Risks analysis for already existent electric lifelines in
case of seismic disaster
Eduardo De Francesco
SETEL,
Rome, Italy
e.defrancesco@setelgroup.it
Abstract— After the description of FMECA methodology applied
to vulnerability evaluations typically in electronic context, an its
use is suggested for powerline in case of earthquakes. The
procedure gives a series of quantification risk tables which
correctly filled give the indication of the probability risk for each
harm of the electric network becoming an useful instrument to
preventively fix where primarily act in case of a disaster.
Keywords-component: lifelines, engineering of lifelines, electric
lifelines, risk management, FMECA.
I. INTRODUCTION
Lifelines are structures that are important or critical for a
community to function, such as, pipelines (liquid fuel and
natural gas), powerlines, water, sewers, communications,
roadways and port facilities (airports, highways, ports, rail and
transit) [1].
In case of a disaster, as earthquakes, tsunamis, tornados or
very big snowfalls, the correct work of lifelines or a their very
quick re-establishment assure a mitigation of further damages
to persons and things.
The approach versus the lifelines can be planning in case
of new plants or addressed to detect their criticalities in case of
plants already existent.
In the first case the Lifelines definition process involves
getting utility and transportation network operators together
within a region or metropolitan area. Inputs are also provided
from scientists, engineers, emergency managers, insurers and
planners. In this way, Lifelines Projects represent a collective
physical risk management process[2]. This approach is
particularly useful during the designing of new plants and it is
so promising that it is born a new engineering branch the
“Lifeline Engineering”[3] which challenges faced are in
continuing to reduce the vulnerability of the systems to
disasters. This way to view the problem is particularly diffuse
in some “young” countries as New Zealand or Australia and in
USA.
The second approach is instead particularly useful in all
countries where the plants and the lifelines are already existent
and build before that innovative legislation on disasters has
been adopted. For these countries, a correct screening and
knowledge of the lifelines is the key for a quick emergency
response and to recover after a natural disaster, the elective
978-1-4577-1829-8/12/$26.00 ©2012 IEEE
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Fabio Leccese
Dipartimento di Ingegneria Elettronica
Università degli Studi “Roma Tre”
Rome, Italy
leccese@uniroma3.it
nation for this approach is probably Italy, which has at the
same:
• high population density;
• medium risk of disaster due to earthquakes but a big
damages risk for things and persons because of old
buildings and structures design and realizations
overlapped during almost 3,000 years of history;
• last but not least, the artistic importance of a
significant part of these buildings.
In this work will be presented a survey methodology to
evaluate the risk associate with power lines.
II. FMECA METHODOLOGY
Failure mode, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA)[4]
is an extension of failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA).
FMEA[5,6] is a bottom-up, inductive analytical method which
may be performed at either the functional or piece-part level.
FMECA extends FMEA by including a criticality analysis,
which is used to chart the probability of failure modes against
the severity of their consequences. The result highlights failure
modes with relatively high probability and severity of
consequences, allowing remedial effort to be directed where it
will produce the greatest value.
The FMECA analysis procedure typically consists of the
following logical steps:
• Define the system and its mission
• Define base rules and assumptions in order to help
drive the design
• Construct system block diagrams
• Identify failure modes (piece part level or functional)
• Analyze failure effects/causes
• Feed results back into design process
• Classify the failure effects by severity
• Perform criticality calculations
• Rank failure mode criticality
 • Determine critical items
• Feed results back into design process
• Identify the means of failure detection, isolation and
compensation
• Perform maintainability analysis
• Document the analysis, summarize uncorrectable
design areas, identify special controls necessary to
reduce failure risk
• Make recommendations
• Follow up on corrective
implementation/effectiveness
FMECA may be performed at the functional or piece part
level. The first case considers the effects of failure at the
functional block level while the second considers the effects of
individual component failures. This last requires far more
effort, but is sometimes preferred because it relies more on
quantitative data and less an engineering judgment than a
functional FMECA.
The criticality analysis may be quantitative or qualitative,
depending on the availability of supporting part failure data.
1) System definition
In this first phase, the whole complex system is fully
defined and subdivided into a hierarchy structure made of
subsystems, units and piece parts. For the system and for
subsystems will be provided a functional descriptions that
cover all operational modes and mission phases.
2) Ground rules and assumptions
In this step, base rules and assumptions are defined and
agreed. This might include, for example:
• Standardized mission profile with specific own
associated time
• Sources for failure rate and failure mode data
• Identification of which faults the built-in test will
realize
• Whether the analysis will be functional or piece part
• Definition of criteria (mission abort,
maintenance, etc.)
• Procedures and systems for uniquely identifying parts
or functions
• Severity category definitions
3) Block diagrams
In this third step is built a structure, normally a tree, that
links systems and subsystems viewed as functional block to
highlight the information flow at different levels of system
hierarchy. The structure helps to identify critical paths and
interfaces, and identifies the higher level effects of lower level
failures.
4) Failure mode identification
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Next, a complete list of failure modes is developed for
each piece part or each function covered by the analysis. For
functional FMECA, typical failure modes include:
• Inopportune operations or maneuvers
• Inability and failures to operate when is required
• Loss of output
• Intermittent output
• Wrong output (given the current condition)
• Wrong output (for any condition)
action
The FMECA analysis specific for piece part could be made
exploiting the databases which provide their failure mode
ratios and failure mode. A matrix will have on the columns the
function or piece part analyzed and in the rows the failure
modes. Because the large data quantity, a single identifier is
usually assigned to each function or piece part, and to each
failure mode of each item.
5) Failure effects analysis
Considering the criteria identified in the base rules, step 2,
for each row of the FMECA matrix, failure effects are
determined. Effects are described before for local, then for
higher, and end (system) levels. These effects may include:
• System failure
• Degraded operation
• System status failure
• No immediate effect
All failure effect categories used at various hierarchical
levels are suitable used by the analyst by engineering
judgment.
6) Severity classification
After that, for each failure mode of each unique item is
assigned the severity classification and filled on the FMECA
matrix, based upon system level consequences. Usually the
severity levels have from 3 to 10 steps.
7) Failure detection methods
The ability of the system to detect and report the failure in
safety, question is analyzed for each component and failure mode.
One of the following will be entered on each row of the
FMECA matrix:
• Normal: indicates a safe condition
• Abnormal: indicates a malfunction so it is necessary
to take an action
• Incorrect: indicates a safe condition in the event of
malfunction, or alerts to a malfunction that does not
exist (false alarm)
8) Criticality ranking
Failure mode analysis could be qualitative or quantitative.
In the first case, a mishap probability code is assigned and
inserted in the matrix. Using severity code as one axis and
probability level code as the other, the failure mode may then
be charted on a criticality matrix. For quantitative assessment,
for each failure mode of each item it is necessary to calculate
Cm (modal criticality number), and, for each item, Cr (item
criticality number). These numbers are computed as Cm= λp α
β t and ∑ considering the following values:
• Basic failure rate λp
• Failure mode ratio α
• Conditional probability β
• Mission phase duration t
where λp derived from a failure rate prediction based on
defined model. α is provided by a database source obviously
to correctly assign failure mode ratio for functional level
FMECA it is necessary an engineering judgment. β represents
the conditional probability that the failure effect will result in
the identified severity classification, given that the failure
mode occurs. It represents the analyst's best judgment as to the
likelihood that the loss will occur. Using either Cm or Cr on
one axis and severity code on the other a criticality matrix may
be charted for graphical analysis.
9) Critical item/failure mode list
Once the criticality assessment is completed for each
failure mode of each item, the FMECA matrix may be sorted
by severity and qualitative probability level or quantitative
criticality number. This enables the analysis to identify critical
items and critical failure modes for which design mitigation is
desired.
10) Recommendations
The natural output of FMECA are recommendations which
are made in this step to design to reduce the consequences of
critical failures. The most common are the selection of higher
reliability components, the reduction of the stress level at
which a critical item operates and the adding of redundancy or
monitoring to the system.
11) Maintainability analysis
Maintainability Analysis and Logistics Support Analysis
require data from the FMECA.
12) FMECA report
At the end the FMECA gives a report consisting of system
description, base rules and assumptions, conclusions and
recommendations, corrective actions to be tracked, and the
attached FMECA matrix.
The real strengths of FMECA include are surely:
• Comprehensiveness
• systematic establishment of relationships between
failure causes and effects
• its ability to point out individual failure modes for
corrective action in design.
Unluckily this is paid as
• extensive labor required
• large number of trivial cases considered
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• inability to deal with multiple-failure scenarios or
unplanned cross-system effects[4].
III. FMECA APPLIED TO POWERLINE
The idea developed in this article is to try to associate the
FMECA methodology in a field unusual as the behavior of a
powerline during an earthquake.
1) Reliability
Considering that the reliability is the ability of a person or
system to perform and maintain its functions in routine
circumstances, as well as hostile or unexpected circumstances.
To apply this concept to a powerline means to measure the
probability that this system does not breakdown and
warranties the connection after a possible calamity.
The probability depends by three elements:
• Vulnerability of the network harms;
• Level of network interconnection;
• Importance of each network harms.
The Knowledge of the vulnerability means to know which
are the network weak points and to associate them the possible
effects.
2) Mission
The mission is to study the powerline vulnerability in case
of an earthquake (0÷8 Richter’s scale) in area far from sea, so
avoiding tsunami scenario, but considering a series of possible
negative situations as the presence of little dams or little fuel
tanks.
3) Power line structures
A power line can be represented as in Fig. 1:
Fig. 1 Simplified diagram of AC electricity distribution from generation
stations to consumers. Transmission system elements are shown in blue,
distribution system elements are in green.
From the figure is possible to identify the characteristic
elements of an AC electricity distribution
• Generating Station included the Step up Transformer
• High Voltage Transmission line composed by pylons
and cables
• Substation with step down transformer (HV/MV)
 • Medium Voltage Transmission line composed by
pylons and cables
• Substation with step down transformer (MV/LV)
• Low Voltage Transmission line composed by simple
pylons, pylons with MV/LV transformers and cables.
For each of these elements has to be find the possible
threats of failures.
For generating station and for substations the possible
menaces are the collapse of the civil structures which could
break the connections and/or cabinets and/or switches causing
the stop of the production. The station could be subjected to
inundation if closed to rivers, lakes or dams.
Both for HV and for MV lines the problems are joined to
the oscillations which can produce the collapse of the civil
structures as the pylons cement basements, or the metallic
structures of the pylons or the slashes of the cables. Obviously
the proximity with rivers or lakes or dams increases the hazard
for the lines.
For LV transmission line it is important also to consider
the proximity with buildings, or pylons with a MV/LV
transformer mounted on top for which the easiness that the
pylon falls down rises.
4) Objiective
In this paragraph we will try to define a quick
methodology which allows to characterize the vulnerability of
a powerline in emergency phase where a lower decision time
is requested.
The proposed model is based on a series of analysis tables
and an evaluation form obtained considering the parameters
which can affect on the network vulnerability. The application
of this methodology forecasts a first step in which the state of
the network is verified, after that, considering the indexes
representative of the system conditions, a filling of the
analysis form is executed. The last step forecasts a weigh sum
of the previous data which gives an indicative value of the
harm network vulnerability. Then the results can be shown by
graphs or implemented on software.
To characterize the vulnerability, it is necessary to know
the specific elements characterizing the powerline findable
studying the electric project and the collateral elements
definable only through a survey methodologically fixed. In the
first case it is possible to talk of intrinsic vulnerability while,
in the second, of extrinsic one.
For each harm of the line will be necessary to find firstly
generic characteristics as length, a summary description of the
way, the type of line (high voltage, medium voltage, low
voltage), the presence of ramification, the provider; secondly,
a more detailed filing which describes if there are some
sensible point as art buildings or extremely important
buildings for safety coordination as government palaces or
firemen, police, army buildings or hospitals.
After that it is possible to evaluate the vulnerability of the
network through the association of a characteristic index for
each network harm.
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5) Organization of the analysis form and characteristic
indexes
The analysis form is imposed in such a way to describe in
details the parameters which have to be detected. The form is
composed by a series of tables which each one describes
different characteristic elements of the same portion of the
network.
In the proposed methodology the indexes vary in the range
0÷5 for intrinsic vulnerability analysis, while for multi-risk
area (extrinsic vulnerability) the indexes are worsen.
6) Survey
To characterize in detail the lifeline by the indexes it is
necessary to have a big quantity of data. A correct survey
should be realized by qualified personnel able to interact with
different public and private realities as towns, little countries
or commodities providers which could have different
sensibility toward the problem. This produce a dispersion of
the information often hardly manageable.
For the characterization of the vulnerability of the
powerline is essential the risk definition which should findable
from the different chart of different risks (seismic, hydro
geologic, hydrologic, fire, industrial) provide by the regional
authority. At this point it is possible to distinguish if the
construction and the maintenance follow the normative. Then
it is useful to know as the power line could interact with the
other lifelines.
A survey so realized should provide all the necessary
information to determine the vulnerability of the powerline.
7) Tables description
For a correct analysis of the network, it is not possible to
consider only the vulnerability of the powerline. This is
punctually evaluated, but it is developed itself also for
hundreds of kilometers; moreover it is not possible to consider
only the geographic element, the environment and its risks,
because the infrastructure interacts with the environment
forming a complex system and the analysis should consider
this interaction.
The first consideration is joined with the risk present in the
area where the powerline is located successively it is
necessary characterize the vulnerability of the elements which
compose the infrastructure.
The first table describes the seismic risk (Table 1).
TABLE I. SEISMIC RISK
Seismic Waggle Liquefaction Active Active
Risk Fault < 500 Fault
m
Low
+5 0 +2 0
Inclination
High
+10 +5 +3 +1
Inclination
For the Seismic risk they have been considered the
waggles, liquefaction of the area, and the presence of a Fault.
 For the Hydro Geologic risk it is important to know if IV. CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
there were or there are landslides in the area. FMECA methodology, typically used in different context,
TABLE II. HIDRO GEOLOGIC RISK has been adopted to trace a route to evaluate the vulnerability
Low High of an important lifeline as the powerline.
Landslide None
Probability Probability
The methodology applied to electric network allows to
Exposition 0 +2 +4 specify which harm of the powerline is most exposed to
damages in case of earthquake so suggesting where more
quickly to act in these scenarios.
Next table shows the Hydrologic risk which depends
exclusively by the height of the site, in case of alluvial water Anyway, at this stage of the work, it is more correct to talk
the risk rises with its height. about future perspectives than conclusions, in fact the FMECA
TABLE III. HIDROLOGIC RISK
methodology has been applied does not considering the
multiple relations and interactions of faults happening to
Alluvial risk High (> 0.2 m) Low (< 0.2 m) None different elements of the electric network, moreover a
Exposition +4 +1 0 modeling approach supported by statistic evaluations could
improve the analysis also permitting to develop an automatic
evaluation risk software.
Table IV shows the vulnerability index for the Electric
Stations. REFERENCES
TABLE IV. ELECTRIC STATION RISK [1] U.S. Geological Survey – Science for a Changing World
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/learn/glossary/?term=lifelines.
< 4 Richter 4 ÷6 Richter 6÷8 Richter ≥ 8 Richter [2] D. Brunsdon, “Lifelines Engineering in New Zealand: A Collective
Scale Scale Scale scale Approach to Earthquake Risk Assessment,” National Lifelines Co-
ordinator, P O Box 588, Wellington, New Zealand
Civil drb@spencerholmes.co.nz.
Structures +1 +2 +4 +5 http://earthquake.tier.org.tw/document/sedmess/s32.pdf.
collapse [3] American Society of Civil Engineers – Technical Council on Lifeline
Earthquake Engineering.
http://www.asce.org/Content.aspx?id=2147488653.
Table V shows the vulnerability index for the HV, MV and [4] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Failure_mode,_effects,_and_criticality_anal
LV Lines. ysis#cite_ref-0.
TABLE V. HV, MV, LV LINES RISK [5] Quality Associates International's History of FMEA
[6] E. Fadlovich, "Performing Failure Mode and Effect Analysis".
< 6 Richter 6÷8 Richter ≥ 8 Richter Embedded Technology, December 31 2007.
Scale Scale scale http://www.embeddedtechmag.com/component/content/article/6134.
Pylons cement +1
+3 +5
basements collapse
Pylons Metallic +1
+3 +5
structures collapse
Slashes of the cables +3 +5 +5

For the Lines, mainly for MV and LV, there could be some
elements that can increase the vulnerability. Table VI shows
these elements.
Elements that Street Fuel Pipeline Telecomu- Proximity
can worsen Lighting or Fuel Tank nication with
the Lines and trees or distributor Cables Buildings
situation
MV Lines 4 4 2 5
HV Lines 2 2 2 3

Summing, for each analyzed electric network harm, the

single indexes of vulnerability presented in the previous tables
it is possible to individuate which are the most problematic
harms and so establish where and how act to avoid
furthermore problems to persons and things in case of a
disaster as an earthquake.

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