British Borneo Invasion 1942

CONCEPT version 0.
1 12 Februari 2020
By Sybren van Klaarbergen
Punjabis on Borneo 1941 – 1942
The Invasion of British Borneo 1942

In 1863 Great Britain granted recognition of Sarawak as an independent and sovereign country. However, this was not
what Sir James Brooke, 1st Rajah of Sarawak, desired. He tried several times to gain Protectorate Status of Sarawak
from Great Britain. For he knew that in time of war, Sarawak would not be able to defend itself without the help of one of
the Great Powers of the time. Sadly, this proved to be true during the Chinese Uprising of 1857. Sarawak was nearly
defenceless until the rather late arrival of a British Fleet from Singapore. It was during this time that Sir James Brooke
began to think seriously about offering Sarawak to the United States as a colony. Several years prior to 1863, Sir James
sent a letter to then U.S. President James Polk. In this letter he offered Sarawak to the United States. The only pre-
condition was that he be allowed to remain in power. Sadly, this letter was never read by President Polk. The United
States, then pre-occupied with the looming Civil War between North and South, never seriously considered Sir James'
offer. It was not until 1863 that President Abraham Lincoln replied to the letter sent almost 4 years earlier by Sir James.
President Lincoln politely declined Sir James's offer. Sir James then offered Sarawak to the Dutch, Belgians, Italians,
French, and finally the Portuguese. The only serious offer came from Belgium. However, the King of the Belgians set
too many strict preconditions which did not suit Sir James Brooke. With the exception of Belgium, the other nations
being pre-occupied with their own issues in the region did not wish to expand their already over-stretched resources by
taking in Sarawak. As a result, Sir James Brooke was "forced" into the arms of Great Britain, a nation whose respect he
had yet to earn.
In 1888, Great Britain, after refusing to offer protection to Sarawak for so many years suddenly offered it. However, it
was not granted in the protection of the interests of Sarawak, but in the interest of the British Empire. Apparently, Great
Britain suddenly became aware that another European Power could easily take Sarawak for themselves. This is the
reason why the British finally offered Sarawak protection. Under the 1888 agreement, negotiated by Sir Charles Anthony
Brooke, 2nd Rajah of Sarawak, all the foreign affairs of Sarawak were to the responsibility of British Government.
Internal affairs remained the responsibility of the Brooke Rajahs.
In accordance with this 1888 Agreement, Great Britain despatched troops and material to bolster the defences of
Sarawak during the 1930s. During the late 1930s the Royal Air Force based 205th RAF Squadron at Kuching. This was
a seaplane squadron consisting of Walrus Flying Boats. However, this was withdrawn in 1941 and returned to
Singapore.
Realizing that war was imminent, the Brooke Government, under Sir Charles Vyner Brooke, conducted preliminary work
to establish airstrips at selected locations throughout the country. These airstrips would be located at Kuching, Oya,
Mukah, Bintulu, and Miri. By 1938 work was completed on all the airstrips except Bintulu, which was discontinued in
October 1938 due to financial reasons. On 26 September 1938, the Kuching Airstrip was opened. It was situated at the
7th Mile (Bukit Stabar) and measured 700 meters long by 300 meters wide. However, despite the modern air facilities
available, the RAF stationed no aircraft in Sarawak during 1941. In addition, the Royal Navy withdrew from Sarawak,
and the British Protectorates of Labuan and North Borneo in 1940.
With no air or sea forces stationed in or around Sarawak, the British government encouraged the Brooke Regime to
adopt a "scorched earth policy" in the event of a Japanese attack. The Singapore Conference of October 1940 further
presented the dismal defence situation of Sarawak by stating that without command of the sea or air, it would be
pointless to defend Sarawak and the other British colonies in the area. An alternative plan was proposed by Air Vice-
Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham which suggested that 200 RAF and Royal Dutch Aircraft be used to defend the
territories of Sarawak, Labuan, Brunei, and British North Borneo. Brooke-Popham stated that this should be sufficient to
defend the territories against any Japanese attack. His request for such an outrageous amount of aircraft was declined
by the British and Dutch governments on the grounds that they were simply not available.
Later, it was proposed to develop a Denial Scheme. Returning to the "scorched-earth" policy mentioned earlier, Denial
Schemes were in place to destroy the oil installations at Miri and Lutong. In addition, the Bukit Sabir Airfield (11 km
south of Kuching, the capital of Sarawak), was to be held as long as possible, then would be destroyed.
The prelude to the war

The island of Borneo is a land of primeval jungle. The coasts are fringed with mangrove and swamp, and over nine-
tenths of the interior is covered with thick evergreen forests. In 1941 the population was small – that of the whole island
was estimated at less than three million – and there were less than a dozen settlements large enough to be called
towns. There were few roads and only one short railway; communication was by the many waterways or by narrow
jungle paths. Much of the interior was unexplored, or very inadequately known. It was rich in oil and other raw materials.
The island was partly Dutch and partly British. British Borneo lay along its northern seaboard and comprised the two
states of British North Borneo and Sarawak, the small protected State of Brunei, and the Crown Colony of Labuan
Island.
Borneo occupies a position of great strategic importance in the south-west Pacific. It lies across the main sea routes
from the north to Malaya and Sumatra on the one hand, and Celebes and Java on the other. Strongly held, it could have
been one of the main bastions in the defence of the Malay barrier, but neither the Dutch nor the British had the
necessary resources to defend it. The available forces had to be concentrated further south for the defence of
Singapore and Java, and all that could be spared for Borneo and the outlying Dutch islands were small detachments at
important points which it was hoped might prove a deterrent to attack.
To gain control of the oilfields, to guard the flank of their advance on Malaya and to facilitate their eventual attack on
Sumatra and western Java, the Japanese decided, as a subsidiary operation to their Malayan campaign, to seize British
Borneo. This operation was launched by Southern Army eight days after the initial attack on Malaya.
The oilfields in British Borneo lay in two groups: one at Miri close to the northern boundary of Sarawak, and the other
thirty-two miles north, at Seria in the State of Brunei. The crude oil was pumped from both fields to a refinery at Lutong
on the coast, from which loading lines ran out to sea. Landings were possible all along the thirty miles of beach between
Miri and Lutong and there was, with the forces available, no possibility of defending the oilfields against determined
attacks. Plans had therefore been made for the destruction of the oil installations. Sir Robert Brooke-Popham,
Commander-in-Chief Far East, decided it would be prudent to honor the 1888 defence agreement with Sarawak.
Consequently, in late 1940, he ordered the 2nd Battalion, 15th Punjab Regiment, a heavy 6-inch gun battery from the
Hong Kong-Singapore Royal Artillery, and a detachment of 35th Fortress Company (Royal Engineers) to proceed to
Kuching (British North Borneo).
In December 1940 a company of 2/15th Punjab was sent to Miri for the protection of the demolition parties, and in May
1941 the rest of 2/15th Punjab was sent there to provide a garrison. This lone battalion consisted of approximately 1,050
soldiers under the command of Major C.M. Lane. For the defence of Sarawak region, it was deployed as follows:
At Miri was deployed a force of 2 officers, and 98 other ranks:
• 1 Infantry Company from 2/15 Punjab Regiment
• 6" Hong Kong-Singapore Royal Artillery Battery
• 1 Platoon of Royal Engineers
These troops were entrusted with the destruction of Miri Oil Fields. It was to be known as the Miri Detachment.
At Kuching was deployed a force of 1 officer, and 52 other ranks:
• 6 Platoons of infantry from 2/15 Punjab Regiment
These troops were to conduct a delaying action at the Bukit Stabar Airfield outside of Kuching. They were to be known
as the Kuching Detachment. The other troops from the 2/15 Punjab were to be deployed piecemeal at the other airfield
and oil facilities in Sarawak.
In addition, the Brooke Government mobilized the Sarawak Rangers. This force consisted of 1,515 troops who were
primarily Iban and Dyak tribesmen trained in the art of jungle warfare led by the European Civil Servants of the Brooke
Regime. British Lieutenant Colonel C.M. Lane who commanded the battalion was placed in charge of all forces in
Sarawak, which included the native Volunteer Corps, Coastal Marine Service, the armed police and a body of native
troops known as the Sarawak Rangers. Collectively, this force of 2,565 troops was known as "SARFOR" (Sarawak
Force).
In August 1941 a partial denial scheme, which reduced the output of oil by seventy per cent, was put into effect. It was
also decided that no attempt should be made to defend British North Borneo, Brunei or Labuan, and the Governor of
North Borneo, Mr. Robert Smith, was informed that the Volunteers and police were to be used solely for the
maintenance of internal security. It was however decided to defend Kuching because of its airfield, and because its
occupation by the enemy would give access to the important Dutch airfield at Singkawang II, sixty miles to the
southwest and only some 350 miles from Singapore.
The country between Kuching and the sea is roadless, but is intersected by a number of winding waterways which flow
through mangrove swamps to the sea. There are two main approaches to the town: the first by the Sarawak River,
which is navigable by vessels up to sixteen foot draught; and the second by the Santubong River, which will take
vessels up to twelve foot draught. The roads from Kuching run east to Pending, north-west to Matang, and south to
Serian a distance of forty miles from Kuching. The airfield lay seven miles south of the town on the Serian road. At the
airfield a road branched off to the west; after crossing the Sarawak River at Batu Kitang, where there was a vehicular
ferry, it terminated at Krokong fifteen miles short of the Dutch frontier.
There were two plans of defence that were proposed- Plan A and Plan B.
Plan A called for a mobile defence. The objective was to hold the Bukit Stabar Airfield as long as possible. Further
delaying actions were also to be conducted so as to allow for the proper execution of the denial schemes. If enemy
resistance was such that it could not be delayed, then the airfield would be destroyed and the entire force would retreat
into the mountains and jungles in small parties and fight as a guerrilla force for as long as possible. Unfortunately, at the
Anglo-Dutch Military Conference during September 1941 held in Kuching, it was pointed out that Plan A could not be
carried out if the Japanese landed 3,000 to 5,000 men with air and sea support. J.L. Noakes, the defeatist Sarawak
Secretary for Defence, had continued to argue the inadequacy of SARFOR and that it had no hope against the
Japanese if they landed in force. His idea was to take a 'wait and see' attitude and continue to appeal to Singapore for
more troops and equipment. In the event that this was not forthcoming, Sarawak should surrender so as to prevent any
bloodshed. Rajah Sir Charles Vyner Brooke, was completely against this defeatist talk and vehemently argued that
Sarawak should put up a fight, a fight to maintain the honor of the Brooke Raj. At the end it was decided that the town
could not be defended against the weight of attack which was to be expected, and the plan was reluctantly changed to
one of static defence of the airfield.
During late November 1941, Lieutenant-General A.E. Percival, GOC Malaya Command, took a 2-day tour of Sarawak to
assess the adequacy of its defence preparations. He summarized the situation as follows: "Nobody could pretend that
this was a satisfactory situation, but at least it would make the enemy deploy a larger force to capture Sarawak than
would have been necessary if it had not been defended at all and that, I think, is the true way to look at it...the best I
could do was to promise to send them a few anti-aircraft guns and too tell them of the arrival of Prince of Wales and
Repulse, which were due at Singapore in a few days...not that I expected anit-aircraft guns to be of much practical
value. But I felt that the moral effect of their presence there would more than counterbalance some slight dispersion of
force".
As a result of Percival's assessment of Sarawak's defences, an alternative plan of action was proposed, Plan B. This
was based on static defence. All available troops and supplies were to be concentrated within a 5.5 kilometer perimeter
of the Bukit Stabar Airfield to ensure that its destruction was not interfered with. The rationale for Plan B was presented
by Brooke-Popham as follows: "The only place which it was decided to hold was Kuching, the reason for this being not
only that there was a modern airfield at this location, but that its occupation by the enemy might give access to the
Dutch airfields in Borneo, furthermore, it would also give the enemy access to Singapore. Being only some 350 miles
from said place".
Further orders were issued by Vyner Brooke that all the Civil Servants not assigned to the Sarawak Rangers were to
remain at their posts. No thought must be given to the abandonment of the native population by any European officer of
the Brooke Raj.
The Brooke Government which had already heard of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (on 7 December 1941)
quickly ordered the complete and total destruction of the oil fields and airfields at Miri and Seria. Orders for the
demolition of the refinery at Lutong and the denial of the oilwells reached the officer commanding at Miri on the morning
of the 8th December, and by the evening of the same day the task was completed. On the following day the landing
ground there was made unfit for use, and on the 13th the Punjabis and the oil officials left by sea for Kuching. The
destruction of the oilfields had been completed none too soon.
On 20 November 1941, the Kawaguchi Brigade was activated in Tokyo (Japan), and placed under the direct command
of the Southern Army. It was commanded by Major-General Kiyotake Kawaguchi and it was composed mainly of the
following units stationed at Canton, southern China, which had been previously under the command of the 18th Infantry
Division:
Order of Battle for Japanese forces
Sarawak, December 1941
Major-General Kiyotake Kawaguchi (commander)
35th Infantry Brigade Headquarters
124th Infantry Regiment
one platoon of the 12th Engineer Regiment
a unit from the 18th Division Signal Unit
a unit from the 18th Division Medical Unit
4th Field Hospital, 18th Division
a unit from the 11th Water Supply and Purification Unit
In addition, the following units from Japan and Manchuria were to be used to reinforce the Detachment:
33rd Field AA Battalion
one company of the 26th Independent Engineer Regiment
(minus two platoons)
nd
2 Independent Engineer Company
80th Independent Radio Platoon
37th Fixed Radio Unit
a unit from the Oil Drilling Section of the 21stField Ordnance Depot
1st Field Well Drilling Company
2nd Field Well Drilling Company
3rd Field Well Drilling Company
4th Field Well Drilling Company
48th Anchorage Headquarters
118th Land Duty Company
While in Tokyo Major-General Kawaguchi was informed that the enemy strength in British Borneo was estimated at
approximately 1,000 regular soldiers (mostly Indians) and 2,500 native volunteers, with a probable further 5,600 Dutch
soldiers in Dutch Borneo. Intelligence sources reported that the entire island was covered with dense jungle with only a
few poor roads near the river mouths. The only means of transportation was possible by water. Information in regard to
weather and terrain was very scant and not very reliable and there was only one small scale map of the island available.
Immediately upon his return to Canton from Tokyo, the Detachment commander proceeded to Sanya, Hainan Island, to
attend a conference with the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet and the Direct Escort Fleet
commander in order to reach an agreement on co-operative measures in the event of war. It was decided that the first
landings would be made at Miri and Seria in order to capture vital oilfields and airfields in these towns. Part of the force
would remain in this area to reestablish Miri oilfield while the main body would advance and capture the Kuching airfield.
All units of the Kawaguchi Detachment had to receive special training in landing under cover of darkness and in jungle
fighting, and naturally they also had to change their equipment and would have to be given special survival and field
sanitation training.
At 13.00 on 13 December 1941, the Japanese invasion convoy left Cam Ranh Bay, Indo-China, with an escort of cruiser
Yura (Rear-Admiral Shintaro Hashimoto) with the destroyers of the 12th Destroyer Division, Murakumo, Shinonome,
Shirakumo and Usugumo, submarine-chaser Ch 7 and the aircraft depot ship Kamikawa Maru and 10 transport ships
carried the Japanese 35th Infantry Brigade HQ under the command of Major-General Kiyotake Kawaguchi (known as
Kawaguchi Detachment), 124th Infantry Regiment from the Japanese 18th Division, 2nd Yokosuka Naval Landing Force
plus the 4th Naval Construction Unit. The Support Force consisted of Rear-Admiral Takeo Kurita with the cruisers
Kumano and Suzuya and the destroyers Fubuki and Sagiri. Distant cover for the Malaya and Borneo operations
northeast of Natoma Island from 15 to 17 December 1942 is provided by Vice-Admiral Nobutake Kondo with the heavy
cruisers Atago and Takao, the battleships Haruna and Kongo and the destroyers Ikazuchi, Inazuma, Asashio, Oshio,
Michishio and Arashio. To protect westwards, the Japanese submarines I-62, I-64, I-65 and I-66 are stationed in the
passage between Natoma Island and northwest Borneo. The convoy at first proceeded toward the southwest but, during
the night, it changed course to the southeast and made directly for Miri. About this time the Left Flank Unit aboard IJN
transport ship Hiyoshi Maru separated from the main body and proceeded toward Seria. The Japanese invasion plan
called for a landing to be made at Miri and Seria to capture the oil fields. A large force would then be left behind to
initiate repairs to these oil facilities, while the rest of the force would then make their way to capture Kuching and its
nearby airfield.
The convoy crossed the South China Sea without being sighted, and at about 2330 on the 15th, the main body of the
convoy arrived at the Miri anchorage, approximately two nautical miles from the shore, while the Hiyoshi Maru arrived at
the Seria anchorage at midnight. Immediately upon reaching the anchorage, both flank units commenced to transfer to
landing barges. At first the sea was relatively calm but about 0100 on the 16th, the wind velocity increased and the
waves grew high. Transfer from ships to barges was extremly difficult until it became impossible to keep the landing
barges close to the ships and the units were forced to continue the transfer operation by ship's crane. Finally between
0510 and 0610 the Right Flank Unit completed its landing, while the Left Flank Unit landed about 0440. The Right Flank
Unit quickly captured the government buildings and the post office at Miri as well as the surrounding district with
plantations. In the meantime, the Left Flank Unit landed on the west coast near Seria and occupied the large copra
plantations, the Seria oilfields, and the strategic sector north of Seria to prepare for an attack against Brunei. There was
offered very little resistance by the British forces, and during the morning on the 16th, the two units secured the oilfield
at Seria and oilfields and airfield at Miri. The main body of the Kawaguchi Detachment found only about 50 members of
the police unit defending Miri. They surrendred with very little fighting. Two companies of the 2nd Yokosuka SNLF
landed on the coast near Lutong and within two and a half hours captured the important Lutong oil refinery. It then
proceeded to occupy and secure the Miri airfield without meeting any resistance. Part of the Detachment was
immediately assigned the mission of restoring the oilfields at Miri and Seria, while, after 17 December, the main body of
the Detachment prepared for the next operation - the landing at Kuching. The Japanese troops suffered only 40
casualties between 16 and 23 December, most were drownings as a result of Japanese amphibious operations.
News of the landing did not reach Air Headquarters, Far East, until 9 p.m. on the 16th. Reconnaissance aircraft from
Singkawang II were ordered to investigate at daylight on the 17th. Dutch naval aircraft attacked the ships at anchor later
that day and again on the 18th, but without effect. On the 19th December 1941 the Dutch flying boat X-32 from Tarakan
Island sank the Japanese destroyer Shinonome (Cdr. Hiroshi Sasagawa) of 1,950 tons off Miri, while another flying boat
X-33 damaged a transport ship. The destroyer could not take the pounding and went down with her entire crew of 228
officers and men. Kuching realized that its turn was soon to come and work went on day and night to complete the
airfield defences. This work was delayed on the 19th by a raid on the town by fifteen Japanese bombers which set fire to
a large petrol store but otherwise did little material damage. A large part of the native population however fled from the
town, and labour, which had been difficult to obtain before, became almost unprocurable.
On the 22nd December the main body (two battalions) of the Japanese invasion force re-embarked at Miri and left for
Kuching, leaving one battalion to secure all British Borneo outside Sarawak. Although after the occupation of Miri the
Detachment commander, Major-General Kawaguchi, was unable to obtain any additional information in regard to the
enemy's strength or disposition, he did learn that there is one small railway on the western coast and no roads through
the jungle. Consequently, an attack on north Borneo would have to be made from landing barges. On returning back to
Miri on 28 December, Major-General Kawaguchi ordered Lieutenant Colonel Watanabe to advance on the 31st by
landing barges to Brunei with one infantry battalion and there to collect small boats to be used for the attack on north
Borneo. The Japanese soldiers of the Watanabe Force, however, discovered that the British had already destroyed all
big ships in the harbour, so that only small native boats remained. On 1 January 1942, two infantry platoons
commanded by a company commander landed on Labuan Island, capturing the British Resident, Hugh Humphrey who
later recalled: "I was repeatedly hit by a Japanese officer with his sword (in its scabbard) and exhibited for 24 hours to
the public in an improvised cage, on the grounds that, before the Japanese arrived, I had sabotaged the war effort of the
Imperial Japanese Forces by destroying stocks of aviation fuel on the island". On 8 January, Kawaguchi proceeded to
Jesselton and having occupied that town and Beaufort, where he disarmed the small police unit. Using ten small fishing
boats, two infantry companies (minus two platoons), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Watanabe, captured Sandakan,
the seat of government of British North Borneo, and rescued the 600 interned Japanese citizens. On the morning of the
19th January, the Governor Robert Smith surrendered the State and, refusing to carry on the administration under
Japanese control, was interned with his staff. This unit then captured Tawau and Lahad Datu on the 24th and 31st
respectively. This time they freed a further 1,500 Japanese citizens. The Japanese forces suffered no combat casualties
during this operations.
The convoy which left Miri on the 22nd of December was escorted by the cruiser Yura, the destroyers Murakumo,
Shirakumo and Usugumo, the minesweepers W 3 and W 6 and the aircraft depot ship Kamikawa Maru. Covering Force
was consisted of cruisers Kinu, Kumano and Suzuya, with the destroyers Fubuki and Sagiri. West of Covering Force
was the 2nd Division of the 7th Cruiser Squadron (Mikuma and Mogami) with destroyer Hatsuyuki. It was sighted and
reported to Air Headquarters, Far East, by Dutch reconnaissance aircraft on the morning of the 23rd, when it was about
150 miles from Kuching. At 11.40 that morning twenty-four Japanese aircraft bombed Singkawang II airfield, so
damaging the runways that a Dutch striking force which had been ordered to attack the convoy was unable to take off
with a bomb load. Despite the critical situation the Dutch authorities urged the transfer of their aircraft to Sumatra. Air
Headquarters, Far East, agreed and during the afternoon of the 24th the aircraft were flown to Palembang. The convoy
did not however escape unscathed. On the evening of the 23rd it was first attacked by Dutch submarine K-XIV (Lt.Cdr.
C.A.J. van Well Groeneveld) sank two enemy ships and damaged two others, and the following night of 23/24
December 1942 another Dutch submarine K-XVI (Lt.Cdr. L.J. Jarman) torpedoed the IJN destroyer Sagiri (1,750 tons)
near Kuching, Sarawak. Their own torpedoes caught on fire and the ship simply blew up, killing immediately 121 officers
and men. The IJN destroyer Shirakumo and minesweeper W 3 rescued 120 survivors. The K-XVI was herself sunk by
Japanese submarine I-66 (Cdr. Yoshitome) on her way back to Soerabaja. Five Bristol Blenheims of 34th (B) RAF
Squadron from Singapore, at almost extreme range, bombed the ships at anchor the same evening, but did little
damage. The convoy was seen at 6 p.m. on the 23rd approaching the mouth of the Santubong River. Two hours later
Colonel Lane received orders from Singapore to destroy the airfield. It was too late to change back to mobile defence
and, as there seemed to him no point in attempting to defend a useless airfield, he asked General Percival for
permission to withdraw as soon as possible into Dutch north-west Borneo.
While awaiting a reply Lane concentrated his battalion at the airfield, with forward detachments in the Pending area east
of the town and on the roads to the north of it, 18-pounder gun and 3-inch mortar detachments covering the river
approaches, and a Punjabi gunboat platoon, working with the Sarawak Rangers and the Coastal Marine Service,
patrolling north of Kuching.
The convoy proceeded westward, arriving at a point, east of Cape Sipang at 0300 on the 24th. At 0120, the IJN
transport Nichiran Maru with Colonel Akinosuke Oka arrived at the prearranged anchorage off the mouth of the
Santubong River. At 0400, the unit aboard the IJN transport Nichiran Maru, commanded by Colonel A. Oka, completed
its transfer to landing barges and proceeding west of Cape Sipang. At about 9 a.m. twenty enemy landing craft were
observed approaching the shore. The small Punjabi gunboat platoon, hopelessly outnumbered, withdrew up the river
without loss. At 11 a.m. as they neared the town the landing craft were engaged by the gun and mortar detachments,
who sank four before themselves being surrounded and killed. During the afternoon three more craft were sunk by
gunfire, but the remainder were able to land their troops on both sides of the river, and by 4.30 p.m. the town was in
Japanese hands.
Meanwhile Lane had been instructed by Percival to hold the Japanese for as long as possible and then act in the best
interests of west Borneo as a whole. Since the capture of the town threatened to cut off the forward troops, Lane
ordered them to withdraw to the airfield. The Japanese followed up and before dark made contact with the airfield
defences. Throughout the night sporadic firing went on as they felt their way round the perimeter. Major-General
Kawaguchi received a report from his intelligence officer that there was approximately 400-500 British troops in the
vicinity of the Kuching airfield. As Christmas Day dawned, firing temporarily ceased and advantage was taken of the lull
to send the hospital detachment with the women and children on ahead into Dutch Borneo. During the morning the
Japanese encircling movement continued, and a company was sent to hold the ferry crossing at Batu Kitang so as to
keep the road clear for escape.
A general withdrawal into Dutch Borneo was ordered to start at dusk, but heavy firing was heard to the north of Batu
Kitang shortly after noon and, fearing that his line of retreat would be cut, Lane decided on immediate withdrawal. The
enemy, reinforced by the 2nd Yokosuka SNLF, soon aware of his intention, launched a full-scale attack on the two
Punjabi companies forming the rearguard. Of these two companies only one platoon succeeded in rejoining the main
body. The remainder, totaling four British officers and some 230 Indian troops, were cut off and either killed or captured.
At about 1640 on the 25th, the Japanese troops completely secured the Kuching airfield. The Japanese losses during
this operation (including those at sea) were about 100 killed and 100 wounded. The rest of the battalion reached Batu
Kitang without loss to find the village deserted and the ferry unattended. They had great difficulty in crossing the river,
but by dark all except the covering force were over. Most of the transport had to be left behind. Renewed Japanese
attacks threatened to cut off the covering force, but it managed to make good its escape to the southward, and after a
march of about sixty miles through dense jungle with little food or water rejoined the battalion at Singkawang II airfield
on the 31st. Following the capture of Kuching airfield, the Detachment commander ordered Colonel Oka to secure the
strategic area around Kuching with the main force of the 124th Infantry Regiment, while he with one infantry battalion
(excluding two companies) left Kuching on the 27th and returned back to Miri.
The main body made its way to Krokong. There the road ended, and the remaining vehicles and heavy equipment had
to be abandoned. There, too, the Sarawak State Forces, in view of their agreement to serve only in Sarawak, were
released to return to their homes. From the 26th ‘Sarfor’ ceased to exist as a combined Indian and State Force, and the
Punjabis, much reduced in strength, carried on alone. On the morning of the 27th the column crossed the border into
Dutch Borneo and two days later arrived at Singkawang II airfield where there was a garrison of 750 Dutch troops. The
women and children were sent on by road to Pontianak on the coast, whence they escaped by ship on the 25th
January, only four days before the Japanese occupied the town. Lane placed his battalion under Dutch command for
the defence of the airfield and the surrounding area. There followed a breathing space while the Japanese prepared for
their next advance, though clashes took place between patrols near the border.
The Japanese troops in Singkawang, 1942.

The man with the moustache on the right is Major-General Kiyotake Kawaguchi.
It was realized at Headquarters, Malaya Command, that the Punjabis would be urgently in need of food and
ammunition. On the 30th December air reconnaissance confirmed that the airfield was unfit for use. Thereupon Air
Headquarters made arrangements for supplies to be dropped and the following day three Blenheims from Singapore,
modified to carry containers, successfully dropped 900 pounds of supplies on the airfield.
The Japanese planned to attack the airfield from the north, and also from the west by a force landed on the coast. This
attack was held up by bad weather for nearly a week, but on the 24th January five companies advanced along the road
from the Dutch border, and by the 25th had reached a village two and a half miles north-east of the airfield. Having
destroyed the stores and barracks, the defenders launched an attack on the 26th which was repulsed. That evening a
counter-attack succeeded in turning their flank and early on the 27th the order was given to evacuate the airfield. A
Dutch tank was used to hold a crossroads for a while. During the withdrawal two Punjabi platoons were surrounded but,
refusing to surrender, they fought on under their Indian officer until late in the afternoon. It was only when their
ammunition was expended and the enemy was attacking in overwhelming numbers that the gallant little party laid down
its arms. Japanese reports have since given their casualties at the hands of these two platoons as between 400 and
500 killed or wounded. Of the seventy Punjabis engaged only three escaped. The remainder were never seen again;
there is evidence to show that they were brutally put to death by the infuriated Japanese. On the evening of the 27th
January the remnants of the Punjabis crossed the Sungei Sambas and took up a position on the high ground at Ledo,
fifteen miles south-west of the airfield.
Meanwhile three Japanese companies had left Kuching in small craft during the night of the 25th and by daybreak on
the 27th had landed at Pemangkat due west of the airfield. Striking north-east and south and meeting with little
opposition, they quickly captured the coastal villages and moved towards Bengkajang, thus threatening to surround the
Allied force at Ledo.
After the fighting at Singkawang II airfield the British-Dutch forces retreated to Sanggau. There this force was split and
the Dutch troops went to Sintang, while the British-Indian troops went to Nanga Pinoh. On the 29th, after a series of
rearguard actions, the Punjabis withdrew to Ngabang and two days later to Nanga Pinoh. By this time further resistance
was useless, and on the 4th February the Punjabis with Dutch agreement set out in two columns for Sampit and
Pangkalanboeoen on the south coast. The British tried to get out of Borneo by going south. Their aim was to find a radio
station at Sampit (or if that failed at Pangkalanboen) in order to get contact with Java Island or to reach one of the
harbours in the south of Borneo.
The force at Nanga Pinoh was split in three parts: A (Sikh), B (PM) Company and part of Staff (Hindu) Company under
command of Major Milligan formed the western column, which took the shorter route, C (Khattack), D (Jat) and part of
Staff (Hindu) Company under command of Lieutenant Colonel Ross-Thompson formed the eastern column, which took
the longer route and the blitzparty. The blitzparty consisted of 2 officers and 4 men and it was their task to go as fast as
possible to Sampit in order to get contact with Java Island.
Of the adventures of the two columns on their long journey through the almost unexplored jungles and swamps of
southern Borneo much might be written. Travelling by forest track and by raft and boat on treacherous rivers, short of
food and clothing, and constantly exposed to tropical heat and rain they finally reached the coast. The blitzparty arrived
at Sampit on 14th February 1942, where they found that the radio station had been destroyed, so they immediately
went, via Samboeloe, to Pangkalanboen, where they arrived on February 19th. In the meantime were C and D
Company split into three marching groups. The Staff Company arrived as first in Sampit on 1st March 1942. From
Sampit boats were sent to pick up C Company, while D Company was ordered to halt at Kotabesi. C and Staff Company
marched from Sampit south but on March 7th they got word that the Japanese troops had landed 14 km south of them. A
platoon of C Company was sent on a reconaissance mission but very soon they came under fire. As the British soldiers
had very little ammunition, they broke off contact and returned back to Sampit. Exhaustion took its toll and 104 men had
to be left during the retreat. From Sampit the remaining men went up to Kotabesi where they joined up with D Company
and together they went to Pandau, where they were informed that the Dutch East Indies Army had capitulated on Java
Island. By boat they went to Kenamboi. In the meantime a Japanese broadcast was calling on all Allied forces in the
Netherlands East Indies to lay down their arms. The broadcast was accompanied by a threat of reprisals if resistance
continued.
The A and B Company tried to reach Kotawaringin airfield. They didn’t meet any Japanese soldiers and they arrived
about the 23rd February at Kenamboi, where they were re-united with C and D Company. On 31st March 1942 a
Japanese ship arrived at Pangkalanboen (or Koemai). Retreat into the jungle-covered mountains was considered, but
the bitter experience of the past few weeks had made it clear that troops could not long survive the trying climatic
conditions. The order to surrender was therefore given and on 1st April 1942 all arms were surrendered.
At Kotawaringin airfield was stationed a small Dutch force (ca. 250 men). This garrison was never engaged in any
fighting and they probably laid down their arms on the same day the British did.
In the ten weeks since leaving Kuching 2/15th Punjab had fought many actions, inflicting heavy casualties on the
enemy, and had traveled under most adverse conditions over 800 miles through extremely difficult country. They had
carried with them their light automatics, rifles and ammunition. As General Percival has said, it was ‘a feat of endurance
which assuredly will rank high in the annals of warfare. It says much for the morale of this fine battalion that it remained
a formed and disciplined body to the end.’
The Japanese occupation of Sandakan, January 1942
Dawn at Sandakan on Sunday 18 January 1942 was lashed by heavy monsoonal rains and wind that continued
throughout the day, yet it was oppressive and humid, typical of the tropics. The Europeans of Sandakan waited with
apprehension throughout the day with the only laudable sound being the incessant rainfall. At sometime during the day
Dr. Taylor rang his wife from the hospital, "I've just had a report that this weather is as bad at sea as it is here" he said,
"so perhaps they (the Japanese) won't make it in those small boats, but the Japs have been sighted off Kudat."
At six o'clock that evening the European residents were ordered by the Governor, Mr. Robert Smith, to Government
House. For whatever hopes that the storms may have wrecked the invading Japanese forces at sea were dashed, for
their battered warships had in fact anchored in Sandakan Harbour during the night and all day. The pyshical amphibious
invasion properly began the next day when at 7 am on the morning of the 19 January the Japanese came ashore
unopposed. The enemy was greeted by the British Resident, East Coast, Mr. Owen Rutter, and accompanying the
Japanese was the British Resident of the West Coast, in case of resistance he would have been the first to be shot
dead.
There was no organised opposition as the North Borneo Volunteers, of about company strength, was demobilised
weeks before, to avoid needless casualties and would have been no match for the heavily armed Japanese invasion
force. Dr.Taylor recalled that Air Chief Marshal Brooke-Popham, C-in-C British Forces in Malaya said that the waters
around the area of Sandakan were too shallow for an invasion force, and Dr.Taylor observed that "he was an old fogey,
and the Japanese came ashore in little boats anyway." The Japanese commander established his authority with the
British Governor and the fears of atrocities subsided when the Europeans having congregated at Government House
were sent home until May. Then the Japanese decided to intern everyone at the Quarantine Station on Berhala Island,
near the leper colony, eventually after twelve months on this foresaken island the European internees were sent to
Kuchin
Note The British North Borneo (Sarawak) region formed part of Malaya Command and therefore came directly under
General Percival’s control.
Note Japanese Order of Battle for the British North Borneo Operation:
• Kawaguchi Detachment (35th Infantry Brigade) of Major-General Kiyotake Kawaguchi aboard the IJN transport ship
Katori Maru
• 18th Division - 124th Infantry Regiment - 3,275 men
• 2nd Yokosuka SNLF - 746 men aboard IJN transport ship Hokkai Maru
• 4th Naval Construction Unit - 260 men aboard IJN transport ship Tonan Maru#3
Note The Right Flank Unit was composed of the 124th Infantry Regiment (minus 3rd Battalion and the 8th Company of
the 2nd Battalion), one platoon of the 1st Company of the 26th Independent Engineer Regiment and two companies of
2nd Yokosuka SNLF. The unit landed at Miri and Lutong.
Note The Left Flank Unit was composed of the 3rd Battalion of the 124th Infantry Regiment and one platoon of the 26th
Independent Engineer Regiment. The unit landed at Seria, Brunei.
Note Japanese Ship Losses during the British North Borneo Operation:
23 December 1941 – destroyer Sagir torpedoed and sunk off Kuching by Dutch submarine K-XVI
18 December 1941 – destroyer Shinonome sunk by bombs off Miri by Dutch flying boat X-32
24 December 1941 - IJN transport ship Hokkai Maru and Tonan Maru#3 were mined and grounded at Kuching
24 December 1941 - IJN transport ship Unyo Maru#2 was sunk by KNIL at Kuching
23 December 1941 - IJN transport ships Hiyoshi Maru and Katori Maru were sunk by Dutch submarine K-XIV and 34th
RAF Squadron enroute to Kuching
24 December 1941 - IJN transport ship Nichiran Maru was sunk by mine at Kuching
Note List of IJN transport ships, British North Borneo, December 1941:
IJN transport ship Hokkai Maru
IJN transport ship Tonan Maru#3
IJN transport ship Unyo Maru#2
IJN transport ship Unknown Maru
IJN transport ship Unknown Maru
IJN transport ship Hiyoshi Maru
IJN transport ship Kenkon Maru
IJN transport ship Myoho Maru
IJN transport ship Nichiran Maru
IJN transport ship Katori Maru, command ship of Major-General Kiyotake Kawaguchi
Note World War II Plus 55 by David H. Lippman
Note "X-32 and X-33 returned to Tarakan to refuel and rearm for another attack on Miri. On the night of the 17-18th they
flew to Miri and attacked shipping. 9 miles north of Miri, the planes sighted a convoy of three ships off Lutong at 0650,
and attacked in the face of light AA fire. X-33 dropped four 500lb bombs on a merchant ship, but all missed. X-32
dropped six 500lb bombs on the largest warship, which was thought to be a cruiser. One bomb failed to drop, but two
were direct hits and a third a near miss, leaving the ship listing dead in the water and heavily afire.
The "cruiser" was actually the 1,950 ton destroyer Shinonome of the Imperial Japanese Navy's 12th Destroyer Division.
She could not take the pounding and went down with her entire crew of 228 officers and men.
Shinonome's loss has been the subject of some confusion, although Japanese monographs list her as a victim of air
attack. Most English sources attribute her loss to a Dutch mine, but Miri was British territory and well north of any Dutch
minefields.
Other sources report her to have been torpedoed by X-33. However, the Do-24 was not designed to carry torpedoes
and there are no other documented cases of it doing so in the East Indies or European Theater. Since Dutch and
Japanese records are in agreement, this appears to settle the debate concerning the loss of Shinonome"-- Tom
Womack.
The conquest of Borneo Island, 1941-1942
When talking about Dutch Borneo 1941-1942, we often forget those less-known battles and places in Borneo, which
were, although generally playing a minor, almost non-important role in the Netherlands East Indies Campaign 1941-
1942, also scenes of fierce and bloody battles betwen the Japanese and Dutch-British troops. Not much has been
written about these terrible jungle battles in Borneo in 1941-1942, so I am hoping that this small section here will be
helpful to those people who are seeking information about this forgotten part of the history of World War II in the
Southeast Asia, whether you are a WWII researcher or just a person searching for their lost relatives.
The capture of Tarakan Island, January 1942

The marshy island of Tarakan lies on the east coast of Borneo, near the city of Tanjungselor. The island was important
since the Dutch discovered oil and dotted it with oil field pumps and tower rigs.
On 25 December 1941 the first air attack on Tarakan Island is made by 4 engined flying boat. On 28 December 1941
occured a dog fight over Tarakan Island between 5 Dutch Brewster Buffalo fighters and 8 Japanese Zero fighters. Two
or three Buffalo's and (possibly) two Zeros are shot down. One Dutch pilot is reported dead and one missing. The air
attack on the airfield caused one plane loss and little damage.
On 9 January 1942 minelayer Prins van Oranje (Lt.Cdr. A.C. van Versendaal) is slightly damaged by Japanese air
attack. Possibly 1 Japanese plane shot down.
On 10 January a Dutch Dornier Do-24K flying boat spotted a Japanese invasion fleet. The Dutch Commander ordered
the destruction of all oil fields on the island. Dutch submarine K-X (Lt.Cdr. P.G. de Back) escaped although attacked by
a Japanese floatplane while she was sailing through a Dutch minefield. On the same day minelayer Prins van Oranje
layed the last part of the minefield. The lightship of Tarakan is bombed and damaged. Japanese destroyers came to
pick the crew up.
Oil fields on Tarakan Island Dutch minelayer Prins van Oranje

The main objective of the invasion of Tarakan Island was the capture of the oilfields, oil refineries and the airfield located
on the island. Under the operational plan, landings were to be made on the eastern shore where the Dutch troop
concentration was not particularly strong. Considering that the west coast of Tarakan Island is more suitable for
amphibious landings, the Dutch command expected the invasion would be conducted there, so when the amphibious
landings were later successfully delivered on the east coast all were a little bit surprised. It was also planned that after
the occupation, naval units were to relieve the Army units in the defence of the island.
After mopup operations around the city of Davao, Phillipines, the Sakaguchi Detachment was to leave the securing of
the city to the Miura Detachment and concentrate its strength in the vicinity of Talomo, Mintol and Daliao in preparation
for the invasion of Borneo.
Order of Battle for Sakaguchi Detachment
Tarakan Island, January 1942
Major-General Shizuo Sakaguchi (commander)
56th Infantry Group Headquarters
146th Infantry Regiment
Armoured Unit of 56th Infantry Group
1st Battalion of 56th Artillery Regiment
1st Company of 56th Engineer Regiment
2 Company of 56th Transportation Regiment
nd
Medical Unit of 56th Infantry Group

1st Field Hospital of 56th Division
The Right Wing Unit Operations, Tarakan Island, January 1942

At sunset on 10 January 1942, the convoy reached its 1st anchorage, approximately 30 km east of Tarakan. In the
afternoon, Tarakan Island was visible due the smoke caused by the Dutch destruction of the oilfields and other vital
installations. By night the flames were so bright that the island was clearly visible in the dark. At 04.00 hours on 10
January, the Wing and Left Wing Unit boarded landing craft and started for their landing points. Initially, the Right Wing
Unit, mistaking the flames from the Goonoong Tjankool oilfields for those of the Tarakan oilfield, missed its proposed
landing point. The Japanese commanders realized their mistake, when the landing boats were already returning back to
their ships. The first Japanese troops (Right Wing Unit) hit the shores on the east coast of Tarakan Island exactly at
midnight of 11 January, followed by 2nd Kure Special Naval Landing Force thirty minutes later. After reaching a point
start ca. 4 km north of the mouth of the Amal River, it recognized the position and proceeded south to the mouth of the
river. They soon overwhelmed the small guard patrols guarding this sector. Arriving at the mouth of the river at dawn,
the unit made a sudden attack against the Dutch pillbox located there and killed most of the guards, while some KNIL
Indonesian soldiers were captured.
Through interrogation of several Indonesian POWs, the general disposition of the enemy was obtained and the unit
proceeded through the jungle to the area north of the Tarakan oilfield which they reached at approximately 1100 on the
January 11th. As the Right Wing Unit advanced inland to the area north of the oilfield, they seized one important hill, but
the Dutch machine-gun and rifle fire was so severe that any further advance was literally impossible. However, in spite
of the Dutch counter-attack that night, the unit launched night raids. They managed to get through barbed wire, to
destroy all machine-gun nests and killed almost all Dutch commanding officers with knives. They soon captured the first
and second row of barracks. At daybreak the Dutch garrison commander, Lieutenant Colonel S. de Waal, discovered
that his front line is weak and that all further resistance would be useless. He dispatched a messenger, under a flag of
truce, with an offer to surrender. Colonel Kyohei Yamamoto, commander of the Right Wing Unit, immediately wired the
commander of the Sakaguchi Detachment, informing him of the enemy's surrender. After the Dutch troops finally
surrendered, the 2nd Kure Special Naval Landing Force advanced rapidly to the Tarakan airfield and occupied it by the
morning of January 12th. During this advance the unit was bombed by Dutch bombers from Samarinda II airfield and 18
Japanese soldiers were killed. At 12.00 hours one infantry company dispatched from the Right Wing Unit also occupied
the village of Djoewata which had a Dutch coastal battery located there at the north end of the island.
During this first engagement the Japanese managed to capture a group of about 30 KNIL soldiers. When this group
refused to tell them how to get to the main city of the island, they were all stabbed to death by bayonets of Japanese
rifles. Only one man survived this massacre. He managed to drag himself to a hospital where he recovered.
The Japanese warships in front of Tarakan Island, January 1942. The smoke
The Japanese soldier on guard on Tarakan Island, 1942. The
rising above the island comes from the oil fields, which were set on fire by the
photo was taken shortly after the Japanese occupied the island.
Dutch.
The Left Wing Unit Operations, Tarakan Island, January 1942

The Left Wing Unit landed at the prearranged point at 0300 on the 11th and advanced west into the jungle toward the
rear of the Dutch coastal battery which it was supposed to destroy. Due to the dense jungle and the steep terrain, the
unit was able to advance only 100 meters per hour. After losing its way several times, the unit finally came out in the
rear of the Dutch coastal battery around 1700 on the 12th. The Sakaguchi Detachment Headquarters had lost track of
the movements of the Left Wing Unit and there had been no report from the officer who was sent out to contact the unit.
Therefore, at midnight on the 11th, Lieutenant Colonel Namekata from the artillery unit was ordered to land with one
infantry company with the mission of capturing the Dutch coastal battery, which was the main objective of the Left Wing
Unit. At approximately 0200 on the 12th Lieutenant Colonel Namekata's unit landed at the same point as had the Left
Wing unit, proceeded along the coast and by day break reached a position in front of the battery. Initially, it was planned
that the Detachment Headquarters was to land in the same area as the Right Wing Unit, immediately after the area was
secured and then proceed by land to the city of Tarakan. However, because the Right Wing Unit had lost its way the
Headquarters could not land as scheduled. On the 12th, upon learning of the Dutch forces surrender, the Headquarters
arranged with the Navy to land on Tarakan Island.
On the 12th, the following message was received by the Naval Forces: "Although the enemy has offered to surrender, it
is feared that the coastal battery located at the south end of the island is not aware of this and it would be dangerous to
proceed to the Tarakan pier, therefore held up your sailing". In spite of this message, the warning was ignored and the
movement went on as planned. When the six minesweepers entered the bay, they were fired on by the Dutch coastal
battery and two minsweepers W 13 and W 14 were hit by 4.7 inch shell and sank with most of their crew. These were
the only Japanese naval losses in this action. The naval commander later promised amnesty for the gun crews and
based on this promise the Dutch Island Commander managed to persuade the gun crews to surrender. The Japanese
Army Commander on the other hand was brutal and had the prisoners turned over to him. He ordered the prisoners to
be tied in groups of three. Sometime later they were thrown into the water where all 219 Dutch soldiers drowned.
The commander of the Sakaguchi Detachment, Major-General Shizuo Sakaguchi, left his ship at about noon on the 12th
and landed at the mouth of the Amal River, arriving at the office of the British Petroleum Manufacturer at sunset. On the
morning of 13th, he received the enemy commander and formally accepted his surrender. Mopping-up the island was
completed on the 13th. On the 14th, the entire Sakaguchi Detachment boarded the ships and left the island. Their new
objective was Balikpapan.
During the night from 11 January to 12 January 1942 the minelayer Prins van Oranje tried to escape the confines of
Tarakan Island but was sunk by a Japanese destroyer Yamakaze (Lt.Cdr. Shuichi Hamanaka) and patrol boat P 38 with
heavy loss of life.
The casualties of the Imperial Japanese Army (Sakaguchi Detachment) numbered only 7 men killed on the land and 1
men on the water, while the naval units suffered 47 killed on the land and 200 at sea. Of those 47 killed on land, 18
were killed by the air attack on or near the airfield immediately after the surrender. The Japanese managed to capture
871 Dutch POWs.
Damage after self-destruction, Tarakan Island, January 1942
Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger (KNIL Army)

Dutch Garrison on the Island of Tarakan numbered approximately 1300 men. The Dutch commander on the island was
KNIL Lieutenant Colonel S. de Waal.
The garrison has following units:
• Tarakan Garrison Battalion (7th KNIL Infantry Battalion), including one MG Company and a Motorised Detachment
with 7 armoured cars
• Artillery Battery (4 x 75mm guns)
• Coastal Artillery Detachment (2 x 120mm guns and 4 x 75mm guns); one coastal battery with 4 x 75mm guns was
placed at the north point (Cape Djoeata) of Tarakan Island while other were placed at the south point of the island.
• Anti-Aircraft Battery (4 x 40mm guns)
• Engineer Platoon
• Mobile Auxiliary First Aid Platoon
Militaire Luchtvaart, KNIL (Air Force)

On the island were 3 Glenn-Martin bombers and a couple of Brewster Buffalo fighters - only until mid-December
because the field was too soft.
Zeemacht Nederlands-Indië (Royal Dutch Navy)

On the island was Commandement Maritieme Middelen Tarakan under (local) Navy Commander H.C. Nieuwenhuisen.
Its Naval strengh was:
• minelayer Prins van Oranje (Lt. Cdr. A.C. van Versendaal)
• submarine K-10 (Lt.Cdr. P.G. de Back)
• patrol boat P 1 (Corporal A. de Sluys)
• Van Mastdijn/Van Masduin (exact name is unknown) = ex-Japanese fishing vessel Dornia Maru, confiscated by Dutch,
displacement unknown, commander unknown, sunk south of Tarakan with troops on 10 January 1942.
• motor boat Aida = (from the Bataafsche Petroleum Mij), commander unknown
• motor boat Parsifal = commander unknown
There were several instalations on the shore that also fell under Naval Command Tarakan:
• Mine depot (dutch: Mijnenmagazin) with the capacity 310 mines and 150 tons for laying mine fields.
• Naval Air Base (Marine Luchtvaartdienst): Naval Air Group GVT-7 with 3 flying boats Dornier Do-24K
• electrical plant
• maintenance shops
• 2 underground gasoline depots of 100,000 liters each
Nihon Rikugun (Imperial Japanese Army) & Imperial Japanese Special Naval Landing Force
• Sakaguchi Brigade (56th Regimental Group) under Major-General Shizuo Sakaguchi. Brigade was concentrated at
Davao, Phillipines. It was composed of the 146th Infantry Regiment and units of armoured vehicles, field artillery, military
engineers and medical service. It has numbered about 5,500 men.
• Kure 2nd Special Naval Landing Force (naval infantry unit) under command of Navy Commander Masanari Siga.
This unit was also concentrated at Davao, Phillipines. It has about 1,100 men.
• Airfield Construction Group No.5
• Oilfield Construction Group No.2
Teikoku Kaigun (Imperial Japanese Navy)

The convoy for Tarakan numbered 16 transport ships carrying Sakaguchi Brigade and Kure 2nd Special Naval Landing
Force. The convoy escort was under command of Rear-Admiral Shoji Nishimura in light cruiser Naka (flagship) and
consisted of:
4th Destroyer Flotilla
Naka
• 2nd Destroyer Division
destroyers- Harusame, Samidare, Yudachi, Murasame
• 9th Destroyer Division
destroyers- Asagumo, Minegumo, Natsugumo
destroyers- Umikaze, Kawakaze, Yamakaze, Suzukaze
Air Group
seaplane tender Sanyo Maru
seaplane tender Sanuki Maru
one oiler
Base Force was under command of Rear-Admiral Sueto Hirose.
Base Force
• 2nd Base Force:
patrol boats- P 36, P37 and P 38
• 11th Minesweeper Division
minesweepers- W 13, W 14, W 15, W 16
minesweepers- W 17, W 18
• 31st Submarine-chaser Division
submarine chasers- Ch 10, Ch 11, Ch 12
and other auxiliary ships.
The capture of Balikpapan, January 1942
The following is based on the Japanese Monograph No.29: Balikpapan Invasion Operation Records, USAFFE 1953
and updated by other additional information.
The city of Balikpapan lies on the southeast coast of Borneo Island, just south of Samarinda and north of Tanahgrogot.
It was important due his oil fields and apart that it was also important oil harbour with big oil refineries.
Having secured Tarakan Island, Balikpapan, with its rich oilfields and strategically important airfields, was the next target
of Japan's sweep southward. The 56th Mixed Infantry Group, the Sakaguchi Detachment, under the command of Major-
General Shizuo Sakaguchi, was ordered to take Balikpapan with its oilfields, oil installations and airfields with as little
damage as possible.
Order of Battle for Japanese forces
Balikpapan, January 1942
Major-General Shizuo Sakaguchi
commander of the 56th Mixed Infantry Group - Sakaguchi Detachment
Assault Unit
Colonel Yamamoto (commander)
146th Infantry Regiment (less 2nd Battalion)
Armored Car Company
Field Artillery Battalion
One Engineer Company (less one platoon)
Surprise Attack Unit
Major Kaneuji (commander)
2nd Battalion of the 146th Infantry Regiment
One Engineer Platoon
One Independent Engineer Platoon
One Radio Squad
Units under direct command of the Group Commander, Major-General Shizuo Sakaguchi were the following:
Salvage Unit
Major Takagi (commander of the AAA Battalion)
two infantry companies of the 146th Infantry Regiment
One AAA Battalion
One Independent Engineer Company (less one platoon)
One Transport Company
Two Radio Platoons
Group Medical Unit
One company of the Special Naval Landing Force
Before the start of the operation, the following pre-landing measures were to be carried out:
- it was decided that emissaries would be dispatched to prevent the destruction of the oil refinery installations
- native policemen would be dispatched to the area to be used as road guides by the Surprise Attack Unit
- the Surprise Attack Unit would receive training and instruction in the important points of secret movement up the river.
The Dutch East Indies Army had in Balikpapan City a reasonably strong garrison with approximately 1,100 troops under
the command of KNIL Lieutenant Colonel C. van den Hoogenband. The city itself was also very well protected with
coast, anti-aircraft and field batteries. There were coastal guns at the harbour (2 x 120mm guns and 4 x 75mm guns),
while the entrance to the harbour was protected by a minefield; the last passage laid by auxiliary minelayer Soemenep
(Lt. T. Jellema). At Balikpapan and the nearby oilfields in Samarinda were also stationed some well-trained destruction
groups with the mission to destroy the important oil installations in case of Japanese attack.
Meanwhile back at Tarakan Island, a former manager of the Tarakan Branch of the Borneo Petroleum Manufacture
Company agreed to work for the Japanese Army on condition they would employ him in repairing the wrecked oilfields
in Tarakan. The Group Commander, therefore, with the consent of the Navy's commander, dispatched this men,
together with a captured Dutch officer and three Japanese soldiers-interpreters, to Balikpapan on a captured Dutch ship,
the motor boat Parsifal. They carried a message to the Balikpapan Garrison Commander, Lieutenant Colonel C. van
den Hoogenband, demanding that the oil refinery installations there be handed over to the Japanese Army without being
damaged. These emissaries left Tarakan Island on 16 January 1942. On January 20th, 1942, the Dornier flying boat X-
21 spotted a small vessel off the coast of Samboaja, heading for Balikpapan. The flying-boat landed near the vessel, the
motor boat Parsifal, and took aboard two KNIL Captains, G.L. Reinderhoff and A.H. Colijn, and flown to Balikpapan to
deliver the message to the Balikpapan Garrison Commander. Lieutenant Colonel C. van den Hoogenband refused their
demands and three Japanese soldiers-interpreters were immediately returned back to their unit on 23 January, while
both Dutch officers did not return.
Two native policemen, who had moved from Balikpapan to Tarakan Island two months previously, were secretly landed
near Balikpapan. It was planned to use them as guides for the Surprise Attack Unit. They were to change to a canoe
near Samboaja and land on the coast south of that city. They were then to proceed to Balikpapan and reconnoiter in its
vicinity. They landed as planned and later successfully guided the Surprise Attack Unit up the river by lighting lamps at
all important points as signals. They were also used as road guides for the unit.
In order to test the possibility of proceeding up the river secretly, the Surprise Attack Unit placed mangrove tree
branches on both sides of landing craft and had a destroyer direct a searchlight on them from the distance of one
kilometer. The test proved successfull and it was decided that the river near the Dutch fort could be successfully
navigated in this manner. The planned date of departure was delayed from 16 January until the 20th, because of a lack
of air support which was still needed in the Celebes Operation. On the 18th, the Dutch commander ordered the
destruction of oil installations in Balikpapan. After that, the destruction teams were evacuated from Balikpapan to
Samarinda II airfield, while the smaller group at Samarinda was transported by the flying boats of the MLD. The oilfields
were, however, not badly damaged. The only serious damage was to tanks, pipes and special wharves in the harbour
area.
At 20.00 on the 22nd the convoy crossed the equator and advanced southward. From early morning to sunset of the 24th
formations of Dutch bombers attacked the convoy every fifteen to twenty minutes. The convoy successfully reached the
designated position, approximately three miles southeast of Balikpapan airfield, on the evening of the 24th. About 20.00
on the 24th, the four USN destroyers – USS Paul Jones, USS Parrot, USS Pope and USS John D. Ford of the 59th USN
Destroyer Division under the command of Commander Paul H. Talbot, under cover of darkness, slipped into the midst of
the convoy, torpedoed the transports and sank six of them. As the Assault Unit had already transfered most of its men
to the landing craft, only 29 men of the Sakaguchi Detachment were reported killed or missing in this raid.
The Assault Unit landed as scheduled without meeting enemy resistance and, by dawn, had occupied the airfield. Their
advance southward, however, was slow as the bridges on the coastal road had been destroyed and the unit did not
reach the northern outskirts of Balikpapan City until the night of the 25th. The Dutch garrison troops had been withdrawn
and the unit entered the city without a fight. Also that night the 56th Mixed Infantry Group Headquarters with Major-
General S. Sakaguchi followed the main unit into the town.
After leaving the main body of the convoy the Surprise Attack Unit, while proceeding southward, was attacked by
approximately 20 Dutch bombers, but none of the transport ships were hit. The ships arrived at the designated position
after sunset and at 22.00 hours, the unit began to move up the river in landing craft. While passing Balikpapan Fort, the
craft were compelled to pass through an area strongly illuminated by Dutch searchlights, but due to their camouflage
and well-timed movement, they luckily passed through unseen. Guided by the lights placed by the native policemen,
who had proceeded them, the Surprise Attack Unit landed just south of the reservoir at 0430 on the 25th. No Dutch
troops were encountered and while part of the unit occupied the area around the reservoir, the main body proceeded to
the village of Banoeabaroe, arriving there at 14.40 hours, thus cutting off the Dutch line of retreat. While the main body
of the unit was advancing along the road to Balikpapan City, it ran into a Dutch military column, commanded by
Lieutenant Colonel C. van den Hoogenband (garrison commander), attempting to escape from Balikpapan. After
defeating this Dutch column, the Surprise Attack Unit proceeded to Balikpapan City. The city was completely occupied
during the night of the 25th. Having completed mopping up the surrounding area on the 26th, the men of the 56th Mixed
Infantry Group assisted the naval infantry units in repairing the airfield.
After the capture of Balikpapan City, a new unit - the Kume Detachment, was formed under the command of Lieutenant
Colonel Kume, which was dispatched to secure and to protect the oilfields together with naval infantry units. The part of
the detachment advanced from Balikpapan City through the village of Banoeabaroe to Samarinda, while the main force
moved forward along the Balikpapan City-Samboaja-Sangasanga-Samarinda-Road, mopping up the remained Dutch
troops in the vicinity of Samarinda.
Kume Detachment
Lieutenant Colonel Kume (commander)
1 Battalion of the 146th Infantry Regiment (less two companies)
st
One Engineer Platoon

One Radio Squad
Immediately after the capture of Balikpapan City, the main elements of the Sakaguchi Detachment began to prepare for
the invasion of Bandjermasin. On Japanese request, several employees of the local administration, a few patients in the
town's hospital, several doctors, three priests and one parson stayed in Balikpapan City. Taken captivity were also
some military personnel - members of the Dutch East Indies Army. A few days later (on February 20th or 24th), all these
prisoners, about 80 of them, were executed at the beach near the old fortress Klandasan, in front of the eyes of the
native inhabitants who were forced to watch this execution.
Order of battle for Dutch and Japanese Army

The Dutch garrison in Balikpapan numbered approximately 1,100 men. Dutch Commander was KNIL Lieutenant
Colonel C. van den Hoogenband.
The garrison had following units (Balikpapan Force):
• 6th KNIL Infantry Battalion
• Engineer Company
• Anti-Aircraft Machine-Gun Platoon (3x AAMG)
• Coastal Artillery Detachment with 2 x 120mm, 2 x 75mm and 2 x 75mm guns

At that time there were no Dutch planes. There exist however one airfield which was located near the town of Manggar.

In Balikpapan existed Commandement Maritieme Middelen Balikpapan under (local) Naval Commander Cdr. F.H.
Vermeulen. There were also some vessels in Balikpapan at the time of Japanese invasion: lightship Orion, auxiliary
minelayer Soemenep, two ships from the "search service", a service which checks entering ships on contrabande, etc.
They were sunk on the river by own crews in such a way, that they formed obstacles for entering ships. The "search
vessel" was sunk in the "mouth" of the Sanga Sanga River. The lightship, apparently also in service as search vessel
(most likely immobile) was sunk near the island of Noebi.
Nihon Rikugun (Imperial Japanese Army) & Imperial Japanese Special Naval Landing Force
• Sakaguchi Brigade (56th Regimental Group) under command of Major-General Shizuo Sakaguchi. The brigade
numbered ca. 5,500 men.
• Kure 2nd Special Naval Landing Force under command of Navy Commander Masanari Siga.
Teikoku Kaigun (Imperial Japanese Navy)

Convoy for Balikpapan numbered 16 transport ships carrying the Sakaguchi Brigade and the Kure 2nd Special Naval
Landing Force from Tarakan Island. Convoy escort was under command of Rear-Admiral Shoji Nishimura in light cruiser
Naka (flagship) and consisted of:
4th Destroyer Flotilla
Naka
• 2nd Destroyer Division
destroyers- Harusame, Samidare, Yudachi, Murasame
destroyers- Asagumo, Minegumo, Natsugumo
destroyers- Umikaze, Kawakaze
Air Group
seaplane tender Sanyo Maru
seaplane tender Sanuki Maru
one oiler
Base Force was under command of Rear-Admiral Sueto Hirose.

2nd Base Force
Patrol boats- P 36, P 37, P 38
• 31st Submarine-chaser Division
submarine- chasers- Ch 12
and other auxiliary vessels.
The Japanese occupation of Bandjermasin on 10 February 1942

Bandjermasin was in 1942 rather a small town in southeast of Borneo. The Japanese occupied this territory so that they
could get in their possesion airfields from which they could control Java Sea and also Java Island.
Immediately after the capture of Balikpapan on 26 January 1942, 56th Mixed Infantry Group (Sakaguchi Detachment)
was ordered to complete the occupation of Dutch Borneo by invading Bandjermasin, its capital. During the Balikpapan
battle and also after the occupation of that city, every effort was made to gather information from Japanese residents,
natives and POWs. Reconnaisance flights of the area were made by the naval air unit. It was necessary to capture
Bandjermasin, as quickly as possible, in order to secure its airfield for fighter planes scheduled to partcipate in the Java
Operation.
Heavy transport losses had been incurred during the Balikpapan operation and it was felt that even heavier losses
would be suffered if Bandjermasin was attacked from the sea, as it was closer to the Dutch air bases in Java and enemy
bombers were active in the area. This, together with the fact that the Navy, being engaged in the invasion of Ambon and
Makassar, was unable to provide sufficient escort, made it advisable to plan the attack, as much as possible, over land.
Other deciding factors in the decision to attack over land was that the river mouth near Bandjermasin was too shallow,
making it impossible to take transports up the river.
It was decided that Group Headquarters would not take part directly in the Bandjermasin operation, but instead would
remain in Balikpapan and assume operational command of the mopping up operations in the Sanga Sanga area and
prepare for the invasion of Java. The attack on Bandjermasin was to be carried out by two separate landing forces,
Land Drive Unit and Sea Drive Unit. The Land Drive Unit was supposed to leave Balikpapan on the evening of 30
January, land at Tanahgrogot before daybreak on the 31st and immediately prepare to advance through the
mountainous jungle terrain and then steadily south towards to Bandjermasin.
The Sea Drive Unit was to conduct an amphibious movement by landing craft, landing at a point approximately 80
kilometers southeast of Bandjermasin, where it should joined with the Main Force. The forces were to coordinate
surprise attacks on Bandjermasin and capture the town. In order to keep the plan secret, sea transportation of troops
was to be carried out only at night.
Land Drive Unit Sea Drive Unit
Colonel Kyohei Yamamoto (commander) Captain Yoshibumi Okamoto (commander)
rd th
3 Battalion of 146 Infantry Regiment (less one
one Infantry Company
company)
one Artillery Battery one Engineer Platoon
one Engineer Company (less one platoon) one Independent Engineer Platoon
one Radio Platoon one Radio Squad
Medical Unit
Transport Company
The Land Drive Unit (a battalion size unit with ca. 400 men) under command of Colonel Kyohei Yamamoto left
Balikpapan on the evening of 30 January 1942 and landed in Adang Bay (Teluk Adang) without opposition before
daybreak on 31st January. The transport ships which had transported the Land Drive Unit from Balikpapan to Adang
Bay were immediately sent to Palau Island to refuel and prepare for the Java Operation. The first objective of
Yamamoto's unit was the small town of Tanahgrogot, south of Balikpapan, which was taken on 1 February 1942. From
there the Japanese troops started to advance towards the west, travelling by jungle tracks, through rough terrain, short
of food and adequate clothing, and constantly exposed to the tropical heat, rain and various diseases, they marched on.
As there were no roads or bridges through the jungle, simple log bridges had to be built to enable the unit to cross deep
ravines. The area was infested with mosquitos and land leeches and the terrain was very steep. Nine days' field rations
were to be carried by each man, and as soon as possible, all other provisions for the troops were to be obtained from
the country. Some elements advanced along a route south of the main force's route, in order to create a diversion. The
main unit then advanced swiftly to the south, without waiting for the concentration of its entire strength, in order to
prevent retreating enemy from destroying bridges. At the beginning of the campaign the Japanese soldiers carried with
themselves almost 600 bicycles, but at the end only one Nippon soldier was still capable of carrying his worn-out
bicycle. The Imperial Japanese march to victory against the tropical elements took its toll.
The only serious clash between the Imperial Japanese Army troops and colonial Dutch KNIL forces took place in the
neighbourhood of the town of Moera Oeja which is about 40 km north of Tandjoeng. A small KNIL military outpost was
stationed there because here the road led south to Bandjermasin, another important oil and port facility facing south
towards the island stronghold of Java. The outpost consisted of only one KNIL brigade, which was given the task to
observe Japanese troops movements, after which they had to link up with the forces at Tanahgrogot and together
mount a fighting retreat. Shortly after the Japanese troops passed through gaps in the dense jungle mountains, they met
with Dutch troops which were advancing north towards their objective and most probably on patrol around the foot hills
of the jungle clad mountains as forward scouts. Apparently there were no casualties on either sides.
After this encounter, Japanese troops continued the march to victory southward, quickly occupying the towns of Moera
Oeja, Bongkang, Tandjoeng, Amoentai, Barabai, Kandangan and Rantau, meeting no organised military resistance
whatsoever. For the Dutch colonial territorial commander in Bandjermasin, Lieutenant Colonel H. T. Halkema, this was a
very stressful and serious situation. He had only approximately 500 men under his command, of which about half of
them were stationed at Kotawarangin airfield, near the city of Pangkalandoen, and he also had orders not to defend
Bandjermasin, but to fight a protracted guerilla war.
The Sea Drive Unit under command of Captain Yoshibumi Okamoto left Balikpapan on the evening of 27 January 1942,
three days ahead of the Land Drive Unit. The craft moved only at night and were carefully concealed in the river banks
during the daylight hours and camouflaged with mangrove branches, while the troops were resting in the forest, so that
they were completely hidden from aerial reconnaisance planes. Radio silence was maintained all the time. One naval
officer was attached to the unit as a pilot. The surprise night attack was successfully carried out on the town of
Kotabaroe on Laoet Island, as planned. Very little resistance was encountered and a large quantity of military supplies
and provisions was captured.
Apparently the local administrative governor wasn't very pleased with his territorial commander and he asked the main
Dutch Netherlands East Indies Army HQ on Java Island for a replacement. The replacement commander was on his
way by airplane, but returned as they saw Bandjarmasin was on fire and they thought, although wrongly, that it was
already occupied by Japanese troops and perhaps it would be unwise to attempt a landing. The Okamoto's unit landed
at a point approximately 80 km southeast of Bandjarmasin on 8 February 1942 and advanced overland without
opposition, to the airfield. As the Land Drive Unit had already dispersed the enemy, there was no fighting after the Sea
Drive Unit reached the Martapoera airfield on 10 February 1942.
At 0900 on 10 February, the Martapoera airfield was captured by the Advance Force together with the Engineer
Company. By the evening of the 10th February, with the arrival of the main force and the Sea Land Unit, Bandjermasin
was finally occupied. There was no fighting.
Lieutenant Colonel H. T. Halkema came by sea to the Barito River, with his staff, accompanied by elements of units
under his command. By now many KNIL native soldiers had already deserted with defeat of the colonial Dutch lingering
in the air. Lieutenant Colonel Halkema received orders to proceed to Kotawarangin airfield. When he arrived there, with
only 75 men left under his depleted command, he received an order to have part of his shrunken force, soldiers that
were physically capable, to staunchly defend the airfield, while those remnants that are too weak and exhausted should
to be sent to Java Island. Lieutenant Colonel Halkema was later even court-marshalled by the military court (Hoog
Militair Gerechtshof). In the meantime a brave group of civilians, and military escapees, 180 persons, managed to evade
the Japanese aboard a small coaster to Madoera Island, among which also included 20 women.
The official Japanese casualties during the Bandjermasin operation numbered only 9 soldiers who were killed or died
from various diseases, while at least 80% of the men were infected with malaria. The casualties and the number of
POWs on the Dutch side are unknown. The distance travelled by land routes was approximately 400 km and the
distance through jungle approximately 100 km.
Note One Dutch report states that only 8 men were present at the Dutch defence observation outpost when it was
attacked by the advancing Japanese, and only three escaped, making their way to Kandagan. As a result the link up
with the Tanahgrogot forces never materialised. Only 8 men is very small for a brigade, so maybe half the brigade was
on patrol or perhaps the bulk of the troops had already deserted, references are unclear on what happened for certain.
The Japanese official sources on the other hand mentions that the clash occured just after the Nippon troops passed
through the jungle clad mountains between Tanahgrogot and Moera Oeja, and that they clashed with "enemy troops"
which were advancing northward. It can be assumed that the Japanese met an understrength KNIL brigade, which was
on recon-patrol around the foothills of the jungle covered highlands and that advanced to contact - it was not a set-piece
battle for an outpost.
Order of battle for the Dutch and Japanese Armies

The Dutch territorial commander in Bandjermasin was Lieutenant Colonel H.T. Halkema which had approximately 500
men under his command in the following units:
• South and East Borneo KNIL Infantry Battalion
• Stadswacht Infantry Company in Bandjermasin
• Militie Detachment with 5 independent squads with approximately 75 men and 2 armoured cars

There were some airfields in the Bandjermasin area like in Dajoe, Kotawaringin and Martapoera. There are no reports of
any Dutch warplanes in this area.

There was probably only a militarized harbour master in Bandjermasin. No Dutch ships are reported in Bandjermasin.
Nihon Rikugun (Imperial Japanese Army)

some elements of the Sakaguchi Brigade:
• one infantry battalion (minus one company) which advanced inland (Colonel K. Yamamoto)
• one infantry company of the overland infantry battalion which conducted an amphibious landing (Captain Y. Okamoto)
The Japanese occupation of Samarinda, 1942

Samarinda was a small, sleepy town in 1942 with several small oil fields in the vicinity, on the east side of Borneo
Island, several miles north of Balikpapan. In the town of Samarinda was stationed a small Dutch KNIL garrison under
command of KNIL Captain G.A.C. Monteiro. The garrison consisted of:
• KNIL Infantry Company
• Motorised Detachment with 2 armoured cars
• Artillery Battery (3 x 75mm L/30 guns)
• Machine-Gun Squad
• Machine-Gun Squad
• Mortar Platoon
• Mortar Platoon
The town of Samarinda was occupied by the Japanese troops after the battle of the Netherlands East Indies was
already over. There was also a small river fleet of small ships with KNIL troops armed with ant-tank rifles etc., that made
advancing for the Japanese very difficult.
The mystery of Samarinda II airfield
The Samarinda II airfield was probably one of the most extraordinary places in the whole Dutch East Indies in 1941-
1942. Before the war, the Dutch KNIL Army prepared a dozen of so called "secret airfields", to where the planes would
be transfered in case of war, so that they wouldn't be caught on the ground and destroyed by a sudden Japanese air
attack. The Samarinda II airfield was one of these airfields and it was located deep in Borneo jungle, between the towns
of Longiram and Melak.
The KNIL garrison at Samarinda II airfield was under command of KNIL Major G. du Rij van Beest Holle and numbered
approximately 500 men. The garrison consisted of following units:
• KNIL Infantry Company
• Anti-Aircraft Machine-Gun Platoon (AAMG)
• Militie Detachment with 5 independent squads with approximately 75 men
The KNIL Air Force at Samarinda II airfield consisted of several Martin bombers, Brewster Buffalo fighters, Lockheed
Lodestars, flying in the vicinity, keeping contact with HQ on Java Island and staff. The Samarinda II airfield commander
was KNIL Air Force Major L.C.A van Dam. On the airfield were stationed following units:
Ie Vliegtuiggroep (1st Group)
• 1-VI.G.I (Bomber Squadron) with 11 WH-3 Glenn Martin bombers, commanded by KNIL Air Force Captain W.F.H. van
Rantwijk
Ve Vliegtuiggroep (5th Group)
• I- 1.VI.G.V. (Fighter Squadron) with 4 B-339D Brewster Buffalo fighters, commanded by KNIL Air Force 1st Lieutenant
P.A.C. Benjamins
• II-1-VI.G.V (Fighter Squadron) with 4 B-339D Brewster Buffalo fighters, commanded by KNIL Air Force 2nd Lieutenant
J.N. Droog
A Dutch Glenn Martin bomber is loaded with British bombs during the type's service in the Far East.
The Japanese Air Force discovered the Samarinda II Air Base on 24 January 1942. In the next days this air base was
constantly attacked by Japanese Navy Zeros. They were welcomed by 5 Dutch Brewster Buffalos. Two Dutch Brewster
Buffalos were shot down and both pilots killed. It is Interesting that one Japanese Navy Zero plane survived its crash at
Samarinda II airfield almost undamaged, so that the Dutch pilots could inspect this famous Japanese fighter closely for
the first time.
On 28 January 1942 two other Dutch Brewter Buffalos were shot down and the Dutch command agreed to evacuate this
air base, but it was decided that the airfield garrison would stay there because USA had promised to deliver 1000
fighters!! Most of the KNIL troops were captured by the Japanese. There were however small parties that went to fight
on in the jungle, but they were all overwhelmed and usually executed by the Japanese. The Japanese also payed the
Dajaks (native people who were extremely violent towards the Dutch) to search for KNIL soldiers and to kill them.
After all this was over a small group of 15 KNIL soldiers from Samarinda II Air Base separated themselves from the
main group to fight a guerilla war. This didn't exactly work out well. They were found in early June and all shot except
two soldiers. In April 1942 they went underground with the Dajaks until they were turned over by the same natives to the
Japanese. The Japanese let them live. The local representative of state in Longiram went inland with some KNIL
soldiers, but they were soon forced to seek protection with the Dajaks. They turned them over and all were executed. In
Samarinda four local representatives of state weee beheaded. The KNIL detachment in the city itself reached
Samarinda II Air Base, but lost most of the native soldiers due to desertion.
There was no resistance when the Japanese troops arrived at Samarinda II Air Base. The ground commander received
orders from the AKH on Java on 8 March 1942 to capitulate the next day, and not to destroy any weapons, equipment,
or the airfield. The air commander flew to Samarinda to turn over the airfield to the Japanese on 9 March 1942. The
Japanese troops finally arrived at Samarinda II airfield on 19 March 1942.
The Japanese did not use the Samarinda II airfield, as the supply situation was very difficult (about 160 kilometers from
Balikpapan through pretty difficult terrain). They did take that which was useful, and left a small infantry detachment to
keep one landing strip cleared for emergency use.
The Japanese occupation of Pontianak, January 1942
Dornier Do-24K
In Pontianak was a Dutch Naval Air Station with Naval Air Group GVT-1 with 3 Dornier Do-24K flying boats. The Dutch
KNIL Army garrison in Pontianak was under command of KNIL Lieutenant Colonel D.P.F. Mars and numbered
approximately 500 men. Dutch forces in West Borneo consisted of the following units:
• West Borneo KNIL Garrison Battalion
• Stadswacht Infantry Company (ca.125 men) in Pontianak
• Anti-Aircraft Battery (2 x 40mm guns) plus some AA machine-guns
• Stadswacht Detachment (ca. 50 men) in Singkawang
• Stadswacht Detachment (unknown strength) in Sintang
They transported themselves with small boats and one larger freighter. They moved towards the town of Sambas. The
town of Pontianak was finally occuped by Imperial Japanese troops on 29 January 1942.
Note KNIL Lieutenant Colonel D.P.F. Mars was Dutch territorial commander for West Borneo area (Territoriaal
Commando Westerafdeling van Borneo)
The Japanese occupation of Tambelan Islands, December 1941

Some sources mention the Tambelan Islands in the Karimata Strait as the first bit of land of the Dutch East Indies
Archipelago occupied by Imperial Japanese Forces on 27 December 1941. This remains, however, a bit dubious. Few
other documents indicate that the first Dutch territory attacked was Terempa Island in the Anambas Group. It was the
first step in a concentrated effort to eliminate the string of auxiliary seaplane support bases operated by Dutch Naval
Aviation. According to these sources the Terempah Village on Terempa Island was heavily bombed and strafed by
Japanese aircraft on 14 December 1941. Among the casualties were 40 dead, mainly Indonesian civilians and 100
wounded with a great deal of material damage. Much of the village was virtually destroyed. The remaining villagers were
evacuated by the Dornier flying boats of the Naval Air Group GVT-3 to Tandjong Pinang in the Riouw Archipelago
shortly afterwards.
The Japanese occupation of the Anambas Islands, January 1942

The Anambas Islands were occupied by the Imperial Japanese troops on 26 January 1942. They were used as an
advanced naval base and according to some references also as a seaplane base for the Malaya and Dutch East Indies
Campaigns. The Natuna Islands were probably taken shortly afterwards.
Japanese troops landing at Natuna Islands, Borneo, December 1941.
The Japanese occupation of Singkawang, January 1942

The town of Singkawang was occupied by Imperial Japanese troops on 27 January 1942.
The Japanese occupation of Pemangkat, January 1942

The town of Pemangkat was occupied by Imperial Japanese troops on 27 January 1942, after they had carried out an
amphibious landing in the vicinity of the town.
The Japanese occupation of Sambas, January 1942

In Sambas was a Dutch Naval Air Station with Naval Air Group GVT-4 with 3 flying boats Dornier Do-24K. The town of
Sambas was occupied by Imperial Japanese troops on 27 January 1942.
The Japanese occupation of Ledo, January 1942
The town of Ledo was occupied by Imperial Japanese troops on 27 January 1942.
The Japanese occupation of Singkawang II airfield, January 1942

The Dutch KNIL Air Force had built a secret airfield near the town of Ledo, which is named in Allied sources as
Singkawang II airfield. There had been stationed some Dutch air force units in December 1941, but they were soon,
after the first Japanese air strikes, withrawn to Sumatra Island. The airfield commander was KNIL Air Force Captain C.
Terluin and it had the following units on the airfield:
• 2-VI.G.I (Bomber Squadron) with 11 WH-3A bombers, commanded by KNIL Air Force Captain R. De Seneport Domis
• 1-VI.G.V (-) (Fighter Squadron) with 5 B-339D fighters, commanded by KNIL Air Force 1st Lieutenant A.A.M. Van Rest
The Singawang II airfield, located near the town of Ledo, was occupied by Imperial Japanese troops on 27 January
1942.
The Japanese occupation of Ngabang, January 1942
The town of Ngabang was occupied by Imperial Japanese troops on 31 January 1942.
The Japanese occupation of Sintang, February 1942

The town of Sintang was occupied by Imperial Japanese troops on 16 February 1942. In the city was stationed a
Stadswacht Detachment (unknown strength).
There had been no real rapport between the imposing Dutch and various indigenous people of Borneo, although
organised with the view of colonial exploitation, this did not allow for the pride and dignity of the many tribes involved.
Dutch Borneo was better administrated than Sarawak, but the government organisation, limited as it was, took slight
notice of the customs and lives of the local people.
During the Second World War when the Japanese military moved into the area there was an uprising at Putussibau in
central Borneo, near the Sarawak border, and the local people murdered the Dutch administrator. Lieutenant Davijd, of
the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army, was stationed at Sintang on the Kaupas River, west Borneo, and went to the
troubled region under orders to rectify the unrest.
He sorted out the problem at Putussibau and on returning received the bad news that Dutch troops had capitulated to
the Japanese. He refused to surrender, went back to Putussibau with three European Non-Commissioned Officers and
a civilian. There during mid-March 1942, Lieutenant Davijd formed a guerilla group and held out at Putussibau for three
difficult and desperate months.
By the end of June the Japanese sent a force of 200 troops against the tiny stronghold, Davijd, seven men and two
women escaped, intending to cross a high mountain range and arrive on the east coast of Borneo 270 miles away. As
the journey came to the source of the Mahakam River the ten refugees heard that Samarinda had fallen to the
Japanese.
Lieutenant Davijd moved his minuscule column back to the upper reaches of the Kaupas River, where they settled down
until October. Then the party was set upon by Punan Dayaks, killing all the men and bringing two women prisoners, plus
the lifeless bodies of the men, to the Japanese occupying Putussibau.
Here, in an example of Japanese unpredictable behaviour that one warrior should show to another, the dead men were
buried with full military honours. And so ended one Dutch attempt to, not only carry out guerilla operations, but to
escape from colonial Borneo now occupied by an imperial Asian force.
The Japanese occupation of Sampit, March 1942

The town of Sampit was occupied by Imperial Japanese troops on 6 March 1942.
The Japanese occupation of Pangkalanboeoen, March 1942

The town of Pangkalanboeoen was occupied by Imperial Japanese troops on 9 March 1942, when Dutch KNIL garrison
surrendered at the Kotawarangin airfield, near the town of Pangkalanboeoen.
The Use of Armoured Vehicles on Borneo, 1941-1942

Both Allied and Japanese forces used few armoured vehicles during the fighting on various places on the island of
Borneo. Used piecemeal, they never had a great influence on the outcome of the fighting. They are also seldom
mentioned in books, reports or diaries. Most of the information that follows comes from the deeply researched book De
Japanse Aanval op Nederlands Indie Deel 2, KNIL Cavalerie 1814-1950 and from an article in the periodical Stabelan.
The allied forces on Borneo had the following AFVs:
2/15 Punjab Regiment: Bren Carriers in the Mortar and MG platoon

KNIL at the Singkawang II airfield: 3 light tanks & 2 overvalwagens
KNIL Infantry Battalion Infantry No. VII on Tarakan Island: 7 overvalwagens
KNIL Infantry Battalion Infantry No. VI at Balikpapan: 3 overvalwagens
KNIL garrison at Samarinda: 2 overvalwagens
KNIL compagny Stadtswacht at Bandjermasin: 2 overvalwagens
The Japanese forces used Armoured Vehicles only during the attack on Balikpapan: 8 Type 97 Tankettes of the 56th
Infantry Group Tankette Unit.
INDIAN SPECIAL RULES
Indian forces use all the British special rules on pages 246 – 248 of the main rulebook except the British
Bulldog special rule. In addition, they have their own War Cry Special Rule
War Cry
Indian platoons do not use the British Bulldog special rule. Instead, enemy platoons must reroll their first successful
Motivation Test to Counterattack an Indian platoon that Launched an Assault against them.
North-west Frontier
All Indian Infantry and Man-packed Gun teams are Mountaineers.
Mountaineers treat steep hillsides as normal Cross-country Terrain (they can move At the Double across them) and
mountains as Difficult Going.
Mountaineers can cross Impassible cliffs and similar obstacles. To do so they must start the Movement Step adjacent to
the obstacle and not be Pinned Down (see the Flames of War rulebook). Roll a Skill Test for each team instead of
moving in the Movement Step.
• If they succeed, the team crosses the obstacle, halting at the other side.
• If they fail, the team remains where it is.
A team that attempts to cross an Impassible obstacle cannot shoot this turn, although it can assault.
Khukuri
Gurkha Platoons re-roll failed To Hit rolls in asasult combat against Infantry, Gun, or Transport teams.
KNIL SPECIAL RULES
Brigade
KNIL, being a colonial professional army, spent most of its time garrisoning, keeping the peace and patrolling the vast
Island empire. This led to the ‘Infantry’-Brigade (Squad), being a 3-‘sectie’ (Team) unit, commanded by a ‘Brigade
Commandant’ (Brigadier – NCO Rank). This unit was self-sufficient and conducted independent operations. The training
emphasized own decision making.
KNIL Infantry Platoons use the German Mission Tactics Special rule (see page 242 of the Rulebook).
KNIL ‘Rifle or Rifle/Machine Gun or ‘Carbine or Carbine/Machine Gun’ Platoons can detach one Rifle or Carbine
Brigade (Squad), receive a Command Klewang / Carabine Team for independent action.
Until the Rifle or Rifle / Machine Gun’ Brigade re-joins its KNIL Rifle or Rifle / Machine Gun’ Platoon, it operates as
separate platoon with its own command team. Although the Brigade operate as separate platoons for all other purposes,
a Rifle or Rifle /MG Platoon deploys all the time as a single platoon. For example, this means that you treat the whole
Rifle or Rifle /MG Platoon as a single platoon, when calculating the number of platoons held in Ambush or Reserve.
Upon re-joining its KNIL Rifle or Rifle / Machine Gun’ Platoon, the Rifle or Rifle / Machine Gun’ Brigade loses its
Command Klewang / Carabine Team, which is taken out of the game, without consequences (for losses).
Grizzled Veterans
After the First World War, the Netherlands main concern was policing its West and East Indies’ Colonies. For this, the
KNIL was an all-volunteer and professional force, consisting of 3 (motorized, but understrength) Divisions, of 2 Infantry
Regiments and supporting troops each. Within each Infantry Company, the first platoon consisted of ‘European Soldiers,
the second and third platoons of volunteer Soldiers from the Indonesian Islands. Volunteers from the Moluccas, Ambon
and Northern Celebes / Sulawesi being valued for their loyalty and fierce warrior like stance and posture.
‘Landstorm’ Battalions were militia battalions of older reservists (32 – 55 Years Old) with less heavy weapons and
transport. Some Landstorm battalions even contained companies of retired soldiers (average age 50), who in some
battles were noted by the Japanese for their remarkable fighting spirit!
‘Stadswacht and Landwacht’ companies could be mixed regular Army and volunteer Stadswacht-units, tasked to
conduct local internal order and security duties and were often augmented with Overvalwagen (in the Netherlands
Indies made open topped 4x2 ‘boiler house plated’ Armoured Personnel Carriers). However, during the campaign both
Landstorms and Stadswacht were employed for mobile defense duties in their zone of operations, with very mixed
results. As a sizable element consisted of retired KNIL Veterans with combat experience in the Colonial Campaigns on
the islands. Japanese remarked on their ferocious attitude achieving local surprise through their excellent knowledge of
the area.
After the Netherlands fell to the Germans in May 1940, the ‘European’ source for recruitment fell away. The following
mobilization and rapid expansion by the European part of Dutch Indian society led to reserve officers being recalled to
the army with very little extra training. After 20 years of civilian life, all were highly motivated, some were still good
soldiers. However, a number were not up to the task.
To reflect the variable quality of KNIL Infantry Officers in Beroeps-, Landstorm and Stadswacht Companies, they are
rated Beroeps, Landstorm and Stadswacht. After deployment, but before the first turn roll a die for each Beroeps,
Landstorm and Stadswacht platoon and its attached teams and consult the Grizzled Veterans table below to determine
their Training and Motivation Characteristics.
Mid War Grizzled Veterans Table

Roll ‘Beroeps’(Professionals) Landstorm Stads-/Landwacht
1 Reluctant Trained Reluctant Trained Reluctant Conscript
2 Confident Trained Reluctant Trained Reluctant Conscript
3 Confident Trained Confident Trained Reluctant Trained
4 Confident Trained Confident Trained Confident Trained
5 Confident Veteran Confident Trained Confident Trained
6 Fearless Trained Fearless Conscript Fearless Veteran
Defensive Fighting
The Dutch defence concept was designed so the army could hold out for a couple of months to allow a new ally, such
as Britain, Australia or the United States to come to their aid. The Dutch expected a classic war of defence with trenches
and fortified positions blocking, river crossings and mountain passes.
Dutch Infantry and Gun teams attempting to Dig In succeed on a roll of 3+.
When conducting Defensive Fire, Infantry and Gun teams that are Dug In or in Entrenchments can shoot over any Man-
packed or Light Gun teams that are also Dug In or in Entrenchments.
Pre plotted Artillery

The Dutch expected to fight a defensive war. They pre-plotted artillery bombardment along expected routes of advance.
When firing a Bombardment Dutch Artillery platoons with a Staff team may re-roll first failed attempts to Range In on an
Aiming Point in the opponent’s Deployment Area.
Onze Eilanden / Our Islands.

The Netherlands Indies comprise more than 10-Thousand islands consisting of rice fields, jungle, steep mountains and
ravines. The KNIL, by years of patrolling and Stadswacht-duties through local knowledge had intimate experience in
operating in these environments.
KNIL Infantry and man packed gun teams treat Difficult Going as Cross country terrain, allowing them to move at the
double in Dense jungle, (Open) Woods, Streams and Plantations and on lower slopes of Mountains.
Life in the Jungle

The years of campaigning and independent small unit patrolling the islands, made that the level of field craft of the KNIL
soldiers was at a very high level. They were extremely adept in using the terrain to their advantage.
Teams from a KNIL Infantry company, Motorized Infantry Company, Mechanized Infantry Company,
Mechanized Cavalry Squadron and Independent Recce Squadron or Company are always Gone to Ground, unless they
move at the double, shoot or assault (Recce Cautious Movement rule found on pg. 193 of the FoW-rulebook).
Aircraft Terror
In the KNIL there was a standing order to take cover when attacked by Aircraft. Due to inexperience with the effects, this
led in the beginning of the fighting to the undesired effect that every soldier went into cover, irrespective of the actual
threat.
All KNIL platoons with teams within 8”/20cm and in line of sight of an attacking enemy Aircraft, at the moment of actual
positioning of the Aircraft, must take a Motivation test to check if they carry on with current orders. If they fail the test,
the platoon becomes pinned down.
Allied platoons
Black Force was one of the last moment attempts of the Allies to reinforce the Netherlands Indies. On the Battles of
Ambon, Bali, Java and Timor, American, Australian, British and Indian Forces, fought alongside the KNIL. Sometimes
forces will contain platoons from allied armies fighting alongside your main KNIL force. While allied platoons have to
obey your orders, they will still answer to their own commanders
An Allied platoon is one of a different nationality from the Company HQ.
Warrior teams and Independent teams may not Voluntarily Join an Allied platoon, and cannot Spot for Allied Artillery
Batteries (see page 126 of the main rulebook).
The only exception to this is that US, British and Commonwealth teams can Spot for each other’s Artillery
Bombardments.
Infantry Rifle Platoon ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Platoon Beroeps Landstorm Stadswacht
HQ Section with 1 Rifle Command Tm
3x Infantry Squads (á 3x Rifle Team) 110 80 70 points
2x Infantry Squads (á 3 x Rifle Team) 85 65 45 points
Option
Replace Rifle/Command Tm to SMG/Klewang Cmd Tm for +5 points
Replace all Rifle Tms with Rifle/MG Tms per Inf Squad. for +10 points
Replace Rifle/MG Cmd Tm to SMG/Klewang Cmd Team for free
Add 1x Bantam GP Blitzbuggy and up to 3x Chevy 1.5 Ton/GMC
2.5 Ton Trucks for the Pln +5 points
‘Brigade’ special Rule
infantry Carbine Platoon ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Platoon
Landstorm Stadswacht
HQ Section with (1 Carbine/Klewang Cmd Tm) Beroeps
3x Infantry Squads (á 3x Carbine Tm) 80 50 40 points
2x Infantry Squads (á 3x Carbine Tm) 65 30 20 points
Option
Replace Carbine/Klewang Team to SMG/Klewang Cmd Team for +5 points
Replace all Carb teams with Carb/Carb MG teams per Inf Sqd for +10 points.
Add 1x Bantam GP Blitzbuggy and up to 3x Chevy 1.5 Ton/
GMC 2.5 Ton Trucks for the Pln +5 points.
‘Brigade’ special Rule
Assault Pioneer Patoon-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Platoon Beroeps Landstorm Stadswacht
HQ Section with Cmd Carbine / Klewang team and
3x Assault Eng Sqds (of 2 Pioneer Carbine Teams ea) 90 55 45
2x Assault Eng Sqds (of 2 Pioneer Carbine Teams ea) 65 30 20
Option
Add 1x Bantam GP Blitzbuggy and up to 3x Chevy 3 ton/
GMC 2.5 ton Truc for the platoon + 5 points
Add 1x Pioneer Supply Truck for +25 points
Mechanized Infantry Platoon
Platoon Beroeps
HQ Section with Cmd Rifle/MG team and 1x Braat
3x Rifle/MG Infantry Squads /3x Braats 170 points
2x Rifle/MG Infantry Squads / 2x Braats 135 points
Options
Replace Cmd RMG team with Cmd SMG/Klewang Tm for free.
Replace all R/mg Tm for Carbine/Carbine/MG Tms, per squad for - 10 points
Add up to one .50” AA MG to one BRAAT Overvalwagen for + 10 points.
Mechanized Infantry Platoon--------------------------------------------------------------------

STADSWACHT
HQ Section with Cmd Rifle/MG team and 1x Braat
3x Rifle/MG Infantry Squads /3x Braats 130 points
2 Rifle/MG Infantry Squads / 2x Braats 95 points
Option
Replace Cmd R/MG team with Cmd SMG/Klewang Tm for free.
Replace all R/mg Tm for Carbine/Carbine MG Tms for per squad --10 pts points
Replace Cmd Carbine CMG team with Cmd SMG/Klewang Tm for free.
Add up to one .50” AAMG to one of the BRAAT Overvalwagens for + 10 points.
LIGHT TANK PLATOON------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Platoon Beroeps
Lt.Tank Platoon 3 Vickers Carden-Lloyd tks
1x VCL M1931 Cmd Tk and 1 section of 2 VCL M1936 Tks 65 points
Motorized Anti-Aircraft Machine-Gun Platoon

Platoon (B
Beroeps L)
Landstorm
CMD M2 AA MG /Chevrolet 30 cwts &:
2x Anti-Aircraft Sections +75 60 points
1x Anti-Aircraft Sections +50 40 points
KAPITEIN
75mm Light Field Gun Artillery Battery ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Kapitein
Motorised Artillery Beroeps
Cmd CarbineTeam, Obs Rifle Team & Carbine Staff team
4x 75mm Krupp/siderius L/30 M1932 Veldartillerie 160 points
Or 2x 75mm Krupp/siderius L/30 M1932 Veldartillerie 90 points
Option
Add Bantam Blitzbuggy and 30 CtW/
2.5 ton GMC trucks for the battery at + 5 points
Add up to 1 additional observers team for + 15 points
Coastal Artillery Battery----------------------------------------------------------------------- KAPITEIN

Fortified Static Artillery Kapitein
Cmd Carbine Team, 2x Observer Carbine team & Carbine Staff team
4x Bofors 150mm Naval L/17 Gun 390 points
4x Hembrug 105mm Naval Gun 335 points
Or 2x Bofors 150mm Naval L/17 Gun 205 points

105mm Bofors L22 M1924 105mm Howitzer 175 points
A Coastal Artillery Battery is a Fortified Platoon. See page 262 of the

Rulebook
Coastal Artillery Battery HONG KONG & SINGAPORE ARTILLERY REGT.---------------- Captain ---
Fortified Static Artillery Capitain
Cmd Carbine Team, 2x Observer Carbine team & Carbine Staff team
Or Cmd Carbine Team, 1x Observer Carbine team & Carbine Staff team
A Coastal Artillery Battery is a Fortified Platoon. See page 262 of the

Rulebook
40mm Medium Anti-Aircraft Battery Beroeps

Platoon
HQ Section Cmd Carbine Tm with
4x Bofors 40mm L60 tl 105 points
Option
Add Bantam Blitzbuggy with GMC 2.5 ton Truck for the platoon for+5 points
Aircraft---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Spordic Air Support Beroeps
Curtis Hawk 75A-7 95 points
Or Hawker Hurricane Mn IIb (MG only) 25 pointst
(Interception only)
Or Hawker Hurricane Mn IIC 105 pointst
Or Brewster Buffalo 90 points
Or Glenn Martin Light Bomber 90 points
2/15 Punjabi Regt. Arsenal
Tank Teams
Armour
Name Mobility Front Side Top Equipment and Notes
Weapons Range ROF Anti- Firepower
Tank
Light Tanks
Vickers Carden Loyd M1931 lt tank Half- 1 1 0 .303” Coax MG; Amphibious; Unreliable
.303”MG (KNIL) Tracked 3 2 6+
16”/40cm
Vickers Carden Loyd M1936 lt tank Half- 1 1 0 Unreliable
Vickers .303”MG (KNIL) Tracked 3 2 6+
16”/40cm
Reconnaissance
Universal Carrier Half- 0 0 0 Hull MG, Recce.
tracked
16”/40cm
Universal Carrier with .50 cal MG Half- 0 0 0 Hull MG, Recce.
tracked
With .50 cal MG 16"/40cm 3 4 5+ Hull mounted
Universal Carrier with Boys anti-tank Half- 0 0 0 Hull MG, Recce.
rifle tracked
16"/40cm
With Boys anti-tank rifle 2 4 5+ Hull Mounted
Universal Carrier with extra hull- Half- 0 0 0 Two Hull MG, Recce.
mounted MG tracked
Indian Pattern Carrier Jeep 0 0 0 Hull MG, Recce.
Indian Pattern Carrier with .50 cal Jeep 0 0 0 Hull MG, Recce.
MG 16”/40cm 3 4 5+ Hull mounted
With .50 cal MG
Indian Pattern Carrier with Boys anti- Jeep 0 0 0 Hull MG, Recce.
tank rifle
With Boys anti-tank rifle 16”/40cm 2 4 5+
Indian Pattern Carrier with extra hull- Jeep 0 0 0 Two Hull MG, Recce.
mounted MG
Anti-Aircraft (SP)
Chevrolet 1.5T SP M2. 50”AAMG Wheeled - - - Anti-Aircraft. Turntable Portee;
(KNIL) 16”/40cm 4 4 5+
Vehicle Machine-guns
Vehicle MG 16”/40cm 3 2 6 ROF 1 if other weapons fire
Twin Vehicle MG 16”/40cm 4 2 6 ROF 2 if other weapons fire
AA MG 16”/40cm 3 2 6 ROF 1 if other weapons fire
Gun Teams
Weapon Mobility Range ROF Anti-Tank Firepower Notes
Machine Guns
Vickers.303”HMG / 7.92 Man-Packed 24“/60cm 6 2 6 ROF 3 when pinned down or movi
Mortars
47mm Brandt-Stokes Light Man-Packed 24“/60cm 2 1 4+ Can Fire over friendly troops
Mortar (KNIL)
ML 3” Mortar Man-Packed 24“/60cm 2 2 3+ Minimum range 8”/20cm, Smoke
Firing Bombardments 40“/80cm - 2 6 Smoke Bombardment
Anti-Tank Rifle teams

Solothurn 20mm anti-tank rifle 16“/40cm 3 5 5
(KNIL)
Anti-Aircraft Guns
Bofors 40mm gun (KNIL) Immobile 24”/60cm 4 6 4+ Anti-Aircraft, Turntable
Anti-Tank
OQF 2 pdr Gun Medium 24”/60cm 3 7 4+ Gunshield, no HE, Turntable
OQF 25 pdr Gun Heavy 24”/60cm 2 9 3+ Gunshield Smoke Turntable
Firing Bombardments 80”/200cm -- 4 5+ Smoke Bombardment
Artillery
75mm gun Krupp-Siderius Heavy 24”/60cm 2 9 3+ Gun shield, Smoke
L/30 M1911-33 Smoke bombardment
Firing Bombardments (KNIL) 80”/200cm -- 3 6
OQF 18 pdr Gun Heavy 24”/60cm 2 8 3+ Gun shield, Smoke, Turntable
Firing Bombardments 72”/180cm - 3 6+ Smoke Bombardment
Coastal Artillery
Hembrug 105mm Naval Gun Immobile 40”/100cm 1 14 2+ Gun shield, Turntable
Firing bombardments (KNIL) 96”/240cm -- 4 4+
6”Mk VII Naval Gun Immobile 48”/120 1 15 1+ Gun shield, Turntable
Firing bombardments 100”/250cm -- 5 3+
Bofors 150mm Naval L/17 Immobile 48”/120 11 17 1+ Gun shield; Turntable
Gun (KNIL)
Firing bombardments 112”/280cm -- 6 3+
Fortifications
Weapon Range ROF Anti-Tank Firepower Notes
HMG Pillbox 24“/60cm 6 2 6 ROF 3 when pinned down
HMG Bunker 24“/60cm 6 2 6 ROF 3 when pinned down
Infantry Teams
Weapon Range ROF Anti-Tank Firepower Notes
SMG /Klewang team(KNIL) 4”/10cm 3 1 6 Full ROF when moving, Hits on 2+ in Assaults
Tank Assault 1
Carabine /Klewang team(KNIL) 4”/30cm 1 1 6 Hits on 2+ in Assaults Tank Assault 2
Carabine team (KNIL) 12”/30cm 1 1 6
Carabine /Carabine 12”/30cm 2 1 6
Machinegun team (KNIL)
Rifle team 16”/40cm 1 2 6
Rifle /MG team 16”/40cm 2 2 6
MG team (KNIL) 16”/40cm 3 2 6 ROF 2 when pinned down
Solothurn 20mm anti-tank rifle 16“/40cm 1 5 5 Tank Assault 3
Boys Anti-tank Rifle team GBR 16”/40cm 1 4 5+ Tank Assault 3
2”Light Mortar Team GBR 16”/40cm 1 1 4+ Smoke can fire over friendly teams.
Flame Thrower Team (KNIL) 4”/10cm 3 - 6 Flame -Thrower
Staff Team 16”/40cm Moves as Heavy Gun Team
Additional training and Equipment

Pioneer Team are rated as Tank Assault 3
Sticky Bombs are rated as improvised Tank Assault 3
Transport Teams
Armour
Weapon Mobility Front Side Top Equipment & Notes
Trucks
Bantam, Blitz buggy / & Trailer Jeep - - - Optional Hull mounted MG & Passenger-fired
Motorcycle Combi AA MG
Chevrolet 1.5T, Dodge ¾-ton, Wheeled - - - Optional Passenger-fired AA MG
Dodge 1½-ton, GMC 2½-ton or 2½-
ton Dump truck etc.
Engineer Vehicles
Pioneer Supply Truck Wheeled - - -
Aircraft
Aircraft Weapon To Anti- Firepower Notes
Hit Tank Sporadic Air Support
Curtis Hawk 75A-7 MG 3+ 6 5+
Bombs 4+ 5 2+
Hawker Hurricane Mn IIb (MG MG 3 1 6 (Interception only)
only)
Hawker Hurricane Mn IIC MG 2 6 5+
Bombs 4 5 2+
Brewster Buffalo MG 3+ 5 5+
Bombs 4+ 5 2+
Glenn Martin Light Bomber Bombs 4+ 6 2+

3 1 6
Special Rules: Taxying Aircraft: Fixed MGs can fire ROF 3 (+1 if 2x MGs) during take-off, like ‘hull MG’
Dorsal MGs (2x) can fire (ROF 2 if other weapons fire) 180 ₒ to the side of Aircraft.
For Evacuation scenario’s only:

British Borneo Invasion 1942

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British Borneo Invasion 1942

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CONCEPT version 0.

The Invasion of British Borneo 1942

The prelude to the war

The Japanese troops in Singkawang, 1942.

The capture of Tarakan Island, January 1942

Oil fields on Tarakan Island Dutch minelayer Prins van Oranje

Medical Unit of 56th Infantry Group

The Right Wing Unit Operations, Tarakan Island, January 1942

The Left Wing Unit Operations, Tarakan Island, January 1942

Damage after self-destruction, Tarakan Island, January 1942

Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger (KNIL Army)

Militaire Luchtvaart, KNIL (Air Force)

Zeemacht Nederlands-Indië (Royal Dutch Navy)

Teikoku Kaigun (Imperial Japanese Navy)

One Engineer Platoon

Order of battle for Dutch and Japanese Army

Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger (KNIL Army)

Militaire Luchtvaart, KNIL (Air Force)

Zeemacht Nederlands-Indië (Royal Dutch Navy)

Teikoku Kaigun (Imperial Japanese Navy)

Base Force was under command of Rear-Admiral Sueto Hirose.

The Japanese occupation of Bandjermasin on 10 February 1942

Order of battle for the Dutch and Japanese Armies

Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger (KNIL Army)

Militaire Luchtvaart, KNIL (Air Force)

Zeemacht Nederlands-Indië (Royal Dutch Navy)

Nihon Rikugun (Imperial Japanese Army)

The Japanese occupation of Samarinda, 1942

The Japanese occupation of Pontianak, January 1942

The Japanese occupation of Tambelan Islands, December 1941

The Japanese occupation of the Anambas Islands, January 1942

Japanese troops landing at Natuna Islands, Borneo, December 1941.

The Japanese occupation of Singkawang, January 1942

The Japanese occupation of Pemangkat, January 1942

The Japanese occupation of Sambas, January 1942

The Japanese occupation of Singkawang II airfield, January 1942

The Japanese occupation of Sintang, February 1942

The Japanese occupation of Sampit, March 1942

The Japanese occupation of Pangkalanboeoen, March 1942

The Use of Armoured Vehicles on Borneo, 1941-1942

2/15 Punjab Regiment: Bren Carriers in the Mortar and MG platoon

Mid War Grizzled Veterans Table

Pre plotted Artillery

Onze Eilanden / Our Islands.

Life in the Jungle

An Allied platoon is one of a different nationality from the Company HQ.

‘Brigade’ special Rule

infantry Carbine Platoon ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

‘Brigade’ special Rule

Assault Pioneer Patoon-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Mechanized Infantry Platoon--------------------------------------------------------------------

LIGHT TANK PLATOON------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Motorized Anti-Aircraft Machine-Gun Platoon

Coastal Artillery Battery----------------------------------------------------------------------- KAPITEIN

Or 2x Bofors 150mm Naval L/17 Gun 205 points

A Coastal Artillery Battery is a Fortified Platoon. See page 262 of the

A Coastal Artillery Battery is a Fortified Platoon. See page 262 of the

40mm Medium Anti-Aircraft Battery Beroeps

Anti-Tank Rifle teams

Additional training and Equipment

Glenn Martin Light Bomber Bombs 4+ 6 2+

For Evacuation scenario’s only: