
bank as represented by Lourdes V. Palomo in the aforementioned
amount of US $5,600 or its equivalent in Philippine currency.
Contrary to law.”
Arraigned thereunder, Tiomico entered a plea of Not

Guilty, at which juncture, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
John B. Egana manifested that he was authorizing the
private prosecutor, Atty. Jose B. Soncuya, to prosecute the
case subject to his direction, supervision and control.
_______________
3 Rollo, p. 128.
221
VOL. 304, MARCH 4, 1999 221

On October 16, 1989, Gretel S. Donato was presented to

testify for the prosecution. According to her, she worked for
the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) in 1981 and in
1982, she was assigned as one of the Letter of Credit
processors in the International Operations Department of

BPI. Her duty, among others, was to process letter of credit
applications which included that of Tiomico. The trust
receipt executed by the latter was given to her as part of
the documents supporting his Letter of Credit.
The following documents presented in the course of the
testimony of Donato were identified by her as follows:
(1) Exhibit “A”—Letter of Credit;

(2) Exhibit “B”—Pro Forma Invoice;
(3) Exhibit “C”—Letter of Credit Confirmation;
(4) Exhibit “D”—Trust Receipt; Exhibits D1-D4—signatures
thereon;
(5) Exhibit “E”—Statement of Account, the amount of
P306,708.17 appearing therein, as Exhibit E-1, and the
signature thereto of an unidentified bank officer, as
Exhibit E-2;
(6) Exhibit “F” Letter of Demand of the bank’s legal
department; a return card, as Exhibit F-1, and the
signature of the addressee’s agent, as Exhibit F-1 A.
Counsel for petitioner objected to the admission of Exhibits

“A,” “B,” “C” and “D” on the ground that witness failed to
identify the said documents inasmuch as her testimony
regarding the signatures appearing therein were evidently
hearsay. But the trial court admitted the said documentary
evidence, despite the objections raised thereto by the
defense. Thereafter, the prosecution rested.
After the People rested its case, petitioner begged leave
to file a demurrer to the evidence, theorizing that the
evidence on record does not suffice to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the accusation against him. But instead
of granting the said motion of the defense, the trial court
ordered a re-opening of the case, so as to enable the
prosecution to adduce more evidence. The defense objected
but to no avail. The trial court
222

proceeded with the continuation of trial “in the interest of

justice.”
On September 5, 1990, the lower court denied the
demurrer to evidence. The Motion for Reconsideration of
the defense met the same fate. It was denied. The case was
then set for continuation of trial on December 12, 1990.
Reception of evidence for the defense was set on January 7,
1991. But on January 4, 1991, three days before the
scheduled continuation of trial, the defense counsel filed an
Urgent Motion for Postponement for the given reason that
he had to appear before Branch 12 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila on January 7, 1991.
On January 7, 1991, the lower court denied the Urgent
Motion for Postponement and adjudged petitioner to have
waived the right to introduce evidence on his behalf.
On January 30, 1991, the trial court promulgated its
decision finding petitioner guilty of a violation of PD 115,
and sentencing him accordingly.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals came out with a
judgment of affirmance, the dispositive portion of which, is
to the following effect:
“WHEREFORE, the Court finds JESUS V. TIOMICO guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of violation of PD 115 and is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of
prision mayor, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum; to indemnify Bank of the Philippine
Islands the sum of P109,386.65
4
and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.”
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the

Petition for 5Review by Certiorari at bar, seeking to annul
the decision of the Court of Appeals; raising as issues:
_______________
4 RTC Decision, p. 4; Rollo, p. 134.

5 Promulgated on May 31, 1995 by the Fifth Division of Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. No. 11977.
223
VOL. 304, MARCH 4, 1999 223

(1) WHETHER OR NOT PD 115 OR TRUST RECEIPTS

LAW IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL;
(2) WHETHER OR NOT A TESTIMONY CAN BE
ADMITTED DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF FORMAL
OFFER AS REQUIRED BY SECTIONS 34 AND 35,
RULE 132, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT;
(3) WHETHER OR NOT THE TESTIMONY OF WITNESS
WITH REGARD TO THE LETTER OF CREDIT AND
OTHER DOCUMENT IS HEARSAY; AND
(4) WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS DEPRIVATION OF
DUE PROCESS ON THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
WHEN THE TRIAL COURT DENIED THE MOTION
FOR POSTPONEMENT BY THE DEFENSE COUNSEL.
As regards the first issue, the Court has repeatedly upheld

the validity of the Trust Receipts Law and consistently
declared that the said law does not violate the
constitutional proscription against imprisonment for non-
payment of debts. (People vs. Cuevo, 104 SCRA 312; People
vs. Nitafan, 207 SCRA 726; Lee vs. Rodil, 175 SCRA 100).
Such pronouncement was thoroughly explained in Lee vs.
Rodil (supra) thus:
“Verily, PD 115 is a declaration by the legislative authority that,

as a matter of public policy, the failure of a person to turn over
the proceeds of the sale of goods covered by a trust receipt or to
return said goods if not sold is a public nuisance to be abated by
the imposition of penal sanctions. As held in Lozano vs. Martinez
(146 SCRA 323, 338):
x x x certainly, it is within the authority of the lawmaking body to

proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare.
Acts mala in se are not the only acts that the law can punish. An act may
not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se,
but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be
outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The State can
do this in the exercise of its police power.
224

In fine, PD 115 is a valid exercise of police power and is not

repugnant to the constitutional provision of non-imprisonment for
non-payment of debt.”
In a similar vein, the case of People vs. Nitafan (supra)

held:
“The Trust Receipts Law punishes the dishonesty and abuse of

confidence in the handling of money or goods to the prejudice of
another regardless of whether the latter is the owner or not. The
law does not seek to enforce payment of a loan. Thus, there can be
no violation of the right against imprisonment for non-payment of
a debt.”
Anent the second issue, the pivotal question is: Should the
testimony of a witness be admitted despite the failure of
the proponent to offer it formally
6
in evidence, as required
by Section 34 of Rule 132? We rule on this issue in the
affirmative. Records disclose that the private prosecutor
stated the purpose of the testimony in question although
7
he
did not formally offer the same. The proceedings went on
as follows:
“ATTY. SONCUYA:
The purpose of the testimony of the witness is to prove
that the accused applied for a letter of credit, for the
opening of a letter of credit and for the importation of
machinery from Japan and that those machinery were
delivered and received by the accused as evidenced by
the trust receipt and that the accused failed to comply
with the terms and conditions of the said trust receipt,
your Honor.
COURT:
All right, proceed.”
_________________
6 Sec. 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court states that: “OFFER
OF EVIDENCE—The Court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must
be specified.”
7 T.s.n., p. 2, February 5, 1990.
225
VOL. 304, MARCH 4, 1999 225

8
As aptly stressed by the Solicitor General in his Comment,
“the absence of the words, ‘we are formally offering the
testimony for the purpose of . . .’ ” should be considered
merely as an excusable oversight on the part of the private
prosecutor.
It should be borne in9 mind that the rationale behind
Section 34 of Rule 132 is to inform the Court of the
purpose of the testimony, to enable the judge to rule
whether the said testimony is necessary or is irrelevant or
immaterial.
In the case under scrutiny, since the purpose of subject
testimony was succinctly stated, the reason behind the
requirement for its formal offer has been substantially
complied with. What the defense counsel should have done
should have been to interpose his objection the moment the
private respondent was called to testify, on the 10
ground that
there was no prior offer made by the proponent.
The tendency of the rules on evidence, is towards
substantial justice rather than strict adherence to
technicalities. To condemn the disputed testimony as
inadmissible due to the failure of the private prosecutor to
properly observe the rules on presentation of evidence,
would render nugatory, and defeat the proceedings before
the lower court.
On the third issue—whether or not the witness can
testify on subject documents introduced as evidence despite
her admission that she did not see the accused sign the
said exhibits, we likewise rule in the affirmative.
11
As aptly held by the appellate court:
“Gretel Donato testified that she was not present when appellant
affixed his signature on the documents in question (p. 22, ibid.).
She, however, identified the signatures thereon (Exhs. “A-1,” “A-
2,” “D-1,” “D-2” and “D-3,” Letter of Credit; Exhibit B—Pro Forma
In-
________________
8 Rollo, p. 178.
9 Catuira vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 398, p. 402, citing the Minutes of the
Revision of Rules Committee, 8 October 1986, p. 5.
10 Ibid., p. 400.
11 CA Decision, p. 8; Rollo, p. 140.
226

voice; Exhibit C—Letter of Credit Confirmation; Exhibit D—Trust

Receipt; Exhibits D1-D4—signatures thereon; pp. 129 and 132 of
Orig. Rec.) as those of the appellant Jesus V. Tiomico arising from
her familiarity therewith inasmuch as she was the one who
processed the papers pertinent to the transactions between the
appel-lant and the complainant bank (TSN, Feb. 5, 1990, pp. 4-6).
Her testimony, therefore, cannot be considered hearsay because it
is principally based on her personal knowledge of bank
transactions and the documents and records which she processes
in the regular course of the bank’s business operations.”
It is not essential to the competence of a lay witness to

express opinions on the genuineness of 12handwritings that
he did see the person in question write. It is enough that
the witness has so adopted the same into business
transactions as to induce a reasonable presumption and
belief of genuineness of the document. This is due to the
fact that in the ordinary course of business, documents
purporting to be written or signed by that person have been
habitually submitted to the witness, or where knowledge 13
of
handwriting is acquired by him in an official capacity.
Did the witness gain familiarity with the signature of
the accused? The answer is yes. Exhibits “A” to “D”: Letter
of Credit, Pro-Forma Invoice, Letter of Credit Confirmation
and Trust Receipt, respectively, were all familiar to the
witness since the said documents bearing the signature of
the accused were all submitted to her for processing. It is
therefore beyond cavil that she acquired sufficient
familiarity to make witness competent to testify on the
signatures appearing in subject documents. From the time
of the application to its approval and when Tiomico
defaulted, she (witness) was the one who had overseen the
transactions and recommended the actions to be taken
thereon. As a matter of fact, she was the one who referred
the failure of Tiomico to pay his balance to the Legal
Department of BPI, prompting the said legal department to

send him (Tiomico) a demand letter.
___________________
12 Francisco, Revised Rules of Court: Evidence, p. 440, 1973 ed.

13 20 Am Jur, 703.
227
VOL. 304, MARCH 4, 1999 227

Furthermore, whether there was due execution or

authenticity of such documents was impliedly admitted by
the accused. On this point, we quote with approval 14
the
conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals, to wit:
“On the other hand, appellant impliedly admitted the due exe-
cution of the assailed documents considering that he did not deny
the fact that he opened a letter of credit. Neither did he deny that
the signature appearing thereon is his. What appellant intended
to dispute was merely the balance of his past due account with
the complainant bank, thus:
‘COURT
Denied.
What is the defense of the accused?
Denial that he opened the letter of credit.
ATTY. EBRO
No, your honor.
COURT: What is the defense?
x x x x x x x x x
ATTY. EBRO
Q: —Now you identified signatures allegedly of the
accused on Exhibit A, which is the application for the
letter of credit, I ask you Miss Donato, were you
personally present when this signature was affixed to
the document?
A —(witness going over Exhibit A) I was the one of the
ones who processed the letter of credit.
ATTY. EBRO
May we ask for an order directing that the witness res
pond to my question.
COURT
Just answer the question.
WITNESS
A —No, sir.
COURT
Does the accused deny the signature?
______________
14 CA Decision, p. 12; Rollo, p. 143.
228

ATTY. EBRO
No, your Honor. I am just showing also that she has been
exaggerating.
(TSN, Feb. 5, 1990, pp. 12-13, p. 22)”
that the documents under scrutiny are admissible in

evidence,as held by the trial court.
Anent the fourth issue, petitioner theorizes that the denial
of the motion for postponement sent in by his lawyer
violated his constitutional right to due process.
It should be stressed that subject Urgent Motion for
Post-ponement was not the first motion for resetting ever
presented by the counsel for petitioner. On December 12,
1990, upon motion of the latter, and without objection on
the part of the prosecution, the reception of evidence for the
defense was reset once more to January 7, 1991, at 8:30 in
the morning.
The most basic tenet of due process is the right to be
heard. Where a party had been afforded an opportunity to
participate in the proceedings but failed to15
do so, he cannot
complain of deprivation of due process. Due process is
satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to

be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed 16
waived or
forfeited without violating the Bill of Rights.
It is further theorized by petitioner that the lower court
should have at least granted him another trial date so as to
enable him to present his evidence, so that the denial of his
Urgent Motion for Postponement infringed his
17
constitutional right to be heard by himself and by counsel.
This submission is unsustainable.
When an accused is accorded a chance to present
evidence on his behalf but due to his repeated unjustifiable
failure to
_______________
15 Loong vs. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 1.

16 Comendador vs. De Villa, GR No. 93177, August 2, 1991, 200 SCRA
82, 89.
17 Petition, p. 50; Rollo, p. 59.
229
VOL. 304, MARCH 4, 1999 229

appear at the trial without any justification, the lower

court orders the case submitted for decision on the basis of
the evidence on record, said judicial action is not tainted
with grave abuse of discretion because in such a case, the
accused is deemed to18 have waived the right to adduce
evidence on his behalf.
Furthermore, records show that in this case the defense
counsel did not even bother to appear for the scheduled
reception of evidence for his client on January 7, 1991,
notwithstanding the fact that the trial court did not act
upon, much less grant, the Urgent Motion for
Postponement which he filed on January 4, 1991. Lawyers
should never presume
19
that their motions for postponement
would be granted.
A motion for continuance or postponement is not a
matter of right. It is addressed to the sound discretion of
the Court. Action thereon will not be disturbed by appellate
courts, in the absence of clear and manifest abuse 20

of
discretion resulting in a denial of substantial justice.
Motions for postponement are generally frowned upon
by courts if there is evidence of bad faith, malice 21
or
inexcusable negligence on the part of the movant. The
inadvertence of the defense counsel in failing to take note
of the trial dates and in belatedly informing the trial court
of any conflict in his schedules of trial or court
appearances, constitutes inexcusable negligence. It should
be borne in mind that a client is
________________
18 Siguian vs. People, GR No. 82197, March 13, 1989, citing People vs.
Angco, 103 Phil. 33 (1958).
19 Videogram Regulatory Board vs. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 50.
20 Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
122629, promulgated December 2, 1998, citing the cases Belstar
Transportation, Inc. vs. Board of Transportation, 181 SCRA 209, 213
(1990), Alcaraz vs. Racino, 125 SCRA 328, 334 (1983), Sumadchat vs. CA,
111 SCRA 488.
21 Ching Heng So vs. Tan Boon Kong, 53 Phil. 437.
230

bound by his counsel’s

22
conduct, negligence and mistakes in
handling the case.
As gleanable from the records:
“x x x Attached to the motion is the Order of said court dated

November 19, 1990. Obviously, when the case was called on
December 12, 1990, the counsel for the accused had already
known of the scheduled hearing before the Metropolitan Trial
Court, yet he agreed to the hearing on January 7, 1991. Counsel’s
conduct is not consistent with the thrust of the Judiciary to
expedite the termination23
of cases under the Mandatory
Continuous Trial x x x.”
A lawyer as an officer of the court is part of the judicial

machinery in the administration of justice. As such, he has
a responsibility to assist in the proper and sound
administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an

instrument to advance its ends and the speedy, efficient,
impartial, correct and inexpensive adjudication of cases. A
lawyer should not only help to attain these objectives. He
should also avoid improper practices that impede, obstruct
or prevent their realization, charged as he is with the
primary task of assisting the court 24
in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.
Petitioner invites attention to the Affidavit of Desistance
by the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI). This issue
raised by the petitioner cannot be entertained
25
as it was
only raised for the first time on appeal.
Considering that the assailed decision is firmly anchored
on prevailing law and established jurisprudence, the Court
cannot help but deny the petition.
________________
22 Suarez vs. Court of Appeals, 220 SCRA 274.

23 RTC Order dated January 7, 1991, p. 1; Rollo, p. 126.
24 Agpalo, The Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers, First
Ed., p. 127, cited in pages 13-14 of CA Decision, Rollo, pp. 145-146.
25 C. Alcantara Sons, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission,
229 SCRA 109.
231
VOL. 304, MARCH 4, 1999 231

Soriano vs. Court of Appeals
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of

the Court of Appeals, dated May 31, 1995, affirming the
judgment of conviction rendered on January 28, 1991 by
the court of origin AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Romero (Chairman) and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ.,

concur.
Vitug, J., Abroad on official business.
Panganiban, J., On leave.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Note.—The essence of due process is the opportunity to

be heard. (Ysmael vs. Court of Appeals, 273 SCRA 165
[1997])
——o0o——
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Tiomico v. CA

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9/24/21, 9:20 AM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 304

216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

JESUS V. TIOMICO, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT

Constitutional Law; Trust Receipts Law; Court upheld the

Same; Same; PD 115 is a declaration by the legislative

this in the exercise of its police power. In fine, PD 115 is a valid

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Evidence; Testimony of a

VOL. 304, MARCH 4, 1999 217

Tiomico vs. Court of Appeals

mony of a witness be admitted despite the failure of the proponent

Same; Same; Same; The tendency of the rules on evidence, is

Same; Same; Same; It is not essential to the competence of a

affirmative. x x x It is not essential to the competence of a lay

Same; Constitutional Law; Due Process; Where a party has

218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Tiomico vs. Court of Appeals

process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity

Same; Motions; Lawyers should never presume that their

Same; Same; Action thereon will not be disturbed by appellate

addressed to the sound discretion of the Court. Action thereon will

Same; Same; Motions for postponement are generally frowned

Administrative Law; Attorneys; A lawyer has a responsibility

VOL. 304, MARCH 4, 1999 219

Tiomico vs. Court of Appeals

tion, charged as he is with the primary task of assisting the court

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This is a petition for review by certiorari under Section 2,

1 CA G.R. No. 11977, promulgated on May 31, 1995 by the Fifth

220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ments, despite several demands, the International

“That on or about the 29th day of October, 1982, in the

Arraigned thereunder, Tiomico entered a plea of Not

VOL. 304, MARCH 4, 1999 221

On October 16, 1989, Gretel S. Donato was presented to

processors in the International Operations Department of

(1) Exhibit “A”—Letter of Credit;

Counsel for petitioner objected to the admission of Exhibits

222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

proceeded with the continuation of trial “in the interest of

“WHEREFORE, the Court finds JESUS V. TIOMICO guilty

Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the

4 RTC Decision, p. 4; Rollo, p. 134.

VOL. 304, MARCH 4, 1999 223

(1) WHETHER OR NOT PD 115 OR TRUST RECEIPTS

As regards the first issue, the Court has repeatedly upheld

“Verily, PD 115 is a declaration by the legislative authority that,

x x x certainly, it is within the authority of the lawmaking body to

224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In fine, PD 115 is a valid exercise of police power and is not

In a similar vein, the case of People vs. Nitafan (supra)

“The Trust Receipts Law punishes the dishonesty and abuse of

VOL. 304, MARCH 4, 1999 225

226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

voice; Exhibit C—Letter of Credit Confirmation; Exhibit D—Trust

It is not essential to the competence of a lay witness to

Department of BPI, prompting the said legal department to

12 Francisco, Revised Rules of Court: Evidence, p. 440, 1973 ed.

VOL. 304, MARCH 4, 1999 227

Furthermore, whether there was due execution or

14 CA Decision, p. 12; Rollo, p. 143.

228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

that the documents under scrutiny are admissible in

satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to