You are on page 1of 9

Global Discourse • vol 9 • no 1 • 5–13

© Bristol University Press 2019 • Online ISSN 2043-7897


https://doi.org/10.1332/204378918X15453934505897

Themed Issue: The Limits of EUrope: Identities, Spaces, Values


Section: De-Europanisation Theory

RESEARCH

The limits of EUrope


Russell Foster, Russell.1.foster@kcl.ac.uk
King’s College, London, UK

Jan Grzymski, j.grzymski@lazarski.edu.pl


Lazarski University, Warsaw, Poland

Key words European integration • crisis of the EU • European disintegration • populism

To cite this article: Foster, R. and Grzymski, J. (2019) The limits of EUrope, Global
Discourse, vol 9, no 1, 5-13, DOI: 10.1332/204378918X15453934505897

The boundaries of Europe are quite unknown.


Herodotus
Histories IV, xiv-xvi
c.440 BC

In his fifth-century BCE chronicle of the Graeco-Persian Wars, Herodotus describes


a challenge that European scholars have faced for two and a half millennia (Drace-
Francis, 2013: 1). Since Antiquity, discussions of just what ‘Europe’ is, descriptively
and normatively, have not been resolved and consensus has been reached that multiple
‘Europes’ exist. Recent events in Europe, though, suggest that while the boundaries
of Europe are, and will forever remain, quite unknown, the boundaries of EUrope
are becoming identifiable.
‘Europe’ has long been an unsatisfactory metonymic synecdoche for the post-war
European project, in the form of the ECSC, EEA, EC, EEC, and now EU. ‘EUrope’
distinguishes the specific political project, whose boundaries are not merely a question
of academic curiosity or policy making but a source of significant discontent, anxiety
and violence in contemporary Europe. This special edition has been drawn together
to study the manifold aspects of how EUrope’s multiple boundaries are emerging.
EUrope is changing. Partly in response to internal anxieties over rapid integration
and expansion, as witnessed in the Dutch and French rejections of the proposed
European Constitution in 2005, and partly in response to external pressures and
responses by EU and national governments, namely the Great Recession, austerity
and the migration crisis, EUrope’s changes are manifesting. The most visible
manifestations have been Brexit; the rise of Euroscepticism and illiberal democracies;

5
Russell Foster and Jan Grzymski

the eurozone crisis and economic disparities across the EU; the immigration and
asylum crisis; and mounting perceptions of a democratic deficit and a legitimacy
crisis of EU institutions. As this special edition argues, these have not just affected
national and EU-level statecraft. They are causing significant shifts in the discourse
of Europeanisation, integration and dis-integration of the EUropean project.
Theories of de-Europeanisation have been understudied. In 2014 Hans Vollaard
questioned whether the EU’s own processes of integration are driving support for dis-
integration, even predicting that the British would leave the EU – but not fully, due
to an unclear exit process and the complexity of withdrawal. For Vollaard, a British
exit might compel partial exits by other member states. Since 2016, predictions of a
‘domino effect’ of other Eurosceptic governments following Britain’s example have
proved wrong, with even hard-Eurosceptic government and parties changing their
rhetoric and policies on withdrawing from the EU or even the eurozone, potentially
because the British precisely illustrate the difficulties and internal factionalism that
results from leaving. It remains to be seen to what extent the British represent
a unique case, and whether dis-integration in the form of other exits would be
similar or different. This special edition examines theories of dis-integration from
Europhilic and Eurosceptic perspectives to question just what dis-integration means,
and how theories of de-Europeanisation can help make sense of EUrope’s current
condition – and its future. Whether that future is one of stability or apocalypse, it is
increasingly evident that future EUrope will be markedly different from the current,
unsustainable model.

The end is nigh?


While theories of de-Europeanisation have received scant attention, in recent years
predictions of collapse have proliferated. From Paul Krugman’s (2012) theory of
Eurodämmerung triggered by a Greek financial collapse, to Douglas Murray’s (2017)
analysis of The Strange Death of Europe caused by a Huntingtonian clash of Europe
versus Islam, eschatological scenarios have become popular. Ivan Krastev’s (2014)
After Europe, Giandomenico Majone’s (2014) Rethinking the union of Europe post-crisis,
James Kirchick’s (2017) The end of Europe, Walter Laqueur’s (2007) The last days of
Europe and (2011) After the fall, Roger Bootle’s (2014) The trouble with €urope, Anthony
Giddens’ (2014) Turbulent and mighty continent, and Jan Zielonka’s (2014) Is the EU
doomed? differ markedly in their predictions and eschatological visions, but share a
common trait – a belief that the structures which propelled EUropean integration are
now an active threat. The Four Freedoms of the European Union have become the
Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse; heralds of a coming, traumatic, change. While
predictions have often been wrong, and scenarios differ, this shared realisation that
EUrope in its current form is not working is found across academia, journalism and,
significantly, national and EU-level policy making, indicating a common awareness
that today’s EUrope must end – in either reform or collapse.
While Euroscepticism was apparently defeated in the ‘Year of Elections’ in 2017,
the more general potential crisis of EUrope is crucial in understanding the current
challenges for the EU. The ability of Eurosceptics to influence political discourse on
a domestic and EU-wide level was made apparent in domestic leaders’ calls for slower
European integration, or the adoption of new forms of European integration such
as ‘two-speed Europe’ or a scaling-back of sovereign power from Brussels. Despite

6
The limits of EUrope

apparent successes such as the PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation) treaty,


the (dwindling) possibility of soft Brexit, and Emmanuel Macron’s increasingly empty
and unheeded calls for reform and restructuring of the Union, the EU continues
to face significantly larger structural and spontaneous problems which threaten the
sustainability of the EUropean project in its current form, and which therefore
necessitate new academic models of Europeanisation, European integration and
EUrope itself.
The EU’s own solutions are less than satisfactory. In Europe’s last chance (2017),
Guy Verhofstadt argues that only more integration can save the Union. In Jean-
Claude Juncker’s (2017) white paper on the future of the EU by 2025, one of the
five proposed scenarios, and arguably the least persuasive, is based on maintaining
the status quo; four others are predicated on reversing, slowing, partially accelerating
or fully accelerating integration. Four of five official scenarios indicate that the
Commission is equally aware that EUrope is incapable of continuing in its current
state; a reflection of Pope Francis’ (2014, 2017) descriptions of Europe as unstable,
haggard, and decaying. Scenarios of acceleration or deceleration raise the question
of what, regarding EUrope, is at stake.
This special edition demonstrates that what is at stake is not the details of EUrope,
but EUrope itself. We are living through an actual and potential crisis of EUrope, with
its promise of democratic, peaceful, prosperous and open political union challenged.
For the first time, those promises are the very cause of ongoing different crises and
the foundations of EUrope may be the cause of EUrope’s fall. Employing rhetoric of
‘more integration’ has proved to be a cause of accelerating challenges. The promise
of the free movement of people has led to securitisation of borders and migration;
the rescuing of the common currency project generated severe austerity measures
affecting many citizens across the EU; and, paradoxically, sticking to a democratic
ethos of ‘the people’s choice’ urged the decision of the British government to host
an EU membership referendum, in which the European value of ‘more democracy’
meant, in the end, a reversal of post-war EUropean integration.
Inevitably, Brexit is a common topic for all contributors in this special edition.
Brexit is now imminent, and its process will impact British and European life in terms
political, economic, social, cultural and intellectual. The extent to which Brexit has
colonised discourse in Britain suggests that ‘Brexhaustion’ will continue long after
Brexit Day – regardless of how, or even whether, the British leave. Most significantly
for this special edition, Brexit illustrates the limits of EUrope in the present and the
future for other EUropeans; not simply limits in political terms but at much more
essential and fundamental levels. The British are arguably a unique society in the EU,
a family of nations whose relationship with each other is in constant flux and whose
membership within the EUropean project has always been ambivalent and lukewarm
at best (Carl et al, 2018). There is no single ‘Euroscepticism’ and the British version,
which resulted in Brexit, is not a template by which we can or should understand
EUrope. Denmark has nearly as many EU opt-outs as the United Kingdom, but
there is no desire for a Danish exit. Brexit is popularly blamed on xenophobia,
despite the UK having significantly fewer extreme parties than in many members
of the EU, some of which have gained office and formed governments while others
have nudged mainstream parties towards the right. Observers since 2016 have been
quick to describe Brexit as an uprising of the ‘left-behinds’, the white working
class that has borne the brunt of neoliberal deindustrialisation and national austerity

7
Russell Foster and Jan Grzymski

treatments, but this fails to account for a Leave campaign led by the super-rich and
supported by wealthy Britons as much as by the post-working class and the precariat.
Meanwhile, narratives that Brexit was driven by racism (leading many ‘Remainiacs’,
at the time of writing this paper, to call not for a second referendum but to simply
unilaterally cancel the Brexit process, based on an assumption that Leavers were
motivated exclusively by blind prejudice) fail to explain black and minority-ethnic
support for Leave. As the first incidence of a member state withdrawing from the
Union, Brexit represents a nexus of Europe’s complicated political, legal, commercial,
cultural, racial and demographic fluidity, as well as representing a stark reality – for
the first time, the European Union has been assigned a limit. Nowhere is this more
evident than in the return of the very phenomenon which EUrope was designed to
transcend – nationalism.
EUrope is undeniably experiencing a wave of nationalism and the return of ethnic
nationalist discourses. More than economic disparity, migration, drum-thumping
‘populist’ governments or external challenges from Moscow, Ankara, Washington
or even Beijing, it is nationalism that poses the most significant threat to the
European project. Various authors in this special edition address the question of
nationalism’s return. Is ethnic nationalism a direct threat to the EU, as Roger Casale
argues? Is nationalism more of a threat to national governments but irrelevant to
the EU institutions, as Gerard Delanty claims? Or, instead of a dichotomy between
suppressing nationalism or allowing nationalism to destroy the EU, is Europeanness
itself a nationalism, as Russell Foster argues, which reproduces the same hostilities,
exclusionary rhetoric and violence as ethnic nationalism?
Nationalism is, however, only one of several significant challenges facing EUrope
in 2019 and beyond. Brexit will occur on 29 March, and the European Parliament
elections from 23–26 May will replace the Juncker Commission. We anticipate that
both of these are likely to lead to a significant upswing of Eurosceptic and populist
political forces in the EU, alongside renewed levels of white (trans)nationalism and
ethnicist discourses on ‘taking our country back’ across Europe. These inform our
understanding of limits.

The limits of EUrope


This special edition looks at those current problems through highlighting the limits
of EUrope as a project. There are conceptual limits as well as physical borders, in
which EUrope will be confined and in which exclusions will be made from its
imagined space, exercising democracy, peace and the four freedom. This is already
being pioneered either by reactions to collective EU policy (such as neighbours of
the EU, or non-EU migrants) or by member states’ own policy choices (for example,
Brexit in the UK, Euroscepticism in Austria and Italy, illiberal politics in Poland and
Hungary). These limits are challenging many, previously optimistic, views of ‘ever-
closer Union’ and ‘Normative Europe’. As we see in the many contributions to this
edition, the ultimate limits of EUrope lie where the practices of de-Europeanisation
occur.
Given ongoing changes within the EU, and the countdown to what is increasingly
likely to be a traumatic and poorly-managed Brexit, the EU (and European studies)
must adapt a focus away from ‘crisis’ and towards ‘post-crisis’, addressing how the EU
is morphing and how it will operate in the years beyond Brexit, beyond Macron and

8
The limits of EUrope

Merkel, and beyond Putin and Erdogan. The very concept of ‘the limits of EUrope’
is therefore, potentially, one way to understand the current systemic challenges to
EUropean integration in this imminent, perhaps already active, ‘post-’ era.
At the upper level of analysis, and as many papers in this special edition show, the
EU may be currently ‘pushing back’ problems, or ‘buying time’, to use Wolfgang
Streeck’s phrase (2014), and in this way immersing itself into the illusion of being
in a ‘post-crisis’ situation. One can claim therefore that the EU has a significant
adaptive potential, that is to say that EUrope acts as perpetuum mobile; permanently
adaptable and permanently in flux, not necessarily doomed as ‘crisis’ is simply, as
Pope Francis (2017) argues, ‘change’, and change/crisis is the norm rather than the
exception for EUrope. Hence, it may be the case that the EU does not acknowledge
or even recognise the deeper, more systemic problems, that it faces. We therefore see
the concept of the limits of EUrope as also going beyond Clause Offe’s metaphor
of ‘entrapment’ (Offe, 2015), in which he recognised that poor agency and weak
leadership is ‘entrapping’ EUrope in a currently unsustainable status quo, and in
which EUrope can go neither backward nor forward. With Brexit on the horizon,
we see that ‘reversing the irreversible’ is indeed possible – even with increasingly
inevitably negative consequences for the UK, regardless of how de-Europeanisation
is managed – precisely as Vollaard (2014) predicted.
As we observe in many contributions in this special edition, the major problems
and challenges for EUrope lie at the very limits of its own promises. We refer here to
Steven Hill’s (2010) term ‘Europe’s Promise’, by which EUrope, as an imagined space,
is associated and constructed in popular discourse as providing promises of peace,
democracy, the four freedoms, open borders, solidarity and economic prosperity.
This is equally a promise for the EUropean people as well as being perceived as a
promise to many non-EUropean people. Yet simultaneously, as this special edition
examines, these promises of EUrope may now be the cause of EUrope’s termination.
In the special edition the contributors identify EUrope’s different limits in terms
of identity, memory, space, borders, and the normative and transformative impact
of EUrope. The writers also see that reaching those limits often means an ignition
of a ‘de-Europeanisation’ process; such as Brexit or the rise of illiberal democracies.
We therefore identify three major types of limits. First, limits beyond which EUrope
does not want to go any further (enlargement, political union). Second, limits beyond
which EUrope may want to go further but cannot, at least at present (fiscal union,
political union). Third and most significant – as we argue that EUrope has overlooked
such scenarios – is what we identify as limits via which EUrope’s promises betray
those same promises. Freedom of movement, for example, leads to closed borders.
Closer financial union leads to rapid infection of financial markets. When EUrope
tries to defend them it, in fact, turns against the very essence of those ‘promises’. We
argue that it is this last limit which should be most studied, in order to move beyond
the current political and intellectual impasse over EUrope.

Structure of the edition


This special edition addresses EUrope’s manifold challenges. Drawing together experts
from a range of European studies fields, from various EU member states and from
different career stages, this edition is additionally novel in offering a unique format.
Each academic analysis is accompanied by a response from an expert in industry,

9
Russell Foster and Jan Grzymski

policy making, commerce, diplomacy or analysis. The nature of EUrope’s systemic


and spontaneous crises requires a multidisciplinary and extra-disciplinary approach,
with reflexive dialogue between academic and non-academic specialists. Equally,
our special edition draws together Eurosceptic and Europhilic voices. As events in
Europe since 2008 have demonstrated, European studies and EU affairs are excessively
dominated by pro-EUropeans, integrationists and Remainers. To understand not only
the causes of, but also the solutions to, EUrope’s problems, it is essential to move
beyond ideological echo chambers to which the academy is far from immune, and
engage with perspectives and voices with which we may fundamentally disagree.
‘Europe’ has always been nebulous, but it has been acknowledged since the writings
of Herodotus that multiple ‘Europes’ exist. This has never been more true than today,
and to preserve Europe – whatever its definition may be or whichever Europe is
being defended – it is vital to open forums for dialogue and sharing insights from
across the continent, across ages and career stages, across fields and specialisms, and
across normative perspectives of what Europe should be, do and aspire to. Divided
into four sections which reflect the four realms of EUrope’s challenges and limits,
this special edition attempts to offer such a forum.
In Part I, William Outhwaite and Ben Rosamond theorise different conceptions
of de-Europeanisation. David Spence, Alex Callinicos, Christoph Meyer and Pierre
Vimont respond with analytical and normative visions of what ‘de-Europeanisation’
does, and could, mean.
Part II approaches EUrope’s limits in terms of identity and memory. Russell
Foster examines the nature of identity politics in Brexit Britain, arguing that Brexit
demonstrates the emergence of two hostile and mutually incompatible ‘European’
identities in the same space. Gerard Delanty examines the nature of self-determination
and nationalism within member states, arguing that nationalism is not a threat to
the EU as ‘nationalism’ is changing. Peter Vermeersch analyses memory politics in
the processes of de-Europeanisation in eastern Europe, and how the EU fits into
a narrative of victimhood. John Mills, Roger Casale, and Marti Grau í Segu lend
their expert insights from industry, political activism, and policy making to link the
authors’ arguments to developments beyond the academy.
Part III examines EUrope’s limits in space and borders. Jan Grzymski assesses the
significance of blurred hard borders and whether the European Neighbourhood
Policy has exacerbated bordering within EUrope, and between EUrope and its
neighbours. Adrian Favell examines the role of re-nationalisation in Brexit Britain
and how concepts of European citizenship disadvantage the already marginalised.
William Walters and Martina Tazzioli review the role of solidarity in Europe, and
how responses to migration necessitate new approaches to citizenship, borders, and
the oft-invoked but nebulous concept of ‘European values’. Tobias Schumacher,
Omar Khan and Liz Fekete offer their specialist responses from border studies, civil
advocacy and non-governmental engagement to illustrate the territorial and ethnic
limits of EUrope.
Part IV analyses transformative and normative limits to EUrope. Ruth Wodak
demonstrates the role of discourse in constructing and legitimising a ‘post-shame
era’ of illiberalism, populism, and the normalisation of incivility and hostility among
European governments preoccupied with immigration and an elusive enemy in the
form of the ‘EUropean’ elite. Spasimir Domaradzki unpacks de-Europeanisation
through diplomacy and the law, presenting the novel concept of ‘opportunistic

10
The limits of EUrope

legitimisation’ as a means of explaining how the EU’s own normative influence


weakens EU integration. Bogna Gawrońska-Nowak questions whether a EUrope
defined by economic rationalism is now extinct, and argues that economic factors
remain essential for understanding the normative and transformative power of an
identity-obsessed EUrope. Heather Grabbe, Andreas Aktoudianakis, Krassen Stanchev
and Federico Ottavio Reho present informed responses from political, economic and
institutional thinktanks to demonstrate the relationship between theories and practices
of EUrope’s normative and transformative powers. In an overarching narrative,
Rosie Mutton reviews a recent leading text – Ashoka Mody’s (2018) EuroTragedy
– to examine the continuing flux of EUrope which connects the themes of all the
special edition’s papers.
Together, these eleven articles and their expert responses offer a transdisciplinary
approach to the crisis of European integration and identity by approaching different,
but synergistic, aspects of the European project’s systemic crisis, which highlight the
conceptual, political and physical limits of EUrope.
Herodotus’ claim that the boundaries of Europe are quite unknown remains as true
as it was when Themistocles fought Xerxes. Given contemporary developments and
the challenges 2019 will present, there is little reason to expect that its boundaries will
become clearer any time soon. But while Europe’s boundaries will forever be vague,
EUrope’s boundaries are starting to form and become visible. And what can be seen
can be managed – and challenged. This special edition offers some first insights into
this rapidly changing EUrope.

Acknowledgements
In addition to all of the contributors who very generously donated their expertise and very
valuable time – especially the responders – we wish to thank the University Association for
Contemporary European Studies (UACES) for its Small Event Grant, Lazarski University
Warsaw, King’s College London, and the Leverhulme Trust and the Polish Association for
European Studies, for their very generous financial contributions to a conference we held
on this special edition on 1 and 2 October 2018. We are very grateful to Carlton House
Terrace – the current home of the British Academy and the former residence of George
IV in the heart of London – for hosting our EU conference in EUrope’s first secessionist
member. Thanks go to the Corbridge Trust who generously hosted Jan Grzymski in
London over the summer of 2018, and to Erasmus for facilitating Jan’s visit to King’s
College London in November 2017, and Russell’s visit to Warsaw in May 2018. Thanks
go to Vicky Cleaver and Toby Goode of Associated Press, for their superb insights and
comments throughout the event. A medal should go to Marta Kołodziejczyk, without
whose indefatigable work the conference, and arguably this edition, would be a fantasy.
Great thanks go to Christoph Meyer for his continuing guidance and support as Russell’s
mentor. Very special thanks go to Magnus Ryner, Head of Department at European and
International Studies, King’s College London; to Juliusz Madej, President of Lazarski
University Warsaw; and to Wojciech Bieńkowski, Łukasz Konopielko, Martin Dahl and
Adrian Chojan for securing financial support for the conference. Across the Channel in
Brexit Britain, equally special thanks go to Parth Dattani, Virginia Preston and Anthony
Senior at King’s College London, and to Alina Boryca at Lazarski University, for their
tireless help and invaluable expertise related to organising the conference. Very special
thanks go to Matthew Johnson, Editor-in-Chief of Global Discourse, for his support and
encouragement. Great gratitude goes to Edwina Thorn, Leonie Drake, Dave Worth and

11
Russell Foster and Jan Grzymski

Julia Mortimer at Bristol University Press, for their technical expertise and superhuman
patience. Last, but by no means least, Jan and Russell want to give their great gratitude
to William Outhwaite. Without William, not a letter on these pages would exist.
Finally, a very special thank you from Russell Foster to his co-editor and co-
organiser Jan Grzymski. Over a machine coffee in a cold British office, on a rainy
November day in 2017, Jan pioneered this project. During his Corbridge Trust visit
to London in the summer of 2018, Jan ended up bearing an enormous administrative
and logistical burden while Russell was recovering from an unexpected cybernetic
upgrade. Jan’s professionalism, expert insights and tireless diligence were the driving
forces that made this special edition and its conference happen. Even though the
British are leaving Europe, this special edition demonstrates that for all our differences,
the British and the Europeans still work well together. Long may that remain so.

Russell Foster and Jan Grzymski


London and Warsaw, December 2018

Conflict of interest
The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.

Funding
Russell Foster is funded by a Leverhulme Early Career Fellowship.
Jan Grzymski’s visit at Department of European and International Studies, King’s College
London, July–October 2018 was funded by Mary and Clifford Corbridge Trust, Robinson
College, Cambridge University, UK.

References
Bootle, R. (2014) The trouble with €urope: why the EU isn’t working, how it can be
reformed, what could take its place, London: Nicholas Brealey.
Carl, N., Dennison, J. and Evans, G. (2018) ‘European but not European
enough: an explanation for Brexit’, European Union Politics, https://doi.
org/10.1177/1465116518802361.
Drace-Francis, A. (2013) European identity: a historical reader, London: Palgrave.
Francis, I. (2014) ‘Address of His Holiness Pope Francis to the European Parliament
and to the Council of Europe’, Holy See, 25 November, http://w2.vatican.
va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2014/november/documents/papa-
francesco_20141125_strasburgo-parlamento-europeo.html
Francis, I. (2017) ‘Address of His Holiness Pope Francis to the Heads of State
and Government of the European Union in Italy for the Celebration of
the 60th Anniversary of the Treaty of Rome’, Holy See, 24 March, http://
w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2017/march/documents/papa-
francesco_20170324_capi-unione-europea.html
Giddens, A. (2014) Turbulent and mighty continent: what future for Europe? Cambridge,
UK, and Malden, MA: Polity Press.
Juncker, J.-C. (2017) White Paper on the future of Europe: Reflections and scenarios for the
EU 27 by 2025, European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/
beta-political/files/white_paper_on_the_future_of_europe_en.pdf

12
The limits of EUrope

Hill, S. (2010) Europe’s promise. Why the European way is the best hope in an insecure age,
London and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Kirchick, J. (2017) The end of Europe: dictators, demagogues and the coming dark age, New
Haven, CN: Yale University Press.
Krastev, I. (2017) After Europe, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Krugman, P. (2012) ‘Eurodämmerung’, New York Times, 13 May, https://krugman.
blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/13/eurodammerung-2/
Laqueur, W. (2007) The last days of Europe: epitaph for an old continent, New York: St
Martin’s Press.
Laqueur, W. (2011) After the fall: the end of the European dream and the decline of a
continent, New York: Thomas Dunne Books.
Majone, G. (2014) Rethinking the union of Europe post-crisis: has integration gone too far?
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mody, A. (2018) EuroTragedy: a drama in nine acts, New York: Oxford University Press.
Murray, D. (2017) The strange death of Europe, London: Bloomsbury.
Offe, C. (2015) Europe entrapped, London: Polity Press.
Streeck, W. (2014) Buying time. The delayed crisis of democratic capitalism, London and
New York: Verso.
Vollaard, H. (2014) ‘Explaining European disintegration’, Journal of Common Market
Studies, 52(5): 1142–1159.
Verhofstadt, G. (2017) Europe’s last chance: why the European states must form a more
perfect union, New York: Basic Books.
Zielonka, J. (2014) Is the EU doomed? Cambridge, UK, and Malden, MA: Polity Press.

13

You might also like