Arguing for Democracy

Gerardo Munck

Making the Case for Democracy

It is a matter of urgency to learn how to argue for democracy. It is important to know

how to make a case for democracy.

The Nature of Democracy. The first thing is to be clear about what we mean by
democracy. Fuzzy, contradictory, and ad hoc definitions of democracy abound in
academic writing and even more so in public discourse. So we need to be more
disciplined when we discuss democracy.

Do not drink Gallie’s “democracy-is-an-essentially-contested-concept” Kool-Aid.

Beware of the terminological maze associated with the discourse on varieties of

democracy and hybrid concepts.

Democracy is one thing, and a country has it or not and, if it has it, it can have it to
different degrees.

Avoid definitions that are minimalist, i.e., that exclude key properties of democracy (e.g.,
Schumpeter, Lipset), and maximalist, i.e., that include extraneous properties that are
not part of democracy (e.g., D. Beetham, L. Morlino).

The sweet spot is some combination of suggestions made by Robert Dahl, in

Democracy and its Critics (1989), and Adam Przeworski, in Democracy and the Limits
of Self-Government (2010). Read and reread these two books – they are our best
guides.

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A synthesis of Dahl (1989) and Przeworski (2010) would look something like this.
Democracy is a system of government based on (1) competitive elections, in which (2)
all adults can vote, and (3) winners of elections have the effective power to make
publicly binding decisions. Additionally, (4) some basic political freedoms should exist.

Various issues regarding thresholds and the relationships among properties of

democracy remain open questions. But Dahl and Przeworski offer what I consider an
indispensable point of reference for our discussion about what democracy is.

The Value of Democracy. The second thing to be clear about is that democracy is not
an absolute value (that trumps all others) and that possible trade-offs among multiple
values must be confronted head-on.

Part of the value of democracy is intrinsic. If democracy embodies the values of political
liberty and political equality, it frees us from political domination. We get such
arguments pretty directly from normative political theory.

To use a distinction made by Hans Kelsen, if you prefer autonomy, a form of

government in which the laws are made by the same people to whom they apply, to
heteronomy, whereby one lives under laws one cannot influence, you would obviously
prefer democracy.

But a good part of the value of democracy could be due to its consequences. And to
discuss them we need to bring in the social sciences.

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The Value of Democracy I. Dahl. Dahl addressed the question, why should we value
democracy? in On Democracy (1998: Ch. 5). I think his proposal – see below - went too
far: it promises too much and hence creates expectations that will likely not be met.

The Value of Democracy II. Przeworski. A better discussion, which combines political
theory and social science, is provided by Przeworski in Democracy and the Limits of
Self-Government (2010) and Why Bother with Elections? (2018).

The one-line summary of Przeworski's argument is that democracy has a key virtue: it
allows for the processing of conflicts in society in a peaceful manner.

But Przeworski’s longer summary in Why Bother with Elections? (2018: 4) is worth
reading closely:

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 Przeworski, Why Bother with Elections? (2018: 4)

As a bonus, Przeworski’s more recent (2022) summary of his view, which adds some
words about “the populist danger,” can be read in his tweet here:

https://twitter.com/AdamPrzeworski/status/1484148564729249792

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The Value of Democracy III. Others. For other relevant discussions about the
consequences of democracy, see these publications:

Acemoglu, Daron @DrDaronAcemoglu, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo, and James A.

Robinson, “Democracy Does Cause Growth,” Journal of Political Economy 127
(1)(2019): 47-
100. https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/124287/700936.pdf?sequence=2&i
sAllowed=y

Gerring, John, Carl Henrik Knutsen @carlhknutsen, and Jonas Berge, “Does
Democracy Matter?” Annual Review of Political Science 25 (2022): 357-75.
https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-polisci-060820-060910

V-Dem @vdeminstitute, “Case for Democracy Conference. Conference Report.”

https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/files/vdem_casefordemocracy_report.pdf

The Bottom Line

A discussion about the nature and value of democracy requires that we draw on both
normative political theory and the social sciences.

This discussion needs some order. Dahl was rightly frustrated with “the continuing
debates about what we mean by democracy—I mean this and he means that” (Interview
with Dahl in Munck and Snyder, Passion, Craft & Method in Comparative Politics 2007:
145).

This discussion calls for prudence. As Przeworski (2010) stressed, to defend

democracy, we need to know its limits – so as not to ask from democracy what no form
of government can deliver.

******

Making the Case Against Critics of Democracy

Arguments for democracy must explain why democracy is valuable. They also must
respond to unwarranted criticisms of democracy.

The Rhetoric of Reaction

General lessons for engaging with democracy’s critics can be drawn from Hirschman’s
Rhetoric of Reaction (1991).

Hirschman shows how opponents of democracy (& other progressive goals) deploy
three theses: the futility, perversity, and jeopardy theses.

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Hirschman’s categories can be summarized as follows:

(1) Futility: democracy is not possible.

(2) Perversity: democracy is possible, but it ends up in its opposite: tyranny.
(3) Jeopardy: democracy is possible, but leads to loses that are not compensated by the
existence of democracy.

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Importantly, each of these theses makes a different kind of claim. And each thesis can
be evaluated.

Also, even though logical arguments and empirical evidence could be strengthened
(more research is desirable), problems with each thesis can be identified.

The Futility Thesis

The futility thesis (democracy is not possible) is common. Indeed, the refrain country 1
(usually a non-Western country) is “not ripe” or “nor ripe yet” for democracy because it
lacks factor X (some prerequisite) is oft repeated.

But this thesis lacks credibility.

A broad rejection of prerequisites is provided by Hirschman. He proposed, instead, a

possibilistic perspective in which outcomes are not “preordained” and “paths leading to
an outcome that appears to be foreclosed on the basis of probabilistic reasoning alone”
are discovered.

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Albert Hirschman, “In Defense of Possibilism,” pp. 171-75, in Hirschman, Rival Views of
Market Society and Other Recent Essays (1986), p. 173.

A rejection of arguments about prerequisites due to Lipset (1959), and Almond and
Verba (1963), is provided by Rustow (1970).

A point-by-point rebuttal to various arguments about prerequisites is offered by

Kurzman (1998).

Many things are unthinkable until they happen. Genuinely new things always take us by
surprise. And by now we know that democracy has emerged and endured in all sorts of
conditions, in all corners of the world and in all cultures.

Sources

Hirschman, “In Defense of Possibilism,” pp. 171-75, in Hirschman, Rival Views of

Market Society and Other Recent Essays (1986), pp. 171, 173.

See also Hirschman “The Case Against “One Thing at a Time.” World Development
18(8)(1990): 1119-22.

Dankwart Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model.” Comparative

Politics 2(3)(1970): 337-63.
https://moodle.swarthmore.edu/pluginfile.php/100501/mod_resource/content/0/Democra
cy/Rustow_Transitions_Toward_Dynamic_Model.pdf

Charles Kurzman, “Not Ready for Democracy? Theoretical and Historical Objections to
the Concept of Prerequisites.” Sociological Analysis (Tirana, Albania) 1(4)(1998): 1-12.
https://kurzman.unc.edu/wp-
content/uploads/sites/1410/2011/06/Kurzman_Not_Ready_for_Democracy.pdf

The Perversity Thesis

The perversity thesis concedes that democracy can be attained but holds that attempts
to foster democracy are best avoided because democracy easily degenerates into the
tyranny of an unbridled majority.

Further, the perversity thesis appears plausible. Majorities can be capricious and
foolish. Leaders elected by these majorities can abuse their power. It is also true that
autocrats are capable of good government. Enlightened autocrats have existed and do
exist.

But evidence does not show that, when majorities have the power to govern in a
democracy, rule is more tyrannical than under non-democracy.

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We have no reason to believe that good government is more likely, on average, in
autocracies.

The Jeopardy Thesis

The jeopardy thesis grants that democracy is possible, yet holds that democracy is best
avoided so as to prevent the loss of something more valuable (e.g., personal freedom,
high culture, economic growth).

This thesis is the most complicated to address. The jeopardy thesis can be difficult to
refute. The idea of trade-offs between democracy and other values is plausible. And we
simply lack well-justified metrics to make judgements about such trade-offs. For
example, how much economic growth would justify giving up democracy? Yet, in some
instances, evidence can be brought to bear on the discussion.

It was common in the 1960s-1970s to hold that autocracy had an advantage over
democracy with regard to economic performance. The choice was framed as one
between dictatorship and development or democracy and poverty.

But now we have a different view. Adam Przeworski (2018) reviews the evidence and
concludes that “on average, autocracies do not perform better economically than
systems in which elections are competitive.” Daron Acemoglu et al. (2019) go further &
show that “democratizations increase GDP per capita by about 20 percent in the long
run .” On the one issue about which we have solid research, the conventional wisdom of
the 1960s-70s has been overturned or at least seriously questioned.

Sources

Przeworski, Why Bother with Elections? (2018: 101).

Daron Acemoglu, @DrDaronAcemoglu, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo, and James A.

Robinson, “Democracy Does Cause Growth,” Journal of Political Economy 127
(1)(2019): 47-100, p.
47. https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/124287/700936.pdf?sequence=2&is
Allowed=y

Learning from the Past

Most current criticisms of democracy are recycled arguments from past debates. So,
read about critics of democracy in the past.

Here are some useful sources:

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Femia, Joseph, Against the Masses: Varieties of Anti-Democratic Thought since the
French Revolution ( 2001); which is framed in terms of Hirschman’s three theses.

Gilley, Bruce, “Is Democracy Possible?” Journal of Democracy 20(1)(2009): 113-27.

https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Gilley-20-1.pdf

Lippincott, Benjamin Evans, Victorian Critics of Democracy: Carlyle, Ruskin, Arnold,

Stephen, Maine, Lecky (1938)

Roper, Jon, Democracy and Its Critics: Anglo-American Democratic Thought in the
Nineteenth Century (1989)

Spitz, David, Patterns of Anti-Democratic Thought: An Analysis and a Criticism, with

Special Reference to the American Political Mind in Recent Times (1949)

The Bottom Line

Few critics of democracy overtly advocate for autocracy. More common are veiled
criticisms of democracy. Also, in different countries, the battle over democracy takes
different forms.

Democrats should learn how best to defend their views against the critics they face.

They must be able to detect and counter unwarranted criticisms.

They should defend democracy by invoking values but also the social sciences.

Whether democracy prevails depends on various factors, such as ideological

polarization, economic power, military power, and external forces. However, at times,
knowing how to argue for democracy, and how to respond to critics of democracy, can
make a difference.

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