Is Sino-Christian Theology Truly “Theology”?

Problematizing Sino-Christian Theology as a Public Theology

Jason Lam Melbourne School of Theology

jason.lam@cantab.net

Abstract
Most participants in the Sino-Christian theology movement are not affiliated with the
church. This state of affairs naturally raises the question whether what scholarship
arises is really a kind of theology or merely writings on public and/or political issues
with reference to Christian themes. And yet the movement is more influential than the
church in the Chinese public realm in terms of its ability to produce a Christian voice.
The purpose of this article is first to examine the historical development of Sino-
Christian theology over the past several decades. Some particular themes of this
movement are then explored. These themes are intertwined with the discussion of
polytheistic values, nationalism, and self-identity in times of cultural conflict: all of
these matters are of wide public concern. There are evident tensions within the Sino-
Christian theology movement: the intention is to show points of difference can be
transformed and become a creative drive behind the construction of a new kind of
theology in the Chinese public realm.

Keywords
Sino-Christian theology – China – public theology – modernity – nationalism

I. Introductory Remarks

“Sino-Christian thelogy” in this essay refers specifically to the emerging Christian

studies phenomenon in Mainland China starting from the late 1980s, and gradually
attracting attention and participation from scholars in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and other
Chinese-speaking areas. One reason this movement has come into focus is that, after
the Cultural Revolution ended until today, the Chinese church has been busy with
training clergy and is unable to dedicate many resources to academic work. Therefore,
serious research on Christianity for the last few decades has had to rely mainly on
intellectuals in the university system. But most of them have little, if any, affiliation to
the institutional churches. Interestingly, they have been forming a kind of “theological
qua cultural movement” in an academic setting.1 Several decades have passed, and

1 For brief analyses cf. Pan-chiu Lai & Jason Lam, “Retrospect and Prospect of Sino-Christian Theology:
An Introduction by the Editors”, in Pan-chiu Lai & Jason Lam eds., Sino-Christian Theology: A
Theological Qua Cultural Movement in Contemporary China (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2010), pp. 1-17;
Jason Lam, “The Emergence of Scholars Studying Christianity in Mainland China”, in Lai & Lam eds.,
China has in many aspects changed dramatically; Sino-Christian theology has also
developed in changing conditions. One of the outstanding features is that it is not a
movement initiated by the church but is more influential than the church in the public
(especially academic and publication) realm with regard to its ability to produce a
Christian voice.2 Therefore Sino-Christian theology distanced itself from the church
early on and opted to use everyday language rather than traditional theological
expressions when participating in discussions on public issues in communist China.
Some scholars have already pointed out that this “public” character is different from
the conventional understanding of the public sphere in western academia and simply
means adherence to the principle of “rationality of willingness to communicate”.3 In
the following we shall thus first offer an analysis of the fast-changing situation in China
for the sake of better understanding how several important “theological” themes
emerged in the past few decades. Nevertheless, as this kind of “public” discourse is a
response to its unique situation, some observers have questioned whether this discourse
can be counted as a kind of genuine “theology” or whether it constitutes no more than
accidental writings on public or political issues by scholars interested in Christianity.4
To address this concern, we shall examine these themes and try to offer some
preliminary suggestions for charting a future direction for this “public theology”
movement. One may find that Sino-Christian theology is truly facing challenges in its
unique context. Nonetheless, this may also point to a wider, specifically modern,
problem encountered today by the human and social sciences, including theology. At
the same time, however, the movement also offers an opportunity for effecting a crucial
transformation of the Christian faith to address contextual needs.

II. An Analysis of the Historical Situation

Mainland Chinese academics started to study Christian works in the 1980s, but
writings directly entitled “Sino-Christian theology” did not appear until the 1990s. 5

Sino-Christian Theology, pp. 21-33. In a sense the present essay is a continuation of this previous piece
of work.
2 It is, of course, related to the restrictions put on religions by the Chinese government, cf. LI
Xianping, “The Place ‘Centered ‘Space Religious Activity’: The Changes of ‘Religious System’ in
China”, Logos & Pneuma 26 (2007), pp. 93-114.
3 JIANG Yihua, “Huaren Shijie Fazhan Gonggong Zhexue de Yiyi” (The Significance of Developing
Public Philosophy in the Chinese World), in HUANG Junjie & JIANG Yihua eds., Gongsi Lingyu
Xintan [A New Exploration of the Public and Private Spheres] (Shanghai: East China Normal
University Press, 2008), pp. 41-54 at p. 52; also cf. XIE Zhibin, “Why Public and Theological? The
Problem of Public Theology in the Chinese Context”, International Journal of Public Theology 11
(2017), pp. 381-404; Alexander Chow, Chinese Public Theology (Oxford: OUP, 2018).
4 ZHANG Xu, “The Chinese Way of Christian Theology: Towards the Second Stage of Sino-Christian
Theology” [in Chinese], in Daniel Yeung, Jason Lam & Gao Xin eds., Inheritance and Development:
Essays from the 4th Roundtable Symposium of Sino-Christian Studies (HK: Logos & Pneuma, 2012),
pp. 41-67 at p. 42.
5
LIU Xiaofeng and HE Guanghu are usually seen as the two pioneers of Sino-Christian theology; their
elaborations of the notion can be found from LIU Xiaofeng, “Xiandai Yujingzhong de Hanyu Jidu
Shenxue” (Sino-Christian Theology in the Modern Context), Logos & Pneuma 2 (1995), pp. 9-48;

2
Initially, participants largely inherited the so-called “New Enlightenment” spirit of the
1980s (see introduction below) after the Reform and Opening Up policy was
implemented. Due to the far-reaching changes in Chinese society connected with this
policy, a better understanding of the “theological” themes developed in Sino-Christian
theology requires some familiarization with this complex backdrop.

2.1 The Initial Stage of Studying Modernity

At the beginning of the 1980s when the Reform and Opening Up policy was
implemented, intellectuals in Mainland China were very interested in western thought
in general due to the urgent need for modernization. This was not only an academic
interest; intellectuals detected the profound differences between eastern and western
culture and wanted to find common ground, hoping that China might follow the
footsteps of the developed countries. In this situation, although western thought is very
complicated, it was absorbed as one organic whole under the agenda of “modernity.”
Many intellectuals favored an idealized reading of modernity and the Enlightenment,
which in many ways hampered a clear understanding of the inner tensions of modernity.
This was the so-called “New Enlightenment” period in Mainland Chinese academia.6
In this period, Sino-Christian theology emerged with this idealized interpretation
of western intellectual history.7 Although most intellectuals at the time were outside of
the institutional church, they appreciated rather than criticized the Christian faith and
culture and focused on its humanistic values. In this way Sino-Christian theology was
established on the platform of humanities subjects in the university system and showed
its “public” character in the academic realm. This was the initial outlook of Sino-
Christian theology. 8 We should, however, bear in mind that this was the result of
following an idealized version of “New Enlightenment” thought. Thus in the 1980s
even GAN Yang, who describes himself as a liberal-leftist today,9 claimed that the
difference between East and West should be perceived as that between the traditional
and the modern, “Today we must view the difference between Chinese and western

English version can be found in Huilin Yang & Daniel Yeung eds., Sino-Christian Studies in China
(Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2006), pp. 52-89; revised and expanded version as “Hanyu
Shenxue yu Lishi Zhexue”, in LIU Xiaofeng, Hanyu Shenxue yu Lishi Zhexue [Sino-Christian
Theology and Philosophy of History] (HK: Logos & Pneuma, 2000), pp. 3-96; HE Guanghu, “Hanyu
Shenxue de Genju yu Yiyi” (The Basis and Significance of Sino-Christian Theology), “Hanyu Shenxue
de Fangfa yu Jinlu” (The Methodology of and Approaches to Sino-Christian Theology), in Daniel
Yeung ed., Preliminary Studies on Chinese Theology (HK: ISCS, 2000), pp. 23-53; English version can
be found in Yang & Yeung eds., Sino-Christian Studies in China, pp. 106-132.
6 Analysis of this era cf. XU Jilin, Dangdai Zhongguode Qimeng yu Fanqimeng [The Enlightenment
and Anti-Enlightenment in Contemporary China] (Beijing: Social Science Literature, 2011), pp. 12-13,
44-45.
7 The first Sino-Christian theology article attracting wide attention by LIU Xiaofeng is “Xiandai
Yujingzhongde Hanyu Jidu Shenxue” [Sino-Christian Theology in the Modern Context], Logos &
Pneuma 2 (1994), pp. 9-48.
8 Cf. Jason Lam, Narrative, Tradition, Faith: A Search for the Social Identity of Sino-Christian Theology
[in Chinese] (HK: Logos & Pneuma Press, 2010), ch.1.
9 Cf. his blog <http://www.caogen.com/blog/index.aspx?ID=200> (accessed 2 January 2019).

3
culture as the difference between various western cultures, i.e. a kind of difference
within the same realm of modern culture. Only in this sense can it be understood as
difference in equality.”10 In other words, the unique character of Chinese culture was
not the main focus of intellectuals at that time.

2.2 Deeper Understanding and Diversity of Thought

The three decades during which Sino-Christian theology has developed coincide
with the recent period of intellectual thought diversification in Mainland China. Apart
from idealizing modern western thought, owing to the influence of the Reform and
Opening Up atmosphere in the 1980s, intellectuals from different disciplines also took
a stand against political totalitarianism. As cultural pluralism became more and more
accepted, a homogenous humanistic value system no longer seemed justifiable. In
addition, as intellectuals engaged in more in-depth study of the Enlightenment, they
understood more about its inner tensions and conflicts. They thus discovered that
modernity not only offers resources for self-identity but also promotes self-negation.
Thus, alongside liberal thought, which continues to exist in Mainland academia, there
have also been pluralistic views of modernity, and some prominent intellectuals have
embraced postmodern thought. Since the 2000s Leo Strauss’s political thought has been
introduced and won a measure of popular appeal, while Chinese intellectuals have
further diversified.11
This diversifying process has been a natural development: as intellectuals learned
more from western thought, they discovered that some theories of modernity which
claimed universal applicability had in fact heavily relied on western cultural premises
and were not necessarily compatible with either modern or ancient Chinese thought.
Consequently, some have turned to their own cultural tradition for self-identification;
some radicals have even become anti-western, suspecting that the western ideas they
were taught are part of a hidden colonizing agenda. Some might infer that self-identity
can only be founded in one’s own cultural tradition; this is quite common for
intellectuals who held postcolonial positions.12 Thus it is not surprising to find that
some academics wanted to resist mainstream western thought by means of traditional
Chinese thought or marginalized western ideas – or a mixture of both. Some studied
western thought not in order to understand the west but to formulate their resistance
against it. A very complicated academic landscape was the result.13 In a sense this
complexity echoed the May Fourth Movement of the 1920s, when the modern spirit
and traditional cultural spirit both came under suspicion. At that time Chinese culture
was regarded as lacking the necessary elements for modernization. Thus modern

10 GAN Yang, Gujin Zhongxi zhi Zheng [Debate between Ancient and Modern, Chinese and the West]
(Beijing: Sanlian, 2006), pp. 45-46, my translation.
11 XU, Dangdai Zhongguode Qimeng yu Fanqimeng, pp. 13, 37.
12 TAO Dongfeng, Shehui Zhuanxing yu Dandai Zhishi Fenzhi [Social Transformation and
Contemporary Intellectuals] (Shanghai: Sanlian, 1999), pp. 36-38.
13 XU, Dangdai Zhongguode Qimeng yu Fanqimeng, p. 166.

4
cultural thought since the Enlightenment had to be scrutinized. This in turn was also a
potential hindrance to any sense of identification with traditional culture while, at the
same time, suspicions of colonization informed scholarly output.14 Nevertheless, the
1990s were completely different from the early 20th century as China has since entered
an era of dramatic economic growth. Since the 2000s, China has played an important
role on the global stage and shown itself as eager to develop and present its cultural
heritage to the modern world. A once neglected cultural or national character has moved
to the fore, which is related to the issue of self-identification mentioned above.

2.3 Struggling between Universal Values and Nationalism

In this recent development, intellectuals did not question whether China needed
modernization or not but only which kind of modernization was needed and how to
proceed developing it in the present situation. In the academic realm a technical
question was raised: after the plurality of modernity is recognized, can we still recover
any “universals” from within that plurality? This question led to a dispute over the
existence of universal values in Mainland China while the opposite stance was a kind
of narrow nationalism. Nevertheless, we should be aware that, as is true of modernity,
there are different kinds of “nationalisms,” each with its corresponding implications.15
Without elaborating on the distinctions of different nationalisms, it should be noted that
this background is intertwined with the development of Sino-Christian theology. Since
this theological movement was closely related to the study of modernity and
intellectuals were deeply interested in western thought, studying Christianity became
an important element to this general intellectual backdrop and many scholars found it
worth their while to explore Christian faith and theology. However, the diversification
in the 1990s emerged partly because of the rise of national consciousness; this would
to some degree cool the initial interest in studying Christianity. Some scholars who
were once sympathetic took on neutral and even antagonistic attitudes. This change is
likely to have arisen not due to internal factors within Sino-Christian theology but from
the wider social atmosphere. As ZHANG Xu said, “This social-political
environment cannot be changed by Sino-Christian theology; it exists in the
environment. But if we do not consider the social space and institutions shaped
by this environment, we will lose the historical and concrete senses of the
study.”16
The above summary highlights how the development of Sino-Christian theology
has coincided with intellectual diversification in Mainland China. In the past,
everything was planned: from the economy to politics and even culture. But since the

14 TAO, Shehui Zhuanxing yu Dandai Zhishi Fenzhi, pp. 22, 28.

15 Cf. the related discussions in the themed journal issue “Christianity and Nationalism”, Logos &
Pneuma 35 (2011).
16 ZHANG, “The Chinese Way of Christian Theology”, p. 43; my translation.

5
1990s people have experienced the dissolution of social homogeneity.17 Seen from this
perspective, the foundational article “Sino-Christian theology in the Modern Situation”
written by LIU Xiaofeng in 1995 is quite subtle and full of wisdom, placing Sino-
Christian theology in the context of modernity. Five years later the focus of Liu’s
revised work Sino-Christian Theology and Philosophy of History shifted to the
philosophy of history, while still expanding on the theme he initially introduced; this
work sees Chinese scholars’ interest in Christian theology as an overtone of their
interest in western modernization.18 Thus ZHANG Xu has accurately pointed out, “In
the beginning when LIU Xiaofeng introduced Christian academic thought into
Chinese culture, one of his motivations was to use the transcendence,
ecumenicity and a-political character of Christianity in order to confront our
national discourse, whether political-nationalistic or Marxist.”19
Seen against the backdrop of this historical development, the major background is
that China as a late-developing country has struggled between certain universal principles
and national identity. Liu therefore emphasized that (Christian) “theology” and “Chinese”
(culture) were inherently in conflict. He even made use of the crisis theology of the early
Karl Barth as an analogy; and the “theology” mentioned refers to an ideal type introduced
by Max Weber, whereas “Chinese” culture in Liu’s sense was depicted as parallel to other
historical national cultures:20

Christ Event
↓
Christian Theology (ideal type)
↑ (historical type)
Greek Latin English, French, German, Sino-Christian
Theology Theology Russian Theology Theology

When we look back today, many “theological” issues raised years ago corresponded to
related problems of modernization. The question that attracted most attention is probably
whether theology needs to be “indigenized” and “accommodated” to Chinese culture.
Seen from another angle, this is the “theological” version of many past questions related
to modernity, e.g. whether the universal values (and even liberalism) suggested by
modernity can be localized and whether cultural nationalism can cohere with modernity.
The above diagram can be redrawn as follows:21

17 TAO, Shehui Zhuanxing yu Dandai Zhishi Fenzhi, p. 4.

18 LIU Xiaofeng, Hanyu Shenxue yu Lishi Zhexue, pp. 3-96.
19 ZHANG, “The Chinese Way of Christian Theology”, p. 53.
20 LIU, Hanyu Shenxue yu Lishi Zhexue, pp. 89-93.
21 The most intriguing point for theologians is whether a “humanistic appropriation” (of the Christ
event) can replace the original kerygmatic basis. Chinese academics avidly debated this at one point.
Cf. Jason Lam, “The Significance of Bonhoeffer’s Thought to the Recent Discussion of Sino-Christian
Theology”, The Bonhoeffer Legacy: Australasian Journal of Bonhoeffer Studies 3 (2015:1), pp. 37-56.

6
 Humanistic Appropriation
↓
Modernity (ideal type)
↑ (historical type)
English, French, German, Chinese Modernitiy
Russian Modernity

LIU and others could shift from one focus to another because they strategically
“introduced Christian thought as a grand tradition stretching from ancient to modern
western history.”22 The major reason Sino-Christian theology emphasizes its humanistic
rather than religious nature is due to the fact that the majority of participants are not
confessing Christians. Another reason, however, is that most of the issues they have dealt
with are closely related to problems discussed in the humanities; Sino-Christian theology
articulates Christianity as a significant backdrop to the western humanities, attracting
keen scholarly participation. It thus emerges as a kind of “theological studies” on the
public platform.23

III. Themes developed by Sino-Christian Theology in the Public Realm

If “from homogeneity to diversification” can be seen as a general trend among

academics in Mainland China, then participants of Sino-Christian theology should
study its mechanisms from the vantage points of other disciplines. Otherwise the
participants can hardly produce “theological” reflections addressed to the public. In the
following I list several “theological” themes already initiated but in need of further
development. They emerged largely on the basis of socio-cultural debates rather than
due to conventional theological interest. Nevertheless, since Sino-Christian theology is
being developed in the public arena, it should absorb these public issues as its own
themes while also reflecting on its unique position and orientation.

3.1 Polytheism of Values and the Atmosphere of Nihilism

Since the mid 1990s, intellectual homogeneity began to dissolve in Mainland
China because of the lessening of ideological control. In other words, civil society, still
in its infancy, began to emerge and separate itself from the state.24 In the process of

22 ZHANG, “The Chinese Way of Christian Theology”, p. 54.

23 Cf. LI Qiuling & Jason Lam, “Réflexion sur l’histoire de la sino-théologie et des études chrétiennes
en langue chinoise”, Francois Barriquand trans., Transversalités 103 (2007), pp. 113-127.
24 Cf. LI Xiangping, Zhongguo Dangdai Zongjiaode Shehuixue Quanshi [The Sociological
Interpretation of Contemporary Chinese Religions] (Shanghai: Renmin, 2006), esp. ch. 3-5; also cf. Lam,
Narrative, Tradition, Faith, ch. 4. But some people may question whether China has a genuine sense of
“civil society” or “public sphere”. Cf. GU Xin, “Dangdai Zhongguo youwu Gongmin Shehui yu
Gonggong Kongjian?” [Is there “Civil Society” and “Public Sphere” in Contemporary China? A Review
to the Related Discussions in the West], Modern China Studies 1994:4,

7
modernization, this is considered the differentiation of social structure in a nation-state,
which is related to the organization of social institutions. As an autonomous state, the
People’s Republic of China has its own system of institutions. In addition to the law,
however, any country must supply a set of values for people to embrace voluntarily so
that representative institutions can run smoothly. In other words, it must establish a
political community in a nation: the two realms and identities of national community
and political community should be differentiated. Consequently, Chinese academics
continue to deepen their discussion on the tension between nationalism and universal
values. What a political community needs is a theory of state and citizenship, whereas
a national community calls for cultural belonging and a system of values. The two are
never entirely separate, in particular because in reality it is usually the case that a
national community wants to construct a political community. Thus it is not surprising
to find recent Mainland Chinese scholarship focused on political thinkers like Niccolò
Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, G. W. F. Hegel, Karl Marx and the like. Moreover,
Chinese scholars have not only studied the political writings of these thinkers but also
their relationship to the Christian faith, as culture and values have been a primary
concern among the Chinese elite. This trend is salient when we browse some of the
publications that have emerged since the turn of the millennium. In addition to
translating and studying traditional theological writings on socio-political issues by St.
Augustine, St. Thomas, Martin Luther, or John Calvin, Chinese scholars further turned
to Baruch Spinoza’s biblical criticism, John Locke’s writings on salvation, David
Hume’s view on natural religion, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s concept of civil religion.
A full volume of Logos & Pneuma, the pioneering journal of Sino-Christian theology,
was devoted to the theological theme “Contemporary Political Philosophy and
Christianity” in 2009. The theme editors wanted to highlight an important issue ignored
by many Chinese intellectuals since the May Fourth Movement, when academia was
focusing on western political philosophers. The problem of negotiating values in the
religiously pluralistic context was not only an old problem but has remained relevant to
this day.25
When we turn to the dimension of the construction and operation of a community,
we may better understand some subtle developments of Sino-Christian theology and
their relationship to academic trends. While the decline of totalitarian ideology
promised to bring about increased freedom of thought, the prospect of plurality would
only result in affirming individual rights and the autonomy of morality. The unified
faith of the past, previously furnished by totalitarian ideology that met the demands of
a (quasi-) state religion, had been lost. In such a situation one can only ask “What is

<https://www.modernchinastudies.org/us/issues/past-issues/49-mcs-1994-issue-4/320-2011-12-29-11-
30-39.html> (accessed 7 Oct 2019).
25 SUN Xiangchen & HUANG Yong, “Contemporary Political Philosophy and Christianity:
Introduction to the Main Theme”, Logos & Pneuma 30 (2009), pp. 19-26 at pp. 23f.; also cf. the related
articles in the theme.

8
right?” on the basis of law in the public realm; however, the question “What is good?”
is merely a matter of individual choice, an issue in the private realm. This led to the
polytheism of values in Weber’s sense and was the backdrop for the debate between
the “secular spirit” and the “humanistic spirit” that emerged in Mainland Chinese
academia in the 1990s.26 Needless to say, this is only a reductionist description, as no
group would dare champion a return either to the extreme of a vulgar culture or to
intellectual homogeneity. Therefore, the diversification in academia includes camps of
developmentalism, Hayekian liberalism, neo-leftism, leftist liberalism, neo-
conservatism, and other streams of thought.27 Leo Strauss was introduced into Chinese
thought at the time George W. Bush Jr. was elected US President. Some people even
regarded Strauss’s thinking as the intellectual resource behind the US political
conservative camp.28 Chinese translations of the works of Strauss increased at this time
and scholars published on his thought prolifically. “Theological” writings quickly
followed. In 2001, an issue of Logos & Pneuma featured four translated articles written
by Strauss and another one by John G. Gunnell on “Strauss before Straussianism:
Reason, Revelation and Nature”. LIU Xiaofeng wrote a very long lead article entitled,
“Philosophy, God and the Possibility of Good Life: Leo Strauss’s Political Philosophy
and Theology”.29 Since then Chinese interest in reading Strauss and related discussions
on revelation and philosophy have persisted while scholars have linked the debate to
Chinese culture.30
In this connection, it is worth noting the significant differences between China and
the west since the differentiation of social structures in the late Qing Dynasty. The unity
of traditional western society is in some sense based on the unification of political and
religious power. Religion not only provides values and norms but also legitimacy to
underpin the political and economic system. But in the modern differentiation of social
life, privatized religion has difficulty providing a unified belief and values for society.
Contemporary western liberal society therefore often strives hard for John Rawls’s type
of overlapping consensus for a community composed of different religions,
philosophies and moralities. In China, on the other hand, a similar “secularization”
process is not easily identifiable as the country was never actually established on a
western kind of institutional religion like Christianity - although now a conscious effort
is made to separate politics, economics, culture, and other realms from the control of

26 Cf. TAO, Shehui Zhuanxing yu Dandai Zhishi Fenzhi, pp. 137-202.

27 Cf. XU, Dangdai Zhongguode Qimeng yu Fanqimeng, pp. 58-62.
28 Cf. James Altas, “Chicago’s Grumpy Guru: Best-Selling Professor Allan Bloom and the Chicago
Intellectuals”, New York Times Magazine (3 Jan 1988), pp. 12-31; “Undemocratic Vistas: The Sinister
Vogue of Leo Strauss”, 28 Nov 1994; and “A Very Unlikely Villain [or Hero]”, 29 Jan 1995.
29 Cf. the theological theme of “The Political Conflict of Revelation and Philosophy” of Logos &
Pneuma 14 (2001).
30 Traditional theologians may find that many writings on this theme are quite marginal to “Christian”
theology but closer to natural theology. E,g, CHEN Jiaqi, “Fade Jingshen: Qishi Shenxue yu Zhengzhi
Shenxue” [The Spirit of the Law: Theology of Revelation and Political Theology], Twenty-First
Century 32 (Nov 2004), <http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/ics/21c/media/online/0408041.pdf> (accessed 7 Nov
2019).

9
“religion” (e.g. Confucianism and other forms of state belief). What China has
experienced since the May Fourth Movement is the collapse of the “universal kingship”
system as suggested by LIN Yishen, such that the traditional political and cultural order
disintegrated altogether. 31 Therefore the problem of pluralism in China is a highly
complicated one. The influence of the Confucian tradition diminished both in social
institutions and intellectual consciousness, and the country also suffered from western
invasion. Thus it not only encountered a western polytheism of values, but also the
deeper issue of a persistent threat to social and national identity. Society moved towards
ethical nihilism, and a cultural vacuum with little sense of nostalgia formed among
intellectuals.
The above not only describes the situation around the time of the May Fourth
Movement. As mentioned earlier, totalitarian ideology had played the role of a (quasi-)
religion before the Reform and Opening Up policy was implemented. It took hold of a
kind of sacred legitimacy and thus a homogeneous society was formed. With the
sanctioning of freedom and plurality, an integrity crisis as suggested by Harold J.
Berman erupted.32 To this end both the western (ancient Greek) and Chinese (pre-Qin)
classics were studied. One of the reasons for the rise of “Leo Strauss fever” in China
was the social perception of the loss of core values. Chinese intellectuals troubled by
the adversaries of modernity began to study how a holistic worldview was formed in
the ancient East and West.33
“Theology” has played a special role in this collapse and consequent process of
re-establishment since, in the past, absolute value was legitimized on a divine basis. In
the history of the West, this type of legitimization belongs to the realm of theology. In
the process of social differentiation, a different political philosophy and theology were
developed. Thus scholars also called for and developed discourses in the emerging
Sino-Christian theology movement. Nevertheless, we should be aware that this kind of
“theology” was not constructed in the service of a political or national community. It is
rather because, after the differentiation of social structure, what was previously “public”
was perhaps no longer truly universal: the notion of “public” diversified. Moreover,
Chinese scholars inferred from this that after the unified values and power established
by (quasi-) religion had collapsed, the so-called “public” realms, including the political
and economic, were often presupposed to be “secular” and antagonistic to religious
participation. In other words, a kind of “secular” consciousness had already usurped the
divine position of absolute value originally occupied by God. This secular

31 For the classical treatment cf. LIN Yisheng, Zhongguo Chungtongde Chuangzaoxin Zhuanhua [The
Creative Transformation of Chinese Tradition] (Beijing: Joint Publishing, 1988), pp. 166-168; for the
comparison with the West cf. TAO, Shehui Zhuanxing yu Dandai Zhishi Fenzhi, pp. 167-171, 193-202.
32 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge
& London: Harvard University Press, 1983).
33 Cf. XU Jian, Gujin zhi Zheng yu Wenmin Zijue [The Debate between Present and Past and the Self
Consciousness of Civilization: Leo Strauss in the Chinese Context] (Shanghai: East China Normal
University Press, 2010); XU, Dangdai Zhongguode Qimeng yu Fanqimeng, pp. 144-153.

10
consciousness formed a civil religion – state religion even – which in turn affected
communication between different communities.34 “Political theology” in this situation
may play a significant role for directing what is good or offering incentives to stand
with the marginalized and pursue justice. This is the distinction between strong and
weak politics; and Chinese academia has become aware of this.35 There are abundant
resources from the Christian theological tradition that can be appropriated by
intellectuals for the purpose of informing a political theology in the Chinese context.
It is for this reason that we often come across discussions in Sino-Christian
theology that touch on topics like religiosity and secularity in the public realm, although
here they are more broadly conceived than counterpart debates in the West. These are
also themes that are studied across different disciplines. In fact, any topic of political or
ethical concern can be researched in many disciplines, including theology. These issues
are becoming increasingly relevant in China, where Christian theology is considered an
emerging discipline. It is a difficult project; nonetheless, observers will find that
Chinese scholars are beginning to engage and approach theological questions from their
own local context in addition to absorbing traditional western discussions.36 However,
these discussions are usually not conducted using conventional theological terminology
and approaches. As a result, some even dismiss them as a form of inter-cultural
dialogue.37 Apart from the fact that there are no theology departments in the Mainland
Chinese university system, seen from the above situation, Sino-Christian theology can
only be conducted as a kind of interdisciplinary studies in a more “public” realm rather
than committed solely to the discursive concerns of one or two subjects. Moreover, one
must also consider how “theological” discussion can contribute to other Chinese
disciplines, as well as to western traditional theories. These issues have all been taken
up by Chinese scholars from their own perspectives with regard to different subjects
and geographical locations.38

3.2 Nationalism and the Genesis of a National God

Apart from the common forfeiture of identity and core values, one difference
between the differentiation of social structure in the east and west is also reflected in

34 Cf. KUNG Lap Yan, “The Publics, Church and Hong Kong: The Narrative Nature of Public Theology”
[in Chinese], Logos & Pneuma 32 (2010), pp. 85-115 at pp. 99-100.
35 Cf. BAO Limin, “The Tracks and Types of Contemporary Public Theology” [in Chinese], Logos &
Pneuma 32 (2010), pp. 27-44.
36 Cf. the theme “Sociology of Religion”, Logos & Pneuma 26 (2007); XIE Zhibin, How Public? Why
Theological? A Review and Prospect of Sino-Christian Public Theology (HK: Centre for the Study of
Religion and Chinese Society, 2016).
37
E.g. Wolfgang Kubin, LIU Xiaofeng et al, Christianity, Confucianism and Modern Chinese
Revolution [in Chinese] (Hong Kong: Institute of Sino-Christian Studies, 1999); LI Xiangping, Xin
Yang, Ge Ming Yu Quan Li Zhi Xu [Faith, Revolution and the Order of Power] (Shanghai: Century
Innovation, 2006).
38 For a preliminary discussion in relation to Sino-Christian theology cf. the theme “Sino-Christian
Theology and Public Space”, Logos & Pneuma 32 (2010).

11
the underlying motivations and driving forces of social transformation in each setting.
As Daniel A. Bell wrote:

The ideologies of the nineteenth century [in the West] were universalistic,
humanistic, and fashioned by intellectuals. The mass ideologies of Asia and
Africa are parochial, instrumental, and created by political leaders. The driving
forces of the old ideologies were social equality and, in the largest sense,
freedom. The impulsions of the new ideologies are economic development
and national power.39

As society develops in this way, one may ask whether it is possible for people
embracing different values to live together peacefully. In the traditional western world
God is the bearer of absolute value, while today personal choices void of a common
absolute standard for judgment establish value. Thus when God withdraws from this
world, it is the people who decide rise up to fill the gap left by God or the institutional
religion; civil society then takes on a crucial function. From this perspective, one of the
greatest crises in China today is that, apart from the fact that the society lacks a value
consensus, power is not distributed justly among the people. Thus civil society has no
viable framework within which to develop healthily and serve its proper functions. In
this situation, China did not experience an economic crisis such as was witnessed in the
West in the early 21st century; instead the Chinese economy skyrocketed, transforming
China into a global superpower. The result is that people are filled with all sorts of
materialistic desires while lacking any ethical consensus. Historically, a workable order
has never been implemented by citizens without a healthy society, nor has the rule of
law ever been established within a framework of values in which principles were at
odds with each other.
Needless to say, nihilism cannot replace the position once occupied by religious
faith. At the moment the “state” rose up powerfully and the citizens found that the state
power was a convenient means to rest on. A collective subjectivity greater than the
individual began to emerge. Isaiah Berlin wrote, “Individual self-determination now
becomes collective self-realization, and the nation a community of unified wills in
pursuit of moral truth.” 40 This happens because a nation-state is established by a
national community that shares a common culture. If they can be unified with a
common will, then a unique subjectivity can be constituted greater than the whole group.
Nevertheless, this convenient unifying basis is merely a kind of authoritarianism. What
it aims at is only the legitimacy of the wealth and institution of the “state,” lacking the

39 Daniel A. Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 403.
40 Isaiah Berlin, Freedom and Its Betrayal: Six Enemies of Human Liberty (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2014), p. 74.

12
common values and ethics people require at the moment. 41 Thus, when gathering
different people together, the question “What is good?” is put aside and replaced by
“What is our position?” Consequently, the gods behind the plurality of values enter into
a state of eternal warfare. Generally, however – and this is especially true of the ruling
class – people are only interested in who has the final say, such that power instead of
justice becomes the ultimate objective.42 In this way the tension detected by Weber is
ignored. XU Jilin sharply observed that

[C]ontemporary authoritarian politics is de-political (dissolving democracy),

de-public (can only be discussed privately), and de-moralized. Behind the laws
there is no spirit of ethics; the legitimacy of the government does not rely on
universal values, but is only established on a politics which tries to fulfill the will
of the people.43

Seen from this bleak perspective, contemporary China evidently never implemented the
required transformations after religion was privatized, as has happened in the West. On
the contrary, the state seems more interested in secretly maintaining a state of
caesaropapism.44 As a matter of fact, serious studies have pointed out that communism
is a kind of quasi-religion. At this time the “state” wants to acquire the divine position
once occupied by God or institutional religion and stands above the constitution and
laws when it plays the card of patriotism. The only difference is that it wears not a
sacred robe but a secular jacket.
In light of this, it is not surprising that the theories on the state suggested by Carl
Schmitt, “crown jurist” of the Third Reich, have been heatedly discussed in Mainland
China. Once again LIU Xiaofeng was the initiator, with many scholars quickly joining
the discussion. 45 Their focus has been on Schmitt’s theories concerning the self-
identity of a political community by identifying people as either enemies or friends.
This identity is ultimately manifested as the will of the state above the constitution and
laws. In contemporary China, when the authority of the “state” is on the rise, the enemies
are the western countries that invaded China in the past, as well as these countries’ allies.
The rationale behind the mechanism of the friend-foe distinction, according to Schmitt,
has a “theological” basis. His oft-quoted but controversial view suggests that “all
significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological

41
In fact, it was precisely a set of common values and ethics that the May Fourth Movement
intellectuals longed for.
42 XU, Dangdai Zhongguode Qimeng yu Fanqimeng, pp. 202, 269.
43 Ibid., p. 147; my translation.
44 On this point cf. Kubin, LIU et al, Christianity, Confucianism and Modern Chinese Revolution.
45 Cf. the theme “Theology in the Context of the Tyranny of Value”, Logos & Pneuma 16 (2002); also
cf. Kai Marchal & Carl K. Y. Shaw eds., Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss in the Chinese-speaking World
(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2017).

13
concepts.” 46 Accordingly, Schmitt thought that the secular society did not really
exclude God but just replaced him with another god. Therefore Thomas Hobbes, who
elevated the state to the position of deus mortalis, was prominent in Schmitt’s thought
and has also been widely cited among Chinese academics.47 He pointed out that even
a people-oriented democratic theory could never fully rid itself of this kind of “political
theology”. In his Constitutional Theory Schmitt wrote:

The principle “all power derives from God” can possibly mean that a
state power is exercised even against the will of the people; in this meaning, it
contradicts democracy. It does so as well if it means that with the appeal to
the will of God, the definitiveness and validity of the people’s will is denied.
If God, in whose name one governs, is simply not this people’s god, the appeal
to God’s will can lead to the fact that the will of the people and the will of
God are different and collide with one another. Then, under democratic logic,
only the will of the people must come into consideration, because God cannot
appear in the political realm other than as the god of a particular people. That
is the meaning of the principle “the people’s voice is the voice of God”.48

From the perspective of this “political theology”, the voice of the people is the voice of
God; but it is equal to creating a national god for a secularized nation-state. Thus the
differentiation among people is a key question for this political theology, and
distinguishing between friend and enemy is foundational for Schmitt’s thought, as
reflected in his famous quote: “Name your enemy and I will tell you who you are.”49
This quotation and the related discussions outlined above have circulated widely in
Chinese academia and have even been linked to debates on the legitimacy of one-party
rule.50
From the above overview, it is not difficult for Chinese intellectuals to see that
Schmitt’s “political theology” is not a kind of traditional theological discourse but aims
at showing the close relationship between theology and jurisprudence and their
similarity in structure and intellectual resources. It is also a reflection of modern
differentiation of social structure. As we know, there were outspoken reverberations

46 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George
Schwab (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 36.
47 Cf. Carl Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a
Political Symbol, trans. George Schwab & Erna Hilfstein (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1996).
48 Carl Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, trans. Jeffrey Seitzer (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008),
pp. 254-255.
49 Carl Schmitt, Glossarium: Aufzeichnungen der Jahre 1947-51, ed. Eberhard Freiherrr von Medern
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1991), p. 243; my translation.
50 For an overview of this “theological” phenomenon cf. ZHANG Shuangli, “Why should one be
interested in the theological dimension within the project of modern politics? On the Chinese
acceptance of Carl Schmitt’s political theology”, Critical Research on Religion 2 (2014), pp. 9-22; also
Flora Sapio, “Carl Schmitt in China”, The China Story, 7 Oct 2015,
<https://www.thechinastory.org/2015/10/carl-schmitt-in-china/> (accessed 31 October 2019).

14
after the publication of Schmitt’s Political Theology in 1922 when the young Walter
Benjamin and Paul Tillich formulated their responses. 51 More recently, Mathias
Eichhorn even compared him with Karl Barth.52 But if a comparison with Barth is
noteworthy, then I suggest that more attention should be given to Friedrich Gogarten, a
contemporary and follower of Barth. He thought that one had to decide in favour of
God as “wholly other” rather than the world with its religion, culture and nation. Christ
as mediator forbids other mediations between God and human beings, including
religious inspirations and practices, experiences, virtues, requirements, and so on. Faith
thus became a deliberate decision similar to that formulated by Schmitt. Karl Löwith
pointed out that this decision of faith was structurally similar to the political decisionism
of Schmitt (and his mentor Martin Heidegger) and shared the same spiritual prototype
in Søren A. Kierkegaard.53 As a Jew, Löwith was obviously concerned about Gogarten,
Schmitt and Heidegger joining or supporting the Nazi regime. Thus their decisionism
must be queried. Nevertheless, Barth was also a spiritual descendant of Kierkegaard
and suggested a similar decisionism of faith while at the same time being a
representative of resistance to National Socialism. Seen in this way, one cannot say that
decisionism must necessarily bring about the demonic; at least more in-depth
examination is needed before drawing a conclusion.
In probing further we see that Gogarten advocated for the church at that time to
make a decision of faith and urged believers to become “German Christians”. By
pledging loyalty to the National Socialist movement people might experience the
calling of sola fide to realize their faith. Therefore German people should encounter
God who was present in history through the new law of the state; the church would
become its historical witness.54 Interestingly, LIU Xiaofeng, who introduced Schmitt
into Chinese thought, acutely remarked:

It is exactly because they took the only mediator Jesus Christ too lightly
that the decision of faith, which is the heritage of the Reformation, was
transformed into Heidegger’s decision of national Dasein and Schmitt’s
decision of national sovereignty. In this way, Gogarten relied on the “German
God” indeed. But the “German God” is not Jesus Christ of personal
confession but the god of a [political] community.55

51 Carl Schmitt, Politische Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität (Munich: Duncker
& Humboldt, 1934; 1st ed. 1922).
52 Mathias Eichhorn, Es wird regiert! Der Staat im Denken von Karl Barth und Carl Schmitt in den
Jahren 1919 bis 1938 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1994).
53 Cf. Karl Löwith, Martin Heidegger & European Nihilism; trans. Gary Steiner; ed. Richard Wolin
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 166-169; Friedrich Gogarten, Die religiöse
Entscheidung (Jena: Eugen Diedrichs, 1921).
54 Friedrich Gogarten, Einheit von Evangelium und Volkstum? (Hamburg: Hanseat, 1933).
55 LIU Xiaofeng, Hanyu Shenxue yu Lishi Zhexue, p. 213.

15
Seen in this way, decisionism may really be deliberate and dangerous. But the
difference between Gogarten and Schmitt on the one side and Barth on the other not
only depends on the direction of one’s leap of faith. The more crucial issue is that the
subjectivity of the political community secretly replaced the person of Jesus Christ in a
similar “theological” structure. From this perspective, we may understand the puzzle
raised by ZHANG Xu, “The historical lesson of the 20th century shows that
emphasizing individual faith is not capable of overcoming the national ideology
growing with the modern Protestant background. There is a weak point if one
tries to confront national ideology with an existential position.”56 It is because,
as the above analysis of Schmitt highlights, it was a “theological” problem and was
related to the inflation of nationalism.
History lets us see that even in countries with a Christian background “theology”
can be twisted into a demonic instrument. Now as it is applied in China when there is
no consensus and even a collapse of values, the situation is more dangerous. Thus XU
Jilin raised the following warning:

Regardless of Schmitt’s idea, national quintessence, or responsive authority,

their common point is making use of the name of the people, through a kind of
pseudo-democracy, to transfer the ultimate power of decision for the state to a
certain sovereign person. This is a position like the Pope, an embodiment of
God’s will above constitution and laws. It has unlimited constitutional power
and a power of decision at the state of exception.57

The participants of Sino-Christian theology should unearth the related elements so as

to resist the dispersion of the demonic, as Schmitt had already shown us the importance
of “theology” in this situation. When XU Jilin reviewed the development of modernity,
he pointed out that although the Enlightenment thinkers emphasized that human beings
can be “perfected”, they never neglected the “fallen” nature of humankind. But as the
wheel of history continued to roll, the problems of modernity accumulated. 58 Can
Chinese scholars learn from German theologians to resist the emergence of the demonic
today? That is another reason driving Chinese scholars to appropriate theological
resources in the past to encounter the fast-changing situation of their own context.59

3.3 Constructing Self-identity in Cultural Conflict

We have spent much space on discussing issues concerning theology in relation to
Mainland China’s socio-political situation in the above two sections. But another

56 ZHANG, “The Chinese Way of Christian Theology”, p. 53.

57 XU, Dangdai Zhongguode Qimeng yu Fanqimeng, p. 268.
58 Ibid., pp. 138-140.
59 An example can be found from the theme introduction of “Critical Theory and Theology”, Journal
for the Study of Christian Culture 22 (2009), pp. 9-18.

16
problem will arise if one thinks that Sino-Christian theology has only to deal with
modernization from this aspect. As CHIN Ken-Pa wrote:

The modernization problem of Chinese thought is presented through

nationalism of culture (emphasizing national quintessence and taking Confucianism
as religion) and state (Nationalist and Communist Party). Through the dichotomy of
Chinese/western or modern/traditional they strengthen the national symbol. The
genuine problem of Christian faith encountering Chinese thought is this kind of
“nationalism”.60

This seems justified if read against the above analysis, since constructing a modern
nation-state is the ultimate aim for the modernization of China. In fact, all developed
countries have undergone a similar, painful experience in their respective
modernization processes. Therefore China must struggle with her own cultural tradition
but not only by adopting a kind of western social theory per se. Thirty years ago NG
Lee-Ming in his renowned work Christianity and Social Change in China already
pointed out that Chinese Christian leaders like WU Yaozong, XU Baoqian, WU
Leichuan, etc. in the Republican period often conducted their practices on a social
theory in the name of Christianity, struggling to “indigenize” Christian faith for the sake
of nation-building.61 Thus both LIU Xiaofeng and CHIN Ken-Pa thought that Sino-
Christian theology today should not follow the old way and rely on “indigenization” or
“accommodation” theories, which have brought about persisting discussion since the
1920s. They thought that Chinese society not only needs to transform its external shape
but also connect its cultural tradition to modernity. This is the reason they believe that
nationalism embracing a static tradition is the true obstacle to Christianity taking root
in Chinese soil.62
Some scholars hold similar views but without sympathy for Christianity. As
mentioned above, some Chinese intellectuals have developed a new strand of anti-
westernism since the 1990s. They thought that if their opponents were defeated, then a
self-identity could automatically be established. XU Jilin pointed out that the more
intense this kind of patriotic fervour was, the more difficult it was for genuine modern
cultural contents to develop.63 On the one hand, the promise of such an identity was
just based on a shallow, exclusivist national spirit without solid contents, which can
only be constructed through long-term effort. On the other hand, not only does the New
Enlightenment spirit reject this shallow concept: since the May Fourth Movement

60 CHIN Ken-Pa, “What is Sino-Christain Theology?” [in Chinese], Sino-Christian Studies 1 (2006),
pp. 125-157 at p. 132, my translation.
61 NG Lee-Ming, Christianity and Social Change in China (HK: Chinese Christian Literature
Council, 1981), pp. 277-278.
62 CHIN Ken-Pa, “From Chinese Theology to Sino-Theology: The Paradigm Shift”, Sino-Christian
Studies 8 (2009), pp. 81-112.
63 XU, Dangdai Zhongguode Qimeng yu Fanqimeng, p. 173.

17
Chinese intellectuals have tried hard to absorb modern ideas, for they understood that
Chinese traditional culture required a modern transformation. Therefore holding the
flag of traditional culture merely as an external form may meet with momentary
approval, but in the long run it cannot resolve the cultural issues China has faced for
more than a century. XU Jilin, having analyzed the difference between the national and
political community, thus acutely observes:

In the modern era, China has never wanted for national symbols of value
or cultural symbols. What is needed is concrete political content, especially of the
kind that is produced by modern times and beneficial to the public. Modern
national identity is not merely an ethnic and cultural identity; it is more important
to identify with the nation-state, which is not merely an abstract form of authority
and law, but is related to the contents of ways of life, social institutions and the
value system of a community.64

This does not mean that Chinese culture has only to deal with politics and a constitution
at the moment, or that there is no need to make any changes to its values and tradition.
But XU Jilin also considers how these different concerns can be integrated into an
organic whole relevant to the constitutional requirement of the state (political
community) and filter out a consensus of social (national community) values. XU Jilin
consequently suggests that what China presently needs can be summed up under three
headings: a theory of state, ethics, and a philosophy of culture.65
In the preceding sections, we briefly discussed the former two elements in relation
to “theology”. However, XU Jilin did not specify what he meant by “philosophy of
culture.” It seems that what he is suggesting here is a sort of cultural strategy for
encountering the challenges on the other two fronts. If self-identity is not rewarded
automatically by knocking down one’s opponents, then the problem becomes urgent
and complicated, especially when China is now facing the issues of modern
transformation and the rise of national power. Needless to say, this accumulation of
major challenges is not to be solved by theologians alone; it is a problem faced by all
citizens of the country. Nevertheless, the efforts put forth by Christian intellectuals
since the 1920s to date may serve as a resource when addressing this public issue. They
worked hard to “indigenize”, “accommodate”, or “contextualize” Christianity. This
discussion has once again brought together scholars from both inside and outside the
church for serious engagement, which is often categorized as inter-religious or cross-
cultural dialogue in Mainland China today.66

64 Ibid., p. 178.
65 Ibid., p. 134.
66 Sources on this topic are too abundant to be listed. One may note that many research institutes
involved in “theological studies” in China choose names related to “inter-religious” and “cross-
cultural” studies.

18
 In this light, the development of the Sino-Christian theology movement has rightly
been understood as a product of the New Enlightenment in China, taking theology as
an element of the western cultural tradition. But if one can view Christian thought in
this way, then the Chinese cultural tradition can also be treated in a similar fashion.67
Nowadays intellectuals face the encounter of different religio-cultural traditions, giving
rise to conflicts between ancient and modern, east and west. In the midst of such
conflicts, scholars struggle to reach a consensus. In light of this, we can better
understand those participants of Sino-Christian theology who oppose theories of
accommodation, as do LIU Xiaofeng and CHIN Ken-Pa; they are not really against
their own cultural tradition or the western one. They are simply concerned that
emphasizing accommodation as the Jesuits did during the Ming and Qing dynasties
would discourage both Christianity and Chinese culture from engaging in self-
reflection and self-renewal. According to LIU and CHIN, Christian theologians should
therefore not accommodate too much to Chinese culture. On the contrary, the inherent
contradictions between the two should be adequately addressed. Otherwise, it would
add the burden of helping the construction of a modern nation-state to Sino-Christian
theology, even to the point of making it a political instrument.68 Therefore ZHANG
Xu wrote, “The conflict between Christianity and Confucianism does not lie in
some minor details; there may not be any conflicts on those levels. The conflict
occurs in the unique way of ethical existence and the search for meaning within a
community’s cultural tradition.” 69 Regardless of whether we agree with this
assessment, cultural negotiation is always an issue a (theology) scholar faces when
choosing a way of life and ethical system that suits a given community – in any cultural
context. 70 Therefore Chinese academics are sensitive to the differences between
cultural traditions; CHIN Ken-Pa also emphasized that Christianity should retain its
character as a foreign religion even to the point of becoming an enemy of the Tao.71
Seen in light of the “Sinicization-of-Christianity” agenda promoted by the Chinese
official church in recent years, the above suggestion of recognizing the distance
between Sino-Christian theology and Chinese culture bears an insight. Intellectuals who
are interested in studying Christianity have been alarmed by the “Sinicization”
propaganda as it is driven by the Communist Party and guided by socialism, both of
which leads scholars to question its true meaning and objective.72
Consequently, in an already divided Chinese academia, Sino-Christian theology
on the one hand should be sensitive towards the public and not separate itself from its

67 ZHANG, “The Chinese Way of Christian Theology”, p. 54.

68 CHIN, “What is Sino-Christain Theology?”, pp.137-141.
69 ZHANG, “The Chinese Way of Christian Theology”, p. 49.
70 Ibid., pp. 46-50.
71 CHIN, “What is Sino-Christain Theology?”, pp. 133-137; “From Chinese Theology to Sino-
Theology”, pp. 88-94.
72 E.g. Tobias Brander, “A Besieged Boom: Christianity in China”, Theology Today 76 (2019), pp.
194-199.

19
own historical, political, and social situation. On the other hand, however, Sino-
Christian theology should also emphasize its connectedness to the Christian tradition in
its own “subjectivity”. I am cautious of using “subjectivity” instead of “individuality”
here. With regard to the published literature, some important figures of the Sino-
Christian theology movement like LIU Xiaofeng often emphasized that this kind of
discourse was produced by the “faith of an individual” for the sake of distancing him-
or herself from the institutional church. 73 But from our review of the (mis-)use of
Schmitt’s thought in the Chinese context, it is not difficult to find the crucial point at
misplacing the confessing subjectivity with the collective and national sense. On top of
that, the person of Jesus Christ, the object of confession, was also replaced. From a
dogmatic point of view, the object of confession requires us to have a personal
encounter with him in our subjective self. At the same time, he does not deny the need
for believers to connect with one another and form a kind of subjectivity greater than
any one believer. In addition, the person and “subjectivity” of Jesus Christ originates in
the Triune communion. Thus the human fellowship initiated by him should reject any
exclusivist spirit of homogeneity and instead form an open community – the church.
This is the theological basis of sanctorum communio and should also be considered by
the participants of the Sino-Christian theology movement.74 This is no small challenge,
but may be a necessary agenda for connecting the political issues emerging in the public
realm to the more traditional inter-religious or cross-cultural dialogue advocated by
both Christian and Confucian scholars.
As a matter of fact, many participants of the Sino-Christian theology movement
identify with both Christianity and Confucianism or other Asian religious traditions.
This is an interesting academic trend that has lasted for a long time, but it also represents
an identity crisis for modern Chinese intellectuals, especially those with Christian
commitment. In such circumstances, the participants of this movement, especially those
who are sympathetic to and even confess the Christian faith, may ask: being a member
of Chinese academia at the same time what role should Sino-Christian theology play on
this platform? Further, how should Christianity transform itself to adapt to this process?
If then the movement is sensitive to public issues and commits to its original religious
origin, then its “theologicity” can still be reflected in the context. In line with this, the
social and political phenomena are important elements triggering theological reflection.
But one must integrate these with Christian categories. Speaking in theological terms,
it is an opportunity for the divine Word to manifest its significance anew in the Chinese
context. This is particularly true for the confessing scholars in Chinese academia.75

73 LIU Xiaofeng, Geti Xinyang yu Wenhua Lilun [Individual Belief and Cultural Theory] (Sichuan:
Renmin, 1997).
74 Cf. Lam, Narrative, Tradition, Faith, ch. 4.
75 Yaqing Chen, “Xueyuen yu Jiaohui” [Academy and the Church: Christian Scholars and their
Bewilderment], Regent Review of Christian Thoughts 5 (2007), pp. 215-226 at p. 220; in footnote 6 the
author writes that Christian scholars in Mainland China belong to the Chinese cultural community. For
them, Christian identity is therefore a crisis as well as an opportunity.

20
Therefore CHEN Yaqian wrote:

Although Christian scholars believe that the answer from the revelation of
God is always correct, one must appropriate the infinitely rich significance of this
answer (incarnation) from different areas and levels of life. Only if one can
appreciate the depth and width of this question, can one understand the depth
and width of incarnation. Every question to Christianity in academia gives
Christian scholars a chance to think about our faith from an angle or in a way
never thought of before. Apart from these kinds of questions posed by others,
no genuine Sino-Christian theology can be produced.76

This juxtaposition may be where the attraction of this “public theology” locates and
thus has gathered so many participants.

IV. Concluding Remarks

After revisiting several issues related to “theology” in Chinese academia in recent

years, we arrive at the issue of identity in Sino-Christian theology, which emerges from
the subjectivity of the participating scholars. At this point, however, we encounter a
dilemma: on one hand Sino-Christian theology is first of all a kind of theology and
should thus have its own position and agenda instead of being just an instrument of
lofty goals (like the revival of national culture in modern times). On the other hand, it
has attracted the attention and participation of scholars precisely because they found it
capable of contributing to these goals. Seen positively, Sino-Christian theology has
been developing with recent academic trends, such that it can enter different disciplines
of the Chinese-speaking world and contribute its standpoints on public issues. From
another perspective, “theology” is caught up with changing academic tides and may
easily lose sight of its distinct position and agenda. In fact, there is no definite answer
to the question how the relationship between theology and public issues should be
developed. Moreover, those involved in Sino-Christian theology come from different
disciplines, which means that this movement can naturally engage in the public realm.
A kind of “inter-disciplinary” approach when discussing heated agendas is well suited.
In this situation, the question becomes how Sino-Christian theology can find its own
identity without losing itself in current public issues and academic trends. This is in fact
not a special question for Christianity in China, but a modern issue many disciplines
(including theology) of the human and social sciences have been facing since the
Enlightenment.77 The tension is so strong that it threatens to tear people apart at times

76 Ibid., p. 226.
77 This is also noticed by Naomi Thurston in her Studying Christianity in China: Constructions of an
Emerging Discourse (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2018), pp. 148f.

21
in thinking and writing. Nonetheless, it can also be transformed into a creative drive for
constructing a new kind of theology as a constituent of modern Chinese culture.

(This is the pre-typeset version published in International Journal of Public Theology

14 (2020): 97-119)

22