Article cs ‘Current Sociology Mining disaster in the Doce ©The Autor() 2021 7 hee River: Dilemma between sagepb comfourals permission Ot Tot 7700139212 T0S9224 governance and participation Jouralsgepu.con/homele @SAGE Cristiana Losekann® Espirito Santo Federal University, Brazil Bruno Milanez Juiz de Fora Federal University, Brazil Abstract In this article, we assess how the demand for participation modified the governance structure initially proposed to deal with the reparation of impacts caused by the failure of the Fundao dam in Mariana (Minas Gerais, Brazil). Throughout the text, we identify how mining companies sought to build a solution based on a complex structure of governance with the consent of government agencies. We also verify that, in contrast, social movements pressured justice institutions for alternatives that guarantee some level of participation of the affected communities. As a result of this interaction, we argue that a hybrid system was created, which proved excessively slow, highly inefficient and unable to meet the main demands of the affected people. Keywords Disaster reparation, governance, mining, participation Introduction This article assesses how the demand for participation affected the governance structure originally proposed to address the impacts of the Fundio Dam disaster in Mariana (Minas Gerais, Brazil). Throughout the text, we identify how mining companies, with the con- sent of government agencies and following the recent tradition of the extractive sector for managing conflicts, sought to propose a solution to a problematic governance Corresponding author: Cristiana Losekann, Department of Social Sciences, Espirito Santo Federal University, Av.Fernando Ferrari, Goiabeiras, Vitoria 29075-910, ES, Brazil. Email: cristiana losekann@utes.br2 Current Sociology 00(0) structure. We also verify that social movements relied on justice institutions to pressure for alternatives that guaranteed some level of participation to the communities living in the areas affected by the disaster. As a result, we argue that the hybrid system created was not only excessively slow and extremely inefficient but also unable to meet the main demands of the people affected. This political process generated an institutionalize relief that confused the concepts of governance and participation and failed to meet the demands of communities and social movements. In this sense, this article discusses how the state, justice institutions, tension between companies, and movements of affected people led to an institutional arrangement differed from the one initially desired by the movements of affected people, had harmful effects on the mobilization process itself, and caused frustration and demobilization. This article reports on a 6-year trajectory of social movements and community organi- zations created by the people affected by the disaster that contaminated the Doce River basin in the states of Minas Gerais and Espirito Santo. The study was conducted with data collected by primary (interviews, focus groups, seminars, debates) and secondary methods (documentary analysis, media monitoring, bibliographic review). Between March and September 2017, the authors joined the Working Group that advised the Doce River Task Force, which was created by the Federal Prosecution Service (MPF) and the Prosecution Service of Minas Gerais, for discussions that would spawn the creation of the Term of Adjustment of Governance Conduct (TAC-Gov). Governance and its use in mining conflicts Definitions and main limitations One of the few consensuses about governance is that it has multiple interpretations and uses (Katsamunska, 2016; Takahashi, 2019). For example, Rhodes (1996) traced its ori- gins to the emergence of neoliberal practices and policies aimed at public sector reform and the privatization of state-owned companies. At the same time, Rosenau and Czempiel (1992) connected the term to the deepening of globalization, associating it with a dis- course of nation-state weakening and the rise of multilateral organizations and transna- tional corporations. Although debating the origin of each of these perspectives is beyond the scope of this text, a brief analysis of their initial proposals might be necessary. The emergence of this term is related to World Bank reports. When studying the causes of Africa’s poor eco- nomic performance in the late 1980s, the Bank proposed the construction of ‘good gov- ernance’, which vaguely included efficient public services, a reliable judiciary, a public administration subject to social control, anti-corruption measures and freedom of the press (The World Bank, 1989). The concept of governance was, then, defined as ‘the manner in which power is exercised in managing a country’s economic and social resources for development’ (The World Bank, 1992: 1). Discussion about the sociology of governance is broad and emphasizes domination and the exercise of power. It also deals with the very existence of what we call society; the existence of solidarity, cohesion, or coordination between people to form whatLosekann and Milanez 3 constitutes the social (Ansell, 2007). Bevir (2007) argues that the concept of governance has been used to describe changes in the role of the state after 1980s public sector reforms. By studying the weakening of the bureaucratic-hierarchical model and its replacement by market systems or networks, the sociology of governance is associated with the study of how diffuse forms of power and authority can guarantee some degree of order in the absence of state. Torres (2016) relates this research field to multiple state crises, including fiscal and administrative aspects but primarily legitimacy. In this con- text, the state would seem less capable of solving social problems or meeting community needs, fostering thereby the emergence of other organizational solutions. Part of the literature on governance presents a normative, often positive, perspective. For example, Torfing et al. (2012) argue that interactive forms of governance are ‘com- plex processes through which a plurality of social and political actors with diverging interests interact in order to formulate, promote, and achieve common objectives by means of mobilizing, exchanging, and deploying a range of ideas, rules, and resources? (p. 14). The advantage of the sociological perspective is the development of a less nor- mative view of governance, seeking to examine and understand the empirical forms of its application (Naqvi, 2017). According to Carrigan and Coglianese (2011), the concept of defense owes partly to scholars on the subject who restrict their studies to situations where actors have a com- mon goal. It is not by chance that Kooiman (1993) provides examples that highlight co- regulation, co-orientation, coproduction, and cooperative management. When evaluating academic publications on governance in India, Jayal (2007) mentions that this normative perspective presents the concept as a broad list of components that include ‘almost every conceivable public good’ (p. 129). The author questions a prescriptive view of govern- ance that seems to adopt a ‘one-size-fits-all’ perspective, while ignoring the fact that institutions are embedded in society and, therefore, involve a series of distributive con- flicts that entail resources and power. Torfing et al. (2012) highlight how a significant part of the governance literature neglects power and politics, often being described as a merely pragmatic question of ‘problem-solving’, with the pursuit of common goals occurring through a depoliticized process. In his critique, Thérn (2010) argues that it perhaps makes more sense to treat governance specifically as a discourse, mobilizing the arguments presented by Mouffe (2005) against the post-political vision, which aims to suppress the existing conflict in political processes and build an apparent culture of consensus. From perspective of the theory of organizational fields, Fligstein and McAdam (2012) suggest possible variations in governance patterns based on the dynamics occurring within and between these fields (revisiting Bourdieu). The authors approached multiple actors in an effort to understand, for example, the relationships between and within com- panies as well as those between companies and state actors. They also add the perspec- tive of strategic collective action, which analyzes the structural aspects of the fields and their intersections and influences, assuming that governance can be empirically defined in these spaces. From this analysis, the authors conclude that an actor’s position of power determines what emerges from these intersections. Thus, the sociological approach facilitates understanding governance through empiri- cally observed practices, even though such practices might be guided by a normative4 Current Sociology 00(0) perspective. This approach also facilitates the assessment of how the values, identity, and perceptions of actors define the paradigms adopted in the creation of governance systems (Bevir, 2007), besides explaining their exercise of power and their attempts to exert domination (Ansell, 2007). In this context, our study attempts to contribute to both politi- cal sociology and organizational theory by describing how the governance models pro- posed to address the Doce River mining disaster reflect the understanding of participation according to members of justice institutions (e.g. the Public Prosecutor's Office or the Public Defender’s Office), based on their past experiences in public hearings. ‘At the same time, highlighting the tension between governance and participation, we demonstrate the power imbalance between actors, given that mining companies have a con- siderable capacity to influence state and governmental actors and that they rely on large law firms. Thus, not only did these actors obtain a favorable position when dealing with courts and justice institutions, but business concepts such as compliance and the very notion of governance also guided all agreements. Business arguments proved compatible with the emerging values of the members of justice institutions, especially regarding resolvability. Besides evaluating domination, the sociology of governance also stimulates debate on forms of resistance, for, as Ansell (2007) stated, ‘governance may be a benign expression for domination or social control’ (p. 902). By opposing governance and participation, our study discusses domination and counter-domination, describing a process in which com- panies, through governance arrangements and with the assent of justice institutions, claim authority and legitimacy through repairing the damage caused by the disaster, while demands for participation by affected people emerge as resistance strategies against this domination. Experiences in the mining sector The mining sector is essentially resource-intensive; hence, it causes environmental dam- age and conflict (Benson and Kirsch, 2010). As the notion of governance has been elabo- rated over the past decades, the sector has sought to appropriate and instrumentalize this concept to reduce potential losses resulting from the disputes of affected communities. St-Laurent and Le Billon (2015) identified a vast body of literature that discusses the replacement of ‘government’ by ‘governance’ and assess how neoliberal trends reset the state and its responsibilities toward mining companies. In the Latin American context, Peru is an exemplary case of such a movement. Due to the country’s long mining history and its remarkable growth during the commodities boom, Bebbington (2010) studied its extractive sector governance. According to the author, mining industries tend to assume the role normally assigned to the state when they commence their activities in remote Peruvian areas; these roles include territorial planning, conflict management, and public service provision. However, the adoption of governance systems based on substitution for the state is not limited to countries on the periphery of extractive networks. Marques (2016) points out that in Canada, the state is more likely to encourage fragmented community relations initiatives implemented at the individual firm level than to consolidate regulatory prac- tices at the sector level. In the same context, St-Laurent and Le Billon (2015) studied the relationship between mining companies and Indigenous Nations, verifying a ‘selectiveLosekann and Milanez 5 absence’ on the part of government agencies in such negotiations. Cheshire (2010) ana- lyzed the governance systems implemented by mining companies in two remote loca- tions in Australia and evaluated how the power transferred to these companies allowed them to replace the state’s performance in the provision of public services and in deter- mining the future of the affected communities. This analysis indicates a certain tradition of the extractive sector of appropriating governance discourse, especially from the minimum state perspective, and ignoring the participation of affected people. In certain aspects, this same strategy marked their initial proposal to repair the damage caused by the Fundao Dam disaster. Debate over participation in disaster relief For the purpose of this study, disaster is understood in the light of political ecology, which is counter to the dominant view that understands disaster as {an] event concentrated in time and space, in which a society, or a relatively self-sufficient subdivision of a society, undergoes severe danger and incurs such losses to its members and physical appurtenances that the social structure is disrupted and the fulfillment of all or some of the essential functions of the society is prevented. (Fritz, 1961: 655) Like Tierney (2007), we question the attributions proposed by this definition, which portrays disasters as discrete, concentrated events that exclusively cause physical losses. In contrast, we assume that historical processes contribute to disasters and that condi- tions of structural inequality, although naturalized, contribute to the creation of situations of vulnerability. From this perspective, disasters are understood as part of broader social patterns and practices, evincing and widening existing social inequalities; they are better described as extreme manifestations of a dynamic, dialectical, and continuous process of the ‘ongoing shaping and reshaping of societies and the spaces they occupy’ (Bolin and Stanford, 1998: 8). Although valuing community participation is a key aspect of disaster relief, the litera- ture agrees that this process entails many difficulties (Bustillos Ardaya et al., 2019; Chandrasekhar et al., 2014; Curato, 2018; De Oliveira and Paleo, 2016). Chandrasekhar et al. (2014) problematize the difficulties in participating in relief processes after disas- ters, especially considering that deliberations are completed under short-term pressure, that is, under a ‘time compression’. Moreover, they also state that factors affecting local mobilization dynamics, such as the entry of new actors (companies, political actors, bureaucrats, and associations) and loss of trust in traditional participation channels, are elements that complicate this process even further. Regarding the nuclear disaster in Tohoku, Japan, De Oliveira and Paleo (2016) stated that participation is a central element in the production of qualified information within a population. Bustillos Ardaya et al. (2019) analyzed the model for participation in flood- related disasters in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), verifying the considerable potential for avoid- ing major disasters in regions of risk. The specificities of each disaster also impose their own difficulties. In general, the difficulty in building participation mechanisms is proportional to the diversity of impacts,6 Current Sociology 00(0) as the public becomes more heterogeneous and interests more diffuse. Situations where many elements depend on expertise and technical aspects pose additional obstacles to stakeholder communication and the sharing of important information for the relief deci- sion-making process. Disaster reparation depends profoundly on the ability of the state to coordinate the multiple actors and interests at stake; when the state lacks this ability, the reparation process tends to be more conflictive, costly, long-lasting, and painful. Process visibility is another important element of participation. In a study conducted by Chandrasekhar et al. (2014), the authors identified that stakeholder visibility and impact are related to transformative participation; however, some actors, even those with low visibility, have a significant impact on the process through opposition mechanisms, which they call ‘non-traditional’ (p. 375) participation. The authors analyzed the follow- ing three cases: the 2018 earthquake in Dujiangyan (China); the 2004 tsunami in Nagapattinam, Tamil Nadu (India); and the 2005 Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans (the United States), none of which involved a causation/culpability relationship similar to that analyzed in our study, in which the disaster was caused by a company and unrelated to natural events. Corroborating the studies of Lyra (2019) and Pastran and Mallett (2020), we verified a lack of government coordination in disaster repair, as well as the delegation of its responsibilities to the companies that caused it. This means that affected people were excluded from the process, even through traditional channels, leading them to oppose and confront it by means of justice institutions, which we may characterize as non-tradi- tional participation. Although this challenge may be included within a scheme that classifies it as participa- tion, such a claim for access to the reparation decision-making process does not end there. By excluding affected people from the formulation of reparatory strategies, reparation far from contemplates these people’s needs and demands. Thus, the criticism may address the observation that a given decision-making process was not participatory and inclusive, in addition to referring to the way in which participation is conceived and executed. According to Curato (2018), participation is a central element for achieving success in disaster relief, a fact already stated by the United Nations Disaster Relief Organization in 1982. The author analyzed the participation models implemented in three communi- ties affected by the Haiyan Typhoon disaster in the Philippines, adopting the concepts of participation and governance as synonyms for investigating the following three distinct logics: authoritarian, community, and deliberative. Bearing these three logics in mind, Curato analyzed aspects of the local design of participation as well as the broader social context involved, based on different understandings of who should participate, how to express dissatisfaction, how to receive feedback, and how to act democratically. The types of participation generated by the author’s analysis of these three cases are sum- marized below. As stated by the author, the authoritarian models analyzed result from the combina- tion of the following three factors: fragmented and conflictive community, state as deci- sion maker, and weak community control with a little information because of external surveillance and scant process adherence. Curato (2018) observed that not all types of participation are desirable and none all of the time. In this regard, Warren (1996) high- lighted that people may not want to engage in a participatory decision-making process,Losekann and Milanez 7 but they may wish to have instruments of control over decision makers. Although not a classically deliberative form of collective decision-making, it comprises a democratic form of participation that is often more feasible or desirable, especially in the context of great internal community competition. Although the analysis performed by Curato (2018) provides elements relevant to reflection on participation, the studies reveal an important difference; in our case, the companies responsible for the disaster were a fundamental player, constituting a distinet reparation problem and introducing an actor that represented a polar opposite to the com- munities seeking reparation. The disaster and the construction of agreements Impacts, institutional response, and demands for participation The Fundao tailings dam, in the municipality of Mariana, in the state of Minas Gerais, Brazil, breached on 5 November 2015, killing 19 people and hundreds of farm animals, burying small villages near the dam, and contaminating the Doce River, the fifth largest river in Brazil. The mud crossed the state of Espirito Santo reaching the sea; on the coast, the tailings developed new dynamics south and north of the shoreline. Six years after the collapse, fishing was still prohibited on most of the state’s shoreline, and the fish were still contaminated with heavy metals (Duarte et al., 2021). The Fundao Dam disaster was considered one of the worst environmental disasters in Brazil and the worst mining dis- aster in terms of the volume of tailings that escaped from the dam (Bowker, 2018). There were two distinct institutional reactions to the disaster. On one hand, federal and subnational governments, after facing a legal threat, sought an immediate and expe- ditious extrajudicial agreement with the companies, based on governance precepts, transfer of responsibility to the companies, and absence of the state (Santos and Milanez, 2017). On the other hand, affected communities, social movements, and justice institu- tions like the Prosecution Service and the Public Defender’s Office focused on judicial means to press for corporate accountability. The reparation process was marked by a debate over the need to incorporate the par- ticipation of those affected by the disaster and how such participation should be por- trayed in the legal agreements produced. Most of our observations stem from the internal monitoring process, whether through participation in the Working Group created by the MPF or through daily conversation with individuals from the social movements and local communities involved. The Doce River Caravan Charter, composed on 26 April 2016, established participa- tion as a demand. The charter claimed that ‘the population of the Doce River basin has been denied, by Samarco/Vale/BHP and the government, from access to information, par- ticipation, and decision-making in agreements; compensatory, preventive, and emergency measures; and in the destinations of the affected communities’. Besides the Caravan, sev- eral acts, notes, and public manifestations declared that the issue of participation was central. This was the case, for example, with the 2019 hearing organized by the Senate Environment Committee, which demanded the participation of affected people in mining companies’ contingency plans, highlighting the disaster in the Doce River basin.8 Current Sociology 00(0) ‘The Movement of People Affected by Dams (MAB) published several official notes demanding participation; the note written for the 2-year anniversary of the dam collapse is rather emblematic. In it, MAB defends that every agreement must necessarily include the ‘qualified, informed, and deliberative participation of the central part of the process, that is, the people affected by the damage caused by the disruption. The principle of Victim Centrality in the reparation, mitigation, and indemnity processes must be observed’ (Movimento dos Atingidos por Barragens, 2019). Transaction for conduct adjustment term On 30 November 2015, the Attorney General’s Office, along with the governments of Minas Gerais and Espirito Santo, filed a public civil action against Samarco. However, this lawsuit was soon replaced by the Transaction for Conduct Adjustment Term (TTAC) between Samarco Mineragao, its shareholders (Vale and BHP Billiton), and the federal government, state governments, and other government agencies. The TTAC also created the Renova Foundation, a private foundation responsible for coor- dinating recovery activities for environmental health, as well as for establishing the criteria for identifying who was entitled to receive compensation (Unido et al., 2016) Regarding state control, the TTAC established the Interfederative Committee (CIF), whose objectives were to set priorities in project execution and to follow up and monitor programs (Figure 1) In response to the TTAC, the affected people built movements for object to govern- ance design. Of the main criticisms, we may highlight the lack of participation by those affected; the transfer to companies of the power to establish criteria for recognizing those affected and to determine the method of compensation; the lack of recognition of imma- terial and moral damages; and the separation between ‘socioeconomic’ and ‘socio-envi- ronmental’ damages (Articulagdo Nacional de Agroecologia, 2016). As a result, the MPF judicially questioned the approval of the TAC in March 2016 pointing out the lack of participation of affected people and the identification of flaws in the agreement (Ministério Pablico Federal et al., 2018). One month later, the MPF proposed a Public Civil Action (No. 0023863-07.2016.4.01.3800), determining a more thorough diagnosis to serve as a basis for the damage repair and broader participation of those affected. Preliminary adjustment term Thereafter, the MPF sought to address mobilization demands while conducting negotia- tions through agreements, which resulted in the signing of the Preliminary Adjustment Agreement (TAP) in January 2017. This agreement did not cover the major demand provided for in the MPF’s Public Civil Action — the participation of those affected which lead affected people, social movements, and researchers to oppose the TAP. Of the various criticisms they addressed, we may stress the separation between socio-environ- mental and socioeconomic dimensions, an aspect already criticized in the first agree- ment. Such a division limited the whole discussion of the participation and inclusion of civil society in decision-making processes to socioeconomic issues, precluding the socio-environmental axis from social movement criticisms and excluding debate overLosekann and Milanez (9102) 1839 BUN XB107 “AL102 "¥L102) Te 3° [e19Pay ODNANd OLIPASIUIWY 242 Uo paseg ‘suo\RNY :22.noS “siuaweauBe alp Aq pauBisap sananon.as a2ueWieAod “| @4nBig nnn oddns = wowesions ¢— a | ‘sdiysuoneiay suosueura pueba7lo Current Sociology 00(0) participation from related issues. Thus, important environmental organizations were excluded from the discussion of reparation. Addition to the TAP To tackle some of the problems identified in the TAP, the MPF created the Working Group. Formed by MPF and Prosecution Service of Minas Gerais representatives, this group requested subsidies from research groups linked to public universities and social movements, aiming to expand its assessment of the main limitations of the TAP. In addi- tion to meetings organized with the Working Group, the MPF also negotiated with the companies’ lawyers, which led to the signing of an Additive Term to the TAP in November 2017, stipulating the hiring of a technical advisory system to support affected people at public hearings and to follow up the socioeconomic diagnosis and reparation actions of affected communities (Ministério Pablico Federal et al., 2017a). Another important ele- ment of this Additive Term was the institutionalization of participation in Renova Foundation activities, which created the need to develop a structure to define the instances and channels through which the affected communities could express themselves and try to influence the entities involved The judge tasked with evaluating public civil actions likewise spoke against such participation, arguing for the need for state guardianship over people.” This position sug- gests a misunderstanding of the meaning of social participation and reveals a conserva- tive stance dressed up in procedural zeal. Despite this questioning, the Additive Term to the TAP was finally presented to the companies, including the following recommendations for the socioeconomic axis; adopting the principle of the ‘centrality of victims’ suffering’, choosing an entity with no ties to the mining sector to execute the work, providing technical assistance to the affected, and establishing an institutional design that provides balanced mechanisms. Definitions regarding public hearings were based on territoriality, which includes respect for affected people’s self-organization, the dimensions and types of affections, and logistical feasibility. TAC-Gov In response to the companies’ demand for the termination of ongoing lawsuits, a new agreement was proposed at the end of October 2017 based on an initiative of the judge himself. The new Term of Adjustment of Conduct (TAC) sought to adjust the governance structure of the reparation system to allow, at least nominally, the participation of those affected, thus the name Term of Adjustment of Governance Conduct. This ratification not only incorporated some of the criticisms made to the TAC but also included part of the TAC that had not yet been ratified by the courts. However, the proposed structure was not conceived at once or by a specific actor; rather, as described in this article, it was the product of the interaction of different actors with varying capacities and unequal levels of power over more than 2 years. In this sense, the TAC-Gov emerged as an amendment to the TTAC, the TAP, and the Additive Term to the TAP.Losekann and Milanez I After several negotiations, the TAC-Gov was signed in October 2018, constituting small advances when compared to the TTAC, especially regarding the creation of Technical Advisory Services for affected people. However, the institutionalization of participation proposed as a means to counterbalance the governance dimension of the TTAC, resulted in very few gains for those affected. Moreover, these small advances are likely to be further reduced owing to the complexity of the proposed institutional design. The ‘governance structure’ proposed by the TAC-Gov (Figure 1) consisted of an institu- tional arrangement that attempted to create interaction rules between state agencies (executive and judiciary), businesses, and affected communities, comprising govern- mental, private, and public perspectives in very unequal power relations. In the next section, we describe and evaluate some of its characteristics. Distortions in the use of the concept of participation Governance and participation: ambiguity in the agreements The main change in the existing structure was the creation of a Committee of Affected People supported by Technical Advisory Services and a Forum of Observers to control the actions of both the Renova Foundation and the experts hired by the Prosecution Service. Although created in response to the mobilization of those affected, the agree- ment goes beyond participation, combining models and expectations from different actors regarding the development of the disaster recovery process and how decisions are made in the process. Thus, the TAC-Gov suggests the following two normative logics: a governing one and a participatory one. The model created by the TTAC more closely follows the governing logic, as it involves private actors and instances created to accommodate already weak governmen- tal control. Following the ‘rationality’ of governance models, the governing logic trans- fers the protagonism to the private sector, thereby reducing the role of the state (c.f. Stoker, 1998). However, participatory logic is more linked to the institutionalized inclu- sion of affected communities within governance institutions. Such inclusion partly resulted from a broad and diffuse mobilization process among affected people, which was better articulated by the MAB and other movements that arose during the process and were supported by academic groups and civil society organizations. The primary role of instances linked to participatory logic is to cede to affected people control of the implementation of programs developed by the Renova Foundation and its contractors. Thus, local commissions should not only have access to information related to these programs but also be able to make criticisms, proposals, and suggestions about them and about the performance of different instances linked to the agreement with the aid ofa technical advisor. In this scenario, the Forum of Observers would function as a second instance of participation, enabling dialog between people appointed by local commis- sions, groups of academics, and members of social movements, aiming to conduct critical evaluations of the performance of the programs and the group of experts hired by the Prosecution Service. Still, in this dimension, the text of the TAC-Goy, unlike that of the TTAC, does not define the concept of participation, which should be formulated alongside technical advisors and in accordance with the logic of each local commission.12 Current Sociology 00(0) Although an important point raised by several actors, including research groups and organized bodies such as the MAB, the debate concerning the identification of affected individuals did not receive much attention in the agreements. As highlighted by Losekann (2020), accurately identifying those affected would be a key factor in establishing the formation of a participatory process, without which the legitimacy of the process in prac- tice could not be assessed with a minimum degree of certainty, The governance structure presents a certain overlap between the functions of local commissions and regional chambers. Although, in principle, affected people can seek either, different functions are assigned to each body. Whereas local commissions can make proposals to existing programs, regional chambers have the power to make alterations to them. Moreover, regional chambers are the ideal place to negotiate pos- sible conflicts with the Renova Foundation, which can considerably reduce affected people’s influence, as it represents an extra step between the demands of the commu- nities and decision-making. Thus, regional chambers may be understood as either instances of governance or as an intersection between the logics of governance and participation. The envisaged recruitment type dialogs with the many different models found by Curato (2018) and can be divided into the following two groups: community based or civil society based. Community-based recruitment means that people recruited to par- ticipate in the processes are from the affected community and not necessarily formally organized, whereas civil society-based recruitment implies a process derived from for- mal organizations acting from the perspective of the affected people. The type of func- tion expected from the participation encouraged by the institutional model is yet another difference across several instances that resemble the one observed by Curato (2018). Although several participation functions are specified in the institutional model, only one provides a deliberative and communicative dimension in which people can collec- tively construct their solutions. Here, we understand ‘deliberative’ in the same sense as Curato (2018), with reference to the theoretical discussions of deliberative approaches to democracy. Thus, the term refers to a democratic space where one aims to build a communication process that enables the construction and confrontation of the prefer- ences of the participating public. From this perspective, the idea of deliberation does not necessarily refer to a binding decision-making process (Dewey and Rogers, 2012; Habermas, 2015). Imprecision of the concept of participation Besides the problem discussed earlier, another central limitation of the TAC-Gov con- cers the imprecision in the definition of the concept of participation. The term appears 40 times in the document but in different contexts and with different meanings according to the sphere to which it relates. Table 1 describes some relevant aspects of each instance and indicates the possible limitations arising from this imprecision. The term describes two objectives associated with participation, one linked to deliberation and the other to social control; participation as ‘review of the TAC governance system’ and participa- tion as ‘follow-up of those affected in the planning, execution, and monitoring phases of the programs and actions foreseen in the TAC’.13 Losekann and Milanez “o102) 72 omen @107 az10z *ZI07) P29 fIBP94 O>yqn4 OURDSANY ay UO Poseg stony :30:NOS ennuo> aanes9p9}990 15 ‘parpaye asoys 02 0 0q Kew pue anessneaung jepow wonedionied oy ‘snenowep ‘Aion 20U 5} auawninudas Jo wu0} Oy, parsaye asoup 02 aypuag apa] jo 2q Aew pur aneioneeung pur pi8u! st japow uonedionued oy InuuiOD aya U Ia4JUO9 asneD ‘ew 2} ‘2anzeu 3unenogeu 831 03 ang paroaye asoun 02 aypuag apni jo 9q Aew pur aneioneaung pue pis! jopow uonedionued ou, ‘pornaye osoys o1 aypuag apni] jo 2q Aew pur aneioneaing pur piu! si jopow uonedionued oy, ‘wopaay yen29}jau1 Burpnjaur >}10m ap Jo uoNIND9xo 242 JO} suopupuoo ata pur aredionued Ajemae ajdoad Auew Moy uo puadap [tm 2] parsoye ‘asoin pur pauty ajdoad ain uaanaaq poystgeaso axe 2eya sdiysuorsejod ‘ayp uo ypnus Ki@a puadap [im 2] sdnoud [ees ureasa> Jo uo|snypxo ‘swaiqoud ‘28pa/Mour 2ynua!Ds pure *y>seasa4 ‘s]WapeDe Anueunwuopaid ox sosnpo2oid ou “sOAOMOH ‘98pamouy [£90] pur 10m jeo}UYD—2 paziqeIads anon “Bunooy) 2104 ‘sBunaayq sBune9y sBunaoy 2104 “Bun0y) suiods, ‘sipms ‘sun22Iq unjnsuod pue ‘uonezigow ‘sje1s9941 ‘eo1Ape 40} a8pa/mour, [220] put asiaiodxo A29!90s ds 1D YIM PAUIqUIOD 240M [e>!UY>a2 poze uonnan.nsuo> ann221}02 Pauyap aq OL voneauasoidoy vone8aaq vones9jeq voneB9j9q vonenuesaidas 40 uone29j0q uonewioyu pur jo.nuo> oneziue8.0-y0s 40 quawe8e8ug ID tp on ao1ape yeatuy>oy uonepuno,, AOUDY 242 49A0 [o.2U0 vuonepunog eAoUY 4p J9AO Jo.NUOD, uonepunoy eroUaY 242 \nIM parenoBu sauaunsnipe eanpoud o, sipoloud pu sueufo.d s,uonepunog enouay anoge suoIuido aA OL uonepuno, exousy ‘2p Jo suonze ay Uo apap of stiadxe a0yj0 s,s03nD9s04g >ijand pue uonepunog eroUayY 242 Jo BULLOMUOYY 4n290 [1M BurziUe810 40 uonedPiued moy auyaq sjesodoud ping 4. "41D pute uonepunog enoury paraye ajdoad “ssoquiey> eotuype auawiuosiaus 4410 pareye aydoad ‘315, sraquiey> euoioy puvog Aiosupy seasn.n Jo puvog sioauasqo jo winsog suosiape peoquype suoisstuu0> vonewini3a} ‘engine uonedinied 40} uado ‘uo os pur ‘suoissnasip ‘sBuneay souasaid Yam so2n20}02u1 arewN397 e207 vuonewniday swiaiqoad ajqissod papiaoud uonse ata jo aanmeg yo addy pansadxa 1 ey), aoueasuy Jopows a2ueUIOA]8 MOU atp Jo saDuEIsU! 942 Jo sisheuy “| A1GEL4 Current Sociology 00(0) Regardless of these stated goals, the concept of participation is associated with differ- ent processes in the TAC-Gov. In Chapter 1, ‘The Objects’, the term is associated with the following three different processes: (1) the idea of ‘governance’, when discussing the already models existing in the TAC (programs, projects, and reparation actions); (2) the idea of ‘mechanisms of effective participation of the people affected’, when approaching the TTAC and TAC-Gov stages in a broad and vague way; and (3) a ‘negotiation pro- cess’, related to the renegotiation of the programs already mentioned in governance (Ministério Publico Federal et al., 2018: 4). In other words, the idea of effective partici- pation remains imprecise, while the notions of governance and negotiation appear con- nected to the same processes. In Chapter 2, participation is again described with the adjective ‘effective’, and its attributions are expanded. One may see the idea of effectiveness as associated with an expectation of inclusiveness; that is, that affected people (in an abstract way) are included within a process (Ministério Publico Federal et al., 2018: 4). However, to guarantee inclusiveness, one should know the audience that must participate in all subdivisions. This fact both highlights the importance of acknowledging the differences, for full par- ticipation of the public in question is not viable because of the number of people, and poses a problem, because understanding the audience would require a study that should have been conducted prior to the creation of the participatory model. The conceptual confusion of the expression ‘effective participation’ poses yet another problem, as it does not have the force of concretion, expressing more a desire than a real control mechanism for making a decision effective. To produce effectiveness in the sense proposed here, a democratic institutional model should imply some instrument of con- trol, which was not established in the agreements. When the text addresses the function of local commissions, the sense of participation approaches the idea of presence (Ministério Publico Federal et al., 2018: 9). This aspect reveals an approximation to the public hearings model, which addresses the potential risk of simply legitimizing already-made decisions; this model is the one best known to the Public Prosecution Service, and it has been widely examined by both affected people and research on the topic (Bronz, 2016; Zhouri, 2008), ‘Another form of participation foreseen in the Forum of Observers. Although initially intended as an instance of social control, its attributions of following up the project per- formance by offering opinions and suggestions make it more related to the function of information control and a channel for suggesting accountability measures. In other spaces, participation assumes the idea of occupying ‘vacancies’ as delegates of the affected people in regional chambers, technical chambers, councils, and so on. For example, the Board of Trustees of the Renova Foundation refers to the participation and representation of affected people (Ministério Piiblico Federal et al., 2018: 21). The form of participation is not defined in terms of principles such as respect for cultural back- grounds, gender equality, or respect for minorities. Final remarks This study sought to evaluate how the participation of individuals affected by the Fundio Dam disaster was incorporated into the governance design created to provide recoveryLosekann and Milanez 15 after the disaster. The analysis focused on the TAC-Gov; however, this term is based on negotiations and instances provided for in previous agreements and thus results from a series of interactions between different agents over the course of 2 years. The term was designed based on a governance model that disregarded the role of the people affected by the disaster and was gradually adapted and negotiated owing to social mobilization and opposition. Evaluating this interaction, as well as social movements’ mobilization strate- gies and companies’ counter-mobilization tactics, is an important research agenda. We identified the following three dimensions of the demand for participation throughout the recovery process: as a process that denounces the lack of participation and advocates for it; as a moment in which popular criticism addresses the means through which participa- tion is incorporated, distorted, and reverted to the idea of governance; and as problems related to the implementation of the proposed model. Justice institutions played a central role in this process by mediating the demands of the affected people. However, the resulting structure ended up adapting the model cre- ated by the TTAC according to their understanding of the concept of participation, lead- ing the TAC-Gov to inherit a series of vices and weaknesses. Two important aspects should be considered in this regard. First, these institutions have limited political power and, consequently, a few negotiation possibilities; thus, their proposals must necessarily fit the structure created by the TTAC. Second, members of justice institutions have a limited institutional capacity to propose participatory systems, as verified in the docu- ment analysis, which suggests that they only managed to emulate participation forms familiar to them, such as public hearings (adopted in the format of the local commis sions) and representative democracy, adopted in the regional chambers, the Board of Trustees of the Renova Foundation, the Advisory Council, the CIF, and the CIF’s techni- cal chambers. These choices did not address, for example, issues associated with the participation of traditional communities, since their principles are not included in the reparation structure, even though ILO Convention 169 is vaguely mentioned. Despite the critical analysis of the performance of state institutions and their actors throughout the entire process, one cannot infer the causalities that generate such weak- nesses. Thus, we may not rightfully admit the presence of any political-ideological inter- ference or conclude that it is simply a matter of technical failure; all these aspects are present to some extent, but alone, they do not determine the outcome of the process. However, we may argue about the limited political power of these institutions when other powers at stake and which results resulting in a narrow margin for negotiation. As for specific issues of organizational design, the TCA Gov presents a complex structure (Figure 1) and does not clearly define the roles of the actors and decision mak- ers, failing to describe what people can do and to whom they should turn. Being a com- plex document, it presents an extremely intricate structure that hinders information transfer, evaluation of how it functions, and understanding of the whole. The complexity of the institutional structure created can also lead to participation fatigue. By being forced to adhere to a complex participation model that does not guarantee a fair remedy, people can feel discouraged from participating, especially because the model offers few solutions for addressing divergences between different communities. The TAC-Gov is an attempt to institutionalize mobilization and participation Although important and necessary, it need not and should not be the only strategy used16 Current Sociology 00(0) by the affected communities ~ this is only one of many possible ways. However, it only makes sense if added to other aspects, including the involvement of public opinion, demonstrations, and mobilizations. Therefore, structures created to promote participa- tion in disaster relief contexts must not inhibit the creativity and mobilization of affected people. Funding The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/ or publication of this article: The authors would like to thank the Research Support Foundation of the State of Rio de Janeiro — FAPERJ (Project E-26/010.002189/2019) and the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (Productivity Scholarship, 2019 and Project 426974/2016-6) for supporting this research. ORCID iD Cristiana Losekann © hitps://oreid.org/0000-0002-9043-6099 Notes 1. Resolvability has been broadly accepted by justice institutions as a quality that denotes a special competence for resolving conflicts. It emerges as a contraposition to the idea of judicialization, considered harmful to the good performance of these institutions. Reaching an agreement (regardless of the outcome) instead of taking a case to court is considered a success. 2. RULING to ACP 69758-61.2015.4.01.3400 of 17 October 2017, References Ansell C (2007) Sociology of governance. 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Author biographies Cristiana Losekann is Associate Professor at the Department of Sociology, Espirito Santo Federal University (Brazil). She coordinates the Research Group on Social Mobilization - Organon. Her research interests include participation and environmental policy in Brazil, collective action, mobi- lization of rights, and the impacts of social mobilization on institutional changes. In 2018, she co sd The Disaster at the Doce River basin: challenges for universities and public institutions (in Portuguese). She has recently published the article The Rio Doce mining disaster: Legal framing in the Brazilian justice system (2019).Losekann and Milanez ed Bruno Milanez is Associate Professor at the Industrial and Mechanical Department, Juiz de Fora Federal University (Brazil). He coordinates the Politics, Economy, Mining, Environment, and Society Research Group (PoEMAS). His research interests include corporate strategies, mining legislation, and the relationship between mining corporations and government. In 2021, he co- edited Forged essentiality and harm: the effects of mining activities over workers, indigenous peoples and communities during the Covid-19 pandemic in Brazil (in Portuguese). Résumé Dans cet article, nous évaluons comment I'exigence de participation a modifié la structure de gouvernance initialement proposée pour aborder la réparation des impacts causés par l'effondrement du barrage de Fundao, a Mariana, dans I’Etat du Minas Gerais au Brésil. Nous identifions comment les sociétés miniéres ont cherché a élaborer une solution basée sur une structure complexe de gouvernance, avec l'accord des instances gouvernementales. Nous vérifions également qu’a l'inverse, les mouvements sociaux ‘ont fait pression sur les institutions judiciaires pour obtenir des solutions alternatives garantissant un certain niveau de participation des communautés affectées. Le résultat de cette interaction est la création d'un systéme hybride, qui s’est avéré excessivement lent, totalement inefficace et incapable de répondre aux principales demandes des personnes affectées. Mots-clés Gouvernance, participation, exploitation miniére, réparation des préjudices liés & des catastrophes Resumen En este articulo, se evaltia como la demanda de participacién modificé Ia estructura de gobernanza propuesta inicialmente para llevar a cabo la reparacién de los dafios causados por la rotura de la presa Fundao en Mariana (Minas Gerais, Brasil). A lo largo del texto, se identifica cémo las empresas mineras buscaron construir una solucién basada en una estructura compleja de gobernanza con el consentimiento de las agencias gubernamentales. También se verifica que, por el contrario, los movimientos sociales presionaron a las instituciones judiciales en favor de alternativas que garantizaran algun nivel de participacién de las comunidades afectadas. Como resultado de esta interaccién, se sostiene que se creé un sistema hibrido, que result excesivamente lento, altamente ineficiente e incapaz de satisfacer las principales demandas de las personas afectadas. Palabras clave Gobernanza, mineria, participacién, reparacién de dafios causados por desastres