HISTORY HL IA FIRST DRAFT

TOPIC: MILITARY HISTORY – WWII: BATTLE OF KURSK

RQ: To what extent was the Russian T-34 tank superiority against the German Tiger
and Panzer tank the key reason for the outcome of 1943 Kursk battle?

Word count: 2198

MAY 2022
SECTION 1: IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION OF SOURCES

This essay will investigate the following question: “To what extent was the Russian T-34

tank superiority against the German Tiger and Panzer tanks the key reason for the outcome of

1943 Kursk battle?”.

Panther vs T-34. Ukraine 1943 by Robert Forczyk, is relevant to this investigation because it

clearly argues that T-34 was a much the decisive factor of the battle. Kursk. The Greatest

Tank Battle, 1943 by Mary Barbier, ais relevant to this investigation, as she concludes that

the most decisive factors were the German mistakes and the superior preparation by the

Soviets, not the T-34 quality.

Source 11

The origin of the source is of great value for this investigation since the author has published

many books on military history and is a retired lieutenant colonel himself, with first-hand

experience of strategy and weapons. However, he is not a professional historian, therefore,

may not be able to fully appreciate the merits and weaknesses of his own sources. His

purpose is to compare the two tanks and a significant part of the book is dedicated to Kursk.

This is of value as it directly discusses the quality of T-34 and its contribution to the battle.

However, the focus of the does not allow for discussion of other factors, such as the Soviet

strategy or the German mistakes on planning. The content consists of a detailed discussion of

all aspects around the two tanks, including not only technical characteristics, but also

production costs and efficiency. A limitation of the content is however, the occasionally

intimidating technical language “defensive hedgehog”, “The 75mm Kwk 40 L43 gun on the

Pz IV F2 fired an AP round with a muzzle velocity of 740m/s...” 2 Terms incomprehensible to

1
Forczyk, Robert, Panther vs T-34. Ukraine 1943. Osprey Publishing. 2007
2
Panther vs T-34; T-34. The Red Army’s legendary medium tank: pp 30
laymen.

Source 23

The origin of the book is valuable since Mary Barbier is a professor of military history in the

US who has widely published on WWII history, offering a professional and sound approach

to historical research. There is, though, the limitation that she does not have any

specialization on military history. The purpose is to present the battle of Kursk to a wider

audience with an interest in military history. Focusing exclusively on the battle allows her to

discuss the causes for Soviet victory extensively. However, since she addresses the general

public, she is forced to be more narrative and less analytical in her discussion. In terms of

content the author discusses all the strategic choices and mistakes of both sides; therefore,

offering a very good scope for the topic; however she does not discuss the T-34 tank in great

detail and mostly discusses the other factors that led to the Soviet victory.

SECTION 2: INVESTIGATION

3
Barbier, M.K., Kursk. The Greatest Tank Battle, 1943.
One of the most important battles of World War II was the battle of Kursk, July 1943, where

thousands of German tanks attempted to break through the Soviet defenses and retake the

initiative on the Eastern front. However, the Red Army stood firm and, despite heavy losses

both in men and tanks, managed to withstand attack and even lead a counter offensive. Most

historians attribute the Soviet victory primarily to the strategy and the meticulous preparation

of the Soviets for the German attack at Kursk, as well as mistakes made by the German

leadership4. The same view seems to be held also by the military personnel of the two

armies5. However, the battle of Kursk has stayed rightly the biggest tank battle in history with

over 6,000 tanks involved. This is the reason why some military historians, like Forczyk and

Tucker, came to the conclusion that the decisive factor for the Soviet victory was the

superiority of their T-34 tank, which “sent Hitler’s panzers reeling at Kursk” 6. This argument

becomes more convincing when taking into account, not only the fighting capacity of the T-

34 but also the efficiency of its production and how the Soviet military leaders used it. This

essay will attempt to argue that, although the tank was not the most important factor, it

contributed heavily to the Soviet victory.

The battle of Kursk

To assess the factors that shaped the battle of Kursk, it is necessary to refer to the key

developments prior to and during the battle. This battle was carefully prepared by Hitler and

his general staff to inflict as many casualties on the Red Army as possible and regain the

initiative on the Eastern front7. Unfortunately for the Germans Stalin had had full knowledge

of their plans for an attack at Kursk since March, thanks to Soviet and British espionage.

Therefore, the Soviet staff had ample time to prepare their defenses and concentrate a large

4
Barbier, M.K., Kursk. The Greatest Tank Battle, 1943.
5
Kursk. The German view. Eyewitness Reports of Operation Citadel by the German Commanders; The Battle
for Kursk, 1943. The Soviet General Staff study.
6
Tucker, Anthony, T-34. The Red Army’s legendary medium tank. Pen and Sword. 2015 pp 1
7
Healy, Mark, Kursk 1943. The tide turns in the East. Osprey publishing. 1992, pp 8-9
part of their army and air force in the salient of Kursk8.

Operation Citadel took place in July 1943 starting with a fierce attack of the German armor

divisions. Despite the heavy losses inflicted (it is estimated that the Soviet army lost more

than 800,000 men and 1500 tanks), the Germans never managed to achieve their military

targets. On the contrary, the Red army managed to destroy a significant part of the German

armor divisions and counter attack (albeit with little success). After almost 10 days of

fighting Hitler called off the offensive without having achieved any of his targets and, as later

shown, was unable to make up for the heavy losses9.

T-34’s Contribution to the Battle

TheT-34 was one of the important factors for this predominantly armored clash. Both

Forzcyk and Tucker clearly state that the Soviet tanks, despite the heavy losses, had overall

the upper hand10. They managed to knock out more than half the Panzers and Tigers they

confronted, being swifter and more flexible. The soviet leadership managed to overcome the

major advantage of the German tanks which was their thickest armor and the bigger gun by

literary digging the T-34s in the ground. In this way the German tanks had to come closer in

order to spot their enemy, losing their advantage. The fight now was mostly determined by

the flexibility of the tank and the ability of the crew 11. The T-34 was among the best medium

tanks, with radio, an improved gun, armor and engine, and a three-member crew; so it was in

position to face a technically superior large tank at close range12.

Besides its actual performance, however, it is perhaps of more significance that the T-34 was

not very costly and complex in design, hence it was far easier and cheaper to produce in

8
Overy, Richard, Russia’s War. Penguin. 1997
9
Healy, Mark, Kursk 1943. The tide turns in the East. Osprey publishing. 1992
10
Forczyk, Robert, Panther vs T-34. Ukraine 1943. Osprey Publishing. 2007; Tucker, Anthony, T-34. The Red
Army’s legendary medium tank. Pen and Sword. 2015
11
Forczyk, Robert, Panther vs T-34. Ukraine 1943. Osprey Publishing. 2007pp 52-54
12
Tucker, Anthony, T-34. The Red Army’s legendary medium tank. Pen and Sword. 2015
comparison to all German tanks, and even more to the costly and hi-tech Tiger and Panther

tanks. In 1943, the Russians produced more than 15,000 T-34s whereas the Germans

produced “only” 1,700 Panther tanks and far fewer Tigers. In Kursk the Red Army had 3,400

T-34s against 1300 German tanks (Tigers, Panthers and Panzers)13. Forzcyk demonstrates

how crucial it was that the Russians could simply throw in more and more tanks whereas the

Germans had no reserves to keep up the fighting 14. This is why the German attack eventually

stalled; no matter how many tanks they destroyed, there were others to replace them 15. Hence,

if this factor is also taken into consideration, it can be asserted that the quick and efficient

production of T-34s was a crucial factor in prevailing over the German armor divisions.

Besides T-34

Other historians though prefer to emphasis on wider factors for the outcome of the battle.

Barbier gives much emphasis on the long-term preparation of the Soviets and how important

the decisions made in the spring were 16. Unlike Hitler, Stalin listened to his generals and

opted for their recommended strategy. The Red Army should first wait and defend against a

German attack, weaken the enemy, and then launch a counter offensive17. As a result, the

Soviet General Staff had more than enough time to prepare their defenses. Luckily or wisely,

they correctly guessed the targeted territory, confirmed also by Soviet and British

intelligence. Therefore, the Red Army had, by July, amassed almost 2,000,000 men, more

than 25,000 anti-tank guns, mortars and artillery, 1,000 Katyusha rockets, and more than

3,000 aircrafts, as opposed to 800,000 German infantry, 10,000 guns and 2,100 aircraft. In

addition, a further 100,000 civilians were also deployed to help build the defense lines18.

Strategy wise the Soviet General staff had learned from the heavy losses of the initial stages
13
Forczyk, Robert, Panther vs T-34. Ukraine 1943. Osprey Publishing. 2007 pp 78
14
Forczyk, Robert, Panther vs T-34. Ukraine 1943. Osprey Publishing. 2007, pp. 54
15
Forczyk, Robert, Panther vs T-34. Ukraine 1943. Osprey Publishing. 2007pp 55.
16
Barbier, M.K., Kursk. The Greatest Tank Battle, 1943. Ian Allan publishing. 2002, pp.
17
Barbier, M.K., Kursk. The Greatest Tank Battle, 1943 pp 41-43.
18
Barbier, M.K., Kursk. The Greatest Tank Battle, 1943 pp 28-29; 45-46
of the war and they had prepared a far more effective plan to face the Panzer onslaught. The

overall depth of the defense lines was more than 100 miles, and they were organized into

different belts supported by tank divisions, antitank guns and several minefields with more

than 40,000 mines. Each belt was supported by 2 or 3 reserve divisions and behind them there

were other divisions with the sole purpose of counterattacking 19. The plan proved highly

effective, especially during the first days of the battle, when the German tanks moved

forward line after line, but they were always finding new opponents in front of them and

when they had to stop or retreat, they were facing strong counter attacks20.

Finally, a significant factor for the outcome of the battle was the mistakes of the German

military staff. The first one is that they were too confident of the strength of their army,

especially the tank division capability. Based on their success during operation Barbarossa,

they launched their offensive with insufficient reserves21. This was partly a matter of an

inability to replace the casualties of the previous months and Hitler’s decision to reinforce the

Mediterranean front22. But it was also a matter of a miscalculation of the strength of the

Russian army both in men and tanks23. A second mistake was the underestimation of the

fighting capacity of the Soviet army. The Germans were surprised by the organization of

defense, the depth of the lines, the extent of antitank guns and minefields, as well as the

progress the Soviet tank crews had made 24. Therefore, their tanks moved without the

necessary caution or failed to spot the well camouflaged T34s in time, thus suffering heavy

losses25.
19
Kursk 1943. The tide turns in the East pp 29-31.
20
Barbier, M.K., Kursk. The Greatest Tank Battle, 1943 pp 62-67; Glantz, David and Harold Orenstein (eds.),
The Battle for Kursk, 1943. The Soviet General Staff study. Frank Cass. 1999 pp 119-125
21
Barbier, M.K., Kursk. The Greatest Tank Battle, 1943 pp 112-119
22
Barbier, M.K., Kursk. The Greatest Tank Battle, 1943 pp 126
23
Kursk. The German view. Eyewitness Reports of Operation Citadel by the German Commanders pp 28;
Barbier, M.K., Kursk. The Greatest Tank Battle, 1943 pp 128
24
Barbier, M.K., Kursk. The Greatest Tank Battle, 1943 pp 114, 148, 153, 163; Newton, Steven H. (ed.), Kursk.
The German view. Eyewitness Reports of Operation Citadel by the German Commanders. Da Capo Press. 2003
pp 142, 257
25
Newton, Steven H. (ed.), Kursk. The German view. Eyewitness Reports of Operation Citadel by the German
Commanders. Da Capo Press. 2003 pp 78, 260; Glantz, David and Harold Orenstein (eds.), The Battle for
CONCLUSION

The battle of Kursk can be summarized as follows: a forceful attack by the German army,

with their tank divisions being the spearhead, which eventually stalled. The Germans had to

retreat without achieving any of their targets due to their heavy losses which they were

unable to replace, in contrast to the Russians who seemed to have endless reserves.

contributing first and foremost to this outcome was the excellent preparation and the strategic

plan of the Soviet general staff, as well as the inability of the Germans to conceive the size

and ability of their opponents, and their lack of reserves. To this general explanation the T-34

plays an important but not crucial role. Being easy to produce massively helped the Russians

to build a huge number of tank reserves. Being medium sized and flexible and powerful,

allowed them, despite heavy losses, to overcome the German tanks, thanks to their close

contact fighting capacity. However, the T-34 is not related to the strategic mistakes of the

high command, the defense works built by thousands of Russian civilians, or the vast

numbers of infantry and anti-tank weapons produced by the Soviet factories, were arguably

the most decisive factors.

SECTION 3: REFLECTION

Because of the nature of my topic, I was confronted by all sort of technological, mechanical,

and military information, that it was impossible to fully absorb and understand. I realized that

professional historians have a huge task to be able to appreciate and confirm all the different

evidence needed for their research. The second issue I faced had to do with the reliability of

Kursk, 1943. The Soviet General Staff study. Frank Cass. 1999 pp 228-234
my sources. For instance, the documents revealing the view of the German or the Soviet

General staff brought me into confusion. Some points of the two reports converged, but

others, like the effectiveness of the Panzer divisions differed a lot.

Therefore, to tackle these issues I had to adopt multiple methods. Firstly, for the technical

analysis the main option I had was to rely on the experts’ conclusion. Complementary, I

tested their conclusion against the actual outcome of the battle. When, for example, Forczyk

was arguing that T-34s were superior in close combat, I saw that indeed that was the case

based on the description of the battle from Barbier. For the contradicting information

displayed in my sources, I had mainly to examine the motifs and knowledge capacity of the

officers producing the reports. For instance, the German staff had every reason to try to

present their performance in better light to avoid the wrath of Hitler, and the Soviet staff

could judge the performance of the German tanks without having any insider’s knowledge.

This investigation, first and foremost, made me realize how complex the work of a historian

can be. History is first and foremost fact and information based. The historian studies the

deeds of the human society which involves all sort of data and evidence produced by humans.

This sounds pretty much straightforward but it was only by doing this investigation that I

realized that contemporary sources can be so diverse and contradictory. I understand now that

the Historian must be very vigilant and seek every help from other experts when producing

an argument or a theory given the diversity and contradictions of his information.

LIST OF REFERENCES

Barbier, M.K., Kursk. The Greatest Tank Battle, 1943. Ian Allan publishing. 2002

Bean, Tim and Will Fowler, Russian Tanks of World War II – Stalin’s Armored might.
MBI Publishing Company. 2002

Forczyk, Robert, Panther vs T-34. Ukraine 1943. Osprey Publishing. 2007

Glantz, David and Harold Orenstein (eds.), The Battle for Kursk, 1943. The Soviet
General Staff study. Frank Cass. 1999.

Healy, Mark, Kursk 1943. The tide turns in the East. Osprey publishing. 1992

Newton, Steven H. (ed.), Kursk. The German view. Eyewitness Reports of Operation
Citadel by the German Commanders. Da Capo Press. 2003

Overy, Richard, Russia’s War. Penguin. 1997

Tucker, Anthony, T-34. The Red Army’s legendary medium tank. Pen and Sword. 2015