Professional Documents
Culture Documents
of Proof
The Purpose of the ICC Confirmation of Charges
Procedure
Triestino Mariniello*
1. Introduction
On 3 June 2013, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
found that the evidence presented by the Prosecutor did not meet the required
threshold for confirming the charges and decided to adjourn the confirmation
* Senior Lecturer in Law, Edge Hill University (UK). This article elaborates upon thoughts that I
have published earlier with Mr Niccolo' Pons. For further details on the previous work, see T.
Mariniello and N. Pons, ‘The Confirmation of Charges at the International Criminal Court: A
Tale of Two Models’, in T. Mariniello (ed.), The International Criminal Court in Search of its
Purpose and Identity (Routledge, 2015) 217^241. I wish to express my gratitude to Dr Peter
Langford and Dr Sergey Vasiliev for their comments on an earlier draft. All errors and omis-
sions remain mine alone. [Mariniet@edgehill.ac.uk]
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Journal of International Criminal Justice 13 (2015), 579^599 doi:10.1093/jicj/mqv035
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580 JICJ 13 (2015), 579^599
hearing in the Gbagbo case pursuant to Article 61(7)(c) of the ICC Statute
(Adjournment Decision).1 The majority of the Pre-Trial Chamber requested ç
for the first time since the establishment of the ICC ç that for the purposes of
the confirmation of charges, the Prosecutor must present her strongest pos-
sible case based on a largely completed investigation. Judge Ferna¤ndez de
Gurmendi (now ICC President) dissented from the majority, by stressing that
the ICC Statute does not establish any obligation for the Prosecutor to submit
to the Chamber all her evidence or to present to the Chamber ‘her strongest
possible case’.2 On 12 June 2014, a different majority committed Laurent
Gbagbo for trial (Confirmation Decision).3 Pre-Trial Chamber I departed from
the approach taken in the Adjournment Decision, by setting aside the ‘largely
completed investigation’ requirement. The majority insisted on the limited
scope and purpose of the confirmation of charges, and asserted that the con-
1 Decision adjourning the hearing on the confirmation of charges pursuant to article 61(7)(c)(i)
of the Rome Statute, Gbagbo (ICC-02/11-01/11-432), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 3 June 2013 (‘Gbagbo
Adjournment Decision’).
2 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ferna¤ndez de Gurmendi, Gbagbo Adjournment Decision, 6 June
2013, x 14 (‘Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ferna¤ndez’).
3 Decision on the Confirmation of Charges against Laurent Gbagbo, Gbagbo (ICC-02/11-01/
11-656-Red), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 12 June 2014 (‘Gbagbo Confirmation Decision’).
4 Ibid., xx 21^23.
5 Gbagbo Confirmation Decision, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert, supra note 3.
6 Ibid., x 4.
7 For a detailed analysis of the ICC jurisprudence on the limited scope of the confirmation of
charges and the role of Pre-Trial Chambers as mere ‘gatekeepers’, see S. Vasiliev, ‘International
Criminal Trials: A Normative Theory’ (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Amsterdam), Vol. I, at 398^405.
12 See Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 16
December 2011 entitled Decision on the confirmation of charges, Mbarushimana (ICC-01/
04-01/10-514), Appeals Chamber, 30 May 2012 (‘Mbarushimana Appeal Judgment’), x 41.
13 See, inter alia, Decision on the admissibility for the confirmation hearing of the transcripts of
interview of deceased Witness 12, Katanga (ICC-01/04-01/07-412), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 18
April 2008, x 64.
14 For a detailed assessment of the evidentiary threshold of reasonable doubt in international
criminal justice, see C.M. Roha, ‘Reasonable Doubt Standard of Proof in International Criminal
Trials’, in K.A.A. Kahn, C. Buisman and C. Gosnell (eds), Principles of Evidence in International
Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press, 2010) 650^670.
15 Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Abu Garda (ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red), Pre-Trial
Chamber I, 8 February 2010 (‘Garda Confirmation Decision’), x 40.
16 Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN), Pre-Trial
Chamber I, 14 May 2007 (‘Lubanga Confirmation Decision’), x 37.
17 Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the
Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-424), Pre-Trial
Chamber II, 15 June 2009 (‘Bemba Confirmation Decision’), x 28. See also O. Bekou, ‘Prosecutor
v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’, 8 Human Rights Law Review (2008) 343^355, at 344.
To achieve this objective, the confirmation hearing has to ensure that ‘no case
proceeds to trial without sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds
to believe that the person committed the crime or crimes with which he has
been charged’.18
Following the assessment of the evidence disclosed between the parties and
communicated to the Chamber, judges may (i) confirm the charges;19 (ii)
decline to confirm the charges;20 or (iii) adjourn the hearing and request the
Prosecutor to consider (a) providing further evidence or conducting further
investigation with respect to a particular charge;21 or (b) amending a charge
because the evidence submitted appears to establish a different crime within
the jurisdiction of the Court.22
believing’ that a person has committed a crime falling within the jurisdiction of
the tribunals.27 The same standard applies when establishing the existence of
a prima facie case to confirm an indictment under Articles 19(1) and 18(1) of
the Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR, respectively.28
The ICC Prosecutor’s interpretation equating the Article 61 standard for the
confirmation of charges with the prima facie standard at the ad hoc tribunals
is not persuasive. It is true that, while the ICC is not bound by the jurispru-
dence of the ICTY and ICTR, judges of the ICC have frequently referred to the
practice of the ad hoc tribunals, especially in the area of substantive criminal
law. However, the structural differences between the confirmation of indict-
ment before the ICTY and ICTR, on the one hand, and the confirmation of
charges before the ICC, on the other, militate against taking the ad hoc
Statutes and Rules into account to interpret procedural rules under Article 61
than with the standard at the confirmation of charges stage.34 The provision
concerning the issuance of an arrest warrant before the ICC requires a lower
standard than the confirmation of charges.35
Thus, the standard under Article 61(7) falls between the threshold of ‘rea-
sonable grounds to believe’, required for the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
and ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’, required by Article 66(3) for the conviction.36
The evidence submitted to the Pre-Trial Chamber under Article 61 must be
analysed and assessed as a whole.37 Judges sitting in Pre-Trial Chambers do
not have the mandate to convince the Trial Chamber that the accused is
guilty ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ as required by Article 66(3). Nor may they
anticipate whether the Trial Chamber will enter a conviction or an acquittal
on all or part of the charges. Instead, the mandate of the Pre-Trial Chamber
judges is to assess, at the moment they hear the case, whether there is suffi-
34 Ibid., x 43.
35 Ibid.
36 Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome
Statute, Ruto, Kosgey and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-373), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 23 January 2012
(‘Ruto, Kosgey and Sang Confirmation Decision’), x 40.
37 Lubanga Confirmation Decision, supra note 16, x 38.
47 Ibid., x 20.
48 Gbagbo Adjournment Decision, supra note 1, xx 16^18.
49 Decision Establishing General Principles Governing Applications to Restrict Disclosure pursu-
ant to Rule 81 (2) and (4) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/
06-108-Corr), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 19 May 2006.
50 Judgment on the Prosecutor’s appeal against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled
‘Decision Establishing General Principles Governing Applications to Restrict Disclosure pursu-
ant to Rule 81(2) and (4) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence’, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/
06-568), Appeals Chamber, 13 October 2006, x 54.
51 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ferna¤ndez, supra note 2, x 44.
52 Ibid., x 44(6). As a matter of example, in respect one of the incidents charges by the Prosecutor,
the Majority of Pre-Trial Chamber I requested ‘any forensic evidence indicating who fired the
ammunitions and what their alleged target was’.
53 Gbagbo Adjournment Decision, supra note 1, x 25.
54 Ibid., x 25. See also Decision on defence application pursuant to Article 64(4) and related
requests, Kenyatta (ICC-01/09-02/11-728), Trial Chamber V, 26 April 2013, xx 118^123.
55 Gbagbo Adjournment Decision, supra note 1, x 25.
56 Gbagbo Confirmation Decision, supra note 3.
57 Ibid., xx 21^23.
58 Ibid., x 23.
59 Ibid., x 21.
60 Ibid.
61 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert, supra note 5.
62 Ibid., x 4.
63 Ibid.
Prosecutor ‘need not submit more evidence than is necessary to meet the
threshold of substantial grounds to believe’.70
the trial, even if the Prosecutor is not prohibited, under the Statute, and as
confirmed by the Appeals Chamber, from conducting additional investigations
after the charges are confirmed and before the trial begins. Furthermore, it is
argued that the more advanced the case at the time of the confirmation hear-
ing, the more effective the filtering function of the Pre-Trial Chamber, as it
will be better prepared to evaluate a substantial amount of evidence and
decide which cases are worthy of trial.81
Notwithstanding the potential benefit of the Gbagbo Adjournment Decision
approach, the move towards a ‘strongest possible case based on a largely com-
pleted investigation’ model has a number of undesirable consequences. First, it
would probably result in a vast amount of evidence being submitted to the
Pre-Trial Chamber. Hence, a more demanding process of evidentiary disclosure
would ensue, in the course of which the Chamber would have to authorize re-
81 Ibid., at 1356.
82 Ibid., at 1352.
83 Ibid., at 1343. For a discussion on the type of evidence that was used in the first confirmation
hearing in the Lubanga case, see M. Miraglia, ‘Admissibility of Evidence, Standards of Proof,
and Nature of the Decision in the ICC Confirmation of Charges in Lubanga’, 6 JICJ (2008)
489^503, at 496^497.
84 The Appeals Chamber has stated that ‘[t]he presentation by the Prosecutor of summaries of
witness statements and other documents at the confirmation hearing is permissible even if
the identities of the relevant witnesses have not been disclosed to the defence prior to the hear-
ing, provided that such summaries are used in a manner that is not prejudicial to or inconsist-
ent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.’ See Judgment on the appeal
of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled ‘Second
Decision on the Prosecution Requests and Amended Requests for Redactions under Rule 81’,
Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-774), Appeals Chamber, 14 December 2006, x 2.
85 See Gbagbo Adjournment Decision, supra note 1, x 17, recalling the well-established jurispru-
dence on the interpretation of the substantial ground to believe threshold under Art. 61(7).
See inter alia, Lubanga Confirmation Decision, supra note 16, x 39; Katanga and Ngudjolo
Confirmation Decision, supra note 18, x 65; Garda Confirmation Decision, supra note 15, x 37;
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Mbarushimana (ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red), 16
December 2011, x 40; Bemba Confirmation Decision, supra note 17, x 29; Ruto, Kosgey and Sang
Confirmation Decision, supra note 36, x 40.
86 Gbagbo Adjournment Decision, supra note 1, x 17; Lubanga Confirmation Decision, supra note 16,
x 39.
87 See K. Shibahara and W.A. Schabas, ‘A rticle 61: Confirmation of the Charges before the Trial’, in
O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Hart
Publishing, 2008), at 1171.
88 Miraglia, supra note 83, at 497.
confirming the charges on the basis of nearly the same evidence presented at
the trial stage would have little or no meaning, as it could appear as an antici-
patory finding of the guilt of the suspect, even though the Pre-Trial Chamber
has no power to enter a conviction.
The travaux pre¤ paratoires to the Statute also suggest that providing the Pre-
Trial Chamber and, by implication, the Defence, with the entire case file of the
Prosecutor was not considered to be an optimal solution, as it would have entailed
unnecessary delays in the smooth conduct of the pretrial proceedings ‘if the evi-
dence collected in the case was excessive’.89 Even if it would be beneficial that
the Pre-Trial Chamber andTrial Chamber coordinated amongst themselves to en-
visage a uniform disclosure system, it is plausible that, in practice, the evidence
would be collected and disclosed at the pretrial phase of the case only to be re-dis-
closed once again before the start of the trial, especially where the Trial
7. Concluding Remarks
The ICC Statute establishes four different, progressively higher evidentiary
thresholds in Articles 53(1)(a), 58(1), 61(7) and 66(3).96 The lowest test is pro-
vided in the early stage of the proceedings, namely, in Article 53(1)(a) regard-
ing the initiation of an investigation, where the Prosecutor has to assess
96 See Ruto, Kosgey and Sang Confirmation Decision, supra note 36, x 40. However, in the Bemba
Confirmation Decision, supra note 17, x 27, Pre-Trial Chamber II found that there are only
three evidentiary threshold, by omitting any references to Art. 53(1)(a).
97 The same evidentiary threshold is enshrined in Art. 15 with regard to the Pre-Trial Chamber’s
authorization for the Prosecutor to commence investigations proprio motu.
98 Bemba Confirmation Decision, supra note 17, x 27.