Accelerat ing t he world's research.

Bewitched by our words:

Wittgenstein, language-games, and
the pictures that hold sport
psychology captive
Owen Thomas

International Review of Sport and Exercise Psychology

Related papers Download a PDF Pack of t he best relat ed papers 

A perspect ive on consult ancy t eams and t echnology in applied sport psychology
Owen T homas

Doing sport psychology briefly? A crit ical review of single session t herapeut ic approaches and t heir re…
Owen T homas

NZJP Vol 3 2013 Drury Wit t &RedQueen

Nick Drury
Applied and Pedagogical Reflections
Bewitched by our words: Wittgenstein,
language-games, and the pictures that
hold sport psychology captive
Pete Lindsay, Tim Pitt & Owen Thomas

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) was arguably one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century.
Despite previous interest in philosophical approaches (Corlett, 1996), and the value given to philosophy in
relation to applied practice (Poczwardowski, Sherman & Ravizza, 2004), almost no attention has been
given to Wittgenstein’s works in sport psychology. In this article, we suggest that our discipline frequently
suffers with conceptual confusions and misunderstandings driven by our unintentional misguided use of
language. Through the philosophical thinking of Wittgenstein, we explore the tacit language-games and the
pictures that hold thinking captive within sport psychology, and attempt to provide an alternative lens
through which researchers and practitioners can view the discipline. By drawing on Wittgenstein’s philosophy,
and the methods of previous psychologists whose works were shaped by Wittgenstein (e.g. Watzlawick,
Weakland & Fisch, 1974), the wider implications for applied sport psychology and the training of
practitioners are considered.
Keywords: Philosophy; language; applied practice; Watzlawick.

‘Philosophy unravels the knots in our thinking; hence its results must be simple, but its activity is as
complicated as the knots that it unravels.’ Wittgenstein (2005, p.311).

L
UDWIG WITTGENSTEIN (1889–1951)
was arguably one of the most important
philosophers of the 20th century, with
his early work in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
(1921) claiming to have solved all the major
problems in philosophy (Warburton, 2001).
Although over half-a-century has passed
since his death, authors have suggested the
field of psychology could learn a great deal
more from Wittgenstein’s work than it
already has (e.g. Hutto, 2009; Lourenço,
2001; Racine & Müller, 2009). Indeed,
Lourenço (2001) commented that ‘…after
studying Wittgenstein’s work, a psychologist
cannot continue to think as he or she used to’
(p.90). The drive to consider Wittgenstein’s
philosophy and writings has filtered into
developmental (Lourenço, 2001) and cogni-
tive psychology (Moyal-Sharrock, 2009),
neuroscience (Bennett & Hacker, 2003), and
psychotherapeutic approaches (Fischer,
2011; Heaton, 2010). However, there has
been almost no consideration of his work
within our domain of sport psychology
despite previous authors’ suggestions that
scholars, practitioners, and the discipline as
a whole could benefit from the clarity
provided by the rigor of deeper philo-
sophical thinking (e.g. Corlett, 1996).
Sport psychologists have tended to
consider philosophy in terms of the practi-
tioner’s own professional philosophy of prac-
tice (Poczwardowski, Sherman & Ravizza,
2004; Ravizza, 2002) or the philosophical
grounding of research methods that
underpin our discipline (Biddle et al., 2001;
Giacobbi, Poczwardowski & Hager, 2005).
Throughout their development, practi-
tioners and researchers are rightly encour-
aged to question and clarify their own
chosen philosophies, to ensure congruence
between personal beliefs and their chosen

Sport & Exercise Psychology Review, Vol. 10 No. 1 41

© The British Psychological Society 2014
Pete Lindsay, Tim Pitt & Owen Thomas
methods and behaviours (Lindsay et al.,
2007). Nevertheless, with the exception of
Martens’ (1987) now 25-year-old seminal
paper, relatively little attention has been
given to the philosophical underpinning of
sport psychology as a discipline. Although
accusations of incongruence have been
leveled at practitioners, it might be prudent
for us to explore the congruence of the disci-
pline itself.
Developmental psychologists Racine and
Müller (2009) recently suggested that
specialty areas of psychology could benefit
from exploring the relevance of Wittgen-
stein to their particular area of expertise.
Specifically, they suggested such benefit
could arise from more careful scrutiny of
their conceptual underpinnings in order to
clarify the use of relevant psychological
concepts. In this article, we suggest that our
discipline frequently suffers with conceptual
confusions and misunderstandings driven by
our unintentionally misguided use of
language. This bewitchment is exemplified
by the limited conceptual clarity, or shared
consensus, in defining and explaining many
of our major concepts, creating myriad prob-
lems in both research and practice. For
example, and by no means an exhaustive list,
the discipline lacks agreed definitions and
conceptual clarity around core constructs
such as goals (Elliot & Fryer, 2008), anxiety
(Cheng, Hardy & Markland, 2009),
momentum (Smisson et al., 2007), confi-
dence (Thomas, Lane & Kingston, 2011),
cohesion (Carron & Brawley, 2012), ability
(Li & Lee, 2004), giftedness (Tranckle &
Cushion, 2006), mental toughness (Thel-
well, Weston & Greenlees, 2005), and aggres-
sion (Grange & Kerr, 2010). Indeed, it is
quite commonplace for the introductory
narrative of a research article within sport
psychology to contain statements empha-
sising sentiments such as, ‘…whilst there
remains a lack of agreed definition, or
conceptual clarity regarding the specific
nature of [concept], the present article will
serve to investigate [it] further’. It could be
argued that such research might require a
42
fundamental reassessment if it is to offer any
worthwhile findings in the longer term to
the future development of the discipline.
That such fundamental concepts are still
being debated, nearly a century after
Coleman Griffiths founded the discipline,
may suggest our bewilderment is not simply
due to having not found the right answers,
but instead that we have been asking the
wrong questions. The focus of the present
article is perhaps particularly timely given
the National Institute of Health’s recent
withdrawal of support for the latest revision
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (i.e. DSM-5) due to a lack of
consensus in the definitions and categorisa-
tion of mental illnesses described within the
manual (Lane, 2013).
Lourenço (2001) argued that by ignoring
the danger of words and ill clarified
concepts, psychologists can fall prey to
several fallacies which can give rise to
‘…ungrounded concepts, illusions of explanation,
unbearable reifications, hasty and misleading
conclusions, and a mix-up of language-games’
(p.90). We believe that some of the above
issues are present within sport psychology.
Henceforth, to quote Wittgenstein (1980),
the aim of this article is to be ‘…nothing more
than a mirror in which the reader sees his [or her]
own thinking with all its deformities’ (p.18), so to
free researchers and practitioners from some
of the tacit assumptions inherent in their
language and the pictures that have held
them captive. In doing so, we aim to bring
into the light some of the assumptions that
have bedeviled our discipline, assumptions
which have spawned a proliferation of
concepts, theories, and abstractions. We will
argue that the roots of this bewitchment
might not stem from poorly executed empir-
ical methods, or poorly conducted practice,
but instead from misunderstandings in the
logic of our language and therefore the
psychological phenomena we seek to under-
stand. Guided by the philosophical approach
of Wittgenstein, our aim is to provide an
alternative lens through which practitioners
and researchers can view the discipline. The
Sport & Exercise Psychology Review, Vol. 10 No. 1

first step in this philosophical investigation
and unravelling of these knots is to re-
examine the foundations from which the
language of sport psychology has developed.
Science, psychology, and philosophy
‘The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not
to be explained by calling it a ‘young science’; its
state is not comparable with that of physics, for
instance, in its beginnings… For in psychology
there are experimental methods and conceptual
confusion.’ Wittgenstein (1953, p.232).
The opening of the first dedicated
psychological laboratory by Wilhelm Wundt
in 1879 marked psychology’s initial shift
towards a scientific paradigm. Prior to
Wundt, the study of human behaviour was
primarily located in the fields of philosophy,
anthropology, and religion. Nevertheless, it
was Wundt who moved psychology from the
perceived subjectivity of philosophy, guiding
the discipline through to sciencehood
(Hatfield, 2002). As noted by Vealey (2006),
the first steps in the development of modern
sport psychology were associated with these
desires to establish psychology as a scientific
discipline.
Since Wundt first embraced the scientific
method, the assumptions of Western science
have continued to spread across psychology.
Two classic exemplars of the scientific
psychologist include the late Sigmund Freud
and his once colleague Carl Jung. Freud and
Jung, arguably two of the most influential
psychologists of all time, identified causal
explanations for psychological distress, and
provided a number of general ‘laws’ in order
to explain and identify the causes of human
behaviour (Cavell, 1996). Freud, for
example, used psychoanalytic methods to
reveal meaning behind a behaviour in rela-
tion to mental processes and historical expe-
riences, in an almost Newtonian causal-chain
like manner. This approach of identifying
the supposed mental processes driving
behaviour was labeled as ‘mentalism’ and
stood in stark contrast to the more empirical
behaviourist approaches that were later to
develop (Uttal, 1999).
Sport & Exercise Psychology Review, Vol. 10 No. 1
Bewitched by our words
The theories of Freud and his colleagues
had a major influence on Western thought
during the 20th century, and his ideas spilt
beyond the confines of psychoanalysis (e.g.
the notion of the unconscious mind). Never-
theless, since Freud and psychoanalysis,
psychology and its corresponding models of
psychotherapy have progressed through
various waves of thinking which have
included behavioural, humanistic, and
cognitive psychology (for a detailed review of
the history of psychology, see Wertheimer,
2012). Some authors have noted that more
than any other science, psychology is always
chasing the latest fashion and is often quick
to dismiss its predecessors (Liben, 1997;
Lourenço, 2001). Hence, Lourenço (2001)
commented that this is one reason why
psychology is at risk of making hasty conclu-
sions, forming disembodied concepts, and
using ungrounded words. In recent times,
the major therapeutic framework that domi-
nates the discipline is that of cognitive-
behavioural therapy (CBT); a school of
thinking which underpins the majority of
Western sport psychology and its educational
pathways (Tod & Lavallee, 2011). Although
its predecessor, behavioural therapy, was crit-
icised for ignoring cognition (what many
viewed as the foundation of psychology),
CBT incorporated cognition at its core whilst
purportedly maintaining the empirical meas-
urability of behavioural therapy. Thus, CBT
and its offspring (e.g. psychological skills
training) incorporated the aspects of
mentalism alongside empiricist methods. It
is precisely this manner of thinking Wittgen-
stein contested.
Wittgenstein did not take issue with
psychology’s aim to be a science, but with the
foundations upon which this approach was
built. He stated, ‘…the existence of the experi-
mental method makes us think we have the means
of solving the problems that trouble us; though
problem and method pass one another by’ (1953,
p.232). In his view, confusions within
psychology did not arise because of technical
issues (i.e. poorly conducted experimental
methods) but mainly logical ones (i.e. the
43
Pete Lindsay, Tim Pitt & Owen Thomas
methods ignore the nature of the
phenomena they seek to understand).
Wittgenstein’s criticism of psychology
(above) was leveled at the multitude of
misconceptions of mental processes. These
misconceptions of mental processes and of
the relationships between the mind, the
brain, and behaviour were a primary causes
of what Wittgenstein saw as the barrenness of
psychology. He proposed that the route to
posing fruitful questions, and thus obtaining
valuable answers, led first in the clarification
of the psychological concepts that are
utilised within psychology (Hacker, 2007).
With reference to Wittgenstein, Hacker
(2007) posited that for psychology to achieve
maturity as a discipline it should not strive to
emulate the methods of physics, but instead
rid itself of these conceptual confusions.
Language, thought, and language-games
in sport psychology
‘A picture held us captive. And we couldn’t get
outside it, for it lay in our language, and
language seemed only to repeat it to us inexorably.’
Wittgenstein (1953, §1151)1.
One of Wittgenstein’s key propositions
was that our world is created by, maintained
through, and constrained by our use of
language. He argued that philosophy was the
‘…struggle against the bewitchment of our under-
standing by the resources of our language’ (1953,
§109). Heaton (2010) stated that the ambi-
guity of this statement is of great impor-
tance. He suggested that Wittgenstein was
proposing that language is both the source
of our confusions and the sole means by
which we may seek to cure them. In this
sense, language is not the product of our
thoughts, but the means by which we think
(Blair, 2006; Proudfoot, 2009).
To Wittgenstein, the speaking of
language constituted a form of life. He
coined the term ‘language-game’ to describe
the relationship between our vocabulary and
associated behaviours, and to further under-
line how our language is part of an activity.
1 Note that the symbol ‘§’ signifies Wittgenstein’s use of a proposition (1921) or an aphorism (1953).
44
He used this phrase to refer to the connec-
tions between words, actions, and situations,
which are often left unexamined or
unspoken. Wittgenstein thus highlighted the
analogous nature of using a language and
playing a game according to a certain set of
rules. Misunderstandings arise when the
rules of one language-game are unquestion-
ingly brought into another, carrying with
them unquestioned assumptions and beliefs
hidden within our words and grammar like a
linguistic Trojan horse. Nevertheless, once
these tacit connections (rules) are high-
lighted to the player, they prevent the indi-
vidual from mindlessly continuing to play
the same old game. It’s almost as if we teach
someone a previously unknown move that
will always result in them winning the game
(e.g. of chess), and thus the game is no
longer playable as it once was.
In addition to these language ‘games’,
Wittgenstein later used the term ‘picture’ to
denote a conception that holds thinking
captive which are hidden in our language
(preventing the possibility of seeing alterna-
tive perspectives). These pictures often lead
us to the false assumption that our language
mirrors reality (Racine & Müller, 2009).
Describing or highlighting a language-game
that is being played by an athlete, coach or
sport psychologist can throw light upon the
false picture that is holding them captive. In
the following section we outline three
pictures that we believe are common to the
language-games of sport psychology.
Picture No. 1
Tilting at Windmills
Wittgenstein (1953) stated that ‘…problems
arise when language goes on holiday’ (§38),
suggesting that many of our confusions lie
within our use of language. Such confusions
arise in sport psychology when, attempting
to approach our work scientifically, we
mistakenly confuse ‘concepts’ for ‘objects’
and subsequently treat them as such within
our endeavors. This seemingly innocuous,
Sport & Exercise Psychology Review, Vol. 10 No. 1

unintended, yet careless use of language
unfortunately helps perpetuate the concep-
tual confusion and misunderstanding that
has plagued the discipline. This confusion
between concepts and objects is prevalent
within CBT and psychoanalysis (Heaton,
2010), and we would argue that it is endemic
within sport psychology.
The confusion generated via the process
of mistaking ‘concepts’ as ‘objects’ typically
occurs when a verb or adjective is deceptively
‘frozen’ (or transformed) into the noun
form of a psychological entity. As a plausible
yet simplistic example, an athlete states that
he or she feels like they never act in a confi-
dent manner and may find themselves being
described by others and themselves as
lacking in ‘confidence’. Wearing a psycho-
educational, mental skills hat, a practitioner
may believe this to be self-evident. The sport
psychologist involved in formulating this
problem and working with this athlete may
then find him or herself working to remedy
this supposed deficit. However, this noun
form (confidence) of the adjective (confi-
dent) suggests that this problem involves the
athlete lacking a ‘thing’ that can be
obtained. But what is this thing and how are
we to judge that the athlete is lacking it? Has
the coach inferred a lack of this thing called
‘confidence’ because of a behaviour that he
or she has observed? Would having the
athlete complete some form of self-assess-
ment questionnaire or intake interview
confirm that this was indeed the case? On
what grounds was this ‘case of the missing
confidence’ initially formulated? The first
author has regularly worked with athletes
described as such, when in actuality, this
‘missing confidence’ transpired to be
nothing more than the athlete simply not
being particularly vocal on the pitch. Sadly,
the misguided search for this erroneously
missing fictional object or quality often
proves frustrating and reinforces their
mistaken belief that they are so flawed. Simi-
larly, another athlete complaining of feeling
anxious during a competition (e.g. experi-
encing sweaty hands, heavy legs, negative
Sport & Exercise Psychology Review, Vol. 10 No. 1
Bewitched by our words
thoughts) may conclude that she is suffering
from a psychological dis-ease called
‘anxiety’. This is yet another example of
flawed reasoning and faulty logic driven by a
sloppy use of language.
We would argue that this manner of
confusing a process, concept, or abstract
noun (i.e. to be anxious, or to be confident)
for an object or physical noun (i.e. I have
anxiety, I lack confidence) is at the heart of
many of our bewitchments. Once the step
has been taken of mistakenly transforming
the verb or adjective (concept) into a noun
(object) we can become entranced in the
belief that we’re investigating and inter-
vening with actual things. Moreover, whilst
we have detailed just two simple examples of
this form of misguided reasoning, this
picture is rife within our discipline, and it
continues to spawn an ever-increasing
number of concepts (e.g. resilience, reso-
nance, resistance, concentration, cohesion,
communication, mental toughness,
momentum, motivation, ad infinitum). As
Wittgenstein said, when you play such
games, the debating of abstractions means
you’ve already lost (Monk, 2005). As a direct
result of this misunderstanding, our journals
and textbooks have become overrun with
studies seeking to confirm the validity of
such ill-formed constructs, measuring colle-
giate and elite performers against these, with
researchers and applied practitioners
careers spent tilting at these windmills like
Cervantes’ Don Quixote.
Picture No. 2
Through the Looking-Glass
One of the most common forms of language-
games played within sport psychology is that
of metaphor and it has potential to further
compound the concept/object problems
described above. Whilst the pervasive nature
of metaphorical descriptions used within
sport psychology can provide practitioners
with the opportunity to work and facilitate
change (Andersen & Speed, 2011; Hanin &
Stambulova, 2002; Lindsay, Thomas &
Douglas, 2010), these generalised descrip-
45
Pete Lindsay, Tim Pitt & Owen Thomas
tions can also constrain and restrict (Lawley
& Tompkins, 2000) due to the unspoken
rules of these hidden language-games.
Confusions often arise when a statement
from one language-game is (mis)interpreted
by the rules of another. This process of
carrying meaning from one context to
another is at the heart of metaphor and thus
central to the conceptual confusions that
can engulf us. We are at greatest risk when
we forget that we’re playing a metaphorical
game when describing concepts such as
‘mental toughness’, ‘momentum’, ‘robust
confidence’, or ‘motivational climates’.
In describing and treating such abstract
concepts as we might their physical counter-
parts, we are playing by the rules of a
different game and thus prone to self-
inflicted confusion. We would argue that this
use of physical metaphors to describe the
‘frozen’ verbs or adjectives of psychological
experience can further entrance practi-
tioners and researchers alike into believing
that they are dealing with actual things. In so
doing, we look through such metaphorical
language when we should instead look at it,
remaining mindful that these descriptive
metaphors are just simplistic generalisations
(Lindsay et al., 2010). The root of these
confusions perhaps lies in our craving for
such generalisations, our craving for
simplistic ‘scientific’ laws, the limits of our
language and again in our discipline’s desire
to play the ‘scientific game’. Such confusions
do not stem from poorly executed empirical
methods, but instead from the attempt to
use these empirical methods to verify the
abstracted claims of mentalism.
Jabberwocky is a poem within Lewis
Carroll’s (1871) classic novel Through the
Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found There,
which provides an entertaining demonstra-
tion of the seductive nature of nonsense
words. Alice only needed to ‘beware the
Jabberwock’ for the reason that she believed
it to be real. It is not to say that the
metaphorical language (and the concepts
referred to in picture no. 1) should be
removed from our dialogue (if such a purifi-
46
cation of psychological language was even
possible), but rather that we maintain an
awareness of the metaphorical or abstract
nature of our language and remain sensitive
to the meaning of words in the language-
games we play. Wittgenstein himself
suggested that imprecision in language is
only natural, and does not necessarily
suppose a misunderstanding. Nevertheless,
‘…Wittgenstein’s message that we need to
command a clear view of the use of our concepts
is…an appeal to examine if a concept that makes
good sense in a certain context or language-game
makes also sense, or it is rather misleading or even
nonsensical, in a different context and language-
game’ (Lourenço, 2001, p.109). An investiga-
tion into the use of psychological concepts
and metaphorical language can shed light
on the picture that is holding thinking
captive, and can assist individual’s in getting
out of the rabbit hole down which they have
fallen.
Picture No. 3
Games With No End
The potential misunderstandings and confu-
sions created by the language and scientific
desires of (sport) psychology does not only
relate to the escalating generation of
concepts. Wittgenstein (1976) alluded to a
further bewitchment inherent in our
language that serves to perpetuate the
concept/object issues outlined previously.
He commented that there is a ‘…powerful
urge we have to see everything in terms of cause
and effect’ (p.410). Wittgenstein suggested
that the reason why individuals can so easily
be drawn into a debate of cause and effect is
due to the fact they are so embedded within
the game of language. In his classic experi-
ments, psychologist Jean Piaget demon-
strated that, from an early age, we are
conditioned to think in causal terms due to
the limits of narrative descriptions. Wittgen-
stein (1953) recognised how prone we are to
succumbing to theorise and encouraged us
instead ‘…don’t think, but look!’ (§66) and to
‘…do away with all explanation, and description
alone must take its place’ (§109). The tendency
Sport & Exercise Psychology Review, Vol. 10 No. 1

towards fixating upon generating concepts
and theories was recognised over 50 years
ago is often at the heart of the bedevilment
of psychologists (Dunnette, 1966). In line
with previous authors, we suggest that in
their rush to theorise, rather than accurately
describe, psychologists are at risk of falling
prey to all sorts of deep-seated conceptual
confusions (Hutto, 2009). The authors
would argue that the risk of such confusion
is even greater within sport psychology due
to the physically analogous language used to
describe mental processes as outlined above.
Combining this predisposition towards
causal thinking, alongside our propensity for
mistakenly confusing concepts and objects,
sport psychologist are at risk of mindlessly
playing games with no end. These games of
searching for supposed causes to poorly
defined phenomena can lead us at best into
circular reasoning and at worst into tautolog-
ical quagmires. For example, if we consider
an athlete who suffers from bouts of anxiety,
concentration issues, and a loss of confi-
dence, how are we to explain this using a
classically Newtonian case-formulation? Is
the anxiety the cause, maintaining, or
resulting factor of this situation? Or alterna-
tively, is this an attentional control issue that
leads the athlete to focus upon irrelevant
stimuli, leading to a drop in confidence
following under-performance? We would
argue that identifying an underlying ‘cause’
within such cases is impossible and a
misguided endeavor, with well-intentioned
practitioners left chasing theoretical rain-
bows. Despite this, we continue to believe
that the formulation process is one of uncov-
ering and identifying the underlying cause
of a clockwork problem, rather than accu-
rately describing the situation at hand.
Wittgenstein in practice
‘What we are destroying is nothing but houses of
cards and we are clearing up the ground of
language on which they stood.’ Wittgenstein
(1953, §118).
Previous authors have argued that
Wittgenstein’s philosophy can be practiced
Sport & Exercise Psychology Review, Vol. 10 No. 1
Bewitched by our words
literally as a kind of psychotherapy
(Ammereller & Fischer 2004; Fischer, 2011;
Heaton, 2010; O’Hanlon & Wilk 1987).
Fisher (2011) and Heaton (2010) drew on
the philosophy of Wittgenstein to guide their
approaches to psychotherapy and how they
conceptualised human problems. Both
authors highlighted the false lines that seem-
ingly divide psychology from philosophy,
which are in part maintained by the struc-
ture of many academic institutions.
O’Hanlon and Wilk (1987) argued that
therapy, in its most basic sense, is essentially
the process of introducing the client to
philosophy, acting as a primer in thinking
clearly about their own problems. Whilst the
philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein has, in
recent times, formed a therapeutic method
in itself, Wittgenstein’s philosophical
approach can also act as a guide to our
thinking and thus practice and research.
One of the earliest examples of Wittgen-
stein’s influences on applied psychology was
evident in the writings and practice of clin-
ical psychologist Paul Watzlawick and his
colleagues at the Mental Research Institute
(MRI), in Palo Alto, California (Sigmon,
1985).
The MRI was founded in 1959 by Don
Jackson as a research and training facility
dedicated to therapy. Jackson had previously
been working with Gregory Bateson and his
colleagues on a project funded by a Rocke-
feller Foundation research grant to explore
communication, context, and paradox (e.g.
Bateson et al., 1956). This interest in
communication, alongside the interactional
nature of psychological problems was central
to the initial work at the MRI. Influenced by
the theoretical leadership of Bateson, and
the clinical leadership of Jackson, what was
loosely known as the Palo Alto Group
focused upon the phenomena of human
change. The Brief Therapy Centre was
created at the MRI in circa 1967, by
Watzlawick, Weakland, and Fisch to investi-
gate ways of doing therapy briefly. These
efforts, and the results they achieved, led the
Palo Alto group to question much of what
47
Pete Lindsay, Tim Pitt & Owen Thomas
they had believed, learned, and practiced. At
the crux of these new ideas was the philo-
sophical thinking of Wittgenstein and the
issues with language he alluded to in his own
writings.
Watzlawick and his team at the MRI did
not play the explanatory ‘scientific game’ of
psychology, and rejected the search for an
underlying hypothesised cause behind a
client’s problem. Instead, as per Wittgen-
stein’s suggestions, they focused their efforts
on the logic of language and descriptions of
problems, driven by the client’s frame of
reference, in which they can become entan-
gled. For example, they identified novel ways
of exploring problem situations, such as
asking clients about their previously failed
attempts at solving the problem they were
currently facing. In doing so, they noticed
that clients typically partook in what
Watzlawick, Weakland and Fisch (1974)
termed ‘more of the same’; that is,
continued attempts of failed solutions which
were just ‘first order’ variants upon a single
over-arching theme (cf. Bateson, 1972,
1979). The client, however, would firmly
believe that they had tried every possible
avenue whilst looking for a solution, but they
were unknowingly trapped within a self-
imposed language-game when describing,
and thus attempting to solve their problem.
As a fictional example, when asked about
their attempts at solutions to help an
anorexic daughter begin eating, the parents
might state that they had tried ‘everything’.
This included having the daughter meet
with the general practitioner who tells her
the health risks of not eating, having her
sister stress the importance of good nutri-
tion, her parents explaining their fears about
her current dieting, providing educational
leaflets about the risks of eating disorders,
etc. Each of these solutions falls under the
general, higher-order theme, of ‘not eating
is bad and dangerous, and you should eat.’
The clients attempted solutions act only to
maintain, fuel, or even become the problem.
These ‘first order’ (Bateson, 1972, 1979)
attempts at resolving the problem are all
48
restricted by the same tacit assumption
(picture) about the nature of the problem
and thus possible solutions.
In order to resolve such problems,
Watzlawick and colleagues (1974) developed
a novel form of paradoxical intervention.
They found that prescribing the opposite
behaviour to that of the theme connecting
the initial ‘failed’ solutions would often
resolve the issue (i.e. instructing the indi-
vidual who cannot sleep, despite their
various efforts in trying to sleep, to instead
try and stay awake). They cite that to the best
of their ‘…knowledge, it was Wittgenstein who
first speculated on the practical, behavioural
implications of paradox’ (p.63). It was Wittgen-
stein (1956) himself who commented:
‘The various half-joking guises of logical
paradox are only of interest in so far as they
remind anyone of the fact that a serious form of
the paradox is indispensable if we are to
understand its function properly. The question
arises: what part can such a logical mistake
play in a language game’ (p.179)
In sport psychology, Bar-Eli (1991) provided
several illustrations of paradoxical interven-
tions with athletes based on such therapeutic
strategies, which all involve ‘second order’
change (i.e. a change in the rules of knowing
and of the language-game). For example,
instructing an athlete who has a fear of
making mistakes to purposively make one
small error in each of their performances.
Watzlawick and colleagues found that by
identifying the theme that connected all of
the failed attempts, you could often identify
the tacit belief, frame, rule, or game that the
client was playing. The simple solution
would typically involve something that went
against this belief, not adding something
different, just rearranging what was already
there. Essentially, the tacit assumption which
connects the client’s previously attempted
(failed) solutions provides us with the rules
to the language-game that they’re playing,
and a paradoxical intervention contravenes
this faulty rule, breaking the frame of the
picture that holds them captive, and renders
the game unplayable.
Sport & Exercise Psychology Review, Vol. 10 No. 1

Problem formation and resolution
‘Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were,
cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them
clear and to give them sharp boundaries.’
Wittgenstein (1921, §4.112).
Heaton (2010) suggested that Wittgen-
stein’s methods could be of great use in
assisting us to loosen the grip of the
misleading pictures and analogies that keep
our thinking trapped. Wittgenstein (1921,
2005) suggested that these ‘knots in our
thinking’ are often represented in the
description of problems in cloudy, vague,
and over-generalised terms. The practicality
of unraveling such knots in our thinking
involves a different approach to problem
solving, and thus problem resolution. To
show the fly out of the fly bottle can often involve
traveling through what seems like the least
obvious opening (Watzlawick et al., 1974).
When these knots become untied, an indi-
vidual may realise that the problem was not
what they had originally thought. Fischer
(2011) described these knotted problems as
‘pseudo-problems’, and that when con-
cerned with these problems the only thing to
do is to tackle the misunderstanding at the
heart of it. To borrow an analogy, Fischer
points out that when a child is afraid of
monsters under their bed, there is no real
security problem; the loving parent need not
guard the room, reflect upon the nature of
monsters, nor teach them the coping-skills to
deal with monsters; the loving parent instead
helps the child overcome their fear in time
by explaining that monsters do not exist.
Should the parent teach the child ‘tech-
niques’ or ‘skills’ with which to tackle the
problem, it is likely that the child’s fear
would increase having thus been validated.
Such attempts to resolve these problems
would actually become the problem them-
selves, and applying more of the solution
makes the situation worse.
In this sense, we concur with the senti-
ment of Watzlawick et al. (1974). When
athletes or coaches come to a sport psycho-
logist seeking help for a problem, they often
describe their desired change in seemingly
Sport & Exercise Psychology Review, Vol. 10 No. 1
Bewitched by our words
meaningful, but actually unhelpful terms.
They typically want to be more confident,
less anxious, have better communication
with teammates, have increased motivation,
etc. The vagueness of these goals makes their
attainment tricky, if not impossible. When
pressed for an answer as to what specifically
would have to happen or stop happening so
that they would be more confident, or less
anxious, they are very often at a loss. This
bewilderment is not due to the fact that they
have simply not yet found an answer to their
problem, but rather that they are asking the
wrong question in the first place, or in
Wittgenstein’s (1921) terms, ‘…for an answer
that cannot be expressed, the question too cannot
be expressed’ (§6.5).
As Wittgenstein (1921) suggested, prob-
lems are often described in cloudy terms and
so it is our job to ‘…make them clear and to give
them sharp boundaries’ (§4.112) on a case-by-
case basis. To do so, we must avoid falling
foul of our craving for generalisations, vague
abstractions, and causal explanations. Steve
de Shazer (1994), creator of solution-
focused brief therapy, was another therapist
to be significantly influenced by the philo-
sophical thinking of Wittgenstein. De Shazer
(1985) and associates (de Shazer et al., 2007)
outlined the ‘miracle-question’ as a useful
technique for generating solutions and
escaping the potential entanglement of
playing the ‘scientific game’ when inter-
acting with clients. This form of question
assists both the practitioner and client in
discussing the goals of the consultation
without probing for an explanation to the
underlying cause of their problem.
O’Hanlon and Wilk (1987) also outlined a
useful technique for avoiding another
bewitchment that is common to the
language of (sport) psychology. Their
Wittgensteinian methods advocated the use
of video-descriptions (discussing behaviours
as if they were being presented on a video-
screen) when conversing about a problem
with a client. This technique can be used to
‘unfreeze’ the nominalised noun that is used
to label a problem back into a behavioural
49
Pete Lindsay, Tim Pitt & Owen Thomas
level description, thus making the problem
solvable again (e.g. ‘if you had [confidence],
how would you know? What would your
teammate or coach see? What would I see
differently?’). As an individual begins to
unravel the knots in their thinking, and thus
throw light on pictures which have held their
thinking captive, a realisation may occur that
there was no problem in the first place or
that the solution is now seemingly obvious
given the new view of the problem.
Attempting to solve problems within the
existing language-game represents efforts at
‘first order’ change. For example,
attempting to resolve a supposed ‘lack of
confidence’ or ‘pre-match anxiety’ by using
psychological skills training to try and give
the athlete this missing entity. These solu-
tions may only serve to make the problem
worse as they implicitly validate the ‘search
for the missing’ confidence. These problems
may not be resolved by solutions that have
the same inherent assumptions, but instead
by a ‘second order’ change to the perception
of the nature of the problem itself. Perhaps
one should not aim to teach the athlete
something (e.g. a mental-skill), but should
instead aim to make the athlete feel differ-
ently towards the problem. The aim is to
change the perception of the situation (the
way they view the problem) and not change
the cognition. If the perceptual frame is
changed, then the emotional reaction will
also change, thus changing the behaviour
and eventually the cognition of the athlete
(Nardone & Salvini, 2007). The majority of
interventions in psychotherapy (Nardone &
Salvini, 2007) and sport psychology aim to
change cognitions, behaviours, or emotions.
Nevertheless, a change in how the athlete
views or feels about a situation (i.e. how they
perceive the problem) is the starting point of
all of these (Nardone & Salvini, 2007).
Wittgenstein (1953) outlined this
reframing process using the classic duck-
rabbit example (see Figure 1). He used this
illustration to demonstrate how focusing on
a different aspect of an image could result in
50
a change of perception. When shown the
image in Figure 1 (overleaf), an individual
may report to seeing a rabbit. However,
when one is shown the duck, they can no
longer go on seeing only the rabbit for the
rules to the game have changed; they cannot
go on playing the same old (rabbit) game
and a ‘second order’ change has been
achieved (Watzlawick et al., 1974); for it is
now a duck-rabbit. While the image itself
remains the same, the meaning and percep-
tion of it has been completely changed.
Discussion
The primary aim of this article was to
engage, challenge, and involve readers in
the exploration of some of the tacit assump-
tions inherent within the language of sport
psychology. In reflecting upon some of the
language-games played and the pervasive
nature of metaphorical communication
within our discipline we aimed to demon-
strate how misunderstandings can arise and
subsequently be maintained. Through the
philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, we
sought to challenge commonly held beliefs
about the nature of psychological pheno-
mena and the manner in which they are
researched and approached in practice.
In exploring how Wittgensteinian
approaches can be applied in practice, the
authors demonstrated how our use of
language could both help create many of the
problems that researchers and practitioners
face, and provide us with the sole means by
which to solve them. We propose that the
avoidance of generalising and mindlessly
playing the ‘scientific game’ is critical to
avoiding knots in our own thinking and that
of our clients. Alongside this, being mindful
of the manner in which adjectives and verbs
can become frozen into the abstract nomi-
nalisations of psychological nouns can help
prevent us from confusing concepts for
objects. Additionally, recognising, and thus
avoiding attempts to solve pseudo-problems,
could prevent many wasted hours of both
research and practice.
Sport & Exercise Psychology Review, Vol. 10 No. 1
 Bewitched by our words

Figure 1: A re-work of the classic duck-rabbit image used by Wittgenstein (1953)

to demonstrate changes in perception based on seeing aspects.
From ‘The Mind’s Eye’, by J. Jastrow, 1899, Popular Science Monthly, 54, p.312.
In the public domain due to copyright expiration.

Implications for Practice O’Hanlon & Wilk, 1987), in that practi-

‘It often happens that we only become aware of the
important facts, if we suppress the question ‘why?’;
and then in the course of our investigations these
facts lead to an answer.’ Wittgenstein (1953,
§471).
To avoid becoming bewitched by our
words, we propose that practitioners and
researchers alike might benefit from having
a working understanding of the teachings of
Wittgenstein. In applying these teachings in
the field of sport psychology, researchers and
practitioners alike should primarily seek to
describe, rather than explain (Wittgenstein,
1953). The temptation to indulge in the
creation and maintenance of psychological
entities, based upon the foundations of
mentalism, serves to sooth our desires to be
considered scientific. Despite this, the
process ultimately sentences us to wrestling
with ill-defined and conceptualised pheno-
mena. To avoid such pitfalls, we concur with
previous authors (e.g. de Shazer, 1985, 1988;
tioners would instead benefit from focusing
upon gaining behavioural, ‘video’ level
descriptions from their clients, essentially
sifting the facts from the associated mean-
ings. In gaining these behavioural descrip-
tions, practitioners and researchers unfreeze
the nominalised verbs or adjective, changing
the psychological entity back into an observ-
able process that can then be explored.
In playing the ‘scientific game’, practi-
tioners can find themselves undertaking a
formulation process to search for underlying
causes behind behaviours, cognitions, or
emotions. This may well be appropriate, but
we would recommend considering the
approaches adopted by Watzlawick and
colleagues (1974) at the MRI and subse-
quently de Shazer (1985) and O’Hanlon and
Wilk (1987). Like these authors, we believe
that in searching for underlying causation,
before accurately describing the case that we
are investigating (in either research or prac-

Sport & Exercise Psychology Review, Vol. 10 No. 1 51

Pete Lindsay, Tim Pitt & Owen Thomas
tice settings), sits at the heart of many of our
bewitchments. Rather than continue to
search for a hypothesised cause, practi-
tioners may consider using techniques such
as the ‘miracle question’ (de Shazer, 1985).
This approach suggests that the client is
telling you everything that you need to know,
and the practitioner should keep their atten-
tion externally on the client, rather than
internally on some theory. We would agree
with the sentiment of O’Hanlon and Wilk
(1987) in that ‘…every now and then, in the
course of a session, a hypothesis might accidentally
enter the therapist’s head, and the best remedy for it
is to lie down until it goes away’ (p.98).
Conclusions
In this article we have argued that sport
psychologists (and athletes) might, in
certain circumstances, become bewitched by
their words. Specifically, issues may arise
when confusing concepts for objects (and
treating them as such), playing by the rules
of different language-games in the wrong
contexts, and by overly focusing on linear
cause and effect thinking. By viewing the
discipline through the philosophical lens of
Wittgenstein, we can begin to unshackle
ourselves from these pictures that may hold
thinking captive. Thus, we may ‘…be able to see
that some problems in [sport] psychology are not to
be solved, but dissolved’ (Lourenço, 2001,
p.112). We perhaps do not need to read
Wittgenstein in order to realise that using
confounding terms can lead to confusions,
but practitioners and researchers alike may
wish to consider reading his works in order
to know how important it is for psychologists
52
to discuss the grammar and meaning of
some of their concepts. We concur with
Corlett (1996), in that exploring the philo-
sophical foundations of our discipline may
lead to training implications for developing
practitioners. Neophyte and in-training
sport psychologists should perhaps be
encouraged to read more philosophical
works, or have these be incorporated into
formal qualifications. As practitioners’
acquaintance to philosophy increases, the
discipline of (sport) psychology may gain
greater clarity over its philosophical roots,
and perhaps remain mindful of the ‘scien-
tific game’ in which it is absorbed.
The Authors
Pete Lindsay
The English Institute of Sport &
The Centre for Sport and Exercise Science,
Sheffield Hallam University.
Tim Pitt
The English Institute of Sport &
Cardiff School of Sport,
Cardiff Metropolitan University.
Owen Thomas
Cardiff School of Sport,
Cardiff Metropolitan University.
Correspondence
Pete Lindsay
English Institute of Sport,
Coleridge Road,
Sheffield, S9 5DA.
Email: pete.lindsay@eis2win.co.uk
Sport & Exercise Psychology Review, Vol. 10 No. 1

References
Ammereller, E & Fischer, E. (2004). Wittgenstein at
work: Method in the ‘philosophical vnvestigations’.
London: Routledge.
Andersen, M.B. & Speed, H. (2011). The practitioner
and client as storytellers: Metaphors and folktales
in applied sport psychology practice. In D.
Gilbourne & M.B. Andersen (Eds.), Critical essays
in applied sport psychology (pp.87–104). Champaign,
IL: Human Kinetics.
Bar-Eli, M. (1991). On use of paradoxical inter-
ventions in counseling and coaching in sport.
The Sport Psychologist, 5, 61–72.
Bateson, G. (1972). Steps to an ecology on mind: Collected
essays in anthropology, psychiatry, evolution, and
epistemology. New Jersey: Jason Aronson
Bateson, G. (1979). Mind and nature: A necessary unit.
New York: E.P. Dutton.
Bateson, G., Jackson, D.D., Haley, J. & Weakland, J.
(1956). Toward a theory of schizophrenia.
Behavioral Science, 1, 251–264.
Bennett, M.R. & Hacker, P.M.S. (2003). Philosophical
foundations of neuroscience. United Kingdom:
Blackwell.
Biddle, S.J.H., Markland, D., Gilbourne, D.,
Chatzisarantis, N.L.D. & Sparkes, A.C. (2001).
Research methods in sport and exercise
psychology: Quantitative and qualitative issues.
Journal of Sport Sciences, 19, 777–809.
Blair, D. (2006). Wittgenstein, language and information:
‘Back to the rough ground!’. Netherlands: Springer.
Carron, A.V. & Brawley, L.R. (2012). Cohesion:
Conceptual and measurement issues. Small Group
Research, 43, 726–743.
Cavell, M. (1996). The psychoanalytic mind: From Freud to
philosophy. United States: Harvard University Press.
Cheng, W-N.K., Hardy, L. & Markland, D. (2009)
Toward a three-dimensional conceptualisation of
performance anxiety: Rationale and initial
measurement development. Psychology of Sport and
Exercise, 10, 271–278.
Corlett, J. (1996). Sophistry, Socrates, and sport
psychology. The Sport Psychologist, 10, 84–94.
de Shazer, S. (1985). Keys to solution in brief therapy.
New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
de Shazer, S. (1988). Clues: Investigating solutions in brief
therapy. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
de Shazer, S. (1994). Words were originally magic.
New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
de Shazer, S., Dolan, Y., Korman, H., Trepper, T.,
McCollum, E. & Berg, I.K. (2007). More than
miracles: The state of the art of solution-focused brief
therapy. London: Routledge.
Dunnette, M.D., (1966). Fads, fashions, and folderol
in psychology. American Psychologist, 21(4),
343–352.
Sport & Exercise Psychology Review, Vol. 10 No. 1
Bewitched by our words
Elliot, A.J. & Fryer, J.W. (2008). The goal construct in
psychology. In J. Shah & W. Gardner (Eds.),
Handbook of motivational science (pp.235–250).
New York: Guilford Press.
Fischer, E. (2011). How to practise philosophy as
therapy: Philosophical therapy and therapeutic
philosophy. Metaphilosophy, 42(1–2), 49–82.
Giacobbi, P.R., Poczwardowski, A. & Hager, P. (2005).
A pragmatic research philosophy for applied sport
psychology. The Sport Psychologist, 19, 18–31.
Grange, P., Kerr, J.H. (2010). Physical aggression in
Australian football: A qualitative study of elite
athletes. Psychology of Sport & Exercise, 11, 36–43.
Hacker, P.M.S. (2007). The relevance of Wittgenstein’s
philosophy of psychology to the psychological
sciences. Forthcoming in Proceedings of the
Leipzig Conferences on Wittgenstein and Science 2007,
http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/RecentPapers.
html
Hanin Y.L. & Stambulova, N.B. (2002). Metaphoric
description of performance states: An application
of the IZOF model. The Sport Psychologist, 16(4),
396–415.
Hatfield, G. (2002). Psychology, philosophy, and
cognitive science: Reflections on the history and
philosophy of experimental psychology. Mind &
Language, 17(3), 207–232.
Heaton, J.M. (2010). The talking cure: Wittgenstein’s
therapeutic method for psychotherapy. United
Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan.
Hutto, D.D. (2009). Lessons from Wittgenstein:
Elucidating folk psychology. New Ideas in
Psychology, 27, 197–212.
Jastrow, J. (1899). The mind’s eye. Popular Science
Monthly, 54, 299–312.
Lane, C. (2013). The NIMH withdraws support for
DSM-5. Retrieved from:
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/side-
effects/201305/the-nimh-withdraws-support-dsm-5
Lawley, J. & Tompkins, P. (2000). Metaphors in mind:
Transformation through symbolic modelling. United
Kingdom: The Developing Company Press.
Li, W. & Lee, A. (2004). A review of conceptions of
ability and related motivational constructs in
achievement motivation. Quest, 56(4), 439–461.
Liben, L. (1997, Fall). Standing on the shoulders of
giants or collapsing on the backs of straw men?
The Developmental Psychologist, 2–14.
Lindsay, P., Breckon, J.D., Thomas, O. & Maynard, I.W.
(2007). In pursuit of congruence: A personal
reflection on methods and philosophy in applied
practice. The Sport Psychologist, 21, 335–352.
Lindsay, P., Thomas, O. & Douglas, G. (2010).
A framework to explore and transform client-
generated metaphors in applied sport psychology.
The Sport Psychologist, 24(1), 97–112.
53
Pete Lindsay, Tim Pitt & Owen Thomas
Lourenço, O. (2001). The danger of words:
A Wittgensteinian lesson for developmentalists.
New Ideas in Psychology, 19, 89–115.
Martens, R. (1987). Science, knowledge, and sport
psychology. The Sport Psychologist, 1, 29–55.
Monk, R. (2005). How to read Wittgenstein. United
Kingdom: Granta Books.
Moyal-Sharrock, D. (2009). Wittgenstein and the
memory debate. New Ideas in Psychology, 27,
213–227.
Nardone, G. & Salvini, A. (2007). The strategic dialogue:
Rendering the diagnostic interview a real therapeutic
intervention. London: Karnac Books Ltd.
O’Hanlon, B. & Wilk, J. (1987). Shifting contexts:
The generation of effective psychotherapy. New York:
Guilford Press.
Poczwardowski, A., Sherman, C.P. & Ravizza, K.
(2004). Professional philosophy in the sport
psychology service delivery: Building on theory
and practice. The Sport Psychologist, 18, 445–463.
Proudfoot, D.D. (2009). Meaning and mind:
Wittgenstein’s relevance for the ‘Does language
shape thought?’ debate. New Ideas in Psychology, 27,
163–183.
Racine, T.P. & Müller, U. (2009). The contemporary
relevance of Wittgenstein: Reflections and
directions. New Ideas in Psychology, 27, 107–117.
Ravizza, K.H. (2002). A philosophical construct:
A framework for performance enhancement.
International Journal of Sport Psychology, 33, 4–18.
Sigmon, S.B. (1985). A specific philosophical
influence on applied psychology: Wittgenstein to
Watzlawick. Psychology, A Quarterly Journal of
Human Behavior, 22(2), 42–45.
Smisson, C.P., Burke, K.L., Joyner, B., Munkasy, B.A.
& Blom, L.C. (2007). Spectators’ perceptions of
momentum and personal control: Testing the
Antecedents-Consequences Model. Athletic Insight:
The Online Journal of Sport Psychology. 9(1), 79–90.
Thelwell, R.C., Weston, N.J.V. & Greenlees, I.A.
(2005). Defining and understanding mental
toughness within soccer. Journal of Applied Sport
Psychology, 17, 326–332.
54
Thomas, O., Lane, A. & Kingston, K. (2011). Defining
and contextualising robust sport-confidence.
Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 23, 189–208.
Trankle, P. & Cushion, C.J. (2006). Rethinking
giftedness and talent in sport. Quest, 58(2),
265–282.
Tod, D. & Lavallee, D. (2011). Taming the wild west:
Training and supervision in applied sport
psychology. In D. Gilbourne & M.B. Andersen
(Eds.), Critical essays in applied sport psychology
(pp.193–215). Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.
Uttal, W.R. (1999). The war between mentalism and
behaviourism: On the accessibility of mental processes.
New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Vealey, R.S. (2006). Smocks and jocks outside the box:
The paradigmatic evolution of sport and exercise
psychology. Quest, 58, 128–159.
Warburton, N. (2001). Philosophy: The classics. London:
Routledge.
Watzlawick, P., Weakland, J. & Fisch, R. (1974). Change;
Principles of problem formation and problem resolution.
London: W.W. Norton & Co.
Wertheimer, M. (2012). A brief history of psychology.
New York: Psychology Press.
Wittgenstein, L. (1921). Tractatus logico-philosophicus
(D. Pears & B. McGuinness, Trans, 1961).
New York: Routledge.
Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations
(G.E.M. Anscombe, Trans.). New York:
Macmillan.
Wittgenstein, L. (1956). Remarks on the foundations of
mathematics. (G.E.M. Anscombe, Trans.; in G.H.
von Wright, R. Rhees & G.E.M. Anscombe, Eds.).
United Kingdom: Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. (1976). Cause and effect: Intuitive
awareness. (P. Winch, Trans.). Philosophia, 6(3–4),
409–425.
Wittgenstein, L. (1980). Culture and value. (G.H. von
Wright, Trans.) Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Wittgenstein, L. (2005). The big transcript (C.G.
Luckhardt, Trans.) Oxford: Blackwell.
Sport & Exercise Psychology Review, Vol. 10 No. 1