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To cite this article: Foster, R. and Grzymski, J. (2019) The limits of EUrope, Global
Discourse, vol 9, no 1, 5-13, DOI: 10.1332/204378918X15453934505897
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Russell Foster and Jan Grzymski
the eurozone crisis and economic disparities across the EU; the immigration and
asylum crisis; and mounting perceptions of a democratic deficit and a legitimacy
crisis of EU institutions. As this special edition argues, these have not just affected
national and EU-level statecraft. They are causing significant shifts in the discourse
of Europeanisation, integration and dis-integration of the EUropean project.
Theories of de-Europeanisation have been understudied. In 2014 Hans Vollaard
questioned whether the EU’s own processes of integration are driving support for dis-
integration, even predicting that the British would leave the EU – but not fully, due
to an unclear exit process and the complexity of withdrawal. For Vollaard, a British
exit might compel partial exits by other member states. Since 2016, predictions of a
‘domino effect’ of other Eurosceptic governments following Britain’s example have
proved wrong, with even hard-Eurosceptic government and parties changing their
rhetoric and policies on withdrawing from the EU or even the eurozone, potentially
because the British precisely illustrate the difficulties and internal factionalism that
results from leaving. It remains to be seen to what extent the British represent
a unique case, and whether dis-integration in the form of other exits would be
similar or different. This special edition examines theories of dis-integration from
Europhilic and Eurosceptic perspectives to question just what dis-integration means,
and how theories of de-Europeanisation can help make sense of EUrope’s current
condition – and its future. Whether that future is one of stability or apocalypse, it is
increasingly evident that future EUrope will be markedly different from the current,
unsustainable model.
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Russell Foster and Jan Grzymski
treatments, but this fails to account for a Leave campaign led by the super-rich and
supported by wealthy Britons as much as by the post-working class and the precariat.
Meanwhile, narratives that Brexit was driven by racism (leading many ‘Remainiacs’,
at the time of writing this paper, to call not for a second referendum but to simply
unilaterally cancel the Brexit process, based on an assumption that Leavers were
motivated exclusively by blind prejudice) fail to explain black and minority-ethnic
support for Leave. As the first incidence of a member state withdrawing from the
Union, Brexit represents a nexus of Europe’s complicated political, legal, commercial,
cultural, racial and demographic fluidity, as well as representing a stark reality – for
the first time, the European Union has been assigned a limit. Nowhere is this more
evident than in the return of the very phenomenon which EUrope was designed to
transcend – nationalism.
EUrope is undeniably experiencing a wave of nationalism and the return of ethnic
nationalist discourses. More than economic disparity, migration, drum-thumping
‘populist’ governments or external challenges from Moscow, Ankara, Washington
or even Beijing, it is nationalism that poses the most significant threat to the
European project. Various authors in this special edition address the question of
nationalism’s return. Is ethnic nationalism a direct threat to the EU, as Roger Casale
argues? Is nationalism more of a threat to national governments but irrelevant to
the EU institutions, as Gerard Delanty claims? Or, instead of a dichotomy between
suppressing nationalism or allowing nationalism to destroy the EU, is Europeanness
itself a nationalism, as Russell Foster argues, which reproduces the same hostilities,
exclusionary rhetoric and violence as ethnic nationalism?
Nationalism is, however, only one of several significant challenges facing EUrope
in 2019 and beyond. Brexit will occur on 29 March, and the European Parliament
elections from 23–26 May will replace the Juncker Commission. We anticipate that
both of these are likely to lead to a significant upswing of Eurosceptic and populist
political forces in the EU, alongside renewed levels of white (trans)nationalism and
ethnicist discourses on ‘taking our country back’ across Europe. These inform our
understanding of limits.
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The limits of EUrope
Merkel, and beyond Putin and Erdogan. The very concept of ‘the limits of EUrope’
is therefore, potentially, one way to understand the current systemic challenges to
EUropean integration in this imminent, perhaps already active, ‘post-’ era.
At the upper level of analysis, and as many papers in this special edition show, the
EU may be currently ‘pushing back’ problems, or ‘buying time’, to use Wolfgang
Streeck’s phrase (2014), and in this way immersing itself into the illusion of being
in a ‘post-crisis’ situation. One can claim therefore that the EU has a significant
adaptive potential, that is to say that EUrope acts as perpetuum mobile; permanently
adaptable and permanently in flux, not necessarily doomed as ‘crisis’ is simply, as
Pope Francis (2017) argues, ‘change’, and change/crisis is the norm rather than the
exception for EUrope. Hence, it may be the case that the EU does not acknowledge
or even recognise the deeper, more systemic problems, that it faces. We therefore see
the concept of the limits of EUrope as also going beyond Clause Offe’s metaphor
of ‘entrapment’ (Offe, 2015), in which he recognised that poor agency and weak
leadership is ‘entrapping’ EUrope in a currently unsustainable status quo, and in
which EUrope can go neither backward nor forward. With Brexit on the horizon,
we see that ‘reversing the irreversible’ is indeed possible – even with increasingly
inevitably negative consequences for the UK, regardless of how de-Europeanisation
is managed – precisely as Vollaard (2014) predicted.
As we observe in many contributions in this special edition, the major problems
and challenges for EUrope lie at the very limits of its own promises. We refer here to
Steven Hill’s (2010) term ‘Europe’s Promise’, by which EUrope, as an imagined space,
is associated and constructed in popular discourse as providing promises of peace,
democracy, the four freedoms, open borders, solidarity and economic prosperity.
This is equally a promise for the EUropean people as well as being perceived as a
promise to many non-EUropean people. Yet simultaneously, as this special edition
examines, these promises of EUrope may now be the cause of EUrope’s termination.
In the special edition the contributors identify EUrope’s different limits in terms
of identity, memory, space, borders, and the normative and transformative impact
of EUrope. The writers also see that reaching those limits often means an ignition
of a ‘de-Europeanisation’ process; such as Brexit or the rise of illiberal democracies.
We therefore identify three major types of limits. First, limits beyond which EUrope
does not want to go any further (enlargement, political union). Second, limits beyond
which EUrope may want to go further but cannot, at least at present (fiscal union,
political union). Third and most significant – as we argue that EUrope has overlooked
such scenarios – is what we identify as limits via which EUrope’s promises betray
those same promises. Freedom of movement, for example, leads to closed borders.
Closer financial union leads to rapid infection of financial markets. When EUrope
tries to defend them it, in fact, turns against the very essence of those ‘promises’. We
argue that it is this last limit which should be most studied, in order to move beyond
the current political and intellectual impasse over EUrope.
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The limits of EUrope
Acknowledgements
In addition to all of the contributors who very generously donated their expertise and very
valuable time – especially the responders – we wish to thank the University Association for
Contemporary European Studies (UACES) for its Small Event Grant, Lazarski University
Warsaw, King’s College London, and the Leverhulme Trust and the Polish Association for
European Studies, for their very generous financial contributions to a conference we held
on this special edition on 1 and 2 October 2018. We are very grateful to Carlton House
Terrace – the current home of the British Academy and the former residence of George
IV in the heart of London – for hosting our EU conference in EUrope’s first secessionist
member. Thanks go to the Corbridge Trust who generously hosted Jan Grzymski in
London over the summer of 2018, and to Erasmus for facilitating Jan’s visit to King’s
College London in November 2017, and Russell’s visit to Warsaw in May 2018. Thanks
go to Vicky Cleaver and Toby Goode of Associated Press, for their superb insights and
comments throughout the event. A medal should go to Marta Kołodziejczyk, without
whose indefatigable work the conference, and arguably this edition, would be a fantasy.
Great thanks go to Christoph Meyer for his continuing guidance and support as Russell’s
mentor. Very special thanks go to Magnus Ryner, Head of Department at European and
International Studies, King’s College London; to Juliusz Madej, President of Lazarski
University Warsaw; and to Wojciech Bieńkowski, Łukasz Konopielko, Martin Dahl and
Adrian Chojan for securing financial support for the conference. Across the Channel in
Brexit Britain, equally special thanks go to Parth Dattani, Virginia Preston and Anthony
Senior at King’s College London, and to Alina Boryca at Lazarski University, for their
tireless help and invaluable expertise related to organising the conference. Very special
thanks go to Matthew Johnson, Editor-in-Chief of Global Discourse, for his support and
encouragement. Great gratitude goes to Edwina Thorn, Leonie Drake, Dave Worth and
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Russell Foster and Jan Grzymski
Julia Mortimer at Bristol University Press, for their technical expertise and superhuman
patience. Last, but by no means least, Jan and Russell want to give their great gratitude
to William Outhwaite. Without William, not a letter on these pages would exist.
Finally, a very special thank you from Russell Foster to his co-editor and co-
organiser Jan Grzymski. Over a machine coffee in a cold British office, on a rainy
November day in 2017, Jan pioneered this project. During his Corbridge Trust visit
to London in the summer of 2018, Jan ended up bearing an enormous administrative
and logistical burden while Russell was recovering from an unexpected cybernetic
upgrade. Jan’s professionalism, expert insights and tireless diligence were the driving
forces that made this special edition and its conference happen. Even though the
British are leaving Europe, this special edition demonstrates that for all our differences,
the British and the Europeans still work well together. Long may that remain so.
Conflict of interest
The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.
Funding
Russell Foster is funded by a Leverhulme Early Career Fellowship.
Jan Grzymski’s visit at Department of European and International Studies, King’s College
London, July–October 2018 was funded by Mary and Clifford Corbridge Trust, Robinson
College, Cambridge University, UK.
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