CHAPTER 21

Schiller’s Philosophy of History

Andree Hahmann

A discussion of Schiller’s Philosophy of History must address two questions: First,

does Schiller have a philosophy of history at all? Second, if so, is it more than a
popularized form of Kant’s philosophy of history? The first question arises in part
from a more general concern about Schiller’s philosophy that has been expressed
variously by scholars in recent centuries. At the heart of this concern lies the fact
that Schiller is conceived primarily as a poet, and one wonders how a poet can be
a philosopher at the same time. The second question is based on Schiller’s open
admiration for Kant and the overall presence of Kantian themes and phrases in
Schiller’s theoretical work.
This chapter will answer both questions. The first part argues that Schiller
worked out a philosophy of history that shaped his approach to history as we find
it both in the published lectures and in his major historical writings. The second
part emphasizes important differences between Schiller’s approach to history and
Kant’s. It will be shown that essential aspects of Schiller’s philosophy of history
can not only be traced back before his first engagement with Kant, but are also
consistent with his overarching aesthetic-philosophical project.

Schiller’S PhiloSoPhy of hiStory

Some scholars claim that Schiller has not proposed a philosophical account of
history comparable to his philosophical letters or his work on aesthetics. His two
major historical works appear to be unaffected by any philosophical views

A. Hahmann ()
Tsinghua University, Beijing, China e-mail:
ahahmann@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 371

Switzerland AG 2023
A. Falduto, T. Mehigan (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook on the Philosophy of
Friedrich Schiller, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16798-0_21
372 A. HAHMANN

(Malter 1995, 281–282, Schmidt-Biggemann 1995, 273–274, 280). Rather, we find

limited reflections on the philosophy of history only in a few short texts. More
than that, most of the views expressed in these texts are simply variations on
Kant’s thought (Kaufmann 1940, 65; Schieder 1960, 31). But if this were the case,
we would have to conclude that Schiller has no philosophy of history of his own.
It is therefore not surprising that Frederik Beiser in his otherwise groundbreaking
work on Schiller’s philosophy does not address the philosophy of history as a
separate but devotes only some lines to Schiller’s “study of history” (2005, 39). In
what follows, I will show that, contrary to these assumptions, Schiller actually
proposed a unique view on history that is based on what can rightly lay claim to
be called a philosophy of history. We will then see that Schiller’s approach
assumes a fairly independent position within late German Enlightenment. In fact,
important features of later idealistic views of history are already prefigured in
Schiller’s philosophy of history.

Philosophy of History and Universal History

Admittedly, Schiller did not devote an entire book to his philosophy of history.
This does not mean, however, that he did not develop his own philosophical
account of history. It should be noted that Kant also did not present his account
of history in a single work, but developed his philosophy of history in a series of
short texts aimed at a wider audience. There are several reasons for this. Firstly,
the historical themes aroused the interest of a general audience concerned with
the ideas of the Enlightenment. 1 Of crucial importance to what was considered
the great project of the Enlightenment is the idea of man’s unique
determination.2 This determination requires the special education of man, nicely
depicted in Lessing’s influential essay on The Education of the Human Race
(1780). In this essay, Lessing connects the educational project with what is called
a universal history, that is, the idea that one has to “consider the entire sequence
of human beings, during the entire course of the ages, as a single man who lives
perpetually on and learns something all the time” (Blaise Pascal, taken from
Abrams 1973, 201). In Germany, influential versions of this idea were presented,
aside from Lessing, by Schlözer, Iselin, Herder, Gatterer, Tetens, and Kant. As
mentioned above, Kant is considered particularly important for the development
of Schiller’s conception of universal history. However, although there is an
evident impact of Kant’s account of history on Schiller, we must not lose sight of
other possible sources for Schiller’s conception of universal history. I will return
to this later.
Kant’s first publications on history can be seen against the backdrop of the
work of his former student Herder. In fact, it is difficult to disentangle the
relationship between Kant’s and Herder’s development of philosophy of history
(Schmidt-Biggemann 1995, 267–269). Herder admired Kant’s lectures on
1 The Berlinische Monatsschrift was founded in 1783 by Friedrich Gedike and Johann Erich Biester,
with whom Kant had been in correspondence since 1779. The letters show that Kant’s choice of topics
for the journal was partly based on Biester’s wishes.
2 A popular version of this idea goes back to Johann Joachim Spalding’s Betrachtung über die
Bestimmung des Menschen, Greifswald 1748.
 21 SCHILLER’S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 373

anthropology, which in turn already encapsulated central ideas of Kant’s mature

philosophy of history. Important for us is that Kant commented in a series of
reviews on the first and second part of the books of his former student
Herder (Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit 1784–1791). What
Kant found particularly objectionable about Herder’s account of history was that
Herder proceeded without principle and thus without philosophical guideline but
rather emphasized the role of chance in his presentation (Review of J. G. Herder’s
Ideas for the philosophy of the history of humanity. Parts 1 and 2 AA 8: 54–55). As
becomes clear from Kant’s Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim,
what a philosophy has to accomplish is to order the seemingly irregular course of
human history in order to make history fruitful for the overriding objective of
philosophy, namely to contribute to the realization of the determination of man
(IUH, AA 8: 25; 27; 29; 31). With the Conjectural
Beginning of Human History, published in 1786, Kant then also presented an
explicit counter-proposal to Herder. Central to Kant’s essays are above all two
assumptions, which are spelled out differently in his texts on history: First, the
claim—put at the beginning of the earlier-published Idea for a Universal History
with a Cosmopolitan Aim—that the history of free actions is as an appearance
also subject to a certain regularity that can be assessed teleologically (IUH, AA 8:
17, 19). This natural purpose is said to consist in the perfect development of
human predispositions, since predisposition is determined by nature to
completely develop (IUH, AA 8: 18; 19, 21; 30. See also AA 8: 115, 308). However,
this development presupposes a liberal political constitution
(IUH, AA 8:22, 28. See also Review of J. G. Herder’s Ideas for the philosophy of the
history of humanity. Parts 1 and 2 AA 8: 64; PP AA 8:366). Consequently, to
establish this political constitution becomes the ultimate end of the natural
development of man (MM, AA 6: 355; see Hahmann 2013, 2018).
Secondly, Kant assumes that this natural realization of the human
predispositions cannot happen in the individual, but only in the whole species
(IUH, AA 8:18). To achieve this end, nature employs a special means, namely
natural antagonism. This idea can be traced back to the 1770s and was developed
in different ways by Kant in his writings. In the end, however, it refers to a kind of
“unsociable sociability” (IUH, AA 8:20–21), according to which man’s striving is,
on the one hand, to socialize with fellow humans, but, on the other hand, also to
isolate himself from the very others. The result is discord among the people and
eventually war (Conjectural Beginning of Human History AA 8: 119–120, 121; TP
AA 8: 310; PP AA 8: 365).
The influence exerted by Kant’s ideas on the systematics of history become
evident, for example, in Reinhold, who was particularly concerned with the
scientific status of history itself. Reinhold claims that, in order to call history a
science, it will be necessary to give it a systematic form. Otherwise, it would
remain a mere collection or aggregate of historical facts. To provide this form to
history is one of the main objectives of a philosophy of history, or, rather, it
constitutes the essence of philosophy of history (Briefe über die Kantische
Philosophie vol. 1, 1790: 34–35).
This brings us eventually back to Schiller. We know that Schiller’s engagement
with Kant has been heavily influenced by Reinhold (Heinz 2007). In fact, it was
374 A. HAHMANN

Reinhold who sparked Schiller’s interest in Kant’s philosophy in the first place as
Schiller confessed in a famous letter to his friend Körner. 3 For our purposes, it is
noteworthy that Schiller was particularly interested in Kant’s philosophy of
history since his first contact with Kant’s philosophy. Two things follow from this:
Firstly, Kant’s work in the philosophy of history undoubtedly helped to shape
Schiller’s own conception of philosophy of history. 4 However, this does not mean
that Schiller blindly adopted Kant’s approach, and it does not justify to downplay
Schiller’s own contribution at all. We will come back to this in the second part of
the chapter. Secondly, and even more importantly for the moment, we have to
bear in mind the importance of systematic form to universal history. Against this
background, it is not surprising to note that similar to Kant and Reinhold, Schiller
also emphasizes the systematic form that history must take and he also believes
that philosophy of history has to establish this system. This becomes evident
most of all in Schiller’s inaugural lecture delivered after his appointment as
professor of philosophy5 in Jena. From this lecture emerged the text Was heisst
und zu welchem Ende studiert man Universalgeschichte, which is considered
Schiller’s most important and explicit contribution to philosophy of history
(published in Teutscher Merkur, November 1789).6
The importance that Schiller lays on systematic form becomes evident at the
beginning of the text. There Schiller famously distinguishes between the bread-
and-b utter scholar on the one hand and the genuine philosophical head on the
other (SW 4:750–754). At this point, we cannot consider all possible aspects of
Schiller’s comparison.7 However, we can clearly see that with the help of this
example Schiller contrasts synthetic activity with mere analytic thinking. The
former is related to philosophy, whereas the latter exhibits a rather limited view
on the underlying subject. Taken literally, synthesis means to combine distinct
elements, whereas analysis is a decomposition or division of what is already
combined. A crucial condition of this procedure is the idea that everything in the
world is actually interrelated or connected to which Schiller points in various
writings (SW 4:752, 773; SW 5:281, 283–284, 289). For Schiller, a real philosophic

3 Letter to Gottfried Körner, 29 August 1787: “Only in October do his lectures begin, which have
Kant’s philosophy and beautiful sciences as their content. Against Reinhold you are a despiser of Kant,
for he claims that after 100 years Kant must have the reputation of Jesus Christ. But I must confess
that he spoke sensibly of it, and already got me started with Kant’s little essays in the Berliner
Monatsschrift, among which the Idea for a Universal History gave me extraordinary satisfaction. That I
will read and perhaps study Kant seems to be certain.”
4 This has already been noted by Reinhold in a letter to Kant (14 June 1789, AA 11: 62).
5 Although Schiller is often conceived as professor of history, this is not true, at least in the strict
sense. In fact, he was appointed extraordinary professor of philosophy, which has been emphasized
by his colleagues in Jena who refused to accept Schiller as a historian at the faculty. See Muhlack
(1995), 9.
6 This text is followed by Die Sendung Moses (Thalia, Heft 10, 1790), Etwas über die erste
Menschengesellschaft am Leitfaden der Mosaischen Urkunde (Thalia, Heft 11, 1790), and Die
Gesetzgebung des Lykurgus und Solon (Thalia, Heft 11, 1790).
7 Prüfer (2002), 114–115, identifies a former, more personal motivation and points to Körner, who
in a letter from 1785 complains about his “Brotstudium”. Others point to institutional reasons for
Schiller’s distinction and his aim to criticize the traditional division between the lower faculty, that is,
philosophy, and the higher faculties, theology, medicine, and law, at German universities (Muhlack
1995, 27–28).
 21 SCHILLER’S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 375

head aims at this overarching coherence (SW 4:764; SW 5:284). 8 Consequently, a

philosophical or synthetic mind can never be satisfied with mere fragments. His
findings remain fragments, however, if the individual pieces are not combined, or,
as Schiller puts it in his inaugural lecture, synthesized (SW 4:752–753).
One must notice that Reinhold already pointed out in his discussion of history
that history remains to be a mere collection or aggregate of unrelated facts if it is
not united from a specific point of view. Reinhold takes this perspective as a
unifying principle to combine what is as such separated, and it is only in virtue of
this principle that a system can emerge. Schiller not only emphasizes this thought
in his inaugural lecture but also stresses the systematic combination of facts at
various places in his oeuvre, but especially in his historical writings (Kaufmann
1940). It becomes clear therefore that Schiller agrees with both Kant and
Reinhold that it is a major task of a philosophy of history to create a systematic
unity that distinguishes a philosophical view on history, that is, universal history
from a collection of historical facts. And if we agree with Reinhold that this is also
what essentially constitutes a philosophy of history for Schiller and his
contemporaries, we must admit that Schiller indeed proposed a philosophy of
history insofar as he accomplished to constitute a universal history based on
principles. To assess therefore Schiller’s philosophy of history, we need to
consider his system more thoroughly. In the following, I will argue that Schiller’s
systematic constitution of history is determined by a teleological perspective.

Providence in History
One of the major tenets of Enlightenment accounts of history, which is still most
problematically discussed, is the relationship between history and teleology.
According to a frequently raised objection, Enlightenment thinkers naively
assumed that history must be conceived as a teleologically ordered sequence of
events. At first sight, this seems to apply to Schiller as well. He frequently appeals
to this teleological order in nature that emerges from seemingly chaotic events
and helps to develop human predispositions and talents (Alt 2008, 532–533).
Similar to Kant, Schiller calls this purpose in history either providence, reason,
fate, or simply nature. We can find many examples of how Schiller employs the
idea that divine providence is governing human fate and thus the course of world
history all over Schiller’s historical writings (SW 4:764, 766, 767, 768, 776, 784,
787–788, 847, 850; SW 5:250–251, 285). However, we should not immediately
infer from the usage of these terms that Schiller simply and naively adopted the
view that history is guided by an overarching purpose. As I will show in this
section, it is not so much the uncritical application of theological assumptions but
rather underlying systematic considerations that are responsible for Schiller’s
teleological approach to history. In other words, systematicity as such requires a
superordinate teleology in history because only this teleological assumption can
provide a systematic organization of what appears to be chance events.

8 See also SW 4:846: “Reason cannot endure in an anarchic world. Always striving for harmony, it
would rather run the risk of unhappily defending order than desisting with indifference.”
376 A. HAHMANN

How exactly can teleological principles help to give history a systematic form?
First of all, it is important to note that the concept of providence unites three
different aspects of history: first, the idea of progress; second, that good arises
from evil; and third, the idea of an overarching order. That history need not
necessarily be seen as progressive is evident and emphasized by Kant, who points
out that alternatively there could be improvements in small matters but all in all
considered things remain the same (IUH AA 8: 17, 25). At least in the Idea for a
Universal History, Kant leaves it at this statement and expresses his conviction
that the philosopher must choose the side of providence. Schiller adds to this
thought by noting that human societies reveal distinct levels of development (SW
4:754). According to Schiller, “it is a wise hand” (SW 4:754) that draws our
attention to this fact in order to demonstrate that human societies naturally
develop, and it is on the basis of these observations that the historian is enabled
to determine the origin and course of this development.
The second idea, that good emerges from evil, is important in propelling the
development of society. Similar to Kant, Schiller claims that this development
depends on contrary conditions, either within human society (SW 4:813) or
between different states where hostility plays an essential role as incentive to
establish a juridical condition (SW 4:755, 766, 849). In Etwas über die erste
Menschengesellschaft, for example, the development of human societies is
triggered by opposing forces of nature (SW 4:769–770). It is only through war
that man can reach a position to completely develop his “reason and Sittlichkeit”
(morality, SW 4:770). For Schiller, however, the fact that good can emerge from
evil is also demonstrated by the fate of individuals who can turn the evil that
befalls them to their own good or the good of their people, as we can see from
the example of Moses. It is through providence, also called foresight or fate in
this chapter, that Moses was taken from the Hebrews and enjoyed an Egyptian
education which in turn was necessary to develop the capability and will to
accomplish to save the Hebrew people from Egyptian slavery (SW 4:787–788).
The two preceding ideas finally culminate in the idea that the purpose of
nature consists in creating political order or “to guide freedom by the bonds of
necessity” (SW 4:766).9 The opposite state to this would be “lawless freedom”,
which is at the same time a state of war (SW 4:755, 776, 805, 850). According to
Schiller, however, this condition has been overcome by continuing peace
prevailing in Europe at that time (SW 4:756–757). The reason for this state of
peace sees Schiller in the balance of European powers established by providence
or the “spirit of order” (SW 4:851). For Schiller, this balance brought about an
enduring but fragile state of peace in Europe as late as 1789, that is, shortly
before the outbreak of warfare that would shake Europe as a result of the French
Revolution.
If we look more closely at these passages, it becomes clear that Schiller uses
providence as a methodological device to structure historical facts and
sometimes also to fill historical gaps. Apparently, historical documents are often
scarce, especially regarding the oldest development of human societies. This can

9 See also SW 4:776: “It is usually only through the consequences of disorder that people arrive at
the introduction of order, and lawlessness usually leads to laws in the first place.”
 21 SCHILLER’S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 377

put the historian in a problematic position. In order not to be left with a mere
aggregate or assemblage of historical facts, the universal historian has to appeal
to reason to establish a systematic presentation (SW 4:763, 771):

The Mosaic document leaves us here and skips a period of 15 or more years to
show us the two brothers as already grown up. But this intervening period is
important for human history, and if the document leaves us, reason must fill the
gap. (SW 4:771)

Reason is equipped with many tools to fill these gaps. Not only does it infer
from effects to causes (SW 4:761), but it can also proceed according to analogy or
take from various sources to establish a systematic whole (SW 4:764). In this
special case, it means that Schiller also employs Greek sources to explain what
remains unclear in the biblical tradition (SW 4:780; 782). The choice of material
and the inferences by analogy, however, are guided by a teleological view on
history, which allows the universal historian to make use of these various sources
in view of an overarching teleological structure of events or “to transform what
he sees related as cause and effect into a combination of means and purpose”
(SW 4:764). We can see therefore that it is not so much the unquestioned
adoption of theological assumptions but rather systematic aims that made
Schiller employ this approach to history. In other words, systematicity as such
requires a superordinate teleology in history, which allows for systematically
organizing the seemingly random historical events. Or, as Schiller puts it:

He begins to remove one phenomenon after another from the domain of blind
chance, from freedom from law, and to fit it as a link into a harmonious totality
(which to be sure, exists only in his imagination). (SW 4:764, translation taken from
[1972], 332)
This last point deserves our special attention. It also makes clear that Schiller
does not naively assume that history is actually teleologically ordered. On the
contrary, Schiller is well aware of the subjective status of providence (Reed 2011,
272). It is the historian himself who conceives of history as if it were determined
by a superordinate plan:

Thus he transplants this harmony from himself to the nature of things; that is, he
imports a rational purpose into the course of the world, and a teleological principle
into world history. (SW 4:764 translation taken from [1972], 332)10

This superordinate plan of nature which constitutes a systematic whole

provides the means to order the seemingly random facts presented by the
historical sources. And only in view of this systematic whole is it worth calling
history a science. In a nutshell then, the harmonious order of historical facts is
produced by the universal historian who applies a teleological method of reason
in order to satisfy the systematic standards of philosophy of history.

10 See also SW 4:764: “This impulse strives for harmony and irresistibly nags the philosopher to
assimilate everything around him to his own rational nature and to transform every phenomenon in
his experience into the highest reality he knows—into thoughts” (translation taken from [1972], 332).
378 A. HAHMANN

Two points follow from this observation. First of all, Schiller’s teleological
assumptions that underly his historical writings must not be conceived as an
expression of the “passionate strength of his own will” (Kaufmann 1940, 8) but
derive from methodological considerations shaped by his philosophy of history
(Dann 2005, 74). Secondly, this philosophy of history is essentially constructivist
insofar as the historian has to establish a systematic whole that rightly deserves
to be called universal history.11 We have seen that Schiller agrees in this method
both with Kant and Reinhold. They are also well aware that in order to find any
sense in history we have to make it.

Schiller and Kant

Let us now turn to the second question and see whether Schiller blindly follows
Kant in his philosophy of history. As mentioned above, some scholars go so far as
to claim that Schiller’s approach is basically little more than a variation on Kantian
themes and thoughts (Malter 1995, 283). This judgement can draw on several
observations. We have seen that Schiller’s first contact with Kant’s philosophy
was through Kant’s texts on history. Moreover, in a famous letter Reinhold
mentions to Kant that he won Schiller over to Kant’s project (letter to Kant, 14
June 1789, AA 11: 62). Aside from the systematic claims discussed in the first part
of this chapter, there are many terminological similarities between Kant’s and
Schiller’s approach to history. For example, Schiller seems to have adopted from
Kant the important distinction between the philosophical head and the bread-
and-butter scholar in his inaugural lecture (Kant, IUH AA 8: 30). But nowhere else
does Schiller’s debt to Kant become as clear as in Etwas über die erste
Menschengesellschaft nach dem Leitfaden der mosaischen Urkunde (SW 4:767–
783). It has been pointed out that Schiller not only modelled the text according to
Kant’s Conjectural Beginning of Human History but also took over central claims
from his predecessor. But while all this is clearly the case, it does not follow that
Schiller did not make a unique and original contribution to philosophy of history:
First of all, it should be noted that the same or similar observations also apply to
Reinhold and Fichte, who are also heavily influenced by Kant. Moreover, it is still
unclear whether Schiller’s engagement with Kant is not essentially shaped by
Reinhold’s perspective on Kant (Heinz 2007).12 We also know that Schiller cannot
be counted among the blind followers of Kant’s philosophy from his critical
discussion of other aspects of Kant’s thought, most importantly Kant’s so-called
rigorism in ethics (Hinderer 2005, 37). But even more strikingly, Kant’s own
thoughts on history are not only problematic to locate within his overall
philosophical system, but he also seems to have adopted many of his basic ideas
from other Enlightenments thinkers, such as, Lessing, Schlözer, and Herder.

11 Schiller’s constructivist approach is nicely depicted by his friend Wilhelm von Humboldt, Werke,
Bd. II, S. 381–382: “Schiller used to claim that the historian, if he had absorbed all the factual
information through precise and thorough study of the sources, must still first construct the material
thus collected into a history out of himself [...].” See also Schiller’s letter to Caroline von Beulwitz, 10
December 1788 (NA 25:154).
12 Notice also that Die Sendung Mose draws on Reinholds, Die Hebräischen Mysterien oder die
älteste religiöse Freymaurerey.
 21 SCHILLER’S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 379

Although it is almost impossible to determine who took what from whom, it

simply cannot be excluded that Schiller draws from the same sources when he
developed his philosophy of history and later adds Kantian material to his original
project.13 In fact, I will show below that we have good reason to believe that
Schiller is pursuing a philosophical project of his own that not only clearly sets
him apart from Kant (and Reinhold) but also fits in well with his overall literary
production.

The Ends of History

So far, we have only pointed out that providence serves as a teleological
perspective (Reinhold, Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie I:34:
“gemeinschaftlichen Gesichtspunct”) or guideline (Kant, IUH, AA 08:17:
“Leitfaden”) necessary to establish a system. But until now, the exact purpose
that providence promotes has been left open. In this section, we will see that
Schiller’s and Kant’s philosophies of history diverge most clearly in this point. As
mentioned above, Kant’s philosophy of history must be seen in the overall
context of the Enlightenment question of the determination of man. It was briefly
mentioned that Kant first addressed this topic in his lectures on anthropology,
from which his philosophy of history emerged. Although the exact details of
Kant’s determination of this purpose are still under dispute, it is clear that for
Kant the final end of nature is related to the moral development of man. To this
end, juridical conditions must be created, which in turn promote the cultural
development of man and serve as a prerequisite for the moral final destination.
Looking at history, understood in a broad sense as the proper sphere of moral
action (Kant, IUH, AA 8:17 and Schiller, SW 4:749), helps to promote this goal by
pointing people towards it and thus strengthening their will and determination to
achieve it. What is more, this end provides the focal point of the historian,
needed both for the selection of his material and to establish the necessary order
to conform to scientific requirements.
At first sight, Schiller agrees with Kant in determining the overall purpose of
nature, although there are slight differences in terminology and emphasis. Similar
to Kant, Schiller also stresses the importance of the juridical state as a means to
fulfill the determination of man, that is, the complete development of all human
predispositions.14 Moreover, Schiller seems to have adopted Kant’s terminology
when he calls this condition “the highest good” (SW 4:815). For Schiller, the
highest good includes “Sittlichkeit” (morality) paired with “Kunstfleiß” (artistic
diligence), “Wissenschaften” (sciences), and “Fortschreitung des Geistes”
(progress of the spirit, SW 4:817), which taken together constitute true
happiness.
We can set the differences aside for the moment. What is important for us to
note is that Schiller also derives a subordinate end from the overall determination

13 Or as Reed (2011), 273, puts it: “Schiller was already on the way to Kant’s position before he
ever read the essays.”
14 SW 4: 815: “The state itself is never an end, it is only important as a condition under which the
end of humanity can be fulfilled, and this end of humanity is none other than the development of all
the predispositions of man, progress.” See also SW 4: 831, 832–833.
380 A. HAHMANN

of man. The exact relationship between these two ends is difficult to grasp in
Kant. We have already seen that the final end of creation, that is, the moral
development of man presupposed specific legal requirements that Kant also calls
the highest political good. In his Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant takes the
latter to be the last end of nature (“letzter Zweck der Natur”) and the former the
final end of creation (“Endzweck” AA 5:431; see Geismann 2006). Although
Schiller agrees with Kant in assuming two distinct purposes in nature, at closer
inspection we can see that both of these ends differ crucially from what can be
found in Kant. Schiller strangely emphasizes the present state of affairs and
demands that the universal historian takes this present state of affairs as the focal
point of his systematic research. Accordingly, he wants the universal historian to
concentrate primarily on those events that had an influence on the current world
state. In other words, the historian should only concern himself with events that
are apparently relevant to the production of the current state of affairs
understood as an overall end of all preceding history. What determines therefore
Schiller’s teleology is the actual state of affairs. To put it differently: Schiller takes
the current point of human development as an endpoint for all proceeding
events, which were thus destined to produce the actual state as their final end
(SW 4:760–761, 766; see Mann 1959, 1124 and Frick 1995, 99). With this in mind,
the current state of affairs provides the starting point of the universal historian to
look for past events that had the highest impact on the development of world
history and finally brought about or fundamentally contributed to the
determination of the current world state. 15
This is a highly remarkable claim, not only because it nicely depicts Schiller’s
above-mentioned constructivist approach to universal history. We can also see
more clearly how the teleological principle helps to establish a system from
isolated facts by the application of causal laws that are effective in history (SW
4:763). It is precisely in the way Schiller applies these causal principles that it
becomes most evident how his universal history departs from world history,
understood as the sum or collection of all historical facts. For universal history,
neither proceeds mechanistically, that is, according to a blind sequence of causes
and effects, nor does it abolish these very laws. On the contrary, Schiller
repeatedly emphasizes how important causality and the observation that similar
causes produce similar effects are for a historian (SW 4:763). Yet, universal
history and world history, taken as this unspecified sequence of events, diverge in
a most important aspect: A universal historian picks out peculiar events from a
present-day standpoint. As Schiller stresses, these events even seem to be
causally isolated in their own time and happen without any preceding notice. Yet
they have the greatest impact on the following time. He illustrates this idea with
the help of an example, namely the birth of Jesus Christ which is a most
important fact for universal history (SW 4:763). A further example of an event
that greatly influenced the development of world history is the constitution of the
Judaic state (SW 4:783). Against the backdrop of these events, we can clearly see
15 SW 4:762: “World-history therefore proceeds upon a principle which directly reverses the
world-order itself. The real series of events descends from the origin of things to their most recent
state, while the universal historian moves in the opposite way from the most recent state of the
world up to the origin of things” (translation taken from [1972], 331).
 21 SCHILLER’S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 381

how history understood in the widest sense and universal history necessarily
break apart: The former has no means to approach this type of events properly:
“[…] neither in the age in which it appeared, nor in the people among whom it
came into being, can one find […] a satisfactory explanation of its appearance”
(SW 4:763, translation taken from [1972], 331). Consequently, these events can
only be understood as mere chance events. Accordingly, from the point of view of
history understood in the widest sense, which takes into account all historical
facts in equal measures, history presents itself as a fragmentary or chance
assemblage of events. As seen above, Schiller takes this stance towards history to
be unworthy of a real philosophic mind, who in turn will connect these events in a
rational system—which forms a coherent whole (SW 4:763). 16
To come back to the twofold teleological structure mentioned above: similar
to Kant, Schiller also assumes an overarching philosophical purpose in addition to
this actual state which eventually also shapes the view on the present state of
affairs and thus the perspective of a universal historian. But two things must be
noted. Firstly, this philosophical purpose does not replace the historical
perspective but complements it. Secondly, Schiller once more fundamentally
departs from the path embarked by his famous predecessor in how he conceives
of this ultimate end of creation. Kant points out that the final purpose
(“Endzweck”) under which everything else must be subsumed is the complete
moral development of man included in the highest good. This development,
although one can detect some drawbacks, follows a forward-leading succession.
Schiller, on the other hand, agrees with Kant to a large extent about the nature of
this ultimate end, but disagrees with him about the path that leads to it. Schiller
also assumes that it is the purpose of man “to educate himself as a human being”
(SW 4:750), whereby above all the liberative moral aspects are important.
However, how he conceives of history is not so much a straightforward
development but more a dialectical model of distinct stages. I believe what has
led Schiller to this assumption is a problem that Kant simply did not recognize as a
problem since his major interests were exclusively devoted to morality. For Kant,
ancient philosophers did not properly distinguish between both aspects of the
highest good, that is, morality and happiness. Consequently, morality has been
mixed up with happiness. From this perspective, however, the ancient world did
not become aware of the holy nature of morality. Kant emphasizes that the idea
of pure morality was first introduced by Christianity (CPrR, AA05: 127–128).
Accordingly, if we take complete moral development as the endpoint of history,
we can see clear progress from ancient to Christian and thus even medieval
thought. In Schiller, however, who equally emphasizes the importance of art and
science for the overall development of human “Sittlichkeit” (morality), a
completely different picture emerges. Without question, the ancient world
provided the finest example of a highly developed art only to fall down into
pieces and decline for centuries. Only recently can art and sciences claim to have
reached a level comparable to antiquity (SW 4:829–830). This is the crucial
observation that Schiller has in mind when he sets out his view on universal

16 Frick (1995, 84) points out that Wilhelm von Humboldt closely follows Schiller in this point.
382 A. HAHMANN

history.17 Accordingly, the history that he outlines is not so much linear but
appears to be circular, at least at first sight. For it is here that we can see Schiller’s
second striking innovation that sets him apart from Kant. Indeed, Schiller’s view
on history is not circular but dialectical and the objective endpoint of historical
development is a return of the dialectical movement to itself, that is, to its
ancient starting point, but not to negate the departure but in order to “aufheben”
and culminate in a more advanced state. Take, for example, On the Aesthetic
Education of Man in a Series of Letters, in which Schiller contrasts Greek with
modern humanity (SW 5:582, 436–437) or how he presents the three stages of
natural harmony, cultural division, and the ideal of the future of humankind in On
Naïve and Sentimental Poetry: “They are, what we were; they are, what we
should become once more. We were nature like them, and our culture shall lead
us along the path of reason and freedom back to nature” (SW 5:695, translation
ESS 181; see also SW 5:581; Abrams 1973, 213). In this model, Schiller introduces
the “aufheben” in a synthesis, and thus prepares Hegel’s later approach to history
(Abrams 1973, 212–213; Hinderer 2005, 35–36, 39–41; Kaufmann 1940, 6–7):

Beauty unites […] two conditions which are diametrically opposed and can never
become One. It is from this opposition that we have to start. […] In the second
place […] beauty unites these two opposed conditions and thus destroys the
opposition [hebt also die Entgegensetzung auf]. Since, however, both conditions
remain everlastingly opposed to each other, there is no other way of uniting them
except by sublating18 them [als indem sie aufgehoben werden]. […] both these
conditions totally disappear in a third without leaving any trace of division behind in
the new whole that has been made. (SW 5:625, translation AE 123–125)

For Schiller, the history of civilization is distinguished into three stages: a

natural, an aesthetic, and a moral stage, whereby the third stage incorporates
and preserves the values of both the natural and the aesthetic stages (Abrams
1973, 213). Given that the first stage finds its finest example with the ancient
Greek world and especially Greek art, it is not surprising that Schiller most clearly
worked out this view on history in his late aesthetical essays. But this does not
mean that he changed his view on history or abandoned fundamental earlier
assumptions that shaped his philosophy of history as some assume (Koopmann
1995, 69–72; Frick 1995). On the contrary, Schiller makes ample use of this
threefold developmental scheme in various historical writings. For example, we
can trace back Schiller’s dialectical understanding of history at least to Etwas über
die erste Menschengesellschaft nach dem Leitfaden der Mosaischen Urkunde

17 SW 4:766: “By unravelling the fine gears by which the silent hand of nature has been developing
the powers of man since the beginning of the world, and by indicating with precision what has been
gained in each period for this great plan of nature, it [universal history, A. H.] restores the true
standard of happiness and merit which the prevailing delusion has falsified differently in each
century. It cures us of the exaggerated admiration of antiquity and of the childish longing for times
past; and by drawing our attention to our own possessions, it does not make us wish back the
vaunted golden ages of Alexander and August.” See also SW 4:845; SW 5:582.
18 Wilkinson and Willoughby translate as “destroying” which however does not properly capture
the dialectical process described here by Schiller.
 21 SCHILLER’S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 383

(Abrams 1973, 209).19 We can add to this that Schiller worked out his historical
texts in line with this dialectical method too (Muhlack 1995, 15; Schieder 1960).
In the next section, I will show that basic features of Schiller’s overall
philosophical view on history reach back as early as his academic writings from
the Karlsschule. Moreover, we find fundamental aspects of Schiller’s philosophy
of history equally in his medical, poetic, and theoretical work.
Philosophy of History and Schiller’s “Lifetime-Project”
It has been noted that Schiller’s engagement with history goes back to his earliest
writings composed at the Karlsschule (Hinderer 2005, 34). In these texts, Schiller
mentions two important sources of his historical approach: Schlözer and Garves
commentary on Ferguson (SW 5:300–301; Dann 2005, 77; Koopmann 1995, 61).
In his second medical dissertation, Schiller quotes from Schlözer’s conception of
universal history, through which he is introduced to the universal history of the
whole human race (SW 5:303–306). Schlözer remains an important point of
reference for Schiller, who also refers to Schlözer in his later work. For instance,
Schiller uses Schlözer’s text in the preparation of the lectures in Jena (NA, 25:
387; see Muhlack 1995, 10). In Schlözer, we already find the idea that it is the aim
of a universal historian to transform the aggregate of historical facts into a system
(Vorstellung seiner Universal-Historie I, § 9–10, 14–19) that is determined by a
teleological perspective or plan:

The universal historian raises them [the great world events] out of the already
prepared material of innumerable special histories [...] selects them purposively,
and arranges each history in a relation to the other parts and to the whole plan: this
gives them their form. (Vorstellung seiner Universal-Historie, I. § 8, 13–14)

Above we identified this objective as the fundamental feature of a philosophy

of history. We can see now that this view is not unique to Kant or Reinhold but
also shows up in other important inspirations of Schiller’s work. As indicated at
the beginning, we cannot rule out either that Kant and Schiller have drawn from
similar sources or that these ideas belong to a common set of conceptions and
ideas shared by many thinkers in late Enlightenment thought. A further important
source of Schiller’s philosophy of history can be seen in Herder. Both thinkers
share a strong fascination for natural philosophy. In Schiller’s case, this
fascination also goes back to his medical training. Schiller’s later repeated
parallelization of natural and political developments perhaps also stems from this
background (Peter Hanns Reill 2006, 69). In any case, in his first theoretical texts
we can see not only a clear idea of the goal of historical development but also the
idea that the study of history itself must be subordinated to this superior goal
(SW 5:250–251, 281–285, 302–306). As Walter Hinderer notes in his discussion of
Schiller’s early anthropological texts: “Schiller’s first dissertation, Philosophie der
Physiologie, already contains in nuce the ideas of his later writings” (2005, 35). 20
19 SW 4:768: “He should learn to revisit the state of innocence which he now lost, through his
reason, and come back as a free rational spirit to where he had started from as a plant and as a
creature of instinct [...].” See also SW 4:771; 845.
20 Hinderer (2005), 42: “Although Schiller’s theoretical ideas were stimulated by ‘the philosophy of
the physicians’ […], popular philosophy […], and the writings of Garve, Kant, Reinhold, Herder, and
384 A. HAHMANN

To put it differently, in his later work, Schiller elaborates on his early

understanding and advances his view but he does not completely transform it, as
one might expect if we assume that Schiller’s philosophy of history is nothing
more than an adaption of Kant’s thought.
The fact that Schiller’s preoccupation with history cannot be attributed solely
to his reading of Kant is also made clear by the function Schiller assigns to the
study of history and how it fits into his overarching project. In his inaugural
lecture, Schiller claims that the occupation with universal history is not only an
attractive and useful activity but it also has therapeutic effects on individuals and
even whole societies. Through enlarging the historical perspective, it displays the
grand picture of the times and nations before one’s eyes. Consequently, the
perspective of universal history will have an effect on the rash decisions of the
moment and can even help to transcend egotism. For it not only connects the
individual with his past but also opens her view to the future, by extending the
brief existence of human beings. Thus, universal history can bridge the gap
between self-love and freedom, or the individual and the species (SW 4:765). This
way it allows for real education and progress of humankind. This is in fact no
small task that Schiller attributes to universal history. Instead, this is actually, so
to speak, Schiller’s lifetime project as becomes clear both from his earliest and
latest writings (Frick 1995, 87).
Contrary to other scholars, who believe that Schiller’s own development, but
above all his works on history, is determined more by coincidental circumstances,
I conclude therefore that Schiller’s philosophy of history remains remarkably
constant over his intellectual development. What others framed as “ruptures”
(Brüche Frick 1995, 97) in Schillers relationship with history, I would call
development or change in emphasis, often related to the genre in which Schiller
expresses his thought. History, for Schiller, remains not only an important source
of inspiration, from which he takes the ideas of his poetic work, as he confessed
to Goethe (Letter to Goethe, 5 January 1798, NA 29:183). We now see that these
works are consistent with his overarching goal. The only difference is the means
Schiller uses when he pursues this goal. Applying Schiller’s own method, one
could also say: what seems random in itself comes together to form a
harmonious whole in view of this overarching goal of achieving man’s
determination.21

concluSion
I want to conclude my discussion by returning to our two initial questions: Does
Schiller have a philosophy of history? I believe we can vigorously affirm this
question both with respect to how Schiller’s contemporaries Kant and Reinhold
conceive of a philosophy of history and its major objectives but also in light of

Fichte, he developed a basic view of the human being quite early that later changes only in its
questions, its methodology, and above all in the differentiation of its terminology.” As I will briefly
indicate in the following, Schiller’s basic aims, nicely captured by Hinderer in terms of the ancient
claim to assimilate to the divine, remain the same and constitute what deserve to be called his
lifetime project.
21 See once more Humboldt’s judgement about his friend (Werke, Bd. II., 384).
 21 SCHILLER’S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 385

Schiller’s own engagement with history. Is it more than a popularized form of

Kant’s philosophy of history? Although it is tempting to view eighteenth-century
philosophy exclusively through Kantian lenses, Schiller, like Reinhold and Fichte,
offers a good example of how Kant’s contemporaries both responded to and
reshaped Kant’s thought, ultimately adapting it to their own ends. But in contrast
to his peers Reinhold and Fichte, Schiller’s contribution to the development of
German idealism is still largely undervalued. I believe that his philosophy of
history in particular offers a good example of how his thoughts paved the way for
the great idealistic systems of the philosophy of history.

referenceS
Abrams, H. M., Natural Supernaturalism. Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature,
Norton Library: New York 1973.
Alt, Peter-André, Natur, Zivilisation, Narratio. Zur triadischen Strukturierung von Schillers
Geschichtskonzept, in: Zeitschrift für Germanistik 18.3 (2008), 530-545.
Beiser, Frederick, Schiller as Philosopher. A Re-Examination, Oxford 2005.
Frick, Werner, Der Maler der Menschheit. Philosophische und poetische Konstruktionen
der Gattungsgeschichte bei Schiller, in: Schiller als Historiker, hrsg. von O. Dann, N.
Oehlers und E. Osterkamp, Stuttgart, Weimar 1995, 77-107.
Dann, Otto, Schiller the Historian, in: A Companion to the Works of Friedrich Schiller, ed.
by Steven D. Martinson, Rochester 2005, 67-86.
Geismann, Georg, "Höchstes politisches Gut" - "Höchstes Gut in einer Welt". Zum
Verhältnis von Moralphilosophie, Geschichtsphilosophie und Religionsphilosophie bei
Kant, in: Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 68 (2006) 23-41.
Hahmann, Andree, Pflichtgemäß aber töricht! Kant über Spinozas Leugnung der
Vorsehung, in: Das Leben der Vernunft. Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants, ed. by D.
Hüning, S. Klingner, C. Olk, Berlin, Boston 2013, 477-505.
Hahmann, Andree, Naturzustand und Naturgarantie in Kants Schrift Zum ewigen
Frieden, in: ... jenen süßen Traum träumen. Kants Friedensschrift zwischen objektiver
Geltung und Utopie, hrsg. von D. Hüning und Stefan Klingner, Baden-Baden 2018, 65-
90.
Heinz, Marion, “Die Harmonie des Menschen mit der Gottheit” – Anthropologie und
Geschichtsphilosophie bei Reinhold und Schiller, in: Friedrich Schiller. Der
unterschätzte Theoretiker, ed. by G. Bollenbeck und L. Ehrlich, Köln, Weimar, Wien
2007, 27-37.
Hinderer, Walter, Schiller’s Philosophical Aesthetics in Anthropological Perspective, in: A
Companion to the Works of Friedrich Schiller, a.a.O. 2005, 27-46.
Humboldt, Wilhelm von, Werke in fünf Bänden, ed. by A. Flitner and K. Giel, 3rd ed.
Darmstadt 1979.
Koopmann, Helmut, Das Rad der Geschichte. Schiller und die Überwindung der
aufgeklärten Geschichtsphilosophie, in: Schiller als Historiker, a.a.O. 1995, 59-76.
Malter, Rudolf, Schiller und Kant, in: Schiller als Historiker, a.a.O. 1995, 281-291.
Mann, Golo, Schiller als Historiker, in: Merkur 13/142 (1959), 1120-1137.
Muhlack, Ulrich, Schillers Konzept der Universalgeschichte zwischen Aufklärung und
Historismus, in: Schiller als Historiker, a.a.O. 1995, 5-28.
Prüfer, Thomas, Die Bildung der Geschichte. Friedrich Schiller und die Anfänge der
modernen Geschichtswissenschaft, Köln, Weimar, Wien 2002.
386 A. HAHMANN

Reed, T. J., So Who Was Naïve? Schiller as Enlightenment Historian and His Successors, in:
Who Is This Schiller Now? Essays on His Reception and Significance, ed. by J. L. High, N.
Martin, N. Oelers, Rochester 2011, 271-283.
Reill, Peter Hanns, “Schiller, Herder, and History” in: Schiller und die Geschichte, ed. by. M.
Hoffmann, München 2006, 68-78.
Reinhold, Carl Leonhard, Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie, vol. 1, Leipzig 1790.
Schieder, Theodor, “Schiller als Historiker”, in: Historische Zeitschrift 190 (1960)31-54.
Schiller, Friedrich 1972 [1789]. “The Nature and Value of Universal History: An
Inaugural Lecture.” History and Theory 11, no. 3: 321-334.
Schlözer, Ludwig August, Vorstellung seiner Universal-Historie. Göttingen, Gotha 1772.
Schmidt-Biggemann, Wilhelm, Geschichtsentwurf und Erziehungskonzept, in: Schiller als
Historiker, a.a.O. 1995, 267-280.