Lee Brobst’s THY WILL BE DONE IN ASSOCIATION NEWSLETTER Volume IlNo. 4 May 1990, CONVERTING THE STATUTE OF CHARITABLE USES TO TODAY'S FEDERAL AND STATE Charitable Uses were not validated by the Statute of Charitable Uses, but had an independent existence in chancery apart from that statute, has been recognized by the courts of most states. Carter v Balfour Adm'r, 19 Ala. 814; In re Hinkley's Estate, 58 Cal. 457; Beall v Fox's Ex' rs, 4 Ga, 404; Grimes Ex'rs v Harmon, 35 Ind. 198, 9 Am.Rep. 690; Miller v Chittenden, 2 lowa 305; Going v Emory, 16 Pick., Mass., 107, 26 AmDec. 645; Chambers v Gity of St. Louis, 29 Mo.543; Griffin v Graham, 8 N.C. 96, 1 Hawks 96, 9 Am.Dec. 619; Landis v Wooden, 1 Ohio St. 160, 59 Am.Dec.615; Zimmerman v Anders, 6 Watts & S., Pa. 218, 40 Am.Dec. 552; Hopkins v Upshur, 20 Tex. 89, 70 Am.Dec. 375. In some states the courts declare that the Statute is a part of the common law, i ., 69 Colo. 135, 169 P. 138, L. R. A. 1918B, 710; Dickenson v City of Anna, 310 Ill, STATUTES 222, 141 N.E. 754, 30 A. L. R. 587; i , 234 Mass. 389, 125 N.E.609; Buchanan v Kennard, 234 Mo. 117, 136 S.W. 415, 37 LRA. , N.S. 993, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 50; although it would seem to be a remedial statute which made use of enforcement machinery not available in the United States (as, for example, officers of the established church) and hence that the statute was not suited to this country. In other states the view is that the statute is not in force but that charities are valid by reason of the GENERAL POWERS OF EQUITY TO ENFORCE ALL TRUSTS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Nebraska, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Tennessee. Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (2d edit.) @ 322 (1942). Since this date of 1942, all states have enacted some sort of statutes upon the subject. The statutes re-introduced the courts of "Star Chamber”which were nothing more than courts for purposes of raising revenue for charitable purposes including the support of the Church of England. As we have learned, this power always did exist but through private policy. Since 1933 this private power is public policy and thus reflected in the statutes and codes of both federal and slate governments. Being this editor lives in Pennsylvania and has access to Pennsylvania statutes and procedure books; he will go into an expose of Pennsylvania law followed then by federal law as it Is in TODAYS law books. The reader can then go into his state law and federal law and see the unfoldment of the modus operandi of the public trust. GENERAL EQUITY-STATE Here in Pennsylvania the public trust is codified in “Title 20, of Purdon's Pa, Consolidated Statutes Annotated” and is called "Decedents, Estates and Fiduciaries". Beginning at section 101 which is the very beginning. This section is also called the “Orphans Court Division," which by the way is also where the admiralty-maritime jurisdiction lies; and has been the case since the beginning of Pennsylvania in 1620. Sec. 101 Short litle: This title shall be known and may be cited as the "Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code." Sec. 102 Definitions: Bold print will put emphasis on important words. "Clerk." Means the clerk of the orphans’ court division of the court of common pleas. (In some states it is called the superior court or the district court. Court of original jurisdiction.) "Court, orphans’ court, or orphans’ court division.” Means the court of common pleas exercising the jurisdiction referred to in this code through its orphans" court division. “Fiduciary.” Includes personal representatives, guardians, and trustees, whether domiciliary or ancillary, individual or corporate, subject to the jurisdiction of the orphans’ court division. Blacks Law Dictionary 5th Ed., defines “fiduciary” as a person holding the character of a trustee, or a character analogous to that of a trustee, in respect to the trust and confidence invalved in it and the scrupulous good faith and condor which it requires. A person having a duty, created by his undertaking, to act primarily for another's benefit etc. "Foreign fiduciary’. Means a personal tepresentative, guardian of a minor or incompetent person, trustee or one performing the functions of any such fiduciary, who is subject primarily to the control of the court of another jurisdiction and has not received ancillary authority in the Commonwealth. “Letters” Means letters testamentary or letters of administration of any description. "Minor" Means an individual under the age of 18 years. "Personal representative.” Means an executor or administrator of any description. "Register." Means the register of wills having jurisdiction of granting of letters testamentary or of administration. "Trust" Means any trust, whether testamentary or inter vivos, subject to the jurisdiction of the orphans’ court division. “Will” Means a written will, codicil or other testamentary writing and a nuncupative will. We will now proceed to the “Pennsylvania Standard Practice” 2d Edition as produced by Lawyers Cooperative. In Pennsylvania there is a 30 volume set of procedure books and in Vy. dl-laddition to the procedure books there is a 10 volume set of court rules called Goodrich Amram 2d ed. These are the books that tell you how to use the codes and statutes as well as the court rules. Every state has a set of these books that are geared to your state's laws and are produced by the various publishing companies such as West, Lawyers Cooperative, Mitche, etc. Section 143:14. Power to create trust: "The Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code provides that a power "to creale a trust for my benefit" shall mean that the attorney in fact may execute a deed of trust, designating one or more persons (including the attorney in fact) as original or successor trustees and transfer to the trust any or all property owned by the principal as the attorney in fact may decide, subject to the conditions and further; a power “to make additions to; an existing trust for my benefit" means that the attorney in fact, at any time or times, may add any or all of the property owned by the principal to any trust in existence when the power was created, provided that the terms of ‘such trust relating to the disposition of the income and corpus during the lifetime of the principal are the same as those set forth with respect to the creation of a trust by an attorney in fact. The attorney in fact and the trust and its beneficiaries are answerable as equity and justice may require to the extent that an addition to a trust is inconsistent with prudent estate planning or financial management for the principal or with the known or probable intent of the principal with respect to disposition of his estate." If you will notice, there is never any mention as to who creates this trust for "my benefit", it mentions principal but who is the principal? or who is the attorney in fact? You are the principal and the bureaucracy is the attorney in fact. Section 143:19: “The Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code provides that the conferral of a = power "To withdraw and receive the income or corpus of a trust” means that the attorney in fact may: (1) demand, withdraw, and receive the income or corpus of any trust over which the principal has the power to make withdrawals (2) request and receive the income or corpus of any trust with respect to which the trustee thereof has the discretionary power to make distribution to or on behalf of the principal (3) execute a receipt and release or similar document for the property received". Now you know why it is meaningless to argue all the tax cases. If you argue tax law; the court's decision is based upon those tax cases but the court is taking judicial notice of the fact that being a ‘person’ the ruling is for "your benefit’. As a ‘person’ subject to, your income is from the trust fund and you must report your earnings to the bureaucracy (your attorney in fact). Failure to do so, engages the attorney in fact to make a demand upon you and your only defense is another statute unless you can get the legislature to act on your behalf. You have no remedy in Law. Remember the legal maxium, "Those who seek equity must do equity". When involved with a public trust; general equity. Section 143:24: “Obligations of the following governmental bodies are authorized investments which may be made by fiduciaries". Fiduciary is a red flag word that must become a part of your vocabulary as is trustee and beneficiary. "(1) Obligations of the United States or the United States Treasury or those for the payment of which the faith and credit of the United States is pledged, including obligations of the District of Columbia”. *(2) Obligations of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania or those for the payment of which the faith and credit of Pennsylvania is pledged". Notice it does not say State of Pennsylvania {capital 8) nor does it say theland is pledged. What is pledged is the conscience of the ‘persons’ subject to the trust. “Obligations of any commonwealth or state of the United States, or any county, city, borough, town, township, school district, institution district, or other political subdivision, having the power to levy taxes, of any such commonwealth or state etc and etc." If this isn't notice of the 14th amendment trust | do not know what is. Section 143:27: “Obligations of any authority, commission, or similar governmental organization existing pursuant to the laws of Pennsylvania or the laws of any other state or of the District of Columbia are authorized investments which may be made by fiduciaries etc.” We will now proceed to Section 79:23, Trusts: “It has been noted that the jurisdiction of equity in all cases of trust, express or implied, resulting or constructive, is unquestioned". Peoples v Pittsburgh Tiust Co. v Saupp (1936) 320 Pa. 138, 182 A 376. “A court sitting in equity has jurisdiction of a testamentary trust". Johnson's Appeal (1848) 9 Pa. 416. "A court sitting in equity has exclusive jurisdiction over the supervision and control of trustees in the management or administration of their trust". ee eee cae ta Co. (1922) 273 Pa. 12, 116 A 518. Section 2.6: “Judicial power is not to be exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of a judge but for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the legislature or, in other words, to the will of the law.” Malnick v Melnick (1942) 147 Pa Super 564, 25 A2d 111. What is your law? The Republic or the Democracy? Or better 4 what is your evidence to prove your selection???? Section 2.7: All courts have inherent rights and powers, to amend its record in order to make it conform to the facts. Re Macoluso's Naturalization (1912) 237 Pa 132, 85 A 149; Davis v Commonwealth Tnust Co. (1939) 335 Pa 387, 7A2d 3; Mid-City Bank & Trust Co. v Myers (1942) 343 Pa 465, 23 A2d 420; Re Gerlach's Estate (1950) 364 Pa 207, 72 A2d 271, 16 ALR2d 1397; Re Weiss's Estate (1951) 366 Pa 456, 77 A2d 422; Commonwealth v Meyer (1951) 169 Super Ct 40, 82 A2d 298. Every court of record is the guardian and judge of its own records and is clothed with full power to control and inquire into them and to set them right if incorrect. Commonwealth y Hefner (1926) 89 Super Ct 173, and to direct that its records be corrected to conform with the facts and truth of a case. Sweeny v Delany (1845) 1 Pa 320; lven's Appeal (1859) 33 Pa 237; Keen v Hopkins (1865) 48 Pa 445; Sheffy's Appeal (1881) 97 Pa 317; Re Nimick's Estate (1897) 179 Pa 591, 36 A 350; which do not depend solely upon express constitutional or legislative grants to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of their jurisdiction. Commonwealth yv_Brownmiller (1940) 141 Super Ct 107, 14 A2d 907. Under the Pennsylvania Constitution, the courts of Pennsylvania have certain inherent rights and powers to do all such things as are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice. Sweet v Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (1974) 457 Pa 456, 322 A2d 362. Refer back to Videl v Girard in April 1990 issue of this newsletter. Section 2.67 Equity proceedings: "When a court sitting in equity acts in personam, as it does when it has jurisdiction of the parties, it is not restricted by geographical boundary lines.” Cohn v Weiss 356 Pa “78, 51 A2d 740. This is why the jurisdictional issue about enclaves and forts etc. is a frivilous issue. You must bear in mind that the general equity of trust law is the same at the federal level as it is at the state level. GENERAL EQUITY-FEDERAL ‘We will now proceed to the federal jurisdiction over the subject of trusts as taken from "Gyclopedia of Federal Procedure Jurisdiction and Judicial Power" third edition 1982 Revised Volume. | published by Callaghan & Company of Wilmette, Ill. Section 2:92 page 246. Trusts: “Administration of trusts and control over trustees have always been subjects of equity jurisdiction. A federal court accordingly may exercise jurisdiction in such matters, even with respect to testamentary trusts. Federal court had jurisdiction of suit for accounting and for appointment of successor trustee or testamentary trustee, and which involved as well construction of will, despite fact that state court had some twenty years before entered decree retaining perpetual jurisdiction over trust estate." DeKorwin v First National Bank of Chicago, 84 Supp 918. Section 2.187 Trusts: "Ifa testamentary trust is severable from administration of an estate, and no proceedings with respect to its administration have been had, the field is one of general equity jurisdiction and a federal court may take over administration of the trust or entertain proceedings relating to it.” Garret v First Nat. Bank & Toust Co, of Vicksburg, Mississippi, 153 F2d 289; McClellan v Carland, 187 F 915; Brun v Mann, 151 F 145; Herron v Comstock, 139 F 370; Sullivan v Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 74 F Supp 964. Section 72:15 Actions to enforce trusts: "A trust, whether express or implied, or any right growing out of a trust 5 relationship can be enforced by an action a federal court, where federal jurisdiction exists. Such an action is a civil action in the nature of suit in equity.” Commonwealth Trust Co. of Pittsburoh v Bradford, 297 US 613 80 L Ed 920; Clews y Jamieson 182 US 461, 45 L Ed 1183; in. ia-Conti Exploration Co., 282 F2d 787 {imposition of constructive trust); St Petersburg 25 F2d 397 (equitable jurisdiction over actions to recover trust funds). "Courts of equity... . have power to compel the trustee to perform specific acts, to restore diverted funds and other wide jurisdiction over a trust, its property, and the trustee." City of Jacksonville v Bankers Life Co., 90 Fad 141. At the beginning of the country, the United States Supreme Court declared in Wheaton y Peters 8 Peters US 591; there is no federal common law and the equity that is applied is the equity of England. In 1842 the United States Supreme Court reversed its decision of Wheaton v Peters and in Swift v Tyson 16 Peters 1 said that there was a general federal common law. The Swift decision was based upon the fact that the country was starting to grow as a commercial country which was the intent of the founders and that the people were trading their real property (coin in “PAYMENT” of debt in their commercial transactions. In other words, a jury trial could be demanded in a civil cause based on a commercial transaction because the "Law" of landed substance was in commerce; portable landed substance. In other words, the peoples’ money. This was public policy. The people determined what their "Law" was. The equity of that era of Swift v Tyson was special equity that followed the "Law". A legal maxium of equity is that equity always follows the law. But the question arises what law? In other words, the "Law" was thedetermining factor first, then special equity which followed the "Law". The “Law” blocks compelled performance. If the “Law is public policy, then there is no way to compel the public to perform to private code law. When the people issue their own money, there is no way to compel the public to perform to their own money. In the case of public money, the equity would be special equity. In the case of a public trust such as the 14th amendment, the equity would be general equity. The Swift v Tyson decision was reversed in 1938 by the United States Supreme Court by Erie Railroad 'v Thompkins 304 US 64 which stated there is no general federal ‘common law but a common law based upon each case as it arises. The law that is to be applied in the absence of federal law is the law of the state. The Erie RR decision was based upon the fact that the people decided in 1933 that they no longer wanted their "Law" based upon "PAYMENT" of debt. This is the precise reason why the government in the 1930's, confiscated the gold coin from the people. The government did this to protect the gold which was the peoples “Law”. The people decided in 1933 that they no longer wanted their "Law" and when that fact was established, the "Law" (gold) was confiscated to be put in Fort Knox and thereto be kept until the people decide to return to the "Law". The gold in circulation today is commodity gold with no fixed standard and thus is not the "Law" nor is silver the "Law". The government has not affixed its’ seal to guarantee its’ weight and fineness. THE EDITOR WANTS TO STRESS UPON YOU THAT YOU NEVER NEVER EVER ARGUE THE MONEY ISSUE IN COURT. IN FACT, YOU NEVER MENTION IT BECAUSE THAT IS NOT THE ISSUE. THE ONLY REASON I MENTION THE MONEY IS THAT IT IS AN EDUCATIONAL TOOL TO SHOW YOU HOW WE HAVE EVOLVED TO THE POINT OF TODAY. YOU CAN BE COMPELLED TO ACCEPT THE PRIVATE MONEY BUT YOU CANNOT BE COMPELLED TO ACCEPT THE JURISDICTION 6 THAT GOES WITH IT. MONEY ISA POLITICAL ISSUE. COURTS CANNOT DECIDE POLITICAL ISSUES. The question is, are you subject to the jurisdiction of the 14th amendment. The means to the "Law’ is within you. We the People. In other words, you execute what is called a chose in action ( Your declaration of Independence) to get a chose in possession which means you have acquired your absolute rights. What the Erie Railroad decision is saying is, there is no "Law" based upon public policy; only general equity based upon, trust law; but should you not want the law of trust; then you have a political right to renounce that trust relationship based upon your private policy. You must make it known that you want no part of the public trust and when this is made known, there can be no evidence which the democracy can bring foreword to construct a fiduciary relationship with regards to the public trust. At that point, the "Law" is applied such as in the case of Mr. X in the November 1989 issue of this newsletter. Make no mistake about it, the higher courts make no mistakes in their decisions and if that should happen as in the case of Philadelphia Baptist Ass'n v Hart. 4 Wheat. 1, 4 L.Ed. 499; they are soon corrected. Do not think for one minute that the appeal courts do not know what is going on. Anybody who thinks otherwise; smokes funny cigarettes. In Virginia, West Virginia, and Maryland, the courts were early led into error by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Philadelphia Baptist Ass'n v Hart, 4 Wheat. 1, L Ed. 499. The decision was later repudiated by the Supreme Court in Vidal v Girard, 2 How. 127, 11 L.Ed. 205, (this case was discussed in detail in the April 1990 issue of this newsletter) and held that charitable uses depended for existence on the statute, and that the statute not being in force in those Jurisdictions no charitable trusts could +iexist; Gellago's Ex'rs v Attorney General 30 Va. 3 Leigh) 450, 24 Am.Dec. 650; American Bible Soc. V Pendiston, 7 W. Va. 79; State v Warren, 28 Md. 338. Gifts to charity could only be made by outright gifts to charitable corporations. This early mistake has been rectified by legislation sanctioning most charitable trusts. Va. Code, 1950, @ 55-26, 55-31; W. Va. Cose @ 35-2-1, 35-1-1; Md. Ann. Code 1957, art. 16 @ 195, art. 93 @ 4 409. See also, 4 Howard, 1 Md. Law Rev. 105; 25 Va. LR. 109; 39 Va. LR. 121. See Miller v Mercantile Safe Dep, & Tr, Co., 224 Md.); Moore v Perkins, 169 Va. 175, 192 S. E. 806; Beatty v Union Trust & Deposit Co., 123 W. Va. 144, 13 S. E. 2d 760. In New York the English Statute of Charitable Uses was repudiated in 1788. The Revised Statutes of 1830 authorized only four classes of express trusts in land and did not mention charitable trusts. Laws 1788. c, 46; Beekman v Bonsor, 23 N.Y. 298, 307, Am.Dec. 269 It becomes a question whether charitable trusts had any existence after the adoption of the Revised Statutes. On the one hand, it was claimed that no charitable trust could exist, since the Statute of Charitable Uses was not in force and since the Revised Statutes made no provision for charitable trusts. On the other, it was maintained that the original jurisdiction of chancery over charitable trusts, irrespective of the Statute of Elizabeth, ought to enable the courts to support charitable trusts. The dispute went on for many years; the courts at first leaning to the view that charitable trusts could be supported under equity's general jurisdiction, but later taking a definite stand that charitable trusts were not possible in New York in view of the statute of 1788 and the Revised Statutes of 1830.1 The only method by which a charitable object could be 1 Williams v Williams, 8 N.Y. 525; Bascon v Albertson, 34 N.Y. 584; Holmes v Mead, 52 N.Y. 332; Holland v Alcok, 108 N.Y. 312, 16 N.E. 305, 2 Am.StRep. 420. a hee accomplished during this period was by gift to a charitable corporation absolutely, either by donation to a corporation already in existence or to ane to be formed. The failure of a large charitable gift by the will of Samuel J. Tilden, Tilden _vy Green, 130 N.Y. 29, 28 N.E. 880, caused so much discussion and criticism that in 1893 the legislature passed what was known as the Tilden Act, which restored the English system of charities as it was in force before the American Revolution.? Notice the date 1893 which is after the 14th amendment of 1868. In other words, there was a constitutional amendment which allowed the formation of a private trust to become a public trust should the people decide to partake of its benefits on a one to one basis. Last but not least was the fact that we had our "Law" of the "Public National Money Standard in PAYMENT" of debt which came from Mother Earth. The issue of trusts bounced back and forth between the "Law" and equity and nothing was established as definite just as was the citizenship issue as to which was primary, state citizenship or federal citizenship as discussed in the July 1989 issue of the "Eye of the Eagle” Newsletter. Here is a perfect example of what the ancient Egyptians taught meaning the "Doctrine of Opposites"; + and -; (positive and negative) everything is held in equil The "Law" and religion. Both 2 Wetmore v Parker, 52 N.Y. 450; Cottman v Grace, 112 N.Y. 299, 19 N.E. 839, 3 L.R.A. 145; Riker v Leo, 115 N.Y. 93, 21 NE. 719; Bird v Merklee, 144 N.Y. 544, 39 N.E. 645, 27 LRA. 423. 3 Laws 1893, c. 701 Allen v Stevens, 161 N.Y, 122, 55 N.E. 568; Murray v Miller, 178 N.Y. 316, 70 N.E. 870; Trustees of Sailors’ Snug Harbor in City of New York.v Carmody, 217 N.Y, 296, 105 N.E. 543. McKinney's New York Real Property Law, @12, in effect prior to September 1, 1967, and the sources of the present statute, See McKinney's N.Y. EPTL 8- Vtcomplemented each other, the way it should be but today public policy cannot separate their religion from their "Law". In other words, ‘persons’ have been taken out of time and place and put in time and space and thus we see the results. After studying the court cases upon the subject of charitable trusts; one begins to see that the founders of this nation were very wary of charitable trusts after the experiences with the king, the Church of England and the courts of the Star Chamber. The question now becomes where should charity end and the Law begin????. This is why the people in their individual capacity must take control of their own lives and not depend on an artificial (corporation) to solve their problems. Politicans cannot solve their ‘own problems let alone yours. Their solutions make the problems worse. When charity goes public, the weak through political action becomes too numerous and in conquence destroy the strong. You could use the analogy that the squeeky hinge gets the oil. The cunning and manipulative then use the weak for their objectives and the one in the middle is too busy trying to survive that all he can do is work himself into oblivion. The intellectuals jump ship and pretty soon the ship sinks of its own dead weight. We then start all over again. In the process of all this one can begin to see that greed, hate, bias, prejudice, etc., become the tools for the downfall of us all. We could also put this another way which is a little out of context but is worth mentioning. Man is equity - (negative) Mother earth is the "Law" + (positive). Man through his greed of materialy cannot separate his needs from his wants (conscience). He has put more demands upon Mother Earth than she can deal with. In other words, there is no balance and as a consequence, Mother Earth is sick and when she is sick so are her children. We heal Mother Earth by healing her children of greed, ignorance, and stupidity thus restoring equilibrium. In Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota the history of charitable trusts was somewhat similar to that of New York. Early legislation in these three states somewhat repudiated the Statute of Elizabeth and also adopted practically verbatim the New York chapter on uses and trusts, which declared that only four enumerated real property trusts were valid and make no mention of charitable trusts.* In Michigan and Minnesota this was held to prohibit charitable trusts both as to real and personal property; Methodist Episcopal Church of Newark v Clark, 44 Mich. 730, 3 N.W. 207; Shanahan v Kelly, 88 Minn. 202, 92 N.W. 948. in Wisconsin, as a result of this legislation, charitable trusts of reality were held to be impossible, Danforth v City of Oshkosh, 119 Wis. 262, 97 N.W. 258. but gifts of personalty in trust for charitable uses were allowed, because the Statute of Uses and Trusts had no application to personal property. Dodge v Williams, 46 Wis. 70, 1 N.W. 92, 50 N.W. 1103. Later legislation in Michigan and Wisconsin validated all charitable trusts by statutes modeled after the Tilden Act of New York.5 A general charitable trust act in Minnesota was declared unconstitutional because of a defect in its title but a later act established the the validity of all such trusts.© 4 Mich. Rev. St. 1846, c. 63; Wis. Rev. St. 1849, c. 57; Minn.-M.S.A. @501.01 et seq, 5 Mich. Pub. Acts 1907, No. 122 formerly Mich. How. Ann. St. 1912 @ 10700, but repealed by Mich, Pub. Acts 1915, No. 280 which re-enacted sections 10700 and 10701, How. Ann. St. 1912, and added the sentence, “Every such trust shall be liberally construed by such court so that the intentions of the creator thereof shall be carried out whenever possible,” and validates all gifts under the former statute. See M.C.LA. @ 554.351, 554.352; In re Brown's Estate, 198 Mich. 544, 165 N.W. 929; Wis. St. Ann. 231.11(6, 7); Williams v City of Oconomowoc, 167 Wis. 281, 166 N.W. 322. See Zollman, 8 Marquette LR. 168; 10 id. 177. 6 Minn. L. 1927, c. 180. See Minn. Stats. Ann. @ 501.12. See E. S. Thurston, Charitable GiftsIn Mississippi a constitutional provision restricting gifts to charity has been repealed. Const, Article 14, @ 269, repealed by L. 1940, c. 325. See Bell v Mississippi Orphans Home, 192 Miss. 205, 5 So. 2d 214. In the remaining states charitable trusts have from the beginning been enforced, either because of the adoption of the Statute of Elizabeth or the common law of England, or because of the enactment of statutes which declare the enforceability of charitable trusts,” or merely on the basis of equity's general jurisdiction.8 in Minnesota, 1 Minn. Law. Rev. 201; Dwan, 14 Minn. LR. 587. 7 Conn. Gen. St. Ann. @ 45.79, 45.80; Ga. Code @ 108-201 to 108-210; Ky. R.S. 381.260; Md. Ann. Code 1957, art. 16 @ 195, art. 93 @ 4- 409; N.C.-G.S. @ 36-23.1 For construction see Westport Bank & Trust Co. v Fable, 126 Conn. 665, 13 A.2d 862; Shrader v Erickson’s Ex’r, 284 Ky. 449, 145 S.W. 2d 63. As to the statute in La. (La. R.S. @ 9:2271 et seq,), see Succession of Maguire, 228 La. 1096, 85 So.2d 4 ® carter v Balfour's Adm’, 19 Ala. 814; In re Hinkley's Estate, 58 Cal. 457; Doughten v Vandever, 5 Del. Ch. 51; Drskine v Whitehead, 84 Ind. 357; Beidler v Dehner, 178 lowa 1338, 161 N.W. 32; Miller v Tatum, 131 Ky. 490, 205 S.W. 557; Succession of Meunier, 52 La - Ann. 79, 26. 776, 48 L.R.A. 77; Preachers" Aid Soc, of Maine Conference of Methodist Episcopal Church v Rich, 45 Me. 552; Bills v Pease, 116 Me, 98, 100 A. 146, LILA 1917D, 1060; Sanderson v White, 18 Pick., Mass., 928, 29 Am. Dec. 591; Thorp v Lind, 227 Mass. 474, 116 N. E. 946, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 1204; Catron v Scaritt Collegiate Institute, 264 Mo. 713, 175 S. W. 571; In re Nilson's Estate, 81 Neb. 809 116 N.W. 971; In re Hartung's Estate, 40 Nev. 262, 160 P. 782; Gagnon v Wellman, 78 N.H. 327, 99 A. 786; Board of Education of City of Albuquerque v School Dist. No. 5 of Bernalillo County, 21 N.M. 624, 157 P. 668; Hagan v Sacrison, 19 N.D. 160, 123 N.W. 518, 26 L. R, A. N.S., 724; Landis v Wooden, 1 Ohio St. 160, 59 Dec. 615; Pennoyer v Wadhams, 20 Or. 274, 25 P. 720, 11 LIR.A. 210; In re Close's Estate, 260 Pa. 269, 103 A. 822; Rhode Island 5 The enumeration of charitable purposes in the Statute of Charitable Uses is not considered exclusive, even in those states where that statute is adopted as a part of the common law. The list given in the statute is merely illustrative of charitable trusts theretofore established. Many other analogous and similar purposes are allowed as valid charitable objects. The statute merely set forth some of the more common charities then In force. I"t clearly appears that the statute cannot be looked to as the sole test of what is public charity, but that ‘many other uses, not named, and not within the strict letter of the statute, but which, coming within its spirit, equity, and analogy, are considered charitable."? Since the adoption of the Statute of Charitable Uses several statutes on the subject have been adopted in England successively, culminating in the Charities Act of 1960 which was the result of a parliamentary inquiry begun in 1950 which produced an extensive report on the history and status of charities in England. All of these statutes have been chiefly concerned with machinery for Hospital Trust Co. v Olney, 14 Rl. 449; Shields v Jolly, 1 Rich. Eq., 8.C., 99, 42 Am. Dec. 349; Gibson v Frye Institute, 137 Tenn. 452 193 S. W. 1059, L.R.A. 1917D, 1062; Hopkins v Upshur, 20 Tex. 89, 70 Am. Dec. 375; United States v Late Corporation of Church of Jesus Christ v Latter-Day Saints, 8 Utah 310, 31 P. 436; Burr's Ex'rs v Smith, 7 Vt. 241, 29 A. Dec. 154; Susmann v Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Seattle, 101 Wash. 487, 172 P. 554. See Smith, 1 Ga. Bar. J. 16; 11 Mont. LR. 96; 3 Southwestern LJ. 168; Wheeler, 15 Tulane L.R. 177; Young, 43 Ill, LR. 623; 13 Oki. L. R. 354; Fisch, American Acceptance of Charitable Trusts, 28 Notre Dame L. 219; The charitable Trust as a giving device, Vestal, 1957 Wash. U, L. Q. 195; Symposium on charitable trusts (with particular reference to Ohio), 18 Oh. St. Lu. 149; Craig, Charitable Trusts in lowa, 9 Drake LR, 90; De Paul LR. 84 (lll. developments). 9 Buchanan v Kennard, 234 Mo. 117, 136 S.W. 415, 420, 37 LR.A., N.S., 993, Ann. Cas. 1912 D, 50.enforcement. They have not been intended to validate charities. RELIGIOUS PURPOSES "Provision for the support of religious institutions, workers, activities and services is regarded as of public benefit and is therefore charitable. It is the function of the court and not the settlor to decide whether a gift qualifies as religious. No clear cut definition of religion has ever been given by statute ‘or decision. While all churches and sects which have large followings in the United States have been held to qualify as religious, it is not clear to what extent the courts will sanction the support of other religious beliefs as charitable. It seems probable that a trust to combat all religions would be held void as against public policy, and clearly this would be so if the so- called religion practiced immoral or criminal acts". Restatement, Trusts. Second.@ 371. While the Statute of Charitable Uses mentioned only one purpose which would nowadays be classed as religious, namely the repair of churches, this was explained by the draftsman of the statute as caused by the uncertainty in 1601 as to what would be from time to time the established religion, since it depended on the beliefs of the king, and hence trusts founded to aid ‘one religion might be declared void in a 10 later reign. 1° But thereafter, when the Church of England was made the established church, trusts for its purposes were declared charitable in many decisions, and although trusts to advance dissenting protestants, Roman Catholic and the Jewish religion were for many years denied any charitable quality and were sometimes classified as “superstitious",17 this situation was changed by the Toleration Act of the nineteenth century.12 In the United States there has never been any doubt that the advancement of religious enterprises is charitable.13 Many of the statutes validating charities or providing for their enforcement mention religion. A charitable trust may bring religious benefits to the community in a large variety of ways. For example, it may provide a site for the erection of a house of worship; or for its repair, or for the construction of a parsonage; for the support of a particular church or denomination; for the maintenance of a course of sermons; to pay the salary of the pastor of a church; for the support of home or foreign missions; for the education 10 See Sir Francis Moore's exposition of the statute as given in Duke, Charities, 1805 ed., p. 125. 11 At the time of King Henry VIII (1509-1547), the Roman Cathlic Church was established in England. The king wanted a divorce from his wife and the pope would not give him the divoree and in conquence, the pope ex- communiated the king from the church, in turn; the king ousted the pope and established the Church of England as the established church. 12 As to dissenters, see Shrewsbury v Hornby, 5 Hare 406; Attorney General v Cock, 2 Ves. 273. As to catholics and Jews see St. 8 &9 Vict. c. 59 @ 2; St. 3. & 4 Wm. IV, c. 115; In re Michel's Trusts, 28 Beav. 39; Bradshaw v Tasker, 2 My. & K. 221 13 In re Small's Estate, 244 lowa 1209, 58. N.W. 2d 477 (advancement of fundamentalist doctrine); Buchanan v Willis, 195 Tenn. 18, 255 S. W. 2d 8 (new testament teachings only); Gootz v Old Nat. Bk. of Martinsburg, 140 W. Va. 422, 84 S. E. 2d 759 (must be for specific religious orginizations).young men in the ministry; for the dissemination of religious books; for the aid of a Sabbath school or other religious educational institution; for the benefit of a Young Mens Christian Association; or to provide homes or pensions for retired religious workers and their families. A trust to aid religion, without specifying what religion or how the aid is to be furnished, is a valid charity, although admittedly giving great latitude to the trustee, and the same Is true where the trustee Thompsons Estate, 282 Pa. 30, 127 A. 446 is expressly given discretion to select methods or objects. Inre Geppert's Estate, 75 S. D. 96, 59 N.W. 2d 727. The burden-is on the court to decide whether the institutions, ideas, and practices which the settlor has sought to make the basis of a charitable trust are religious. 14 The courts have not bound themselves by any clear cut definition of feligion. In several constitutional and tax cases courts have expressed the view that belief in a divinity is essential to a religion,19 It seems clear that the settlor cannot create or adopt a set of practices and theories and describe them as his religion, and thus bind the courts to approve a trust for their advancement as charitable. Examples might exist where 14 In re Hummeltenberg, (1923) 1 Ch. 237 (training of spiritualistic mediums not charitable); Re Coats’ Trusts, (1948) 1 Ch. 1, 340. See Glover v Baker, 76 N.H. 393, 420, 83 A. 916, where the court said: “Mrs. Eddy had the constitutional right to entertain such opinions as she chose, and to make a religion of them, and to teach them to all others; ..... . Whether her opinions are theologically true, the courts are not competent to decide.” 15 Davis v Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 10S. Ct. 299 (alleged illegal establishment of a religion); Berman v U.S. 156 F.2d 377 (draft act); Washington Ethical Soc. v District of Columbia, 84 Wash. LR. 1072 (tax exemption). But see Fellowship of Humanity v County of Alamedia, 315 P2d 394 (humanism). eli tl nudism and sun worshipping, or opposition to the slaughter of animals and consequent vegetarianism, were merely the hobbies of the settlor. We dare not loose sight of what Joesph Story said about trust law in Videl v Girard Exer's as was printed in the April 1990 issue of this newsletter on page 8 last paragraph. “This is not a judicial decision but is a legislative expos Gifts to the numerous denominations and sects of protestant Christianity have been held charitable, as have donations in aid of the Roman Catholic and the Jewish religions. Whether trusts in support of Mohammedanism and the oriental and other religions, which have relatively small following in America, would be treated as charitable is an undecided question. The right of all citizens to freedom of speech and religion argues for them, but much might depend on the breadth of vision and tolerance of the particular court considering the question. In Thorton v Howe, 31 Beavan's English Rolls, 13; the nature of the religion which equity would support as a charity was considered. A testrix created a trust to aid in the propagation of the writings of Jonna Southcote, a person who believed that she was a child by the holy ghost and had received divine revelations. The court ‘sustained the trust as being in aid of the Christian religion, notwithstanding that a great part of the writings of Joanna Southcote appeared to the court foolish and profit-less. The court said by way of dictium that "the Court of Chancery makes no distinction between-one sort of religion and another........ Neither does the court, in this respect, make any distinction between one sect and another. It may be that the tenets of a particular sect inculcate doctrines adverse to the very foundations of all religion, and that they are subversive of all morality. In such a case, if it should arise, the Court will not assist the execution of the bequest, but will declare it to be void;...... But if the tendency were not immoral, and although ‘this court might consider the opinionssought to be propagated foolish or even devoid of foundation, it would not, on that account, declare it void, or take it out of the class of legacies which are included in the general terms of charitable bequests." If the advancement of religion is for the public interest, it would seem that a trust aimed at weakening or destroying religion would be non-charitable, but the decisions on the subject are not conclusive. Clearly a trust to support a religion which had immoral or illegal practices as a part of its system would be void. Examples might exist in the cases of polygamy, human sacrifice, or the teaching of doctrines which would lead to hate and violence by one section of the community against another. It is sometimes held that a gift to a clergyman or other church official, to be used in his description, without mention of any other particular objectives, should be interpreted as meaning that the money was to be spent for religious work and that the gift was to the donee in his official capacity and not as a private individual. In England it is held that in order that a trust for religion shall be held charitable it must involve the bringing of religious benefits to the public or some class of it, and must not be merely a case of private religious exercises and devotions, open only to clergy, monks, nuns, or others of similar position. Under this view not all religious trusts are charitable. The distinction is between public or social religion and secret or private religious exercises. WHAT 2nd AMENDMENT ?222 Most people have a very distorted view of the second amendment to the Constitution of United States of America when viewed from the 14th amendment. The amendment was designed to protect "TITLE" or (2 absolute ownership to property both real or personal. But for those 14th amendment persons you have no title to your property and as we have learned, the interest that is held in property is equitable subject to the public trust therefore NO "TITLE". In other words, the courts will eventually rule on this matter and despite what the 2nd amendment reads, which is "LAW" when viewed from the 9th and 10th amendments. But then 14th amendment ‘persons’ have no excess to the "LAl only a equitable standing as determined by the courts ruling upon a constructive trust because your will is in the legislature. In other words, the courts decision will be based on whether there is privately held property with "TITLE" thereto or whether the property is held in common. If you think you own your car because its' paid for, look at the title, notice it says certificate of title and a certificate is not "TITLE". Here again we have notice of the vehicle held in trust. For those who are not subject to the public trust, you have “TITLE' to your property therefore you have something to protect. In other words, the police powers are there to protect the public trust property and to keep those 14th amendment ‘persons’ from damaging or destroying property held absolute by those who are not subject to the public trust. Yearly subscription rate is $35.00 per volume year. May thru April of each year. Volume | is available in its entirety for $35.00. Volume II started in May of 1990. ‘Send CASH OR U.S, POSTAL MONEY ORDERS ONLY TO: NOTICE NEW ADDRESS Lee Brobst RD 1 Box 213 F Hesston, PA. 16647 Ve ei