Cases for May 15, 2021

Dela Cruz vs. Commission on Elections G.R. No. 192221. November 13, 2012.*

DOCTRINE: It bears to stress that Sections 211 (24) and 72 applies to all disqualification cases
and not to petitions to cancel or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy such as Sections
69 (nuisance candidates) and 78 (material representation shown to be false).

CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER:

Petitioner would have clearly won the elections had the MBOC properly tallied or added the
votes cast for Aurelio to her votes.

Thus, petitioner insists she would have garnered a total of 6,921 votes as against the 6,428
votes of private respondent.

By issuing a directive to consider the votes cast for Aurelio as stray votes instead of counting
the same in favor of petitioner in accordance with COMELEC Resolution No. 4116, the
COMELEC’s First Division gravely abused its discretion.

FACTS:

Petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Vice-Mayor of the Bugasong,
Antique. Subsequently, Aurelio N. Dela Cruz (Aurelio) also filed a certificate of candidacy for the
same position.

Petitioner filed a petition to declare Aurelio a nuisance candidate on the ground that he filed his
certificate of candidacy for the vice-mayoralty position to put the election process in mockery
and to cause confusion among voters due to the similarity of his surname with petitioner’s
surname.

COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution declaring Aurelio as a nuisance candidate and
cancelling his certificate of candidacy. Despite the declaration of Aurelio as a nuisance
candidate, however, his name was not deleted in the Certified List of Candidates and Official
Sample Ballot. Petitioner prayed that in the event Aurelio’s name can no longer be deleted in
time for the elections, the COMELEC issue an order directing that all votes cast in favor of
Aurelio be credited in her favor. COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. 8844: to delete the
names of the foregoing candidates from the certified list of candidates; and to consider stray the
votes of said candidates, if voted upon. Petitioner insisted that the votes cast in favor of Aurelio
be counted in her favor. However, the MBOC refused, citing Resolution No. 8844.

Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of the Province of Antique an election protest.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT:

COMELEC contends that there is a substantial distinction between a manual election where
Resolution No. 4116 applies, and an automated election governed by Resolution No. 8844.

While the votes for the nuisance candidate were not considered stray but counted in favor of the
bona fide candidate, this is no longer the rule for automated elections.

ISSUE:
W/N the votes cast for such nuisance candidate (AURELIO) be considered stray or counted in
favor of the bona fide candidate (PETITIONER)?

RULING:

It should be counted in favor of bona fide candidate which in this case was the petitioner.

PETITION FOR DISQUALIFICATION vs PETITION TO CANCEL CERTIFICATE OF

CANDIDACY. In Fermin vs. COMELEC, this Court distinguished a petition for disqualification
under Section 68 and a petition to cancel or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy (COC)
under Section 78. Said proceedings are governed by different rules and have distinct outcomes.
They are different remedies, based on different grounds, and resulting in different eventualities.

To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or
68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or
cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said
certificate that is false.

The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is
merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or
denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed
a CoC. Strictly speaking, a cancelled certificate cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much
less to valid votes. Said votes cannot be counted in favor of the candidate whose COC was
cancelled as he/she is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a COC. But
should these votes cast for the candidate whose COC was cancelled or denied due course be
considered stray?

In Martinez III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, the Court applied the rule in
COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 not to consider the votes cast for a nuisance candidate stray
but to count them in favor of the bona fide candidate notwithstanding that the decision to declare
him as such was issued only after the elections. Here, Aurelio was declared a nuisance
candidate long before the May 10, 2010 elections. On the basis of Resolution No. 4116, the
votes cast for him should not have been considered stray but counted in favor of petitioner.
COMELEC’s changing of the rule on votes cast for nuisance candidates resulted in the
invalidation of significant number of votes and the loss of petitioner to private respondent by a
slim margin. The basic rule that the primordial objective of election laws is to give effect to,
rather than frustrate, the will of the voter. The inclusion of nuisance candidates turns the
electoral exercise into an uneven playing field where the bona fide candidate is faced with the
prospect of having a significant number of votes cast for him invalidated as stray votes by the
mere presence of another candidate with a similar surname. Any delay on the part of the
COMELEC increases the probability of votes lost in this manner. While political campaigners try
to minimize stray votes by advising the electorate to write the full name of their candidate on the
ballot, still, election woes brought by nuisance candidates persist.

RESOLUTION 8844 VS RESOLUTION 4116 RESPONDENT’S ADDITIONAL CONTENTIONS:

COMELEC justified the issuance of Resolution No. 8844 to amend the former rule in Resolution
No. 4116 by enumerating those changes brought about by the new automated election system
to the form of official ballots, manner of voting and counting of votes. It said that the substantial
distinctions between manual and automated elections validly altered the rules on considering
the votes cast for the disqualified or nuisance candidates. As to the rulings in Bautista and
Martinez III, COMELEC opines that these find no application in the case at bar because the
rules on appreciation of ballots apply only to elections where the names of candidates are
handwritten in the ballots. THE COURT’S RULING: In Martinez III, The Court took judicial notice
of the reality that, especially in local elections, political rivals or operators benefited from the
usually belated decisions by COMELEC on petitions to cancel or deny due course to COCs of
potential nuisance candidates. In such instances, political campaigners try to minimize stray
votes by advising the electorate to write the full name of their candidate on the ballot, but still,
election woes brought by nuisance candidates persist. As far as COMELEC is concerned, the
confusion caused by similarity of surnames of candidates for the same position and putting the
electoral process in mockery or disrepute, had already been rectified by the new voting system
where the voter simply shades the oval corresponding to the name of their chosen candidate.
However, as shown in this case, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8844, nine days before the
elections, with sufficient time to delete the names of disqualified candidates not just from the
Certified List of Candidates but also from the Official Ballot RESOLUTION 4116 PREVAILS.
The court held that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the votes cast for a nuisance
candidate declared as such in a final judgment, particularly where such nuisance candidate has
the same surname as that of the legitimate candidate, not stray but counted in favor of the latter,
remains a good law.

CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE VOTERS THAT COC HAS BEEN CANCELLED.

Moreover, private respondent admits that the voters were properly informed of the cancellation
of COC of Aurelio because COMELEC published the same before election day. The voters’
constructive knowledge of such cancelled candidacy made their will more determinable, as it is
then more logical to conclude that the votes cast for Aurelio could have been intended only for
the legitimate candidate. The possibility of confusion in names of candidates if the names of
nuisance candidates remained on the ballots on election day, cannot be discounted or
eliminated, even under the automated voting system especially considering that voters who
mistakenly shaded the oval beside the name of the nuisance candidate instead of the bona fide
candidate they intended to vote for could no longer ask for replacement ballots to correct the
same. RESOLUTION 4116 = LIBERALLY CONSTRUED Resolution No. 4116 is more
consistent with the rule well-ensconced in our jurisprudence that laws and statutes governing
election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that
the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical
infirmities. Indeed, as our electoral experience had demonstrated, such infirmities and delays in
the delisting of nuisance candidates from both the Certified List of Candidates and Official
Ballots only made possible the very evil sought to be prevented by the exclusion of nuisance
candidates during elections.

OTHER DISCUSSIONS: A nuisance candidate is defined as one who, based on the attendant
circumstances, has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of
candidacy has been filed, his sole purpose being the reduction of the votes of a strong
candidate, upon the expectation that ballots with only the surname of such candidate will be
considered stray and not counted for either of them. DISPOSITION: Consequently, the 532
votes cast for Aurelio N. Dela Cruz during the elections of May 10, 2010 should have been
counted in favor of Casimira S. Dela Cruz and not considered stray votes PETITION
GRANTED. RESOLUTION 8844 IS DECLARED VOID. Petitioner Casimira S. Dela Cruz is
hereby DECLARED the duly elected Vice-Mayor.

Bautista vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998

FACTS:

Petitioner Cipriano “Efren” Bautista, a mayoralty candidate in Navotas petitioned the COMELEC
to declare a certain Edwin “Efren Bautista, a nuisance candidate. The latter was accordingly
declared a nuisance candidate by the COMELEC. However, because a motion for
reconsideration was filed by Edwin Bautista, his disqualification did not become final until three
days after elections. In view thereof, the name of Edwin was excluded from the list of candidates
for Mayor. But on election day, his name was included again in the list. Later that same day,
such name was again stricken off the list. Thus, as per petitioner’s request, the COMELEC
ordered that the votes cast for “Efren”, “Efren Bautista”, and “Bautista” be declared stray votes
but to segregate such stray votes into a separate improvised tally sheet in order to count the
total stray votes. When the canvass of the election returns was commenced, the Municipal
Board of Canvassers refused to canvass as part of the valid votes of petitioner the separate
tallies of ballots on which were written "EFREN BAUTISTA", "EFREN", "E. BAUTISTA", and
"BAUTISTA". Said ballots were tallied by the BEI separately either on some portion of the
election return not intended for votes for mayoralty candidates or in separate sheets of paper.
petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Declare Illegal the Proceedings of the Municipal
Board of Canvassers.

Issue:
Whether the "Bautista votes" contained in the separate tally sheet constitutes stray votes.

Held:

Yes. The votes separately tallied are not really stray votes. Then COMELEC Chairman
Bernardo P. Pardo himself, now a respected member of the Court, in his May 14, 1998
Memorandum, allowed the segregation of the votes for "Bautista", "Efren", and "Efren Bautista",
and "E. Bautista" into a separate improvised tally, for the purpose of later counting the votes. In
fine, the COMELEC itself validated the separate tallies since they were meant to be used in the
canvassing later on to the actual number of votes cast. These separate tallies actually made the
will of the electorate determinable despite the apparent confusion caused by a potential
nuisance candidate. What remained unsaid by the COMELEC Chairman was the fact that as
early as May 13, 1998, the COMELEC had already spoken and stated its final position on the
issue of whether or not Edwin Bautista is a nuisance candidate.It has been established that
respondent's known appellation or nickname is not "Efren" as stated in his Certificate of
Candidacy, but "Boboy" or "Boboy Tarugo". Two "EFRENS" and two "BAUTISTAS" will
necessarily confuse the voters and render worthless a vote for an "Efren" or "Bautista" during
the appreciation of ballots, thus preventing the determination of the choice and true will of the
electorate. Respondent's lack of financial means to support a campaign as an independent
candidate is manifested by his inability to file his Income Tax Returns for calendar years 1995
and 1996. This only amplifies the fact that he has no bona fide intention to run for the position
of municipal mayor of Navotas, a municipality with 104,601 registered voters.

Respondent has not demonstrated any accomplishment/achievement in his twenty-six (26)

years of existence as a person that would surely attract the electorate to choose him as their
representative in government. Elective public officials are respected leaders in the community.
Respondent has not shown any.

This Commission as the vanguard of the people in the determination of the chosen
representative of the electorate in government will not be an instrument to subvert that choice.
The circumstances in the case at bar warrant that respondent be declared a nuisance
candidate.

A cancelled certificate cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes.
However, since the aforestated ruling was not yet final on election day, how then do we
determine the will of the electorate? Factual circumstances and logic dictate that the "Bautista"
and "Efren" votes which were mistakenly deemed as "stray votes" refer to only one candidate,
herein petitioner. Such votes, which represent the voice of approximately 21,000 electors, could
not have been intended for Edwin Bautista, allegedly known in Navotas as a mere tricycle driver
and worse, a drug addict, and satisfactorily and finally shown as a candidate with no political
line-up, no personal funds that could have supported this own campaign, and no
accomplishments which may be noted and considered by the public, as against a known former
public officer who had served the people of Navotas as barangay official, councilor, and as vice-
mayor. To rule other wise will definitely result in the disenfranchisement of the will of the
electorate, which is, as we mentioned, the situation that our election laws are enacted to
prevent.

A stray vote is invalidated because there is no way of determining the real intention of the voter.
This is, however, not the situation in the case at bar. Significantly, it has also been established
that by virtue of newspaper releases and other forms of notification, the voters were informed of
the COMELEC's decision to declare Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate.

G.R. No. 207105, November 10, 2015

ARSENIO A. AGUSTIN, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
SALVADOR S. PILLOS,

FACTS

The petitioner was naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America. He filed his
certificate of candidacy (CoC) for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos,
Ilocos Norte. As the official candidate of the Nacionalista Party,6 he declared in his CoC
that he was eligible for the office he was seeking to be elected to; that he was a natural
born Filipino citizen; and that he had been a resident of the Municipality of Marcos,
Ilocos Norte for 25 years.  Respondent Salvador S. Pillos, a rival mayoralty candidate,
filed in the COMELEC a  Petition To Deny Due Course and/or to Cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy of Arsenio A. Agustin, alleging that the petitioner had made a material
misrepresentation in his CoC by stating that he had been a resident of the Municipality
of Marcos for 25 years despite having registered as a voter therein only on May 31,
2012.

The petitioner countered that the one-year requirement referred to residency, not to
voter registration; that residency was not dependent on citizenship, such that his travel
to Hawaii for business purposes did not violate the residency requirement pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence; and that as regards citizenship, he attached a copy of
his Affidavit of Renunciation of U.S./American Citizenship executed on October 2, 2012.

The COMELEC En Banc issued its assailed resolution cancelling and denying due course
to the petitioner's CoC. On election day, May 13, 2013, the name of the petitioner
remained in the ballot. He was later on proclaimed as the duly elected Municipal Mayor
of Marcos, Ilocos Norte for obtaining the highest among the contending parties.

Issues

Whether the petitioner is eligible as a candidate for Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos,
Ilocos Norte.

Whether Pillo is the rightful occupant of the contested elective position.

HELD

The Court finds and declares that the petitioner made no material misrepresentation in
his CoC; hence, there is no legal or factual basis for the cancellation of the CoC. Even
so, he was disqualified to run as Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte for
being a dual citizen. With his disqualification having been determined and pronounced
by final judgment before the elections, the votes cast in his favor should not be
counted. Accordingly, his rival, respondent Pillos, should be proclaimed duly elected
Mayor for obtaining the highest number of votes in the elections.

The non-presentation of his Oath of Allegiance should not be fatal to his constitutional
right to run for public office especially because the sole ground for Pillos' petition in the
COMELEC had dealt only with the residency requirement; that Pillos could have included
citizenship as a ground by the amendment of his petition, but he did not move for that
purpose; that he duly complied with the requirements for the re-acquisition of his
Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225, and the proof of the re-
acquisition had been submitted to the Election Officers in Ilocos Norte; and that the
COMELEC, by not at least holding a clarificatory hearing to ascertain and confirm such
matters, violated his right to due process by denying to him the opportunity to prepare
for his defense.

The petitioner filed a valid CoC, but the use of his USA passport after his
renunciation of foreign citizenship rendered him disqualified from continuing
as a mayoralty candidate. It is not disputed that on October 6, 2012,36 after having
renounced his USA citizenship and having already filed his CoC, he travelled abroad
using his USA passport, thereby representing himself as a citizen of the USA. He
continued using his USA passport in his subsequent travels abroad37 despite having
been already issued his Philippine passport on August 23, 2012.38 He thereby effectively
repudiated his oath of renunciation on October 6, 2012, the first time he used his USA
passport after renouncing his USA citizenship on October 2, 2012. Consequently, he
could be considered an exclusively Filipino citizen only for the four days from October 2,
2012 until October 6, 2012.

The petitioner was declared disqualified by final judgment before election day;
hence, the votes cast for him should not be counted.
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall
not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing
of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation
of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

The Resolution disqualifying Cayat became final on 17 April 2004, way before the 10
May 2004 elections. Therefore, all the 8,164 votes cast in Cayat's favor are stray.
Cayat was never a candidate in the 10 May 2004 elections. Palileng's
proclamation is proper because he was the sole and only candidate, second to none.
Carpio-Morales vs. Binay, G.R. No. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015 (Digest on RA 6770)
(RE: Validity of 1st and 2nd paragraphs of RA 6770)
FACTS:

On July 22, 2014, a complaint was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching"
Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public
officers and employees of the City Government of Makati accusing them of Plunder and
violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and
construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building.

On March 5, 2015, the 1st Special Panel filed a complaint against Binay, Jr., et al,
charging them with six (6) administrative cases17 for Grave Misconduct, Serious
Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and six (6)
criminal cases18 for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds,
and Falsification of Public Documents.

On his first term, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award21 for Phase III, IV and V of
the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's Construction Corporation (Hilmarc's),
and consequently, executed the corresponding contract without the required publication
and the lack of architectural design, and approved the release of funds therefor.

On his second term, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance
of the contract with Hilmarc's for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project and
release of funds to MANA Architecture & Interior Design Co. (MANA) for the design and
architectural services covering the Makati Parking Building project.

The ombudsman issued preventive suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al.  under
preventive suspension for not more than six (6) months without pay, during the
pendency of the OMB Cases.

Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari59 before the CA seeking the nullification of the
preventive suspension order, and praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to
enjoin its implementation. Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held
administratively liable for any anomalous activity attending any of the five (5)
phases of the Makati Parking Building project since: (a) Phases I and II were
undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V
transpired during his first term and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for
a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any,
thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and academic. In any event,
Binay, Jr. claimed that the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order failed to
show that the evidence of guilt presented against him is strong, maintaining
that he did not participate in any of the purported irregularities.
Assistant City Prosecutor of Makati Billy C. Evangelista administered the oath of office
on Makati City Vice Mayor Romulo V. Peña, Jr. (Peña, Jr.) who thereupon assumed
office as Acting Mayor. At noon of the same day, the CA issued a Resolution, granting
Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, notwithstanding Pena, Jr.'s assumption of duties as Acting
Mayor earlier that day. The Ombudsman manifested that the TRO did not state what act
was being restrained and that since the preventive suspension order had already been
served and implemented, there was no longer any act to restrain.

Binay, Jr. filed a petition for contempt, accusing Secretary Roxas, Director Brion, the
officials of the Philippine National Police, and Pena, Jr. of deliberately refusing to obey
the CA, thereby allegedly impeding, obstructing, or degrading the administration of
justice.

ISSUE:

Are the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 6770, valid and constitutional?

RULING:

The first paragraph is declared INEFFECTIVE until the Court adopts the same as part of the
rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued; The second paragraph is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID.

The Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in
so doing, took away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an
investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court’s constitutional rule-
making authority. Through this provision, Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that
was created by this Court under its duly promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both
integral and inherent to every court’s exercise of judicial power. Without the Court’s consent to
the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of the same as part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation
of the separation of powers principle.

In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting provisional
injunctions, such as in the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the
constitutional allocation of powers; it also practically dilutes a court’s ability to carry out its
functions. This is so since a particular case can easily be mooted by supervening events if no
provisional injunctive relief is extended while the court is hearing the same.

Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against “decision or
findings” of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus – similar to the fourth paragraph of
Section 27, RA 6770- attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction
without its advice and concurrence, it is therefore concluded that the former provision is also
unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsman’s posturing, Fabian should
squarely apply since the above-stated Ombudsman Act provisions are in part materia in that
they “cover the same specific or particular subject matter,” that is, the manner of judicial review
over issuances of the Ombudsman.

Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly determinative of the
existence of the CA’s subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition,
including all subsequent proceedings relative thereto, as the Ombudsman herself has
developed, the Court deems it proper to resolve this issue ex mero motu (on its own motion):
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily
rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in
which case it may be raised at any time or on the court’s own motion. The Court ex mero motu
may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is developed.
The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.

The Ombudsman found Binay, Jr. administratively liable, and dismissed him from the
service. By such dismissal, the questions raised against the CA's issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction against the Ombudsman were rendered moot and academic. I
join the Majority in saying that the preventive suspension order, being an ancillary
issuance, was dissolved upon the Ombudsman's resolution of the administrative
charges on the merits. Thus, to dwell on the preventive suspension of Binay, Jr. and his
co-respondents any further would be superfluous

Naval v Comelec, 729 SCRA 299 (2014)

 
FACTS: 

From 2004 to 2007 to 2010, Naval had been elected and had served as a member of the
Sanggunian, Second District, Province of Camarines Sur. Upon the creation of RA 9716, the
legislative districts of Camarines Sur has been reapportioned moving the district of Naval to the
Second District. In the 2010 & 2013 elections, Naval won again as member of the Sanggunian
and subsequently questioned by Julia as another member of the Sanggunian positing the three-
consecutive term which is violative of the Constitution.

ISSUE:  
Whether a municipal mayor, having been elected and had already served for three (3)
consecutive terms, can run as city mayor in light of the conversion of the municipality to a city.

HELD 
No, Naval violated Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code when he filed his COC despite
knowledge of his ineligibility. The conversion of the municipality into a city did not convert the
office of the municipal mayor into a local government post different from the office of the city
mayor. The Court took into account the following circumstances: (1) That the territorial
jurisdiction of [the] city was the same as that of the municipality; (2) That the inhabitants were
the same group of voters who elected the municipal mayor for three (3) consecutive terms; and
(3) That the inhabitants were the same group of voters [over] whom he held power and authority
as their chief executive for nine years

Naval’s ineligibility to run, by reason of violation of the three-term limit rule, does not undermine
the right to equal representation of any of the districts in Camarines Sur. With or without him,
the renamed Third District, which he labels as a new set of constituents, would still be
represented, albeit by another eligible person. 

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M.

NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY.
MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents. G.R. No. 205728               January 21, 2015

TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property

FACTS:

On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing
of the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by ten
feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The
first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health
Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case.
This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH)
Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral
candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354,
otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by
petitioners as comprising “Team Patay” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”

Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate.
Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names of candidates for the 2013
elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not
candidates for that election.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political
question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies as the case was not brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its
divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
 4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated
petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral
regulation.
6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

HELD:

1. FIRST ISSUE: Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin
is a political question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of
review.

No. The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or modesty.
There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the expanded
jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution..

The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act of a
constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming
arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the
tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.

 Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue involves a
truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there
are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the
government properly acted within such limits.

                A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of
constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny
and review of this court.

                In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech.
Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely
into any doubt that a political question brings.

2. SECOND ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of

administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before the COMELEC En
Banc or any if its divisions.

No. The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in
this case. Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the
controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something had by
then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case, organ of government
before a court may come into the picture.” Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the
message and their medium, had understandable relevance especially during the elections.
COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an
actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to
curtail petitioners’ speech. In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative
remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of
speech.

3. THIRD ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private

citizens.

No. Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that
they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these provisions
pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong
to any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the
preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.

4. FOURTH ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the
tarpaulin violated petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression.

Yes. The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high
degree of protection. Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election
propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and
rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water. The Court held that while the tarpaulin may
influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not
necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return
for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list group. By interpreting the law, it
is clear that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored messages are covered.

The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech

Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the other
hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more than propose a
commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however,
definitely political speech.

5. FIFTH ISSUE: Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or

content-neutral regulation.

Content-based regulation. Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on

the subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes
controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not
easily divorced from the size of its medium. Content-based regulation bears a heavy
presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.
Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has
overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the
government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.” Even with the
clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is no
compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify
curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize
the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of
the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.

6. SIXTH ISSUE: Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.

Yes. The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin
remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise protected
by the Constitution. Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of
private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is
void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal
protection of the laws. The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where
decals and stickers should be posted is “so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private
property.” Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that
no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.

7. SEVENTH ISSUE: Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered
religious speech.

No. The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this
court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not
suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on
such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as
to its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious speech.

Doctrine of benevolent neutrality

                With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality
allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are
government policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote the government’s
favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without
hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise
of, a person’s or institution’s religion.

                As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into account . . . to
exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose
religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state
involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.”

Lemon test

A regulation is constitutional when:

1. It has a secular legislative purpose;

2. It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
3. It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.