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FACTS
The RTC convicted Yu of Estafa on May 26, 2005. On June 9 or 14 days later
from receipt of the decision, Yu filed with the RTC a motion for new trial (MNT) alleging
that she discovered new and material evidence. On October 17, the judge had denied the
MNT for lack of merit. Yu had received the October 17 decision only on November 3.
On Nov 16, Yu filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC alleging she has a fresh
period of 15 days pursuant to the Neypes Rule from Nov 3 (thereceipt of the denial of
her MNT) OR up to Nov 18 to file her Notice of Appeal. On November 24, 2005, the
respondent RTC Judge ordered Yu to submit a copy of Neypes Ruling for his guidance.
On December 8, 2005, the prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for
being filed 10 days late, arguing that Neypes is inapplicable to appeals in criminal cases
as the Neypes case is a civil case. As the prosecution filed a Motion for Execution, Yu
had filed a petition for prohibition and TRO against the RTC.
Yu argues that the RTC lost jurisdiction to act on the prosecution's motions when
she filed her notice of appeal within the 15-day reglementary period.
ISSUE
Whether the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes Ruling apply to appeals in
criminal cases?
HELD
YES, While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court held
that the "fresh period" to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in
criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
for the following reasons:
1.BP 129 makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in criminal and civil cases
when it categorically stated “for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from
the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from”
2.The provisions of Rule 41, Section 3 and Rule 122, Section6 although differently
worded, mean exactly the same. Thereis no substantial difference between the two
provisionsinsofar as legal results are concerned - the appeal periodstops running upon
the filing of a motion for new trial orreconsideration and starts to run again upon
receipt of theorder denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration. Itwas this
situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases. Noreason exists why this situation in
criminal cases cannot besimilarly addressed.
In Neypes, the Court modified the rule in civil cases on the counting of the 15-day period
within which to appeal. The Court categorically set a fresh period of 15 days from a
denial of a motion for reconsideration within which to appeal, thus:
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole
prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and
inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals
to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows
extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their
appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of
15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted
from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.