POLICY DETERMINATION BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ON THE PROPER

MANAGEMENT OF FOREST RESOURCES CANNOT AS A RULE BE INTERFERED BY THE

COURTS

FELIPE YSMAEL, ETC VS. DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ETC

OCTOBER 18, 1990

Petitioner sought the reconsideration of a memorandum order issued by the Bureau of Forest
Development which cancelled its timber license agreement in 1983, as well as the revocation of
TLA No. 356 subsequently issued by the Bureau to private respondents in 1984 by sending
letters to the Office of the President and the MNR [now the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). Petitioner’s prayers were to no avail. Hence the petition in the
Court, imputing grave abuse of discretion to public respondents.

RULING:

The Court stressed the authority of administrative bodies to handle matters within there scope
without need of interference by the courts of law. These administrative bodies are deemed to be
in better positions to determine issues within their specialty and resolve the same. The Court
cited the doctrine of res judicata which avers that the decisions and orders of administrative
agencies have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment. The rule of res
judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by competent authority acting
within their exclusive jurisdiction

The Court also held that the assailed orders by public respondent was in line with the latter’s
duty to develop and conserve the country’s natural resources in view of the constitutional
mandate of the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm
and harmony of nature. It is their duty to regulate the issuance of licenses (TLA) as they see fit,
which the court cannot interfere with. The Court further held that sans grave abuse of discretion
which may be imputed to public respondents, the court ruled that petitioner cannot seek
affirmative relief.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

SUNVILLE vs. JUDGE ABAD

The application of the expertise of the administrative agency in the resolution of the issue raised
is a condition precedent for the eventual examination, if still necessary, of the same question by
acourt of justice.

FACTS:
Sunville was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA) authorizing it to exploit timber in Lison
Valley, Zamboanga del Sur. Respondents filed a petition with the DENR to annul the said TLA
due to some serious violations of its conditions and provisions of forestry laws, carried out by
petitioner. They likewise filed a complaint for injunction in the RTC, based on the same causes
of action. Sunville filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction of the court and non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies. The motion was denied by Judge Abad of the RTC. The
CA affirmed and held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without
exception and pointed to the several instances approved by this Court where it could be
dispensed with. The respondent court found that in the case before it, the applicable exception
was the urgent need for judicial intervention given the petitioner’s operations have caused
heavy siltation in various rivers.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondents should first exhaust administrative remedies?

HELD:
YES. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the
appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their
jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. One of the
reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon the
Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not
exclusively) within the competence of the other departments. As correctly suggested by the
respondent court, however, there are a number of instances when the doctrine may be
dispensed with and judicial action validly resorted to immediately. Among these exceptional
cases are: (1) when the question raised is purely legal; (2) when the administrative body is in
estoppel; (3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; (4) when there is urgent need for
judicial intervention; (5) when the claim involved is small; (6) when irreparable damage will be
suffered;(7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (8) when strong public
interest is involved; (9) when the subject of the controversy is private land; and 10) in quo
warranto proceedings. In this case, the Forest Management Bureau of the DENR should be
allowed to rulein the first instance on this controversy coming under its express powers before
the courts of
justice may intervene. The respondents have failed to satisfactorily establish that the
extraordinary circumstances to justify deviation from the doctrine by exhaustion of administrative
remedies and immediate resort to the courts. In fact, Sunville has stopped its operations in
compliance with the order of the DENR.

PAAT VS COURT OF APPEALS 266 SCRA 167

Facts: The controversy started when the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while
on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver
could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck.
The truck was confistcated.

Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed was filed by the private
respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director

Baggayan. The Court issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to private respondents.
Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court
contending that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners aver that the trial
court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under administrative
seizure proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277.

Private respondents resisted to avoid the operation of this principle asserting that the instant
case falls within the exception of the doctrine upon the justification that
(1) due process was violated because they were not given the chance to be heard, and (2)
the seizure and forfeiture was unlawful on the grounds: (a) that the Secretary of DENR and his
representatives have no authority to confiscate and forfeit conveyances utilized in transporting
illegal forest products, and (b) that the truck as admitted by petitioners was not used in the
commission of the crime.

ISSUE: W/N Replevin lies in a case where the Doctrine of Administrative Exhaustion was not
followed

HELD: No. A crime was committed and the tools of the crime are under custodia legis. With the
introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of cutting,
gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes a
distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309

From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin cannot be sustained against the
petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture
proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P. D. 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin
suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents‘ failure to exhaust
administrative remedies should have been the proper course of action by the lower court
instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the
return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition
precedent prior to one‘s recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an element of
private respondents‘ right of action, is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court.
JURISDICTION

LAGUA VS CUSI
FACTS: This is a mandamus case filed against respondents for closing a logging road without
authority. The private respondents extended that as the acts complained of by the petitioners
arose out of the legitimate exercise of respondent East coast Development Enterprises’ rights
as a timber licensee, more particularly in the use of its logging roads, therefore, the resolution of
this question is properly and legally within the Bureau of Forest Development, citing as authority
Presidential Decree (P.D.)No. 705. The lower court affirmed the respondent’s defense, stating
that the petitioners must first seek recourse with the Bureau of Forest Development to
determine the legality of the closure of the logging roads, before seeking redress with the
regular courts for damages.

ISSUE:W/N the regular courts can take cognizance of the damages case without first seeking
the determination of the Bureau regarding the legality of the closure

Held: Yes. P.D. No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its order does not vest any
power in the Bureau of Forest Development to determine whether or not the closure of a logging
road is legal or illegal and to make such determination a pre-requisite before an action for
damages may be maintained. Moreover, the complaint instituted by the petitioners is clearly for
damages based on the alleged illegal closure of the logging road. Whether or not such closure
was illegal is a matter to be established on the part of the petitioners and a matter to be
disproved by the private respondents. This should appropriately be threshed out in a judicial
proceeding. It is beyond the power and authority of the Bureau of Forest Development to
determine the unlawful closure of a passage way, much less award or deny the payment of
damages based on such closure. Not every activity inside a forest area is subject to the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development.

REPUBLIC VS NAGUIAT
G.R. NO. 134209; JANUARY 24, 2006

FACTS:
Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four parcels of land located in
Panan, Botolan, Zambales. The applicant alleges that she is the owner of the said parcels of
land having acquired them by purchase from its previous owners and their predecessors-in-
interest who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the
best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is
there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.
Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto, considering the fact that she has not
established that the lands in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to
alienable and disposable property.

ISSUE:
Did the areas in question cease to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the
public domain?

HELD:
No, the said areas are still classified as forest land. The issue of whether or not respondent and
her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the
parcels of land in question is of little moment. For, unclassified land cannot be acquired by
adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long,
cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification
simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified
as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or
other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. The
classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like.

HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI vs. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY

FACTS:

These are two petitions for review on certiorari questioning the decision of the CA which
declared the disputed property as forest land, not subject to titling in favor of private persons.
These petitions have their genesis in an application for confirmation of imperfect title and its
registration filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The parcel of land sought to be
registered is known as Lot No. 885 of the Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an area of
645,703 square meters.

Petitioners Roque Borre and Melquiades Borre, filed the application for registration. In due time,
the heirs of Jose Amunategui filed an opposition to the application of Roque and Melquiades
Borre. At the same time, they prayed that the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre
containing 527,747 square meters be confirmed and registered in the names of said Heirs of
Jose Amunategui. The Director of Forestry, through the Prov. Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an
opposition to the application for registration of title claiming that the land was mangrove swamp
which was still classified as forest land and part of the public domain. Another oppositor,
Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956
square meters was concerned. Applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold whatever rights and
interests he may have on Lot No. 885 to Angel Alpasan. The latter also filed an opposition,
claiming that he is entitled to have said lot registered in his name.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117,956 square meters to Emeterio
Bereber and the rest of the land containing 527,747 square meters was adjudicated in the
proportion of 5/6 share to Angel Alpasan and 1/6 share to Melquiades Borre.

A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui contending that the
disputed lot had been in the possession of private persons for over 30 years and therefore in
accordance with Republic Act No. 1942, said lot could still be the subject of registration and
confirmation of title in the name of a private person in accordance with Act No. 496 known as
the Land Registration Act. Another petition for review on certiorari was filed by Roque Borre and
Encarnacion Delfin, contending that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing their complaint against the Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The Borre complaint was for
the annulment of the deed of absolute sale of Lot No. 885 executed by them in favor of the
Heirs of Amunategui. The complaint was dismissed on the basis of the CA’s decision that the
disputed lot is part of the public domain. The petitioners also question the jurisdiction of the CA
in passing upon the relative rights of the parties over the disputed lot when its final decision after
all is to declare said lot a part of the public domain classified as forest land.

The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as forest land
because it is not thickly forested but is a “mangrove swamp”.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable of registration in the
names of the private applicants.

RULING: A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels
of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by
kaingin cultivators or other farmers. “Forest lands” do not have to be on mountains or in out of
the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees
growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land
actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as “forest” is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. Possession of forest
lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. It bears emphasizing that a
positive act of Government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to
convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.

The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised Administrative Code are
found in Lot No. 885 does not divest such land of its being classified as forest land, much less
as land of the public domain. The appellate court found that in 1912, the land must have been a
virgin forest as stated by Emeterio Bereber’s witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as
1926, it must have been a thickly forested area as testified by Jaime Bertolde. The opposition of
the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the appellate court’s finding that timber licenses
had to be issued to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask
for a license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the property was
converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from the District Forester that the
same could not be done because it was classified as “public forest.”
The court affirmed the finding that property Lot No. 885 is part of the public domain, classified
as public forest land. Petitions were DISMISSED.

G. R. NO. L-32266 FEBRUARY 27, 1989

THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, PETITIONER VS.
RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL, RESPONDENT

FACTS:

On January 25, 1949, the respondent, Ruperto Villareal, applied for the registration of a land
which consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located in Sapian, Capiz. He
alleged that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more
than forty years. Director of Forestry was one of those who have opposed of such application for
such land is mangrove swamps and is classified as inalienable. The application was approved
by the Court of First Instance of Capiz and the decision was affirmed in the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether the legal classification of the land in dispute is a non-alienable forest land or an
alienable agricultural land.

HELD:

The Court held that mangrove swamps form part of the public forests and set aside the decision
of the Court of Appeals and dismissed the application for registration of title of the private
respondent.

Under the Commonwealth Constitution, only agricultural lands were allowed to be alienated.
Under C.A. No. 141, mineral and timber or forest lands were not subject to private ownership
unless they were reclassified as agricultural lands and so released for alienation. Mangrove
swamps were considered agricultural lands and so susceptible of private ownership. However,
the Philippine Legislature subsequently declared that the mangrove swamps form part of the
public forests. It is stated in the Administrative Code of 1917 Section 1820 that ‘public forest’
includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa and
mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character.

It is held in the case of Tongson v Director of Forestry that mangrove swamps where only trees
of mangrove species grow, where the trees are small and sparse, fit only for firewood purposes
and the trees growing are not of commercial value as lumber do not convert the land into public
land. Such lands are not forest in character. They do form part of the public domain. This view is
maintained in the case of Heirs of Amunategui v Director of Forestry. In this case, it is held that
‘forested lands’ do not have to be on mountains or in out-of-the-way places. Swampy areas
covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may
also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and
does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as ‘forest’ is released in an official proclamation to that effect so may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect titles
do not apply.
The private respondent invoked the survey plan of the mangrove swamps approved by the
Director of Lands to prove that the land is registerable. Such approval is ineffectual because
under the

Revised Administrative Code Section 1827, it is the Director of Forestry who has the authority to
determine whether forest land is more valuable for agricultural rather than forestry uses, as a
basis for its declaration as agricultural land and release for private ownership.

Even if the land in dispute is agricultural in nature, the proof the private respondent offers of
prescriptive possession thereof is remarkably meager. The record contains no convincing
evidence of the existence of the informacion posesoria allegedly obtained by the original
transferor of the property, let alone the fact that the conditions for acquiring title thereunder have
been satisfied. It has not been shown that the informacion posesoria has been inscribed or
registered in the registry of property and that the land has been under the actual and adverse
possession of the private respondent for twenty years as required by the Spanish Mortgage
Law. Moreover, the tax declarations made by the private respondent were not sufficient to prove
possession and much less vest ownership in favor of the defendant.

The court then, held, in sum, that the private respondent has not established his right to the
registration of the subject land in his name and reiterated for emphasis that mangrove swamps
or manglares form part of the public forests of the Philippines therefore they are not alienable
and may not be subject of private ownership until and unless they are first released as forest
land and classified as alienable agricultural land.

YNGSON VS. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, ET AL

GR NO. L-36847 JULY 20, 1983

Summary:
A number of people, including Petitioner and Private Respondents, applied for a permit to utilize
66 hectares of mangrove swamps for fishpond purposes, but were not granted, the area still
being considered to be communal forest. When the area was released for said purpose, the
three private parties in this case had conflicting claims on the same. Initially, the Bureau of
Fisheries awarded the whole area in favor of petitioner. However, the Sec. of Agriculture and
Natural Resources later ordered the division of the area into three portions, one part for each of
the petitioner and the private respondents. Not satisfied with the portion received, petitioner
appealed the order.
Facts:
• March 19, 1952 – Petitioner-appelant, Serafin B. Yngson, filed with the Bureau of
Fisheries (BoF) to utilize mangrove swamps with an area of 66 hectares, more or less, situated
at sitio Urbaso, barrio Mabini, municipality of Escalante, province of Negros Occidental;
• March 19 and April 24, 1953 – Respondents-appellees, Anita de Gonzales and Jose M.
Lopez, filed their respective applications with the same bureau for the same area;
• When the applications were filed by the aforesaid parties in the instant case, said area
was not yet available for fishpond purposes, as they were still considered as communal forest;
• January 14, 1954 – The area was released for fishpond purposes;
• April 10, 1954 – Director of BoF issued an order awarding the whole area in favor of the
petitioner-appellant and rejecting the claims of the respondents- appellees; Appellants appealed
the order;
• April 5, 1955 – Secretary of Dept. of Agri. And Nat. Resources (DANR) set aside the
order of the Director of BoF and caused the division of the area in question into three portions
giving each party an area of one-third (1/3) of the whole area covered by their respective
applications;
• Appellant filed a petition for review from the aforesaid order but the same was dismissed
by the Office of the President of the Philippines; A motion for reconsideration filed by the
appellant was likewise denied. A second and third motion for reconsiderations filed by the
appellant was also denied;

CFI of Negros Occidental:

• Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari against Respondents asking that the orders of
Public Respondents be declared null and void and that the order of the Director of Fisheries
awarding the entire area to him be reinstated;
• CFI dismissed the petition on the ground that plaintiff had not established such
"capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment" on the part of the Public Respondents as to
constitute grave abuse of discretion justifying review by the courts in a special civil action.
Issue:
WON the administrative agencies having jurisdiction over leases of public lands for
development into fishponds gravely abuse their discretion in interpreting and applying their own
rules.
Ruling:
No, the administrative agencies did not gravely abuse their discretion in interpreting and
applying their own rules.
It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that until
timber or forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor
the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell, or otherwise dispose of these lands
for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond leases, and other
modes of utilization.
In this case, all the applications were premature; therefore not one of the applicants can claim to
have a preferential right over another. The interpretation by the Office of the President was held
to be an exercise of sound discretion which should not be disturbed.

UTILIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, ET AL. v. MUÑOZ

This involves 2 cases:

1. Case #1: (certiorari and prohibition) – Government officials filed petition to annul CFI
ruling allowing Pinagcamaligan Indo-agro Development Corporation, Inc (Piadeco) to haul its
logs in the area.
2. Case #2: (injunction and prohibition) – Piadeco filed petition to ask that respondent
government officials are without authority and jurisdiction to stop logging operations,
construction of the roads, cutting, gathering and removing of timber and other forest products
from Piadeco’s private woodland area.

FACTS:
• Piadeco claims to be the owner of some 72,000ha of land, evidenced by a Titulo de
Propiedad and a deed of absolute sale in its favor. Piadeco applied for registration as private
woodland some 10,000ha of the land. The Bureau of Forestry issued in Piadeco’s name
Certificate of Private Woodland Registration No. PWR 2065-New, to expire on December 31,
1964.
• Piadeco conducted logging operations. Acting Director of Forestry Rivera issued an
order cancelling the CPWR on the ground that Piadeco violated forestry rules and regulations
for cutting trees within the Angat and Marikina Watershed Reservations, expressly excluded
from the certificate; and required Piadeco to surrender the original certificate. Forest Station
Warden Marquez wrote Piadeco requesting the latter to desist from conducting operations and
to refrain from removing logs already cut unless they have been sealed and properly invoiced.
• Nawasa BOD advised Piadeco of the revocation of the 1964 grant to Piadeco of a right
of way from a barrio in Antipolo to Rizal, as an access road to its logging concession.
• Piadeco filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition upon the averment that the acts of
Rivera, Marquez and Nawasa were all precipitate, arbitrary, whimsical and capricious. A writ of
preliminary injunction restraining was issued.
• Piadeco moved to declare the forestry officials in default for failure to answer its petition
on time. Unaware, forestry officials filed a MTD on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction
over their persons or the subject matter of the petitioner, and that administrative remedies have
not yet been exhausted. Forestry officials were declared in default.
• Piadeco entered into an amicable settlement with Nawasa; CFI approved. It was held
that Piadeco was the owner of the land in question; that its operation was not in

violation of forestry rules and regulations; that aside from its registration certificate, Piadeco was
permitted by Nawasa thru the latter’s Resolution 1050, Section of 1963, to conduct selective
logging within the Angat-Marikina Watershed upon payment. CFI made the writ of preliminary
injunction permanent.
• Santiago vs. Basilan Lumber Co., L-15532, October 31, 1963, even if Piadeco’s private
woodland was unregistered, it still retains its inherent “rights of ownership, among which are (its)
rights to the fruits of the land and to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal
thereof,” its only liability being the payment of surcharges on the timber severed from the land.
• Piadeco applied for the renewal of its CPWR; denied. Despite the expiration of its
registration certificate and the non-renewal thereof notwithstanding, Piadeco continued logging
operations. It was about this time that illegal logging was denounced by some members of
Congress thereby attracting national attention. This led to a directive by the President of the
Philippines on March 8, 1965 to stop all illegal logging operations.
• Piadeco filed an ex parte writ of execution; granted. Forestry officials refused to permit
Piadeco to haul its logs. Piadeco asked the court to declare them in contempt.
• Forestry officials filed Case #1. Piadeco filed a motion to dissolve; blocked by SolGen.
SolGen filed a manifestation praying that forestry officials be authorized to turn the logs over for
the construction of prefabricated schoolhouses. Piadeco objected on the ground that said logs
are still its private ownership and no law empowers the state to seize, confiscate and turn over
the cut logs. Both Piadeco motions were denied.
• Piadeco wrote to Rivera a request to grant it “AUTHORITY to cut, gather and remove
timber” from its alleged private woodland. In the absence of such authority or permit, it shall cut,
gather and remove timber from the said area subject to the payment of regular forest charge
and 300% surcharge for unlawful cutting in accordance with the penal provisions” of Section
266 of the Tax Code.

ISSUE/s:
1. WoN Piadeco can claim ownership over the parcels of land– NO.
• Sec 1829 does not describe with particularity titles that may be registered with the
Bureau of Forestry. Administrative authority in the past considered as registrable, titles issued
during the Spanish period. But when Forestry AO 12-2 came intro effect on Jan 1, 1963, that
order should be deemed to have repealed all such previous administrative determinations.
o Forestry AO 12-2 has the force and effect of law, promulgated pursuant to law (Sec
1817 Revised Admin Code). It was recommended by the Director of Forestry and approved by
the Secretary of Agricultural and Natural Resources.
• It is an administrative regulation germane to the objects and purposes of the law. A rule
shaped out by jurisprudence is that when Congress authorizes the promulgation of
administrative rules and regulations to implement a given legislation, “[a]ll that is required is that
the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be
not in contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law prescribes.”
o Geu-keko vs. Araneta, 102 Phil. 706, 712, we pronounced that the
necessity for vesting administrative authorities with power to make

rules and regulations for various and varying details of management has been recognized and
upheld by the courts.
 The exception is the Torrens title.
• If a Spanish title covering forest land is found to be invalid, that land is public forest land,
is part of the public domain, and cannot be appropriated. Before private interests have
intervened, the government may decide for itself what portions of the public domain shall be set
aside and reserved as forest land. Possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into
private ownership.
• Purpose of the registration required in Sec 1829: to exempt the titled owner of the land
from the payment of forestry charges as provided for under Sec 266 of the NIRC. If an owner
fails to so register, he shall be obliged to pay forest charges, as prescribed in Sections 264 and
265. However, as provided in Section 266 above-quoted, if an owner does not register his title,
but he desires to cut, gather and remove timber and other forest products from his land, he may
“secure a license from the Director of Forestry in accordance with the Forest Law and
regulations.”
• Piadeco’s Titulo appears to be an adjustment title.
• Types of titles granted by the Spanish crown: (1) the “titulo real” or royal grant; (2) the
“concession especial” or special grant; (3) the “composición con el estado” title or adjustment
title; (4) the “titulo de compra” or title by purchase; and (5) the “informacion posesoria” or
possessory information title, which could become a “titulogratuito”.
• Royal Decree of August 31, 1888 classified public lands subject to adjustment into two
groups:
o First. Those bounded at any point thereof by other lands belonging to
the State, and those which, though entirely encircled by private lands, had a total area of more
than 30 hectares.
o Second. Those with an area of less than 30 hectares and entirely
bounded by private lands
• The presumption is that land pertains to the State, and any person seeking to establish
ownership over land must conclusively show that he is the owner.
o Piadeco’s ownership of the land suffers from vagueness, fatal at least in these
proceedings. It asserts that Don Mariano acquired it by prescription. Don Mariano mortgaged
the land under pacto de retro but did not redeem it, so the only heir of mortgagee adjudicated
the land to herself and later conveyed it to Piadeco.
o A mere statement by the judge below that Piadeco appears to be the owner of the land
cannot wipe out the objectionable features of its title.
• Even on the assumption that Piadeco’s alleged title is registrable, said corporation
cannot complain against the cancellation thereof. By Forestry Administrative Order 12–2, [t]he
Director of Forestry may cancel a certificate of registration for any violation of the provision of
this Order or of the forest and internal revenue laws and regulations or of the terms and
conditions embodied in the certificate, or when found that the area is no longer covered with
forest, or upon failure of the landowner thereof, or of his

representatives, to obey, follow or implement instructions of the said Director of Forestry.

• Piadeco’s registration certificate should remain cancelled and cannot be heard to protest
further. The certificate could be stricken down anytime. They could not be permitted to remove
from the premises those logs that have already been cut before the expiry date of its registration
certificate because such certificate is a nullity.
• Seizure made by the government authorities cannot be branded as illegal (BIR Circular
V-37, Sec 3). The Court cannot justifiably order the delivery to Piadeco of the logs impounded
right there on the land because a contrary posture is tantamount to abetting a wrong. The logs
belong to the State.

RULING:
Case #1: Petition for certiorari and prohibition granted. Case #2: Petition for injunction and
prohibition denied.

TAN VS. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY

AUGUST 9, 2017LIGHT
G.R. NO. L-24548

Facts:

On April 15, 1963, Petitioner Wenceslao Tan won the bidding for the license of logging
operations on a public forest land in Olongapo.
On May 30, 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon
promulgated Order no. 46 which gives the power to the Director of Forestry to grant (a) new
ordinary timber licenses where the area covered thereby is not more than 3,000 hectares each;
and (b) the extension of ordinary timber licenses for areas not exceeding 3,000 hectares.
On December 19, 1963 General memorandum Order No. 60 was issued by the acting
secretary, revoking the authority delegated to the Director of Forestry which incidentally was the
same date the license for petitioner was signed.
Acting on claims of irregularity, the license for the petitioner was revoked.
The RTC dismissed the complaint, hence the petitioner raised it directly to the Court.

Issue:

1) Whether or not the license is void ab initio

2) Whether or not the Director of Forestry gravely abused its discretion in revoking the license

Held:

Yes.
a. The release of the license on January 6, 1964, gives rise to the impression that it was ante-
dated to December 19, 1963 on which date the authority of the Director of Forestry was
revoked.
b. While the timber license might have been signed on December 19, 1963 it was released only
on January 6, 1964. Before its release, no right is acquired by the licensee.

c. As pointed out by the trial court, the Director of Forestry had no longer any authority to
release the license on January 6, 1964. Therefore, petitioner-appellant had not acquired any
legal right under such void license.

2. No. A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not
a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which
can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this ceise.

Petition denied.

CRIMINAL OFFENSES AND PENALTIES

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. QUE

G.R. No. 120365, December 17, 1996

FACTS

The Provincial Task Force on illegal logging received information that a ten-wheeler truck with
illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. Que’s truck was spotted and discovered to
contain cocounut slabs with sawn lumber inserted in between. He failed to give the cargo’s
supporting documents: (1) certificate of lumber origin, (2) certificate of transport agreement, (3)
auxiliary invoice, (4) receipt from the DENR, and (5) certification from the forest ranger
regarding the origin of the coconut slabs. All he could show was a certification 7 from the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Sanchez Mira, Cagayan that
he legally acquired the coconut slabs.

ISSUES

Whether there are no existing forest laws and regulations which required certain legal
documents for possession of timber and other forest products.
Whether the law only penalizes possession of illegal forest products and that the possessor
cannot be held liable if he proves that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removal of such forest
products is legal.

RULING

No, appellant interprets the phrase “existing forest laws and regulations” to refer to those laws
and regulations which were already in effect at the time of the enactment of E.O. 277. However,
the suggested interpretation is strained and would render the law inutile. The phrase should be
construed to refer to laws and regulations existing at the time of possession of timber or other
forest products.

DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the
transport of timber and other forest products. Section 3 of the Administrative Order provides that
the movement of logs, lumber, non-timber forest products and wood-based or wood based shall
be covered with the appropriate Certificates of Origin. The transport of lumber shall be
accompanied by CLO (Certificate of Lumber Origin).

No, because there are 2 distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. 705.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering,
collecting or removing timber or other forest products by presenting the authorization issued by
the DENR. In the second offense, however, mere possession of forest products without the
proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal
source is immaterial because E.O 277 considers the mere possession of timber or other forest
products without the proper legal documents as malum prohibitum.

AQUINO v. PEOPLE
GR No. 165448 July 27, 2009
FACTS: The Teacher’s Camp filed with the DENR an application to cut down 14 dead Benguet
pine trees within their area in Baguio City. The trees were to be used for the repairs of Teachers
Camp. After the inspection of the trees to be cut, the Executive Director of the DENR issued a
permit allowing the cutting of 14 trees. Thereafter, a group of forest rangers received information
that pine trees were being cut without proper authority at the Teacherâs Camp. They went to the
site where they found petitioner Aquino, a forest ranger from CENRO, another forest ranger, two
supervisors, and two sawyers. The forest rangers found 23 tree stumps, out of which only 12
were covered by the permit. An information was then filed against the five individuals for cutting
without permit the nine (9) pine trees in conspiracy. The trial court ruled that despite the
existence of a permit, the trees cut exceeded the allowed number of the trees authorized to be
cut and that the cutting of trees went beyond the period stated in the permit. Nonetheless, all of
the accused have been acquitted in the trial court and on appeal, except for the petitioner.
Petitionerâs defense was that he was merely sent to supervise the cutting of trees at the
Teacherâs Camp and he was not aware of the trees covered by the permit. However, he still
supervised the cutting of trees without procuring a copy of the vicinity map used in the
inspection of the trees to be cut. He claimed that he could not prevent the overcutting of trees
because he was just alone and that he feared one of the sawyers, Santiago.

ISSUE: WoN petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 68 of PD 705

HELD: NO. Section 68 of PD 705 punishes anyone who shall cut, gather, collect or remove
timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land, without any authority. In this case, petitioner was charged by
CENRO to supervise the implementation of the permit. He was not the one who cut, gathered,
collected or removed the pine trees within the contemplation of Section 68 of PD 705. He was
not in possession of the cut trees because the lumber was used by Teachers Camp for repairs.
Petitioner could not likewise be convicted of conspiracy to commit the offense because all his
co-accused were acquitted of the charges against them. Petitioner may have been remiss in his
duties when he failed to restrain the sawyers from cutting trees more than what was covered by
the permit. As the CA ruled, petitioner could have informed his superiors if he was really
intimidated by Santiago. If at all, this could only make petitioner administratively liable for his
acts. It is not enough to convict him under Section 68 of PD 705.

RODOLFO TIGOY vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 144640. June 26, 2006

FACTS: Nestor Ong, who had been engaged in the trucking business in Iligan City since 1986,
was allegedly introduced by his friend Gamad Muntod to Lolong Bertodazo who signified his
intent to rent the trucks of Ong to transport construction materials from Larapan, Lanao del
Norte to Dipolog City. A Contract to Transport was supposedly entered into between Ong and
Bertodazo.

In the evening of October 3, 1993, Ong allegedly ordered Nestor Sumagang and petitioner
Rodolfo Tigoy to bring the two trucks to Lolong Bertodazo in Larapan, Lanao del Norte. He
instructed the two drivers to leave the trucks in Larapan for the loading of the construction
materials by Lolong Bertodazo. Thus, after meeting with Bertodazo, Sumagang and petitioner
Tigoy allegedly went home to return to Larapan at four o'clock in the morning the next day.
When they arrived, the trucks had been laden with bags of cement and were half- covered with
canvas.

That same morning of October 4, 1993, the Ozamis City police received a report that two trucks,
a blue and green loaded with cement, did not stop at the checkpoint. Thus, some police officers
boarded their patrol vehicle to intercept the two trucks. Upon inspection, the police officers
discovered piles of sawn lumber beneath the cement bags in both trucks. The police officers
inquired if the drivers had a permit for the lumber but the latter could not produce any.

After an investigation was held by the police and the DENR office in the city, an Information was
filed against Nestor Ong, Sumagang, Lolong Bertodazo and petitioner Tigoy for possession of
forest products without legal permit in violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree 705, as
amended by Executive Order No. 277, Series of 1987, in relation to Article 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Ong and petitioner Tigoy entered pleas of not guilty during the arraignment. After trial, the
Regional Trial Court found both Ong and Tigoy guilty. On appeal, Ong was acquitted while
Tigoy’s conviction was upheld.

ISSUE: Is Tigoy guilty of possession of forest products without permit?

HELD: Yes. There are two ways of violating the said Section 68: 1) by cutting, gathering and/or
collecting timber or other forest products without a license; and, 2) by possessing timber or
other forest products without the required legal documents.

Petitioner was charged with and convicted of transporting lumber without a permit which is
punishable under Section 68 of the Code. The appellant, Sumagang and the rest of their
companions were apprehended by the police officers in flagrante delicto as they were
transporting the subject lumber from Larapan to Dipolog City. Tigoy contends that he did not
know that the truck was loaded with timber without the necessary permit. However, the
circumstances shows otherwise. Why would the drivers refuse to stop when required? Did they
fear inspection of their cargo? Why would "S.O.P." (which in street parlance is grease money)
be offered to facilitate the passage of the trucks? The only logical answer to all these questions
is that the drivers knew that they were carrying contraband lumber.

In offenses considered as mala prohibita or when the doing of an act is prohibited by a special
law such as in the present case, the commission of the prohibited act is the crime itself. It is
sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law, and
that it is done knowingly and consciously. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit an
offense is not necessary to prove conspiracy. Conspiracy may be proven by circumstantial
evidence. It may be deduced from the mode, method and manner by which the offense is
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused when such acts point to a joint purpose
and design, concerted action and community of interest. It is not even required that the
participants have an agreement for an appreciable period to commence it.

MERIDA VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 554 SCRA 366

Facts: The government hailed Petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon,
Branch 81 (trial court) with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, for "cut[ting],
gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing]" a lone narra tree inside a private land in Mayod, Ipil,
Magdiwang, Romblon (Mayod Property) over which private complainant Oscar M. Tansiongco
(Tansiongco) claims ownership.
The RTC handed judgment rapidly. In its Decision dated 24 November 2000, the trial court
found petitioner guilty as charged, sentenced him to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal and ordered the seized lumber forfeited in
Tansiongco's favor.[12] The trial court dismissed petitioner's defense of denial in view of his
repeated extrajudicial admissions that he cut the narra tree in the Mayod Property with Calix's
permission. With this finding and petitioner's lack of DENR permit to cut the tree, the trial court
held petitioner liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
Issue: W/N sec 28 of PD 705 prohibiting the cutting gathering and collecting of timber and other
forest products apply to petitioner
Held:
Petitioner is liable for cutting timber in private property without permit. Section 68, as amended,
one of the 12 acts[25] penalized under PD 705, provides:

SECTION 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without
License. â€‖ Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, ortimber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land,
without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of
partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to
the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation.
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any
forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products
are found. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 68 penalizes three categories of acts: (1) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing
of timber or other forest products from any forest land without any authority; (2) the cutting,
gathering, collecting, or removing of timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from
private land without any authority;[26] and (3) the possession of timber or other forest products
without the legal documents

MONGE V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 170308, MARCH 7, 2008, 548 SCRA 42

• Petitioner GALO MONGE and Edgar Potencio were found by barangay tanods Serdan
and Molina in possession of and transporting three (3) pieces of mahogany lumber. The tanods
then demanded that they be shown the requisite permit and/or authority from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) but neither Monge nor Potencio was able to
produce any.
• Consequently, they were charged with violation of Section 688 of P.D. No. 705.
• During the trial, Potencio was discharged as state witness and testified that it was
Monge who owned the lumber, and that the latter merely asked him to help him transport it from
the mountain. Hence, the trial court found Monge guilty as charged.

ISSUE:

WON Monge is guilty of violating Section 68 of P.D. No. 705.

RATIO:

Yes. Monge is guilty of violating Section 68 of PD No. 705.

The mere possession of Monge and Potencio of the lumber without the required permit had
already consummated their criminal liability under Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code.

The Revised Forestry Code “is a special penal statute that punishes acts essentially malum
prohibitum.” Regardless of the good faith of Monge, the commission of the prohibited act
consummated his criminal liability. Good faith, which is the absence of malice or criminal intent,
is not a defense. It is also immaterial as to whether Potencio or Monge owned the lumber
as the mere possession thereof without the proper documents is unlawful and punishable.

PALLADA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 131270, March 17, 2000

FACTS

Pallada, as general manager of Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation, a rice milling company,
was convicted of possessing 29,299.25 board feet of lumber, worth P488,334.45 in total, which
were confiscated during a raid by police and DENR officers. On the scene, the company
provided 2 receipts issued by R.L. Rivero Lumberyard, whose permit to operate had already
been suspended.

ISSUE:
Whether the term “timber” includes lumber and, therefore, the Certificates of Timber Origin and
their attachments should have been considered in establishing the legality of the company’s
possession of the lumber.

RULING
No, the statement in the Mustang Lumber case that lumber is merely processed timber and,
therefore, the word “timber” embraces lumber, was made in answer to the lower court’s ruling in
that case that the phrase “posses timber or other forest products” in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705
means that only those who possess timber and forest products without the documents required
by law are criminally liable, while those who possess lumber are not liable.

On the other hand, the question in this case is whether separate certificates of origin should be
issued for lumber and timber. Indeed, different certificates of origin are required for timber,
lumber and non-timber forest products.

TAOPA VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 571 SCRA 610

Facts: The Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of Virac, Catanduanes
seized a truck loaded with illegally-cut lumber (113 pieces of lumber of Philippine Mahogany
Groupand Apitong species without any authority and/or legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations, prejudicial to the public interest.) and arrested its driver,
Placido Cuison. The lumber was covered with bundles of abaca fiber to prevent detection.

On investigation, Cuison pointed to petitioner Amado Taopa and a certain Rufino Ogalesco as
the owners of the seized lumber. In this petition Taopa seeks his acquittal from the charges
against him. He alleges that the prosecution failed to prove that he was one of the owners of the
seized lumber as he was not in the truck when the lumber was seized.

Issue: Whether or not Taopa is guilty of violating Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended?

Held: Both the RTC and the CA gave scant consideration to Taopa's alibi because Cuison's
testimony proved Taopa's active participation in the transport of the seized lumber. In particular,
the RTC and the CA found that the truck was loaded with the cargo in front of Taopa's house
and that Taopa and Ogalesco were accompanying the truck driven by Cuison up to where the
truck and lumber were seized. These facts proved Taopa's (and Ogalesco's) exercise of
dominion and control over the lumber loaded in the truck. The acts of Taopa (and of his co-
accused Ogalesco) constituted possession of timber or other forest products without the
required legal documents.

Moreover, the fact that Taopa and Ogalesco ran away at the mere sight of the police was
likewise largely indicative of guilt. We are thus convinced that Taopa and Ogalesco were
owners of the seized lumber.

MUSTANG LUMBER v. CA
G.R Nos. 104988, 106424, 123784

FACTS:

On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and
slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, DENR
organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said
lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the
petitioner's truck, loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions.
Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and transport documents, the team
seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas
Avenue, Quezon City. The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because of the
refusal of the owner.

On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive Judge Adriano
R. Osorio of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the
team seized on that date from the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts,
trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board
feet of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa.
On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela
and placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan
lumber with a total volume of 311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon
demand the corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and
delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of
their source and origin.

The petitioner's question the seizure contending that the possession of lumber, as opposed to
timber, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even granting
arguendo that lumber falls within the purview of the said section, the same may not be used in
evidence against him for they were taken by virtue of an illegal seizure.

ISSUE:
Whether the contention of the petitioner is correct that lumber is different from timber

HELD:

No,

The Supreme Court held that the Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber
or lumber.
While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the
latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant."

Lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material.

The Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition
of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs
after being prepared for the market."

Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in the absence of legislative
intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary,
and common usage meaning.

And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section
68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber.
Neither should we.

DENR v. DARAMAN, ET AL

This is a case filed by DENR against Daraman and Lucenecio who were caught to transport
illegal pieces of lumber in violation of PD 705. Daraman is the driver of the vehicle owned by
Lucenecio and a certain Asan is the owner of the lumber in question.

Facts of the Case:

Respondents Gregorio Daraman and Narciso Lucenecio were charged with violation
of Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Pablo Opinion, a Forest
Ranger of DENR testified that he asked Daraman for some papers of the assorted lumber, he
replied none because they were not his. He then took hold of the vehicle and the assorted
lumber, took a photograph of it and issued a seizure receipt. He asked the driver for the owner
of the lumber and he was informed that it was a certain Asan of Brgy. Blanca Aurora. The driver
also informed him that the vehicle was owned by his employer, Narciso Lucenecio of the Holy
Cross Funeral Services in Calbayog City. Daraman further told him that [they] went to Brgy.
Blanca Aurora to secure some wood shavings from the furniture shop owned by Asan and Asan
merely asked him a favor of loading his assorted lumbers in the vehicle of the Holy Cross
Funeral Services to be brought to his (Asan's) house in Barangay Abrero, Calbayog City.
Meanwhile, Daraman testified that he told Opinion also that Asan advised him that
if somebody would ask about his lumber, just to tell the person that Asan had the papers for the
lumber with him in his furniture shop at Brgy. Blanca Aurora, San Jorge, Samar. Pablo Opinion,
however, did not take his word and he instead impounded the vehicle together with the assorted
lumber. At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the vehicle was still not returned to him and so
Gregorio Daraman left and returned to his employer at Brgy. Obrero, Calbayog City and told the
latter about what happened." After trial, the RTC acquitted both accused and ordered the return
of the disputed vehicle to Lucenecio. Atty. Rogelio G. Bato Jr. of DENR, Region 8, moved for
the reconsideration of the assailed Decision, only insofar as it ordered the "return of the said
vehicle to the owner thereof." He contended that the vehicle had already been administratively
confiscated by the DENR on December 2, 1993, and that the RED approved its forfeiture. He
further claimed that the DENR had exclusive jurisdiction over the conveyance, which had
been used in violation of the Revised Forestry Code pursuant to Section 68-A of PD 705, as
amended byEO 277. The trial court denied the Motion.

Issues: Whether the RTC had jurisdiction to release the confiscated vehicle. Summary of the
arguments made by each side: Petitioner contends that the RTC overstepped its jurisdiction
when it ordered the return of the disputed vehicle, because the vehicle had already
become government property by virtue of the forfeiture order issued by DENR.
Petitioner, likewise, alleges that the RTC misinterpreted the law when it held that Section
68-A, PD 705 contemplated a situation in which the very owner of the vehicle was the
violator or was a conspirator with other violators of that law.

The holding and the rule:

The Supreme Court upheld the contention of petitioner and set aside the order of the trialcourt.
According to the Court, a comparison of the provisions of the two relevant sections of PD 705,
as amended, showed that the jurisdiction of the RTC covers the confiscation of the timber or
forest products as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally
used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. It is the DENR that has
exclusive jurisdiction over the confiscation of forest products and, to stress, all
conveyances used in the commission of the offense. Hence, the original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the confiscation of "all conveyances used either by land, water or air
in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same" is vested in the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary or a duly authorized representative.
The Court also upheld petitioner's argument that the release of the vehicle to
private respondents would defeat the purpose and undermine the implementation of forestry
laws. The preamble of the amendment in EO 277 underscored the urgency to
conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit of the
present and future generations. The country's forest resources may be effectively conserved
and protected only through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our
forestry laws. Strong paramount public policy should not be degraded by narrow
constructions of the law that frustrate its clear intent or unreasonably restrict its scope.

MOMONGAN VS JUDGE OMIPON 242 SCRA 332

Facts: Police officers of the Municipality of Hinunangan, Southern Leyte apprehended Dionisio
Golpe while he was driving his truck loaded with illegally cut lumber. The truck and logs were
impounded. A complaint was filed against Basilio Cabig, the alleged owner of the logs. After
conducting the preliminary investigation, respondent Judge Rafael B. Omipon found that a
prima facie case exists against Mr. Cabig but he ordered the release of the truck inasmuch as
the owner/driver, Mr. Golpe, was not charged in the complaint.

Regional Director Augustus L. Momongan of the Department of Environment and Natural

Resources filed the instant complaint against respondent Judge alleging that respondent Judge
has no authority to order the release of the truck despite the non-inclusion of Mr. Golpe in the
complaint. The truck should have been turned over to the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office of San Juan, Southern Leyte for appropriate disposition as the same falls
under the administrative jurisdiction of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Office.

Issue: did the Judge commit a reversible error when he ordered the release of the truck?

Held: We find respondent Judge's order to release the truck owned and driven by Mr. Dionisio
Golpe legally justifiable, hence, he is not subject to any disciplinary sanction.

Complainant is correct in pointing out that the DENR Secretary or his duly authorized
representative has the power to confiscate any illegally obtained or gathered forest products
and all conveyances used in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in
accordance with pertinent laws. However, as complainant himself likewise pointed out, this
power is in relation to the administrative jurisdiction of the DENR, which is entirely different from
the criminal jurisdiction of the court that ordered the release of the truck as presided by
respondent Judge.

In addition, according to Article 45 of the RPC, Forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the
instrument or tools with which it was committed cannot be done if the same be the property of a
third person not liable for the offense. Since the truck here is the property of a third party not
charged in the criminal complaint, the order of its release here is henceforth justifiable.

DAGUDAG VS JUDGE PADERANGA 555 SCRA 217

Facts : Illegal forest products were possessed by NMC Container Lines, Inc. were seized by the
DENR. The items were found to be lacking the required legal documents and were
consequently abandoned by the unknown owner.
Later a certain Roger C. Edma filed a writ of replevin for the release of said confiscated
products. Respondent Judge issued the writ despite the fact that an administrative case was
already pending before the DENR.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Paderanga is liable for gross ignorance of the law and for conduct
unbecoming a judge.
Held: Yes. Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright for three reasons.
First, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, courts cannot take
cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies. In

the instant case, Edma did not resort to, or avail of, any administrative remedy. He went straight
to court and filed a complaint for replevin and damages.
Second, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases
pending before administrative agencies of special competence.

Third, the forest products are already in custodia legis and thus cannot be the subject of
replevin.

MAMANTEO VS DEPUTY SHERRIFF MAGUMUN 311 SCRA 259

Facts: The forest employes of DENR CAR tasked wit the enforcement of forestry law
intercepted a San Miguel Corp Van with narra fitches wrapped in nylon sack. The driver of the
van could not produce ant legal permit authorizing him to transport the narra lumber. The
vehicle and its load of narra fitches were confiscated. A criminal complaint against the driver
was filed for violation of Sec. 78 of PD 705(2) as amended and implemented by DENR Admin
order 59. after due notice and opportunity to be hear, an order of forfeiture of the vehicle and its
load was issued by the DENR Regional pursuant to its quasi-judicial authority.
Thereafter SMC, the owner of the vehicle filed a case for recovery of personal property and
damages with the application for writ of replevin with the RTC of Tugegarao. Such court issued
a warrant of seizure of personal property which was enforced by respondent herein deputy
sheriff despite the refusal of DENR employees and officials on the ground that it had already
been forfeited in favor of the government and was now in custodial legis.
Issue: Whether or not the deputy sheriff committed grave misconduct in taking hold of the
property which is already in custodia legis confiscated by other government agency.
Held: A sheriff‘s prerogative does not give him the liberty to determine who among the parties is
entitled to the possession of the attached property; much less does he have any discretion to
decide which agency has primary jurisdiction and authority over the matter at hand. When a writ
is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to the
contrary, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it according to its
mandate.
However, the prompt implementation of a warrant of seizure is called for only in instances where
there is no question regarding the right of the plaintiff to the property.

In this case, the prudent recourse then for respondent was to desist from executing the warrant
and convey the information to his judge and to the plaintiff.

CALUB VS CA
Facts: The Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office of the DENR apprehended 2 motor vehicles loaded with illegally
sourced lumber. The drivers of the vehicles failed to present proper documents. Thus, the
apprehending team impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber. The impounded vehicles
were forcibly taken by the drivers from the custody of DENR. Thereafter, one of the 2 vehicles
was again apprehended by a composite team of DENR-CENRO and Phil. Army elements. The
vehicle was again loaded with forest products.

Private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner, and Constancio Abuganda, the
driver, filed a complaint for the recovery of possession of the vehicle with an application for
replevin against petitioners DENR and DENR Officer Calub.

Issue: Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded vehicles, with
an application for replevin, is a suit against the State

Held: Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent. And a
suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose
is to hold the State ultimately liable. However, the protection afforded to public officers by this
doctrine generally applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good faith and
without willfulness, malice or corruption.

In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were
performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly
official in nature. In implementing and enforcing Secs. 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through
the seizure carried out, petitioners were performing their duties and functions as officers of the
DENR, and did so within the limits of their authority. There was no malice or bad faith on their
part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It
cannot prosper without the State’s consent.

PEOPLE V. ALMUETE
G.R. NO. L-26551, FEBRUARY 27, 1976

FACTS:
Wenceslao Almuete, Fernando Fronda, Cipriano Fronda and Fausto Durion were charged with
a violation of section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law. It was alleged in the information that
the accused being tenants of Margarita Fernando in her riceland, without notice to her or without
her consent, pre-threshed a portion of their respective harvests of five cavans of palay each to
her damage.
The lower held that the information is basically deficient because it does not describe the
circumstances under which the cavans of palay were found in the possession of the accused
tenants; it does not specify the date agreed upon for the threshing of the harvests, and it does
not allege that the palay found in the tenants' possession exceeded ten percent of their net
share based on the last normal harvest.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the tenant's act of pre- reaping and pre-threshing without notice to the landlord
is punishable pursuant to Sec. 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law.

HELD:
No. The prohibition against pre-reaping or pre-threshing found in section 39 of the Agricultural
Tenancy Law of 1954 is premised on the existence of the rice share tenancy system. The
evident purpose is to prevent the tenant and the landholder from defrauding each other in the
division of the harvests. Thus, the legal maxim, cessanterationelegis, cessatipsalex (the reason
for the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases). applies to this case.

Section 4 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms declared agricultural share tenancy throughout the
country as contrary to public policy and automatically converted it to agricultural leasehold.
Presidential Decree No. 2 proclaimed the entire country "as a land reform area".
The legislative intent not to punish anymore the tenant's act of pre- reaping and pre-threshing
without notice to the landlord is inferable from the fact that the Code of Agrarian Reforms did not
reenact section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law and that it abolished share tenancy which is
the basis for penalizing clandestine pre-reaping and pre-threshing.

As held in the Adillo case, the act of pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice to the
landlord, which is an offense under the Agricultural Tenancy Law, had ceased to be an offense
under the subsequent law, the Code of Agrarian Reforms. To prosecute it as an offense when
the Code of Agrarian Reforms is already in force would be repugnant or abhorrent to the policy
and spirit of that Code and would subvert the manifest legislative intent not to punish anymore
pre- reaping and pre-threshing without notice to landholder.

LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL, Petitioner, vs.

THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 186739-960 April 17, 2013

Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)

Facts of the Case:

Ruzol was the mayor of General Nakar, Quezon from 2001 to 2004. Earlier in his term, he
organized a Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly composed of civil society groups, public
officials and concerned stakeholders with the end in view of regulating and monitoring the
transportation of salvaged forest products within the vicinity of General Nakar. Among those
present in the organizational meeting were Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Officer (PENRO) Rogelio Delgado Sr. and Bishop Julio Xavier Labayen, the OCD-DD of the
Prelature of Infanta Emeritus of the Catholic Church and Chairperson of TIPAN, an
environmental non-government organization that operates in the municipalities of General
Nakar, Infanta and Real in Quezon province. During the said assembly, the participants agreed
that to regulate the salvaged forests products, the Office of the Mayor, through Ruzol, shall
issue a permit to transport after payment of the corresponding fees to the municipal treasurer.2
Consequently, from 2001 to 2004, two hundred twenty-one (221) permits to transport salvaged
forest products were issued to various recipients, of which forty-three (43) bore the signature of
Ruzol while the remaining one hundred seventy-eight (178) were signed by his co-accused
Guillermo T. Sabiduria (Sabiduria), then municipal administrator of General Nakar.3
On June 2006, on the basis of the issued Permits to Transport, 221 Informations for violation of
Art. 177 of the RPC or for Usurpation of Authority or Official Functions were filed against Ruzol
and Sabiduria, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM- 0039 to 0259.
Except for the date of commission, the description of forest product, person given the permit,
and official receipt number, the said Informations uniformly read:
That, on (date of commission) or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in General Nakar,
Quezon, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
Leovegildo R. Ruzol and Guillermo M. Sabiduria, both public officers, being then the Municipal
Mayor and Municipal Administrator, respectively, of General Nakar, Quezon, taking advantage
of their official position and committing the offense in relation to their office, conspiring and
confederating with each other did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, issue permit
to transport (description of forest product) to (person given the permit) under O.R. No. (official
receipt number) under the pretense of official position and without being lawfully entitled to do
so, such authority properly belonging to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
to the damage and prejudice of the of the government.

Considering that the facts are undisputed, the parties during Pre-Trial agreed to dispense with
the presentation of testimonial evidence and submit the case for decision based on the
documentary evidence and joint stipulation of facts contained in the Pre- Trial Order. Thereafter,
the accused and the prosecution submitted their respective memoranda.6

After due consideration, the Sandiganbayan rendered on December 19, 2008 a Decision,
acquitting Sabiduria but finding Ruzol guilty as charged. The Sandiganbayan predicated its
ruling on the postulate that the authority to issue transport permits with respect to salvaged
forest products lies with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and
that such authority had not been devolved to the local government of General Nakar.9 To the
graft court, Ruzol’s issuance of the subject permits constitutes usurpation of the official functions
of the DENR.

The Issue
Whether or not Ruzol Is Guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions

The Ruling of this Court

Whether Ruzol Is Guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions
The foregoing notwithstanding, Ruzol cannot be held guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions
as defined and penalized under Art. 177 of the RPC, to wit:
Art. 177. Usurpation of authority or official functions. — Any person who shall knowingly and
falsely represent himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or agency
of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government, or who, under pretense of official
position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the
Philippine Government or any foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being lawfully
entitled to do so, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods. (Emphasis Ours.)
As the aforementioned provision is formulated, there are two ways of committing this crime: first,
by knowingly and falsely representing himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any
department or agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government; or second,
under pretense of official position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or
public officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign government, or any agency thereof,
without being lawfully entitled to do so.32 The former constitutes the crime of usurpation of
authority, while the latter act constitutes the crime of usurpation of official functions.33

In the present case, Ruzol stands accused of usurpation of official functions for issuing 221
permits to transport salvaged forest products under the alleged "pretense of official position and
without being lawfully entitled to do so, such authority properly belonging to the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources."34 The Sandiganbayan ruled that all the elements of the
crime were attendant in the present case because the authority to issue the subject permits
belongs solely to the DENR.35
We rule otherwise.
First, it is settled that an accused in a criminal case is presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved and that to overcome the presumption, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt must
be established by the prosecution.36As held by this Court in People v. Sitco:37

The imperative of proof beyond reasonable doubt has a vital role in our criminal justice system,
the accused, during a criminal prosecution, having a stake interest of immense importance, both
because of the possibility that he may lose his freedom if convicted and because of the certainty
that his conviction will leave a permanent stain on his reputation and name. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Citing Rabanal v. People,38 the Court further explained:
Law and jurisprudence demand proof beyond reasonable doubt before any person may be
deprived of his life, liberty, or even property. Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right of the
petitioner to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and to overcome the
presumption, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established by the
prosecution. The constitutional presumption of innocence requires courts to take "a more than
casual consideration" of every circumstance of doubt proving the innocence of petitioner.
(Emphasis added.)
Verily, an accused is entitled to an acquittal unless his or her guilt is shown beyond reasonable
doubt and it is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity and
persuasion, so that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion, with moral
certainty.39 As explained by this Court in People v. Berroya:40
The necessity for proof beyond reasonable doubt lies in the fact that "(i)n a criminal prosecution,
the State is arrayed against the subject; it enters the contest with a prior inculpatory finding in its
hands; with unlimited means of command; with counsel usually of authority and capacity, who
are regarded as public officers, and therefore as speaking semi-judicially, and with an attitude of
tranquil majesty often in striking contrast to that of defendant engaged in a perturbed and
distracting struggle for liberty if not for life. These inequalities of position, the law strives to meet
by the rule that there is to be no conviction when there is a reasonable doubt of guilt." Indeed,
proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of
error, produces absolute certainty; moral certainly only is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.41 However, contrary to the ruling of the
Sandiganbayan, We find that a careful scrutiny of the events surrounding this case failed to
prove that Ruzol is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the crime of usurpation of
official functions of the DENR.
We note that this case of usurpation against Ruzol rests principally on the prosecution’s theory
that the DENR is the only government instrumentality that can issue the permits to transport
salvaged forest products. The prosecution asserted that Ruzol usurped the official functions that
properly belong to the DENR.
But erstwhile discussed at length, the DENR is not the sole government agency vested with the
authority to issue permits relevant to the transportation of salvaged forest products, considering
that, pursuant to the general welfare clause, LGUs may also exercise such authority. Also, as
can be gleaned from the records, the permits to transport were meant to complement and not to
replace the Wood Recovery Permit issued by the DENR. In effect, Ruzol required the issuance
of the subject permits under his authority as municipal mayor and independently of the official
functions granted to the DENR. The records are likewise bereft of any showing that Ruzol made
representations or false pretenses that said permits could be used in lieu of, or at the least as
an excuse not to obtain, the Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR.

Second, contrary to the findings of the Sandiganbayan, Ruzol acted in good faith.
It bears stressing at this point that in People v. Hilvano,42 this Court enunciated that good faith
is a defense in criminal prosecutions for usurpation of official functions.43 The term "good faith"
is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting "honesty of intention, and freedom from
knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to
abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even though technicalities of
law, together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render
transaction unconscientious."44 Good faith is actually a question of intention and although
something internal, it can be ascertained by relying not on one’s self-serving protestations of
good faith but on evidence of his conduct and outward acts.45

As a final note, We emphasize that the burden of protecting the environment is placed not on
the shoulders of DENR alone––each and every one of us, whether in an official or private
capacity, has his or her significant role to play. Indeed, protecting the environment is not only a
responsibility but also a right for which a citizen could and should freely exercise. Considering
the rampant forest denudation, environmental degradation and plaguing scarcity of natural
resources, each of us is now obligated to contribute and share in the responsibility of protecting
and conserving our treasured natural resources.
Ruzol chose to exercise this right and to share in this responsibility by exercising his authority
as municipal mayor––an act which was executed with the concurrence and cooperation of non-
governmental organizations, industry stakeholders, and the concerned citizens of General
Nakar. Admittedly, We consider his acts as invalid but it does necessarily mean that such
mistakes automatically demand Us to rule a conviction. This is in consonance with the settled
principle that "all reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate error and not crime should be
indulged in for the benefit of the accused."49
Under our criminal judicial system, "evil intent must unite with the unlawful act for a crime to
exist," as "there can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting."50 Actus non facit reum,
nisi mens sit rea.
In the present case, the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Ruzol
possessed that "criminal mind" when he issued the subject permits. What is clear from the
records is that Ruzol, as municipal mayor, intended to regulate and monitor salvaged forest
products within General Nakar in order to avert the occurrence of illegal logging in the area. We
find that to hold him criminally liable for these seemingly noble intentions would be a step
backward and would run contrary to the standing advocacy of encouraging people to take a pro-
active stance in the protection of the environment and conservation of our natural resources.
Incidentally, considering the peculiar circumstances of the present case and considering further
that this case demands only the determination of Ruzol's guilt or innocence for usurpation of
official functions under the RPC, for which the issue on the validity of the subject Permits to
Transport is only subsidiary, We hereby resolve this case only for this purpose and only in this
instance, pro hac vice, and, in the interest of justice, rule in favor of Ruzol' s acquittal.