Rae - 2014 - Ontology in Heidegger and Deleuze. A Comparative Analysis

Co豆豆豆眼目飞re
Gavin Rae
American University in Cairo, Egypt
B1\宜。661210
。 Gavin Rae 2014
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Conte且也
Preface Vl1
A Ck l1 owledgemel1 ts lX
Abbreviatio l1 s for Works Cited Xl
-A 吵'ω 严
1 Introduction
Heidegger and Deleuze
3
The argument developed
吨，中
42'A
Structure of the book

2 Rethinking the Human: Heidegger, Fundamental
677
1123
Ontology, and Humanism
1n search of being
Metaphysical humanism
Human ek-sistence
The importance of being
3 Beingand τechnology: on of
4445
2JV寸J110J?
?νfetaphysics
Being, metaphysics , and anthropocentr如n
Technology
Overcoming the enframing of ll10dern technology
中
The destruction of metaphysics

4 Philosophy as World-view: and the
QJ0
fO 寸/呵，
τhinking of Being
The being of philosophy
The questioning of philosophy
J
寸J
Revealing phi1osophy by doing philosophy

寸/
Phi1osophy as world幡view
5 Transforming Thought: and
Meditative τhinking 87
Overcoming philosophy through thinking 88
Meditative thinking and being 91
Meditative thinking and the ab-ground of being 96
The movement to meditative thinking 102
Willing the overcoming of metaphysical thinking 108
V
vi Contents
6 Deleuze on Being as BecoITlÎng: Multiplicity,

Difference, and Virtuality 116
Being as beco I1ling 117
Becoming as multip1icity 125
Difference and negation 130
Virtuality, actua1ity, possibility, and rea1ity 137
7 Deleuze and the Structural Conditions of Philosophy 145
The image of thought 146
Philosophy as concept-creation 152
The plane of immanence 163
Conceptual personae 172
8 Deleuze on the Purpose and Place of Philosophy 174
The problems of ph i1 osophy 174
Geo-philosophy 180
The place of ph i1 osophy in relation to science and art 187
Thinking the relationship between the discip 1ines 191
9 in Deleuze's Differential Ontology 200
Reconc i1i ng the irreconcilable 201
Different senses of identity 206
Examples of identity in Deleuze's differential ontology 209
Concluding remarks 212
Works Cited 216

Index 221
Preface
What is at issue is philosophy … one of the few great things of

humanity.
Martin Heidegger (1M: 16)
The primary purpose of this book is to offer a comparative analysis of

the ontologies of Martin Heidegger (1889 1976) and Gilles Deleuze
…
(1925…1975) , where ontology refers to the study of the nature of being.

While there are many ways to understand what this means , perhaps the
most basic, although not necessarily the easiest , is to think of it as trying
to answer the question: what does it mean to say that something is? By
examining their responses to this question through the mediating lens
of their respective analyses of metaphysics and thinking, this book also
explores their thinking about thought 'itself'. Heidegger's and Deleuze's
reflections on thought echo and resonate between each other, sometimes
harmoniously, but more often than not discordantly. Their relation-
ship is , therefore , one of discordant harmony where they relate to each
other through differences. By showing that their analyses of thinking
are intimately connected to their analyses of metaphysics , which are
linked to their respective ontologie岛出 is book examines the relation-
ship between epistemology, metaphysics , and ontology in Heidegger
and Deleuze. The title does not reflect this because one of the main
arguments 1丑 ade is that Heidegger's and Deleuze's views on thinking
and metaphysics are grounded' in their respective ontologies , meaning
I ‘
that a genuine comparative analysis must be conducted through their

ontologies. Indeed , to my knowledge , this is one of the first , if not the
first , book that offers an extended , comparative analysis of the ontolo国
gies of Heidegger and Deleuze.
A number of contributions are made by undertaking this study in this
way: (1) we obtain a clear understanding of Heidegger's and Deleuze's
analyses of ontology, metaphysics, and epistemology, including the way
the former grounds' the latter two; (2) we bring two representatives of
I
the phenomenological and post-structuralist traditions into discussion

with one another and so start to show some of the connections and
differences between these schools' of
I and by discussing
the relationship between being, and identity, contribute to
discussions that dominated much of the latter half of twentieth-century
飞111
viii Prefàce
European , so-called 'continental' , philosophy. To highlight their respec ‘
tive understandings and show their historical relevance , 1 suggest that

the Heidegger-Deleuze relationship is fundamentally a discussion about
two questions: (1) how to ove1'come ontologies that p1'ivilege identity
0 1' that think of being in te 1' ms of presence? and (2) how to think the
relationship between identity and difference? Heidegger's response to
the second question is to suggest that 'identity' and 'difference' are
'grounded' in being while Deleuze claims that 'identity' emanates from
'difference'. This brings us to the first question with Heidegger claiming
that overcoming the privileging of identity 1'equi1'es that beingbe thought
through its difference to entities and Deleuze claiming , in contrast , that
it 1'equi1'es that being be thought as difference. Thei1' 1'esponses to these
questions shape their 1'espective analyses of the 'p1'ope 1" way to think
with Heidegger claiming that philosophy must be Ovelωme by, what he
wi1l call , meditative thinking that 1'eflects being's temporal becoming,
and Deleuze claiming , in contrast, that philosophy must be transfonned
to creatively express being's differential becoming. Because Heidegge1" s
and Deleuze's analyses of the 'prope1" way to thinkare 'grounded' in
their analyses of being, any compa1'ison of the two must be located at
the level of thei 1' respective ontologies.
Ack日owledgeme口也
This book has a diverse history encompassing two continents (Africa

and Europe) and three countries (Egypt , Scotland, and Spain). The
project was started just prior to the so-called revolution that swept
Mubarak from power in Egypt and was completed just after the 'coup'
that removed his successor from office. lt was , therefore , written during
a time of tremendous upheaval , social trouble , economic problems , and
increasing lawlessness in Egypt. lndeed , there can't be too many books
out there whose gestation encompasses a 'revolution' and a 'COllp'. While
this horizon was not particularly conducive to study, it did provide
lnany memories, the most comical of which was probably caused by
the increasingly lengthy electricity blackouts that occurred just prior to
the 'COlψ ， that regularly left me reading and writing in a large , otherwise
empty, pitch-black apartment using something akin to a miner's lamp
strapped to 1丑y head.
While there were, therefore, significant difficulties encountered
during the completion of this book, 1 was fortunate to have the support
of a III口umbe 缸r of individuals who 吼，怡
t o var叩
yi怕
ng degre
优 es乓，口
1n泪
ade the process
缸l'‘ less painful than 让
fa i t woul挝
do时the臼l
n丑10S挝t p 1'obably弘'， a nUI口，nber of others whose implicit contribution shaped
its content, l'm explicitly aware of the contribution of the following
and so I'd like to take a moment to acknowledge them. First , I'd like
to thank my friends here in Cairo who have made the last few years
bearable and memorial. There are too many to name specificall弘 and
many have now gone on to pastures new, but , by now, you , hopefully,
know who you are. My family have also , once again , been a source of
invaluable support throughout my Egyptian adventure, even if this has ,
at times , caused them much worry. Professionally speaking, I'd like to
thank my colleagues in the philosophy department fo 1' their support
and daily interactions as we struggle together to teach philosophy in
the desert. This book also benefited from two summer 1'esearch gr丁ants
from the American University in Cairo , which allowed me to undertake
research at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM) , Spain. 1
am particularly grateful to Graham Harman fo 1' his support duri日g the
process through which these we 1'e obtained. I'd also like to thank the
staff at the National Li brary of Scotland, Edinburgh , Scotland fo 1' their
help in obtainin
lX
x Acknowledgements
Different versions of various parts of the book have previously been

presented or published in different formats and I'd like to thank the
editors from these pub 1ications for their permission to use that mate-
rial here and for the various anonyr丑ous reviewers from each for their
helpful comments. More speci白 call弘 a shorter version of Chapter 2,
entitled 'Rethinking the Human: Heidegger, Fundamental Ontology,
and Humanism' , was published in 2010 in Human Studies , vo l. 33 , no. 1,
pp. 23-39. A version of Chapter 3, entitled 'Being and Technology:
Heidegger and the Overcoming of 孔1etaphysics' ， was published in 2012
in the Journal o{' the British Society {'or Phenomeno[ogy, vo l. 43 , no. 3,
pp. 305…325. Aspects of Chapters 4 and 5 were combined to form
the majority of the paper 'Overcoming Philosophy: Heidegger on the
Destruction of Metaphysics and the Transformation to Thinking' , which
was pub1i shed in 2013 in Hwnan Studies , vo l. 36, no. 2, pp. 235-257 ,
and material from Chapter 9 is found in the paper 'Traces of Identity in
Deleuze's Differential Ontolo部7' ， which was published in 2014 in the
Internatíonal Journal o{' Philosophical Studíes , vo l. 22, no. 1, pp. 86一 105.
Aspects of Chapter 8 formed the majority of the paper 'Independence,
Alliance , & Echo: Deleuze on the (Inter幅) Relationship between
Philosophy, Science, & Art' , which was presented at the 'Deleuze,
Philosophy, Transdiscip 1inarity' conference held at Goldsmiths College,
University of London , on the 10-12 February 2012; my thanks to those
who participated. At Palgrave Macmillan , I'd like to thank the anon-
ymous reviewers for their helpful comments and my editor, Brendan
George, for his continued support for the project , willingness to respond
to my queries , and patience, especially in the early stages , when it suffered
some setbacks. Lastly, but by no means least , I'd like to thank Emma for
her unwavering support, patience, 'corr‘ ective' discussions on Deleuze,
and general willingness to put up with me and my 'complaints'. Sín ti 110
podría haberlo hecho.
Abbreviations forWorks Cited
The following is a list of the abbreviations of the works of Heidegger

and Deleuze cited in the text. 1 cite the English translations as these
are the texts that readers will most 1ikely find easiest to consult. 丁hose
looking for the corresponding original can easily find this through a
quick on1ine search or by consulting the preliminary material of each
translation. All other references can be found by comparing the in-text
citation to the '\1飞lorks Cited' section located at the end of the book.
腥的 degger:
τE Heidegger, M. (2013) , The Event, trans. Richard Rojcewicz, lndiana

University Press: Indiana.
CPC Heidegger, M. (2010) , Countη1 Path Conversations , trans. Bret W.
Davis , lndiana University Press: Indiana.
PRL Heidegger, M. (2010) , The Phenom臼1Ology of Religiolls Li fe , trans.
Matthias Fritsch and ]ennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei , Indiana
University Press: Indiana.
PIE Heidegger, M. (2010) , Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression ,
trans. Tracy Colony, Continuum: London.
TDP Heidegger, M. (2008) , Towards the De卢nitiol1 of Philosophy, trans.
Ted Sadler, Continuum: London.
LH Heidegger, M. (2008) , 'Lεtter on Humanism' , in Basic
Writings , trans. David Farrell-Krell, Harper Perennial: London,
pp.217-265.
WL Heidegger, M. (2008), The Way to Language' , in Bαsic Writings ,
trans. David Farrell-Krell, Harper Perennial: London, pp. 397-426.
MFN Heidegger, M. (2006) , Mind卢lZness ， trans. Par飞Tis Emad and Thomas
Kalary, Continuum: New York.
BT Heidegger, M. (2003) , Being and Time , trans. ]ohn Macquarrie and
Edward Robinson , B1ackv飞Tell: London.
EHF Heidegger, M. (2002) , The Essence of Hwηal1 Freedom , trans. Ted
Sadler, Continuum: New York.
ET Heidegger, M. (2002) , The Essence of Truth , trans. Ted SadleI二
Continuum: New York.
ID Heidegger, M. (2002) , and Dil和rence， trans. Joan
Stambaugh, University oÍ Chicago Press: Chicago.
xii Abbreviatiol/ s (0 1" Works Cited
PIA Heidegger, M. (2001), Phenomenological Interp陀 tations o(Aristotle:

Initiation into Phenomenological Research , trans. Richard Rojcewicz,
Indiana University Press: Bl oomington.
TP Heidegger, M. (2001), 'Theτhinker as Poet', in Poe t1如 Language，
Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter, Harper Perennial: New York,
pp. 1-14.
OWA Heidegger, M. (2001), 'The Origin of the Work of Art', in Poe t1y,
Language, Though 已 trans. Albert Hofstadter, Harper Perennial:
New York, pp. 15-86.
WPF Heidegger, M. (2001), 'What are Poets For?' in Poe t1 y, Laηguage，
Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter, Harper Perennial: New York,
pp.87-14.
BTD Heidegger, M. (2001), 'Building Thinking Dwelling', in Poe t1y,
Langllage, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter, Harper Perennial:
New Yor扎 pp. 141-160.
PMD Heidegger, M. (2001),\.. Poetically Man Dwells...' in Poe t1y,
Langllage, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter, Harper Perennial:
Z Heidegger, M. (2001) , Zolikon Seminars: Protocols - Conversations 一
Letters , trans. Franz Mayr and Richard Askay, Northwestern
University Press: Evanston.
IM Heidegger, M. (2000), Introductiol1 归 Metaphysics， trans. Gregory
Fried and Richard Polt, Yale University Press: London.
CP Heidegger, M. (1999), Contributions ω Philosophy (From Enowníng) ,
trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth May, Indiana University Press:
Bl oomington.
TL Heidegger, M. (1 998) , 'Traditional Language and TechnologicaI
Language', Joumal o(Philosophical Research , vo l. 23, pp. 129-145.
KPM Heidegger, M. (1997), Kant and the Problem o(1V1etaphysics , trans.
Richard Taft, lndiana University Press: Bloomington.
FCM Heidegger, M. (1995) , The Fundamental Concepts o( Metaphysics:
World, Finitllde, Solitude , trans. William McNeill and Nicholas
队Talker， Indiana University Press: Bl oomington.
HPS Heidegger, M. (1 994), Hegel's Phenomenology ofSpirit, trans. Parvis
Emad and Kenneth May, Indiana University Press: Indianapolis.
BQP Heidegger, M. (1994) , Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected
IProblems' ot 飞Logic' ， trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer,
Indiana University Press: Bloomington.
TPR Heidegger, M. (1991), The Princ伊 le o(Reaso l1, trans. Reginald Lilly,
Indiana University Press: Bl oomington.
AbbreviatiollS for Works Cited xiii
NIV Heidegger, M. (1991) , Nietzsche 1V: Nihilism , trans. ]oan

Stambaugh , David Farrell-Krell , and Frank A. Capuzzi ,
HarperCollins: New York.
卜JIII Heidegger, M. (1991) , Nietzsche II1: The Will to Power as
I< nowledge and Metaphysics , trans. ]oan Stambaugh , David
Farrell 幡 Krell ， and Frank A. Capuzzi , HarperCollins: New
Yor‘ k.
NII Heidegger, M. (1991) , Nietzsche 11: The Etemal Recllrrence of' the
Same , trans. David Farrell蝙.Kr ell ， HarperCollins: New Yor k.
NI Heidegger, M. (1991) , Nietzsche 1: The Will ω Power as Art, trans.
David Farrell-Krell , HarperCollins: New York.
BPP Heidegger, M. (1 982) , TheBasicProblemsofPhenome l1 01ogy, trans.
Albert Hofstadter, Indiana University Press: Bloomington.
QT Heidegger, M. (1 977) , 'The Question Concerning Technology' ,
in The Questio l1 Conceming Technology alld Other Essays , trans.
William Lovitt , Harper Perennial: New York, pp. 3--35.
TT Heidegger, M. (1977) , 'The Turning' , in The Question ConcemÎng
Technology alld Other Essays , trans. William Lovitt , Harper
Perennial: New York, pp. 36-52.
WNGD Heidegger, M. (1977) , 'The Word ofNietzsche: "God is Dead'" ,
in The Question Conceming ηchnology and Other Essays , trans.
叭Tilliam Lovitt, Harper Perennial: New York, pp. 53-114.
AWP Heidegger, M. (1 977) , 'The Age of the World Picture' , in The
Question Conceming Technology and Other Essays , trans. William
Lovitt, Harper Perennial: New York, pp. 115…154.
SR Heidegger, M. (1977) , 'Science and Re t1 ection' , in The Questio l1
Conceming Teclmology and Other Essays , trans. William Lovitt,
Harper Perennial: New York, pp. 155-182.
GSN Heidegger, M. (1 976) , 'Only a God can Save us; Der Spiegel's
Interview with Martin Heidegger', trans. Maria Alter and John
D. Caputo , Philosophy Today , vo l. 20, no. 4 , pp. 267-284.
PG Heidegger, M. (1974) , 'The Principle of Ground' , trans. Keith
Hoeller, Man and World , vo l. 7, pp. 207-222.
OM Heidegger, M. (1973) , 'Overcoming Metaphysics' , in The End
。f' Philosophy , trans. ]oan Stambaugh , Uni忖飞 ve臼r址t咛
Y of Chicago
Press: Chicago , pp. 84-110.
‘
TB Heidegger, M. (1 972) , On Timea l1 dBeing, trans.Joan Stambaugh ,

Harper & Row: London.
OWL Heidegger, M. (1 971) , On the l机1y to trans. P.D. Hertz ,
Harper & Row: New York.
xiv Abbreviations fòr Works Cited
叭TCT Heidegger, M. (1 968) ，讥lhat is Called Thinking? , trans. ]ohn Glenn

Gray, Harper Perennial: New York.
DT Heidegger, M. (1966) , Discourse on Thinking, trans. ]ohn M.
Anderson and E. Hans Freund, Harper & Row: New York.
Deleuze:
PRT Deleuze, G. (2007) , IProust Round Table' , in Two Regimes of

Madness: Texts and Interviews, 1975-1995, trans. Amy Hodges and
Mike Taormina , Semiotext: New York, pp. 29-60.
ONP Deleuze , G. (2007) , IOn the New Philosophers (Plus a More
Gener址 Problem)' ， in TwoRegimes ofMadness: Tex 扫 and lnterviews ,
1975-1995, trans. Amy Hodges and Mike Taormina, Semiotext:
New Yo 1'k, pp. 139-147.
MIA Deleuze , G. (2007) , IMaking Inaudible Forces Audible' , in Two
Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews , 1975-1995, trans. Amy
Hodges and Mike Taormina, Semiotext: New York, pp. 156…帽-160. 丽-帽嗣白
EYL Deleuze 吼， G. (2007) , IE
日ight Yea 缸1' s Late1'巳‘丁: 1980 Inte
臼l'飞
V ew'飞， in Two
飞vi垃
Regimes of Madne曰 : Texts and Interviews, 1975-1995, trans. Amy
Hodges and Mike Tao 1'mina, Semiotext: New York, pp. 175-180.
PPM Deleuze , G. (2007) , IPortrait of the Philosopher as Moviegoer' ,
in Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Irzterviews , 1975-1995,
trans. Amy Hodges and Mike Taormina, Semiotext: New Yo 1'k,
pp. 21 3--22 1.
LU Deleuze , G. (2007) , 'Letter to Uno: How Feliz and 1 Worked
Together' ， η Two Regirnes o( lvfadness: Texts and Interviews ,
1975-1995 , trans. Amy Hodges and Mike Taormina, Semiotext:
NewYork, pp.237-240.
ZI Deleuze , G. (2007) , IZones of Immanence' , in Two Regimes of
Madness: Texts and Interviews, 1975一 1995 ， trans. Amy Hodges and
Mike Taormina, Semiotext: New York, pp. 266-269.
FP Deleuze , G. (2007) , IFoucault and Prison' , in Two Regimes of
A1adness: Texts 仰d 111terviews, 1975一 1995 ， trans. Amy Hodges and
Mike Taormina , Semiotext: New York, pp. 277-286.
PAD Deleuze , G. (2007) , IPreface to the American Edition of Dialogues' ,
in Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews , 1975-1995 ,
trans. Amy Hodges and Mike Taormina, Semiotext: New York,
pp.309 312.
…
PITP Deleuze , G. (2007) , IPreface to the Italian Edition of A

Thousa l1 d Plateaus' , in Two Regimes of j\1α dness: Texts and
Interviews , 1975-1995 , trans. Amy Hodges and Mike Taormina ,
Semiotext: New York, pp. 313-316.
AbbreviatiollS (0 1' Works Cited xv
叭TCA Deleuze
飞， G. (ρ2007) ，
旷
O {'Madlη7e臼ss
盯: 7η and 归
ext.臼
s 1fη1t，缸
盯
e
e门rnvie
阳们w
e 扩盯/侈5ι， 1975…-1995 ， tra础
缸n
a 刊s. 阳
A my Hodge臼S
and Mike Tao创rm 丑li讪
na玩， Sem 口li怡 ot忧ex对t: New Yor此 k， pp. 317-329.
叭TVτDeleuze 吼， G. (2007) ,
Re喀'gim
ηe臼s o{'Madlη1ess: 7旨以xts α nd Int，缸ervi位盯w
e 孔， 1975… 1995 , trans. Amy
扩何/巧
5
Hodges and Mike Taormina , Semiotext: New York, pp. 330一33 1.
RQS Deleuze , G. (2007) , 'Response to a Question on the Subjec t',
in Two Regimes o{' Madness: Texts and Interviews , 1975-1995 ,
trans. Amy Hodges and Mike Taormina, Semiotext: New York,
pp. 353-355.
L]M Deleuze, G. (2007) , 'Letter to ]ean-CletMartin' , in Two Regimes
。{' Madness: Texts ωld Interviews , 1975-1995, trans. Amy Hodges
and Mike Taormina, Semiotext: New York, pp. 365…367.
队TIR Deleuze , G. (2007) , 'We Invented the Ritornello' , in Two Regimes
。(Madness: Texts and Il1 terviews, 1975-1995 , trans. Amy Hodges
and Mike Taormina , Semiotext: New York, pp. 381-385.
IAL Deleuze , G. (2007) , 'Immanence: A Li fe' , in Two Regimes o(
j\;[adness: Texts al1 d Interviews, 1975-1995, trans. Amy Hodges
and Mike Taormina, Semiotext: New York, pp. 388-..393.
NP Deleuze, G. (2006) , Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh
Tomlinson , Columbia University Press: New Yor k.
E Deleuze , G. (2005) , Expr臼sionism il1 Philosophy: Spinoza , trans.
Martin ]oughin, Zone Books: New Yor k.
AO Deleuze , G. and Guattari , F. (2004) , An ι Oedipus ， trans. Robert
Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen. R. Lane, Continuum: London.
ATP Deleuze , G. and Guattari , F. (2004) , A Thousand Plateaus , trans.
Brian Massumi , Continuu日1: New York.
JHLE Deleuze, G. (2004) , i扣an Hyppolite's Logic al1 d Existence' , in Desert
Islands and Other Texts , trans. Michael Taormina , Semiotext: New
York, pp. 15…18.
B1 Deleuze , G. (2004) , 'Bergson , 1859-1941' , in Desert Islands and
Other Texts , trans. Michael Taormina, Semiotext: New York,
pp.22-3 1.
BCD Deleuze , G. (2004) , iBergson's Conception ofDifference' , inDesert
Islands and Other Texts , trans. Michael Taormina, Semiotext: New
York, pp. 32-5 1.
MD Deleuze , G. (2004) , iThe Method of Dramatization' , in Desert
Islands and Other Texts , trans. Michael Taonnina, Semiotext: New
York, pp. 94-.116.
ONIT Deleuze , G. (2004) , iOn Nietzsche and the Image of Thought',
in Desert Islcmds and Other trans. Michael Taormina ,
Semiotext: New pp.
xvi Abbreviatiol1 S (or Works Cited
GDTP Deleuze , G. (2004) , 'Gilles Deleuze Talks Philosophy' , in Desert

Islands and Other Te x. ts , trans. Michael Taormina, Semiotext:
HRS Deleuze, G. (2004) , 'How do 叭Te Recognise Structuralism ?',
trans. Melissa McMahon and Charles J. Stivale, in Desert Islands
and Other Texts , trans. Michael Taormina, Semiotext: New York,
pp.170 192. …
IP Deleuze, G. (2004) , 'Intellectuals and Power' , in Desert Islands

and Other Te x. ts , trans.Michael Taormina, Semiotext: New York,
pp.206 213. …
FPP Deleuze , G. (2004) , 'Five Propositions on Psychoanalysis' ,

trans. Alexander Hickox , in Desert Isla l1 ds and Other Texts , trans.
Michael Taormina, Semiotext: New York, pp. 274-280.
FB Deleuze , G. (2003) , Fra l1 cis Bacon: The Logic of Se11satio l1,
trans. Daniel 认人 Smith , University of Minnesota Press:
Minneapolis.
N Deleuze, G. (2001) , 'Nietzsche' , in Pure Immane l1 ce: Essays 011 a
Life , trans. Anne Boyman, Zone: New York, pp. 53--102.
ECC Deleuze , G. (1 997) , Essays Critical and Clinical , trans. Daniel
W. Smith and Michael A. Greco , Minnesota University Press:
Minneapolis.
LHC Deleuze , G. (1 995) , 'Letter to a Harsh Critic' , in Negotiatio l1 s:
1972…1990, trans. Martin Joughin , Columbia University Press:
New pp. 3-12.
OAO Deleuze , G. (1995) , 'Gilles Deleuze and Feliz Guattari on Anti-
Oedipus' , in Negotiatio l1 s: 1972-1990, trans. Martin Joughin ,
Columbia University Press: New York, pp. 13-24.
OTP Deleuze, G. (1 995) , 'On A Thousa l1 d Plateaus' , in Negotiations:
1972-1990 , trans. Martin Joughin , Columbia University Press:
New York, pp. 25…34.
STT Deleuze , G. (1 995) , 'Three Questions on Six. Times Two' , in
Negotiα tions: 1972-1990, trans. Martin Joughin , Columbia
University Press; New York, pp. 37 45. …
DI Deleuze , G. (1995) , 'Doubts about the Imaginary' , inNegotiatiol1 s:

1972一 1990， trans. Martin Joughin , Columbia University Press:
New York, pp. 62 67. …
BTO Deleuze, G. (1995) , 'Breaking Things Open , Breaking Words

Open' , in Negotiations: 1972 1990, trans. Martin Joughin,
…
Columbia University Press: New York, pp. 83…93.

LWA Deleuze , G. (1 995) , 'Life as a V飞lork of Art' , in Negotiα tions:
1972-1990 , trans. Martin Joughin , Columbia University Press:
Newγork ， pp. 94-10 1.
Abbreviatio f1 s for vVorks Cited xvii
PF Deleuze , G. (1 995) , IA Portrait of Foucault' , in Negotiatiolls:

1972-1990, trans. Martin ]oughin, Columbia University Press:
M Deleuze, G. (1995) , IMediators' , in Negotiations: 1972-1990,
trans. Martin ]oughin, Columbia University Press: New York ,
pp. 121 134.
…
OP Deleuze , G. (1995) , 10n Philosophy' , in Negotiatiolls: 1972-1990,

trans. Martin ]oughin, Columbia University Press: New York ,
pp. 135…155.
L Deleuze , G. (1 995) , 10n Leibniz' , in Negotiations: 1972-1990,
trans. Martin ]oughin, Columbia University Press: New York,
pp. 156-163.
RBS Deleuze , G. (1995) , ILetter to Reda Bensmaïa, on Spinoza' ,
in Negotiations: 1972--1990, trans. Martin ]oughin, Columbia
University Press: New York, pp. 164-166.
CB Deleuze, G. (1995) , IControl and Becoming' , in Negotiations:
1972-1990, trans. Martin ]oughin, Columbia University Press:
叭TP Deleuze , G. and Guattari , F. (1994) ，科lhat is Philosophy? , trans.
Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell, Columbia University
Press: New York.
DR Deleuze, G. (1 994) , Dij和rence and Repetitioll , trans. Pa飞11 Patton ,
Columbia University Press: New Ym扎
FLB Deleuze , G. (1993) , The Fold: LeibnÍz and the Baroque , trans. Tom
Conley, University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis.
B Deleuze , G. (1 991) , Bergso l1 ism , trans. Hugh Tomlinson and
Barbara Habberjam, Zone: New Ym k.
ES Deleuze, G. (1991) , Empiricism and Subjectivity, trans. Constantin
V. Boundas, Columbia University Press: New York.
LS Deleuze , G. (1990) , The Logic of Sense , trans. Mark Lester and
Charles Stivale, Columbia University Press: New Ymk.
C2 Deleuze, G. (1989) , Cinema 2: The Ti me-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson
and Robelt Galeta, University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis.
DII Deleuze, G. and Parnet , C. (1 987) , Dialogues 11, trans. Hugh
Tomlinson, Barbara Habberjarn , and Eliot RossAlbert , Continuum:
New York.
C1 Deleuze , G. (1 986) , Cinema 1: The Movement-Image , trans. Hugh
Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, University of Minnesota
Press: Minneapolis.
KCP Deleuze , G. (1984) , Kant性 Critiω The Doctrine
the Faculties , trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam,
University of Minnesota Press:
Ph i1osophy has a long history; indeed , one of the longest amongst a11
the disciplines. Important1y, throughout the majority of its long history,
the traditional view of phi1osophy, at least amongst phi1 osophers , has
been that only it is capable of truly revea1ing the truth. For this reason ,
philosophy, sta1'ting with Plato , has tended to see itself as having a
privileged place in the human world. Yet this privi1 eged position has
increasingly come under attack due to perceived failings internal to
philosophy, such as its inability to reveal , beyond a11 dispute, the truth
it has traditionally claimed to be capable of revealing, and the rise of
other disciplines , each of which questions the legitimacy of philosophy
and tries to establish itself as the true guardian of truth. In particular,
the fise of the sciences to ever greater heights of legitimacy and legiti幡
misation , not to mention economics in the practical sphere, have not
only led to a questioning of philosophy's place in the world, especially
in relation to other disciplines, but also to the appearance of something
like an onto-existential crisis in philosophy itself. However, before we
follow its c1'itics and conclude that philosophy is inherent1y useless and
frivolous and should, the 1'efo1'e, be consigned to history, it should also
be remembe1'ed that the last one hundred years 0 1' so of 'crisis' in philos-
ophy has resulted in a tremendous outpouring of philosophical innova-
tion and creativity. Indeed , the so蛐 called crisis in philosophy coincides
with one of the most productive and innovative periods in the history
of philosophy. One only has to think of the number of 'schools' found
in the twentieth cenhuy alone, such as phenomenology, existentialism,
logical positivism , structuralism, post而 structuralism ， deconstructionism ,
postmodernism , and linguistic to name but a few of the domi-
nant trends , to see the diversity 0 1' constitutive of philosophy's
recent history. Philosophy may be through an onto-existential
2 Ontology in Heidegger and Deleuze
crisis relating to its purpose, content, and place , but it is responding to

this crisis affirrnatively.
Given this dynarnic , reflexive questioning, this book resists the ternp-
tation to sirnply proclairn philosophy's downward spiral. Before reaching
such a conclusion, if indeed this conclusion is reached, a rnore patient
engagernent with the question of philosophy, including its purpose,
content, and place , is required. This will not entail a detai1ed historical
analysis of all aspects of the history of philosophy, nor will it engage
with developrnents in other disciplines , but will look to philosophy
'itself' to engage with what philosophy 'itself' thinks about its future. To
do so , 1 turn to philosophy's traditional relationship to truth and , frorn
there , to the question: truth of what? 叭1hile it rnay not have thought of
itself in quite this rnanner, rny guiding contention is that philosophy is
and has always been an inquiry into being. This , however, leads to the
following questions: 叭1hat is being? How does philosophy think being?
叭That is thinking? And what is philosophy?
and Deleuze
The thinker in the history of phi1osophy rnost intimately connected

to the question of being is Martin Heidegger (1 889-1976). Through his
re-raising of this question , Heidegger not only stirnulated thought, but
produced a detailed and powerful critique of rnetaphysics and, through
this , the rnode of thinking Heidegger rnaintains has traditionally been
associated with rnetaphysics: philosophy. Engaging with Heidegger's
thinking on this issue will not only dernonstrate that philosophy itself
entails a reflexivity that enables it to exarnine and critique its history,
but will also reveal a powerful line of critique against the thinking of
being that has traditionally been ernployed by philosophy. In essence,
Heidegger CI让icises thinking that associates being with presence , by
which he rneans thinking of being in terrns of fixed , static , ahistoric ,
essence(s). By dernonstrating that this form of thinking fails to think
the becorning of being, insofar as it irnposes itself on being to affirrn a
partial , technologically orientated anthropocentric revealing of being,
Heidegger highlights deficiencies in philosophy's historical thinking
of being and uses these to point towards future action. Having under-
taken a detailed, if unorthodox , reading of the history of philosophy,
Heidegger cornes to clairn that all the possible perrnutations of rneta-
physics have been exhausted , which does not rnean that its scope 0 1'
influence has waned. Indeed , fm‘ Heidegger, philosophy is in C1包 is
precisely because it continues to cling to metaphysics despite having
Introductioll 3
exhausted all its possibilities. lt is caught in a 1'etu1'n of the sarne , which

is slowly destroying it. Heidegge 1' is , the 1'efore , pessirnistic about philos-
ophy's futu 1'e; indeed , he rnay even be rnore pessirnistic than the rnost
a1'dent critics of philosophy. Rathe 1' than belittle philosophy 0 1' c1'iticise
its rnethods , p 1'esurnptions , and p1'oclarnations , all the while accepting
its continuation; 0 1', accepting its continuation , call fo 1' a 1'ejuvenation
of philosophy based on a 'cor1'ect' rnethodology which will allow philos-
ophy to 1'eveal the t 1'uth in acco 1'dance with the p1'er丑 ises of rnetaphysics ,
Heidegge1' dernands a rno 1'e 1'adical path. For Heidegge1', philosophy is so
i1'1'epa1'ably darnaged by rnetaphysics that nothing othe1' than its whole嗣
sale abandomnent will 1'ejuvenate thinking to being's becorning. With
this , Heidegge1' advocates the ove1'corning of rnetaphysics and , through
this ove1'corning, the forrn of thinking ernanating frorn rnetaphysics:
philosophy.
Heidegge 1" s c1'itique of rnetaphysics and , by extension , philosophy
1'evolves , the 1'efore , a1'ound the question of being and , in pa 1'ticula 1',
whethe1' being is properly thought in tenns of p 1'esence (= identity).
While interesting and irnportant in itself, Heidegge 1" s 1'aising of the
question of being and 1'elated c1'itique of previous ways of thinking gains
in significance because of the t 1'ernendous irnpact it had on subsequent
thinking, including the wo 1'k of the second thinke 1' this book engages
with: Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995). While Heidegge1' neve1', to rny knowl-
edge , rnentions let alone discusses Deleuze 0 1' his work, if looked at
frorn the pe1'spective of Heidegger's influence on Deleuze , we see a ve 1'y
diffe1'ent sto1'Y. Such is Heidegger's influence on Deleuze that , according
to Constantin Boundas, 'Deleuze's choice of the title "Difference and
Repetition" fo 1' his rnost irnportant philosophical text was meant as
a response to Heidegge 1" s "Being and Tirne". "Difference" is asked to
elirninate the last vestiges of identity in "Being" and Tirne turns into
Repetition of the eventum tantllln in the ete1'nal return of infinite
different/ciation' (2009: 326…327). In line with this provocative clairn,
one of the a1'gurnents this book defends is that Deleuze's thinking is
both 'grounded' in and distanced from Heidegger's.
Deleuze's 'grounding' in Heidegger is seen frorn the way he cites
Heidegger in nurnerous texts and places thr
4 Ontology in Heidegger ond Deleuze
such , we find that 'philosophy's weighed down with discussions about

attributive judgements (the sky is blue) and existential judgements (God
is) and the possibility or impossibility of reducing one to the other.
But they all turn on the verb "to be'" (STT: 44). Much like Heidegger,
Deleuze holds that the question of being is the question that grounds
all others. Even if the questioning does not explicitly engage with
being , every questioning always refers to being with the consequence
that the question of being delineates the horizon of thought. Indeed,
Heidegger's claims regarding the primacy of ontology and, linked to
this , his re唰 raising of the question of being were so esteemed by Deleuze
that we find him proclaiming that , along with Foucault , its Heidegger
'who's most profoundly transformed the image of thought' (LWA: 95).
This affirmative appraisal is , however, accompanied by a critical
distancing most evidently seen from Deleuze's remarks regarding
Heidegger's pervasive influence, especially in France in the 1930s and
1940s, an influence he thinks not only needlessly undermines the place
and creativity of philosophy, b时， by identifying a number of traces of
what he will call the 'image of thought' in Heidegger's ontology, leads
Deleuze to charge that, for‘ all his talk of overcoming the 时 i dent咀ity of
m丑1etaphys弘ics鸟， Heidegger's thinking not only cont柱inues to be bound by
repr陀es优er时
1忱ta
挝tion
轧1 ， meaning it continues tωo 恤
i ns挝is时t on a singular truth (the
truth of being) which reduces difference to identity, but also , as a cons •
quence , continues to defend and help perpetuate this mode of thinking.
To escape this, Deleuze turned to Sartre, who was 'a little fresh air' in
comparison (D Il: 9).
Rather than offering a Heideggerian reading of Deleuze, therefore , or
one that turns Deleuze into a Heideggerian , 1 will argue that Deleuze's
appreciation of Heidegger is accompanied by a certain, foundational
critique (OP: 136; PPM: 214) , which will be fully elaborated as the discus幡
sion proceeds , but which can very briefly be summarised as entailing two
different, but related, arguments. Fir叽 by reducing being's becoming to
temporality, Heidegger fails to think the different ways being becomes.
In contrast, while Deleuze will agree that being becomes temporally,
he will recognise that being also simultaneously becomes spatially
and in
IntroductíOll 5
entity (NIV: 192-193). While an admíttedly controversial reading of

Heidegger, one that Heidegger would most probably reject as 'metaphys-
ical' , Deleuze takes thís 'commonality' to entail a moment of ídentity
and so claíms that Heidegger does not go far enough in affirming the
relationship between being and difference. As such , Deleuze concludes
that Heidegger does not go far enough in thinking being's becoming
and remains stuck in the orbit of presence/identity (DR: 66).
To overcome these problems , Deleuze re-examines the role of differ-
ence in Heidegger's ontology. While Heidegger establishes an ontological
difference between being and entíties and claíms the truth of the latter
ís revealed through a questioning of the former, Deleuze maintains that
'being ís a bad concept' (B1: 25) because it sweeps everythíng 'under' ít.
Rather than privilege the question of being and answer it by analysing
being's difference to entities , Deleuze 'collapses' being and difference
'into' one another to claim that being is difference. The consequences
of this are dramati c. In the first instance , it means that Deleuze will
undertake an original analysís of difference that takes aim at the tradi-
tion that, he insists, has privileged the unity of identity. With this, 1
argue that Deleuze not only goes beyond Heidegger's account of being's
becoming, but, in so doing, also offers a radical and innovative account
of difference and its relationship to identity. In particular, Deleuze:
(1) thinks difference as and from difference; to (2) show that identity
emanates from difference. As Deleuze puts it , the aim is to 'think differ-
ence in itself independently of the forms of representation which reduce
it to the Same, and the relation of different to diffe1'ent independently
of those fo 1'ms which make them pass th 1'‘ough the negative' (DR: ixx).
For Deleuze , therefore, the only similarity between entíties is diffe 1'ence
and, importantly, diffe1' ence that emanates, not from a p1'ior unity 0 1'
identity, but from diffe 1'ence itself. In othe1' words , Deleuze offe1' s an
ontology that privileges diffe1'ence over identíty, meaning he will show
how difference precedes, founds , and escapes identity.
τhe argument developed
hnportantly, therefore, Deleuze does not simply criticise Heidegger, but

uses this encounter to affi 1'm an alternative account of being. 如fy overall
argument will show that Deleuze's differential ontology depends upon
and so emanates from perceived probler丑 s in Heidegger's questioning
of being. In turn , this wil1 show because Heidegger and Deleuze
develop their respective accounts of philosophy's pur‘ pose and content
fI‘ om their differing ontologies , the fundamental differences between
6 Ontology ill Heidegger mzd Deleuze
them regarding the nature of philosophy emanate from differences in

their ontological analyses.
Heidegger's thinking on philosophy emanates from and revolves
ar ound his destruction of 1丑 etaphysics. 认1hile the exact natu1'e of this will
‘
become evident as we p 1'oceed, it is important to note that, in general,

Heidegger takes metaphysics to entail a particular understanding of
being whereby human being takes on a p 1'ivileged place in relation to
other entities and views them through a particular closed world-view
which has its own logic and unexamined foundations. Heidegger's p1'ob-
lems with this are multiple, but can be boiled down to his rejection of
the idea that thinking genuinely reveals being by imposing itself on
being. For Heidegger, this gets the o1'der of the thought-being relation-
ship back to front: thinking doesn't determine being; thinking emanates
from and is dependent on being. While Heidegger gropes with a variety
of ways to effect transformations i11. philosophy to ensure it takes its
cue from being as being reveals itself, ultimately, 1 suggest, he becomes
so despondent with the link between philosophy and metaphysics that
he rejects the idea that philosophy can be transformed to tluly reveal
being. Philosophy has to be abandoned for thinking and, in particular, a
type of thinking called meditative thinking which lets being be to reveal
itself to thinking as and when being 'decides'.
While there has been much discussion on the nature of Heidegger's
critique of metaphysics and subsequent affirmation of meditative
thin挝ng， many commentators either fail to make connections between
aspects of his thinking and so fail to understand what he means by
certain concepts 0 1' simply assume prior knowledge of Heidegge1' and
so are unable to explain why he comes to the conclusions he does. By
PI‘ oducing detailed analyses of Heidegger's critique of metaphysics,
anthropocentrism , technological being, and philosophy, 1 not only show
the intricacies of Heidegger's thinking, but am able to offer a number
of original contributions , the most substantial of which is a detailed
discussion , across four chapters , of: (1) the issue of how to effect the
transformation to meditative thinking; and, linked to this, (2) the role
human willing plays in bringing about this transformation. These issues
are crucially important to any understanding of Heidegger but , un
IntroductiO f/ 7
means the transition to meditative thinking cannot emanate frorn any

form of human willing, but must simply wait for being to mystically
open itself to thinking if, as , and when 'it' sees fit (Caputo , 1986: 267;
Osborne , 1989: 94; Zimmerman , 1990: 264).
While there are certainly a number of statements of Heidegger's that
appear to support , what 1 call , this 'mystical' interpretation , 1 identify
a number of problems with it , as a precursor to demonstrating that
Heidegger engages with this issue and tries to resolve it by identifying
and showing that a particular form of human willing has a role to play
in bringing about the transfonnation to meditative thinking. In partic回
ular, by positing the active domination of metaphysical anthropocen-
trism to the passive relaxation of meditative thinking, 1 argue that the
mystical interpretation emanates from a binary passive/active opposi-
tion that re帽 affirms the logic of binary oppositions that Heidegger claims
underpins metaphysics. The second main problem with the mystical
interpretation is that it leaves absolutely no room for human activity
in the transition to meditative thinking, which not only posits a funda-
mental rupture between metaphysics and that which comes 'after' meta-
physics, a position that contradicts Heidegger's insistence that a trace of
metaphysics will remain in that which overcomes metaphysics , but also
leaves no room for socio-political action to bring about this overcoming.
Indeed, given that political activity emanates from human willing, the
mystical interpretation claims that such political action would only
exacerbate the problem. All human beings can do is wait for being to
reveal itself without any sign or guarantee that 'it' will do so.
In contrast, 1 take seriously Heidegger's claims regarding the left-over
trace of metaphysics to argue that Heidegger does not posit a radical
rupture between metaphysics and the 0飞lercoming of metaphysics ,
but holds that the movement will be a tr ansition constituted and , in
‘
part, effected and affected by a fonn of human willing. By appealing

to a number of texts , 1 demonstrate that Heidegger comes to reject
the underlying interpretation of the mystical reading by showing that
a particular form of human willing can contribute to this transition
in accordance with a particular gifting from being. Recogn
8 Ontology În Heidegg;er and Deleuze
technological being and thinking; and (3) reconciling Heidegger's

critique of anthropocentrism with his claim that a trace of metaphysics
will continue to inhabit that which overcomes metaphysics , a reconcili-
ation that also brings Heidegger's thinking into the realm of the polit-
ical by opening a space whereby human socio-political action can help
effect the overcoming of metaphysics and the transformation to medita-
tive thinking.
Having outlined Heidegger's ontology and critique of metaphysics
through detailed discussions of his critiques of anthropocentrisr丑， tech唰
nology, and philosophy, 1 turn to examine Deleuze's ontology, including
his critique of Heidegger 、 as a precursor to examining his under鹏
standing of philosophy. Deleuze's ontology is highly irnaginative and
because commentators tend to gloss over its fundamental parts 1 first
engage with the main concepts of his ontology: multiplicity, difference,
and virtuality with a fourth , immanence , identified as that which runs
through all three. By doing so , 1 provide a holistic account of Deleuze's
ontology that not only shows how these pieces fit together, but also
relates them back to Heidegger to support my argument that Deleuze's
ontology goes beyond Heidegger's by identifying an onto-genetic
account of being rooted in difference. This culminates in a discussion
of the concept 'virtuality' and its relationship to actuality, possibilit弘
and reality which is not only often overlooked in the secondary litera-
ture , but , when it does find its way into discussions , is often conducted
with the underlying assumption that it is clearly understood by readers.
The aim of my discussion is to not only clearly outline this fascinating
concept , but to do so in a way that explores its multi-dimensionality, an
important undertaking given the centr址 role it plays in the process of
individuation that Deleuze claims creates actuality. By piecing together
various comments Deleuze makes on virtuality, 1 offer an interpretation
of it that not only engages with alternative understandings , but which
is also of crucial importance to my later argument that Deleuze's differ-
ential ontology continues to depend upon a certain form of identity at
the onto-genetic level.
Having outlined the core concepts of Deleuze's thinking, 1 then
turn to explore the relationship between his ontolo
Introduction 9
outlining the transcendental features of philosophy, namely the crea-

tion of concepts , the setting up of a plane of immanence , and the use
of conceptual personae, 1 show that Deleuze distinguishes philosophy
from other disciplines , thereby creating a special purpose and place for
it, which , in contrast to Heidegger, does not secure a privileged place for
philosophy amongst other disciplines.
One of the key differences between the two thinkers that comes out
of this discussion is the different ways they evaluate world-views, a topic
of crucial importance in outlining their respective conclusions regarding
philosophy's future. 叭Thile Heidegger and Deleuze agree that philosophy
entails the establishment of a world句iew， Heidegger criticises philosoph-
ical world-views for imposing thought on being, an action that he claims
forgets that thought emanates from being. In contrast, Deleuze claims
world-views are inherently creative and , as such , are intimately connected
to the new (= difference). This disagreement underpins their respective
analyses of philosophy's future. For Heidegger, philosophy's aggressive
stance towards being must be overcomεif thinking is to let itself go in
the way necessary to truly reveal being. Deleuze disagrees and looks to
his differential ontology to claim that if being is difference: (1) there is
no one right way to search for the truth nor is there in fact one truth;
j
and (2) the establishment of a world-view is not anything sinister that

imposes itself on being, but is a manifestation of that particular configu-
ration of being. As being becomes , that first world-view will be altered to
consider the nev飞T configuration of being. In other words , Deleuze criti-
cises Heidegger for maintaining a form of identity, in the sense of a fixed
truth (the truth of being) , that thinking has to simply focus on properly
re-presenting and suggests that being's rhizomic-becoming means that
thinking must also be continuously rhizomic; in fact , this is all thinking
can be. With this , Deleuze severs the traditionallink between philosophy
and the truth and claims that phi1osophy's purpose lies in the creation
of conceptual solutions to problems , a connection that brings Deleuze to
celebrate the proliferation of world-views as a way to offer new insights
on problems. This re盹affirms my argument that
Heidegger's insistence that philosophy be abandoned and replaced by

meditative thinking. The reasoning behind this will be fully explained,
but can be summarised as follows: if being is difference and is continually
different/ciating, not only can philosophy not attain 'the' truth because
the only truth is difference , but philosophy does not need to be overcome
to relate to being as it truly is (the purpose behind Heidegger's insistence
that philosophy be overcome by meditative thinking). Properly relating
to being simply requires that philosophy pay attention to and orientate
itself around being's differential becoming. In other words , philosophy
must be transformed away from representation , whereby it tries to
correctly identify a pre唰 existing eternal truth , to a continually creative
way of thinking that thinks difference as and from difference.
A further difference between the two thinkers relates to their respec帽
tive understandings about the place of philosophy. Heidegger famously
claims that philosophy is more primordial than other disciplines because
it is more closely attuned to the question of being. This establishes a
hierarchy between (1) philosophy (and some forms of poetry) , (2) art ,
and (3) science. Deleuze rejects this hierarchy stating it has no basis in
ontology meaning that , on this issue, Heidegger imposes his thinking on
being, an action that , for Heidegger, is synonymous with metaphysics.
If being is difference , then each form of thinking is simply a different
manifestation of this difference. 叭1ith this, Deleuze once again asserts
that Heidegger's thinking remains tied to the model of metaphysics, or
as he would call it representation , and so is unable to overcome identity-
based thinking to think the difference of each entity. 1 also suggest that
Deleuz 扭e's ar丑1旧
剖ly
a 严si妇s ofnorη1唰-phi让losophica
剖1 fo 1'ms of thinking is more multi-
出imens挝ional than Heidegge
d 臼r‘J
飞F
out吐li垃n址ing the being of science and , to a lesser degree , a1't in anything
other than a negative, one-dimensional way.
Having discussed Deleuze's analysis of the transcendental features of
philosophy, science , and a1't as a means of showing they offer different
analyses of being and are focused on different ends and methods , the
question arises as to the relationship between the disciplines. This is
a crucial issu
11l troductioll 11
ontology, this changes in the late essay i\1ediators where Deleuze intro佩
duces the 'echo' to show that, far from externally influencing one
another, there is an intimate , common ontological thread that runs
between the forms of thinking that al1 0ws each to impact on the others
at the onto genetic level. 飞气1hi1 e 'echo' is an interesting and innovative
‘
account of the way disciplines impact and shape one another, 1 suggest
it causes ser怡 us problems for Deleuze's differential ontology.
叭Tith this , the argument of the book moves from a comparative , expos唰
itory focus to a critical one. 马气1hi1 e entailing a different tone and focus ,
this shift accords with insights developed by both Heidegger and Deleuze
regarding the way to approach philosophical writings. Heidegger, for
example, claims that when engaging with great thinker飞 there are only
two options: 'either to go to their encounter or to go counter to them'
(WCT: 77). 1n other words , when reading a philosophy, we can critique
and seek to negate its arguments 01' we can encounter its thinking and
try to think with it. The latter does not entail an agreement with its
conclusions , but a thinking that travels along the same path to push off
from them. Recognising these options , Deleuze is unequivocal on the
option to be adopted stating that 'no book against anything ever has any
importance; all that counts are books (0 1' something, and that know how
to produce it' (HRS: 192). The aim of any encounter is to think from that
encounter to create anew. For this reason , Deleuze famously concludes
that 'the history of phi1 osophy is the reproduction of philosophy itself'
(DR: xxi). Following this , I argue that Deleuze's notion of echo , whereby
an echo of each discipline finds its way into and shapes the onto-genesis
of others , provides a common thread that links the disciplines and calls
into question his ontological claim that each multiplicity is radically
diffe 1'ent. 1 use this to engage further with the issue of Deleuze's 1'elation-
ship to identity and ask whether Deleuze's ontology is able to affirm the
radical difference as and from difference it aims to.
My argument is it doesn't, and to show this 1 return to the notion
of identity to offer a three-fold account of identify in the senses of
the: (1) identica1 , which refers to the idea that difference emanates
from a foundational , unified source; (2) same , which refers
12 Ontology În Heidegger and Deleuze
identical and same , 1 offer a number of examples to demonstrate that

his thinking continues to insist on featu 1'es common to all entities that
accompany this diffe 1'ence. In particular, the virtual-actual movement
of individuation , which despite Deleuze claiming that (1) virtual Ideas
a1'e diffe 1'ent , (2) the process thr‘ ough which the vi 1'tual is made actual is
diffe 1'ent, and (3) each actual multiplicity is different and continues to
diffe 1'ent/ciate , demonst 1'ates , by the shee 1' fact that the1'e is a common
vi 1'tual-actual movement at all , that there a1'e structures common to all
actualities meaning that each is not as radically different as Deleuze's
ontology affinns. This is complemented by the common transcendental
conditions (the setting up of a plane of immanence and the creation
of concepts and conceptual personae) that define a form of thinking
as philosophical OI, by identifying different transcendental conditions ,
scientific or aesthetic , and is further seen from Deleuze's comments on
the echo that reverberates throughout the different forms of thinking,
a 1'esonance that, 1 suggest, can only occur if there is a connection
between all the diffe1' ent fo 1'ms of thinking. Because 1argue , against othe1'
commentators, that these moments of identity exist at the onto-副.genetic
level of Deleuze's thinking, and while Deleuze's diffe1'ential ontology
goes beyond Heidegge 1" s in terms of the subtlety of its analysis of being's
becoming and the avenues and paths it opens thought to , 1 conclude
that it is not quite able to do 认That it sets out to do: think difference as
and from difference. The lesson to be learned is that to think difference
as and from diffe 1'ence, it is not enough to ove1'come identity in the
senses of the identical and sense; the far subtler sense of identity of the
common must also be overcome. Whether we can do this 0 1' not remains
an open question , but my suggestion is that, if ontology is to be affirma-
tively differential , it must overcome this chal1 enge.
Structure of the book
Given this argument is developed from a comparative analysis of two

thinke 1' s, the 1'e are, at least, two ways to outline and defend it. The fi 1'st
is to offe1' a primo 1'dially 'dialectical' account whereby Heidegger's and
Deleuze's thinking is compared wheneve 1' a simila1'ity 0 1' diffe 1'ence
arises. The great benefit of this approach is it b1'ings out these points of
contact as and when they occur to really make explicit what they entai1.
叭Thile beneficial in this 1' espect, however, this structure suffers f1'om a
number of disadvantages , especially when it comes to developing my
conclusion. First, the complexity of Heidegger's and Deleuze's thinking
means that undertaking the inquiry in this way presupposes that the
IlltroductiO l1 13
reader has a good understanding of their ontologies. Not only is this

inherently problematic , but it risks building an argument on the read-
er's assumptions as opposed to what can be textually supported. One of
my aims is to Constluct an interpretation of their ontologies fror丑 what
they actually say to show the argument developed emanates from their
writings. Second, this dialectical comparison risks producing a text that
continually jumps back and forth between the two thinkers in a way that
may make it too difficult to follow the arguments developed. It would , 1
think, complicate the text to the point that what are already very dif白
cult ideas would be made even more difficult. Finally, my interpretation
of Heidegger and Deleuze needs to be developed , especially because, in
numerous places , 1 am offering conclusions that are different to those
found in the secondary literature. To justify them , 1 have to develop my
conclusions from their own arguments, something that, again , becomes
complicated if 1 have to continually leave a thinker to jump to the other
to identify a sÌlnilarity or difference between them.
Wh i1e 1 make use of the dialectical approach to bring Heidegger and
Deleuze into confrontation with one another, the primordial form of
presentation employed is a linear one. Startingwith Heidegger's ontology,
1 move through his famous analyses of anthropocentrism , technological
being, and philosophy, to his critique of metaphysics and discussion
of meditative thinking. In turn , this allows me to develop my argu-
ment that Heidegger's questioning oÍ being provides the horizon from
which Deleuze's ontology takes off. 1 then outline the key C01丑ponents
of Deleuze's ontology to show how they differ from Heidegger、 a neces-
sary precursor to demonstrating how the differences in their respective
ontologies underpin their different conclusions regarding philosophy's
structure, purpose, content, and relation to other modes of thinking. By
first presenting Heidegger's ontology, 1 am able to show how its pieces fit
together to allow him to come to his conclusion regarding phi1 osophy
and meditative thinking. Wh i1 e allowing me to defend my interpreta-
tion , it also better enables me to support the development of my overal1
argument because , having holistically outlined Heidegger's thinking, 1
can then move to a holistic outline
therefm飞 better allow me to show that, while Heidegger opened up the

question of being and linked it to becoming, Deleuze's ontology goes
further in thinking the different ways being becomes. As such , it offers
more options through which to think issues. Having shown this, 1 am
then mm‘ e clea剖1
Heidegge 臼r‘ i怕
nt祀
er盯
rrr
口
ms of thinking being's bec ∞om
丑lÍ汩
ng ， Deleuze's attempt to
affirm an ontology of difference as and from difference doesn't quite
manage to succeed because moments of a particular form of identity
continue to adhere to the onto-genetic level of his analysis.
At this stage, however, two further points need to be engaged with:
(1) the use of Heidegger's and Deleuze's commentaries on other philoso-
phers; and (2) the role of Felix Guattari in this work. These issues a1'ise
because Heidegge1' and Deleuze spent much of their ca1'eers wo 1'king on
and, in the case of Deleuze, with othe1' thinkers. It appears we ar飞 the1'e鹏
fore , faced with a choice: eithe1' to engage with these commenta1'ies 0 1'
igno 1'e them to focus solely on thei 1' 'pu 1'e' books of philosophy. 1 choose
the former, justifying it by pointing towards thei 1' insistence that the
histo 1'Y of philosophy is crucial to philosophical thinking. Because their
respective histories elucidate many of the points they wi1l make in their
books of 'pu1'e' philosophy, 1 utilise thei1' engagements with the history
of philosophy to p1'esent a holistic account of their analyses.
The issue of Felix Guattari's relationship to this book is, however,
somev飞That more complicated. There is no doubt that Guattari was
hugely influential to the development of Deleuze's thinking; it truly was
a collaboration , rather than what Deleuze will come to call an alliance.
For this reason, it should never be forgotten that Guattari plays a crucial
role in a number of texts frequently attributed solely to Deleuze. 1 say
this here because, throughout the text , 1 will normally fail to mention
Guattari's name, even when quoting from 0 1' discussing books , such as
What is Philosophy? , that they wrote togethe 1'. Fittingly, fo 1' theo 1'ists of
multip 1icity, the reasoning behind this absence is multiple: (1) this is a
book on Deleuze and , as such , it explo 1'es the way his thinking unfolds
and develops; (2) 1 will claim that those ideas developed in conjunction
with Guattari can more often than not be found , whether in fully devel-
o
Introduι'tiol1 lS
their terms , it should focus on their concepts , rather than on who said
what.
Having said this , let me indicate how 1will proceed. Its predominantly
linear structure means the book is split into two parts. The first , composed
of four chapters , engages with Heidegger's thinking by engaging with
his raising of the question of being and critique of anthropocentrism
(Chapter 2) , before Chapter 3 engages with his critique of technology,
and Chapter 4 engages with his critique of philosophy rooted in meta-
physics. Chapter 5 complements these by outlining and engaging with
the fonn of (meditative) thinking Heidegger claims is necessary to over-
come philosophy as metaphysics. This b1'ings us to the second pa1't of
the book, composed of four chapters , which not only outlines Deleuze's
diffe 1'ential ontolo部T and compa1'es it to Heidegge 1" s, but also evaluates
its success in affirming difference as and from diffe 1'ence. More specifi-
cally, Chapter 6 outlines Deleuze's diffe 1'ential ontology and compares it
to Heidegger's , befo1'e Chapte1' 7 engages with what Deleuze's differen-
tial ontology means fo 1' philosophy in te 1'ms of its st1'ucture , Chapter 8
discusses Deleuze's analysis of philosophy's purpose and place in 1'ela-
tion to science and a1't , while Chapter 9 concludes by exploring how
successful Deleuze's ontology of diffe 1'ence is at thinking diffe 1'ence as
and from diffe 1'ence.
: Heidegger,
0日tology， and
Michel Foucault, perhaps jokingly but nonetheless famously, once

stated that 'one day, [the twentieth-century] will be known as Deleuzian'
(1998: 343). As it stands , however, that honour belongs to Martin
Heidegger. In line with his statement that 'to think is to confinn yourself
to a single thought that stands stilllike a star in the world's sky' (TP: 4) ,
Heidegger's entire thinking revolves around one question: the question
of the meaning of being. His response to this question not only entails
an analysis of human being, but, due to the technological nature of
contemporary society, an analysis of technology, and , linked to both ,
an analysis of the notion and nature of thinking itself. There is , there-
fore , a subtle complexity to Heidegger's thinking that revolves around
the entwined interaction of human being , technology, and a particular
way of thinking called 'philosophy'. Each will have to be discussed and
analysed for Heidegger's position to be revealed. This chapter contributes
to this endeavour by outlining and engaging with Heidegger's critique
of traditional forms of humanism and subsequent re-fonnulation of
human being in 1i ne with the question of being. This will not only start
to disclose the critique Heidegger aims at the tradition , but will also
start to reveal an alternative path to this tradition. As such, this chapter
is both introductory, insofar as it introduces a number of key aspects of
Heidegger's thinking , and foundational , in that it not only prepares the
way for Heidegger's analyses of technological being in Chapter 3 and
philosophy in Chapter 4, but also discloses some of the themes that will
be returned to in Chapter 5 where 1 wi1l discuss the transformation in
thinking that Heidegger maintains is necessary to overcome the tradι
tional way of thinking being.
16
Heideggel~ FZll1 da ll1 ental Ontology, and Humanis l11 17
In search of being
叭lhile there is over a decade of work prior to its publication in 1927 and
close to fifty years of work succeeding it , as it stands , Being and Time is
Heidegger's most famous and influential work. While it covers many
themes , its overall purpose is to attend to a particular crisis. Indeed,
the book starts with a somewhat dramatic pronouncement regarding
thought's forgetfulness and , as Hans Ruin notes , continues to be
'animated by a sense of crisis. From its inception , the question which
it seeks to answer has already been lost , and is in need of being reawak-
ened' (2008: 279). The 'crisis' that Heidegger's thought addresses is the
question of being. This question aroused the interest of both Plato and
Aristotle but, for Heidegger, has since been long forgotten or dismissed as
vacuous and/or impossible to answer (BT: 22-23). Indeed, according to
Heidegger, modern attitudes towards being are perhaps best summed up
by Hegel , for whom to talk of pure being is to talk of nothing (1969: 82).
For Heidegger, however, because 'everything we talk about, everything
we have in view, everything towards which we comport ourselves in any
way, is being' (BT: 26) , understanding all else , including ethics , re1i gion ,
humanity, and even absence (LH: 253 , 254 , 258; PIE: 62) , requires an
inquiry into being.
This exhortation is not simply due to a personal choice on Heidegger's
part, but emanates from a fundamental questioning of thinking's rela蛐
tionship to being. As Heidegger explains, we tend 'to know without
further ado what "is" means. 队le are quite confident in our use of "is" and
"being" and cognate expressions' (ET: 149). However, when we ask what
we mean by 'is' , suddenly we find that the waters have muddied consid-
erably. Two points result from this. First, claiming an understanding of
being even though we are unable to conceptually grasp or explain what
being entai1 s discloses that we are intimately connected to being and,
indeed , that 'we operate within a preconceptual understanding of being'
(EHF: 31). Second, recognising that we operate with and from an under唰
standing of being, even though we have not inquired into this precon唰
ceptual understanding, reveals that the question of being pre-reflectively
shapes our self-understanding and activities. As Heidegger notes, while
dεveryone understands the "is" and "being飞... everyone has forgotten
that he thereby hol
one meaning of being over others, we are in danger of misunde1'standing

being and , by extension , entities. For this reason , it is only once we have
inqui 1'ed into the question of being, in c1 uding our p1' e-1'eflective unde1'-
standing of being, that all else can be p1'operly addressed. As a conse-
quence , Heidegge1' holds that 'it is fitting th 寻t we should 1'aise anew the
question of the meaning of being' (BT: 1).
The problem with Heidegge 1" s search fo 1' being, howeve 1', is that , as
he 1'ecognises , while "'being" is the most unive 1'sal concept , this cannot
I丑 ean it is the one which is c1 ea 1'est 0 1' that it needs no fu 1' the1' discus-
sion. It is rather the da1'kest of all' (BT: 23). The difficulty of unde 1'-
standing being is not only that we are not used to thinking 'i t', but that
being 'itself' does not easily lend itself to thought. Indeed , Heidegge1'
claims that 'compared to beings which are immediately accessible , being
manifests the character of holding itself back, of concealing itself in a
ce1'tain manner' (TPR: 63). That the 1'e are entities, which emanate from
being, demonst 1'ates that being's concealment is not total , but that there
is concealment at all makes the task of identifying what being entai1 s
that much harde 1'. This difficulty is compounded by the 'fact' that being
escapes the static categories of traditional formallogic (BT: 23) , meaning
that we have to find another logic to describe 'i t' and its difference from
entities. This new logic must also be accompanied by a new language,
one that does not objectify being and so turn it into an entity (BT: 23).
In other words , we cannot inquire into being as we inquire into entities.
'Being, as t扫 at which is asked about , must be exhibited in a way of its
own , essentially different from the way in which entities are discov-
ered. Accordingly, what is to be found out by asking - the meaning of
being - also demands that it be conceived in a way of its own, essen四
tially contrasting with the concepts in which entities acquire thei 1' deter-
minate signification' (BT: 26). We wil1 see that Heidegger continues to
search for the appropriate way to inqui1'e into being.
The difficulty inherent to thinking being is compounded by the
interpretation of being historically dominant. For Heidegger, being has
been thought as presence entailing a fixed , static , ahistoric essence.
Heidegger questions this understanding by noting that being is inti幡
mately c
Heideggel~ Fundamel1 阳 1 Ontology, and Humanism 19
recognises , thinking this ontological difference is not easy because being

and beings are 'caught in a curious and still unravelled confusion' (LH:
242). 1'0 unravel this confusion , Heidegger notes that being 'is' what
allows beings to be. But being does not exist in a transcendent realm;
being is not 'God [0 1'] a cosmic ground' (LH: 234). Being is mo 1'e primo1'-
dial than the gods because the latte1', as entities, are manifestations of
being (MFN: 208). 认lhile being 'itself' is not an entity, 'being is always
the being of an entity' (B1': 29). But while being is always the being of an
entity, being is not synonymous with beings , nor is being 'in' an entity
(MFN: 178). 'Being is the t1'ace啕 less; is never to be found among beings as
a being. At the most it could be found in be-ing's inceptual semblance,
that is , in being as beingness' (MFN: 178). Being is that which is 'mo1'e
origina1'y' (MFN: 78) than entities , but is not anything fixed or objec-
tive. Far from entailing a p1' esence , being entails a moving t 1'ace that
enables entities to exist. Being, while always the being of an entity, is
'something' fundamentally different to the entities it enables to be. As
a consequence , being is always thought through its difference to the
entities it 'grounds'.
While this ontological difference is central to Heidegge1" s thinking ,
he continues to try to explain it with the consequence that his w1'itings
a1'e littered with different descriptions. 1'hese differences are, however,
diffe 1'ences in 臼nphasis as opposed to 卢mdamental conten t. In terms of
卢 mdamen 臼 1 content, Heidegger is remarkably consistent regarding the
ontological difference. For this reason , I will outline some of its struc-
tural features to suggest what it is not, as a precursor to id白ltifying how
to think being. By claiming that being is always the being of an entit弘
Heidegger overcomes the idea that being resides in a transcendent ,
abstract 1'ealm to entities. Being is always conc 1'etely embedded by virtue
of its constitutive 1'elationship to entities. But this does not mean that
being resides in the entities it allows to be. If it were , there would be
a distinction between an outer appearance and inner essence similar
to the structure of 1丑etaphysical thinking. Nor is it the case that being
emanates from the entities it manifests. If this were the case, Heidegger
would be privileging the question of entities 0
terms of opposition , meaning being is not understood in opposition to

entities. Being cannot be 'determined in opposition to "something飞 not
even as the opposite of "nothing" because be-ing itself is still the origin
of the "nothing" , ...not incidentally, but fundamentally' (MFN: 107).
Being is not opposed to anything else, but is the 'ground' from where
things emerge. Iain Thomson (2000a: 303…304) explains that we have
to be careful when we say that being is the 'ground' of entities because
Heidegger warns us that the notion of 'ground' is intimately connected
to metaphysics , that which Heidegger vociferously rejects. In particular,
the 'ground' of metaphysics covers two senses: first , an ontological sense
that discovers and sets out a solid foundation that metaphysical thinking
cannot penetrate; and , second, a theological sense that holds that a
highest or supreme being founds , establishes , and justifies entities. The
combination of the two senses gives us Heidegger's well-known , if often
misunderstood, notion of onto-theology, which seeks 'to establish both
the 卢 mdamental and the ultimate conceptual parameters of intelligibility
by ontologically grounding and theologically founding and thereby
…
legitimating our changing historical sense of what is' (Thomson , 2011:

…
11; see also Thomson, 2005: 17--19). The metaphysical notion of 'ground'
delineates thinking that establishes and so proceeds from a fixed point
of sameness , all the while claiming that this fixed original source justi唰
fies and defines that which emanates from it.认Then Heidegger says that
being is the 'ground' of entities, we have to be careful to ensure that we
don't fall into the mistake of attributing a metaphysical understanding
of 'ground' to him. While being is the 'ground' of entities, 'ground'
must be understood to be wholly historical and so cannot be thought in
terms of the presence 0 1' identity of metaphysics. After all , as Heidegger
explains , 'to the extent that being as such grounds , it remains groundless'
(TPR: 51). For this 1'eason , 1 want to suggest that when we say that being
is the 'ground' of entities , we understand that being is (1) wholly histor-
ical , (2) that which allows entities to be , (3) particular to each entity, and
(4) always other than the physical manifestation of each particular entity;
it is that which allows the physical manifestation
Heidegger, FU l1 damental Ontology, alld Humallism 21
meaningbeing is always multiple or, put differently, polyvocal , a summa恻

tion that b 1'ings us to the issue of what this polyvocality entails. We need
to c1 a1'ify the sense of 'polyvocality' at play here because 'polyvocality'
can be understood to mean that being is equivocal , meaning it is said
with diffe 1'ent voices across different entities , 0 1' univocal , meaning it is
said with the same voice across different entities. Following Jeff Malpas ,
ít seems that , fo 1' Heidegger, being is equivocal , meaning that different
voices of being are said diffe 1'ently across all entities with the conse-
quence that 'being b 1'ings with it a certain necessa 1'y opacity' (2012: 87).
扩 this is what Heidegger means , and it seems a good way to think about
the problem given that Heidegger explains that 'the impetus for my
whole way of thinking goes back to an Aristotelian proposition which
states that being is said in many ways' (Z: 119) , it directly contradicts
Deleuze's c1 aim that being is univocal , meaning that being is said with
the same voice across all beings. The diffe 1'ence seems to be that whereas
Heidegger c1 aims that being is equivocal , meaning that being is always
unique insofar as it is said differently across different entities , Deleuze
will c1 aim that in suggesting that being finds exp 1'ession throughout
entities , Heidegger is , unintentionally, committed to the c1 aim that
being acts as a commonality inherent to each form of being, a position
Deleuze maintains violates Heidegger's attempt to affirm the unique
difference in kind of each 'thing'. 飞八lhi1 e Heidegger suggests that being is
an 'indeterminate vapor' (1 M: 85) to maintain that it cannot be a 'thing'
that exists in the same way across all entities , Deleuze charges that it
has to entail a sameness that finds expression throughout all entities;
it is , after all , that which allows beings to be. For Deleuze, saying that
being is indeterminate and so finds expression differently throughout
each entity still hints at a form of identity because each entity is always
brought back to the same point: the question of the meaning of being.
The only way to rid ontology of this identity is not to posit an indeter-
minate being that finds equivocal expression throughout entities , but
to think being as difference. Only this ensures that each manifestation
of being will be completely different, thereby ensu
22 Gntology in Heidegger and Deleuze
difference , meaning each is completely different. ln response, Heidegger

would possibly claim that Deleuze forces a metaphysical interpretation
onto his notion of being so that Deleuze interprets being as some form
of metaphysical ground of sameness. We will see that Deleuze does inter帽
pret Heidegger in this way, as a precursor to developing the notion that
being is univoca l. The resolution of this issue depends on the response
given to the relationship between being and difference. While Heidegger
insists that being is revealed through its ontological difference to enti-
ties and, as we will see later in this chapt忧er巳， De创rri‘jda cα1让icises Heidegge臼r‘.，
conclus剖ion claim 丑1ing 吐
t hat it can only rr丑lean that being 妇 i s 'grounded' in
difference , Deleuze argues, in contrast to both Heidegger and Derrida,
that the resolution of this question depends not on affirming being
over difference (Heidegger) or insisting that difference 'precedes' being
(Derrida) , but in recognising that being is difference.
马气le will develop this as we proceed , but what is important for our
purposes is that, for Heidegger, being is that which accompanies and
permits individual entities to be , but is always other than them. It is
the source of entities , without preceding them or being anything fixed
0 1' determinate. lndeed, even nothingness emerges from being because
nothingness has a being of its own , even if the being of its absence
is fundamentally different to the being of presence. Heidegger's point,
mirroring Deleuze's rejection of opposition , is that opposition is unable
to truly think being because it does not reach far enough 'into' the actual
being of being. By simply positing being to another, opposition does not
engage with being on its own tenns and , as such , is unable to return to
being to truly think being. Far from being opposed to anything else ,
being is different to the entities it grounds. With this , Heidegger inau-
gurates a discussion of difference that will occupy much of subsequent
thinking, including, most importantly for our purposes , the thinking
of Deleuze. As noted, however, difference , for Heidegger, is always the
difference between being and entities.
On Heidegger's understanding, this does not entail a reduction of
entities to a singular being; being takes on and finds expression through
nur
Heídeggel~ Fundamental Ontology， α nd HumanÎsm 23
the same time , being is the most singular, whose uniqueness cannot be
attained by any being whateve 1" (NIV: 192). Similarly, in the Int打7
ω Metl ωaphysi α5
c. ， he describes being as both 'that which pertains to every
being whatsoeve 1' and thus dispe 1'ses itself into what is most common-
place [and that which] is the most unique of all' (I M: 83). Being 'is' both a
'common' featu 1'e of all entities , insofar as all entities share the 'commo-
nality' of existence, and 'something' unique to each particular entity,
insofar as each entity 'has' its own being, or way of existing. However, in
a similar vein to the use of 'ground' , we have to be very careful how we
understand the use of 'common' here , for it does not mean 'the same' or
'identical'. To say that being is a 'common' feature of all entities is only
to say that all entities share existence , although we have to remember
that each exists diffe 1'ently due to their individual being. As such , fo 1'
Heidegge1', being 'is' manifested as both 'one' and many.
飞八lhile Frederick Olafson (1993: 112) is correct to note that Heidegger's
changing statements on the ontological diffe 1'ence demonst1' ate that
he neve 1' quite manages to dete 1' mine the relationship between being's
'singularity' and the plurality of entities to his satisfaction, if we antici 懈
pate the argument of later chapters , being's singular plurality means
that being 'is' the 'ground': (1) of identity and difference; and (2) that
secures the difference between entities. But, importantly, Heidegger's
rejection of the notion that being delineates an ahistoric , transcendent
God-figure or cosmic ground , and his insistence that being is always
the being of a particular entity, points to the conclusion that the
existence, or being, of each entity is unique to that particular entity.
Remembering being's equivocity, which it will be remembered means
that being is expressed with different voices throughout different enti-
ties , we find that being is that which allows entities to be , but is that
which is said , 0 1' expressed , differently through each entity. This allows
Heidegger to hold that: (1) because each entity shares the 'commoω
nality' of being, the question of being is of primordial importance;
and (2) the way each entity exists is unique to that particular entity.
While the primordial importance of the question of being means that
disclosing the tru
Ascertaining the being of an entity and, from this, being as such

entails a two-stage movement, both of which are intimately connected
to difference. As Heidegger explains , difference is a
'negative' relationship [insofar as] when... we ascertain the di伊rence

between this blackboard and this lamp on the cei1i ng, we are treating
of a relationship. ln ascertaining such a difference we must not only
co-think the terms of the relationship (blackboard, lamp) - otherwise
the relatedness would hover in mid-air so to speak - but we must go
into the related terms themselves. We ascertain the so-being of the
blackboard and the so-being of the lamp , and from this we grasp their
difference. (EHF: 8)
Heidegger recognises that it appears as if difference entails a negative rela幡

tionship (A is A by virtue of not being B) -- although negative is placed in
quotation marks to warn us about what this negativity entails … wherein
two objects are differentiated from one another and, through this differ-
entiation, become the singular entities they are. But he then goes on to
claim that it is not enough to posit one entity in a negative relation制
ship to another to determine what that entity is. Each entity must be
inquired into on its own terms in distinction fror丑 other entities to deter-
mine what the being of that entity entails. The being of each entity does
not emanate from a negative , external relationship to another entity,
but comes from an engagement with the being of each entity to deter-
mine what each entity entails , which , in turn , will disclose the differ-
ence between two entities. Thinking being entails , therefore, a thinking
of the being of an entity, wherein this entity is placed in a 'negative'
relationship to another to differentiate one from the other and thereby
recognise a space from which to identity an entity as singular. Having
recognised that entities are singular, the being of that entity must be
engaged with on its own terms to determine: (1) what that particular
entity is; and (2) what being entails. With this , Heidegger recognises
that each entity is different to others and , as such , must be thought in
its difference, wherein this difference is secured, not externally in terms
of its 'negative' relationship to another entity, but in terms of its own
specific being.
Subsequent chapters will show that this appears to come very close to
Deleuze's analysis of difference in that Heidegger recognises that entities
cannot be determined through being differentiated from other entities,
what Deleuze will call external difference , but only through an analysis of
their individual being, what Deleuze will call internal difference , which
Heidegger, Fundamental Ontology， α nd Humanism 2S
wi11 then reveal their difference to other entities. Much like Deleuze's
valorisation of internal over external difference , Heidegger claims that
the fundamental difference between entities is gleaned , not from an
entity's external relationship to another entity (i. e. A is A because its not
B) , but from the individual being of each specific entity, which through
a focusing on the ontological difference of that specific entity, will
subsequently reveal its difference from other entities. However, whereas
Heidegger and Deleuze agree that entities are only truly captured
through an analysis of each particular entity in terms of its being, they
differ in terms of what exactly the being of entities entails. Whereas
Deleuze will claim that the being of each entity, or multiplicity as he
calls entities , entails an autopoietic , rhizomic-becoming of (intensive)
difference meaning that the being of entities 'is' nothing but difference ,
Heidegger will , implicitly, claim that the problem with simply affirming
being as difference is that being is not just pure difference because differ-
ence itself has a being and , therefore , emanates from being. As such ,
Heidegger will resist associating being with identity or difference and
instead claim that being is the 'ground' of difference and identity. The
only way to truly think difference and identity is to think the being of
difference and identity. Far from simply being different , being's capacity
to be both singular and multiple, 0 1' identical and diffe1'ent, reveals the
'commonality' of being inherent to identity and difference and discloses
that entities are not simply amaJgamations of pure difference , but neces町
sarily entail a combination of identity and difference. As Heidegger
explains , 'to be something is to be the same αs iωlt: As the same as
itself, it is being-different to every other self-same thing, likewise being唰
similar, being-dissimilar, and being四 cOlmtable' (ET: 158). 认1hile al1 entities
shar‘ e the 'commonality' of being, the specific being of each entity gives
that entity an identity, while the identity that emanates from the being
of each entity differs from the identity that emanates from the being
of another entity. For Heidegger, entities are not just pure identity or
pure difference , but , as manifestations of being, entail identities that not
only become differently, but, because of the u
RM位66111
26 Ontology Ì1 1 Heidegger and Deleuze
insofar as the human being is 'the being in whom the being of beings ,
thus beings in the whole , are revealed. Man is that being in whose
ownmost being and essential ground there occurs the zmderstanding ot
beÍ1晖， (EHF: 95). In other words , the human being has a 'special distinc-
tiveness' (BT: 32) based on its difference from other beings , insofar as the
human being is the only form of being whose 'being is an issue for it'
(BT: 32). Because the human being is distinct from other forms of being,
insofar as 'it' is interested in its being and stands in a unique place in
relation to being , Heidegger insists only the human being can dis cI ose
the importance of being. For the Heidegger of Being an. d Time , the ques-
tion of being is primary but the means to answer this question are found
in , and through , an existential analytic of the human being. But, at
the same time, the ontological entwinement between being and beings
ensures that the dis cI osure of the importance of the question of being
that the existential analytic of the human being uncovers also dis cI oses
the truth of the human being. There are , therefore, two related aspects
to Heidegger's attempt to dis cI ose being: (1) an existential analysis of
the human being; and (2) the use of this existential analysis to dis cI ose
the importance of the question of being. A study of the human being is
a necessary precursor to the study of that which Heidegger holds to be
fundamentally important: being.
Frequently, however, the second movement to being was forgotten or
ignored with the consequence that Heidegger's thought was interpreted
as offering a philosophical anthropology of the human being (Rockmore,
1995a: 95-96). This is not and never was Heidegger's project. Heidegger
is not interested in providing an anthropological account of the human
being; 'the analytic of Dasein remains wholly orientated towards the
guiding task of working out the question of being' (B 俨丁r巨: 38). Heidegger'
irritation at the anthropological interpretation of his 址 t h址inking becomes
叩
a pparent when we read 妇 tüs statement 出
t ha
肘t 'as always 加i nS
缸ei切
yη1 und Zei此t，
i让t 妇i S 斤。
'07n
η out of the truth of being and only thus that man is inquired
into' (MFN: 124). Not only must the movement from analysing the
human being to that of being be continued if the human being, and
all else, is to be understood , but , in fact , the analysis 0
Heideggel~ Fundalllental Ontology, and Hwnα nism 27
(B1': 31) ontology that simply focuses on beings. Only fundamental

ontology can disclose the truth of the human being.
1'0 correct misinterpretations of his thought , clarify his position , as
well as criticise alternatives , Heidegger's later analyses , starting with
the Introducnon ω Metaphysics ， change tac k. Rather than focus on an
analysis of being mediated by an existential analytic of the human
being, Heidegger focuses on being directly, un幡mediated by a primor-
dial analysis of entities. 'The question about human being is now deter-
mined in its direction and scope solely on the basis of the question about
Being' (I M: 219). While not unimportant , the human being becomes
a secondary consideration. But to redefine the human being in terms
of his valorisation of being, Heidegger also provides an analysis and
critique of humanism as he insists it has hitherto been thought.
Metaphysical humanism
While a complicated affair, humanism is an 'inescapable' (Battersby,

1996: 557) part of V飞Testern history. 丁'0 show this , Heidegger p 1'Ovides
a summary genealogy of it which leads him to maintain that the first
explicit version of humanism , as that which is opposed to barbarism ,
'was first considered and striven for in the age of the Roman Republic'
(LH: 224). More specifically, Roman hur日anism a1'O se f1'O m its encounter
with the late Greeks (LH: 224) and embodied the Greek spirit of paideia ,
meaning learned , phi1 osophical scholarship and training in good
conduct and manners , an occurrence that ensured that the affirma-
tion of a culture of reason and education became synonymous with
the essence of humanity (LH: 224). While Heidegger does recognise the
heterogeneous nature of 'humanism' , including Renaissance , Scholastic,
and mode臼r‘~n ve臼r吐 ons轧， he rr丑la挝inta剖ins that each 臼丑lbodies the Greek<
e rr
spirit of paideia. Each version of humanism hitherto thought shares
a common underlying notion of humanit弘 insofar as each holds the
essence of humanity accords with the affirmation of a culture of reason
and education.
Heidegger's understanding of the homogeneity of the different
versions of humanism has , however, been contested. For example , Gail
Soffer argues that it is 'an over心implification and distortion of historical
detail' (1 996: 552) , while , in a similar vein , Vito R. Giustiniani criti-
cises Heidegger's insistence that 'every "historical" humanism cannot
be anything else than a resurgence of Greek paideia' (1985: 184).
While it may be accurate to describe modern versions of humanism
as sharing the Greek's emphasis on according to GiustinianÍ ,
28 Ontology ill Heirlegger í11 zd Deleuze
this does not fit well with Roman 0 1' Renaissance ve 1'sions. Giustiniani
holds that Heidegge1' misinterprets the homogeneity of the diffe1'ent
versions of humanisrn because he: (1) over蝴valorises Greek antiquity;
and (2) conflates 'paideia' and 'hurnanitas' to clairn that each ve 1' sion
of hurnanisrn holds that the essence of the hurnan ernanates frorn the
affirrnation of a culture of education or reason. This , however, fails to
appreciate that there are two senses to 'hurnanitas': one that corre-
sponds to paideia's ernphasis on an affirrnation of a culture of education
and reason and the other that 1'elates to the cultivation of specific indi-
vidual cha1'acte 1' traits. According to Giustiniani , Heidegger's t 1'anslation
reduces 'hurnanitas' to that of the affi 1'rnation of a cultu1'e of education
and 1'eason and fails to app 1'eciate that it also describes the affirrnation
of specific individual cha1'acte 1' t1'aits. Giustiniani's point seerns to be
that , cont1'a1'y to his reading of Heidegge1', there are diffe 1'ent ve 1'sions of
hurnanism because each differs in terrns of how it structu1'es the 1'elation
between the dual senses of the te 1'rn 'hurnanitas'. Evaluating whethe 1' 0 1'
not these criticisrns of Heidegge1" s interp 1'etation of the hornogeneity of
the various hurnanisrns are accurate is not sornething 1 will engage with
here. After all , even if these criticisrns are accurate , the interpretation
of the hurnan being that arises frorn Heidegger's (rnis-?)interpretation
perhaps ernphasises that error can lead to the unveiling of new insights
and paths of thought. The point is to note the contentious nature of
Heidegger's interpretation and , having done so , 'bracket' this discussion
to follow Heidegger to see whe 1'e his inte1'p1'etation leads.
Heidegger accounts fo 1' the hornogeneity of traditional accounts of
hurnanisrn by identifying three different , but related , features shared
by the va 1'ious traditional accounts of hurnanisrn. These cornrnon
features ensure that , while they rnay appea 1' to be diffe 1'ent, each t 1'adi-
tional ve 1'sion of humanism is , in actualit弘 g1'ounded in the sarne st1'uc-
tu 1'es of thought. Fi1' st , Heidegger argues that each traditional ve 1'sion
of hurnanism shares a cornrnon understanding of the essence of the
hurnan being. Each 'has presupposed the rnost universal 11 essence"
of rnan to be obvious. Man is considered to be an anirnal rationale'
(LH: 226; OM: 87). Second , Heideg
Heidegger, Fundamental Ontology, and Hummzisrn 29
foundational principles that shape the parar丑 eters within and through
which human being is discussed and analysed (ID: 58). These param-
eters close thinking off to a predetermined schema and so set the param-
eters for debate. These three aspects conform to the various aspects of
Heidegger's critique of metaphysics. 叭le will return to this issue in subse-
quent chapters, but for now it is sufficient to highlight that, for Heidegger,
thinking is metaphysical if it: (1) occurs through binary oppositions;
(2) is based on a fixed , immutable ground; and/or (3) simply presup-
poses certain truths to be self-evident.
Heidegger's charge is that no matter how different the 'forms of
humanism may be in purpose and principle , in the mode and means
of their respective realisations, and in the fonn of their teaching, all
analyse the humanitas of homo humanlls through a pre-established inter帽
pretation of nature, history, world, and the ground of the world, that
is , beings as a whole' (LH: 225). In particular, human being is defined
in contrast to one genus of being (animals) which culminates in the
human being defined as a rational an iI丑a l. Such a conclusion offends
Heidegger, however, because it does 'not set the humanitas of man high
enough' (LH: 233-234). There are at least two aspects to this. First, by
simply setting up a binary opposition between human and anir丑 al ，
humanism does not inquire into human being on its own terms.
Second, while comparing human being to other beings 'will... always
be able to state something correct about man' (LH: 227) , 让 i t will never
disclose the esse臼nt甘ia址1 盯
a spect of the hur
江1τ丑lan being because whenever
do this we abandon mηlan to the essential realmη1 of animalitas even if we
do not equate hin丑1 wi让th beasts but 剖 at位~ibute a specific difference to him'
(LH: 227). Thus , metaphysical hur丑 anisI丑 always 'thinks of man on the
basis of animalitas and does not think in the direction of his humanitas'
(LH: 227). For Heidegger, disclosing the essential truth of the human
being requires that the human being be analysed in terms of its relation
to being rather than in relation to other beings. Similarly, while recog-
nising that reason is an aspect of the human being, Heidegger maintains
that it is not the essential aspect of humanity (LH: 229); ek心 istence is
the essence of the human b
30 Ontology În Heidegger mzd Deleuze
"humanism 飞 he is necessarily speaking for 'the inhuman and a glori-

fication of barbaric brutality' (LH: 249). Heidegger's questioning of
the logic of binary oppositions is informed by a stance that holds that
simply speaking against something does not immediately mean the
valorisation of its opposite. As he explains , we must not 'immediately
assume that what speaks against something is automatically its negation
and that this is "negative" in the sense of destructive' (LH: 250). The
negation of something is akin to a clearing that then allows a position
with regard to the issue in question to be taken. Criticising humanism
does not automatically mean the inhumane is valorised; it means that
a space is opened from which the human can be discussed unencum-
bered by previous thought. The clearing of thought inherent to critique
allows thought to think about the issue in new and novel ways. Thus ,
'it ought to be somewhat clearer now that opposition to "humanism" in
no way implies a defence of the inhuman but rather opens other vistas'
(LH: 250). My suggestion will be that this acts as one of the standards
through which we can compare Heidegger's and Deleuze's thinking: the
extent to which their ontologies open up new vistas and paths.
Questioning the logic of binary oppositions that underpins metaphys-
ical thought ensures that Heidegger's critique of metaphysical humanism
is not simply a critique of the way the human being has been previ-
ously thought; it is also , as Françoise Dastur (2000: 127) notes , a critique
of the metaphysical assumptions on which thinking has been based
and through which thinking has thought. As we will see in Chapter 5,
Heidegger questions the logic of binary oppositions with a view to
instantiating a new form of thinking constituted by a non-binary, non-
conceptual logi c. Li nked to Heidegger's notion that critique under-
takes a clearing that opens up new paths of thought is his insistence
that being: (1) must be thought on its own terms; and (2) transcends
metaphysical binary oppositions. This is a crucial aspect of Heidegger's
valorisation of being and attempt to rethink the human. For Heidegger,
metaphysics remains caught in an either/or, subject/object dichotomy
because of its reliance on conceptual thought. Being cannot , however,
be thought conceptually; to truly think being requires that we 'recognise
that there is a thinking more r
Heideggel~ Fwzdamental Ontologμ and HU1nσ nism 31
thought that operates through fixed ontic boundaries. This is possible

and indeed necessary because being escapes logical oppositions because
these are themselves grounded in being. Subject and object , essence and
existence, and the notion of a binary opposition are simply different
forms of being (LH: 252). As the ground of logical oppositions , being
is not subject to those logical oppositions; being is 'beyond traditional
oppositions of subject vs. object , of humanity vs. God' (Pattison , 2000:
10). Because of this, being must be thought on its own terms.
Thus , while ]ohn McCumber (1 999: 13一 15) suggests that Heidegger's
attempt to awaken us to the question of being is subordinate to his
atter丑pt to overcome the logic of fixed oppositions , 1 understand that
the two endeavours cannot be separated in this manner. Heidegger's
critique of fixed logical oppositions is dependent on his valorisation of
being. It is because of the non-relational transcendence of being that it
is possible to think beyond fixed metaphysical oppositions. To give the
human being back its dignity by instantiating a new method of thinking
unconstrained by the metaphysical focus on beings or the logic of binary
oppositions requires , according to Heidegger, a focusing on being and
the human's relation to being. As Heidegger explains ,
the question about the essence of being is intimately linked to the

question of who the human being is. Yet the determination of the
human essence required here is not a matter for a free-floating
anthropology, which at bottom represents humanity in the same way
as zoology represents animals. The question about human being is
now determined in its direction and scope solely on the basis of the
question of being. (1 M: 219)
The method to discern being is no longer, as it is in Being and Time , an

existential analytic of the human being to disclose being, but a focusing
on being to disclose the ontological truth of the human being. This
focusing on being is accompanied by a rethinking of the human being.
Human ek-sistence
To rethink the essence of the human being is not, for Heidegger, to abandon
concepts such as 'human being' , 'essence' or 'humanism'; it is to rede-
fine the human being through a questioning and re-formulation of the
categories traditionally used to describe the human. de Beistegui
is , therefore , perfectly correct to note that of the
human being is both a critique of conceptions of the human
32 Ontology ill Heidegger and Deleuze
being and a questioning of the categories that have been used to describe
the human: 'the history that Heidegger recounts is that of man's relation
to his essence, the history of the essence of man , in which the concepts
"man" , "essence 飞 and "history" come to be reformulated radically' (2003:
13). Heidegger's attempt to think a beyond棚metaphysical humanism
does not rely on nor does it attempt to instantiate a fundamental rupture
with humanism that annihilates hu口lanism from thought or discourse.
Thought must clear previous understandings of the hm丑an being, both in
terms of its normative content and logical underpinnings , before coming
to re-examine the issue under discussion unencumbered by presupposi-
tions. Heidegger engages with traditional ver吐 ons of humanism to show
where they went wrong and uses their fa i1i ngs to instantiate a mode of
thinking beyond the framework of metaphysics. Heidegger's so-called
anti翩humanism is not , therefor飞 a critique of the human being per se,
but is a critique of a particular understanding of the human being that he
holds is , and has been, dominan t. ]acques Derrida calls this continued
wor‘ k of Heidegger's on humanity, 'the magnetic attraction of that which
is the "property of man'" (1969: 45). Even when he seeks to affirm the
question of being, Heidegger cannot help but affirm the importance of
the human being. As Derrida explains ,
the thought of being, the thought of the truth of being in whose

name Heidegge 1' de-limits humanism and metaphysics neve 1'theless
remains a thought of man. 1n the question of being as it is raised
in metaphysics , man and the name of man are not displaced. And
they certainly do not disappear. There is , rathef, a sort of re-evalua 恻
tion or revalorisation of the essence and the dignity of man. (1969:
49 50)
…
丁his is perhaps not surp1'ising for, as Keith Ansell-Pearson explains , 'the

promise of the over-human forces us to 1'eturn to man , to recollect his
memor弘 while the discovery, 0 1' invention , of that memory reveals to
us this promise of over-human features' (2009: 20). But Heidegger wa1'ns
that 'thinking does not overcome metaphysics by climbing still higher,
surmounting it, transcending it somehow or other; thinking overcomes
metaphysics by climbing back down into the nearness of the nearest'
(LH: 254). Metaphysical humanism is not overcome by constructing
more elaborate abstract metaphysical schemas; overcoming metaphys-
ical humanism requires that thought comport itself to that which is
both nearest to it and also furthest from its comprehension: being. 丁o
sunnount metaphysics and ascertain the proper essence of the human
Heideggel~ Fundamental Gntology, mzd HumanÍsm 33
being, Heidegger explains that thought rnust 'rnake clear how being
concerns rnan and how it clairns hirn' (LH: 233). Only by directing itself
towards and focusing on the being of the hurnan being will thought be
able to uncover the truth of the hurnan being.
The fundarnental problern with rnetaphysical hurnanisrn is its anthro唰
pocentrisrn, which can be broken down into two different, but related,
aspects. First , anthropocentrisrn does not engage with the question of
being, but rernains a questioning of beings. While rnetaphysical anthro-
pocentrisrn takes itself to be revealing the truth of entities , its failure to
ask the question of being rneans it fa i1 s to reveal the truth of entities in
the way it claims to (KPM: 150). Second, and linked to this, metaphysical
anthropocentrisrn entails 'the positioning, in the sense of the sub才 ect，
of rnan (b e it as the "{/' the "we 飞 the "individual" , the "cornrnunity飞
the "spirit飞 the "body气 there rne 1'e living being, 0 1' the "people") , that
is, of that being frorn , and in view of which , all beings a1' e "explained" in
their beingness' (MFN: 138). By setting up the hurnan being as the entity
frorn which all else ernanates , anthropocentrisrn fails to question being
and is unable to truly think the essence of hurnan being and, indeed,
all entities. For this reason , Heidegger asks: 'can hurnan cornportment
in general and hurnan "thinking" in particular ever be other than what
they are , namely constantly rooted in "rnan? 月， (MFN: 139). Rather
than continue to affirrn the human being as the Archirnedean point
frorn where all else ernanates , Heidegger wants to effect a Copernican
Revolution by decentring the human being from its previously held
central position. While rnetaphysical hurnanism tends to think of the
hurnan's essence as 'something' that resides within the hurnan that
provides hirn with a fundarnental and imrnutable presence at the heart
of entities , Heidegger's rethinking of the hurnan being leads him to
argue that thinking of the essence of the human being in this manner
fails to properly understand its essence. For Heidegger, the essence of
the hurnan being is not found within the hurnan being, whether this is
thought as something fixed and deterrnining or as potential that needs
to be rnade actual (LH: 231) , but lies in its unique relation to being.
Heidegger calls the human being's unique relation to being, its 'ek心
34 Ontology in Heidegger Gnd Deleuze
commentators understood that Heidegger's emphasis on the human

being's existence was simply opposed to the essence of metaphysics.
Rather than privileging essence in opposition to existence , Heidegger's
thought was interpreted as simply privileging existence in opposition
to essence. This led Jean-Paul Sartre to famously state that, in relation
to human consciousness , 'existence comes before essence' (1 973: 26).
Heidegger points out , however飞， that sim丑lpl甘
y rever咀ng an opposition does
not underr口 m
丑1丘ine
山 the binary structure underpinning 让 i t (LH: 232). Sartre'、S
privi且leging of existence over essence simply re-instantiates the logic of
binary oppositions that Heidegger attempts to overcome. To correct this
misinterpretation , Heidegger, in the Letter 011 Hwnanism , re斗vrites 'exist-
ence' as 'ek心istence'. This is supposed to make it clear that holding that
'the essence of man lies in ek-sistence' (LH: 248) 'is not identical with
the traditional concept of existentia , which means actuality in contrast
to the meaning of essential as possibility' (LH: 229). Ek-sistence is not
trapped within metaphysical oppositions. lt is the 'space' within which
the human being lives in relation to being. When identifying what the
essence of human being entails , we must think of the human's ek-sistent
relation to being.
This brings us to the question of the relationship between time and
space in Heidegger's ontology. While the title Being α I1d Ti me indicates
that being is intimately and exclusively related to time, a strand of
recent Heideggerian scholarship has suggested that space plays an , at
least , equally important role in Heidegger's thinking (Frodeman , 1992;
Malpas , 2006 , 2012). 认Thile this suggestion is important in revealing the
often ignored role space and place play in Heidegger's overall thinking, 1
disagree that Heidegger's ontology (defined as his analysis of being) gives
equal priority to space and time. To show this, we must return to the
ontological difference which states that: (1) an entity is revealed through
its being; and (2) being 'is' fundamentally different to the 'objective'
manifestness of entities; being is that which allows entities to be mani-
fested in their particularity. Revealing the essence of an entity requires
an engagement with the being of that entity which cannot have s
Heídeggel~ Fundamental Onto!ogy, and HumallÎsm 35
the analysis is conducted through temporal considerations manifested

ontically as spatially configured entities , each of which is (1) manifested
in different spatial form , and (2) distinguished by a different spatial
relation to being. When trying to work out the essence (= being) of an
entity, we must look to that entity's particular spatial relation to being
to distinguish it from other entities while thinking the being of each
through an identification of the way each particular entity becomes
temporally. For example , the human is distinguished from other enti-
ties because it ek-sists in a specific , unique 'spatial' relation to being;
but this unique e1心 sistent 'spatial' relation is defined by the way being's
temporal becoming 'is' ontically or objectively manifested as human
being. The question of the essence of human being is a question of the
ter丑poral becoming of human being as this is revealed from its ek心istent
relation to being. Rather than going from an analysis of human being
(= spatial manifestation of being) to being (= time) and concluding that ,
because being (= time) is revealed through an analysis of human being
(= spatial manifestation of being) , being must be spatial , we have to
remember Heidegger's Kehre and go from an analysis of being's (non-
objective temporal) becoming to its spatial把mporal manifestness
as entities distinguished by their specific relations to being. This is a
subtle difference , but it is an important one. While the ontic level of
Heidegger's analysis may depend on a 'spatial' explanation to distin幡
guish entities from one another and show how each entity is distin-
guished by its particular relation to being, the 'truth' of each entity is
revealed from the being of that entity, which , because of the ontological
difference , can only entail a temporal becoming.
Nevertheless , it is certainly true that thinking of human essence
in terms of the 'space' human being inhabits from being's temporal
becoming entails a radical rethinking of human essence. It decentres
the essence of human being from within human being so that, rather
than being a property of human being, the essence of human being lies
'outside' human being in its relation to being. Far from human being
controlling being, human being is not only defined by its relationship
to being, but is actually a gift that emanates from being. B
from being. Similarly, Heidegger points out that the same architectonic
applies to the truth. 'Truth is neither somewhere over man (as validity in
itsel f), nor is it in man as a psychical subject , but man is "in" the truth'
(ET: 55). Both freedom and truth are decentred from human being to the
extent that , by gaining their meaning from being, human being resides
within both freedom and the truth. With this , Heidegger aims to not
only rethink what we mean by freedom and truth through an analysis
of their respective relationships to being, but also decentres the human
being from its previously privileged position. Not only is the human
being no longer the centre of being, but truth and freedom are not prop-
erties of human being; human being resides 'within' truth and freedom ,
which are intimately related to being.
For Heidegger, therefore , questioning human being, and indeed
entities in general , no longer entails an anthropological analysis of
the entity 'human being' , but an opening of thought to being that
reveals , in the case of the human being, the human's ek sistence , and ,
…
in relation to other entities , their relationship to being. Importantly,

however, Heidegger notes that while entities are defined in relation to
being, this does not mean all entities stand in the same relationship
to being. Human 'belongingness to being determines him in terms of
the guardiα nship of the truth of being, which means that man as a
being is not an occurrence among the rest of beings!' (MFN: 126). As
Heidegger notes in Being and Time , this is because out of all entities ,
only the human being is interested in its being (BT: 32). Not only do
other beings , most notably animals , remain ignorant or uninterested
in being or are simply unable to disclose being because 'they lack
language' (LH: 230) , but , given that the truth of the human being lies
in its relationship to being, understanding human being requires that
thought turn not to other entities , but to being. Only this turning to
being will disclose the truth of human being.
But the human being's relation to animals is a complex one for
Heidegger. On the one hand, as conscious beings , living creatures are
'in a certain way most closely akin to us' (LH: 230) , but , on the other
hand , they are 'separated from our ek-sistent essence by an abyss' (LH:
230). We may wonder what exactly this abyss entails or whether it is
t
Heídeggel~ Fundα ment，α l O l1 tology, a l1 d Humanism 37
insistence that the human being ek-sists under being should be taken
to mean that the human being exists below being in terms of its impor-
tance. While being is that which is highest in importance , the human
being's ek心istence means that Heidegger's ontology: (1) privileges
the human being over other entities; and (2) maintains that only an
inquiry into being can disclose the truth of the human being (LH: 217).
Understanding human being does not emanate from an analysis of the
abyss that separates the human being from other beings; the human
being's relation to being is what is most importan t. Heidegger exhorts
us to instantiate a mode of thinking that recognises and affirms that
'man is not the lord of beings. Man is the shepherd of being' (LH: 245).
Thus,
man's distinctive feature lies in this, that he, as the being who thinks,
is open to being, face to face with being;... man remains referred to
being , and he is only this. This 'only' does not mean a limitation ,
but rather an excess. A belonging to being prevails within man , a
belonging which listens to being because it is appropriated to being.
(I D: 31)
Such is the importance afforded being that even as he claims that

the human being is subordinate to being, Heidegger claims that this
re嗣 evaluation does not debase the human being; it glorifies the hm口 an
being like never before. Such is his glorification of the human being that
Heidegger even concedes that it entails a μ'humanism" in the extreme
sense' (LH: 245).
It must be remembered , however, that humans disclose being through
both thinking and language. Thinking is always accompanied by being
and indeed always concerns being; 'thinking is the thinking of being'
(LH: 220). Because thinking discloses being to the human being, thinking
is also capable of disclosing 'the relation of being to the essence of man'
(LH: 217). The thinking described here is not the technical thinking of
ca1culation and instrumental rationality. Such thinking limits itself to
analyses of beings and maintains a predetermined ground of inquiry; it
is, therefore, inherently metaphysical and incapable of thinking being.
To think being，气句 e must free ourselves from the technical interpretation
of thinking' (LH: 218). True thinking, for Heidegger, thinks of being not
beings and , by going beyond the binarγoppositions of metaphysics, 'is
a thinking more rigorous than the conceptual' (L曰: 258). But thought is
also intimately linked to conceptuallanguage. 斗Vhile thinking thinks of
being, the disclosure of being occurs language. Language thus
plays a crucial role in disclosing to humans the status and nature ofbeing.
Indeed, without language's disclosure of being, being would remain
concealed. However乓~， Heidegge臼r's concept吐ion of language is not tha时t of
an 怕 i ns挝tru
刀um丑l陀e
臼阳nt the humη1an being uses to disclose its 由 1让t. While 'ma
t hough
挝
acts [as] though he [is叶] the shaper and m 丑laster‘ of language 飞，.….川.lan凯lage
r肥ema 剖in盯
lS the master of mηlan'γ， (σPMD 丘:2 盯13匀). Rather than holding that
language resides within the human being as a tool to be used as and when
it pleases, Heidegger holds that 'we are within language' (WL: 398) and
that, as we reside within language , it is not us that speaks but 'language
that speaks' (队TL: 411).
Heidegge 臼r's decentr挝‘
甘
t
i让ng ofl恒
ang凯u肢age 仕f1'0αm
丑1 the hl口nll
丑1an being 妇 i s designed
to reinforce his decen让tri‘t甘 ing of the hun丑lan being fron丑1 the pri垃me position
町
a cc∞ or叫de创dtωoi让t by metaphysics. Not only is the human being subordinate
to being, it is also encased by language (and , as we saw, freedom and
truth). At the same time , 'the ability to speak is what marks man as man'
(OWL: 112); animals do not reside within language (LH: 230). Language
is , therefore , a constitutive aspect of the human being; 气^1e can... never
step outside it in order to look it over circumspectly from some alterna-
tive position' (WL: 423). As the means through which being discloses
itself, 'language is the house of being' (LH: 217). As the house within
which being resides , the importance of language to the disclosure of
being cannot be overestimated. But several questions arise at this point:
Is language capable of undertaking this crucial role? Does the concep-
tualisation of language not threaten to undermine Heidegger's attempt
to disclose that which cannot be disclosed conceptually: being? Is it not
possible that language may disclose being in an objectified, devalued
form akin to an entity? And , if language is unable to disclose being, how
else can Heidegger hope to disclose being? Such is the important role
that language plays in Heidegger's valorisation ofbeing and his accompa蛐
nying attempt to instantiate a new understanding of human being that
it is no exaggeration to say that Heidegger's entire attempt to disclose
being depends on whether language is capable of disclosing bein
τhe of
We have seen , ther甘ore， that Heidegger's thinking on human being

aims to 'raise anew the question of the meaning of being' (BT: 1). This
raising manifests itself most clearly in and through Heidegger's Letter on
Heideggel~ Fundσ mental Gntology, and Humanism 39
Hwnanism. As one commentator puts it , 'the Letter... 1'ests on a primo 1'-

dial concept of being, the conviction of being in 认Testern philosophy,
and the necessity of ove1'coming metaphysics' (Zago 1'in , 2003: 90). The
fundamental impo 1'tance Heidegger affords the question of being does ,
however, lead to the following questions: 认Thy the privileging of being
ove1' beings? Why is the question of being the most fundamental ques-
tion of all? Why does fundamental ontology have this privileged place
in relation to metaphysics? How can Heidegger talk about difference ,
indicating a neut 1'ality of privileging, and then specifically defend the
privileging of being? And how, if at all , does Heidegge1' justify his valo 1'i-
sation of being?
To his credit, Heidegge 1' 1'ecognises that his valo 1'isation of being will
necessa1'ily be questioned if and when his thoughts on humanism , meta-
physics , and being a1'e properly though t. In response , he a1'gues that
whethe 1' the 1'ealm of the t 1'uth of being is a blind alley 0 1' whethe1' it
is the free space in which freed01ll consεrves its essence is something
each one may judge after he himself has tried to go the designated
way, or even better, after he has gone a better way, that is , a way befit-
ting the question. (LH: 247)
Only once we have travelled along the path Heidegger opens us to with
his re-instantiation of the question of being can we properly judge
whether his valorisation of being is justified or not. 认1hile ]acques
Derrida claims that Heidegger's thinking becomes increasingly 'authori-
tarian' (1 991: 11) as he realises the extent to which his thinking remains
bound to unjustifiable 'metaphysical' premises , 1 understand that his
attempt to justify his privileging of the question of being is somewhat
democratic , insofa1' as Heidegger asks the thinker who has engaged
with his thought to decide fo 1' him 0 1' herself whether the question of
being has the importance he gives it. Until then Heidegger asks us to
reserve judgernent and trust his valorisation of being. But can we trust
Heidegger? Should we trust him? And how does Heidegge 1" s exhortation
to 1'ese1've judgement on his valorisation of being sit with his insistence
that genuine thought must be p1'e-suppositionless? These questions can
perhaps only be answered individually for Heidegger certainly p 1' ovides
no answe 1' to them. There is , however, another line of questioning
that must be posed to Heidegger relating to the ontological difference
between being and beings.
While an aspect of Heidegger's of humanism
engages with the analysis of the hUl丑 an bein 立 Droduced 如 the different
40 Ontology in Heidegger alld Deleuze
ve 1'sions of metaphysical humanism , his analysis is mo 1'e profound ,

insofa 1' as it C1让 icises the logical foundations and assumptions on which
the arguments of metaphysical humanism are built. In contrast to meta-
physical humanism, Heidegge1' wishes to establish a new 'beyond-met-
aphysical' (0 1' beyond dua 1istic-thinking) humanism that will analyse
the human being from a primo1'dial questioning of being. This attempt
to think 'beyond' the logic of binary oppositions is one of the 1'easons
fo 1' his foundational influence on contempora1'y posthumanism (Rae,
2014). Heidegger achieves this because his insistence that being comes
'before' metaphysical oppositions allows him to hold that inqui1'ing into
being escapes the binary oppositions of metaphysics. The escape that
the inqui1'Y into being facilitates opens thought to alternative ways of
thinking, including alternative ways of thinking about the human being.
However, the reader who chooses to follow Heidegger's re-instantiation
of being may wonder whether defining being in terms of an ontological
diffe 1'ence to beings does not result in the same binary structure , albeit
between different terms , as the thinking he seeks to dissipate. In other
words, we may wonder whether Heidegger's attempt to establish a
ne\i甸甸beyond metaphysical (or beyond dualistic斗hinking) h umanism
does not simply re唰 assert another dualism between being and beings?
By positing an ontological difference between being and beings , does
Heidegger's attempt to think beyond-metaphysics not re唰 instantiate a
form of the metaphysicallogic he seeks to overcome?
As we have seen , Heidegger insists that , because being 'grounds' all
binary oppositions , it cannot be subject to the logic of binary opposi-
tions. There are , at least , two reasons for this. First , Heidegger holds that
being escapes the logic of binary oppositions because being is always
the being of an entity. As such, being cannot be posited in opposition
to an entity. While there is an ontological dil和rence between being and
beings , being and beings do not and cannot exist in strict opposition to
one another meaning we cannot speak of a binary opposition between
ther日. Second, Heidegger holds that , because we speak of binary oppo幡
sitions , they exist in some sense and are , therefore , a particular form
of being. Because being is that which is 'common' to t
Heideggel~ Flllldamental Ontology, and Hwnanism 41
Perhaps Jacques Derrida has gone furthest in exploring this question ,

an exploration that leads him to valorise difference , or as he writes it
'différance' , 'over' Heidegger's valorisation of being. While Derrida
recognises that Heidegger holds that , because being is always the being
of an entit弘 being does not exist in strict opposition to beings and
so does not establish a simple binary opposition between being and
beings , he maintains that Heidegger's positing of being as the ground
of binary oppositions fails to realise that , by defining being through
its difference from beings , being is not the ground of all binary opposi-
tions but is dependent on difference. This leads Derrida to argue that
'since being has never had "a meaning 飞 has never been thought or said
as such , except by dissimulating itself in beings , then diff是rance ， in a
certain and very strange way, (is) "older" than the ontological differ-
ence 0 1' than the truth of being' (1982a: 22). Because Heidegger defines
being in terms of its difference from entities, Derrida a1'gues that , strictly
speaking, being cannot be said to exist 'before' all else in a way that
allows it to ground all else; being is actually dependent on a prio 1' and
more fundamental 吐ling': difference. Thus, while Derrida recognises
that Heidegger understands the limitations of thinking within the
const1'aints of binary oppositions , he holds that the means th 1'ough
which Heidegger attempts to overcome the logic of binary oppositions
do not go far enough. In a simila1' vein to Deleuze, De1'rida charges that
Heidegger, fo 1' all his emphasis on difference , does not truly think differ唰
ence. In response , however, Heidegger would, 1 think, retort that differ-
ence is: (1) dependent on being, insofar as it is only possible to speak
of diffe 1'ence in terms of differences between beings; and/or (2) merely
a form of being, insofar as to speak of 'difference' posits difference as
something in some sense , which as noted, means that it 'has' a being of
its own which must be disclosed to fully understand diffe 1'ence. In this
way, Heidegge1' would , 1 think, t 1'y to re-affirm the p1'imacy of being over
Der吐da's privileging of difference.
认Thile an interesting debate that brings to the fo 1'e an i江lportant
criticism levelled against Heidegger's ontological difference, it may be
helpful to late1' chapters to situate Deleuze in 1'elation to it. A
42 Ontology ill Heidegger and Deleuze
the metaphysical premise that being = identity. The only way to do

this is not to posit being as that which is the Iground' of entit柱ies乓， but
to posit di延ffer‘ence as the Iground'仁. It appear‘飞 therefore飞， that Deleuze
agrees wi th Derr世‘'i da's cla剖ims regarding the pr‘ imηlacy of dif旺fe臼1‘它础
臼nce 10飞ver'
e
F
being. This is not so , however, because Deleuze recognises Heidegger's

point that difference has a particular being of its own , meaning that the
discussion is brought back to the question of the being of difference. In
other words , if Heidegger's questioning of being is privileged, the onto-
logical difference immediately brings us to the question of difference.
But if Derrida's difference is taken as the Ifoundation' of being, we are
immediately brought back to the question of the being of difference.
Deleuze's Iadvance' over both Heidegger and Der吐 da is to recognise that
the argument over whether being or difference is ontological1y primor-
dial is not resolved by positing one as more primordial than the other,
but requires that we Icollapse' them into each other and recognise that
being is difference. The next step is to undertake an analysis of differ-
ence to show what it entails and to do so in a way that shows it is onto-
genetic and, therefore, lindependent' of all else. 认Thether to think being
through difference (Heidegger) or being as difference (Deleuze) is one of
the fundamental issues that distinguishes Heidegger and Deleuz已
We will , of course , re-engage with this in subsequent chapters , but if
we now return to Heidegger, we see that his critique of metaphysical
anthropocentrism raises a number of questions including: What does
lessence' mean and de1i neate? Does the human being possess a fixed
essence or potential? ￥Vhat is the relation between essence and exist-
ence? What is the relationship between the human being and other
beings? Can binary oppositions capture the fluidity of human existence
or, indeed, the ontological truth of the human being? Is the human being
the Archimedean point of existence or is the human being dependent
on Isomething' else? What's the relation between language, thought,
and consciousness? And, importantly, given the human being's depend-
ency on being, how will the transformation in human being be effected?
We will (re今 turn to these questions as we proceed, but it is impo
Bei口gand Tech日ology:
Heidegger 0日 the Overco血ing of
Metaphysics
That Heidegger's critique of technology is innovative , widely read ,

cited , and analysed is beyond dispute. Its influence on the philosophy
of technology alone would probably be sufficient to sanction the claim
that it is the most famous and influential aspect of his thinking. But
Heidegger's analysis of technology is also important for his own thinking
and, in particular, his critique of metaphysics. As he repeatedly points
ou t: 'machine technology [is] identical with the essence of modern meta-
physics' (AWP: 116), 'technicity [is] the destiny of metaphysics and its
com pletion' (MFN: 151) , and 吐le name "technology" is understood
here in such an essential way that its meaning coincides with the term
"completed metaphysics". It contains the recollection of te c1më, which
is a fundamental condition of the essential development of metaphysics
in general' (OM: 93). As a consequence, any thorough engagement with
Heidegger's critique of metaphysics must engage with his critique of
technology while any thorough engagement with the latter must also
engage with the former.
However, while discussions of Heidegger's analysis of technology do ,
generally, highlight the link between Heidegger's critiques of meta-
physics and technology, they tend to either simply mention the connec-
tion without fully explaining it and/or focus on providing a detailed
analysis of the latter in a way that bypasses 0 1' at least significan t1 y
downplays any discussion of whether and how modern technology, and
hence metaphysics , can be overcome. For example , Søren Riis offers an
innovative analysis of Heidegger's account of the of modern
technology that shows that , contra the of modern
technology was also a constitutive part of technology in ancient Greece
44 Ontology;11 Heidegger and Deleuze
(2011: 104, 106… 107). 叭1hile this enhances ou 1' unde 1'standing of the
technological enframing inherent to ancient Greece and shows that
there a1'e p1'oblems in appealing to the ancients to reveal an alte 1'native
form of technology, Riis does not go on to discuss how the enf1'aming
of technology can be overcome. From a different direction , Don Ihde
and Andrew Feenberg focus on Heidegger's analysis to offer a c1'itique
of Heidegge 1" s a1'gument that modern technology, in its enframing,
contains a universal essence. This is problematic for Ihde , because it
'keeps one from seeing particularities of technology and thus makes
it impossible to discern the differences of contexts or of cultu 1' es into
which technologies are embedded' (2010: 21) , while fo 1' Feenbe1'g,
Heidegger's a1'gument is developed at such a high level of abstrac-

tion [that] he literally cannot discriminate between electricity and
atom bombs , agricultural techniques and the Holocaust. All are
merely different expressions of the identical enframing, which we
are called to transcend through the recovery of a deeper relation to
being. (2000a: 297)
While this calls into question key aspects of Heidegger's critique, Ihde's
discussion does not discuss Heidegger's relationship to metaphysics
let alone the overcoming of metaphysics , while, when Feenberg broaches
the topic he does not actually engage with Heidegger's texts , but simply
1
states that he is dissatisfied with (1) the explanation(s) given by various

unnamed Heidegger commentators on the topic, and (2) Heidegger's
own words because he is unable to find a detailed programme of political
action that describes how to bring about the overcoming. The conclu-
sion reached is that Heidegger's account on this topic is 'so vague and
oracular [that] it is not possible to figure out what he hopes 0 1' expects'
(Feenbe1'g: 2000b: 446).
In defence of Heidegger, Iain Thomson argues that 'Feenberg's strategy
for responding to the problems associated with the increasing 1世e of
technocracy takes place primarily at what Heidegger would call the
'ontic' level , having to do with our ordinary, everyday experience with
entities , rather than the ontological level , which concerns our under-
lying understanding of the being of those entities' (2005: 63). In othe1'
words, Feenberg's approach, an approach mirrored by Ihde, is to suggest
that Heidegger reduces all technological entities to the same 'essence'
and then , by focusing on particular, socially embedded technological
entities, show that they are, in fact, very different to one another二
While Feenberg and Ihde view this as a legitimate strategy to show the
abstract nature of Heideggerls thinking and indeed the limitations of
Heidegger 011 the OvercomÎng o(MetaphysÎcs 45
his ontological approach , Thomson reminds us that the problem with

this strategy is that 'our everyday ontic actions and decisions almost
always take place within the fundamental conceptual parameters set for
us by our current ontology' (2000b: 436). Focusing purely on the ontic,
everyday level fails to recognise that the ontic level is dependent on and
is developed from an ontological understanding of being. As such , Ihde
and Feenberg fail to recognise that their ontic critiques are dependent
on a particular understanding of being which they have not inquired
into or justified, but have simply taken over and presumed to be true.
By demanding a course of action prior to undertaldng an inquiry into
the meaning of the question of being, the danger is that they base their
conclusions on certain assumed premises , such as that human beings
can wilfully impact 'on' being's becoming , that risk re-enforcing the
metaphysical perspective to be ove1'come.
While this is unlikely to satisfy Ihde or Feenberg, indeed Feenberg's
(2000b) response takes issue with a number of Thomson's arguments ,
my aim in these introductory remarks is not to provide a blow-by-
blow account of their debate , but to show that Heidegger's analysis of
the relationship between metaphysics and technology, including the
former's overcoming, is often overlooked in the literature 0 1' reduced
to an encounter with his views on technology , meaning that his under翩
standing of metaphysics , technology's relationship to metaphysics ,
and the means to overcome the technological-being of metaphysics
are ignored 0 1' posed at the ontic , rather than ontological , leve l.
The consequence is that Heidegger's position is dismissed because
he fails to provide that which his thinking never aims to p1'ovide:
a detaHed po 1itical programme that would secure the overcoming of
metaphysics. Heidegge 1' never provides this because his entire project
revolves around the idea that prior to outlining concrete action to
alter being, we must first determine whether we can alter being , which
can only be done with a prior patient engagement with the ques帽
tion of being. Rather than simply plunging head first into political
activity aimed at certain , pre-determined ends , Heidegger asks that
we first make sure that we understand what the question of being
entails because it is from 吐出 question that concrete , ontic action wi1l
result. T
46 011 臼logy in Heidegger and Deleuze
Only this will allow us to develop it to the point that, should we wish
to criticise it , we will most fully benefit from the encounter. As such,
this chapter takes seriously Heidegger's claims regarding the slowness of
genuine thinking to follow his analysis. But, rather than focus solely on
Heidegger's analysis of technology, it remembers the intimate connection
between Heidegger's c1'itiques of metaphysics and technology to explore
and bring to the fore the r丑any， often-ignored linkages between the two. In
this way, it develops the interpretation of Heidegger defended throughout
and does so in a way that lays the foundations fo 1' the discussion that will
take place over the next two chapters regarding whether Heidegger thinks
the technological enframing of metaphysics can be overcome.
In preparation for this discussion , this chapter also outlines a particu-
larly prevalent interpretation of Heidegger's work that takes Heidegger's
attempted destruction of metaphysics to mean the annihilation of all
metaphysical thinking. Starting with this premise and subsequently
identifying aspects of metaphysical thinking within his thinking has
resulted in numerous commentators claiming that Heidegger fails
in his attempted destruction of metaphysics (Nicholson , 1975: 492;
Mugerauer, 1991: 187 , 191; P凸 ggeler， 1991: 148). Wh i1e accepting the
notion that aspects of metaphysical thinking remain in Heidegger's
thinking, 1 show that there are two related reasons why this is the case.
First , Heidegger's talk of destructing the r丑 etaphysical tradition does not
mean the annihilation of metaphysics. It means a return to the origins
of metaphysical thinking to uncover aspects of the original mode of
thinking that led to metaphysical thinking with a view to purifying
thought to alternatives (TB: 2; CP: 154). This is why Heidegger discusses
'preparatory' (队TNGD: 56) thinking as the way to engage with what he
calls 'originary' (CP: 34) , non-conceptual , non-instrumental, medita-
tive thinking (DT: 46). While 1wil1 return to this issue in Chapter 5, this
chapter spends significant time detai1i ng the second way this critique
of Heidegger goes astray; that is , the way this criticism of Heidegger
misunderstands the relationship between metaphysical thinking and
post or beyond-metaphysical thinking and , in particular, the means to
'achieve' the latter. By maintaining that
Heidegger on the Overcoming ofMetaphysics 47
the subtle point that traces of metaphysical thinking must remain

in his thought because any 'mere countermovement '" necessarily
remains ... held fast in the essence of that over against which it moves'
(叭TNGD: 61). Because 'a regard for metaphysics still prevails even in the
intention to overcome metaphysics' (TB: 24) , any attempt to surmount
metaphysics remains embroiled in metaphysics. As such , Heidegger is
aware that his attempted surmounting of metaphysics contains , and
indeed must contain , aspects of the metaphysical thinking he aims to
overcome , a point of the highest relevance when engaging with Michael
Zimmerman's (1990: 264) claim that Heidegger's critique of metaphys-
ical anthropocentric human willing appears to prevent any individual ,
political, 0 1' social action from contributing to the process whereby meta-
physics is overcome. In a sense, this is because Heidegger does not want
to establish fixed ontic guidelines that would violate being's historical
becoming and so condemn thinking to representing his solution(s). But
it also points towards a further aspect of Heidegger's analysis: the role
human willing has in the overcoming of metaphysics. Given Heidegger
wants to overcome metaphysics , and given his notion of trace, will
aspects of metaphysics remain in that which overcomes metaphysics? If
so , which aspects? What does this mean for metaphysical subjectivity?
‘
And how will the overcoming of metaphysics be brought about? By

bringing these issues to the fore , this chapter not only engages with key
aspects of Heidegger's analysis and links them to the literature , but also
prepares the way for the next two chapters where these questions and
the criticisms they arise from will be engaged with further二
metaphysics , and
As noted in the previous chapter, and true to his insistence that genuine
thought remains concerned with only one thought (TP: 4) , Heidegger's
entire philosophical enterprise focuses on and revolves around one ques-
tion: the question of the meaning of being. To re-cap , being is not God, a
cosmic ground , 0 1' a transcendent realm , nor is 'it' an entity that we can
see , feel , or touch. Being is distinct from , while intimately connected to ,
beings (BT: 29). The distinction between being and beings implies that ,
while beings can be defined objectively and in a fixed manner, being
cannot. By distinguishing between being and beings , Heidegger main-
tains that, while we tend to focus on the latter and answer the question
of 叭That an entity is through recourse to descriptions of its properties
or form , any discussion of the essencεof cannot be
or genuine unless the being of the entitγis identified. Thus. while the
48 Ontology in Heidegger mzd Deleuze
question of being has long been forgotten , ignored, or believed to be

unimportant , irrelevant , or nonsensical , Heidegger insists that it is the
fundamental question with the consequence that it is time to 'raise
anew the question of the 1ηω ning ofbeing' (BT: 20).
The forgetting of being is not a modern phenomenon, but goes back
to the very beginnings of ancient thought. As a consequence, it is not
simply a matter of choosing to inquire into the question of being; doing
so risks examining the question through the lens of the thinking that
covered it over. Before raising the question , Heidegger maintains it is
necessary to traverse back through the metaphysical tradition to destruct
its assumptions and structure. Through the destruction of the tradition,
thought will burrow back to the originary domain from where meta-
physical thinking emanated to reveal the concealing of the question of
being inherent to metaphysics. As a consequence, thought wi1l not only
recognise the necessity of the question of being, but will come to explore
alternative ways in which this question can be thought (BT: 44).
Importantly, however, this destruction is not simply a negative
endea飞TOU1'， no 1' does it aim to simply annihilate 0 1' set itself in opposi-
tion to metaphysics and the metaphysical tradition. Heidegger goes to
great lengths to make it clear that 'annihilation is something essentially
other than destruction' (CPC: 12). 叭1hile annihilation literally annihi翩
lates the thing so that nothing remains ,
with destruction something is always left over - for example, with

the destruction of a building the rubble is left, even if it is pulverized
into the finest dust and blown away. So there is no 'remainderless'
destruction , any more than there is a round square. Even the most
extreme destruction is but a change of condition , whereby something
always remains preserved. (CPC: 12)
Destruction does not annihilate, but neither does destruction entail

devastation , where devastation means laying waste to the tradition so
as to simply leave it behind (MFN: 16). IIIDestruction" is not IIdestruc-
tive" in the sense of annihilating for the sake of annihilation; it is the
IIlaying- free" of the beginning in order to restore its exhausted fullness
‘
and strangeness that is still hardly experienced in the beginning's earliest

inceptuality' (MFN: 54). 叭1hereas the metaphysical tradition settles on
a definition of being and then quickly and quietly forgets this decision
was made , destruction disrupts this understanding by returning to the
originaIγdomain frOI丑 where the metaphysical understanding of being
emanated to reveal alternatives concealed by metaphysics. The destruction
Heidegger 011 the OvercomÍng ofMetaphysics 49
of metaphysics entails a patient engagement with the metaphysical tradi-

tion to strip it down to identify which aspects of it are to be abandoned
and which are to be reformulated to open up future possibilities. The aim
is to return to the 'primordial experiences in which we achieved our first
ways of determining the nature of being 一 the ways which have guided us
ever since' (BT: 44). With this act of return , or purification as Heidegger
calls it (CP: 154) , the aim is to not only identify what was concealed
by metaphysics , but to also see if an alternative is possible. Heidegger's
notion of destruction does not , therefore, simply aim to annihilate meta凰
physics or set itself in opposition to the metaphysical tradition; it aims
to return to the origin of metaphysics , shake its assumptions and ways of
thinking, negate its concea1ing aspects , and de1ineate and take over 'the
positive possibilities of that tradition' (BT: 44). Ultimately, this return to
the originary domain will determine whether there is an alternative way
of posing and revealing the question of being than that which informs
the metaphysical tradition (CP: 34); an alternative that will open up
alternative manifestations of being (BT: 44).
While we will return to the implications and content of Heidegger's
notion of 'destruction' in subsequent sections , at this stage, it is ir卫por
tant to recognise that the reason the question of being may appear
nonsensical or, at least , difficult to comprehend is because thinking
since ancient Greece has settled on a particular way of thinking 'being'
while simultaneously covering over and forgetting both that this choice
was made and , indeed , the question of being itself (EHF: 30). This inter-
pretation of being is not necessarily wrong, but it is partial in that , while
lt reveals aspects of being, it conceals other aspects that prevent the
t: ruth of being frorn revealing itself. Indeed , we will see that one of the
rnajor ways in which this conceahnent propagates and propagated itself

is and was through the dominance of technology. Heidegger names this
dorninant , concealing approach to being: metaphysics. This approach to
being finds expression in all walks of conternporary 叭Testern society, but
is particularly prevalent in conceptions of technology and hurnan being.
Metaphysics , technology, and hurnan being are , therefore , intimately
connected in Heidegger's ana
secures itself in or from a foundational ground. That is , metaphysics

locates itself in and from a fixed point that provides it with meaning
and delineates the parameters of its thinking. Traditionally, this has
been God , but it has also been the '1' taken as pure subject , spirit , and
the unnamed first-mover. For Heidegger, this need for stability not only
conceals aspects of being, but closes itself off to the tempora1ity of being
(I D: 58). The second aspect of metaphysics builds on the first in that it
merely defines entities by comparing them to other entities and so does
not inquire into the being of an entity (NIII: 7). By failing to inquire
into the being of an entity, metaphysics fails to ask that which would
allow it to properly understand what an entity is. It takes aspects of an
entity for granted 0 1' merely assumes its way of approaching the entity is
correct (LH: 225…226). This corresponds to and 1'e-enforces the first form
of metaphysics in that it does not ask about the being of God or the
being of the foundational ground but simply takes it for granted and ,
as such , finds a fixed ground. The third aspect of metaphysics relates to
its logi c. For Heidegger, metaphysics works through strict binary opposi-
tions such as , for example, essence and existence , and subject and object
(LH: 249-250; MFN: 20). Binary logic imprisons thought and being
within static , fixed parameters and so conceals or closes thought off to
alternatives. The conclusion reached is that metaphysics is a closed, self帽
reinforcing system where the logic of binary oppositions is unable and
unw i1ling to inquire into the being of each entity or the binary opposi-
tion itself and merely takes for‘ granted certain assumptions about the
entities that fonn the binary opposition. This ensures a rejection of and
closure to the alternatives that do not conform to those defined as 'true'
by the metaphysical system.
But accompanying and re蜘 enforcing this metaphysical stance is a
particular view of the human. For Heidegger, metaphysics takes the
human being to be a pure subject placed at the centre of beings deter翩
mining, creating, and controlling them. Metaphysics takes humans to
be 'the measure and the centre of beings. Man is what lies at the bottom
of all beings; that is , in modern terms , at the bottom of all objectifi-
cation and representability' (NIV: 28). While this view of the human
finds expr
Heidegger 0 /1 the OvercomÍng o(Metaph)'sÍcs 51
are , the 1'efore , int1'icately entwined; any attempt to ove1'come one must
also ove1'come the othe1' (NIV: 83). But, as mentioned , Heidegger also
maintains that metaphysics and anthropocentrism are re蝴 enfo 1'ced by
and , in tu1'n , 1'e-enfo 1'ce the dominance of technology. Unde 1' standing
Heidegge 1" s views on metaphysics and anthropocentrism 1'equires an
engagement with his critique of technology, an engagement that will
p1'epa1'e the g1'ound fo 1' the following two chapte1's whe 1'e Heidegge1" s
analysis of philosophy and thinking will be outlined.
τechnology
It is impo 1'tant to note that in a simila1' vein to his usage of the wo 1'd
Imeta physics' , Heidegge1' also uses the te 1'm Itechnology' in th 1'ee diffe 1'ent
ways. Fi1' st , technology can mean Ithe totality of the extent machines
and appa1'atuses , me 1'ely as objects that are available in ope 1'ation'
…
(TL: 132). In othe1' wo 1'ds , technology 1'efe1' s to the objects that can be
used to unde 1'take and COI丑 plete a pa 1'ticula 1' ope1'ation. Second , tech-
nology 1'efe1's to the method of p1'oducing the objects used to under.…
take and complete an ope1'ation. Third , and mo 1'e generally, technology
relates to 'what has been specified into one with the humans and the
groups of humans who work in the construction , p1'oduction , instal-
lation, service , and supe1'vision of the whole system of machines and
appliances' (TL: 132). In its most gene1'al sense , technology relates to
and describes a matrix of interlocking activities that combine to create
a pa1'ticula 1' mode of thought and being defined in relation to and out
of its constitutive 1'elationship to appliances , machines, and objects.
For this reason , Tom Rockmore's claim that Heidegger Iseems incapable
of g1'asping the 1'elation of technology to society and human being'
(1995b: 141) is a curious one. For Heidegger, the most fund aInental
aspect of technology is the way it creates the par aIneters of thinking
and, by extension, the normative values of society. The entire point of
Heidegger's critique of technology is to show how it creates a particular
form of human understanding that , in tu 1'n , creates a pa1'ticular society
defined by quantifiable, calculative thinking.
Heidegger sta1'ts his discussion of technology with the seemingly
paradoxical claim that Itechnology is not equivalent to the essence of
technology' (QT: 4). In othe1' words , we cannot simply look to techno-
logical objects to delineate what technology is or means. The essence of
the compute1', fo 1' example , is not simply discovered looking at the
components of the computer itsel f. Heidegger is to the third
definition of technology outlined above: technology ís more than mere
52 Ontology in Heidegger mld Deleuze
objects; it refers to a way of being. The essence of technology relates to

the way of being instantiated and supported by technology. For this
reason , technology is anything but neutral; it values one way of being
over others. In particular, modern technology values and affirms an
instrumental app 1'Oach to technology where technology is taken to be a
passive instrument that simply waits to be picked up and used to fulfil
a human end.
The consequences of this instrumental vision of technology are
profound. 叭lhile philosophy has traditionally identified four causes to
a thing , the instrumental view of technology reduces it to one. While
philosophy's four causes are causa materialis , which delineates the
matter out of which the thing is made; causa fonnalis , which delineates
the thing's form; causa 斤nalis ， which describes the end 0 1' purpose of the
thing; and , final1弘 Cα usa effìciens , which describes the means that bring
about the thing, modern technology reduces the four causes to causα
effìciens and values the efficient and effective production of objects over
all else (QT: 6, 11). While this reveals the object , it does so partially.
Importantly, however, modern technology maintains that this partial
concealment is the only way the thing can be p 1'O perly approached.
With this , modern technology delineates the parameters that determine
how things are known and, as such , is intimately connected to episte唰
mology (QT: 12).
τ'0 show this f飞lrther， Heidegger traces the 1'O ot of the word technology
to the Greek word technë. While there is a tendency for commentators
to focus on defining technë in relation to different p1'O duction practices
with the modern , instrumental , techno辆 scientific mode of p 1'O duction
compared to a more holistic and organic craft mode of p1'O duction
(Feenberg, 2005: 14), Heidegger pushes us to recognise that, while this
is an aspect of the meaning of the word, there is a more fundamental
meaning that relates to knowledge or epistëmë (QT: 13). For emphasis ,
and to ensure no misunderstandings , Heidegger repeats this a number of
times in different texts. Thus , 'technë , as knowledge experienced in the
Greek manner, is a bringing forth of beings in that it brings forth present
beings as such beings out of concealedness and specifical1y into the
unconcealedness of their appearance; technë never signifies the action
of making' (OWA: 57
Heidegger 011 the OvercomÎllg of MetaphysÎω53
叭Thile his histo 1'ical analysis has been questioned (Riis , 2011: 104,
106.…
ω翩m白-喇响翩@偷
m
丑lO de1'口1'n
approaches tωo 忧 t echnology tωo claim 白
t ha
挝t ， while the 1'elation-
ship between technology, thinking, and being was also found in the
craft production of ancient G1'eece , the holistic , o 1'ganic natu 1' e of craft
production means that it was integrated into natu 1'e in a way that was
conditioned by natu 1'e itself. In contrast , mode 1'n technology sets upon
and t 1'ies to impose itself on natu 1'e. The impact of mode 1'n technology
is far mo 1'e insidious, dangerous , and total and, fo 1' this 1'eason , is the
fo 1'm of technology that Heidegger focuses on. Wh i1 e 1'ecognising the
anthropological , instrumental view of modern technology tells us some-
thing about technology, Heidegger 1'ejects the notion that it discloses
the essence of technology. Because it divorces technology from human
being and makes the former a mere instrument for the latter's ends ,
the instrumental view takes humans to be the masters of technology
and so re-enforces the anthropocentrism of metaphysics. This , however,
forgets , igno 1'es , 0 1' misunderstands that technology is one of the ways
that being reveals itself to humans and so is not at the mercy of human
activity and unde 1'standing. As a world-view, technology shapes how
human being pictures and thinks about itself and the world. Far from
being the masters of technology, human activity and understanding are,
in actualit弘 at the mercy of technology (QT: 4, 12).
The revealing that accompanies r丑odern forms of technology is mani国
fested as 'a challenging, which puts to nature the unreasonable demand
that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such' (QT: 14).
Heidegger maintains that this challenge is absent from previous forms
of technology because they are orientated around a more ho 1i stic and
organic approach to nature. While it is true the old windmill is turned
by the wind, this windmill is at the mercy of the wind blowing and
so does not control its movement or impose itself on nature. There is ,
however, something fundamentally different about modern technol-
ogy's approach to nature in that modern technology imposes itself on
nature and seeks to extract resources from nature. Nothing escapes this
process: agriculture is now the mechanised food industry. Air is now
I
set upon to yield nitrogen , the e

S4 Ontology ín Heídegger Qnd Deleuze
the rhythm of nature , mode 1'n technology imposes itself on natu 1'e and
attempts and expects nature to confo 1'm to its ends.
The challenge modern technology sets up fo 1' natu 1'e ensu1'es it
becomes a reservoir of potential to be used for a pa1'ticula 1' human
project or operation in the future. 'The revealing that 1'ules throughout
modern technology has the cha1'acter of a setting唰upon ， in the sense of
a challenging.嗣 fo 1'th' (QT: 16). This settingωupon means that 'the energy
concealed in nature is unlocked , what is unlocked is transformed, what
is transformed is sto1'ed up , what is stored up is , in turn , distributed and
what is distributed is switched about ever new' (QT: 16). This setting-up
and challenging is accompanied by an ordering of components, mech-
anisation , mathematics , and an emphasis on exactitude which help
to more efficiently and effectively unlock the potential of nature (I D:
34-35). To enable nature to be used at any moment to fulfil the ends
of a particular project, modern technology employs a particular view of
its objects. Far from leaving them alone, it transfo 1'ms them into things
with a potential use; a potential that must 1'emain ope1'ative at all times.
Everything is on standby 1'eady for the call to use. Each thing is taken
to be a 'standing reserve' (QT: 17). The example Heidegger provides is
that of an ai 1'liner sitting on a runway. While surely an object , it is more
than an object. If it is simply reduced to an object, Heidegge1' insists it
conceals its essence. Modern technology t 1'ansfo 1'ms it into a thing 1'eady
fo 1' t 1'anspo 1'tation. To fulfil this role , it is not taken to be simply an inan-
imate object on the runway; the entire view of the object is t 1'ansfo 1'med
to one that is always 1'eady fo 1' immanent use. It may never actually have
to t 1'ansport anything and so may simply stand there motionless; but, in
this motionless , there is pent up potential ene1'gy that can be released at
any moment (QT: 17).
Mode 1'n technology imposes this notion of standing啕rese1've on all
things , including humans , each of which is taken to 'possess' a fully
cha1'ged ene1'gy ready to be expelled for the accomplishment of a project
or placed on stand-by to fulfil a role for the good of a p1'oject. Thus ,
'what is peculia1' to technology resides in the fact that , in it, the demand
speaks forth , the demand to challenge nature forth into placing it at
our disposal and securing it as natural
Heídegger 011 the Overcoming ofMetaphysícs 55
from the central position metaphysics gives them. As such , he main嗣

tains that , while it is true humans reveal objects in this manner, they
are not in control of this revealing (QT: 18). Humans reveal objects in
this manner because being reveals itself through structures and a form of
rationality that brings humans to reveal objects in this way. Rather than
being the masters of this revealing, humans are conditioned by being to
reveal objects in this way. 'All modern control of technicity, all claim to
wanting to be its master, is thus only an illusion that covers up - pretty
badly at that - the metaphysical enslavement to technicity' (MFN: 152).
Far from being in control of technology, the dominance of technology
enframes being (QT: 19) and , through this enframing, reveals being
and entities, including human being , in a particular manner. While
human beings think they are in control of technology; it is technology
that shapes and conditions human being. Humans are at the mercy of
technology's form of revealing and the structures and rationa1i ty that
underpin it (QT: 18).
Enframing (Gestell) entails an apparatus that reveals being in an
enclosed and partial manner. Much 1ike a picture-frame encloses what is
within it , so the enframing of technology closes being within its param町
eters. This is not simply a shutting-out of alternatives; enframing reveals
being in a particular, partial manner that conceals co-possibilities. Note
that enframing does not create being; it delineates the way in which being
is and will be revealed. Enframing delineates what will be re飞lealed while
also revealing it in the appropriate manner. More speci负 call y, enframing
sets upon being and brings it forth in a way that reveals it as an object
with a standing-reserve (QT: 20). Enfr aming is , therefore, intimately
‘
connected to the third definition of technology previously discussed ,

insofar as it reveals being in the manner of objects to be used for a
specific human-made purpose, while simultaneously interlinking the
various appliances, projects , and modes of thinking and being together
to produce the blanket uniformity of modern technology. However, we
have to be careful how we understand 'enframing'. Enframing does not
describe something transcendent to being that is stamped on being as
]erry 叭Teinberger (1992: 123) claims , but is an organic revealing that
ema
S6 Ontology Ín Heidegger and Deleuze
the metaphysical tradition , has chosen. For Heidegger, modern science

obliges and re-enforces this objective, calculable view of nature. This
is not because nature reveals itself in these objective, calculative ways ,
but because it is made to by the enframing of modern technology. In
other words , enframing brings scientific theory to base itself on the
premise that being is nothing but 'a coherence of forces calculable in
advance' (QT: 21). When being is set up in this manner, it is logical
to ask and conduct experiments in ways that explore the implications
of this premise with the consequence that science sets up experir丑ents
to validate and explore the consequences of its foundational , unex怕
plored, metaphysical premise. The result is a discipline that values
objectivity, exactitude, and calculability; exactly the 'things' that vali 幡
date and re-enforce the enframing constitutive of modern technology.
This ensures that 'the reality within which man of today moves and
atter丑pts to maintain himself is , with regard to its fundamental charac-
teristics , determined on an increasing scale by and in co叫 unction with
that which we call 叭Testern European science' (SR: 156). But the scien帽
tific outlook is not 'natural' , nor is it based on explored, foundational
premises. It sets upon being and makes being conform to its unexplored,
foundational premises. Science frames being in a way that reveals, vali-
dates, and re-enforces the enframing, metaphysical outlook of modern
technology.
With this , Heidegger is led to make, what appears to be , a histori 附
cally inaccurate claim; that is , while modern technology arose two
centuries after science , it actually precedes modern science and made
science possible (QT: 21-22). Such is the bafflement over this claim
that , at least , one commentator has argued that Heidegger got things
mixed up here and that , in actuality, for him , the essence of science is
the essence of technology (Glazebrook, 2000: 241). Unfortunately, this
criticism fails to appreciate the three senses in which Heidegger uses the
term 'technology'. The apparent chronological confusion in his account
and disagreement over the relationship between technological and
science arises because Heidegger is using the term 'technology' in three
senses and is seamlessly moving between all three. While it is true the
first two senses
Heidegger 011 the OvercomÍng ofMetaphysics 57
had to await modern work processes that resulted from the emphasis on
calculation , exactitude, and objectivity constitutive of modern science ,
rnodern science's emphasis on calculation , exactitude , and objectivity
was dependent on the enframing constitutive of the third sense of tech-
nology which arose around two millennia prior to the advent of the
rnodern scientific outloo k. While its external manifestation in objects
and tools appears to disclose it occurred later than modern science, in its
essence as enframing, modern technology is historically prior to modern
science (QT: 22).
What this discloses is that the enf1'aming of modern technology
involves a specific world伺view， one thoroughly restrictive in that it
imposes itself on being and reveals being in a partial manner. While 1
have already noted that it has been questioned whether, by reducing
all forms of technology to the enframing of metaphysics , Heidegger
is capable of truly app 1'eciating the nuances inhe1'ent to the socially
embedded particularities of each technology (Feenberg, 2000b: 297; Ihde ,
2010: 109), Heidegge1" s insistence that thought , metaphysics, and tech-
nolo部7 are intimately related leads him to claim that the metaphysical
homogeneity of mode 1'n technology is accompanied by a homogeneity
of thinking that opposes a subject to caiculable, inst1'umental objects
(AWP: 152). Far from being a neutral phenomena , Heidegger claims that
Iby not letting things be in their restful repose , but rathe 1' - infatuated
by his progress - stepping over and away from them , the human [has
become] the pacesetter of the devastation , which has fo 1' a long time
now become the tumu1tuous confusion of the world' (CP C: 149). While
the enframing of technology reveals aspects of being, it is a partial ,
enclosed , and reductive approach that has disastrous consequences fo 1'
being in that its instrumental approach leads to environmental degra唰
dation , weapons capable of obliterating the world, and the stunting of
human being. In respect to the latter, Heidegger claims the real threat
from modern technology does not arise from its capacity to annihilate
the physical aspect of human being, but from the constraining impact it
has on the spirit of human being (WPF: 114).
1t achieves this because the closure of enframing impacts on the essence
of human being. 叭Thereas Heidegger insists the essenc
S8 Ontology;n Heidegger and Deleuze
entities , albeit one in control of these other entities. This ensures that the
anthropocentric , metaphysical view of hurnan being not only becomes
dominant , but also becomes ever more entrenched in its dominance.
Human being does not remain untouched by the enframing of modern
technology; it itself becomes enframed so humans become both a being
in control of its environment and at the mercy of the calculable, instru-
mental projects of others. The result is that 'today' s humans are them唰
selves challenged forth by the demand to challenge nature forth into
p 1'epa1'ation [Beretistelhmg]. Humans themselves are set up fgestellt]; they
are thereby demanded to correspond to the aforementioned demand'
(丁 L: 138). Human being does not escape the constraints of the revealing
of enframing; it is subject to it and so is set up as a subject choosing
how to use the objective world fo 1' its own ends 0 1' an object with a
standing回 rese1've that can be used to complete an ope 1'ation 0 1' projec t.
The enframing of mode 1'n technology, itself an example of metaphysics ,
reveals human being through the binary subject-object division consti-
tutive of metaphysics and so 1'e-enforces the metaphysical tradition.
For Heidegger, therefore , human beings are not the masters of modern
technology; they are subject to its enframing and are revealed in a
way that re-enforces the structure of the metaphysical tradition. The
enframing of modern technology is beyond human control;
no single man , no group of men , no commission of prominent

statesmen , scientists , and technicians, no conference of leaders of
commerce and industry, can brake 0 1' direct the progress of history in
the atomic age. No merely human organisation is capable of gaining
dominion over it. (DT: 52)
Far‘ from revealing humans in the open clearing of being that is their
essence , the destiny of enframing conceals this open clearing, imposes a
closed , metaphysical framework on being, and reveals being in general
and human being in particular through this closed, metaphysical
schema. The problem Heidegger has , however, is that , if the enframing
of modern technology is a destiny beyond the control of human wi1l,
it would appear that human being is at its mercy. In other words , wh i1 e
certainly innovative , it would appea 1' that Heidegger's critique of anthro-
pocentrism and his analysis of the consequences of the enframing of
modern technology prevents any way out of the danger of enframing.
As he notes , if technolo部1 is a manifestation of being, and human being
is revealed in the way of moder‘ n technology, human being cannot over~
come technolo部1 through its own actions because its actions simply
Heídegger 011 the Overcorning o(Metaplzysícs S9
reaffirm the metaphysical tradition , as manifested in the enf1' aming of

rnode 1'n technology, it aims to ove 1'come. This 1'eaffi1'ms what Heidegger
says elsewhe1'e: metaphysics cannot be overcome by offe1'ing 'mo 1'e'
rnetaphysics 0 1' 'by climbing still higher, su1'mounting it, transcending it
somehow 0 1' othe1" (LH: 254); if it can be ove1'come at all , the ove1'coming
of the enframing of modern technology and the metaphysical tradition
in general will result from an alternative route than the anthropocentric
wi1l ing of metaphysics.
Overcoming the enframing of modern technology
Heidegger goes on to explore this possibility to reject the claim that

we simply have to turn away from modern technology, set ourselves in
opposition to it , or simply use 'more' of it. While the overcoming of the
enframing of modern technology will , somewhat paradoxically, emanate
from the enframing of modern technology itself, it also entails a funda-
mental reorientation in terms of how humans understand and relate to
themselves. While the overcoming of technology entails and requires
the overcoming of anthropocentrism and metaphysics , this overcoming
is not stamped on technology from an external perspective; the essence
of technology itself harbours the growth of that which will save us from
the enframing of modern technology (QT: 28). This paradoxical thought
must , however, be understood in the correct manner.
Heidegger thinks the answer lies in the meaning of the word 'essence'
and its relationship to technology. 飞Nhile we tend to think of 'essence'
as denoting what the thing is , whether this is as substance 0 1' genus ,
Heidegger insists that enframing, as the essence of technology, does not
conform to this definition. Enframing is not the substance or genus of
each appliance, but denotes the epistemological formation that brings
forth each thing in such a way that each thing is revealed as a standing-
1' eserve. However, enfralning's way of revealing as challenging calls us
to challenge whethe 1' modern technology's way of revealing through

challenging is the only way in which being can be revealed. The chal-
lenge instantiated by enframing leads to the challenging of enframing
itsel f. But in line with his absolute c1'itique of anthropocentrism , it is
not human thought that brings forth this insight , 'it is technology itself
that makes the demand on us to think in another way what is usua l1y
unde 1' stood by "essence"' (QT: 30).
While we tend to think of 'essence' as that which delineates both pres-
ence and endu 1' ance , Heidegger wants us to ‘ ethink not in the sense
of creating another sense of essence , but insofal' as the notion of essence
60 011 归logy În Heidegger and Deleuze
as presence-endurance is dependent on a more primordial moment

described as granting (QT: 31). Essence presences and endures because it
is granted presence and endurance by being. Because humans el心 sist as
the shepherds of being in the open clearing of being, they are the ones
through which being is revealed in this manner. Importantly, because
humans exist in the open-ended clearing of being, humans are defined
by the open-ended possibility of being. The danger of the enframing of
modern technology is it threatens this openness and replaces it with
the anthropocentric, calculable, instrumental world-view of modern
technology. As noted though , the attempt to conceal the open俐 ness of
human being actually reveals the open翩 ness of human being (Q丁: 32).
The concealment of enframing actually opens 'a path... for man to
experience beings in a more originary way' (I D: 40). In itself this does
not overcome the enframing of modern technology, but it shows that
enframing is never total; through enframing, alternatives are, at least,
always partially unconcealed. Bringing to light this partial unconceal-
ment requires that we 'pay heed to the coming to presence of tech-
nology' (QT: 32). It requires that we ponder technology and the impact
it has on being. Rather than merely passively accept it, or take it for
granted, Heidegger wants us to think about the enframing of modern
technology. Once we do so properly, he claims we'll 'find ourselves
unexpectedly taken into a freeing claim' (QT: 26) , which will allow al扯te臼r卜蜀
1口1a
剖ti忖
ve臼s tωo the or叫de
臼r妇
i
themselves.
Heidegger does not , therefore, advocate the wholesale abandonment
of technology; he advocates a different relationship to technology. Here,
Hubert Dreyfus' distinction between 'technology' and the 'technolog-
ical understanding of being' may be helpful, where the former refers to
technologies in the first and second senses of Heidegger's understanding
of 'technology' (appliances and the method of producing them) and the
latter refers to the third sense , that is the way we understand entities solely
in terms of calculation , order, and inshumental rationality. For Dreyfus,
Heidegger's overcoming of technology does not entail a Luddite aban-
donment of technology per se , but the overcoming of our technological
zmderstanding o(being so we come to understand and relate to entities in
non-in
Heidegger 071 the Overcoming of Me臼physics 61
the change in thinldng instantiated by the overcoming of metaphysics

wi1l also be accompanied by alterations in how we comport ourselves
to the world and, importantly, how being reveals itself concretely, one
manifestation of which will be alterations in the role and place of tech-
nology 'in' the world (OM: 91).
While Gail Stenstad (1996: 87) rightly points out that 'what comes
forth , and even more its coming forth , is never revealed in full transpar-
ency' (1996: 87) because Heidegger 'is not looking for a ground or stop-
ping place of any kind , but is attempting to think emerging and arising
itsel f' (1996: 88) , the overcoming of metaphysics is not just an idealistic
overcoming where we think being differently; it requires much more
than this. 队1hile I will suggest in later chapters that a reformed concep-
tion of non-metaphysical human willing has a role to play in helping to
overcome metaphysics , this is only a role; Heidegger's comments on the
primacy of being and his critique of the human privileging of metaphys-
ical anthropocentrism indicate that any overcoming of metaphysics is
primarily due to an alteration in how being reveals itself. If being reveals
itself in a non-metaphysical way, it surely follows that the way tech-
nology is manifested or revealed would also change. While Heidegger
does not develop this himself, the logic of his position , whereby the
technological enframing of metaphysics is overcome through altera-
1' ions in how being reveals i1' self and how human being thinks about
and comports itself 1'0 being, would appear to offer the possibility that
being may reveal itself in the form of a different, 'better' technological
future; whe妃 'better' means , not more enframing, but being revealing
itself through technology in an open and opening manner. For those,
like Feenberg, who demand definitive , concrete, political plans, this will
sound like indeterminate waffle , but , fo 1' Heidegger, this is because they
are thinking from the perspective of metaphysics , simply assuming that
human agency can determine being's becoming, and so demanding a
detaHed plan of action. As Hubert Dreyfus points out , however, this not
only perpetuates the calculative, rational, techno-metaphysical perspec嗣
tive to be overcome , but also fails to recognise that establishing 'a new
sense of reality is not something 出 at can be made the g
doing, instantiate different configurations of the concrete world, a new

fo 1' m of human being, and an open way of thinking and compo 1'ting
oneself to this 'new' fo 1'm of being (NIV: 116-117). Rathe 1' than view
being, in all its diffe 1'ent manifestations , as things with a standing-
1'eserve to be calculated , measured , and used fo 1' a chosen pre-dete 1'mined
end , thought must release itself towards being and simply let being be
(DT: 54-55). Similarly, we must 1'id our thinking of the instrumental ,
calculative thinking of metaphysics and replace it with a meditative
thinking that 1'eveals and recognises the human's unique ek-sistent rela-
tionship to being, ponders things mo 1'e deeply and slowl弘 and does not
seek to impose const1'aints 0 1' world唰views on being but lets being be
to reveal itself as it actually is (DT: 46 , 54). While this 1'equi 1'es p 1'epa1'a耐
性 on in the form of the dest 1'uction of the metaphysical tradition and
the opening of human being and thought to being, this dest 1'ucting is
not simply the annihilation of that tradition no 1' is it simply a mental
activity. It is a purifying that aims to 1'eturn to the 1'O ot of the meta-
physical t 1'adition to uncover those aspects concealed by that t 1'adition
(NIV: 183一 184). With this, alternatives to the tradition in the form of a
genuine questioning of being will , so Heidegger contends , be revealed.
τhe destruction of
Despite this effort , however, nume 1'Ous critics have a1'gued that Heidegger
fails in his endeavour. For example , Graeme Nicholson argues that, by
engaging with the metaphysical tradition and addressing himself to
the same questions as that tradition , Heidegger's thinking contains
'an element of philosophy or metaphysics' (1975: 492). Similarly, Otto
p凸 ggeler argues that Heidegger's attempt to destruct the metaphysical
tradition necessa 1'ily fails because he not only engages with the same
questions as the tradition (认Thy is there being? 叭That is the g1'Ound of
being?) , but also uses terms and ph 1'ases , such as 'fundamental ontology'
and 'metaphysics' , which are intimately connected to the tradition he
seeks to overcome (1 991: 148). Wh i1e these commentators critique
Heidegger's engagement with the metaphysical tradition as evidence of
his intimate connection to that tradition , Robert Mugerauer focuses on
another aspect of Heidegger's destruction of the metaphysical tradition
to argue that he ultimately fails in his attempt 'because he does not
manage to go on to say the still-co日1ing and still 崛 calling-for-thinking in
non-metaphysical terms' (1991: 187). While it is questionable whether
Heidegge 1' would actually be able to say what the 'beyond' of meta-
physics actually entails without: (1) closing off alternatives so that those
Heidegger Ofl the Overcoming ofMetaphysics 63
coming after him simply focus on re-presenting his alternative; and

(2) r非instantiating the emphasis on production constitutive of the meta ‘
physical tradition , there is something in the critique that Heidegger's

attempt to go beyond the metaphysical tradition is imbued by aspects
of the metaphysical tradition itself. Indeed , it is possible to find many
other examples of metaphysical thinking in Heidegger's thought , such
as his privileging of human being over other entities , which advocates a
humanism in the extreme sense (LH: 245) , his distinction between and
valorisation of authenticity over inauthenticity, which , despite his state唰
ments to the contrary (CP: 60-61) , appears to point towards an abso唰
lute ground in the form of a transcendent, normative standard against
which the actual mode of human being is compared , and rnomentary
lapses into the language of rnetaphysics, such as when he talks about
technology effecting 'our inner and real core' (DT: 54) , which reaffirrns
the ontological dualisrn , between the outer appearance of human being
and its substantial, inner core, of the metaphysical tradition (L曰: 248).
Heidegger does not, however, view these as fai1ures. 队Thile his critics
insist that Heidegger's destruction of metaphysics aims to obliterate
all forms of the tradition from thought and by claiming to discover
remnants of metaphysical thinking in his thinking conclude that he
fails in his attempt , we have seen that Heidegger not only explicitly
rejects the idea that the destruction of the tradition entails its annihi-
lation (PIE: 139-140; CPC: 12)1 but also argues that the interpretation
underpinning his critics' view misunderstands what overturning entails.
Far from creating an irreducible and irrevocable break with that which
is being overturned , any attempt to go beyond something is intimately
connected to that thing. A 'trace' (NIII: 4) of metaphysics will always
remain in the attempt to overcome metaphysics. As ]acques Derrida
puts it rather dramatically, no matter the attempt at overcoming meta翩
physics , 'metaphysics always returns... in the sense of a revenant [ghost]'
(1 991: 40).
丁his is a constant theme of Heidegger's found in a number of his texts ,
albeit a theme expressed slightly differently throughout his oeuvre. For
exarnple , in Contributions to Phílosophy, Heidegger rnakes the point that
any criticism 0
64 Ontology ín Heídegger and Deleuze
(WNGD: 61) and is repeated in Country Path CO l1 versations , where he

claims that 'any countermovement against metaphysics , and any mere
turning away frOI丑 it ， always remains still caught in metaphysical repre-
sentation' (CPC: 122). Because metaphysics always remains as a trace 0 1'
returns as a ghost to any attempt to go beyond it , any attempt to move
beyond metaphysics by simply annihilating 01' di飞Torcing itself from
metaphysics is destined to fai l.
This is altered somewhat in Nietzsche where Heidegger explains that
the impossibility of escaping from the metaphysical tradition alto-
gether means that we have to rethink this relationship. Rather than
think of destruction as entailing the annihilation of the metaphysical
tradition , 01', put differently, as the complete escape from the meta-
physical tradition , we have to recognise that such is the power and
continuing relevance of the trace of metaphysics that any attempt to
go beyond metaphysics must be guided by metaphysics. As Daniel
Dahlstrom puts it, Heidegger comes to the conclusion that 'one foot
must be planted firmly in a tradition in O1'der to be able to push off from
it and make the leap to a new beginning with the other' (2005: 36). The
leaping out of the metaphysical t 1'adition requires that we take the tradi懈
tion seriously while also using the tradition to guide the leap beyond
that tradition. As Heidegger notes , 'thinking of being is so decisively
caught up in the metaphysical thought of the being as such that it can
only grope its way with the help of a staff borrowed from metaphysics'
(NIV: 250). This is close to the words of Bei l1g and Time , where Heidegger
talks of the destruction of the tradition as that which p 1'ese1'ves the posi-
tive possibilities of the tradition while purifying thought of the tradi-
tion's negative aspects as detailed in Heidegger's critique of metaphysics
(BT: 44). 认1e also see this in his critique of technology in that the leaping
out of the enframing of modern technology requires and occu 1's through
the enframing of technology.
The implications of this are profound. Because any attempt to over-
come metaphysics remains embroiled in metaphysics , Heidegger main唰
tains that 'our task is to cease all overcoming, and leave metaphysics
to itself' (TB: 24). There are two aspects to this. First, it resonates with
Heidegger's atter丑pt to open up an alternative orientation towards being
than
Heidegger 011 the Overcoming ofMetaphysics 65
While the Heidegger of Being and Ti me seeks to understand and uncover

the importance of the question of being through an engagement with
beings , namely the human being, his later thinking undergoes a turning
that recognises this approach appears to privilege human being in the
same way as metaphysics does. Heidegger turns away from questioning
the human being to raise the question of being, to a direct engagement
with the question of being 'itsel f' (I M: 219). This so-called turning is
manifested in his relationship to metaphysics. Rather than engage with
being through the mediation of a primordial destructing of metaphysics ,
Heidegger comes to the conclusion that the trace of metaphysics that
must remain means that this task is a futile one. As such , Heidegger
turns to a direct engagement with being to let being disclose itself on
its own tenns unhindered by a primordial destruction of metaphysics
(NIV: 161). Presumably, this so唰 called turning is to be mirrored in the
approach to technology so that , rather than getting caught up in criti-
quing or destructing the enframing of modern technology as the means
to overcome this enframing, we need to learn to turn towards tech翩
nology to rethink how we approach and think about it unhindered by
a prior, mediating need to first destruct the metaphysical approach to
technology.
But the question remains as to how exactly these alterations in being,
thought , and human being will occur. What is clear is that Heidegger
offers a sustained CI让ique of the ways i丑 which being has been thought
andjor forgotten in the history of 队Testern society and philosophy and
points towards the need for a rene~气Tal of this question. This renewal
of thought does not siInply entail a reorientation of thinking, but also
requires a new understanding of human being and a different approach
to technology. What is l1 0t clear, however, is how exactly these alter-
ations will ar包e; or, put differently, what the impetus will be for the
re-evaluation of thought , human being, and technology Heidegger calls
for. This feeds into a criticism frequently levelled against Heidegger; that
is, his thinking, for all its originality, lacks any appreciation or space
through which political or social action can gain a legitimate hold to
alter the being of thought and human being. As Michael Zimmerman
puts it, 'while insightful in many ways , Heidegger's account appears
to
of metaphys挝ical anthropocentrisn丑1 p1'events this because depending on

human action to effect the ove臼rcω: 刀omηli汕
ngofm丑le
吐ta
叩 phys剖ics simpl忖
yr陀
e-创.
them 丑letaphys址ical anthropocentrism to be overcome (Haar, 1993: 90). In line
with Heidegger's attempted decentring of human being, these critics
look elsewhere for an answer with the result that they insist that being
'itself' will open itself to alternatives (CP: 58 , 60). As to why, when , and
how this will occur, Heidegger has nothing more to say than that this
remains part of the mystery of being (OWA: 51). All we can do is release
ourselves towards being and open our‘民lves to these potential alterations
(DT: 55). But this simply reiterates the issue: who 0 1' what is the cause of
this releasement and open-ness? If it is human beings acting spontane翩
。 usly and autonomously then Heidegger appears to fall back into the
anthropocentrism he constantly rejects. If it is being, then , not only
does this contradict some of his own statements, but it would appear
that we must simply wait fo 1' this to happen and so forego the illusion
that human-inspired political , educational , and social action can help
bring the alteration about. As a manifestation of the anthr opocentrism
‘
Heidegger diagnoses as the problem , willing social and political change

would , presumably, simply exacerbate the problem.
While , for these critics , Heidegger appears to be at an impasse, perhaps
best summed up by his famous 'only a god can save us now' (GSN: 277) ,
the reason this conclusion is reached is because they forget or ignore
Heidegger's notion of trace. This will not only make sense of the passages
in which he apparently lapses into metaphysical thinking, especially
the anthropocentr怕n of metaphysics , but also prepares the ground for
Chapter S's discussion of the way the leap out of metaphysics is to be
made. Heidegger's notion of metaphysical trace reveals the impossibility
of completely overcoming metaphysical thinking because any attempt to
overcome metaphysics distinguishes itself in opposition to metaphysics
and so becomes embroiled in and to metaphysics. As Heidegger reco段
时 ses ， this means there will always be an aspect of metaphysical thinking
in any attempt to chart an alternative to metaphysics. However, in his
critique of metaphysical anthropocen
Heidegger on the OvercomÎng of' Metaphysics 67
between his absolute critique of metaphysical anthropocentrism and his

notion of metaphysical trace. 飞八Thile the former rejects the notion that
human willing has any part to play in bringing forth the rethinking that
charts an alternative to metaphysics , the latter would appear to find a
place , however 1imited, for action based on and emanating from human
willing. It appears we are faced with the choice of either accepting (1)
his critique of metaphysical anthropocentrism and so falling foul of the
problems that result from this when trying to explain or understand
exac t1y how and when an alternative to metaphysics wi1l be brought
forth or (2) his notion of trace , which would undermine his critique of
an thropocen trism.
飞I\Thile this choice appears to pose problems for Heidegger, 1 have
already intim 丑lated that if we pay close attention to Heidegge 臼r‘.，
com 丑丑m
1 丑lent臼s ， not only are these two choices not the only two available ,
but , in fact , Heidegger is pushing us to think about the overcoming of
metaphysics in a more fundamental and novel way. Maintaining that
human willing has a role to play in the overcoming of metaphysical
anthropocentrism does not mean that we simply fall back on human
willing as an intensification of anthropocentrism to find an alternative
to the anthropocentrism of metaphysics. It means we must destruct
metaphysics , and in particular its notion of wi1l ing , to find the posi唰
tive aspects of its account while recognising and engaging with the
limiting aspects. The novelty of Heidegger's approach is its attempt to
think a form of human willing other than the aggressive , anthropocen-
tric willing of metaphysics with a view to not only remaining true to
his notion of trace , but to also show that human action plays a role in
bringing about the overcoming of metaphysical technology. From this ,
we learn that a form of human willing must necessarily have a role ,
however small , to play in bringing forth alternatives to the anthro刷
pocentric , metaphysical tradition Heidegger constantly critiques. This
starts to respond to some of the questions that continue to plague
Heidegger's critique of metaphysics , especially regarding how the alter幡
natives to metaphysics may come about , while doing so in a way that ,
while affirming a limited role for a form of human willing, remains
true to his attempted d
aggression of metaphysics; (2) human wi1ling is directed towards being

in a particular, open manner; and (3) being opens itself to thought.
The next two chapters turn to Heidegger's analyses of philosophy and
thinking to complement and extend the analyses conducted so far to
not only show how the enframing, technological, anthropocentrism of
metaphysics is manifested in and re-enforced by a particular mode of
thinking , but also engage with the transformation in thinking Heidegger
claims is necessary to enable thought to truly reveal being.
Philosophyas
Metaphysics a口d
of
As noted in previous chapters , Heidegger's critique of metaphysics entai1 s

a critical analysis of a certain understanding and conceptualisation of
three intertwined phenomena: human being, technology, and a partic-
ular form of thinking called philosophy. For Heidegger, humanism is
shaped by thought , which has tended to be based on unexplored foun-
dations , and the metaphysical enframing of technology. The enframing
of technology is re-enforced by the view of the human as the master of
being, which , in tur飞 is underpinned by a mode of thinking that is based
in the subjectfobject division , shaped by the enframing of technology,
and affirms that the human is the master of being. Heidegger's analyses
of human being, technology, and metaphysical thinking disclose that
metaphysics , as he understands the term , is an insidious, pervasive aspect
of 马气lestern thought that forms a coherent , self啕re-enforcing whole that
reveals being in a particular closed , partial manner. 丑 aving examined
Heidegger's critique of metaphysical humanism and attempted rethinking
of human being in line with the question of being in Chapter 2, and the
l ‘ elationship between metaphysics and the enframing of technology in
Chapter 3, this chapter 'completes' Heidegger's analysis of metaphysics
by examining the way in which he understands that metaphysics thinks
being. This will round off the analysis of Heidegger's critique of Ineta-
physics and show how the dominance of metaphysical thinking impacts
on how we think and , crucially, what we think about. 飞Nhile this will be
fully explored in the next chapter, it is important to note that Heidegger's
critique of metaphysical thinking is not simply negative; in line with his
insistence that critique entails an un-concealing of alternatives , it also
re飞ìeals an alternative path for thought and human being. This revelation
69
70 Gntology in Heídegger mzd Deleuze
will , so he contends, overcome the limitations inherent to metaphysics

and open thought and human being to an alternative open relationship
to being. This conclusion does , however, give rise to a number of ques-
tions , including: 认1hat is the relationship between philosophy, thinking,
and metaphysics? If Heidegger is correct to argue that philosophy must
be overcome, and if the opening of human being to being is dependent
on thought opening itself to being, is Heidegger not in danger of simply
re-enforcing the primacy of thought over being constitutive of meta-
physics? And to return to the question posed in the previous chapter:
what role does human willing play in the overcoming of metaphysics'?
While the engagement with these questions wi1l spill into the next
chapter, it will be suggested that the later question is not only one of the
key questions for Heidegger's analysis of thinking, but also one of the
key issues upon which his relationship to Deleuze depends. 叭1e start with
Heidegger's analysis of philosophy.
τhe of
认1hile philosophy has a long history with the consequence that

many claim to know what philosophy is, Heidegger argues that, in
fact , these 'thinkers' have not properly thought through the subject;
their pronouncements ar飞 therefore， either superficial or grounded in
unexplored assumptions (WCT: 4). Far from simply taking off from an
unexplored ground or assumption , Heidegger notes that we must free
OUI‘ selves from 'any kind of sentimental conception' (ET: 72) of what
philosophy is or entails. Thinking about philosophy requires , in the first
instance , a willingness and capacity to question. Heidegger is explicit
on this point: 'what is essential is that you are ready and willing to pose
questions' (ET: 4). 认1h i1 e Deleuze also highlights the importance of ques-
tioning and , following on from this, the posing of problems , Heidegger
claims that if we truly question what philosophy entails, a task that
continues to elude contemporary thought (认1CT: 4) , we will see that,
while the philosophical tradition from Socrates onwards has tended to
conflate (rational) thinking with philosophy, not only are philosophy
and thinking different , but the latter is more valuable and true than the
former. To understand why he thinks this , it is necessary to first identify
what Heidegger means by philosophy.
The first thing to note about Heidegger's understanding of philosophy
is that he recognises that defining what philosophy is is itself a problem
(TDP: 10). Unlike other disciplines , such as the so 刷 called 'hard' sciences
which simply take fo 1' granted the boundaries , purpose, and rules of
MεωpJz川 ics and the ηlÍllking o(Being 71
the discipline , the issue of what philosophy is is itself a philosophical

issue. Indeed , only philosophy is able to question its own foundations
within the parameters of its discipline. 'What mathematics is can never
be discussed mathematically; what philology is can never be discussed
philologically; what biology is can never be uttered biologically. To ask
what a science is , isω ask a question that is no longer a scientifìc question'
(NII: 112). As a consequence , 'the sciences can serve philosophy, [b ut]
philosophy does not necessarily need their service. The sciences first get
their ground, dignity, and entitlements from philosophy' (ET: 60). The
question of mathematics , philology, and biology are dependent on the
answers given to a range of metaphysical , ontological , and epistemolo告
ical questions that can only be answered from the standpoint of a partic唰
ular external discipline; that is , from the standpoint of philosophy.
队1hi1 e the purpose and content of other disciplines is fixed and
predetermined ensuring they only need to look out onto the world to
undertake their activities , phi1osophy is different. Philosophy is outward
looking in that it takes its cue from the various manifestations of being
and inward looking in that it , and it alone out of all the disciplines, is
capable of engaging with its purpose and content within its param-
eters (BPP: 4). While the problem of philosophy's self-understanding
has tended to be downplayed by the tradition , with the consequence
that a certain methodology 0 1' standpoint is adopted without question
(PRL: 6) , Heidegger's point is that ph i1 osophy contains a 1'eflexivity not
found in alternative disciplines.τhis allows it to question and provide
answers to its purpose and content philosophically; it does not need to
appeal to other disciplines for answers. Because philosophy asks about
and is able to answer the foundational questions upon which it and
other disciplines lie , Heidegger maintains that not only is philosophy
more reflexive than other disciplines, b飞1t， in fact , other disciplines ,
such as science and to a lesser degree aesthetics , are grounded in philos-
ophy. While Deleuze will vociferously critique such a move, Heidegger
establishes a hierarchy between philosophy, art , and science in which
the former is primordial , followed by art (excluding poetry which has
a special status for Heidegger akin to genu
72 Ontology Ín Heídegger and Deleuze
such': (1) risks asserting something about philosophy without engaging

with its foundational assumptions in the manner typical of metaphysics;
(2) enframes philosophy within the confines of a closed schema and so
begs the question as to whether philosophy can in fact be defined by these
confines; (3) fails to ask what is means; and (4) risks turning philosophy
into something fixed and determinate. Because the 'is' has long been asso-
ciated with presence and endurance , an association that he questions and,
ultimately, wants to overcome (NIII: 212) , Heidegger thinks that defining
philosophy in this manner would rei市 phi1osophy into something fixed
and determinate and so would fail to truly understand its open ended
'nature'. While this association can be overcome, Heidegger warns that,
until it is , defining philosophy as 'philosophy is x' risks reaffirming the
dominance of presence constitutive of metaphysics.
While it is not possible to identify a fixed , analytical definition of
philosophy, Heidegger does maintain that it is possible to out1i ne
certain features of philosophical cognition. Rejecting Hegel's argu-
ment that philosophy develops dialectically, Heidegger simply asselts
that philosophical conclusions arise from intuition (丁DP: 76) into
the 'extra-ordinary' (IM: 14) aspects of being not ordinarily encoun-
tered; an endeavour it undertakes 'relentlessly and with a level gaze'
(PIA: 31). Philosophy engages with the extr夺 ordinary because it questions
and examines those aspects of being not normally engaged with in ordi-
nary daily life. While this ensures that philosophy is intimately connected
to concrete, facticallife to the extent that it 'in some way drags facticallife
experience along within its problematic - even if in an entirely hidden,
un楠genuine and heavily theorized way' (PIE: 27) , philosophy's purpose is
not simply to record or identify the contents of facticallife. Remembering
fundamental ontology's foundational claim that entities cannot be under-
stood without identifying and engaging with the being of the entity,
Heidegger claims that, while philosophy emanates from and is intimately
connected to facticallife , it searches for and engages with the being of the
entities constitutive of facticallife. Phi1osophy entails a relentless searching
for the extra-ordinary, often ignored, hidden aspects of being. This is
τhe of
叭lhile central to his endeavour, the notion of 'right questioning' is
underdeveloped in Heidegger's thinking. 队That is clear, however, is that
the ri 豆11t 50 1't of que5tioning 'means first of all t11at .,. we do not leap
Metaplzysics and the Thinking of Being 73
over anything worthy of questioning. In this way we must once again

experience the actuality of actual questioning , renouncing the hunger
for results' (ET: 89). 叭Thile Heidegger charges that metaphysics simply
takes over a meaning or grounds its analysis in unexamined assump-
tions and , based on its privileging of the instrumental rationality of tech-
nology, seeks quantifiable, definite results in an as efficient, economical,
and effective manner as possible , the early Heidegger of the 1920s and
early 1930s maintains that philosophy proceeds differently. It is neces-
sary to distinguish Heidegger's comments from this period from his later
comments on philosophy because , as we will shortly see , Heidegger
becomes increasingly hostile towards philosophy, associating it with the
closed, enframing world-view of metaphysics. Nonetheless , 1 want to
suggest that, when it comes to detailing how to engage with an issue,
the notion of 'right questioning' plays a key role in Heidegger's analysis
on the proper way to think about an issue that spans his early attempt to
transform philosophy and later rejection of philosophy for thinking.
叭Thereas metaphysics thinks too quickly with the result that aspects
of being remain concealed , the right questioning of thinking entails
a patient thinking that takes nothing for granted. This patient ques耐
性 oning entails a careful exposition of the issue under discussion in
accordance with the destruction of the meanings attributed to those
concepts by metaphysics. While Heidegger never undertakes an explicit
and detailed analysis of his rnethod of reading, it is clear from the
example he sets in all his writings what exactly this patient , destruc-
tive, questioning entails. Far from seeking a quick, quantifiable result,
right questioning looks at the issue fr om a variety of perspectives to
‘
reveal those aspects that have long been suppressed or concealed. By

deconcealing those aspects long concealed , Heidegger aims to shine a
light on the issue under discussion and so open up new perspectives on
that issue. For this reason , 'deconcealment [Entbergsamkeit] is that which ,
in its fundamental accomplishment , primordially carries, unfolds and
brings together the 0仕-mentioned phenomena of perceiving, viewing,
light and freedom' (ET: 53). Through this deconcealment , thought
will be opened to alte
that 'philosophy .,. is constant transfòrmation … not principal1y because

of changes in its so-called results , but because philosophy itself, in its
questioning and knowing, is a transforming' (EHF: 127). The trans唰
formation inherent to philosophical thinking is more primordial
and beneficial than the quantitative, instru日lentality of metaphysics
because it not only engages with being, a question metaphysics closes
itself to , but also opens thought to possibility, which , it will be remem ‘
bered , stands 'higher than actuality' (BT: 63). Preceding Deleuze on this
matter, Heidegger claims that , far from merely being representative,
philosophy is thoroughly transformative.
Furthermore , in an early lecture course f1' om 1921--1922, trans耐
lated as Phellom臼1010gical Intelpretations ot Aristotle , Heidegger main帽
tains that 'philosophical cognition aims at something ultimate and
universal , the highest' (PIA: 43). While science concerns itself with
its particular sphere , whether this is biological , chemical , physical , or
cosmological (01' one of the sub-sections of each of these) , philosophy
is conce1'ned with that which is universal: being (PIA: 44). In other
wo 1'ds , while the sciences busy themselves with attaining facts 0 1'
constantly conducting research based on thei 1' predetermined frame-
work, philosophy directs itself towards being to let the essence of each
particular form of being reveal itself. For this reason , Heidegger main阳
tains that philosophy is more difficult , thorough , foundational , and
holistic than other disciplines. hnportantly, Heidegger pushes us to
recognise that philosophy is an activity, not a fixed thing (CPC: 17) ,
but insists that it is not an activity defined by the will of philosophers.
It is not because there are philosophers that there is philosophy. Nor is
it the case that there are philosophers because they choose to under-
take the questioning of philosophy. 'On the contrary, philosophy
and philosophers exist only when and how the truth of being itself
comes to pass , a history which is withdrawn from every human insti-
tution and plan , since it itself is the very ground for the possib i1i ty
of human historical being' (BQP: 105). In the early lecture courses of
the 1920s, translated as Phenomello1ogy ot Intuitio l1 and Expression and
The Phenomenology ot Religious Lite , Heidegger links philosophy to life
(PIE: 27 , 1
Metaphysics and tlze Thinking o(Being 75
叭Thereas metaphysics insists on understanding being in terms of

川'constant presence 川 (EHF: 80) with the consequence that being
is taken to be a fixed substance or unchanging essence , Heidegger
famously claims that 'being , whether in ordinary understanding or
in the explicit ontological problematic of philosophy, is 1111derstood in
the light o{'time' (EHF: 81). By emphasising the temporal becoming of
being , Heidegger shows how the fixed representation of metaphysics
is unable to think the true changing nature of being. The swaying of
being's temporal becoming must be inquired into on its own terms ,
meaning that , rather than imposing itself on being, thinking must
follow being as it discloses itself. Despite critiquing any analysis
that begins 'philosophy is x' , Heidegger employs this presentation
to explain philosophy's intimate and constitutive relationship to
being. As such , we find that 'philosophy is finding the simple looks
and secret shapes and letting them appear, in which appearance the
essential swaying of be-ing is shelte 1' ed and lifted into the hea 1'ts' (CP:
50). Philosophy opens itself to being in all its manifestations and lets
being speak through it.
Revealing philosophy by doing

Impo 1'tantly, philosophy's 1'elationship to being must be p1'esuppo懈
sitionless in that it must set aside assumptions and let being appea 1'
to thought. Rather than impose itself onto being, thinking must
1'elease itself towards being to let being disclose itself on its own terms
(DT: 54…56). Fo1' this reason , Heidegger claims that 'the only decision
ahead is this: whether be-ing is inquired into in terms of the sway of
its truth or whether beings retain their machination and pursue a lack
of decision that prevents that which is sole and unique from eve1' again
coming forth [to] be a beginning' (MFN: 37). The only decision thought
faces is whether to continue on the path of metaphysical thinking, a
path that , according to Heidegger, 'has rendered itself superfluous'
(MFN: 253) , 0 1' whether to return to being to chart an alternative path.
However, while this decision is key, Heidegger notes that 'this decision is
not made as an "act" of an individual man; it is the thrust of be-ing itself'
(MFN: 18). To be an act of an individual would entail an act of willing
that, by affirming the human being's role over being, would simply
continue the anthropocentrism of metaphysics. Far from being an act
of metaphysical human willing, Heidegger claims that being will open
itself to thought and so effect the transformation away from the closure
of metaphysics. Rather than willing a change ín being, human being
must come to release itself to being and be carried by the sway of being.
76 011 归 logy in Heidegger and Deleuze
This releasernent requires that thought be open and presuppositionless

towards being. Thought rnust corne to realise that being works through
genuine thought; genuine thought does not irnpose itself on being.
However, the releasernent that brings being forth is tension-ridden: on
the one hand, it requires that hurnan being relax in the face of being
to be captured and rnoulded by being's sway; on the other hand, and
sornewhat paradoxically, we will see that this relaxation rnust be actively
wi1led, which, far frorn being relaxing and easy, requires constant vigi-
lance and effort.
认1e will return to this issue , but insisting that philosophy rnust be free
frorn assurnptions and presuppositions leads Heidegger to clai口1 that
philosophy, 'in its radical , self-posing questionability, rnust be a-the-
isitic' (PIA: 148). Philosophy rnust leave behind a11 presuppositions to
inquire into being unhindered or unconstrained by prior conceptions,
assurnptions , or principles. For this reason , religious dogrna cannot lead
us to philosophy or the process of philosophising because it is based on
unexplored , unexarnined , foundational principles. This is not to say,
however, that philosophy and philosophising cannot lead thought to
religion (P1A: 148). Such a developrnent can only be justified, however,
after a process of rigorous , presuppositionless questioning into the
rnatter二 Heidegger is warning against the tendency of 1'eligious thought
to corne to its conclusions through faith. 叭lhile such a sta1'ting point
may be acceptable to 1'eligion , such action imrnediately places 1'eligious
thought in the orbit of rnetaphysics; an association that , no matter how
enlightened or supposedly open the religion appears to be, ma1'ks it out
as being constituted by a closed, p1'edeterrnined, metaphysical schema.
Philosophy cannot start in this rnanner; to do so leaves too many ques翩
tions unasked and risks imposing a schema onto being in a way that
closes thought to alte 1'natives. While he warns of the danger of starting
with religious dogma, Heidegge1' also discusses the 1'elationship between
philosophy and science. 认1he 1'eas science is inherently useful in that
it provides actual solutions to concrete problems , Heidegge1' rnaintains
that philosophy is inhe1'ently useless in that it does not c1'eate 0 1' produce
anything concrete (BQP: 6; 1M: 13). But while useless in this respect , its
usele
Metaphysics CInd the Thinking of Being 77
philosophy is (叭TCT: 4 , 21). This , of course , raises the question of how

we can do philosophy without knowing what philosophy is in the first
place. For Heidegger, this problern appears to either be a non-issue or
one that is purely logical in that while, if looked at conceptually, the
issue of defining philosophy by its activities despite not knowing what
the activity of ph i1 osophy entails appears to forrn a hopeless circle , expe恻
rientially, we will sirnply know what philosophy entai1 s when we corne
across it (FCM: 154-155). The position underpinning this argurnent is
that 1ived experience discloses far rnore of sornething than conceptual
understanding does. 叭Thile Heidegger is highly critical of the notion
that ph i1 osophy should fall back on lived experience because this sirnply
re唰 enforces the prir丑acy of anthropocentrisrn (CP: 92) , he does rnaintain
that thought should take its leave frorn experience and becorne rnore
non-conceptual in its relationship to being. Genuine thinking entai1 s a
non-objectifying, open , and fluid relationship to being that lets being be
to disclose itself to thought on its terrns (MFN: 17).
But when trying to deterrnine what philosophy entails , Heidegger
reveals two rnistakes that are typically attributed to philosophy, flaws he
rnaintains rnust be avoided to fully understand what it entails. The first
is that we typically dernand too rnuch of philosophy in that we over-
estirnate its capabilities. In turn , this can lead to two problerns: (1) in
line with the 'hard' sciences , we dernand that philosophy irnrnediately
corne up with useful answers (CP: This , however, fails to understand
that genuine thinking is a slow, painful process without irnrnediate use;
and (2) in line with the ends of Inetaphysics , thought has tended to
dernand an absolute ground for philosophy that legitirnises its truth as
the truth (1 M: 11). 飞I\Th i1 e the rnost extrerne exarnple of this is Descartes'
advocation of absolute certainty (PIE: 75) , Heidegger gives Leibniz pre-
erninence with regards to rnodern rnetaphysics , insisting that 'it is only
Leibniz who , with his own origina可 appropriation of the rnetaphysical
tradition (substantia-monas; potential as vis and possibili臼5; "energia")
enacts the actual rnodern beginning of rnetaphysics' (MFN: 352). The
problern with this dernand, however, is that it has never been justified
(PG: 208).
The second potential danger that acc
tωo exa
缸r、1
时
I
perspective to philosophy and takes the '气trut俨h' of this external perspec-

tive for granted. Having done this , it then exarnines philosophy frorn
the taken-for-granted assurnptions of this external perspective with
the consequence that philosophy is taken to be irrelevant. By rejecting
philosophy for its uselessness , this criticisrn exhibits a fetishisrn of 'use'
that ernanates frorn and re-enforces the inst1'urnental view of being
dorninant in rnetaphysics. This not only fails to question what use is 0 1'
why it is supreme , but also whethe 1' in fact philosophy's uselessness 1丑 ay
actually be of value (PIA: 12).
To cornbat these potential failings , the Heidegge1' of 1921 皿 1922 advo-
cates a balanced, synthesised approach that 1'ecognises that: (1) the
overestimation view is on the 1'ight track when it asks philosophy to
outline its purpose and principles; and (2) the underestirnation view is
correct to stress that philosophy must be conc1'ete (PIA: 29). The 1'esult
seems to be that , in this early lecture cou1'se, Heidegge1' maintains that
to be authentic, philosophy must not only be explicit about its airns and
direction , but rnust also be concrete (PIA: 29). Howeve 1', the notion of
'authentic' philosophy is dropped in later texts as Heidegger takes seri-
ously his contention , first proposed in a lecture course given in 1919 ,
translated as Towatds the Defìnition of Philosophy (TDP: 9) , that philos-
ophy is so entwined with metaphysics that it must be abandoned and
replaced by an alternative form of thinking that he will come to call
'meditative' (DT: 46).
as world-vie飞/飞r
认fhile rneditative thinking wil1 be discussed in the next chapter, it is fi 1'st

necessary to outline why Heidegger associates philosophy with meta唰
physics. Before doing so , it will be helpful to reiterate what Heidegge1'
rneans by 'metaphysics'. It will be remernbered from Chapter 2 that,
while Heidegger recognises that rnetaphysics has traditionally related
to 'knowledge of the suprasensuous' (FCM: 41) , he uses the term in a
different rnanner cornposed of three aspects. First , thought is rneta幡
physical if it is grounded in a particular fundamental , absolute prin-
ciple. This has traditionally been God , but has also been the ideas, will ,
spirit, and the unrnoved mover (LH: 226). Second , and linked to this ,
thought is metaphysical if it simply accepts without questioning certain
things as self-evidently true. 1n other words , rnetaphysical thinking is
grounded in unquestioned , unexplored assumptions that ground and
give it meaning (LH: 225). Third , metaphysical thinking occurs through
Metaphysics ond tlze Tlzinking of Being 79
binary oppositions where one aspect of the opposition is privileged over

the other without this privileging having been examined or justified
(LH: 232). The result is that metaphysical thinking entails the creation
of a self唰 enclosed world-view.
While we have examined what these three aspects mean for Heidegger's
analyses of human being and technology, they also have profound impli-
cations for thought, insofar as the combination of the three aspects of
metaphysics leads thought to construct a specific world蝴view. While we
saw this with the enframing of technology, which creates , sustains, and
interprets the world through the closed prism of instrumental ration-
ality, Heidegger widens this critique to maintain that it is not only our
approach to technology that suffers this fate; the dominance of meta蛐
physics ensures our entire mode of thinking becomes subject to it. To
clarify the discussion , Heidegger notes that there are three aspects to
'world-view': (1) the historical process through which life's goals are
created; (2) 'the profession [Bekenntnis] of a person' , which typically
delineates the horizon informing his life goals; and (3) the creation of
goals and values 出 at shape life (PIE: 7). Each world-view has its own
logic , principles , structure , coherence , and ends which re-enforce
one another and create an abstract , but logical , world. For example,
Christianity is a world-view created and supported by a particular view
of God , a division between heaven and earth , the notion of the Trinity,
and a specific moral code. The combination of these aspects combine to
create the parameters through which the world is viewed with this view
being different to the one constitutive of Islam , ]udaisl丑， Buddhism, or
any other religious systel丑， which in turn are different to the parameters
that define the various 'secular' philosophical systems.
The point Heidegger is making is that philosophy has become a forum
within which different systems compete with one another by simply
pitting their view of the world against others. The result is a multiplicity
of world-views each of which simply maintains its conception of the
truth is true. There is no atter丑pt to examine the principles upon which
each rests. Each simply holds fast to these unexamined principles and
retreats into and behind the confines of the walls each has constructed
to delineate its part
80 Ontology in Heidegger 们 ld Deleuze
The fundamental feature of philosophy as world唰view is , however, that

it is based on the notion of ground. In The Princ伊 le ofGround , Heidegger
explains that , while ph i1 osophy has always implicitly grounded itself in a
fixed foundation , it is with modern philosophy, starting with Desca1'tes'
sea1'ch fo 1' absolute ce1'tainty and following th 1'ough to Leibniz's prin-
ciple of sufficient 1'eason , that this demand becomes explicit and prob唰
lematised. As a consequence of this long, intensifying t 1'ajecto 1'Y, 'in
all that surrounds, concerns and meets us , we are on the look out for
grounds. We demand the declaration of the ground fo 1' ou 1' assertions.
飞气7e insist on having a foundation [Begründung] for every behaviour' (PG:
207). Western thought is based on this hierarchical model in which each
thing is dependent on , or caused by, something else , which , in tu 1'n , is
dependent on , or caused by, something else until we arrive at the bottom
of the chain , which is the self揭 sufficient cause of al l. Philosophical anal蛐
ysis tends to go deeper and deeper until it hits this foundational ground
which it cannot penetrate or justify. At this point , thought must either
accept this foundational point or simply step around these assumptions
to establish a new alternative , foundational ground that competes with
the first.
The main problem with philosophy's emphasis on ground is that,
contrary to the different philosophical systems who claim to have found
the 'true' foundational point in contrast to the superficial or false founda-
tions of others , there is no absolute , solid , Archimedean foundation that
grounds thought (WPF: 90). In claiming to have found a solid foundation ,
philosophy has found nothing but a mirage. This does not si口lplyentail
the absence of ground, however, for this would be to lock thought within
a binary opposition of ground/non-ground, thereby re-instantiating the
binary oppositions of metaphysics. Heidegger rethinks the notion of
ground to escape this , a rethinking that leads him to claim that 'being is
the ab翩ground' (MFN: 43). While Heidegger is not , admittedly, very clear
on what exactly this ab-ground entails , from his comments, it appears
to mean that, while being is the 'ground' of all entities insofar as being
is always the being of entities , being is not a thing, fixed substance, or
essence. Being is not transcendent to entities, no
Metaphysi正 5 and the η1Íl1 king otBeing 81
L气Thile Deleuze's extended analysis of the onto-genetic different/ciation

of being will try to clarify the opaqueness of Heidegger's rethinking of
ground , it is important to note that , for Heidegger, the ab-ground not
only plays a crucial role in overcoming the metaphysical view of being
as pure presence, but also has fundamental implications for the way in
which thought is to think being. In particular, Heidegger claims that a
consequence of philosophy's search for a fixed ground is the creation
of various self幽 sufficient world.…轧机飞TS ， each of which competes against
others. However, because: (1) being's becoming entails the absence of a
fixed ground; and (2) each world-view is , by definition, based on unex-
plored assumptions regarding being, each not only fails to understand
its foundational assumptions , but also fails to justi市 them. Three conse唰
quences arise. First , by failing to justi布 its assumptions, each is unable
to justify its conclusions , meaning its truth is based on pure authority.
This ensures that the truth each philosophical system claims to reveal is ,
in actuality, nothing but a closed , partial , unsubstantiated imposition on
being. Far from revealing the truth it claims to reveal , each philosophical
world-view sets up a truth in advance and goes about imposing itself on
being so that being is revealed in the manner that accords with the pr•
established t 1'uths the world-view has imposed on being. Second, each
world-view, as a fo 1'm of metaphysics , entails a sünilar Istyle' (MFN: 64) of
thinking. There is a unity to the philosophical t 1'adition based on the
common metaphysical underpinnings of each philosophical world蛐 view.
Despite their supe1'ficial , external diffe1'ences, Heidegger claims that learlier
philosophy has a constant (albeit hidden) influence on ou1' contemporary
existence' (EHF: 52). IS O long as we are in this way, we remain bonded
and obligated to that beginning whether we know it or not, whethe1' we
know much 0 1' little about it, whether we work it out laboriously by way
of learned reflection , 0 1' whether we feel it immediately and continu-
ally in everyday life' (ET: 88). This implicit influence leads Heidegger to
dismiss contempo 1'ary philosophy as a continuation of the metaphysical
tradition. Thi1'd , each philosophical system takes for granted a ce1'tain
view of being and develops its analysis based on thi
nor is it concerned with concepts as Deleuze will claim; 'the question

about the enactment of philosophizing is no mere question of knowledge
but a question regarding principles' (PIE: 116). Each philosophical system
is based on fundamental , unexplored principles that delineate its param-
eters and, if logical , its conclusions. This ensures that the various philo跚
sophical systems are battles over first principles , each of which is simply
asserted without justification. The battle over these principles defines the
philosophical tradition (PIA: 43).
While Deleuze will agree that philosophy is defined by the process
of world-view creation and celebrates this for its inherent creativity,
Heidegger criticises philosophy as world栅view for imposing thought
onto being. This is one of the key differences between the two thinker飞
a difference that, ultimately, relates back to their different ontologies ,
insofar as Deleuze wi1l celebrate philosophy for its continuous renewal
in the face of being's continuous alteration , whereas Heidegger will
continue to search for the truth of being , a search indicating a singular
answer二 Whereas Heidegger would most probably criticise Deleuze for
his affirmation of philosophical world唰views ， charging that it shows the
extent to which Deleuze's thinking remains metaphysical , Deleuze would
no doubt respond that: (1) unexplored foundations are not troubling
because philosophy is an inherently creative , affirmative endeavour that
responds to the rhizomic becoming of being with the aim of looking
at being in new ways far from there being continuity to philosophy,
…
philosophy's relationship to the rhizomic becoming of being means that

each philosophical system is a uniquely affirmative act of creation; and
(2) whereas Heidegger maintains that philosophy is truth-orientated ,
being's becoming and the concomitant absence of a fixed ground mean
that the search for the truth can no longer define philosophical thinking.
For Deleuze, philosophy must be problem-orientated, not truth-orientated.
This alteration in philosophy's purpose is important because it means
that, whereas Heidegger insists that philosophical thinking is inherently
closed and exclusionary, with the consequence that thought must be
salvaged through a rigorous and near唰total transformation so it opens
itself to being's becorr
Metaphysics alld the η1Íllking o(Being 83
Deleuze , that philosophical world翩view is legitirnate and justified at that

particular tirne and place and in relation to that particular problern.
叭le will return to this issue in subsequent chapters, but, for now, it is
irnportant to note that , while Heidegger criticises any philosophy that
bases itself on unexplored foundations , his thinking on philosophy
does not sirnply rely 0 1' 1'est on this position. One of the difficulties any
cornrnentator has when t 1'ying to explain Heidegge 1" s notion of what
philosophy entails is of piecing together the various cornrnents he rnakes
on the rnatter; an endea飞Tou 1' rnade all the rnore difficult because not
all his points are explicitly rnade , cornpletely thought out , or consistent
with previous views. For exarnple , we have noted that , in the early lecture
course of 1919…1920, translated as Towards the Defmition o( Philosophy,
he appears to conflate philosophy with rnetaphysics (TDP: 7). Shortly
after pronouncing this , however, we learn that only a certain debased
forrn of philosophy is synonyrnous with rnetaphysics and the creation
of a world翩view. 'Philosophy as c1'让 ical science is 110t identical with the
teaching of a world-view' (TDP: 9); it entails sornething else yet to be
deterrnined. We see, therefore, that very early on in his career, Heidegger
irnplicitly distinguishes between what 1 will call philosophy as world四view
and genuine philosophy, sornetirnes referred to as authentic philosophy (PIA:
29; KPM: 158). This lends SUpp01t to François ]aran's (2010: 206) sugges-
tion that frorn the rnid-1920s to the rnid-1930s generally, but frorn
1926 to 1930 specifically, Heidegger tries to save philosophy by distin蛐
guishing between different fonns of rnetaphysics. As a consequence ,
we see that running alongside his critique of rnetaphysical , world-view
philosophy is another forrn of ph i1osophy, which ]aran calls 'scientific
rnetaphysics', but which, following Heidegger, 1 have called authentic
philosophy. This distinction continues in later texts, such as The Age of
the 讥10rld Picture and Contributions to Philosophy, where philosophy is
distinguished frorn world-views. In these texts , Heidegger appears to be
t 1'ying to 1'escue philosophy by transforrning it , an atternpt that leads
to the distinction between 'authentic' and 'non唰 authentic' world幡view
philosophy. 丁his changes in late 1' texts , such as Wh
The fundamental distínction between the two forms of phi1osophy

lies in their respective relationships to being. We have seen that , for
Heidegger, thought is always directed towards being, while also being
a manifestation of being 'itself'. Whi1e this ensures that 'the philoso-
pher is the friend of being' (ET: 60) , rather than the friend of wisdom
he has traditionally been , Heidegger recognises that this friendship can
take different forms. Philosophy as world-view 'arranges the experience
in a certain direction and into its range - always only so far that the
world-view is never put into question' (CP: 26). Philosophy as world嗣
view c1'eates a prism through which the world is viewed and , in this
act , creates the wo r1 d as it wants to see the world. 叭W吁hile
view does indeed need and use philosophical erudition , ... it requires no
philosophy, since , as world view, it has already taken over a particular
interpretation and st1'ucturing of whatever is' (AWP: 140). Anything that
challenges the parameters of the world-view is ignored , concealed , 0 1'
distorted so that it does confo 1'm to its paramete1' s. The enframing of
technology is a perfect example of this. As noted in the previous chapte1',
the enframing of technology imposes itself on being and reveals being
in a particular instrumental , calculative manner while concealing alter-
natives. The result is a closed , self幡 contained framework that 'constricts
and thwarts genuine experience' (CP: 26).
In contrast, Heidegger maintains that authentic philosophy is open
to being. Rather than construct parameters and impose these on being
so that being is forced to conform to and reveal itself through them,
authentic philosophy remains relaxed towards being and lets being
reveal itself on its own te 1'ms through thought. Rather than revea1ing
a closed , predefined account of being, authentic philosophy 'opens up
experience' (CP: 26) to being. As a consequence, authentic philosophy
does not describe
a realm of man's creativity ..., a kind of unfolding of individual

personalities as spiritual creators ..., a science ..., a world-view ... 0 1',
a philosophy of existence. [Authentic philosophy] is a questiol1 Í l1g
which in a fundamental way changes Dasein , man, and the unde1'-
standing of being. (ET: 84)
Authentic philosophy fulfils this transformative role because of its inti-

I丑 aterelationship to being. Because being is historical and , therefore,
always changing so , by opening itself to being, does thought become
open to the continuous change of being and thus to the possibilities
that accompany and are opened up by this becoming. This links to
Metczphysics czlld the Tlzinking ofBeing 8S
Heidegger's analysis of philosophy's uselessness. As noted , philosophy,

for Heidegger, is unlike the sciences in that it has no immediate use-
value. While its opponents view this as philosophy's greatest weakness ,
Heidegger maintains it is its greatest strength because it allows philos-
ophy to have a more intimate relationship to being. It is precisely because
'philosophy accomplishes nothing' (CP: 4) that it is able to explore being
unpressured by the need to attain immediate , calculable results. For this
reason , Heidegger, in agreement with Deleuze , maintains that there is a
freedom to philosophy not found in a1ternative disciplines.
However, as Heidegger continues to engage with the question of
philosophy, he comes to think that philosophy itself is irreparably
damaged by its association with world-views and metaphysics. This leads
him to abandon philosophy and replace it with thinking. Indeed, for
him , 'what is most thought-provoking in our thought-provoking time is
that we are still not thinking' (WCT: 5-6). Richard Rorty has , however,
launched a scathing attack on this aspect of Heidegger's thinking, going
so far as to call it 'pathetic' (1976: 302). He does so because he main翩
tains that Heidegger's rejection of philosophy is not a total rejection
but merely a superficial attempt that points out the failings of the tradi嗣
tion before re懒instantiating a different fo了m of thinking that , for Rorty,
rer丑 ains fatally attached to the tradition it aims to go beyond. This leads
Rorty to claim 由 at it is nothing but 'the last infirmity of the greatest of
the German professors' (1 976: 302).
There are three responses to Rorty's point that need to be made. Fi rst ,
as noted in the previous chapter, Heidegger's destr飞lction of the tradi-
tion does not aim at its annihilation , but recognises that any attempt to
go beyond the tradition must push off from the tradition and is always
constituted by a trace of the tradition. Rorty's insistence that Heidegger's
critique of philosophy and subsequent affirmation of thinking appears to
pathetically reinstate that which is to be overcome shows that he forgetsj
ignores this aspect of Heidegger's thinking. Contra Rorty, Heidegger
recognises that any break is not fundamental , but entails a morphing
into something else; an occurrence that remains marked, to whatever
degree, by that which is replaced. 认11
86 Ontology Ín Heidegger and Deleuze
认Thether his atternpt is successful or not is a question that will have to

wait until subsequent chapters , but 1 think Rorty is too quick to sirnply
reject Heidegger's atternpted reconstruction of thought. Heidegger is
willing to battle through the difficulty of reconstruction rather than
sirnply being happy to offer a critique. Whether it takes us anywhere is
another rnatter, but 1 think we should, at the very least , consider what
Heidegger proposes; sornething Rorty appears unable or unwilling to do.
Third , Rorty seerns to think that the rneditative thinking that succeeds
philosophy entails a rnere continuation of the rnetaphysical world-view
it airns to overcorne. This seerns to do a great disservice to Heidegger.
After all , whereas Rorty sees the rnovernent to rneditative thinking as
nothing rnore than a superficial break with the rnetaphysical tradition
that ends up rnerely reaffirrning the sarne fundarnental tenets of the
rnetaphysical tradition , Heidegger clearly rneans it points towards sorne-
thing rnore radica l. It rnay be that Rorty rneans to say that Heidegger
does not rernain true to the radical path he points towards , but this rnust
be supported especially because Heidegger holds that whether a thinker
fully develops and rernains true to his insights is largely irrelevant. In
other words , the key point when reading a thinker is not so rnuch to
point out where he failed. What is irnportant , according to Heidegger,
and on this point Deleuze will agree, 'is whether we are capable of rnedi-
tating on the truth of his thought , that rneans , whether we are capable of
thinking along with hirn m01万 originarily (not more correctly)' (MFN: 62). If
we accept Rorty's criticisrn of Heidegger, and , indeed , if Rorty's criticism
is that Heidegger's attempt to go beyond metaphysical philosophy is not
radical enough , then , far frorn sirnply disrnissing Heidegger's account,
we have a space within and frorn which to think through the issues
Heidegger points towards. In this way, we treat Heidegger as he cal1 s for
us to treat him; not as a leader 0 1' idol to be followed , but as a stimulus
that brings thinking to thin k. Having engaged with Heidegger's destruc-
tion of metaphysical anthropocentr如ll ， technological enfrarning, and
philosophy, we are fina l1y ready to turn to the pathway Heidegger marks
out for thought to truly engage with the question of the meaning of
being.
Tra口 sforming
Heidegger and
队lhile Heidegger offers a trenchant critique of the anthropocentric, tech-

nologically orientated thinking of metaphysics, his analysis does not stop
there. By offering an alternative to metaphysics , his thinking remains
consistent with his claim that critique is not merely negative, but simul-
taneously entails a revea1ing of an altemative. The revealing-concealing
movement is key to Heidegger's thinking of being, his destluction of the
lnetaphysical tradition, and claim regarding the trace that remains in any
overcoming. In combination with the question of the meaning of being,
this movement lies at the heart of his claim that, far from entailing a
linear, progressive becoming that becomes through a fundamental rupture
from metaphysics, the movement from one entit弘 or form of thinking,
to another, entails a transition 气vithin' being, rather than a fundamental
rupture from being.
Perhaps this is most clearly seen in his analysis of truth where
Heidegger claims that truth and untruth are not simply opposed to one
another as if untruth were the absence of truth. Heidegger's concep-
tion of truth is distinguished from the truth of metaphysical thinking
in that it does not refer to (an arbitrary property of man but the ground
of his existence' (ET: 86). Given that the human resides in the clearing
of being, Heidegger claims that truth is 'the' ground of the clearing that
the human ek-sists and is , therefore, intimately tied to the revelation of
being. In turn , untruth refers not to a correspondence between a concept
and a representation of that concept, but to the disclosedness of being.
Importantly, untruth does not simply entail a falsity about being, but
reveals being in a manner that is , in some way, hidden or concealed.
Note that untruth reveals being and so says sOInething about 七 eing; it
87
88 Ontology in Heidegger and DeJeuze
just does not entail the true and full revelation ofbeing. Untruth is , there制
fore , a revealing of being that is also a concealing of being. 丁he revealing
of being inherent to untruth , no rnatter how partial or concealed this
revealing rnay be , discloses that 'untruth is not an opposite , but the
one question concerning the essence of truth is in i臼 elf the question
concerning the essence of un-truth , for this latter belongs to the essence
of truth' (ET: 92). In short , Heidegger clairns that as rnanifestations of
being, "'truth" and "untruth"' , far frorn entailing a fundarnental and
irreducible difference, 'have the sarne stern' (ET: 97).
Deleuze will criticise Heidegger's conclusion clairning that it perfectly
dernonstrates that , while Heidegger goes sorne way to thinking differ-
ence with his notion of the ontological difference, ultirnately he fails to
think difference sufficiently because his thinking relnains constrained
by the unity inherent to his privileging of the question of the rneaning
of being. While Heidegger starts by affirrning difference, Deleuze charges
that Heidegger reduces all thinking to the question of being and , in so
doing, affirrns the unity inherent to the privi1 eging of identity that he
airns to overcorne. 叭1e will return to this issue in subsequent chapters ,
but what is irnportant to keep in rnind is that Heidegger's revealing of
an a1ternative to the rnetaphysical tradition he so vociferously critiques
is an integral part of his fundarnental ontology. Rather than sirnply posit
arbitrary a1ternatives to that which he criticises, or insist on a creative
rupture that affirrns a radical1y different alternative , Heidegger's notion
of the revealing-concealing nature of truth rnaintains that critique
always reveals alternatives. This revealing takes off frorn the concealing
it reveals and so not only dernonstrates a fundarnental and constitutive
link between the initial position altered and the revelation that results
frorn the destruction of that initial position, but also dernonstrates the
central role that Heidegger's notion of trace plays in his analysis of the
overcorning of rnetaphysics. With this, we turn to that which , Heidegger
clairns, will overcorne rnetaphysical philosophy and, ÌI丑portantly， the
rnanner in w hich this overcorning will be realised.
Overcoming philosophy through thinking
Wh i1e we will see that Heidegger's critique of rnetaphysical philosophy

discloses that the possible perrnutations of rnetaphysical thinking were
finally exhausted with Hegel's and Nietzsche's philosophies (MFN: 20-21) ,
he is well aware that the long historical dorninance of rnetaphysics rneans
that it is ternpting for thought to continue to value this forrn of thinking.
As he explains , while 'its cornpletion... has rendered [rnetaphysics]
Heidegger cmd Meditative Thinking 89
superfluous, [this] cannot mean that metaphysics has succumbed to

impotence' (MFN: 253). Far from rethinking the categories and structure
of thinking, the certainty afforded metaphysics as a consequence of its
long dominant position means it is tempting to think that this is the
only form of thinking possible and/or that all that is required for meta-
physics to reach its promised truth is 'more' metaphysical thinking. In
contrast, Heidegger claims that the completion of metaphysics not only
betrays , but renders pointless , its continuation. Far from being a cause for
mourning, however, its completion entails an opportunity to radically
rethink how we think, an opportunity that has not been possible since
the very beginnings of metaphysics in ancient Greece.
What is required, therefore, is a radical destructing of the metaphysical
tradition to return to the origin of metaphysics to reveal those aspects
of being concealed by the metaphysical tradition. Through the revela蛐
tion of those concealed aspects, thought wi1l not only be opened to those
aspects of being long concealed, but will also, so Heidegger contends, truly
question and engage with the question of the meaning of being. As such,
Heidegger's attempted reconstruction of thought calls fo 1' a new method of
thinking that will replace the binary, conceptual thinking of metaphysics
(1M: 129-130; NIII: 216). This does not, however, mean that Heidegger
comes to oppose philosophy to thinking in a way that re-establishes a
binary opposition. Philosophy is always a mode of thinking, albeit one that
Heidegger comes to view as being irreparably metaphysical. Metaphysical
philosophy is not, therefore, simply opposed to what Heidegger comes
to call thinking, but is , itself, a form of thinking; albeit a debased one
for Heidegger because world-飞liew philosophy (1) imposes itself on being
and so fails to recognise that thinking depends on being, and (2) ignores
the question of being to focus on an anthropocentric analysis of entities.
Heidegger is not calling for the establishment of a new form of thinking
strictly opposed to metaphysical philosophy so that whereas the latter is
conceptual the former is non-concep札lal ， or whereas the latter is constituted
by the subject/object division the former is no t. The thinking to be instan阳
tiated is a modification of metaphysical philosophy; one that destructs the
met
90 Ontology 的 Heidegger and Deleuze
advent of thinking , the thinke 1' must still be wa 1'y of how he thinks to
ensure that his thinking is the genuine , meditative so 1't of thinking and
not the debased thinking of calculation. It is not quite clea1', howeve 1',
whether calculative thinking is me 1'ely another name for metaphysical
philosophy, 01' whethe 1' it is something othe 1' than philosophy and so
resides within the realm of thinking, albeit a residency that is situated
'beneath' the genuineness of meditative thinking.
As Chapte1' 3 demonstrated , the defining feature of calculative
thinking is that it objectifies being to make it easier to compute 矿 ever
new, ever more promising and at the same time mo 1'e economical possi-
bilities' (DT: 46) that will enable it to achieve its p1'edete 1'mined ends.
Because it aims at efficiency, this mode of thinking is supe1'ficial and
g1'ounded in unexplored foundations regarding the natu 1'e of the world
(i. e. that it is calculable , objective, fixed) , the superiority of efficiency,
and its predetermined ends. By re-enfo 1'cing the objectifying calculation
of metaphysics , this mode of thinking helps to 1'e-enfo1'ce technology's
view of the world as a vast 1'ese1'voi 1' of potential ene1'gy. 'Natu1'e becomes
a gigantic gasoline station , an ene1'gy sou1'ce for mode 1'n technology and
industry' (DT: 50). As such , calculative thinking is intimately connected
to the enf1'aming of technology and , by extension , metaphysics , which
ensures it imposes itself on being to reveal being in a closed, partial
manne r. In many respects , the dominance of this mode of thinking
i5 why Heidegger maintain5 that the current age is 50 'thought-poor'
(DT: 44…45). We do not ponder things but 'take in everything in the
quickest and cheapest way, only to forget it just as quickly, instantly'
(DT: 44-45). Such action closes us off to being and prevents its mystery
from being revealed to us.
In contrast, meditative thinking is genuine thought that is open
to being and lets being reveal itself to thought on its own terms. To
do so , thought must inhabit the clearing of being , which entails a
reorientation of our conception of the human being so that human
being's ek-sistence in the clearing of being is recognised and affirmed
(OWA: 51;τT: 41). Furthermo 1' e, meditative thinking is distinguished
from science and calculative thinking by its 1'elationship to inst1'u幡
mentality. Because it does not c1'eate , nor does
Heidegger alld Meditative Thinking 91
through which to engage with being. 叭Thereas world-view philosophy

imposes a closed , conceptual schema on being , meditative thinking ,
having emanated from a return to the originary domain from
where metaphysics arose, engages with being in a different manne r.
Meditative thinking never imposes itself on being in the manner of
world唰view metaphysics and so 'does not fit into the role of a world-view'
(MFN: 42). Whereas the dominance of anthropocentrism ensures that
metaphysical thinking thinks it creates being, Heidegger explains that
meditative thinking 'of be-ing is never a matter of "generating" being ,
so that being would even become a matter of "having been thought'"
(MFN: 111). Meditative thinking learns and accepts it is secondary in
its relationship to being and so sways with being's becoming. However,
while meditative thinking emanates from the closed thinking of
metaphysics, Heidegger warns that it 'cannot become inflexible as the
finished product of a usable presentation either in a "doctrine" or in a
"system 飞 or as "exhortation" of "edification'" (MFN: 17). Meditative
thinking does not entail the accomplishment of a finished product or
way of thinking; it is a path that emanates from being that is and must
remain open to being. As a consequence , there is an order to it , albeit
an order that emanates from being if and when being reveals 'itsel f' in
that manner (CP: 45).
卫在editative and
The key difference between meditative and calculative thinking emanates
from their different relationships to being. 认1hile calculative thinking
ünposes itself on being and so attempts to bend being to thought, medi-
tative thinking lets being be. After all , 'every t 1'ue thinking lets itself be
determined by what is to be thought' (NI: 3 日. Because thinking is a form
of being and always entails a thinking of being, true thinking returns to
that which 'grounds' it (b eing) to let itself be guided by being. As a conse帽
quence, there is an openness to meditative thinking that is lacking in
calculative thinking. Indeed, Heidegge1' claims that meditative thinking
is based on a 'releasement towards things' (DT: 54) through which it aims
to open up and reveal the 'mystery' (DT: 55) of being. Rather than try to
iInpose itself on the world through willing, meditative thinking calls fo 1'
thinking to take a mo 1' e relaxed, yet intense , view of its relationship to
the world. Thought has to learn to recognise that it exists 'within' being
and , with this 'knowledge' , learn to let the world be. This act of letting响be
will , so Heidegger claims , open thought to alternative of
that a1'e concealed by calculative, metaphysical thiηking.
92 Ontology i11 Heidegger alld Deleuze
It may be noted , however, that, in Being and Time , Heidegger criticises

the notion of simply letting things be , associating it with indifference
towards being and , hence , an inauthentic way of being (Bτ': 396). On
first reading, it appears , therefore , that the later Heidegger's thinking
on meditative thinking contradicts his earlier thinking on inauthen-
ticity, insofar as the 'later' Heidegger appears to hold that lettings things
be will truly reveal being, while the 'early' Heidegger appears to claim
it conceals being. Reading Heidegger's comments in Being and Time ,
however, we see that he distinguishes between two senses of letting-be:
(1) letting-be in the sense of indifference, which he associates with conceal回
ment and inauthentic being; and (2) letting-be in the sense of equa-
nir丑ity or calmness , which he associates with authenticity. Remaining
calm in the face of being to let being reveal itself is very different from
being indifferent or aloof towards being. By distinguishing between two
senses of letting-be , and linking meditative thinking to one, Heidegger's
analysis of meditative thinking not only remains consistent with his
earlier critiques of indifference and metaphysical thinking, but reveals
that meditative thinking entails a calm, open resoluteness towards being
that , rather t扭扭 remaining aloof from being or aiming to impose itself
on being, waits for being to reveal itself. 飞l\Tith this, Being and Ti me points
towards the type of relationship Heidegger willlater insist that llledita翩
tive thinking has to being.
Rather than focus on the actuality of something in terms of a fixed ,
enduring presence , meditative thinking focuses on the sway of being's
becoming to reflect the changing becoming of being. This needs to be
explained , however, because Heidegger claims that 'representation is
grounded in reflexio. For this reason , the being of objectivity as such
first becomes evident where the being of thinking is recognized as
explicitly brought about as "1" think something, that is , as reflection'
(OM: 97). Reflection entails a judgement about something with this
judgement requiring that the thing first be represented. The probleIll
Heidegger identifies with this is that it implies a singular truth to be
represented through a specific reflective judgement. Singular truth ,
however, depends on an unchanging world which i
Heidegger and Meditative Thinking 93
is another sense of 'reflection' in Heidegger that describes the process

whereby meditative thinking passively awaits and reflects the gift being
gives it. The two senses of reflection are distinguished by the inten-
tion behind thinking's relationship to being and their comportment
to being. Metaphysical 陀flection takes being to be an effect of thinking
with the consequence that thinking imposes itself on being to repre-
sent and judge being in accordance with the parameters of a world唰view.
lvfeditative reflectioll , in contrast , takes itself to be an effect of being with
the consequence that it passively and attentively waits to reflect being's
becoming as being reveals itself. Meditative reflection does not entail
representation because representation , for Heidegger, is synonyr丑 ous
with an aggressive, anthropocentric willing that imposes itself on being.
This is not, however, how meditative thinking comports itself to being.
Meditative thinking passively and peacefully waits for being to reveal
itself so it can reflect being's becoming as being reveals itself.
This is important because Deleuze , first , criticises representative
thinking for inadvertently affirming an ontology of presence which
thinking aims to faithfully and accurate represent, befor飞 second，
insisting that Heidegger remains wed to the representational model
of thinking because he aims to reveal the truth of being. For Deleuze,
this ir口plies one correct answer which requires a stable conception of
being that can only emanate from ontologies that privilege identity. In
response, Heidegger would no dou钉 t reject thÍs and counter that Deleuze
fails to understand that meditative thinking does not represent being , but
reflects being's becoming with the truth that results changing as being
reveals itself through its becoming. Rather than side with either thinker,
however, this discussion does reveal that Heidegger and Deleuze share a
common project , insofar as they both reject representation. The differ-
ence between them seems to be that , whereas Heidegger overcomes
representation by claiming that meditative thinking takes its cue from
being to reflect being as being reveals 'itself' , Deleuze disagrees , claiming
that this , implicitl)号 maintains a 'correct' way to reflect being which
reaffirms the notion of a fixed , determinate, singular way to approach
issues. Tru
94 Ontology in Heidegger L7 nd Deleuze
representation and reflection are rooted in identity; a schema that leads

him to claim that identity can only be overcome if thinking takes its cue
from being's differential becoming and affirms pure differential creativity.
For Heidegger, it is creativity and (meditative) reflection that are rooted
in difference while representation is rooted in identity. Importantly,
Heidegger claims that creativity does not entail a simple act of pure crea幡
tion , but is grounded in meditative thinking's ability to reflect being's
becoming. Because meditative thinking reflects being's becoming, it is
intimately connected to the yet-to-cOI丑e of possibility and, as such , is 'a
kind of thinking that is always creative' (NII: 130). Meditative thinking is
creative, however, not because it wills an alternative, closed view of being,
but because of its passive, openness to being (CP: 60). Being open to the
mystery of being allows meditative thinking to reflect aspects of being
that remain closed to the aggressive willing of metaphysical thinking,
which leads it to continuously reveal being in creative and previously
unforeseen ways.
From this , it is clear that the content of meditative thinking does
not emanate from an autonomous , individual act; it emanates fro日l
being and, in particular, thinking that is orientated towards being in a
particular manner. To explain this further, Heidegger, in What is Called
Thinking? explains that its dependence on being means that thinking is
inti日lately connected to thanking. The old English version of 'thank' is,
according to Heidegger, 'thanc' meaning '1丑 emory， thinking that recalls,
thanks' (WCT: 244). Thinking is always intentional in that it always
thinks about something. This corresponds to thanking's relationship
to something, in that when thanking we remember and , through this
remembrance, give thanks tojfor that thing. Heidegger maintains that
this remembrance and thanking is constitutive of genuine thinking.
When thinking, thought remembers and gives thanks to being.
Thinking is , therefore, related to thanking for precisely the reason that
its intentionality towards being not only defines the being of thinking,
but when thinking about being, thinking recognises its dependence
on being. Recognising its dependence brings thought to thank being
fo 1' its gift. As such , 'thanc means man's inmost mind , the he
Heidegger mld Meditative ηlinking 9S
human being and so does not go far enough in destructing the human
exceptionalism of metaphysical anthropocentrism (Derrida, 1982b:
124; Calarco, 2008: 53; Boundas, 2009: 336-337; 叭l01fe ， 2010: 125…126),
for Heidegger, humans are the only beings capable of thinking being
because only they ek唰 sist in the clearing of being that allows being to
reveal itself to the human. When this unique placement is combined
with meditative thinking's releasement towards being, Heidegger main-
tains that thinking will be receptive towards being in ways that wi1l
allow being to reveal itself in new and novel ways.
Opening up to being does not mean that thought quickly 01' easily
grasps the secrets of being. Not only must thought open itself to being ,
but being must reveal itself to thought. Meditative thinking must not
become impatient and repeat the mistakes of metaphysics by thinking
that being can be forced , through an aggressive willing, to give up
its secrets. Rather than challenge being, thought must befriend being
(KCP: 172-173). Rather than impose itself on being, thought must lay
before being. Rather than the aggressive , confrontational approach
to being of metaphysical anthropocentrism , thought must become
respectful and deferent to being. 叭lhile thought must be prepared for
being's gifting, it cannot force being to give itself to thought. Being
may never, in fact, give itself over to thought, but thought can play its
role and be prepared to receive being if and when being opens itself to
revelation (BQP: 74).
Importantly, while meditative thinking requires patience , we should
not think this patience entails a gradual , developmental process. Rather
than the heightening or maximisation inherent to the notion of eleva唰
tion , Heidegger claims that thought must step back into the clearing of
being to let being reveal itself unhindered by the metaphysical under翩
pinnings constitutive of philosophy's history. 'The step back points to
the realm which until now has been skipped over, and from which the
essence of truth becomes first of all worthy of thought' (I D: 49). The
stepping back is , therefor飞 intimately connected to Heidegger's destruc-
tion of the metaphysical tradition , a destruction that is not an annihi-
lation , but a return to the originary domain of metaphysics to explore
an alternative way that also entails a radical transformation in 1
ensures that the stepping back to the origins of metaphysics cannot

simply result from an act of metaphysical willing because , far from over耐
coming metaphysics , this would simply re-enforce the dominance of
metaphysics. But neither can it be achieved by sheer passivity because
this entails the absence of wi1l ing which entails a negation of willing and
so remains tied to the willing of metaphysics. In 1ine with his attempt
to move beyond the binary oppositions of metaphysics , later sections
of this chapter wi1l show that Heidegger searches for an alternative to
active willing or sheer passivity. This aims to delineate an alternative
fonn of willing to the willing of metaphysics that will allow thought
to be enveloped and swept along by being's becoming. Through this
enveloping, thought will find its true place in relation to being and , by
letting being reveal itself as being, be able to truly reveal being. Prior to
engaging with this alternative , however, it will be helpful to first further
distinguish meditative thinking from calculating, metaphysical thinking
by examining the ways in which they approach the notion of ground.
鸟在editative and the ab-ground of being
As noted , calculative, 1丑 etaphysical thinking looks for, and builds on , a

foundational principle that grounds and de1ineates the parameters of its
analyses. The search for ground is underpinned by the view that being
is synonymous with pure presence , which allows it to posit static , time唰
less truths. To discover the presence it searches for, grounded thinking
reveals being in a way that accords with its view of being. lt , therefore,
closes itself off to alternatives that do not accord with the parameters
of its unexplored , assumed foundation. As such, grounded thought not
only conceals being, but , by failing to open itself to being , is synony-
mous with the enframing of metaphysics (队TCT: 100). By forgoing the
search for a fixed ground , meditative thinking abandons metaphysical
thinking's mistaken impression that a secure certainty can and should
be found and so attains the freedom to reveal being in the manner in
which being reveals itself (WPF: 90). By allowing being to reveal itself as
it is , rather than trying to force being into a metaphorical metaphysical
bottle , meditative thinking becomes more assured in its relationship to
being. It comes to realise that the knowledge of being gifted to it by
being actually reveals what being is. This , however, is not an easy tas k.
Not only must it overcome two and a half thousand years of intellec- ‘
tual history that has affinned and based itself on the notion of ground,
but choosing to think in and through the abyss is an endeavour that
气nust be experienced and endured' (叭TPF: 90). Paradoxically, its passive
Heídegger and Meditative Thinking 97
relaxation towards being requires constant activity insofar as thought

has to be constan t1 y on its guard to prevent it from thinking through
the lens of metaphysics. It is this paradoxical r它lationship between
active participation and passive relaxation , or, put differen t1 y, actively
willing passive relaxation , that lies at the hea 1't of Heidegger's attempt
to identify and describe both the movement to and comportment of
meditative thinking. Because metaphysics values 1'eflective , 1'ational,
objective thought above others forms of thinking, it downgrades alter唰
native fo 1'ms of thinking, such as faith , intuition , non-conceptuality,
and fee 1ing, to second (0 1' worse) class status if, in fact , it 1'ecognises
them as thinking at all. The great problem with metaphysical think-
ing's privileging of conceptuality is that the static objectivity of concep-
tual thought is unable to reveal the swaying becoming of being. As a
consequence , metaphysical thinking reveals being through a distorting,
partial prism , all the while taking this disto 1'ting, partial prism to 1'eveal
what being truly lis'.
Fo 1' this 1' eason , in The Word of Nietzsche: 'God is Dead', Heidegge1'
claims that thought must move away f1'om emphasising objective
conceptualisation to take seriously alternative , non-conceptual modes
of thinking. As he puts it, Ithinking begins only when we have come to
know that reason , glorified for centuries , is the most stiff唰 necked adver-
sary of thought' (叭TNGD: 61). Sim i1 arly, in What is Called Thinking?
Heidegger claims that being is not capable of being understood if we
start with the notion that only conceptual thought counts as knowledge
(叭TCT: 179). Heidegge 1' wants to not only open thought to alternative,
non-conceptual modes of thinking , but to also get thought to 1'ecognise
that these alte 1'natives are legitimate and justified. Only by recognising,
opening itself to , and taking seriously non-conceptual thinking will it
be able to engage with being 011 bei l1g's own terms. As Krzysztof Zia1' ek
(2008: 251) recognises , this means that only non翩 philosophy， in the
form of genuine, meditative thinking, is open to being in the way that
does not impose itself on being, but reveals being as being 1'eveals itself.
Its dependence on the revelation of being and the lack of any teleology
that discloses a rational orde1' to being's disclosure means that ther
98 Ontology ill Heidegger i1 nd Deleuze
that , 1' athe 1' than entailing a developing succession of systems , the
history of philosophy is a theatre , with each philosophy being an actor
emanating f1' om and orientated towa 1'ds being's 1'hizomic-becoming,
but Heidegge 1' establishes the path Deleuze will walk along.
While Heidegge1' claims that science is the most dominant mode 1'n
variant of metaphysical thinking, he is also CI让ical of 1'eligion , believing
it to also appeal to and sta1't f1'om an assumed , unexplo 1'ed ground.
Science and 1'eligion, so often thought to be opposed , a1'e, fo 1' Heidegge1',
synonymous with one anothe 1', insofa 1' as each is based on the same
logical st1'uctu 1'e whereby each simply appeals to a foundation , whethe 1'
this is the closed enf1'aming of mode 1'n science 0 1' the g1'ound of an
omnipotent , all-powe 1'ful God in whatever guise , and builds an ethical ,
ontological , and metaphysical f1'amework on top of this foundation.
Such action not only betrays the ab峭 ground of being, but, through the
inception of a ground, remains tied to a particula1' conception of being
that closes thought to alternatives. 认1hile we have already seen that
these 1'easons lead Heidegger to dismiss science as metaphysics , the same
reasoning leads him to also claim that religion is metaphysical. Rather
than simply resort to a knee才 erk reaction against religion , however,
Heidegger asks us to think about the religious implications of opening
thought to being in the manner he describes. In line with his notion of
the revealing-concealing nature of truth , he claims that, while religion
conceals aspects of being, engaging with re 1igion , through a destruction
of its metaphysical pretensions , will 1'eveal alternatives. In other words,
there are concealed alternatives embedded within the religious frame-
work that may help genuine, meditative thinking to reveal being. While
he does not put it quite this way, Heidegger's position seems to be that,
if God is infinite , as metaphysical theology tends to hold, then to open
thought to this openness is far more pious and divine than holding
that the infinity of God can be represented through the closed confines
of traditional , metaphysical schemas. By opening itself to being, medi-
tative thinking goes beyond the closed confines of metaphysical reli田
gions and 'is thus perhaps closer to the divine God' (I D: 72). Indeed, in
Contributions to Philosophy, Heidegger provocatively writes that
Heidegger mzd Meditlσ tive T Jz inking 99
last god. v气Thile appealing to a 'last' god may appear to simply reiterate
the teleological underpinnings of metaphysics , there is more to it than
this as Heidegger goes on to speak of the collapsing of a11 theisms that
occur with the death of god, before claiming that this collapse does not
mean the descent into nihilism , but the coming蝴 to七 e of a Imultitude
of gods [that] cannot be quantified' (CP: 289) , mear扩üng they cannot
be subject to the rational calculation of techno-metaphysics. Of course ,
at this juncture, the question arises as to how we are to understand
Heidegger's claims that the destruction of metaphysics will entail the
end of all theisms , including their metaphysical underpinnings , by way
of establishing a Ilast' god? How to reconcile Heidegge臼r‘"s claim
丑1 regarding
a 吐1 las挝t' god with his claim that being is a continuous becoming?
Iain Thomson (2011: 36-37) responds that the apparent tension
disappears if we understand that by 'last god' Heidegger means being.
With the overcoming of metaphysical theism , thinking comes to think
from being with the consequence that the god of metaphysics 'becomes'
being. 叭Tith the overcoming of metaphysical thinking , meditative
thinking comes to think from being's becoming, which , when being's
polyvocality is remembered , brings Thomson to suggest that Heidegger's
11ast god' is not a god of singular identity or oneness, but entails multiple
gods a11 of whom are intimately linked to possibility, a conclusion
supported by Heidegger's comments that Ithe last god is not the end
but the other beginning of immeasurable possibilities fo 1' our histo 1'Y'
(CP: 289). Rather than following Dreyfus's insistence that Heidegge 1" s
ta1k of a last god is a subtle attempt to justify a politics of authoritari-
anism , Thomson's insistence that the 1ast god actually equates to being's
possibility points to an open , Idemocratic' politics; an interesting , if trou 懈
bling, conclusion given Heidegger's own political affiliations. Indeed ,
complementing Thomson's point , ]ohn Caputo claims that , through
the destruction of the presence of metaphysical thinking, thought wi1l
1earn to think of God, not as an imposing, serious , all-powerful being,
but lin terms of play and elusiveness , singing and dancing, the lucid and
the choric' (1 986: xx). Rather than a serious endeavour based on defer-
e
100 Olltology În Heidegger and Deleuze
of rationalism and is, therefore, nothing but the 'weakness and utter
failure of rationalism become apparent' (1 M: 190). We must resist the
temptation to posit a binary opposition between rationalism/irration喃
alism; doing so merely reaffirms the binary logic of the metaphysical
thinking to be overcome (PRL: 54). Rather than 'overcome' rationality
through recourse to irrationality, Heidegger asks us to take a step back,
relax , and open ourselves to the issue. This will show that , due to being's
fluid becoming, thought cannot reflect being by thinking about being in
terms of a static binary opposition. Reflecting the sway of being requires
that thought relate to being in an open , non嗣 conceptual manner. This
will allow thought to not only open itself to being, but be receptive to
any revealing that being allows. To do so , Peter Osborne suggests that
thought must become more mystical , not in the sense of reaffirming
the monotheism of metaphysics , but in recognising, appreciating, and
affirming a certain 'mystical neo-paganism' (1995: 114). Rather than
value logic and reason to the exclusion of alternative modes of disclo-
sure, Heidegger thinks that the destruction of the religious metaphysical
tradition will reveal previously concealed alternatives that thought can
take over. In particular, the mysticism inherent to aspects of the reli唰
gious tradition may be better able to reveal being than the cold , sterile
logic of conceptual thinking. Rather than value strict, objective concep唰
tual analysis , thought must come to appreciate and affinn the flowing ,
dynamic, unstable , and hazy nature of mystical and poetic disclosure.
This does not , however, mean , as a number of commentators have
argued (Nicholson , 1975: 492; Mugerauer, 1991: 187 , 191; P凸 ggeler，
1991: 148) , that Heidegger's thinking descends into an obscure mysti翩
cism. If it did , Heidegger would be guilty of establishing a binary opposi-
tion between conceptual and non-conceptual thought, where to overturn
one is to immediately adopt the other. We have seen , however, that
Heidegger criticises this mode of thinking, meaning that we have to take
seriously the possibility that the positive comments he makes about
non-conceptual thinking do not automatically mean the abandonment
of conceptual thinking for mystical , non-conceptual thinking. While
Heidegger criticises conceptual t
Heidegger σ nd Meditati时 Thinking 101
puts it, 'if thought and poesy speak words , whereas science employs
terms to gain knowledge , Heidegger places thinking and poetry together
and holds both apart from science' (Mugerauer, 1991: 94). While science
is intimately connected to representation and calculability undertaken
with the intent of gaining knowledge about being that is useful for its
predetermined ends , poetry, like meditative thinking, has a far more
intimate , meditative relationship to being. 'Poetry lets [thought] dwell
and so lets-us-be in the clearing of being' (PMD: 213) which reveals that
poetry is able to relate to being in ways that philosophy (in the pejora-
tive sense that Heidegger comes to understand the term) , metaphysics ,
science, religion , and other forms of art are unable to. Only genuine,
meditative thinking has a similar relationship to being (Tr: 41). As a
consequence , lain Thomson is quite correct to conclude that Heidegger's
turn to poetry 'derives not from some antiphilosophical exaltation of
the literary, let alone of the "irrational" , but instead from what he thinks
poets can teach us about those enduringly meaningful experiences
that make our finite lives most worth living' (2011: 20-21). Poets are
capable of capturing aspects of human experience that escape concep-
tual thinking because of the subtlety of poetry's mode of expression; it
is simply better able to express the twists and turns in being's becoming.
As a consequence , Heidegger holds that thought must become more
poetic if it is to truly open itself to being in the way that allows being to
re飞real itself to thought on its own terms.
But , as noted in Chapter 2, Heidegger's attempt to think being is
intimately connected to language so that any attempt to reorientate
thought away from metaphysics must also reorientate language away
from metaphysics. This includes an alteration in the underlying logic of
language away from its traditional dependence on binary oppositions ,
stability, order, rationa1ity, objectivity, and presence , to language that
is more attuned to being. Thinking cannot reveal being through fixed ,
objective terms, but must come to accept and talk of being in a way that
accounts for: (1) human being's unique relationship to being; and (2) the
fluidity of being. 丁his will entail softer, more unfamiliar vocabulary that
discusses the space within and through which huma
102 Ontology in Heidegger i1 nd Deleuze
the fixed meaning inherent to presence, towards languages based on

verbs , which recognise the t1 uidity and changing nature of each thing.
It requires nothing short of a wholesale abandonment of the categories
and mode of thinking through which thought and language have previ-
ously expressed being.
However巳?斗， as a cons优 equence of Heidegge 曰r‘飞 re
叫jection of anthropo-
centr‘jsm丑1 ， this alteration cannot simply be willed , nor is it a matter
of humans creating a new language. Humans are not the master of
language , 'language remains the master of man' (BTD: 144). When
this is complemented by Heidegger's famous statement that 'language
is the house of being' (LH: 217) , it becomes obvious that thought is
not in control of any alteration in language. Thought must wait for
being to reveal language in the manner that will allow being to reveal
itself as it 'is' , which also entails alterations in the human being's rela-
tionship to being, the overcoming of the technological enframing of
metaphysics , and the transition to meditative thinking, all of which are
dependent , not on human willing, but being's gifting. 丁he radical over嗣
coming Heidegger calls for in language, thinking, our understanding of
human being, and technological understanding appears , therefore , to
be beyond human contro l. Indeed , it appears that these transformations
depend on being to such an extent that it is not entirely clear whether
they can and will be enacted; their success must , in other words , 'remain
an open question' (I D: 73). In the first instance, however, thought has
to not only see the need for‘ meditative thinking and the language that
supports and re唰 enforces it, but also actually be transformed to realise
this way of thinking and speaking. How this transformation is to occur
will be a question that will be asked again later, but , for now, we turn to
Heidegger's insistence that the transformation to meditative thinking is
not simply the result of a sudden break with metaphysical thinking, but
requires certain preparation.
τhe movement to meditative thinking
On first glance, it appears that Heidegger is not completely clear as to

what exactly this preparation entails. At times , he maintains that it
simply requires that thought choose to make the leap out of calcula制
tive, metaphysical thinking to genuine , meditative thinking (WCT: 9;
BQP: 5, 162). The movement is , in other words , a decisive , singular and
sudden break from calculative , metaphysical thinking. At other times ,
however, Heidegger maintains that it depends on a particular process
that uncovers and sweeps away the assumptions of metaphysics to return
Heidegger and Meditatíve Thinking 103
to the originary domain out of which metaphysical thought emanated

(CP: 34; 队TNGD: 56; 叭TCT: 233). Returning in this way to the origin of
metaphysics will open the possib i1i ty of subsequently trave1ling down
an alternative path than the one travelled by metaphysics. In line with
Heidegger's critique of binary oppositions , 1want to suggest that it is not
simply one or the other of these options , but actually entails a combi凰
nation of both. As Heidegger puts it , the process that overcomes meta-
physics entails a 'twisting翩 free' (TE: 40) from the tradition that requires a
certain preparation that returns thought to the originary dornain out of
which rnetaphysics arose , to then allow thought to rnake the leap to an
alternative path than the one constitutive of metaphysics.
In contrast to Deleuze's claim that the creative renewal of philosophical
concept翩 creation lies in an affirmative creative act that discloses innova-
tive conceptual solutions to the problems conceptualised as a result of
being's rhizomic七 ecoming， Heidegger claims that true creative thinking
does not emanate from thinking simply positing alternative conceptual
ways of engaging with the wo r1 d. Trying out alternative metaphysical
permutations is simply not radical enough for Heidegger. Genuine crea-
tivity requires a 'more' radical reorientation in the categories and mode
of thinking through which we think, which , at its foundational level ,
entails a movement away from binary, conceptuallogic towards a freer,
flowing form of thinking. Uncovering this alternative way of thin蛇ng
requires a return to the 'original rnotivations' (TDP: 96) frorn 勾-vhich
even the painting and poetry which we have mentioned and the theory
of mathernatical physics receive their determination' (TB: 2).
However, as noted in previous chapters , because any atternpt to go
beyond metaphysics by building on rnetaphysics would sirnply exacer-
bate the dominance of metaphysical thinking, Heidegger maintains that
thought must first destruct the tradition to return to the clearing of the
originary domain to uncover the foundations fr om which metaphysics
‘
arose and chart an alternative path for though t. Importantly, it will be

remernbered that destruction does not entail a simple rejection of the
tradition , but an enquiring that is also a searching for and a 'stak[ing]
out [o f] the positive pos
104 011ωlogy ín Heídegger mld Deleuze
which the tradition arose. Important1y, while destruction entails a 'puri-

fying' (CP: 154) that reveals and so entails a preparation for the explora-
tion of alternative paths for thought to traverse, the destructive process
always leaves something over. Any perspective that expects or aims to
completely leave behind that which it overcomes is simply 'naive' (PIE:
21). Thought must, in other words, return to the beginning to leap ahead
because 'the beginning could be something which , furled in its great-
ness , reaches ahead into the future and, accordingly, the return to the
beginning could be a leaping ahead , indeed a genuine leaping ahead into
the future , though to be sure only under the condition that we really
do begin with the beginning' (BQP: 97). Engaging with and traversing
through the metaphysical tradition will , therefor飞 allow thinking to
point 'to the so-called "fundamental experiences" and therewith into the
proper sphere of the origin that every genuine philosophical problem
can be directed back to , or vice versa, from where it must be decisively
motivated' (PIE: 139). A trace of that which is destructed remains in the
debris from which the alternative will be built and finds expression in
that which is subsequently constructed.
Insisting that thinking return to its Greek origins does not , however,
entail the glorification of ancient Greece because , while Heidegger
tends to be as highly appreciative of the pre-Socratics as he is critical of
Plato and Aristotle , he recognises that the overcoming of (Platonic and
Aristotlean) metaphysics cannot be achieved through a return to what
preceded them. Not only is this return a historical impossibility given
the becoming of being , meaning that the ancient Greeks no longer
speak to us as they once did , but the ancient Greeks failed to think of
the truth of being. Some may have gone further than others in this
endeavour, but , for Heidegger, 'the nature of truth as aletheia was not
thought out in the thinking of the Greeks nor since then , and least of
all in the philosophy that followed after' (0认TA: 49). Engaging with
the history of philosophy, where this engagement does not entail a
rejection 0 1' glorification but a destruction of the tradition , is crucial
to the process through which philosophy will be overcome. For thÎs
reason , lthe history of philosophy is not a matter for historiography,
but a matter of philo
other thinkers does not, therefore , entail mere acceptance or rejection

of their thinking , but is an 'encounter' (飞气1CT: 77) that can be used to
identify those moments in their thinking that point beyond the logic
of metaphysics.
On this point , Deleuze agrees: a certain engagement with the history
of philosophy is itself ph i1 osophy. He does so because he maintains that
reading what others have written allows fo 1' a creative engagement with
the issue unde 1' discussion. In line with his insistence that ph i1osophical
thinking is a creative ente1'p 1'ise , Deleuze maintains that thought can ,
and should , offe1' new readings of philosophe1's that opens thought to
different paths 0 1' appropriates diffe1'ent aspects of diffe 1'ent thinke 1's'
thinking, smashes them togethe 1', and sees what t 1'anspi 1'es as a result.
The aim is to open thought to new perspectives not previously seen.
This is not a logical process , but one that 1'esults from and is info 1'med
by an affinnative act of c1'eative self-exp 1'ession on thought's part. 1 will
explore this issue further in subsequent chapters, but , for now, what
is impo1'tant is that Heidegge1' and Deleuze agree that the histo 1'Y of
ph i1 osophy is not just a collection of dead texts to be igno 1'ed 0 1' read
as a matte 1' of me 1'e interest. Engaging with the history of ph i1osophy
is a c1'ucial pa1't of what it is to do philosophy and , in Heidegge1" s case,
thin k. This insight leads Heidegger to undertake a deta i1 ed, if at times
uno 1'thodox , reading of the history of phi1 osophy, including detailed
studies of, amongst others, Plato , Aristotle , Descartes , Leibniz, Kant ,
Hegel , and Nietzsche with whom he claims metaphysics reaches 'the
final distinctive position in the history of Weste1'n metaphysics' (NIII:
162) whe 1'eby it explicitly critiques its own binary oppositions all the
wh i1 e re-enforcing its dominance by portraying the wo r1 d in terms of
pure will (BQP: 109).
Interestingly, wh i1 e Heidegger's claim that Nietzsche completes
metaphysics is (in)famous , what is less well known is that Heidegge1'
claims that the path that Nietzsche takes to complete metaphysics is
one started by Hegel. Hegel's metaphysics of spirit is important for
Heidegge 1' because he unde 1'stands that Hegel's 'spi 1'it' is synonymous
with pu 1'e human subjectivity. While a contentious 1' eading of Hegel's
notion of spirit (Rae , 2011: 131-136) , Heidegger claims that this under嗣
stand
of fluid substance in terms of pure will to wi1l. The combination of

both enlarges the domain of anthropocentrism to such an extent
that the privileged human subjective willing of metaphysics becomes
synonymous with being. For this reason , 'Hegel's and Nietzsche's
metaphysics belonging together within the completion of Occidental
…
metaphysics like left and right - enact that interpretation of "beings as

such in the whole" which can no longer be surpassed and undermined
within metaphysics' (MFN: 20-21). Heidegger's readings of Hegel and
Nietzsche are controversial , but the consequence Heidegger draws
from them is that , wh i1 e it is quite possible that philosophical thinking
can continue to exist by recycling the world-views of the metaphysical
tradition , the culmination of metaphysics calls for a more original
solution to this impasse. Rather than 'more' philosophy, Heidegger
asks whether it is time for us to rethink what we mean by thinking. His
affirmative response leads him to posit , not more philosophy, but an
escape from philosophy altogether to genuine , meditative thinking.
Hegel and Nietzsche ar飞 therefore ， crucial thinkers for Heidegger
in that they are the ones who drive the final nail in the coffin of
metaphysics and make explicit the need for an alternative mode of
thinking. They are also central to the development of Deleuze's
thinking, albeit for different reasons. Whereas Deleuze and , to a lesser
extent , Heidegger are highly critical of Hegel , they have very different
relationships to Nietzsche. For example , while Heidegger maintains
that Nietzsche signals the end of one way of thinking and so is the
figure that points to the need for a transition away from metaphysics ,
Deleuze celebrates aspects of Nietzsche's thinking, in particular
his affirmation of affirmation and notion that will to power entails
competing forces , to produce an ontology of affirmative difference.
On the one hand , this points towards a sim i1 arity between Heidegger
and Deleuze , insofar as each points towards Nietzsche as the pivotal
figure who renews thought. For Heidegger, this entails a movement
beyond Nietzsche and philosophy to thinking, whereas , for Deleuze, it
entails a thinking that affirms certain aspects of Nietzsche's thinking
to affirm a notion of philosophy based in affirmation , dynamism , and
creativity. On the other hand , Heidegger's and Deleuze'
Heidegger and Meditative η1Ínking 107
offering a novel conception of philosophy based in and frorn the crea-

tion of concepts (Li nck , 2008: 522 , 530). Fo 1' Deleuze , thought takes its
cue frorn being ensu 1'ing that , because of being's 1' hizornic-becorning,
there is no need for philosophy to be ove 1'corne; philosophy sirnply
has to pay attention to being's 1' hizornic唰 becoming. If thought does
this , it will discove 1' that there are not epochs of philosophical conti刷
nuity which ernanate frorn a unita 1'Y point 0 1' which culrninate in a
fixed end , but a theatre of changing perspectives on being. Only if
thought takes its cue frorn being's rhizornic-becorning wi1l philosophy
rernain relevant, pu 1' poseful , and capable of t 1'uly thinking being. In
contrast , Heidegger would no doubt 1' eject Deleuze's thinking fo 1':
(1) failing to recognise the seriousness or depth to which rnetaphys-
ical thinking pe 1' rneates thinking; (2) failing to think deeply enough
about related questions 1' egarding the relationship between philosophy
and rnetaphysics and , in particular, language and its relationship to
rnetaphysics; and (3) accepting and affirrning that world四views can
captu1'e the open , rhizornic flux of being. Far frorn associating genuine
thinking with a creativity that establishes world-views , Heidegger
rnaintains that genuine rneditative thinking reflects being's becoming
as being reveals itself to thought and , as a consequence of this passive
reflecting, is creative.
However, while Heidegger is clear that freeing the creativity that
emanates from being's becoming requires a particular transforma蛐
tion in thinking , he is not entirely clear to what extent meditative
thinking entails a: (1) break from metaphysical philosophy; and (2)
continuation of metaphysical categories. This problem arises because ,
while Heidegger clearly thinks meditative thinking is a qualitatively
different mode of thinking than the closed , confined thinking of
rnetaphysical philosophy, he is also aware that it is not and cannot
constitute an absolute break from lnetaphysical thinking because 'a
regard fo 1' metaphysics still prevails even in the intention to overcome
rnetaphysics' (TB: 24; CP: 122-123; NIV: 141). A 'trace' (NIII: 4) of
rnetaphysical thinking will rernain and constitute genuine , medi-
tative thinking. This raises a number of questions including: What
trace will remain of rnetaphysical philosophy in genuine , rnedit
Willing the overcoming of metaphysical thinking
However, perhaps the most important question that aríses from

Heidegger's analysis is: what is the impetus that drives the movement
towards meditative thinking? While Heidegger's critique of metaphys-
ical anthropocentrism prevents him from simply appealing to human
willing to drive the movement as this would be tantamount to affirming
the metaphysical anthropocentrism to be overcome, it may be thought
that his critique of metaphysical anthropocentrism and analysis of
the human being's dependence on being leads to the opposite conclu蛐
sion: the transformation of thought to be effected is not due to human
willing, but to a renunciation of human willing and a dependency on
being 'itsel f' revealing itself to thought. The problem with this option,
however, is that it appears to substitute 'the arbitrariness of the will [with]
the arbitrariness of "being'" (Osborne , 1989: 94). In other words , it seems
to leave intact the question regarding the impetus that brings being to:
(1) alter thought to reveal being as being reveals itself; and (2) open
litself' to disclosure by meditative thinking. Working within the orbit of
this interpretation , 10hn Caputo (1986: 267) insists that a further issue
arises: what can thought do if it is open to being, but being is not open
to being fully disclosed by thought? If this were to occur, thought would
be in the tragic situation of knowing how to approach being, but would
be unable to reveal being in the way thought knows it must to truly
reveal being. Caputo argues that Heidegger does not and cannot have
a response to this issue given his rejection of action based on human
willing as anthropocentric and hence metaphysical. If this situation were
to occur, thought would remain in a state of despair until being opened
itself to thought; an occurrence not guaranteed to happen.
The problem with the interpretation of Heidegger underpinning both
these points is that it: (1) ignores Heidegger's insistence that a trace of
that which is overcome remains in that which overcomes; (2) reduces
Heidegger's analysis of willing to his critique of metaphysical willing;
and (3) remains within a binary opposition between actively willing
the overcoming of metaphysics or passively awaiting being's Iself'-
opening. As a consequence , the conclusion reached is two-fold: first ,
Heidegger's notion of trace is irrelevant to meditative thinking with the
consequ
Heídegger Gnd Medítatíve Thinking 109
Heidegger's critique of metaphysical , anthropocentric willing and his

notion of trace and affirming the former over the latter ensures that this
interp妃tation not only exemplifies the binary logic Heidegger aims to
overcome, but also fails to recognise that , while Heidegger undertakes a
vociferous critique of the willing of metaphysics , he does point towards
an alternative conception of willing than that which pervades meta-
physics. By reconceptualising the notion of willing and making this
reconceptualised notion of willing part of the process through which
meditative thinking is brought about , Heidegger overcomes the binary
opposition the 'mystical' interpretation depends upon and, by incorpo-
rating a reconstructed form of willing into the movement to meditative
thinking, remains faithful to his notion of trace.
While Heidegger is c1 ear that the movement towa 1'ds meditative
thinking is dependent on ce1'tain historical ci 1'cumstances , namely
the completion of metaphysics , this alone is not sufficient. Given that
thought can 1'emain within the o 1'bit of metaphysical thinking , a deci-
sion must be made rega1'ding metaphysics. Indeed ，吐le only decision
ahead is this: whether be-ing is inquired into in te 1'ms of the sway of
its truth 0 1' whether‘ beings retain their machination and pu1'sue a lack
of decision that p 1'events that which is sole and unique from eve1' again
coming forth [to] be a beginning' (MFN: 37). ln other words , a decision
must be made regarding whethe 1' thought is going to continue down
the path of metaphysics or whether it is going to search for an alterna.帽
tive. But this issue is further complicated by Heidegger's insistence that
the overcoming of metaphysical thinking cannot be achieved by mere
thinking; it also requires that being open 'itself' to thinking, human
being's 'ek心 istence' be reflectively affirmed , an alternative approach to
being be thought , and the technological enframing of metaphysics be
overcome. V飞Tith the exception of the first , each of these presumably
entails and emanates from some form of decision , which presunlably
entails a fonn of human willing.
As noted , howeve1', the decision to ove1'come metaphysics cannot entail
or emanate f1'om the aggressive willing of metaphysical anthropocentrism;
metaphysics cannot be overcome by 'more' metaphysics. But neither does
it simpl
between active willing and passive relaxation , any thinking that views this
issue in terms of these two options remains thoroughly metaphysical and
so simply re-instantiates that which is to be overcome; and (3) implicitly
points to an alternative that overcomes the active/passive binary opposi-
tion. Bringing this implicit possibility to the fore does , however, require
an extensive engagement with the nature of decision and its relationship
to willing; an analysis that will bring Heidegger to reveal that a particular
form of human willing has a role to play in bringing forth the transition
to meditative thinking.
Heidegger develops this most clearly in Country Path Conversations
where he undertakes a discussion of willing and its relationship to
thinking to not only show the intimate connection between thinldng
and willing, but to also reveal that willing is not simply opposed to non幡
willing (CPC: 33 , 37-38). Generally speaking, Heidegger is exploring
the way in which the transition to meditative thinking can occur. More
specifically, he is exploring the paradox of willing this transformation
despite willing seeming to re锢 enforce the dominance of the metaphysics
to be overcome. While Heidegger's remarks are partial and not fully
worked out, an issue that will cause problems when trying to work out the
implications of his thinking, appreciating them requires an introductory
remark on the dual sense of non-willing. For Heidegger, non-willing can
mean: (1) a variation of willing; 0 1' (2) the absence of willing (CPC: 52).
Following Bret Davis , 1 will call the variation of willing, non-wi1l ing, and
the absence of willing, not斗vi1ling (2007: 15). While Heideggerrecognises
it is tempting to maintain the willing of metaphysics can be overcome
by not-willing, he remains highly CI甘 ical of the notion of not-willing
because it not only establishes a binary opposition between willing/
no仁willing ， thereby re-enforcing the binary logic of metaphysics , but ,
more seriously, fails to appreciate that 'non-willing [as no仁wi1ling] still
signifies ... a willing, in that a No prevails in it, even if it is in the sense
of a No that directs itself at willing itself and renouncing it' (CPC: 69).
By operating through negativity, not-willing remains caught in willing
and so does not move thought beyond the willing of metaphysics. The
failure of not-willing returns Heidegg
Heidegger i1 11d Meditative η1inkíng 111
control of being, the releasement towards being of meditative thinking

ensures that the willing of meditative thinking releases thought towards
being so being can reveal itself on its own terms. \八1hile Heidegger vocif-
erously rejects the aggressive , dominating , closed wi1ling of metaphysics ,
the willing of non唰willing is an open and expansive willing that releases
thought towards being.
Genuine releasement towards meditative thinking does not emanate
from noιwilling， the renunciation of willing, or simple submission to
being's 'sel f' -disclosure, if and when this occu1's. While entailing a fo 1'm
of willing, in the fo 1'm of non-w i1ling, the 1'eby taking over a trace of
the metaphysical tradition , Heidegge1' claims that, unlike the closed and
1'estrictive imposition of metaphysical wi1l ing , the l'‘eleaserr 丑lent towa缸rds
being of meditative thinking entails a (non-田抖tγ付叫 7吨i过
咀lling 白
t ha i s open and
挝t 恒
expansive. Rather than t 1'y to impose itself on being 0 1' 1'eveal being in
a predete1'mined manne1', non刑illing wills thought to open itself to
being in a way that 1'eleases itself to , and so takes its cue from , being.
Rather than an end to be attained , non-willing is , therefore , a contin-
uous process , whe1'eby thinking b1'ings itself to a diffe 1'ent intentional
approach towa1'ds being than that constitutive of metaphysics.
Reiner Schü1'mann explains the movement from the closed , imposing
form of metaphysical willing to the open , releasement towards being of
non-willing in terms of a general two-stage process in which thought,
first , wills itself to open itself to being, which , second, brings it to undergo
a fundamental reorientation towards itself and being. In the first instance,
this entails thought coming to recognise its human ek-sistence in the
clearing of being and, through this , its dependence on being. This is
then complemented, in the second instance , by transforming its relation唰
ship to being from 'a priori , " w illing飞 [to] a priori , "1 e tting川(1 990: 250).
No longer thinking of itself as master of being , thought learns to think
in a way that lets its intentional object 'rest upon itself in its very own
being' (0队1A: 31). Deepening Sch甘rr丑ann's analysis, Bret Davies identi蜀
fies th 1'ee specific moments: (1) renunciation (Verzicht) , detatchment
(Abgeschiedenheit) , or holding唰back (Zllrück-halten)
112 Ontology in Heidegger 正md Deleuze
metaphysical to meditative thinking, Heidegger notes that once the

movement to meditative thinking has been enacted, 'this trace of willing
vanishes in the letting自oneself-into ， and is completely extinguished in
authentic releasement' (CPC: 92). Once this transformation to medi-
tative thinking has been effected, all forms of willing are extinguished
from meditative thinking, thereby ensuring meditative thinking does not
impose itself on being, but stands in the clearing of being to let being
be to reveal 'itself' as it is. With this , Heidegger explains (1) the move-
ment from metaphysical to meditative thinking by recognising an open ,
expansive version of willing called non帽willing， which remains faithful to
his notion of trace; and (2) why human being does not simply passively
await being's revelation , but has a role to play in effecting the transfor-
mation to meditative thinldng. Having played its crucial role in bringing
about meditative thinldng, however, all forms of willing vanish from the
meditative thinking that overcomes metaphysical thinking. With this,
Heidegger remains faithful to his claim that, in contrast to metaphysical
thinking's conflictual relationship to being, meditative thinldng entails
an open releasement before being that lets being be to reveal itself to
thinking on its own terms.
We should not, however, think that Heidegger is pointing towards a
total overcoming that results in a pure thinking beyond metaphysical
willing. In line with Heidegger's notion of trace , there is no eschatological
finality to meditative thinking: 'th[叶 futurality [of meditative thinking] is
entirely different from any kind of "eschatological" attitude , that is, from
an attitude that is not attuned to grounding and aims at waiting an "end of
time" which awaiting presupposes already from a complete forgottenness
of being' (MFN: 216). Heidegger rejects a final end to meditative thinking
because the notion of end not only violates being's becoming, but also
depends on and is in danger of re唰 enforcing a logic of binary opposition
that pits a 'process of ending' against 'the end of that process'. Because it
is attunded to being's continuously becoming, meditative thinking must
continuously change and alter in accordance with being's becoming.
Meditative thinking can also always re-instantiate the willing of meta-
p
the metaphysical thinking it overcomes. Meditative thinking entai1s

a precarious breakthrough from the aggressive willing of metaphysics
that is always in danger of slipping back into the aggressive willing of
metaphysics. Far from positing a linear movement from metaphysical
willing, through non-willing, to the absence of willing in meditative
thinking, metaphysical willing remains a possibility thought can always
(re)turn to.τhis possibility, when combined with the swaying of being
that it reflects , ensures that meditative thinking never reaches a fixed
finale; it always entails a difficult becoming. By emphasising rneditative
thinking's struggle with metaphysics , Heidegger remains consistent with
his claim regarding being's becorning, accounts for the way in which a
trace of rnetaphysical willing (in the forrn of non唰willing) accompanies ,
even if it does not constitute , rneditative thinking, and highlights the
difficu1t, continuous , and precarious nature of meditative thinking.
It, therefor飞 betrays the content and spirit of Heidegger's thinking,
especially his critique of binary oppositions , to rnaintain that the move幡
ment to meditative thinking rnust be structured around the dominance
of hurnan willing or the lack of human willing. Meditative thinking
asks us to exarnine alternatives which recognise and incorporate traces
of the metaphysical thinking it replaces. While the optimal cornbina-
tion would be for both being and thought to be open to one another,
if thought finds that it is open but being is not , or if being is open to
re飞ielation but thought closed, Heidegger recognises that a reconstituted
forrn of human (non唰)willing has a limited role to play in facilitating the
rnovernent towards rneditative thinking that will allow being to reveal
itself as it is. By recognising the role that a non-metaphysical form of
human willing plays in the movernent frorn metaphysical to rnedita刷
tive thinking, Heidegger not only remains consistent with his notion of
trace , but , contrary to the interpretation of a nurnber‘ of commentators
(Caputo , 1986: 267; Osborne , 1989: 94; Zirnmerman, 1990: 264) , also
demonst 1'ates that , while human being does not control the rnovement,
'it' is not completely helpless in effecting 0 1' shaping the transforrnation
from metaphysical to meditative thinking.
While Heidegger's notion of n
114 O/1 tology; /1 Heidegger Gnd Deleuze
does somewhat address this issue in his analysis of the enframing of meta-
physical technology where he claims that overcoming the enframing of
mode 凹rn
咀
‘1
n 忧
t echnolog岛Y wi山 11 ， somewhat paradoxicall弘 emanate from the
enframing of modern technology itsel f. In other words , the essence of
technology itself harbours the growth of that which will save us from the
enframing of modern technology because the cha11enging of metaphys-
ical enframing will bring thinking to challenge the cha11enging of meta制
physical thinking in a way that opens thinking to alternatives (QT: 28).
While certainly an interesting proposal , it does not, to my mind, solve
the problem identified because it does not account for why the closure of
metaphysics will be challenged as a result of the challenging constitutive
of metaphysical thinking, nor does it explain at what point this will occur,
if indeed it is granted it wil l. Furthermore, by insisting that metaphysical
thinking undermines itself, this proposal seems to negate the idea that
a form of human action is required to help overcome metaphysics; an
idea that is problematic with regards to Heidegger's claim that a form of
human willing plays a role in this overcoming.
This brings us to a second related problem regarding the relationship
between the fonn of willing constitutive of metaphysical thinking ,
the form of willing necessary to break with metaphysical thinking ,
and the decision to break with metaphysical thinking. As noted ,
thinking must decide to break with metaphysical thinking; a deci ‘
sion that requires a particular form of (non-)willing. But if thinking

decides to break with the aggressive willing of metaphysical thinking
to explore alternatives , with one of these being the open expansive唰
ness of meditative thinking, does this not mean that thinking has
already adopted meditative thinking's openness (to alternatives)
prior to the destruction of metaphysics that Heidegger claims is a
necessary precondition for the movement to the openness of medita-
tive thinking? In other words , it appears that Heidegger's analysis of
the transition to meditative thinking requires , as a precondition , the
(openness o f) meditative thinking he maintains only comes after the
destruction of metaphysics.
These questions must remain open in Heidegger's thinking, at worst
lacunas in his analysis , at best
with the consequence that he is too hasty in rejecting philosophy for

rneditative thinking. By associating philosophy with radical creativity
that ernanates frorn being's rhizornic融becorning， Deleuze deepens
Heidegger's analysis of being, reveals philosophy's intirnate relationship
to ontology, rejects Heidegger's end-of-rnetaphysics thesis, and atternpts
to rescue philosophy from Heidegger's rejection of it. To see why this is
the case and what exactly it entails , we now turn to Deleuze's ontology.
Deleuze 0日 Being as Becoming
Multiplicity, Difference,
Gilles Deleuze offers an ínnovative analysis that forcibly chaIlenges key

aspects of Heidegger's ontology and, by extensíon, end-of-metaphysics
(hence philosophy) thesis. While Deleuze's ontology revolves around
certain key concepts that 且t together in a certain manner, there is an
unfortunate tendency in Deleuzian scholarship to simply take over his
concepts without explaining them. As a consequence, concepts such as
'difference' , 'multiplicity' , 'territorialization' , and 'rhizome' , to name but a
few, litter the field without any real engagement with their multiple mean响
ings. Due to Deleuze's insistence that phiIosophy is intimately connected
to concepts, which themselves are amalgamations of component parts,
1 take seriously the need to mention and engage with these concepts to
explain what Deleuze does and does not mean by them. WhiIe it may be
thought to be a tedious endeavour that can be passed over to start the
process of thinking, if we remember Heidegger's Iesson regarding the slow
pace of genuine thinking, we find that it is only through a patient engage-
ment with the multiple meanings of Deleuze's concepts that we can start
to understand his thinking and actually get to grips with it.
For this reason , the chapter is structured around the three key concepts
of his ontology - multiplicity, difference , and virtuality - which , through
their presentation , wilI reveal the importance of a fm日th: immanence.
Rather than include immanence under a separate category, however, it
will become clear, through the presentation of the first three concepts ,
that immanence is that which flows through each (Kerslake , 2002;
Beistegui, 2010). Each section of this chapter details what Deleuze
means by the specific concept being discussed before relating each to
116
Mult伊licítμ DiftèrenC'e， (1 lld Vir阳ality 117
the other to show that Deleuze's philosophy is systematic , albeit system ‘
atic in openness. 叭lhile perhaps controversial in that the popular image

of Deleuze tends to be that of a thinker of the non翩 system ， my presenta翩
tion does sit well with Deleuze's own assessment of his philosophical
project as one that emanates from belief 'in philosophy as system' (LJM:
365). However, while believing in systems of thought, Deleuze notes
that 'the system must not only be in perpetual heterogeneity, it must
also be a heterogenesis' (LJM: 365). In line with his analysis of the multi翩
dimensional becoming of being, the system must not only encompass
and affirm multi-dimensional multi-perspectivalism , but must also
recognise this multi-dimensionality is self唰 generating and occurs from
and through a range perspectives, points , and directions simultane-
ously. While we will see what this means as the discussion develops , the
important thing to remember at this stage is that Deleuze is a systematic
thinker, albeit a systematic thinker who affirms openness and difference
rather than closure and finality.
as becorning
While Deleuze's dependence on Heidegger's affi 1'mation of the ques-

tion of being has already been noted , Deleuze's 1'esponse to the ques-
tion deviates somewhat from Heidegge1" s. To show this , 1 start with
Deleuze's claim that the 1'e has only ever been one ontological propo-
sition: being is univocal (DR: 35). Univocity emanates f1'om and so
1'eturns us to medieval Scholasticism and , mo 1'e specifically, the diffe 1'-
ence and relationship between 'being as univocal' and 'being as equiv-

ocal'. It will be 1'emembered from Chapte 1' 2 that 'equivocity' means
that being is affirmed diffe 1'ently fo 1' each multiplicity, whether this is
substances , modes , or att1'ibutes (E: 162-163). In other words , God, man,
and animal a1'e imbued by diffe1' ent senses of being. This is how 1 have
a1'gued that Heidegger views being. '[In] contrast , to say that being is
univoca l... means that being has only one sense , and is said in one and
the same sense o( everything of which it is said, whether it be God 0 1'
man , animal 0 1' plant' (Smith , 2001: 169). The univocity of being 1'efe1's,
therefore , to the idea that the being of each thing maintains the same
sense of being found in othe1' multiplicities. 认lhile it may be thought
this posits a fixed , singula1' sense that runs throughout and so unites all
that emanates from it , Deleuze's particular innovation is to show that
univocity, thought as and from does not need to be reduced
to singularity or unity. As Deìeuze
the univocity of being does not mean that there is one and the same
being; on the contrary, beings are multiple and different , they are
always p1'O duced by a disjunctive synthesis , and they themselves are
disjointed and divergent, membra disjU l1 Cω. The univocity of being
signifies that being is voice that... is said , and that it is said on one
and the same Isense' of everything about which it is said. That of
which it is said is not at all the same , but being is the same for every-
thing about which it is said. (LS: 179)
Deleuze's insistence that being is univocal does not mean that being is a
closed, singular, undifferentiated totality f1'O m where all else emanates.
Deleuze rejects the notion that being be thought in terms of, what 1
willlater call , the identical , a notion that posits a foundational , closed ,
undifferentiated unity as the source of difference. As a consequence,
univocity does not mean sel f.… identity, but is 'fully compatible with the
existence of multiple "forms'" (Badiou , 2000: 23). Indeed, being finds
expression in and through multiple , different beings. 叭1hile being is
numerically multiple , each manifestation of being shares the same sense
of being, which , for Deleuze, is difference. As a consequence, we find
that the only 'thing' entities have in common is difference. Building on
this, we can say that the key aspects of Deleuze's notion of univocity are:
(1) being is manifested in the same sense in each multiplicity; (2) being
is metaphysically singular; it is not divided between multiple realms;
(3) while metaphysically sin凯Il ar， different/ciation is constitutive of
being; which ensures (4) the metaphysical singularity of being manifests
itself in a multiplicity of ways. For Deleuze, being is difference , dividing
itself into 1丑ultiple beings , each of which is distinct and different. While
univocal , being is not unitar弘 nor is it undifferentiated; it is nothing
but difference.
As a consequence, Deleuze claims there is no unified originary
domain f1'O m where different multiplicities emanate, nor is it the case
that different multiplicities culminate in unity; each multiplicity is
radically and absolutely different f1'O m others (Bell , 2007: 150一 151).
Understanding how difference manifests itself th 1'Oughout Deleuze's
account does , however, require a brief preliminary note on the distinc-
tion between differentiation and differenciation. As Deleuze explains,
Iwe call the determination of the virtual content of an Idea differentia-
tion; we call the actualisation of that virtuality into species and distin帽
guished parts differenciation' (DR: 207). Differentiation relates to the
different , but undifferenciated (meaning non-spatio-temporally desig佩
nated) virtual Ideas which are made actual by being spatio帆 temporally
Mu lt.伊licít只 Dí厅主rence， Cl lld Vírωality 119
differenciated into actual multiplicities. As a consequence , Deleuze

claims being is nothing but a different /c iating process (B: 42) and , for
this reason, is synonymous with and, in fact, is nothing other than the
process of becoming differentjciated. Furthermore, being's different/
ciating becoming is thoroughly affirmative and 'comes first and fore-
most from the explosive internal force which life carries within itsel f'
(BCD: 40). Contrary to accounts emanating from identity in the sense of
the identical that posit a unified, transcendental ground , Deleuze claims
that being's different/citation emanates from an immanent process of
becoming being does to 'itsel f.' As he explains , 'life as mov臼nent alien-
ates itself in the material fonn that it creates; by actualizing itself, by
differentiating itself, it loses contact with the rest of itself'" (B: 104).
11
Far from being a process associated with death (Moulard唰 Leonard ， 2008:
147) , being's diffe陀nt/ciation is associated with life , which far from
being linear and predictable, is contingent, expressive, irregular, impul-
sive , unpredictable and multiple (B: 106).
Deleuze agrees with Heidegger, therefore , that being finds concrete
expression in or through different forms , with this entailing an open-
ended process of becoming that develops immanently from and to the
entities that express it. They do , however, draw different conclusions
regarding what 'being' means. While Heidegger posits being as that
which allows beings to be and shows being does not entail presence,
but an open-ended becoming, Deleuze engages with what exactly the
becoming of being entails. While Heidegger opens the doors by recog-
nising the becoming of being, Deleuze extends his analysis by recog-
nising and discussing the differential, rhizomic.…becoming of being. As
one commentator puts it , Deleuze 'lights up' Heidegger's analysis of
being by revealing that 'the being of the sensible depends on the sense of
that being' (Hertz-Ohmes, 2010: 86, 88). By doing so, Deleuze not only
deepens our understanding of the rhizomic唰becoming of being, but also
shows that being becomes in ways not countenanced by Heidegger.
In line with his attempted overcoming of the binary logic of meta唰
physics , Heidegger recognises that being is singular and universal ,
meaning 'it' is not one or the other, but one and many. The status of
t
120 Ontology in Heidegger i11 zd Deleuze
Despite Heidegger's attempt to overcome the binary oppositions of

metaphysics by recognising that being is not either one or many, but
is both that which is 'common' to all entities and that which is unique
to each , Deleuze claims that Heidegger's thinking, at the foundational
level of being , continues to revolve around the 'is' and, more specifi-
cally, the question: what is being? For Deleuze , however, emphasising
the question of 'is' is exactly what has to be gotten over if philosophy
is to think being's differential becoming. Not only does the question of
'is' re-enforce 'what' questions that tend to delineate a fixed essence,
thereby undermining thinking's capacity to think the 'when' 'where' ,
and 'how' of being's rhizomic-becoming, but , linked to this , is-questions
also fail to think the difference that defines objects and their relations
to others. For these reasons , Deleuze turns away from the thinking and
questioning that revolves around the 'is' , to a thinking that revolves
around the 'and'. As he writes , 'one must make the encounter with
relations penetrate and corrupt everything, undermine being , make it
topple over. Substitute the AND for IS. A G l1 d B' (DII: 42). Deleuze's
point seems to be that thinking the 'and' as opposed to the 'is' will
allow thinking to think difference and , in 50 doing , also overcome the
presence inherent to is-questions.
It may be objected , however, that Heidegger aims to answer the ques-
tion 'what is being?' through an analysis of the ontological difference,
which leads him to recognise that being is not simply singular, but is
differentiated, insofar as it is that which is unique to each entity Gnd
'common' to al1. In short , it may be objected that Heidegger recognises
that the question 'what is being?' can only be answered once it is recog-
nised that being is this and that. Deleuze rejects this and offers an implicit
critique of Heidegger's method based on two different , but related,
points: first , Deleuze charge5 that , for all its originality, Heidegger's
questioning of being, based on the quest吐ion
trapped wi让thin the 丑1 ine of 'is' questioning that has dominated the tradi-
tion which, by depending on a singular correct answer, is based in an
ontology of identity and, as such , fails to truly think the open-ended
nature of being. Second, while Heidegger tries to think being in a way
that escapes the eit
Multiplicity, Dil如renc马 α nd Virtuality 121
With this , Deleuze implicitly charges that, while Heidegger offers up

the question of being and answers it through a questioning of the onto-
logical difference between being and entities, Heidegger's entire approach
is not radical enough in that it remains caught in the same mode of ques-
tioning, based around the question of 'is' , that constitutes the tradition.
By linking being to becoIlling, Heidegger is able to recognise the changing
nature of being in a way that escapes previous thought, but , by thinking
being through (the ontological) difference rather than as difference, his
ontology not only reduces entities to an original , singular point (the ques唰
tion of the meaning of being) , but also remains needlessly one-dimen-
sional , insofar as it is not able to think the multiple ways being becomes.
飞八lhile Chapter 2 notes that a strand of recent Heideggerian scholarship
suggests that Heidegger's thinking on time emanates from and so depends
on space (Frodeman , 1992; Malpas , 2006 , 2012) , Deleuze takes seriously
the title of Being and Ti me to claim that, for Heidegger, there is an intimate
relationship between being and time which means that he privileges time
over space when thinking being and so fails to recognise and question the
ways in which being becomes temporally and spatially (or, as Deleuze puts
it, geographically). By recognising that being is difference and so is mani-
fested in different ways, Deleuze maintains that the rhizomic-becoming
of being entails not only a spatial and temporal becoming, but a spatio-
temporal becoming that fluctuates intensively. The three axes through
which Deleuze thinks being's differential becoming ensure that, rather
than focus on is-questions, which tend to be underpinned by notions of
a singular fixed essence, being's becoming must be thought in terms of
multiple becomings whereby being becomes in one way and another and
another and another simultaneously. Whereas Heidegger maintains that
being 'precedes' difference , insofar as difference has a being of its own ,
Deleuze claims that because being becomes through difference manifested
as different entities , being is not distinguishable from difference, 'being is
difference itsel f' (DR: 64). Deleuze's ontology tries , therefore, to chart and
outline what the differential becoming of being entails.
To do so , Deleuze's analysis flows alon
122 Gntology În Heidegger mzd Deleuze
rejection of the Platonism he claims has dominated the tradition (DR:

59). Platonism is important for Deleuze because , as he understands it, it
is the most successful doctrine that has affirmed the identity of the One
over the Many, a position clearly seen from the way Platonism subor崛
dinates the many physical representations of a 'thing' to the universal
essence inherent to the Idea of the 'thing' represented. The truth 0 1'
essence of each physical manifestation is not discovered through an
analysis of that particular object , but by discovering the universal Idea
that particular object rep 1'esents. The essence of the colour 'blue' , for
example , is not revealed by engaging with the physical manifestations
of 'blue' , but by identifying the universal Idea 'blue' that each physical
manifestation of blue partially represents. Deleuze's p 1' oblem with this is
that, by reducing the different manifestations of the Idea to the identity
of the Idea , Platonism subordinates difference to identity and so fails to
think 'difference in itsel f' (DR: xix).
To overcome this, Deleuze aims to think difference and carry this
thinking to its conclusion. To do so , he does not simply abandon
Platonism for an alternative, but, as Miguel de Beistegui explains, 'draws
on the Stoic 白 eory of incorporeality and time, as well as on the natu四
ralism of Lucretius , and his theory of the simulacrum in pa1'ticula 1"
(2012: 72) to engage with Platonism and , in particular, the Ideas to
rethink 'them' in terms of diffe 1'ence not unity 0 1' identity. This has to
be understood in a pa 1'ticular way, however, by distinguishing between
two interpretations of Plato's theory of Ideas; that is , that the Platonic
Ideas a1'e an attempt to think (1) the essence of an object through an
unchanging, unive 1'sal essence; 0 1' (2) in terms of multiple Ideas that are
different to one anothe 1' and cannot be reduced to unity (i. e. a mani-
festation of 'blue' is thought in terms of the ldea 'blue' which is not
reducible 0 1' identifiable by examining anything other than the Idea of
blue , which is different to the Idea 'red'). Deleuze claims his thinking
emanates from the latter (MD: 116): 'every body, every thing, thinks
and is a thought to the extent that, reduced to its intensive relations,
it expresses an Idea the actualisation of which it determines' (DR:
254). Their multiplicity ensures that Ideas are: (1) different in kind to
one another and
Mu lt.伊lici凯 Di伊rence， and Vh徊。 li句! 123
intensity in these terms , Deleuze is able to claim that difference in kind ,

which refers to a numerical, spatio-tempm址 difference ， emanates from
differences in intensity of difference (DR: 233, 237, 238).
Furthermore, while Platonic thought insists the Ideas are eternal and
universal, Deleuze seeks to think the Ideas from and through differ嗣
ence. He does so by thinking difference in its difference to come up
with the distinction between differentiation and differenciation previ-
ously mentioned, but which we return to because it is so crucial to
understanding the process through which Deleuze maintains the Ideas
become (DR: 209). As Deleuze explains, 'we call the determination of
the virtual content of an Idea differentiation; we call the actualisa-
tion of that virtuality into species and distinguished parts differencia唰
tion' (DR: 207). Deleuze's thinking on the difference and, indeed, the
relationship between differentiation and differenciation is intimately
connected to the virtual-actual relationship. As Deleuze puts it , 'the
totality of the system which brings into play the Idea, its incarnation
and its actualisation must be expressed in the complex notion of 11 (indi) 嗣
differentjciation'" (DR: 279). From this, Deleuze maintains that Ideas are
not fully formed and eternal , but exist 气Tirtually in differentiated form
(DR: 269). However, while the Ideas are virtually differentiated , their
virtuality, a concept we will return to, but which very basically entails
the non-spatio-temporal pre-individuated field out of which actual
objects emanate, is completely undifferenciated (DR: rneaníng
they do not initially take intensive spatio-temporal determinate form.
For this reason , an 'Idea rnay be completely deterrnined (differentiated)
and yet lack those determinations which constitute actual existence (it
is undifferenciated , not yet even individuated)' (DR: 280). Differentiated
virtual Ideas must be rnade actual and are rnade actual through a process
of differenciation (DR: 279) , whereby the Ideas' pre-individuated virtual
field is differenciated into spatio-temporal components that coalesce
together to form the actual rnultiplicity. The actualisation of the virtual
Idea does not entail a resemblance of a pre-established form , but is a
thoroughly differenciating process so that, by way of differences in
intensity, two act
(DR: 236, 239). First, being is differentiated into different Ideas which
exist in an 'obscure' (DR: 280) undifferenciated , hence non-intensive,
spatio-temporal , non-determinate virtual realm. These virtual Ideas
emanate from differences in degree of difference so that each different
in kind virtual Idea entails a different degree of intensive difference (口
being). These virtual differentiated Ideas are real without being actual
and are made actual through a process that differendates the differ-
entiated virtual Idea, with each differenciation entailing a different
intensive form of each particular differentiated virtual Idea. Each Idea ,
itself differentiated from other virtual Ideas, becomes through a differ-
enciating process that: (1) distinguishes it from other actualisations of
different virtual Ideas; and (2) produces an actual'object' that is differ-
endated from (a) its particular differentiated virtual Idea and (b) other
actualisations of the 'same' virtual Idea by the degree of the virtual Idea
constitutive of the actualisation.
Far from reducing different representations to an identical , universal ,
ahistoric Idea, Deleuze affirms difference to claim that , while two actu嗣
alisations may fall under the 'same' Idea, not only does each actualisa-
tion 'possess' minute intensive differences of that Idea , thereby ensuring
each actualisation is different to other actualisations of the 'same' Idea,
but the movement that actualises two objects of the 'same' virtual Idea
is itself different, and the virtual Idea from where each emanated is itself
'constituted' by difference. These factors ensure that two actualisations
of the 'same' virtual Idea never actualise the exact same virtual content.
Actualisations emanate from different virtualities, thereby securing
their difference from other actualisations of different virtual Ideas ,
and actualise different aspects of the 'same' virtual Idea, ensuring that,
through the differendating process , each actuality differs intensively,
spatially, and temporally. Importantly, however, for Deleuze , the process
through which being different/ciates itself is wholly internal to 'itself'
so that actual objects do not shape 0 1' influence being's different/ciated
becoming. Deleuze's attempt to escape dialectics leads him to reject a
dialectical interaction between the actualities pro
Multiplicít只 Di厅erence， and Virtuali句! 125
the virtual to actual movement that differenciates a differentiated but

undifferenciated virtual Idea without the form or direction of being's
different/ciation being subsequently impacted on or shaped by the actu-
alities its different/ciating process creates. 队1hile uni-directional , insofar
as being's becoming goes from virtuality to actuality, for Deleuze , being's
different/ciating becoming is independent of actual entities meaning it
is far from being linear, predictable 0 1' anthropocent 1'ic. Being's different/
ciating becoming is contingent , non-anthropocent 1'ic , exp 1'essive, irreg惮
ular, impulsive , and unp 1'edictable (B: 106). To flesh out and bette1'
understand the ways Deleuze's ontology describes being's diffe 1'ent/
ciating becoming , we now turn to some of the key concepts , such as
difference, virtuality, and actuality, we have p 1'eviously mentioned. This
will not only make sense of these concepts and show the role they play
in Deleuze's ontology, but will also deepen our understanding of his
ontology. We start with Deleuze's notion of multiplicity.
Becoming as multiplicity
Borrowed from Riemannian mathematics , multiplicity is one of the
key terms of Deleuze's ontology finding expression as far back as his
very first pub 1i cation Empiricism a l1 d Subjectivity (ES: 96). While a
concept that spans his philosophical writings , it is not until his later
works that Deleuze starts to flesh out what he means by multiplicity
and the role it plays in his ontology. Needless to say, the concept
is intimately bound to his understanding of difference and being's
different/ciating becoming (DR: 182; ATP: 275). As Deleuze explains ,
'multiplicity is affirmed as multiplicity; becoming is affinned as
becoming. That is to say at once that affirmation is itse 1f multiple ,
that it becomes itse 1f, and that becoming and multiplicity are them翩
selves affirmations' (N: 85).
Multiplicity plays two key roles in Deleuze's ontology. First , being's
different/ciating entails a complex process through which differentiated
virtual Ideas are differenciated into determinate actualities through an
intensive process that differenciates the pre翩individual ， undiffe1' end帽
ated , differentiated vi 1'tual Idea into actual entities with specific parts
and components. Importantly, each actualisation: (1) differenciates and
so actualises different aspects of its virtual Idea; (2) actualises them in
differenciated ways depending on the deg1'ee of intensity inherent to its
specific differenciation; and (3) creates actualities that (a) emanate from
a unique differenciation of its virtual Idea and (b) are different/ciated
from othe1' actualities that emanate from the 'same' virtual Idea 0 1' from
alte 1'native virtual Ideas. Deleuze employs the concept 'multiplicity' to

show that being's differentjciation occurs along multiple lines of flight.
There is no unity to or underlying fixed essence represented by being's
differen tj ciation.
Second, Deleuze employs the concept 'multiplicity' tωo describe the
ontological structure of the entities created as a result of the vi让rtual蜘阳町.
缸
a ct阳ua
剖1m 丑lOve
臼m丑len
时1芷t. Rather than the differentjciation process entailing
a process of difference that culminates in diffe1'ent entities composed
of fixed , solid, unchanging identities or singular entities composed of
many parts , the differentjciating process creates open-ended differen-
ciating 'entities'. Rather than think of the entities created through the
process of being's differentjciation as simply singular 0 1' fragmented , 0 1'
as singular entities composed of many parts , we need a far more fluid
account of the actualities created from being's differentjciation (AO: 47).
It is not the case that entities are composed of parts that create a whole
or that there is a whole supported by parts , but that each entity is strati-
fied across multiple lines and continues to become ac1'oss these lines all
the while bursting out across new lines of fligh t.
In Dialogues , Deleuze goes some way to deepening ou 1' unde 1'standing
of what he means by lines of flight by stating that everything is composed
of three different lines of flight. The first line entails a rigid division
between various external forms and relations; Deleuze mentions the
relationship between the family and profession specifically. 飞八lhile this
line of flight is rigid and relatively static, the second is molecular and
dynamic and 't1'ace[s] out little modifications , ... make[s] detours, [and ...]
sketch[es] out rises and falls' (DII: 93). This second line of segmentation
is, therefore , intensive and, by virtue of this , leads to continuous minute
changes in the composition of the first line of segmentation and, by
extension , the multiplicity in general. There is , however, a third line of
segmentation identified by Deleuze; a line of segmentation that even he
notes is 'strange' (DII: 94). This strange line of flight is simple , abstract,
yet the most complex of all. It entails the virtual aspect to the multi圄
plicity; the obscur飞 multiple 'potential' -becoming from where actuality
arises. While analytical1y di
Mult伊 licity， Diftèrence, and Virωality 127
that the rnovernent of each rnultiplicity entails an intensive pulsating

rhythrn unique to that particular constel1 ation of the rnultip 1icity. Each
rnultiplicity rnoves to a particular rhythrn which is only ever expressed
rnornentarily before the foldings of the rnultip 1icity contort in a different
rnanner that creates different lines , rhythrns , and flows of becorning (FB:
30, 37 , 41). All of this occurs spontaneously and without any organ-
ising principle or unity because the becorning凰 rnovernent of rnultip1i ci惮
ties entails a rnovernent of and between the 'inner' and 'outer' aspects
of the rnultip 1icity (C1: 11 , 19). Th1'ough this inte1'change, 'the whole
constantly divides depending on the objects , and constantly cornbines
the objects into the whole [tout]: "eve 1'ything" [tout] changes frorn one
to the other' (C2: 29). The becorning of rnultiplicities entails a contin嗣
uous rnovement in the composition of the various lines of flight of the
rnultiplicity, each of which is itself a multiplicity cornposed of rnultiple
lines of flight , themselves composed of dynamic rnultiplicities.
Irnportantly, however, a multiplicity does not contain parts per se ,
but is a fluid becoming of various rhizornic lines of fligh t. Multiplicities
a1'e not, in othe1' wo 1'ds , static entities that are inwardly dynamic.
Multiplicities a1'e fluid becornings that, at no point , crystallise into static,
closed entities. It is fo 1' this reason that Deleuze talks of multiplicities not
entities: the forrne 1' affirm the multi-dirnensionality of being's different/
ciating becoming, while the latter tend to irnply a closed, fixed , static
unity. Multiplicity does not entail a unified entity cornposed of parts ,
b时， as Deleuze explains , 'an organisation belonging to the rnany as
such , which has no need whatsoever of unity in order to forrn a systern'
(DR: 182). With this, Deleuze is trying to describe a process whereby
being becornes in a number of different ways sirnultaneously without
this becorning being contained 01' constrained within an ove1'arching
unity. For this reason , multip 1icity does not 'designate a cornbination of
one and the rnany, but only an organization of the heterogeneous that
does not require an ov 飞ve
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128 On 的 logy in Heidegger and Deleuze
constantly, altering wholes composed of various lines which branch out

in unexpected , non唰 linear， non-uniform ways (L: 161; C1: 168). If we
perceive a boundary, it is not because there is a strict boundary that
encloses multiple parts , but because the multiple elements that compose
the multiplicity have coalesced in such a fashion that the entity
appea 1's to form a coherent , closed whole. Rather than unity creating
mu1tiplicities ,
multiplicity indicates a group of lines 0 1' dimensions that cannot be

1'educed to one another. Every 'thing' is made up of them. A multi鞠
plicity certainly contains points of unification , centres of totaliza-

tion , points of subjectivation, but these are factors that can prevent
its growth and stop its 1ines. These factors are in the multip 1icity they
belong to , and not the reve1'se. (PAD: 310)
Unity does not p1'ecede or create multiplicities , 'unifications are in fact

processes which are produced and appear in multiplicities' (PITP: 315).
Of course , la multiplicity includes focuses of unification , centres of total-
ization , points of subjectivation , but as factors which can prevent its
growth and stop its lines. These factors are in the multiplicity to which
they belong , and not the reverse' (DII: vi). Unity is created through the
configuration of multiplicities; multiplicities do not emanate from a pre-
established unity 0 1' identity. As the multiplicity alters as its rhythmic
becoming engages in the fold-unfold movement , so do the subject ,
totality, and unity that appear from this becoming. But this different/
ciation has no teleology, end跚point 0 1' goal (B: 106), nor is there any
Iprefonned logical order to becomings and multiplicities' (ATP: 277).
Being's different/ciation entails a random , independent , spontaneous ,
and immanent becoming that Icannot be brought back to Some Thing
as a unity superior to all things , nor to a Subject as an act that brings
about a synthesis of things' (IAL: 389). Identity has no role to play in the
becoming of nlultiplicities nor does history. Multiplicities are composed
of various lines Iwhich are true becomings ,... distinct from the history
in which they are developed. Multiplicities are made up of becomings
without history, of individuation without subject (the way in which a
river, a climate, an event , a day, an hour of the day, is individualized)'
(DII: vii). Past rhythms , lines , and directions of becoming are unim-
portant to the present屯 ecoming of multiplicities (DII: 17). There is no
teleology 0 1' dialectical 1' elationship between past巾 ecomings and p1'esent-
becor丑 ings meaning that multiplicities a1'e the purest form of becoming
in that they become immanently and without any plan , pre-direction ,
Multiplicit只 Difference， mzd Virtuality 129
exte1'nal influence, 0 1' end. Put diffe 1'en t1 y, being's immanent diffe 1'ent/
ciation becomes as it different/ciates. Nothing can or does impact on
the diffe 1'ent/ciation of being; different/ciation is an autopoietic act
being does to itself. Fittingly, outlining what this open-ended process
of becoming entai1 s is itself a process that 1' uns along multiple lines. In
Diftèrence and Repetition , Deleuze posits three main aspects to multiplici-
ties: (1) the absence of any p1'ior identity or unity; (2) the recip 1'ocity
of the various elements so that no element of the multiplicity exists
independently 0 1' apa 1't f1'om its othe1' aspects; and (3) the multiple lines
of each multiplicity are bound together by multiple connections that
form together to create a bound , but dynamic , open system (DR: 183).
The various connections of the multiplicity are fluidly bound ensuring
that they burst out in different, unexpected directions , all the while
remaining tied to the other lines of the multiplicity.
To show this further, Deleuze follows Bergson in distinguishing
between quantitative and qualitative multiplicities , which are inti-
mately connected to intensive and extensive multiplicities (ATP: 36,
534). Quantitative multiplicities delineate the way being's differen嗣
ciation entails a spatio-temporal differenciation which creates actual
distinct multiplicities. Qualitative multiplicities delineate the way these
different actual multiplicities are differenc始ted intensively and, as we
will see, are, therefore , intimately connected to differences in degree.
Multiplicities do not just multiply or differenciate themselves in a strictly
linear extensive way; they also differenciate themselves intensively, with
both forms of multiplicity occurring simultaneously. The becoming of
being does not just progress or regress linearly, but bursts forth in all
directions simultaneously (ATP: 263) , an argument Deleuze develops by
introducing the concept 'rhizome' , going so far as to say that' 吁hizome"
is the best term to designate multiplicities' (L1M: 366).
Deleuze's most developed discussion of the rhizome composes the
introductory, first plateau of A Thollsand Plateaus , whe 1'e he aims to
develop a sense of becoming that bu1'sts fo 1'th in unexpected ways with
this bursting forth lacking a central point that generates and unifies
its offshoots
fluctuating, stratified lines of flight that explode out from one another
at multiple points and intensities , which ensures they are inherently
chaotic, disordered , random , multiple , and open processes (ATP: 7…8,
13 , 14).
Perhaps the key aspect of rhizomic-becoming, however, is its imma胃
nence. Rather than emanating from or conforming to a predetermined
plan that charts and determines the actual becoming of the entity,
Deleuze maintains that rhizomes develop as they become. This ensures
that rhizomic-becomings are unpredictable; they burst forth in multiple
directions at multiple intensities that, rathe 1' than developing 0 1' closing
to unit弘 pe1'petuate more intensive and extensive becomings. As he
explains in Anti-Oedipus , being becomes through
pure positive multiplicities whe 1'e everything is possible , without

exclusiveness 0 1' negation , syntheses operating without a plan , where
the connections are traverse, the disjunctions included , the conjunc-
tions polyvocal , indifferent to thei 1' underlying support , since this
matter that se1'ves them precisely as a support receives no specificity
from any structural or personal unity. (AO: 340)
Rather than think from unity andjo 1' maintain difference culminates in
unity, Deleuze asks us to take seriously the idea that being is a self-gen幡
erating, self-organising, open 翩 ended differentjcial becoming that exists
from pure affirmative difference. Deleuze does , however, have a partic-
ular understanding of difference , which , if not prope1'ly understood,
prevents his ontology, and , indeed, his account of phi1 osophy, from
being properly understood. This is one of the great problems with most
discussions of Deleuze's thinking: while noting the importance of differ翩
ence , they tend to mention it without providing a detailed discussion of
what he does and does not mean by it, a method that risks proceeding
based on assumption rather than what is actually written. To ove1'come
this problem , it is to his notion of difference that we now tu1'n.
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Deleuze's ontology is one of openness and affi 1'matíon and, as such, is

highly critical of negation and any philosophy based on the negative 0 1'
that holds a positive view of the negative. 丁he fundamental overa1'ching
reason Deleuze is so CI社ical of thinking, such as his reading of Hegel's ,
that emphasises and becomes through the process of negation is that
he thinks it is inherently life唰 denying (DR: 52). There is no vitality to Ít,
Multiplici~μ Dil和rence， and Virωality 131
which , fo 1' Deleuze, is the measu 1'e of thought. Deleuze also links nega-
tion to opposition to suggest that negation works through the posing of
two opposites which cont 1'adict one another. This cont1'adiction is then
resolved in the unity of synthesis. Acco 1'ding to Deleuze, howeve 1', the
opposition inhe1'ent to negation entails and depends on a specific fo 1'm
of diffe 1'ence which he will call exte1'nal diffe1'ence. While this will be
explained sho 1'tly, the key p1'oblem Deleuze identifies with this fonn of
diffe 1'ence is that it does not think diffe 1'ence itselC but me 1'ely diffe 1'enti-
ates one entity from anothe 1'. Each entity is defined th1'ough its 1'elation-
ship to anothe 1' entity, 1'athe 1' than through its own self-pe1'petuating act
of different/ciation. Fo 1' this 1'eason , Deleuze implicitly maintains that
exte1'nal diffe 1'ence is a 1'eactive fo 1'm of diffe 1' ence opposed to the affi 1'-
mation of internal different/ciation he maintains constitutes being (DR:
28). By emphasising and working th 1'ough external difference , negation
fails to unde1'stand and appreciate that being pe1'petuates itself through
inte 1'nal , not exte1'nal , diffe 1'ence.
But it may be asked: why, if negation is so life翩 denying， does thought
tend to value it 0 1', at least, find it so easy to think through? Deleuze's
1'esponse is that it is because the questio日 of being is and has been posed
in a pa1'ticular manne1'二. Rathe 1' than focαu臼s on the 吐I how'飞气飞w叮vhen'飞， and/or

whe 臼re' of being, Deleuze maintains that thinking has focused on the
'what' of being. To find out what being is , thought has tended to identify
what being is not (DR: 235) , which bases thinking on and f1'om nega-
tivity. 飞叮 hile thought centred around the 'what' is important , Deleuze
wants us to also focus on other types of question to better think the
multiplicity of being. This will allow thinking to escape the dominance
of negation and recognise alternative ways of conceiving and under-
standing being that show the creative process of becoming inherent to
being (MD: 95). By emphasising 'how' , 'when' , and/or 'where' questions ,
Deleuze also re跚 enforces the notion that philosophy is not concerned
with ahistorical truths , but is geo-historically grounded.
Retu 1'ning to negation , however, Deleuze , in Nietzsche al1 d Philosophy ,
makes the point that while 'negation is opposed to affirmation ... affirma-
tio
132 011tology in Heidegger i1 nd Deleuze
and so exists Iwithin' the orbit of difference, wh i1 e negation is opposed

to affirmation because it is only through the negation of affirmation.
Deleuze appears to be trying to say that affirmation is prim 01' dial in
the relationship , existing independently from all else , wh i1e negation
is dependent on affirmation , insofar as negation negates affirmation ,
with the consequence that while affirmation is different to negation,
affi 1'mation does not 1'esult from the negation of negation. Affi1'mation
affirms itself independently of all else , while negation negates affirma-
tion and so depends on the independence of affirmation fo 1' its exist-
ence. Howeve1', while negation depends on affirmation , the reverse is
not true. Affi 1'mation does not depend on no 1' does it emanate f1'om
negation; affirmation affirms independently meaning that negativity
does not ground , touch , influence , 0 1' transfo 1'm affirmation. As Deleuze
puts it, 'only affirmation subsists as an independent powe1'; the nega-
tive shoots out from it like lightning, but also becomes abso 1'bed into it ,
disappearing into it like soluble fi 1'e' (NP: 176).
Having identified that affi 1'mation is dil扣的lt from and independent
of negation , whereas negation is dependent on and thus opposed to affir-
mation , Deleuze shows how affi 1'mation affi 1'ms. In other w 01' ds , if affir、
mation does not become through negation, through what process of
becoming does affi 1'mation become? Fo1' Deleuze , the answe 1' lies in the
meaning and natu 1'e of diffe 1'ence; affirmation diftèrs from negation in a
way that is independent of negation. Deleuze's analysis imp1i es , the 1'e-
f01' e, a form of difference that is distinct from diffe 1'ence that arises from
and through negation. Indeed , in Diftèrence and Repetition , Deleuze is
clear that 'a concept of diffe 1'ence without negation' (DR: xx) is exactly
what he is aiming fo 1'. To create it , he tu 1'ns to the question of diffe 1' ence
itself; not diffe 1'ence in relation to unity 0 1' difference between two enti帽
ties , but Ipure difference , the pure concept of difference , not difference
mediated within the concept in gene1'al , in the genus [01'] the species'
(DR: 60). Engaging with the concept 'diffe1'ence' itself leads Deleuze to
the insight that the 1'e a1'e two fundamental types of diffe 1'ence: differ-
ences in deg1'ee and differences in kind. 叭1hile diffe 1'ence in kind 1'efe1' s
to the fundamental spatio四 tempOI址 diff
Multiplicitμ Di厅èrence， and Virtuality 133
ciation process , in empirical reality in terms of differing degrees of

intensive spatio 唰 temporal configurations. For Deleuze , differences in
kind emanate from differences in intensity (DR: 239) and entail the
outward , spatio幅 temporal manifestation of difference , which results
from 'the' primordial transcendental intensive difference of difference.
As such , 'differences of degree are only the lowest degree of difference ,
and differences in kind are the highest form of difference' (DR: 239;
B: 93). 1mportantly, the terms 'highest' and 'lowest' do not indicate a
normative value indicating that difference in degree is a debased form
of difference in comparison to difference in kind , but rather relate to
the geography of difference. 飞Nhile both forms are necessarily part of
difference, difference in intensity is the lowest , meaning primordial ,
form of difference , with difference in kind being a derivative of this.
Deleuze recognises that , from the perspective of representation , this
appears to reduce difference in kind to difference in degree (DR: 238) ,
but dismisses this as not 'well founded' (DR: 238) because it assumes
that claiming that difference in kind emanates from difference in degree
means that the former is collapsed into the latter. 1n contrast , Deleuze
claims that the two forms of difference are different but not separate
meaning it is possible to secure the difference in kind of each while
claiming that one emanates from the other. More specifically, Deleuze
claims that difference in kind is derived from difference in degree
because , first , 'intensive quality includes the unequal in itself. It repre-
sents difference in quantity, that which cannot be cancelled in differ-
ence in quantity 0 1' that which is unequalisable in quantity itself: it is
therefore the quality which belongs to quantity' (DR: 232). For Deleuze,
quantity emanates from quality because of the ine-quality of quantita-
tive number. Because it is based in ine吁 uality， Deleuze claims quantity
is , itself, a particular manifestation of quality. For this reason , the quan-
tity of difference in kind emanates from qualitative , intensive differ-
ence. Second, Deleuze claims that because intensity entails inequality, it
has, by its nature, to affirm differences, which means, third , that inten-
sity does not depend on anything else for its differentiation
emanates from the actualisation of virtual Ideas. Difference in intensity

as the primordial form of difference entails a non-differenciated horizon
of difference from where the quantity of differences in kind and the
intensive quality of actualised virtual Ideas emanate.
To reiterate, there are two forms of difference in intensity in Deleuze's
ontology: the first primordial form entails a transcendental difference
in degree from where the quantity of difference in kind and, ultimately,
the actualised given emanates , while the second describes the intensive
features of actual multiplicities. While the first primordial form is differ胃
entiated but undifferendated, the second form refers to the intensive,
qualitative differences manifested 'in' each of the actualities created from
the differendating process. Thinking difference is , therefore, a differenti-
ated process requiring an engagement with the various forms of difference
that underpin the different/ciation process , the difference inherent to
the different/ciation process , and the differendated multiplicities created
through the different /ciation process , including their quantitative and
qualitative differences to other actualised multiplicities , which are them-
selves continuously differendating. Having described the different forms
of difference, includinσthe transcendental form of intensive difference
。
from where actuality emanates , Deleuze develops his analysis of differ翩

ence further by engaging with the differendating process through which
virtual Ideas are actualised. This leads him to distinguish between internal
and external difference.
External difference refers to difference that determines an entity
through its relationship to another. For example: A is A because it's
110t B. 叭1hile external difference tells us something about an entity,
according to Deleuze , it cannot tell us what that entity is itself because,
by defining the entity through its relationship to another entity, it
remains stuck in terms of a quantitative difference and so fails to think
the transcendental intensive difference that underpins this external
difference. Furthermore, by defining each entity through its relation-
ship to another, external difference is imbued and constituted by the
negative: A is only A because it's not B. External di
Multiplicity, Di伊rence， and Virtuality 135
By different/ciating itself, being perpetuates itself through the crea唰

tion of independent self制 different/ciating multiplicities each of which
is distinct from others. By thinking difference as different/ciation ,
internal difference is intimately connected to transcendental differ-
ence in intensity and, by extension , pure difference. For this reason ,
Deleuze 1i nks internal difference to being 0 1' life itself (BCD: 40). Indeed ,
Deleuze implicitly maintains that it is only because of the pure , sponta-
neous, self-generation of internal difference that it is possible to speak
of external difference. It is only because the entity first exists through its
self幡 different/ciation that it is then possible to distinguish it from other
entities. 叭rith this , Deleuze is able to conclude that diffe 1'ence , p1'operly
understood as difference in intensity, is pu 1'ely affi 1'mative. This feeds
into his critique of negativity and affirmation of affi 1' mation because , if
difference, as difference in intensity, is self-gene1'ating th 1'ough a p1'ocess
of inte 1'nal diffe 1' ent/ciation then it is not dependent on anything else.
It is he 1'e that Deleuze complements and deepens Heidegge 1" s critique
of ground. It wi1l be 1' emembered that , for Heidegger, being does not
entail a fixed , presenced ground from where entities emanate, but rather
the ab跚ground which entails a swaying, flowing becoming. Deleuze also
criticises the notion of ground as presence agreeing with Heidegger that
the notion of ground as presence has become dominant because of a
need to order and organise being's 书 ecoming in accordance with a privi-
leged fixed identity to be copied 0 1' represented (DR: 272 273). To get
…
round this, Heidegger thinks of ground in terms of being's temporal

becoming with the consequence that, because being is an 'indetermi-
nate vapour' (I M: 85) , its 'grounding' is not that of the fixed , singular
foundation of metaphysics. For Deleuze , however, positing being as the
'ground' of entities does not go far enough because it always reduces
entities/multiplicities to the same point (the question of the meaning
of being) and, in so doing, inadvertently reaffirms the tradition's privi-
leging of sameness (= unity = identity). Rather than thinking being
through difference , it is only by thinking being as difference that thinking
fully escapes from the tradition's privileging of identity bec
over difference. The ground of actuality is not, therefm飞 the unity of

a single question , but rather a terrain which 'swarms' (DR: 277) with
difference. Impmtantly, difference as differ它nce in intensity does not
depend on nor does it emanate from negation or a solid foundation;
it is a pure bursting forth as a pure affirmative becoming. Difference
does not , therefore , result from negation; difference entails affirmation ,
which can subsequently be negated.
But while it may be thought that negation's dependency on affirma-
tion entails a difference from affirmation , Deleuze maintains otherwise.
While affirmation is linked to difference , negation is opposed to differ-
ence. Negation does not entail a difference to affirmation because differ-
ence entails an independent affirmative act which , due to its nature,
cannot be part of negation. But neither should it be thought that this
dependency means negation is merely different in degree to affirmation;
01', put differently, that negation is merely a lesser form of affirmation.
Because negativity reacts to affirmation , it lacks the 'seH'.町 generation
inherent to intensive difference and so cannot be thought in terms of
difference. Deleuze needs , therefore , an alternative term to describe
negation's relationship to affirmation which leads him to claim that,
while affirmation dift'ers in kind from negation , negation is opposed to
affirmation (DR: 51).
Deleuze's thinking on difference takes him once more into relation
with Heidegger who , it will be remembered , maintains that being is that
which is 'common' to all entities , in that all entities exist , while also
being that which finds unique expression 'in' each entity. The ontolog-
ical difference certainly entai1 s differences in kind , insofar as each entity
is a different and unique form of being , and may entail differences in
degree, in that each entity 1丑 ay， although it is never made entirely clear,
'possess' different intensities of being. Furthermor飞 Heidegger's critique
of anthropocentrism reveals that he is also highly critical of what
Deleuze calls 'external difference'. Rather than reveal the truth of enti-
ties through an engagement with their constitutive component parts
01' by comparing them to other entities , Heidegger maintains that each
entity must be and only is truly revealed by examining the being of each
indi
lv[ultiplicitμ Di厅'èren正飞。 nd Virtuality 137
difference. While Deleuze takes over Heidegger's notion of ontological

difference and so works within similar parameters as Heidegger, he goes
beyond Heidegger's analysis by: (1) producing a differentiated analysis
of the difference Heidegger points towards with his notion of ontolog-
ical difference; and (2) thinking the different/ciating nature of being's
becoming through his detailed and differentiated analysis of differ-
ence. For Deleuze , being as difference means that each form of being is
absolutely distinct from other forms; there is no common aspect (not
even existence) that unites or binds the various entities togethe r. While
Heidegger's response would be to agree , after a11 being's polyvocality
means that being is not a transcendent 'thing' that unites a11 entities ,
Deleuze c1 aims that , regardless of his intentions , by privileging being
over difference , Heidegger must think entities from the singularity of
(the question of the meaning o f) being as opposed to the difference
of difference. In contrast to Heidegger's (perceived) unity, continuity,
01' commonality, there is only ruptuI飞 difference， independence , and
divergence (AO: 154). While Deleuze's reading of Heidegger's ontology
is somewhat reductive , it is illuminating in that it a110ws him to develop
a differential ontology. To further outline what this entails , 1 now turn
to the relationship between virtuality and actuality, a relationship that
stands at the centre of the different/ciation relationship , is central to
Deleuze's endeavour to explain the onto-genesis of being, and demon-
strates why actuality is replete with differenciated multiplicities.
a豆豆d
认lhile Heidegger pro c1 aims the importance of the question of being and
does , admittedly, talk of the event (Ereignis) as that which brings enti-
ties to be, his discussion of this concept is notoriously complicated and
underdeveloped. ln contrast , Deleuze spends significant time outlining
the onto-genesis ofbeing. For Deleuze, the onto-genesis ofbeing revolves
around two movements: the differentiation-differenciation movement
which is intimately connected to the virtual-actual movement. In other
words , a differentiated virtual idea is made actual by being differenci唰
ated into an actual spatio-temporal multiplicity. Because 1 have already
discussed the differentiation-differenciation movement, 1 now turn my
attention to the virtual-actual movement. This is important because ,
with the notable exceptions of Manuel Delanda's (2002) attempt to
utilise Deleuze's notion of virtuality to reinvigorate the philosophy of
science and Brian Massumi's (2∞勾 use of the concept to rethink a range
of issues including movement , a11d sensation , the meaning of the
138 011 归logy in Heídegger and Deleuze
virtual is too often underdeveloped or simply taken for granted in discus-

sions of Deleuze's ontology. In contrast , and following Slavoj Zizek's
claim that Deleuze is 'the philosopher of the virtual' (2004: 3) because
the virtual actual movement forms the lelementary coordinates' (2004:
…
17) of his ontology, 1 will suggest that the virtual is not only absolutely
fundamental to Deleuze's ontology and so needs to be outlined in some
detail , but , as Chapter 9 will show, is also the place from where any
attempt to disce 1'n the validity of his attempt to think as and from differ-
ence must be located.
The virtual plays such a crucial role in Deleuze's onto-genetic account
because lit' is the source of actual multiplicities, a conclusion that leads
Deleuze to claim that Iphilosophy is the theory of multiplicities , each
of which is composed of actual and virtual elements' (DII: 112). In
other words , each multiplicity is composed of two faces: a virtual face
and an actual face with the virtual entailing the linvisible , opaque and
shadowy' (C2: 70) underside of actuality. Importantly, the virtual's role
in Deleuze's differential ontology is three嗣 fold: (1) to account fo 1' the
process through which being becomes; (2) to show that the becoming
of being is multiple; and (3) to show that being's becoming does not
conform to a predetermined process or culminate in a fixed end.
While the virtual is not physical in the sense that actuality is spatio-
temporal , Deleuze points out that its non 翩 spatio懈temporality does not
mean that the virtual is opposed to or lacks reality; virtuality has a reality
of its own (I AL: 392). As Deleuze explains , 'the virtual is not opposed
to the 1'eal; it is the real that is opposed to the possible. Virtuality is
opposed to actuality, and therefore , possesses a full reality' (MD: 101).
Virtuality and actuality are dil和rent forms of reality, entailing a specific ,
entwined relationship , while virtuality and possibility are opposed
to one another, a relationship that , for Deleuze , is thoroughly nega ‘
tive. 叭1e will get to the virtual…possible relationship shortly, but it is

important to point out that Deleuze's notion of the reality of virtu-
ality does not mean virtual reality in the form of computer simulation.
For Deleuze , virtuality describes two different , but related, aspects of
being's becoming. First , it relates to the pre-individual , but nonetheless
d
Multiplicitμ Diftèren叫 and Virtuality 139
particular virtual Idea becomes actual, but the virtual'itself' entails both
the 'origin' of each particular multiplicity and the power that generates
the movement from the virtual to the actua l. However, if vi 1'tual being
is distinct from actual 1' eality with the fo 1'me 1' c1'eating the latte 1', and if
vi 1't l1 ality is not an essence that 1' esides 'in' actuality, does this not mean
that vi 1'tuality is t 1'anscendent to actuality?
This issue continues to plague Deleuze's ontology. While Deleuze
explicitly rejects the idea that the vi 1'tual is t 1'anscendent to actuality,
Alain Badiou argues that Deleuze's fo 1'mulation of the vi 1'tual…actual rela-
tionship can only entail a t 1' anscendent relationship. As he concludes,
the relationship between vi 1'tual-becoming , as that which c1'eates , and
actuality as that which is c1'eated, can only entail a 1'elationship whereby
vi 1'tuality 'maintains a kind of t 1' anscendence , transposed , so to speak ,
"beneath" the simulac1'a of the world , in a sort of symmet1'ical relation
to the "beyond" of classical t 1'anscendence' (2000: 45). Despite Deleuze's
p 1'otestations to the cont1'a1'Y, Badiou maintains that Deleuze's notion of
vi 1'tuality violates his attempt to think 'the ve 1'tigo of immanence' (WP:
48). The1'e a1'e, howeve 1', a number of points that need to be made in
1'ega 1'ds to Badiou position. The first is that we have to be careful when
thinking about what Deleuze means when he insists that the vi 1'tual
entails a diffe 1'entiated, yet undiffe1'enciated , 1'ealm from whe 1'e actual
multiplicities emanate. Badiou reads Deleuze in a way that b 1'ings the
latter to hold that actualities lie ready-made in an undifferentiated form
beneath actuality. As such , the virtual entails a t 1' anscendent ground
to actualit予 However， as 1 have argued, being is nothing but a p1'ocess
of imman 例已 affirmative self-differentjciation. 丁he1'e is nothing t1'an硝
scendent to being directing 0 1' shaping its differentjcial becoming. 讯Then
this is applied to the concept 'vi1'tual' we see that the virtual does not
occupy a t 1'anscendent position to actuality, nor is it p 1'e-fo 1'med into a
predete1'mined 'essence'. The vi1'tual entails a process of pu1'e indetermi-
nate becoming. Perhaps Manuel Delanda puts it best when he explains
that 'un1ike a t 1'anscendent heaven inhabited by pure beings without
becoming (unchanging essences 0 1' laws with a permanent identity) the
vir
of reflective thought, he maintains that Sartre's idea must be purged

of its transcendence and thought in pre-pe 1'sonal not pe 1'sonal te 1'ms
(LS: 98-99). As such, he proposes to think being as 'an impe1'sonal and
p 1' e.嗣 individual t 1'anscendental field, which does not 1'esemble the corre-
sponding empirical fields, and which nevertheless is not confused with
an undifferentiated depth' (LS: 102). This pre-pe1' sonal , differentiated,
but p1'e-individuated, t 1'anscendental field is the vi 1'tual face of actuality.
It is a transcendental condition of actual multiplicities, meaning it must
exist for multiplicities to be actual, but is not transcendent to actual multi-
plicities. As a consequence, Deleuze claims that empi 1'ical diffe 1'ences a1'e
rooted in and emanate from a t 1'anscendental , not transcendent, field
of intensive difference (Smith , 2007: 11) , which confirms that being as
difference initially finds expression in a pre-personal, differentiated, but
undifferenciated , transcendental hm垃 on of virtual Ideas , each of which
becomes by being differenciated into actual multiplicities.
This virtual horizonal field is not , however, anything fixed 0 1' deter-
minate , but entails continuous change at a speed and time frame
'shorter than the sho 1'test continuous period imaginable; it is this
very b 1' evity that keeps them subject to a p 1'inciple of uncertainty
and indetermination' (DII: 112).τhis continuous change means that
virtuality does not fo 1'm a fixed ground from where actuality emerges
(DR: 129 , 284) , no 1' is it constituted by the spatio-temporal dimen-
sions of actuality; it is the 'ground' f1'om where actuality's spatio-tem-
poral dimensions emanate. Furthermore , as we have seen , virtuality
is not undifferentiated; it does not , therefore , lie as a solid ground of
actuality. While the virtual can be distinguished f1' om the actual , and is ,
therefore , distinct from the actual , there is no 'gap' between the two.
The relationship between the virtual and actual is such that they are
'distinct, but indiscernible , [and...] in continual exchange. 认1hen the
virtual image becomes actual , it is then visible and liI丑 pid ， as in the
mirror or the solidity of finished crystal' (C2: 70). The virtual is not
transcendent to the actual , but entails the differentiated , but undif嗣
fe 1' enciated , obscu 1' e face made visible by its actual differenciation.
叭1herea
Multiplici凯 Difl它的1ι巳 and ViT 阳α lity 141
inseparable from the movement of its actualization' (B: 42-43) and

that 'the two te 1' ms [virtuality and actuality] don't become inter唰
changeable , they remain distinct , but the distinction between them
keeps changing round' (DI: 66).
Support fo 1' this interp 1'etation is found inη1e Fold , where Deleuze
offers an innovative account of Leibniz's metaphysics to claim that it
does not entail a distinction between two distinct worlds , but 'an entirely
different division of the rooms of the house: private apartments are on
top (individual ones) and the common rooms below (the collective or
the totalities)' (FLB: 119). Importantly，吐le two floors are and will remain
inseparable; they are really distinct yet inseparable by dint of a presence
of the upper in the lower. The upper floor is folded over the lower floor.
One is not acting upon the other, but one belongs to the other, in a
sense of double belonging' (FLB: 119). Interpreting the virtual actual …
relationship through this model allows us to say that the virtual and
actual are two domains of the 'same' Idea, which , while distinct from
one another, are also inseparable. The actual emanates from the differ-
enciation of the virtual , which occurs through multiple and momen-
tary crystallisations of the virtual's infinite speed. Far from reproducing
the model of representation , whereby the actual represents an already
established transcendent virtual, the virtual and actual coexist and enter
into a tight circuit which is continually altering between the two faces.
As such , the virtual is not the 'essence' of actuality nor is it ever found
'in' the actual (MD: 110). Virtuality entails a reality of its own which is
different , although intimately related, to the reality of actuality. While
distinct, there is a mobile connection between the two realities consti翩
tuted by a fluid , mobile, immanent t1 0w of virtuality to actuality (C2:
70; DII: 114).
We should not, however, think that , while the differentiated virtual
Idea is differenciated into actuality, this means the virtual is collapsed
into the actual through this movement or that actualisation exhausts ,
annihilates , or usurps the independence of virtuality. 叭1hile virtuality is
differenciated into actuality, not only does the virtual entail continuous
movement at infinite speed , but the movement from virtual-becoming
to actuality is never singula
142 Ontology Íl l Heidegger and Deleuze
not resemble each othe 1', no 1' do the products 1'esemble the vi 1'tuality
that they embody. … Actualisation , differentiation , a1'e a genuine crea-
tion' (B: 104). The virtual-actual modification entails a purely creative
and innovative becoming that is unconstrained by parameters , prede-
termination , or actual events. This is important because if there was a
'feedback' loop 0 1' dialectical rnovement whereby virtuality was shaped
by the actual objects CI‘ eated by virtuality, it would be possible for virtu-
ality's becoming to be shaped and influenced by actuality. This would,
however, violate the pu1'e becoming that defines vi 1'tual being. While
there is no dialecticallnovement frorn actuality to virtuality that shapes
the virtual's differenciation into actuality, the continuous interchange
between virtuality and actua1ity means that , while the virtual is differ幡
enciated into actuality, the c1'eated actuality is subsequently overtaken
by 气he' new virtual being actualised (C2: 70). Insisting that the virtual
is differenciated into actuality, but is not , in turn , differentiated by the
differenciation of actuality allows Deleuze to: (1) claim that the virtual
and actual are distinct, (2) rer丑 ain consistent with his claim that the
virtual is a pure becoming, and (3) show that the virtual-actual modi-
fication is a differenciating becoming that is multiple, randor丑， non鞠
linear, open-ended and rhizomic (DR: 211).
The virtual does not, therefore , entail an inner potential to be made
actual , or the actualisation of possibility. The multi-dimensionality
inherent to virtual-actual becoming is fundamentally different to the
linear, singular realisation of possibility/potentiality (B1: 30). There are
a number of reasons for this. First, Deleuze maintains that possibility
lacks any form of reality; possibility is that which possibly becomes.
This is in contrast to virtuality which has a rea 1ity of its own (DR: 279).
Second, Deleuze links possibility to representation because the reality
created from possibility emanates from a re-presentation or copying of
the parameters of the possible. 1n turn , this is linked to the third point
which maintains that possibility is realized because possibility delineates
that which reality is realised from. As Deleuze explains ,
the process of realization is subject to two essential rules, one of

resemblance and another of limitation. For the real is supposed to
be in the image of the possible that it realizes. (It simply has its exist-
ence 0 1' reality added to it, which is translated by saying that , from
the point of view of the concept , there is no difference between the
possible and the rea l.) And , every possible is not realized, realization
involves a lirnitation by which some possibles are supposed to be
repulsed 0 1' while others 'pass' into the rea l. (B: 96-97)
Mult伊licit只 DiJ和rence， and Vir 归。 lity 143
According to Deleuze, possibility lies there waiting ('in' non-reality)

ready to be realised and, indeed , is only realised through a particular,
singular process whereby reality is added to its abstract possibility (DR:
279). In contrast , virtuality does not lack reality and entails an open-
ended process of multiple becomings.
Not only is there a constitutive and crucial difference between virtuality
and possibility/potentialit弘 but the virtual-actual relationship is far more
different/ciating than the possibl e-real relationship. While, in Being and
Ti me, Heidegger claims that 'higher than actuality stands possibility' (BT:
63) as a way to affirm open-ended becoming, Deleuze's valorisation of
virtuality over possibility indicates that he thinks Heidegger's valorisation
of possibility over actuality not only fails to understand that actuality is
'grounded' in a virtual啕becoming， but also demonstrates that by affirming
possibi1i ty Heidegger, once again , does not truly think open回ended differ-
ence; a thinking only possible through the virtual. Even when Heidegger,
in the Zolikon Seminars backtracks on his ea r1y valorisation of possib i1i ty,
j
and claims that 'rather than speaking about possibilities as constituents

of Dasein, it is always better to speak about potentiality. to-be [Sei l1 können]
…
in the sense of the potentiality for being-in-the-world' (Z: 158), Deleuze

would presumably counter that swapping 'potentiality' for 'possibility'
still does not sufficiently think being's open幡ended differential becoming.
For Deleuze, the problem with thinking from 'possibility' is that possibility
is opposed to the real, insofar as the former is that which lacks reality,
while the problem with thinking from a 'potential-to七e' made actual' I
is that it constrains being's becoming 'within' fixed parameters and so is

unable to think being's pUI飞 differential becoming. Being's onto搁genetic
differential becoming cannot be adequately thought from 'possibility' or
'potentiality-to-be', but must be thought from virtuality because virtuality
is (p ace 'possibility') real and entails (p ace 'potentiality…-t o-be') an open-
ended differential becoming. In contrast to Heidegger's valorisation of
'possibi1ity' in Being and Time and 'potentiality斗。翩be' in his later thinking,
Deleuze claims that 'higher' than both stands
from the 'same' virtual Idea depending on (的 which aspect of the virtual
is actualised and (b) the manner of differenciation. Becoming through
the virtual-actual relationship is , therefore , purely different/ciating; no
two actualities are ever the same. As a consequence, and anticipating the
content of subsequent chapters , we see that 'the virtual to which philos-
ophy gives form in concepts and the virtual from which science derives
its scientific functions are not the same' (Gilson, 2007: 385). 丁his is the
first time we see the way that Deleuze's ontology finds concrete expres-
sion in his epistemology, an occurrence supporting my claim that, for
Deleuze , thinking emanates from and is intir丑 ately connected to being
(= ontology). To explore this further and , in particular, to see how the
differences between Heidegger's and Deleuze's ontologies create differ帽
ences in terms of their accounts of philosophy, the next chapter not only
outlines what Deleuze understands by philosophy, but contrasts it with
Heidegger's.
Deleuze and
Conditions of Philosophy
Deleuze starts by questioning the place of philosophy, a questioning

that also engages with philosophy's purpose. Traditionally, philosophy
gave itself the honou 1' of being the king of the sciences. We see this
with Plato who a1'gues that only the philosopher can secu 1'e access to
the Ideas , Hegel , fo 1' whom only the philosophical consciousness is
capable of truly understanding the t 1'uth of spirit , and Heidegger, who
insists that philosophy is supe1'io 1' to art and science because only it
is capable of answering its own pu 1'pose and content within its own
pa 1'amete 1's. The entire history of philosophy has been shaped by the
idea that philosophical analysis has some privileged access to the truth ,
which provides it with a privileged position in relation to other disci-
plines. As 1 noted in Chapter 1, howεver， this privileging has recently
come under attack as a consequence of philosophy's inability to reveal
the truth it proclaims sovereignty over and the 1'ise of alte 1'native
discou 1'ses such as biology, compute1' sCience, linguistics, psychoanal唰
ysis , logical analysis , and marketing (WP: 10). The question of philoso唰
phy's pu 1' pose and content is, the 1' efo 1'e, a pressing one for philosophers ,
who want to know what it is they do and why it is important , and fo 1'
non-philosophers , who st 1'uggle to understand what philosophy is and
how it diffe 1' s f1'om alternative disciplines. It wi1l become apparent that
Deleuze takes up this question to affirm an o 1'iginal interpretation of
philosophy that not only seeks to alter its pu 1'pose from that which
has been historically attributed to philosophy, but, in so doing, also
creates a unique , albeit non-privileged, place fo 1' philosophy amongst
alternative disciplines.
Deleuze is not, therefore, pessimistic about philosophy's purpose or
content, nor does he agree with Heidegger's claim that philosophy is
dead or at least should be killed so as to t l'ansform thought away from
145
146 0 1l tology in Heidegger and Deleuze
metaphysical philosophy towards genuine , meditative thinking. Deleuze

continuously rejects Heidegger's end of metaphysics thesis (BTO: 88;
LJM: 365; OP: 136; PPM: 214) , dismissing it on one occasion as 'just tire-
some , idle chatter' (WP: 9). This rejection emanates from his ontology
and can be explained in the fo l1owing manner. If being is difference
then being is always new. Philosophy, as a thinking of being, is , there-
fore , always called to think the new configuration of difference thrown
up from being's different/ciation. There is no need for phi1 osophy to be
replaced; phi1osophical thinking simply has to come to attend to being's
new configurations. It does so by creating a particular world-view, what
Deleuze will call a plane of immanence , to make sense of and provide
conceptual solutions to deal with the particular problems thrown up by
being's different/ciation. While Heidegger laments world-views fo 1' being
closed , enframing distortions concea1i ng the tfuth of being , Deleuze
celebrates them fo 1' offering new understandings of being. 叭lhile the
reasoning behind this will become clea1' as we outline Deleuze's analysis
of philosophy as concept-creation, it should be appa 1'ent that Deleuze
offers an analysis of philosophy that is radically different to that offe1'ed
by Heidegger. The primordial requirement , therefore , is an identifica‘
tion of what exactly Deleuze means by philosophy.
τhe of
叭lhile being's different/ciation is autopoietic, Deleuze claims thinking is

not. Thinking emanates from a fundamental encounter with the world
(DR: 139), which, as his ontology reveals , is an actualisation of 'a' tran-
scendental difference in intensity. In other words , thinking emanates
from being and intends being. Difference lies at the root of thinking,
which is not , however, to say that thinking has always properly under-
stood its object in terms of difference. Indeed, for Deleuze, ontology
has never been 'correct' because it has privileged identity and so has
not thought from being as difference; its Platonic heritage means that
thinking has concentrated on faithfully representing the 'true' , universal
essence of the thing. Deleuze offers a scathing indictment of this 1'epre帽
sentational model of thinking with one commentator even suggesting
that Deleuze's entire oeuvre is best unde 1'stood as an attempt to overcome
'the problem of representation' (Somers在 all ， 2013a: 2). The primordial
problem Deleuze recognises is that we cannot siI口ply choose to think
from difference because we are too accustomed to thinking from iden翩
tity. Prior to being able to think from difference , we have to abandon
the representational model and the ontology of identity upon which
Deleuze and the 5trμ ctural COllditiO I1 S o(Philosophy 147
it is based. In other words , Deleuze is well aware of how strange his

analysis will appear to those who remain trapped within the representa畸
tional mode l. So as to leave no doubt as to what he me剖lS by the repre-
sentational model , Deleuze , in Chapter 3 of Diftèrence and Repetition ,
undertakes a detailed discussion of the various facets of the representa-
tion model to not only offer a critique of previous ways of thinking,
but to also transform thinking to think difference. In other words , he
wi1l show how not to think, as a precursor to revealing the nature of
'true' thinking. In total , Deleuze identifies eight postulates of represen-
tational thought (DR: 167) , thereby demonstrating the diversity of this
way of thinking. Its diversity gives the representational model is contin-
uing strength insofar as its differentiation enables it to seep into every
aspect of ordinary and philosophical consciousness. This re-enforces its
potency and allows it to become the natural way of thinking in every
facet of daily life. Because Henry Somers-Hall (2013b: 96-127) offers a
detailed summary of all eight postulates, 1 will limit the following to a
broad outline of Deleuze's discussion.
Deleuze's analysis of the image of thought, the phrase he uses as
shorthand for what 1 have called the representation model , starts by
examining the notion that philosophy is pre蝴 suppositionless and based
on good will.叭Thile other disciplines start with axiomatic principles
that delineate the means, method, and ends of the inquiry, Deleuze
examines the claim that philosophical thinking is different because it is
exact1y the question of first principles that it engages with. The implicit
point underlying this view of philosophy is that the search for the truth
is a disinterested one undertaken by 'a natural capacity for thought
endowed with a talent for truth or an affinity with the truth , under the
double aspect of a good will 012 the part of 的 e thinker and an upright nature
on the part of though t' (DR: 131). This natural propensity for thinking,
undertaken in accordance with a predetermined 'correct' manner,
pictures thinking as natural and non-subjective; it is an objective search
that truthfully and faithfully aims to recognise, not create , the truth.
To do so , thinking establishes universal , foundational principles, each
of which is assumed to be self-evident, to inform its search an
Deleuze mentions Descartes as a thinker who sought to reveal a foun崛

dational ground free of presuppositions , but who , in so doing, failed
because his affirmation of the cogito presuI丑es leveryone knows , inde-
pendently of concepts , what is meant by self, thinking, and being'
(DR: 129). Not only does the foundational ground presuppose other
knowledge , but its grounding in presuppositions discloses it is not foun嗣
dational. Deleuze also makes this point in relation to Heidegger and, in
particular, Heidegger's affirmation of a pre-ontological understanding
of being. While Deleuze recognises that Heidegger does not start with
objective principles , he nevertheless holds that , with his notion of a
pre国 ontological understanding of being, Heidegger presupposes a foun嗣
dation that legitimises his privileging of the question of being. Not only
does Deleuze link Heidegger to the representational model of thinking, a
thinking that places Heidegger within the realm of, what he would call,
metaphysics , but , anticipating later discussions in What is Philosophy? ,
Deleuze is setting the scene for his insistence that all philosophical
thinking entails a creativity that , far from representing a fixed identity,
entails a creative endeavour aimed at offering conceptual solutions to
problems. While thinkers of the representational model take themselves
to be selflessly engaging with a natural search fo 1' the truth , Deleuze
charges that , in actuality, they a1'e creating the truth they seek by basing
it on unexplored presuppositions. Far from a dispassionate, objective
search for the truth , the representational model not only entails the
creation of truth based in presuppositions , but also entails an ignoring
of this process to affirm its dispassionate search for the truth. Once
this unexplored presupposition is established, 'it matters little whether
philosophy begins with the object or subject , with being or with beings ,
as long as thought remains subject to this Image which already prejudges
everything: the distribution of the object and the subject as well as that
of being and beings' (DR: 131). In other words, Heidegger's presupposi-
tion regarding Dasein's pre-ontological understanding of being under-
pins his privileging of the question of being and ensures that each aspect
of his analysis must necessarily be returned and , hence , reduced to this
question. As such , H
Delellze and the Structural Conditio l1 s otPhilosoph)' 149
the empirical with the latter being judged in relation to whether it repre嗣
sents the former. The representational model not only entails a partic-
ular metaphysics based on an unchanging transcendent principle or
truth , but also implicitly affirms a specific mode of cognition , wherein
cognition aims to recognise and represent the unchanging transcendent
principle. This is problematic because by affirming an unchanging,
foundational principle, the new is sacr甘iced for the eternal. As Daniel
Smith puts it , the problem Deleuze identifies with the representational
model is that 'if identity (A is A) were the primary principle... already
pre-given , ... there would in principle be no production of the new (no
new differences)' (2007: 1). There would , in othe1' words , be no becoming
(Symons , 2006: 7).
Li nked to this , the representational model takes thinking to entail
a naturally good faculty of faculties that unites all aspects of cogni-
tion into a cohe1'ent unity that 1'ecognises and accurately 1'epresents
the objective truth of its objec t. Thought is true if it corresponds to the
foundational principle that thought takes its object's essential t 1'uth to
entail. It matte 1's not whether we
discove 1' a sup1'陇a.阳恻.蝇祀.

an undergrou 山n口矶: we have not advanced a single 挝
ld 0 1' Ur卜'-回doxρ s tep ， but
remain imprisoned by the same cave of ideas of the times which we
only flatter ourselves with having 'rediscovered' , by blessing them
with the sign of philosophy. (DR: 134)
By focusing on reproducing that which al 1'eady exists , thought has

only, and will only, ever sanction conformity. This conformity is a
major issue for‘ thinking because, for Deleuze , the t 1'anscendent prin-
ciples established by the 1' epresentational model are not ahistoric ,
but emanate f1'om specific empi 1'ical realities. A specific fo 1'm of the
empi 1'ical is taken fo 1', and hence tu 1'ned into , a t 1' anscendent universal
principle to be represented with the consequence that the representa-
tional model ends up recognising and reaffirming not transcendent
principles , but the values and norms of a particular empirical 1'eality.
The glorification of the same this entails ensures that 'difference is
c1' ucified ... and becornes an object of representation always in relation 归 G
precon正 eived identit扣。 judged analog抖。 η imagined opposition or a perceived
similitude' (DR: 138 , italics in original). Representation 1'emains forever
t 1'apped in a thinking that recognises and affirms the same and , as
is unable to truly think difference in itself and , by extension ,
being and the new.
While this describes the general fundamental parameters of the repre-

sentation model (DR: 137) and Deleuze's critique of it , Deleuze extends
his analysis by: (1) tracing the implications of these parameters in terms
of truth and error (DR: 148); (2) engaging with the reduction of logic
to whether it corresponds to and hence affirms the underlying tran-
scendent principle (DR: 154一 155); (3) criticising the representation
model's use of and perspective on problems to show it takes problems
to emanate from its foundational principle which reduces problems to
representations of its foundational principle and ignores the creativity
inherent to the posing of problems (DR: 158); and (4) criticising the
teleology inherent to the representation model whereby knowledge is
thought to end when the empirical truly represents the transcendent
principle underpinning the analysis. The representational model not
only fails to think the transcendental difference that 'grounds' identity,
but is also unable to properly think the difference of er丑 pirical reality
because it always subordinates empirical differences to the unity of its
transcendent principle. What is required is a t 1'ansfo 1'mation in thinking
so it abandons the representational model and thinks difference as and
from diffe 1'ence. In Dialogues , Deleuze returns to outline some of the
featu 1'es this alternative mode of thinking entails. As such , we find that
what is required is a thinking that: (1) does not originate in a good
nature and a good will , but comes from a violence suffered by thought;
(2) does not operate in a concord of faculties , but takes each faculty to
the limit of discordance with other faculties; (3) is not closed or obsessed
with recognition , but is open to encounters of the external; (4) does not
struggle against error, but stupidity; (5) is not defined in any moment
by lea1'ning; (6) does not aim at the memorisation of knowledge; and
(7) does not leave it to anyone else to pose 0 1' set questions on its behalf
(DII: 18). With this , Deleuze calls for a new form of thinking that aban-
dons the representational model (DR: 138) to think a 'superio1' empiri-
cism' (DR: 143) that truly thinks the empi1'ical as difference. Importantly,
however, the difference to be thought in and from this superior empiri-
cism emanates not from actual empirical entities , but from where these
empirical realities emanate: di
understood as pure difference... which is at once both imperceptible

for empirical sensibility which grasps intensity only already covered
0 1' mediated by the quality to which it gives rise , and at the same
Deleuze and tlze Structural ConditiollS o(Pl1 ilosoplzy 151
time that which can be perceived only from the point of view of a
transcendental sensibility which apprehends it immediately in the
encounter. (DR: 144)
As noted in the previous chapter, for Deleuze , empirical actuality entails

the differenciation of differentiated , but undifferenciated, virtual Ideas
which are differentiated in terms of differ‘ ent intensities of difference.
It will be remembered that Deleuze's point is that being is difference ,
which , when truly thought 'in-itself' , not only entails a transcendental
difference in intensity, but also ensures that each actuality is an inten-
sive spatio乓 emporal manifestation of this transcendental difference
in intensity. To think the sensible , thinking must not fixate on empir幽
ical actualities , but must 'burrow' to the transcendental difference (in
intensity) that 'grounds' the sensible. Only transcendental empiricism
escapes the identity of the representational model and is truly capable
of thinking the new of (being as) difference.
This leads to an important difference between Heidegger and Deleuze.
As noted in previous chapters , Heidegger claims that the relationship
between metaphysics and philosophy is such that thought has tended
to think that being is synonymous with a presence it aims to represent as
faithfully as possible. So pervasive is this way of thinking that Heidegger
concludes that philosophy is beyond saving with the consequence that
thought must be transformed away from meta吨phy归sica挝1 philosophy 缸 a nd
its unde白1
tiv
刊 e thinking; a 由t hink
挝ing 白
t ha
挝t takes its cue from 吐
t he open
时
1址ing， swaying of
being. Deleuze also criticises the representational model of thinking, but
his differential ontology leads him to differ‘ ent conclusions regarding
philosophy's purpose , content , and future. While Heidegger c1 aims that
philosophy has no future and must be overcome by meditative thinking,
Deleuze maintains that philosophy must be transformed, with this
transformation resulting from a closer engagement with a differential
ontology.
The difference between them emanates from their ontologies and ,
in particular, their notions of becoming. 飞Nhereas Heidegger privileges
temporal becoming when describing being's becoming, thereby claiming
that thought must be transformed away fr‘ om philosophy's focus on
presence to reflect being's temporal swaying, Deleuze recognises that
being's becoming entails a transcendental difference that is manifested ,
through the different/c
152 Ontolog)' in Heídegger and Deleuze
Thought always encounters the new so that , to renew itself, ph i1 osophy

does not have to be abandoned , simply transformed to affirm the new
(= difference). Renewing thinking does not , therefOI飞 require a transfor-
mation away 斤。m philosophy, but a transformation in phi1osophy so it
thinks from being as difference. For Deleuze , a proper understanding of
difference as transcendental difference of intensity will not only provide
philosophy with a future , thereby saving it from Heidegger's culling, but
will also delineate an original purpose and content for philosophy based
on a thinking of the new synonymous with difference. Taking off from
his ontology of difference and critique of the representational model of
thinking, Deleuze provides a detailed analysis of what ph i1osophy, as a
phi1 osophy of difference, entails, including its difference from and rela峭
tionship to other disciplines , such as science and art. We sta 1't with his
analysis of philosophy's content and purpose.
Pl挝lÍ臼losopl趾1巧y as COI口lcep立仁-crea
挝t拉ÍOI践豆
Deleuze's account of philosophy, as a philosophy of difference, develops

immanently with the consequence that de1ineating what exactly he
means by Iphilosophy' is a slow process that only becomes apparent
by piecing together its various component parts. Patience is required
as Deleuze builds up his analysis of philosophy through analyses of
concepts, their horizon in a plane of immanence, a discussion of the
constitution of planes of immanence , the relationship between concepts
and problems , geo-philosophy, and philosophy's relationship to non-
philosophical disciplines such as science and art. The result is a holistic,
albeit open嗣 ended ， account of philosophy as concept (and world-view)
creation as innovative as it is challenging to previous understandings
of philosophy. 叭1hile the image of thought privileges philosophy over
other disciplines because it takes philosophy to be intimately connected
to timeless truths , Deleuze recognises that overcoming the image of
thought requires that its ontology of identity be replaced by a differen输
tial ontology and a new purpose and place be Ifound' for philosophy.
Having criticised the notion that philosophy entails a representation
of identical transcendent principles , Deleuze also questions , and ulti-
mately rejects , the idea that philosophy is synonymous with 0 1' depends
upon contemplation , reflection , or communication. In the first instance ,
it is not possible to think, reflect , or communicate without concepts ,
while , second , thinking, reflection , and/or communication are not the
special preserve of philosophy. As Deleuze reminds us , 'mathematicians,
as mathematicians , have never waited for philosophers before re t1 ecting
Deleuze and the Structural Conditio l1 s of Philosophy 153
on mathematics , nor artists before reflecting on painting or music J

(叭1P: 6). Because philosophy cannot lay special c1 aim to the activities
of contemplation J reflection , and/or communication J these cannot
be the sole preserve of philosophy nor can they be synonymous with
philosophy. Furthermore J reflection , contemplation , and communica-
tion depend on and occur through concepts which brings Deleuze to
c1 aim that 'the concept belongs to philosophy and only to philosophyJ
(叭1P: 34). This leads to the tentative suggestion that 'philosophy is the
art of forming J inventingJ and fabricating concepts' (飞气1P: 2) J which is
refined shortly thereafter to 'philosophy is the discipline that involves
creating concepts J(叭1P: 5). In turn , this leads to a subtle , but fundamental ,
alteration in the status and purpose of the philosopher away from his
traditional Greek唰inspired role as the friend of wisdom J towards his new
role as the friend of concepts (叭rp: 5). This is necessary because the Greek
version of the philosopher: (1) assumes a truth to be discerned by the
philosopher; (2) states it is only the philosopher that has a unique , privi-
leged relationship to wisdom 0 1' the truth; and (3) maintains a specific
conception of friendship involving a relationship between an observer
(the philosopher) and the truth observed. As a consequence J the Greek
conception of the philosopher emanates from the representation model
insofar as he is to represent the singularJ eternal J and ready-formed truth
(WP: 3-5). As noted , DeleuzeJs differential ontology forcibly rejects this
view of being with the consequence that the view of the philosopher
emanating from it must also be overturned. Concepts do not lie in the
heavens ready-made to be plucked out of the air; concepts have to be
created with the job of the philosopher being to create them. There iS J
in other words a constitutive bond between the concepts that define a
J
particular philosophy and the philosopher that created the particular

concepts. For this reason , philosophy is always linked to the embodi-
ment of the phi1 osopher that produced that particular philosophy and
so is never an abstract system of thought; it is an endeavour produced
from concrete reality that always refers to concrete reality by virtue of
the concepts and conceptual schema it creates to explain J create J and
deal with the problems thrown up by con
154 Ontology În Heidegger mld Deleuze
he immediately perceives the need for a particular concept to answer the

issue at hand. This leads Deleuze to claim that it is only because of this
intuitive act that it is then possible to reflect or conter丑plateon thatwhich
results. In short, Deleuze is arguing that intuition grounds reflection
meaning reflection is not the primordial means through which thought
thinks and , given that intuition is inherently creative, re-enforces his
insistence that thinking is inherently creative (B: 13). It is important to
note , however, that, while thought results from an encounter with the
sensible (DR: 139) , the intuitive creation of concepts does not emanate
from anything internal to thought. Thought emanates from the sensible
and, in the case of philosophy, entails a spontaneous concept-creation
by which concepts are given new meaning or are created through exag-
geration , the formation of neologisms , or particularly innovative etymφ
logical formations (叭lP: 7).
Indeed, emphasising that concept佩 creation is an autopoietic act
demonstrates Deleuze's Nietzschean bent. As Deleuze understands
him , Nietzsche claims life is a play of forces that are manifestations
of the will to powe r. Some forces are positive , insofar as they vita 1ise
life; others are reactive, insofar as they stunt life's vitality. It is only
by strugg1ing against and overcoming competing forces that a partic唰
ular manifestation of life perpetuates itself (WP: 37--.3 9; ECC: 100).
Applying this analysis to the act of philosophical creation allows
Deleuze to claim that the act of philosophical creation is an affirma-
tive act that expresses the vita1ity of each thinker. 飞八Thile the content
of the act of philosophical creation may result from an interaction
with a previous thinker's thought , the impetus or intuitive spark that
leads to the creation of another concept emanates from an affirmative
act that expresses that thinker's life vitality. Importantly, however, it
should not be thought that the vitality of each thinker is contro l1 ed
by that thinker. Deleuze's rejection of anthropocentrism means that
he rejects the idea that humans are in control of their being. Being's
different/ciation has created thinker s who are capable of thinking in
‘
particular ways.
The argument implicitly emanating from Deleuze's conclusion is that
the truly great philosophers 'possess' the greatest life force and are
Deleuze and the Structural COllditi0115 o(Philosophy 155
beyond previous understandings to create new concepts that offer( ed)

new perspectives on being. The prirnordial rnanner in which philoso捕
phers open thought to alternatives is by reorientating the ways in which
being is conceptualised. In line with his notion of rnultiplicity, however,
Deleuze suggests that the becorning of concepts is rnultiple and , as we
will see, culrninates in a flexible , open 刷.ended concept cornposed of
rnultiple components. The important point to remember at this stage
is that the concept generates itself through an irnrnanent process of
affirrnative, self-positing. For Deleuze , 'creation and self-positing mutu佩
ally irnply each other because what is truly created , from the living
being to the work of art, thereby enjoys a self-positing of itself, or an
autopoetic characteristic by which it is created' (认TP: 11).
Deleuze's insistence that concepts are self-positing feeds off his
ontology insofar as being is a becoming that becomes through an
autopoietic act of differentjciation. Philosophical creation is not an
anthropocentric act , but one that emanates from the virtual Idea it
emanates from. Unlike Hegel , Deleuze rejects the idea that there is a tele-
ology to the act of philosophical creation. In line with his ontology of
rhizomic becoming, Deleuze insists the act of philosophical action does
not entail a linear, logical development , but an affirmative , random ,
chaotic act of creative differentiation. As Deleuze puts it , 'thinkers are
always , so to speak, shooting arrows into the air, and other thinkers
pick them up and shoot them in ano出 er direction' (PP: 118). While
there is no teleology to the act of ph i1osophical creation , this does not
mean that philosophical creation is undertaken for the sake of frivolity.
Deleuze goes to great pains, through his: (1) analysis of the relationship
between the concepts created and the philosopher who creates them;
(2) insistence that philosophical creation is always orientated towards
concrete problerns; and (3) linking of problems to being's self-differentj
ciation , to show that philosophical creation is not an inherently ernpty,
abstract, and useless activity, but is entirely practical.
叭1hile thought , ever since Plato , has tended to think of concepts
as fixed wholes with a unitary meaning, Deleuze goes out of his way
to criticise this and offer an alternative understanding of concepts.
叭
concepts with 'endo-consistency' (队TP: 19) and ensures they never have
the singular meaning Platonic thought maintains they do. The meaning
of the concept depends on the content of its COI丑ponents ， which are
themselves r丑ultiplicities ， and the relationship between the various
components, which are mobile (WP: 19-20).
One of the issues inherent to Deleuze's analysis , however, is that, while
he explains that there is endo-consistency to the various component
parts of concepts that brings them to coalesce together in a particular
manner to create a particular meaning, he is unable to outline what
exactly mediates the relationship between the various components.
Put differently, by holding that components are multiplicities which
are different to others , Deleuze explicitly rejects the notion of an over-
arching unity or commonality that links the various concepts , but strug嗣
gles to describe what mediates the relationship between components
and allows them to fit together into an open-ended whole. Instead ,
he simply states that while 'components remain distinct... something
passes from one to the other, something that is undecidable between
them' (WP: 19-20). In effect, Deleuze is trying to think the specificity
of particulars, as an absolute specificity, all the while maintaining that
these specific particulars nevertheless interlink with others. 认lhile he
seems to be struggling to think a transcendental ontology of radical
difference , which would seem to entail rupture(s) between different
actualities, it appears his ontological analysis continually depends on
moments of unity to show how one multiplicity passes to another. This
is a continuous theme of Dil和rence and Repetition most clearly seen from
Deleuze's claim that while 'one can pass by degrees from one thing to
another [this] does not prevent their being different in kind' (DR: 2) ,
a position that seems to point to some sort of reconciliation between
continuity and radical difference. It is also seen from his mysterious
notion of the 'dark precursor' (DR: 119) as that 'invisible, impercep-
tible' (DR: 119) 'thing' that , while remaining 'perfectly indeterminate'
(DR: 119) , not only precedes two series or 'things' , but also mediates
the relationship between them , 'determin[ing] their path in advanc e'
(DR: 119). While Deleuze describes the dark precursor as 'the s
Deleuze Glld the 5tructllml Conditiolls ofPhilosophy 157
that Deleuze's differential ontology depends on and is actually grounded

in a form of identity?
Deleuze recognises this and first asks whether 'identity and resem-
blance [are] the preconditions of the functioning of this dark precursor,
or are they, on the contrary, its effects?' (DR: 119) , before responding
that 'i f' the latter, might it necessarily project upon itself the illusion of
a fictive identity' (DR: 119 , italics added) , which leads to the suggestion
that the indeterminate identity be thought in the sense of an 'x' that is
imputed retrospectively to the relationship through reflection , meaning
that 'we cannot, therefore , suppose that the identity... in question [is] a
condition of the being and thought of difference' (DR: 120). But every蛐
thing here depends on following Deleuze址 'if. 矿 we follow Deleuze
down the path he travels where we accept that identity is retrospec-
tively imposed on the difference the dark precursor supposedly truly is
then it would, indeed , appear to follow that the dark precursor should
be thought in terms of a prior difference that subsequently appears as
identity to reflection. But if we do not follow this i万 which Deleuze gives
us no reason to do other than an apparent 'let's see what happens' , we
get a different conclusion. By departing from Deleuze's insistence that
the dark precursor be thought as a prior difference that can subsequently
appear as identity, we arrive at a different conclusion where the dark
precursor is , indeed, an indeterminate identity that precedes , allows
communication between , and so joins the different intensive series of
the system. It all depends on how charitable we are being to Deleuze. Are
we willing to grant Deleuze's if to follow him to affirm difference over
identity; a conclusion that means we have to follow him in appealing
to 'something' that we cannot name , point to , discuss, or identify, but
which must exist to relate the various series or things and so generate
the coherency of system?
Deleuze's demand that we follow him in thinking difference as that
which 'grounds' all aspects of an open-ended system means he must
explain how difference simultaneously differentiates aspects of the
system and pulls theIll together to form an open自 ended system. The
way he does this is to continuously appeal to invisible , indetermi-
nate 'things' that link various aspects of his differential ontolo g)
158 011 归logy in Heidegger and Deleuze
influence the becoming of the others. While Deleuze reads Heidegger

as maintaining that being entails that which is 'common} to all enti-
ties} with the consequence that Heidegger can appeal to this commo-
nality to mediate the relationship between entities} Deleuze}s atter丑pt
to distance himself from (his reading o f) Heidegger leads him to reject
any explicit reference to any form of unity 0 1' commonality meaning he
falls into diffic飞llty when it comes to discussing the liminality of various
multip 1i cities.τ'0 overcome this} he simply glorifies in the turbulence
encountered at the borders between actualities} claiming that it is here
that things happen (C2: 280)} 0 1' refers to an undecidable factor that
allows the t 1' ansition between the two (WP: 19-20). While this no doubt
pushes us to think about the nature of relation} an issue that is too often
simply taken for granted} 1 will} În Chapter 9} also suggest that Deleuzes
attempt to think relations through difference should lie at the heart of
any evaluation of Deleuzes differential ontology.
Emphasising that each concept gains its meaning from the constel-
lation of its multiple components} which are themselves mu1tiple and
fluidly related} does} however} allow Deleuze to chal1 enge and ultimately
overturn the notion of the concept as a fixed} transcendent} singular
entity. This view of the concept emanates from Platonic thought where
each physical representation points towards an overarching unitary
essential Idea that thought focuses on re presenting. In contrast to the
‘
Platonic insistence on the unitary} singular} essential} fixed} and tran-

scendent meaning of concepts} Deleuze posits a multiple} mobile} iI丑ma刷
nent concept that becomes through the coalescing of component pa1'ts
that} 1' ather than producing a fixed closed entity} remains open and
subject to alteration. This move is necessary for Deleuze to avoid what
he considers to be the g1'eat failing of Platonic thought: the g1'ouping of
the various conceptions} 0 1' representations} of the concept under a fixed
unita1'Y true meaning. For Platonic thinking} there is} in othe1' words} a
privileging of the singular concept over the multiple conceptualisations
(or representations in Platonic language) of the concept. For Deleuze}
however} each conceptualisation is not unified by a universal true essence}
but entails a unique con自gur
Deleuze and the Structural ConditiollS o(Philosophy 159
to a specific socio跚historical problem , each use or conception is unique

and creates an original concept. For example , the concept 'the other'
may be found in different philosophical systems but be conceptual-
ised in fundamentally different ways. 丁his does not mean the various
conceptualisations are united by the sarne transcendent , universal
Idea; 'the other' gains its rneaning through the allocation and cornbi-
nation of different components including responses given to questions
of space , tirne, and notions of the self. 'For exarnple , is another perso l1
[autrui] necessarily second in relation to the self? If so , it is to the extent
that its concept is that of an other - a subject that presents itself as an
object 一 which is special in relation to the self: they are two components'
(认lP: 16). 认lhat the concept 吐le other' actually entails depends on the
answers given to a range of related questions including, but not neces-
sarily limited to: Is the self or other primary in the 1' elation or do they
come to be others fo 1' each other simu1taneously? Does the other gain
rneaning through this relationship or does it have an a priori meaning?
And, at what point does the other become other?
To further demonstrate this, Deleuze maps out an alternative under-
standing of the concept 'the other' through a brief phenomenological
analysis positing a harmonious , peaceful world which is violently
disrupted by the primordial experience of the other as manifested
ín his/her face. Because, at the moment of primordial dísclosure , the
other is not known , it is an encounter pregnant with possibility. This
possibility is, however, 'filled' when the other speaks. Suddenly, the
possibility inherent to the other becomes sornething real and actual;
the other takes on a determinate identity (in the example given , the
other becomes Chinese). This particular constellation of cornponents
ensures that the concept 'the other' is composed of 'three inseparable
cornponents: possible world, existing face , and reallanguage or speech'
(WP: 17). A different conception of 'the other' ar包es ， therefore , depending
on how the concept's component questions are framed and answered.
队lhile each conceptualisation has a meaning, with this meaning
emanating from the constellation of its components , this does not mean
it entails or creates a whole defined by fixed boundaries. A co
160 0 1l tology in Heidegger and Deleuze
nature of being. Each thing is not one thing composed of many parts ,
but is an undifferentiated , fluid , open-ended multiplicity that constantly
moves in different, unexpected directions at fluctuating intensities
(AO: 45). Rather than being fixed , homogenous , and objectively delin-
eated, multiplicity denotes a heterogeneous becoming that does not
depend on the constraints of fixed , definitive boundaries to bring
together its va 1'ious components. 飞八Thile cohe1'ent , its extensive and
intensive movement is not const1' ained 0 1' captu1'ed within fixed bound-
a1'ies, nor does its movement gravitate towa1'ds unity. When one aspect
of a multiplicity alte 1's, the multiplicity breaks down and mo 1'phs into
anothe 1' multiplicity. Rathe 1' than fo 1'm unities, multiplicities beget mo 1'e
multiplicities (ATP: 275).
The multiplicity of each concept ensu1' es the same concept can mean
fundamentally diffe 1' ent things in different philosophical p1'ojects.
Diffe1'ent answers to its component questions will result in a diffe 1' ent
conceptualisation of the concept. Each concept is se旺-referential with
its meaning coming f1' om the combination of its inte1'nal components
1' ather than from its relationship to other concepts (认TP: 22). As such ,
each concept must be inquired into on its own terms to determine

the responses given to the questions that support that concept and
the constellation of the concept's various parts. If the answers given
are unsatisfactory or no longer deal with the problem they attend to
sufficiently well , new answers must be given. This changes the constel恻
lation of the component parts of the concept and results in a new
concept. As such , the history of each concept is non-linear in that
it 'zigzags' (叭lP: 18) depending on the philosopher that employs it ,
the problem it is orientated towards , the socio-historical situation it
is employed in , and its relation to other aspects of the philosophe 1" s
though t. This is inevitably so because , as previously noted , concepts
are not self唰 enclosed c1'eations but 1' esult f1' om the c1' eation of ne叫"
ogisms , innovative etymologies , 0 1' entail a thinke 1' taking anothe 1" s
thought and employing it in alte 1'native ways by putting it to use in
ways it was not originally deployed and/o 1' altering the constellation of
its components to give that concept a new meaning.
To show this , Deleuze provides the example of the way D
Deleuze and the Structural CO l1 ditio l1 s ofPhilosophy 161
charges that Desca1'tes does not tell us anything dete 1'minate about the 1.
For this reason , he demands that we go beyond Descartes by taking into
account and explaining the process through which the indete1'minate 1
of Desca1'tes is tu 1'ned into something dete1'minate. 飞气Tith this , Kant adds
a component to Desca1'tes' conception of the cogito: time. This intro-
duction means that Kant must also provide 'a new conception of time'
(认TP: 32) which also 1'equi 1'es a new conception of space. Whe 1'eas the
components of Descartes' cogito are being, thought, and doubt, the
Kantian cogito is composed of being, thought , time , and space , ensuring
that Kant's conception of the 1 takes on a fundamentally different
meaning and composition than Desca1'tes' and allows Kant to think the
self in ways Descartes could not.
Deleuze takes this example to be emblematic of the way concepts a1'e
created. Philosophical creation entails a process of app 1'opriation that
is simultaneously a process of alteration. Each concept created invari-
ably 'carries out a new cutting-out , takes on new contours, and must be
reactivated 0 1' recut' (叭TP: 18). 认1hile two thinkers may discuss the same
concept (i. e. the 1) , the diffe1'ent ways each conceptualises 0 1' config-
ures the component questions (and indeed identifies what the compo-
nent parts are) allows each to offer a new concept. That concepts are
composed of multiple cOlllponents does not , however, mean the various
parts fit together perfectly 0 1' seamlessly. 'As f1'agmenta1'Y totalities ,
concepts are not ... pieces of a puzzle , fo 1' thei 1' ir1'egular contours do not
correspond to each other' (WP: 23). The concept's component parts a1'e
not jigsaw pieces that: (1) fit together seamlessly 0 1' in a singula1' manner;
or (2) disclose a singula1' predetermined picture of being. Conceiving of
the component parts as jigsaw pieces risks painting concepts as closed
totalities that need to be conceived in a particular manner through a
particular combination of its components for the truth , 0 1' picture of the
jigsaw, to be realised.
While fitting togethe1', the connections between the component parts
of a concept are jaggy, overlapping , heterogeneous , and fr吨mented which
ensures that each concept entails and emanates from a unique constella-
tion of component parts. In line with his ontology of 1'adical 1'upture and
discon tin ui ty,
concrete life; philosophy is transformative of life in that it entails a spiritual

exercise that 'operat[es] on who one is and what one does, not merely on
how one thinks about things' (May, 2000: 224). Philosophy does not simply
invent abstract modes of thinking, it 'invents modes of existence or possi-
bilities of life' (Goodchild, 2000: 52). Philosophical concepts conceptualise
being's different/ciation in new and original ways and so instantiate new
ways of acting on our 'new' world. Indeed, phi1osophical concepts 'cannot
be distinguished from a way of perceiving things: a concept forces us to see
things differently' (WVT: 330). By bringing us to see the world differently,
concepts bring us to act differently and instantiate modes of life and activity
(N: 66; ZI: 268). For this reason , 'thinking's never just a theoretical matter.
It [has] to do with vital problems. To do with life itself' (PF: 105).
ln one sense , the individual is always passively transformed through
his engagement with philosophy because philosophy opens him to new
perspectives , ideas , and ways of thinking that challenge his everyday
assumptions (EYL: 176). Deleuze suggests reading philosophy creates
emotional and perceptual alterations 'in' each individual that impacts
on his view of the world (LU: 238). This may not have any lasting
impact, but the point is that , even if it is just ephemeral, philosophy
is intimately connected to and transformative of how we perceive the
world and act towards it. In another sense , however, Deleuze implicitly
maintains that the primordial purpose of philosophy is to effect a trans唰
formation in the individual's thinking and way of being. Rather than
being passively altered as a result of his engagement with philosophy,
the individual should acth吟/ engage in philosophy so as to transform
his life. This transformation is not simply for its own sake however, but
emanates from a desire to vitalise life; that is , to give it energy, spark,
and a spirit of affirmation (ONIT: 142). Rather than be overcome by life's
problems , Deleuze suggests that philosophy offers conceptual solutions
to 1ife's problems and should do so with and through an attitude of
lightness, affirmation, joy, and laughter (NP: 194).
But the contents of this transformation cannot be proscribed in
advance. To do so would enslave philosophical thinking to certain pre-
established pa
Deleuze mzd the Structural ConditiollS o(Philosoplzy 163
not constrained by a priori structures 0 1' meanings that it will be able to

think the unthinkable. In turn , this will allow thought to go beyond
the boundaries of its everyday experience and previous understandings
thereby transforming thought's perspective on and approach to its daily
problems. We wi1l return to the issue of problems and their relationship
to concepts , but, for now, it is important to note that concepts combine
with other concepts to produce a coherent world-view shaped by a non-
conceptual horizon called the plane of immanence.
The plane of immanence
Rather than simply being a collection of random concepts , each think-

er's thought forms a unified and coherent system of though t. It is
for this reason that we speak of Kant's thought , Hegel's thought , and
Wittgenstein's thought. More specifically, each concept is embedded
within and gains meaning from a pre-conceptual background , called the
'plane of immanence' (队TP: 35) , which is the non-conceptual horizon
'underlying' concepts (叭TP: 36). Understanding what exactly the plane
of immanence entails , however, is somewhat difficult for the simple
reason that its non-conceptua1ity poses problems for any philosophical
(= conceptual) discussion of it.
The first thing to note about the plane of immanence is that it is not
anything other than a becoming. The plane does not precede concepts ,
nor does it 1ie there fully formed waiting for concepts to populate it. ]ust
as concepts are created so too is the plane of immanence from , on , and
through which concepts exist. But the plane of immanence is not set up
once and for all. It is because the plane of immanence is nothing but a
becoming that it is a plane of immanence and not a planεof transcend-
ence. Nothing external to conceptuality directs the plane of immanence
nor does it exist in a transcendent realm. Indeed , Deleuze claims the
plane is nothing but its concepts in that it has no content other than the
composition and constellation of its concepts (WP: 36).
But while the plane 妇 i sin让tim丑1ately connected to its concepts轧，让 it 怡
i s not
S吁ynonym 口 ous with them; 让 i t forrr
卫mηlS the hoαl'垃
izon 白t ha
剖t ho
仗ld
白s the various
concepts of a philosophe臼r‘"s thinking together (叭1P: 36). As Deleuze
explains ，气he plane [of immanence] is clearly not a program , design ,
end, 0 1' means; it is a plane of immanence that constitutes the absolute
ground of philosophy, its earth 0 1' deterritorialization , the foundation
on which it creates its concepts' (叭1P: 日lportantly， therefore , the
plane of immanence's becoming on the and formation
of the concepts that populate it (节I/ P: The plane of immanence is
164 Ol1 tology in Heidegget and Deleuze
diagrammatical in that it delineates the parameters of thought, while

its concepts are its intensive features that give it depth , undulations,
content, and, ultimately, direction (认1P: 39). For this reason, philosoph瞩
ical creation is a constructivism that occurs on two levels: the creation
of concepts and the simultaneous setting up of a plane of immanence
(叭TP: 34一35).
Its grounding in and dependence on a horizonal plane of immanence
means that genuine philosophical thinking does not fall foul of the four
illusions Deleuze insists philosophical thinking has tended to fall into:
(1) the illusion of transcendence , which posits another realm or external
point that determines and shapes the becoming of being; (2) the illu匍
sion of universals , which posits a universal explanation or Archimedean
point that grounds the discussion; (3) the illusion of the eternal, which
posits that being remains the same eternally with the consequence that
it is possible to determine and attribute a fixed content to being; and
(4) the illusion of discursiveness that insists that thought occurs through
propositions (WP: 49-50). By insisting that being is nothing other than
a different!ciating, immanent, rhizomic becoming, Deleuze's ontology
rejects transcendence in general and the transcendence of being specifi-
cally. Being as difference entails constant different!cial change , which
undermines the illusions of universals and eternals , and , by asking us
to question what we mean by each of the words or concepts inherent
to propositions , reveals that propositions are dependent on concepts
which are nothing but ever属 changing multiplicities. For‘ this reason ,
phi1osophy is concerned with concepts not propositions.
While populated by concepts , the plane of immanence is non-con-
ceptual (WP: 34). This aspect of Deleuze's thinking is heavily indebted
to Jean-Paul Sartre's distinction between pre-reflective and reflective
consciousness and so a brief divergence into his thought may i11 umi-
nate the analysis. While Sartre maintains that consciousness is unified ,
its unity is differentiated into two complementary aspects: pre嗣reflec
tive self-awareness and reflective self-understanding. 叭Thile this may
appear to form a dualism, in actuality, reflective, thetic consciousness
is grounded in pre-reflective, non-thetic consciousness. Rather than
enta
Deleuze mzd tJz e Structural ConditioflS ofPhilosophy 165
consciousness ensuring that the pre-reflective field is pre-personal; and

second , he insists that pre刊 flectivity does not form a transcendent field
to consciousness , but entails the immanent becoming of being. Being as
difference entails the pre-personal , non-conceptual , differentiated , but
undifferenciated , horizon of thought that becomes by different/ciating
itself. Conceptual thought depends on and entails a modification of this
pre-personal , non-transcendent , non-concep仅lal horizon.
Three consequences arise from this. First , while Heidegger notes that
meditative thinking is intimately connected to the non-conceptuality of
being, he claims meditative thinking can reflect being's non-conceptu帽
ality through a poetic , thoughtful swaying. In contrast, Deleuze claims
there is always an aspect of being that escapes conceptual thought. This
excess can never be understood philosophically because , as the pre-con-
ceptual horizon of thought, it cannot , by definition , be conceptualised
in the way necessary to allow philosophical thought to understand it.
Philosophy's traditional search for the truth is , therefore , an impossible
one. If it aims to disclose the non-conceptuality of being, the lneans
(conceptuality) it employs to do so prevent it from achieving its aim.
As Deleuze puts it , philosophy entails 'an "impossible thought" , [that
thinks] through a very complex material of thought forces that are
unthinkable' (叭TP: 160). Philosophy's inability to think the non-concep-
tuality of being means its traditional purpose of finding and revealing
the truth can only ever be frustrated; philosophy simply doesn't have
the tools available to it to think the non-conceptuality of being and so
ascertain the truth of being. While some have come to the conclusion
that philosophy is , therefore, inherently useless , we will see that Deleuze
salvages philosophy by re-conceptualising its purpose away frOIn its
traditional search for the truth towards a discipline that offers innova-
tive conceptual solutions to problems.
Second, while distinguishing between conceptuality and non-con-
ceptuality 1丑 ay appear to set up a dua1i sm between conceptuality and
pre-, or non- , conceptuality, where conceptuality is opposed to and
dependent on pre-conceptuality, this is not so. 认Thile different , the
conceptual and pre-conceptual a
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166 Ol1 tology in Heidegger and Deleuze
thinking. By defining philosophy as the creation of concepts and

insisting that philosophy's conceptuality is dependent on and emanates
frorn a pre-conceptual horizon , Deleuze clairns that philosophy is inti-
rnately connected to and , ultirnately, dependent on the pre-philosophical
(WP: 40). This does not rnean the pre-philosophical, pre-conceptual
horizon exists ready-rnade prior to the rnornent that philosophy creates
its concepts. The conceptual and pre唰 conceptual develop irnrnanently,
wherein the conceptual is brought together by and entails a rnodifica-
tion of the pre-conceptual , while the pre-conceptual only becornes that
by virtue of the concepts that populate it. Not only is conceptual thought
dependentontheno丑-conceptual ， but 'the nonphilosophical is perhaps
closer to the heart of philosophy than philosophy itself, and this rneans
that philosophy cannot be content to be understood only phi1osophi-
cally or conceptually, but is addressed essentially to non-philosophers
as well' (WP: 41). After all , philosophers , generally speaking, want their
works to find a large non-philosophical audience and non-philosophers
listen to phi1 osophers because what philosophers speak about (being) is
what non-philosophers speak about , albeit in a non , or pre勺 conceptual
rnanner (RBS: 164). Their cornrnon intentionality breaks down , however,
because philosophers and non-philosophers approach being through
fundarnentally diffe 1'ent rneans: the philosopher engages with being
through concepts , while non唰ph i1osophers engage with 'it' through the
emotions in the case of artists 0 1' quantifiable functions in the case of
scientists. It is for this 1'eason that: (1) philosophy both attracts interest
frorn non幌 philosophers and sirnultaneously appears alien to thern;
and (2) inter-disciplinary research is so difficult. v气lhile they are orien-
tated towards the same 'thing' (b eing) , each discipline discusses 'it' in a
different manner and through different rneans.
认le will return to the discussion of the relationship between philo-
sophical and non唰philosophical thinking, specifically science and art,
in the next chapter, but, for now, it is irnportant to note that Deleuze's
discussion of the relationship between the conceptuality of philosophy
and the non , or pre勺 philosophical/conceptual raises a nurnber of ques-
tions , including: Does Deleuze's clai
Deleuze and tlze Structural Conditio l1 s ofPhilosophy 167
content with the knowledge that it is based on a pre翩 conceptual world-

view? Can we be content with Deleuze's insistence that there is always a
b1ind spot to conceptual though t'? If we are not content with this , how
can philosophy uncover its pre-conceptual underpinnings? And, if it
cannot uncover its pre-conceptual underpinnings , what does this mean
for philosophy's relationship to other discip 1ines?
While these questions remain open , one consequence of Deleuze's
analysis of the relationship between philosophical and non-philosoph-
ical thinking is that his claim that reading is always a creative, rather
than a representational , endeavour would appear to be supported. If
thought can never plumb to the depths of its supportive world-view, it
can never articulate all of its assUI丑ptions and presuppositions. 叭Then
reading a thinker's work, we should not try to represent that thinker's
work. 5uch an endeavour is made impossible by conceptual thought's
dependency on and intimate relation to the pre-conceptual , un斗hought
of thought; we should use the encounter with previous thinking to think
for ourselves. Deleuze goes so far as to insist that thought that does not
create anything new from the thought of previous thinkers , but instead
'brandish[es] ready-made old concepts like skeletons intended to intimι
date any creation ... is completely without interest' (叭1P: 83).
Importantly, 'the' pre-conceptual plane of immanence is never singular.
Recalling the notion of multiplicíty, there is not simply one plane of
immanence that links all concepts , each concept is intimately connected
to a unique plane of immanence that provides it with meaning and
unifies it with other concepts to create a coherent world-view. When
we move on to a discussion of Deleuze's notion of geo 响philosophy we
will see that one of the ways in which planes of immanence are distin-
guished from one another is by the historical period within which they
are constructed , while another is the geographical setting the plane of
immanence is created in. An Egyptian will not tend to think like a 5cot,
while the general framework within which an Egyptian and 5cot tend to
think through now will not be the same as it was two thousand years ago.
While the concepts of that particular historical plane of immanence may
still be understandable, this understanding does not feel 0 1' seer
168 0 1ltolog}! in Heidegger and Deleuze
Rorty. Each of these thinkers locates their concepts in an original pre-con嗣

ceptual horizon that delineates and brings coherence to their thought,
and allows it to be Heidegge町r绳怡n 氏飞， Deleuzian
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叭f币it忱tgens挝teinian ， and Rortean. Each thinker not only creates unique

concepts, but also simultaneous1y creates and situates these concepts
within a broader pre-conceptual, horizona1 p1ane that brings coherence
to their various concepts (叭rp: 6, 51).
Because there are planes of immanence , De1euze insists philosophy does
not proceed linearly or 10gical1y to a fixed point, but entails the creation
of concepts and/or the appropriation of concepts from other 抖 p la
矶 ne
臼s.
Through this '气construct甘i飞visr日m丑lγ， (叭TP: 35) , philosophical thinking breathes
life into already fo创r‘~m
pa盯rt怡s and , in so doing , creates new wor1d-views that allow new s01utions
to new and 01d prob1ems to be created. It is , of course, also possible
that new concepts do not create new planes of immanence, but remain
on the same plane of immanence as another thinker and simply intro-
duce new concepts into that p1ane of immanence. This can continue
for a long time as evidenced by Plato and the neo-P1atonists , Kant and
the neo 局 Kantians ， Marx and the neo-Marxists (WP: 57). Thinkers within
these 'isms' work within the same over址1 ， broad world唰view， but refor幡
mulate concepts and so keep alive the broad overall vision of the thinker
that instantiated that particular plane of immanence. However, while
Deleuze recognises this occurs , he is highly critical of the establish-
ment of 5cho01s of thought going so far as to maintain that 'a school [of
thought] is just awful' (ONP: 140). Deleuze's problem with the establish幡
ment of schools of thought is that they stultify creativity. 'The worst
thing about scho01s is not merely the steri1i zation of disciplines (they
have rich1y deserved it) , it is rather the crushing, the suffocation , of
all that happened before or at the same time' (DII: 20). By focusing on
representating a past thinker, scho01s of thought not on1y reiterate the
image of thought , but are unable to breathe life into thinking. Their
focus on scholarship , on getting the right meaning of a thinker, traps
thinking in the gooey tar of history with the consequence that thinking
is unable to truly
Deleuze and the Structural Conditions o(PJz ilosophy 169
the arrows they have thrown , whereas , in the latter, you make your
own arrow or shoot it off in another direction (DR: xv; PP: 118). On the
other hand, not only does Deleuze write voluminously on the history of
philosophy, but he also maintains that 'the history of philosophy is the
reproduction of philosophy itsel f' (DR: xxi). 叭lhi1 e it could be the case
that this means that the history of philosophy simply reproduces what
other genuine phi1osophers have said , 1 want to suggest that it means
that the history of philosophy is a form of philosophy. This reading
is supported by the next sentence which states that 'in the history of
philosophy, a commentary should act as a veritable double and bear the
maximal modification appropriate to a double. (One imagines a phil-
osophically bearded Hegel , a philosophícally clean-shaven Ma 1'x, in the
same way as a moustached Mona Li sa) , (DR: xxi). With this , Deleuze
implicitly distinguishes between two types of historical engagement:
one aiming to simply outline and reproduce what a thinker says and
one that engages with a thinker to use him to affirm alternatives. It is to
the latter that Deleuze turns insisting that, far from reproducing what an
author says , 'reading a text is never a scholarly exercise in sea 1'ch of what
is signified , sti1l 1ess a highly textual exercise in search of a signifier... It
is... a schizoid exercise that extracts from the text its revolutionary force'
(AO: 116).
Indeed , Deleuze sees his own engagement with the histo 1'Y of philos-
ophy as emanating from this affirmative , creative stance. Not only does
he write on thinkers , such as Hume, Spinoza, and Nietzsche, who chal-
lenge the rationalist t 1'adition that dominates the philosophical t 1'adi-
tion (LHC: 6) , but his engagement with these w1'iters , and the history
of philosophy in gene 1'al , famously entails 'a sort of buggering of it'
(LHC: 6) that aims to create monstrous children of thinkers that play
on , amplify, and reveal shifts in their thinking, slips in their content ,
and hidden emissions that are brought to the fore and affirmed. Deleuze
does not engage with these thinkers to faithfully reproduce what they
say; his engagements search for and highlight those aspects that inspire
something new. This is exactly how we should treat past thinkers.
Rathe 1' than w1'ite about a philosophe1' with the aim of 1'ep 1'esenting 0 1'
improving our unde 1'standing of w
constituted by 'an inherent and necessary progress' (2003: 93) towards the
truth and Heidegger insists the history of philosophy forms a continuum
underpinned by the same metaphysical logic that , with Nietzsche, has
exhausted all its possible permutations (NIII: 162), Deleuze rejects the idea
that the history of philosophy entails continuity or a linear development.
Thought does not proceed in a linear fashion , but is rhizomic occurring
through fits and starts , chaotic ramblings that may or 1丑 ay not go some-
where and which shoot off in multiple directions before shooting off in
yet more directions. Far from being united by a t1unk that provides unity
and direction to its becoming, thought bursts forth down avenues and
directions that do not proceed from what has gone before. There is no plan
or end point to this movement; it is a blind, immanent becoming. This
is one reason why Deleuze's writing shoots off in numerous directions,
discussing numerous seer丑 ingly unrelated topics. He tries out certain ideas
and follows their path to see if they lead anywhere. If they do , he follows
it until he can get no more out of the idea, before he changes direction
and focuses on another issue and topic. It is this method that allows him
to discuss so many topics and issues. While those who expect thought
to proceed in a linear manner may find this to be inconsistent or the
height of intellectual and philosophical vacuity, Greg Lambert argues that
Deleuze's 'failure' to discuss an issue to c1 0sure should not be thought of
as a failure or oversight in his analysis , but should be thought of as a pause
or bracketing of the issue (2002: xiv). While traditional ways of thinking
maintain that such tactics betray problems in an analysis , Lambert argues
that Deleuze views it as a way to maintain the discussion even if he does
not have answers to specific questions at that time. In order to continue to
do ph i1 osophy, Deleuze must skip over certain questions so as to prevent
himself 'from falling silent' (2002: xiv) on issues that are currently unre-
solved. Our habit of demanding fixed , completed con c1 usions certainly
means that this approach appears strange and perhaps even unsatisfac-
tory on first encounter, but its openness ensures a fluidity and freedom
absent from c1 0sed systems of thought.
Wh i1 e Lambert's analysis is insightful , insofar as he explains why
Deleuze's thinking does no
Deleuze and the Structural Conditions ofPhílosophy 171
that being evades static, fixed definitions. There is no universa1ity to

being nor is there a fixed , universal , unchanging Platonic Idea under-
pinning each entity defining what the truth or essence of that entity
is (TP: 163). Each philosophy produces a new plane of immanence , or
world-view, that, rather than try to explain the truth of the issue , offers
new perspectives and solutions to problems encountered from being's
different/ciation. Each philosophy orientates itself towards different
problems and creates new concepts with the result that what each
discusses, orientates itself towards , and creates is unique and different.
The different/ciation of being means that what philosophy discusses in
one epoch and the means it uses to do so will be different to the means it
employs to discuss the different configuration of being of another epoch
(Martin , 1997: 621). As a consequence ,
there's no point at all doing philosophy the way Plato did , not because
we've superseded Plato but because you can't supersede Plato , and it
makes no sense to have another go at what he's done for all time.
There's only one choice: doing the history of philosophy, or trans-
planting bits of Plato into problems that are no longer Platonic ones.
(OP: 148)
Any attempt to view the history of philosophy as forming a linear

succession of systems that are progressing towards the truth (Hegel) ,
or are underpinned by the same logical structures (Heidegger) , simply
fails to understand the chaotic , random, rhizomic becoming of being.
Rather than a succession or continuum of systems , the history of
philosophy entails a 'theatre of philosophy' (GDTP: constituted
by different character飞 concepts ， and world-views , each of which is
orientated towards and is c1' eated as a response to specific geo-historical
p1'oblems.
Importantly, being as difference means that (1) while thinking
emanates f1'OIn the sensible, it is diffe 1'ent to the sensible , and (2) it
is Ílnpossible fo 1' thinking to capture the totality of being because (a)
there is no totality to capture and (b) thinking is unable to traverse the
'gap' between itself and being. 丁hinking only ever relates to the sensible
through lenses that impose sense on the 'chaosmos' (WP: 207-208) of
being and is only ever able to do so in a partial way. This 1'e-enforces
my argument that , while Heidegger criticises the world-view thinking
of metaphysics , Deleuze insists that thought sets up a plane of
immanence and creates concepts to
which , to my mind, sounds suspiciously like notion of
world唰view. Wh i1e Heidegger claims that thinking must be transformed

away from the enframing lens of world-views , Deleuze claims that al1
philosophical thinking can ever entail is the establishment of world-
views in the form of a plane of immanence and the concepts that
inhabit it. Heidegger's attempt to get rid of the lenses of thought is , for
Deleuze, an impossibility that , far from freeing thought to disclose being
(= difference) , would actually annihilate thought. Deleuze , in contrast,
is unconcerned by the proliferation of world-views claiming that they
are a consequence of being's different/cial becoming and necessary to
think this becoming.
Conceptual personae
There is , however, a third aspect to Deleuze's account of phi1 osophy that

refers to the manner of its presentation. For Deleuze, phi1 osophy is inti-
mately connected to and , indeed , occurs through conceptual personae
which are , and indeed need to be, invented to bring to 1ife the concepts
and world-view created. There are two types of conceptual personae. The
first describes the creation of characters to speak 0 1' discuss the concept
and entails a lite1'a1'Y technique whe 1'eby the concept is p 1'esented by
an abstract character. The character is taken to be distinct from the
author with the consequence that the composition of the text is compli-
cated. Classic examples of this type of conceptual personae include
Plato's Socrates , Descartes' madman , Kierkegaard's Knight of Faith , and
Nietzsche's Zarathustra (WP: 64). Importantly, this type of conceptual
personae is never singular, but has many features which change as a
philosopher's thinking changes. Indeed , they may even be shadowed
by 'anti' personae, such as the ape 0 1' clown that follows Nietzsche's
Zarathustra 0 1' the sophist that is always connected to Socrates (叭1P: 76) ,
who engage in dialogue and 1丑ultiply the voices at play in the text. This
diversity means that , while two philosophe1's may appear to use the
same conceptual personae, each is unique to that pa1'ticula1' philosophe1'.
Descartes' idiot, for example, is not the same as Dostoyevsky's idiot.
Of course, it may be objected that not all philosophers make use of
characters when doing philosophy. As a consequence , the second type of
conceptual pe1'sonae relates to the concrete , individual philosophe1' that
created the concept and plane of immanence upon which the concept
exists. 飞/飞Thile being is a continuous process of affirmative different/
ciation , the points at which the different aspects of being fold into one
another create obstacles to the free- t1 owing different/ciation of being.
As these obstacles arise , thought can , but does not have to , engage with
Deleuze í7 nd the Structural Conditio l1S of Philosoplzy 173
them and , in the case of philosophical thought , conceptualise them into

problems so as to provide conceptual solutions to these problems. A
philosopher's thought is always intimately connected to the configura-
tion of being within and through which his thinking exists and is the
primary reason why simply conforming to 0 1' copying anothe 1" s thought
is inhe1'ently useless; the configuration of being it emanates from will be
different to that p 1'esent now meaning that its conceptual solutions a1'e
no longe 1' applicable. It also means that the philosopher and the concepts
created a1'e intimately connected to the point of becoming synonymous
with one another (认1P: 64). Thus , we get 'Aristotle's substance, Descartes'
cogito, Leibniz's monad , Kant's condition , Schelling's powe1', Bergson's
duration' (队1P: 7). 队Thile the philosopher may not be mentioned in
the text, he always exists implicitly in the background with his name
helping to create a readily identifiable body of wo 1'k.
Impo1'tantly, while a philosophical concept is always linked to the
author that created it, philosophy focuses on the concepts created as
opposed to the philosophe1' that created them. This distinguishes philos-
ophy from 1'eligion , which also concerns itself with concepts and cha1'帕
瓦ter飞 but inverts the relationship so that the character becomes mo 1'e
important than the concept (WP: 89). For example , Christians focus
on the life of ]esus to determine how to act, the 1'eby giving rise to the
colloquial question: what would ]esus do? Muslims consult the hadith;
Sikhs take their inspiration from the words and life of Guru Nanak and
the ten Gurus; and the Buddha is the point of reference for Buddhists.
1n contrast , phi1 osophy remains unconcerned with Descartes when
discussing Descartes' conception of the madman , instead focusing on
the COI丑ponent parts that underpin his concept 'madman'. While this
points to a fundamental distinction between philosophy and religion ,
the intimate relationship between philosophy and concepts brings us to
an issue that has been alluded to on numerous occasions but never quite
fil1ed out, insofar as it might be thought that affinning that philosophy
is a discipline defined by pure concept creation will necessarily lead to
an abstract, frivolous mode of thinking that is devoid of contact with or
relevance to concrete reality (Hallward, 2006). T
and Place
rr立
。
Deleuze's attempt to overcome the image of thought and affirm philo-

sophical thinking as a creative endeavour leads him to question and
ultimately rethink philosophy's purpose. This chapter takes off from
the previous two by outlining the way Deleuze rethink's philosophy's
purpose , a rethinking that (1) establishes an intimate connection
between philosophy, problems , and concrete geographic space; and
(2) differentiates philosophy from other forms of thinking. In partic-
ular, it wi1l show that Deleuze thinks philosophy's intemal struc-
ture and extemal relations from difference to open up some of the
new vistas Heidegger's questioning of being aims to. lt should also
be noted that this chapter stands at the apex of the transition from
the comparative focus hitherto dominant in this study to the crit嗣
ical approach constitutive of the final chapter. While this chapter
outlines and explains Deleuze's thinking on philosophy's purpose and
place in relation to other modes of thinking, an explanation that will
'complete' the exposition of Deleuze's thinking, it also paves the way
for the concluding chapter where Deleuze's thinking will be evaluated
to determine whether it affirms the difference as and from difference
it aims to. The implications of this wi1l become clearer as we proceed ,
but we start with the new purpose for philosophy that Deleuze gleans
from his ontology, critique of the image of thought , and reorientation
of philosophy around creation.
τ3豆e of
As noted in the previous chapter, for Deleuze, the ìmage of thought holds
that philosophy's purpose is to recognise and represent the t1飞1th as it is
maniÍested in ahistoric, universal, undifferentiated, transcendent ldeas.
174
Deleuze 011 the Pwpose and Place ofPhilosophy 175
In turn, the philosopher is the friend of wisdom who tries to faithfully

represent the truth of the transcendent Idea. According to Deleuze, the
main problem with insisting that philosophy entails a search for the truth
is that: (1) philosophy is not the only discipline that claims access to the
tnIth , which means philosophy must either legitimise why it is the only
discipline whose truth is celtain or accept that searching for the truth is not
the sole preserve of philosophy; and (2) the notion of truth is grounded
in a celtain conception of a fixed 0 1' stable ground. Deleuze's differential
ontology, however, rejects the notion that being entails presence, which
undermines philosophy's previous privileging of the truth. If being entails
a continuous differential becoming then the universal , eternal tluth the
tradition has searched for simply does not exist.
叭Tith this , Deleuze criticises Heidegger for maintaining that philos-
ophy continues to search for the truth of being. 叭lhile Heidegger goes
beyond , what he calls , metaphysical conceptions of being (= presence)
to affirm a form of thinking based on the swaying of being, his concep-
tion of meditative thinking continues to try to capture the truth of this
swaying. 叭lhile 1 have previously suggested that Heidegger would call
meditative thinking's relationship to being a reflection not a represen-
tation , Deleuze would presumably respond that , no matter what it is
called , its emphasis on truth means it , inadvertently, remains caught in
the representational mode l. As such , and despite Heidegger's attempt to
think the ontological difference , Deleuze charges that he does not go
far enough 'into' difference and so remains tied to identity. Rather than
hold to the image of thought's insistence that ph i1osophy's purpose is to
ascertain the truth , but modify the way in which this truth is revealed ,
manifested , or pictured , Deleuze maintains that the representational
model can only be overcome if the search for truth , upon which it is
based, is abandoned. As Daniel Smith explains , 'the aim of philosophy
[is] no longer... to discover pre嗣 existent truths outside of time, but to
U它。 te non-pre-existing concepts within time' (2013: 381). Being's dif征fe 臼r- 翩
ential becor口ning ensures that ther它e is no ahi怡storic truth to ascertain ,

onl片
y
to represen t som
丑le pred
176 Ontology ín Heídegger σ nd Deleuze
it is due to subjective choice (given his influence on Deleuze, one is

reminded of Sartre's pre-reflective fundamental project) or concrete,
material conditions such as a lack of water leading to the problem of
dehydration and possibly starvation. Given the former possib i1i ty places
undue emphasis on subjectivity, a notion Deleuze is deeply mistrustful
of, 1 would suggest that it is to the latter that Deleuze would tur日 a
position that fits well with his discussion of philosophy's relationship to
geography under the term 'geo-philosophy'.
Emphasising that philosophy is concerned with creating original
conceptual solutions to the problems thrown up by being's continuous
different/ciation 1iberates philosophy from the seriousness and misery
that results from its failure to find the truth it seeks. Importantly,
however, philosophy does not simply create concepts for the sake
of creation , but creates to solve problems. Problems do not lie there
ready-made awaiting philosophy's conceptual solutions, nor should we
think the method through which the problem is set up or used to think
through the problem is singular and universa l. The problem must be set
up before philosophy can solve it , with this setting up being an integral
part of philosophical creation. As a consequence , and just as problems
and concepts change, so too must the methods through which philo-
sophical thought thinks about them (PRT: 47). Indeed , as Daniel Smith
recognises, one of the biggest problems philosophy faces and has always
faced , even if this was not always explicitly recognised , is 'to determine
what is a true problem as opposed to a false one' (2007: 14). The result
is that problems , methods , and concepts are intiI丑 ately connected to
one anothe r. While 'it is the solution that counts... the problem always
has the solution it deserves , in terms of the way in which it is stated
(i. e. the conditions under which it is determined as a problem) , and ...
the means and terms at our disposal fo 1' stating it' (B: 16). The statement
of the problem leads thought to think about it in a particular manner,
which shapes the solutions that are provided to it. As much attention
must be given to the formulation of the problem as to the concepts
created to solve it.
It is not the case, however, that having set up the problem in a
particular manner and offered conceptual solutions to it , philosophical
thought is f
Deleuze 011 the Pwpose and Place of' Plzilosophy 177
contemporary problems (OP: 148). Thought has to continuously renew

itself by setting up problems in original ways and offering new solu-
tions to those problems. Interestingly, Manuel Delanda suggests that the
problem-solution relationship mirrors the virtual-actual movement ,
insofar as
the relation between well-posed explanatory problems and their true

or false solutions is the epistemological counterpart of the ontological
relation between the virtual and the actua l. Explanatory problems
would be the counterpart of virtual multiplicities [while] individual
solutions , on the other hand , would be the counterpart of actual indi-
vidual beings. (2002: 164)
In a similar way to the process whereby the pre-individuated virtual

realm 'precedes' and , in a sense , generates the actual , so philosophical
problems entail the pre嗣individuated background horizon that must
be established and set up so that philosophy can create the concep-
tual solutions that define it. This not only backs up my argument that
Deleuze's analysis of philosophy is rooted in the categories of his differ-
ential ontology, but, anticipating the next chapter, also reveals that the
virtual-actual movement lies at the heart of his thinking. Crucially,
however, if philosophy entails the continuous setting up of problems
and the creation of conceptual solutions to them , philosophy can never
find peace. As ]effrey Bell (2011: 12) understands , philosophy only 'is' by
continually upsetting the established order to identify problems which
it then offers conceptual solutions to , with the solutions offered and
the problem(s) to which they are posed themselves subsequently prob-
lematised. It is, therefore , no surprise to find that 'philosophy ...lives in
permanent cr包 is' (认lP: 82).
But this does not mean that all concepts created are of equal value.
Deleuze does not want to propose a free-for-all in which every concept
is equally valid. Evaluation and judgement are still inherent aspects of
philosophical creation; some concepts are better than others. However,
just as philosophy's purpose has changed so too must the standard
against which philosophy is judged. 认lhereas philosophical thought
was traditionally judged in terms of the degree to which it revealed the
truth of the issue , Deleuze's rejection of the idea that the truth is what
I丑 atters for philosophy means that he must find S O!丑e other means
against which to measure philosophical creation. As a consequence ,
Deleuze maintains that the standard which philosophical crea-
tion is judged is not the extent to which it represents 0 1' thinks about
178 Ontology Ín Heidegger C1 nd Delellze
the truth of the issue , but lies in the originality of the concepts created.
Indeed , Oeleuze bluntly states that loriginality is the sole criterion of a
work' (PPM: 217). IPhilosophy does not consist in knowing and is not
inspired by truth. Rather, it is categories like Interesting, Remarkable,
or Important that determine success or failure' (WP: 82). Books of
philosophy are not wrong, Ithey're stupid or irrelevant' (M: 130) or
Ilack importance or interest ... because they do not create any concept
or contribute an image of thought or beget a persona worth the effort'
(叭TP: 82-83). A philosophical concept is a good concept not because it
is true or represents the truth , but because lit works' (OAO: 22) , where
wo 1'ks means: (1) offering new insights and perspectives on the prob-
lems posed; and (2) stimulating thought to think about the issue in new
and novel ways. What works for one thinker will not, however, neces幡
sarily wo 1'k for another. 飞Ne should not think each book or concept
produced will have the same effect on everyone , nor should we expect
it to. Thinkers will be affected by different concepts in different ways.
Some will be inspired by a concept; others will find it boring and useless.
认lhether the philosophical concept is a Igood' concept depends on the
impact it has on other thinkers in terms of whether it stimulates origi-
nality and creativity.
Importantly, if the book 0 1' concept is a Ibad' concept , in that it
does not say anything original 0 1' stimulate original thinking, Oeleuze
extols us to forget about it. 00 not waste time and energy picking apart
its flaws , but move on to other books or concepts or, better yet , create
your own. The only way to judge a philosophical concept is not to ask
whether it is true, but to ask Idoes it work and how does it work... for
you? [And] if it doesn't wor轧 if nothing comes through , ... try another
book' (LHC: 8). There is no universal standard that delineates that one
concept is better than another, but this does not mean that all concepts
are equal; it means that whether a concept is better than another is
defined in terms of originality not the truth , with the measure of a
concept's originality judged by each individual in relation to a specific
problem. This does not lnean that each concept is only susceptible
to one judgement, but that while the concept may not be a 'good'
concept when applied to a particular formulation of a problem , it may
be a I
Deleuze 0 1/ tlze Pμψose and Place of Philosophy 179
This is, in some respects, close to Heidegger who, it will be remembered ,

left it up to the reader to determine whether his raising of the question of
being is justified or not. Deleuze goes beyond Heidegger, however, because
he does not simply ask the reader to evaluate whether a particular issue
(the question of being) is a valid one, but asks the reader to continuously
explore alternatives. While Heidegger attempts to draw the reader‘ into
agreeing with his valorisation of the question of being, Deleuze takes a
step back and appears to simply want to get his readers to open themselves
up to the 口1Ultiplicity of being. If that leads to the sa日le conclusions he
arrives at , fine; if it does not , Deleuze doesn't appear to be overly concerned
instead insisting that, as long as the con c1 usions are creative and original ,
it doesn't matter that alternative conclusions are arrived at. If the conclu-
sions reached are not original and creative, they are unimportant and we
should not waste time engaging with them , but should affirm alternative ,
original con c1 usions and concepts.
For at least one commentator, however, Deleuze's insistence that
philosophy is and should be orientated towards problems not the truth
is problematic. For Myron Penner, Deleuze性 position is simply contra制
dictory because rejecting the relationship between philosophy and the
truth affirms a truth that states that: (1) philosophy is not concerned
with the truth; and (2) concepts cannot bear truth-values. Penner
concludes that by positing a true conception of philosophy, Deleuze
ends up doing and reaffirming that which he rejects (2003: 56-58). A
number of points need to be made in I ‘ elation to Penner's reading of
Deleuze, however. First, Deleuze explicitly points out that he values
creation not consistency (FPP: 278) , backing this up by pointing out that
paradox and contradiction lie at the heart of philosophy for the simple
reason that the pure differentjcial becoming of being is and only can
be paradoxical and contradictory. What applies at one moment to one
configuration of being does not apply to another configuration of being.
Because philosophical thought takes its cue from being, which is para-
doxical and dynamic , philosophical thinking must also be paradoxical
and dynamic (DR: 227). Second, Penner's position is underpinned by
the assumption that Deleuze wants to completely sever t1
Truth cannot count when evaluating philosophy because: (1) philos-

ophy is not the only discipline that lays claim to the truth , which risks:
(a) establishing the truth as something transcendent to thought; and (b)
collapsing modes of thinking into one another; and (2) there cannot be
one truth because of the constant, rhizomic becoming of being. If philos崛
‘
ophy cannot ascertain the truth it is either an inherently useless disci-

pline or must be structured around another purpose, which , for Deleuze,
is going to be providing original conceptual solutions to concrete prob峭
lems. Deleuze does not abandon the truth; he downplays its importance,
which allows him to make truth claims regarding the nature of being ,
philosophy, science, art , difference , negation and so on , while carving out
an alternative purpose for philosophy than the one that has traditionally
caused it so many difficulties. Rather than criticising him in terms of
logical consistency, Deleuze asks us to evaluate him in terms of whether
what he says is interesting and original. If it is, we should create some幢
thing anew from it; if not, Deleuze's response, if indeed he did respond
at all , would be to ask us to create an alternative, which would of course
require a creative act thereby reaffirming Deleuze's position regarding
philosophy's purpose. However, while Deleuze is not interested in the
question of truth , asking the reader to take his thinking and do some回
thing creative with it or leave it to create an alternative, he is interested
in explaining why his analysis of philosophy as concept-creation is not
frivolous , arbitrary, or abstract. Having explained that philosophical crea-
‘
tion is intimately connected to concrete problems , Deleuze supplements

and supports these analyses by explaining how philosophy's location
ensures that its creations are inherently concrete.
While those thinkers who have fallen foul of the illusion of transcendence
have sought to ground philosophical thought in the certainty of a tran-
scendent entity, whether this is God, the unmoved mover, or universal,
ahistoric Ideas, Deleuze has a more literal interpretation of philosophy's
ground. When Deleuze talks about the ground of philosophy, he means
the literal ground on which the philosopher lives and thinks. Philosophical
thought is always linked to its place of birth and, for this reason , 'is a
geophilosophy' (WP: 95). The earth never stays still, however; it is split
ínto different territories with these territories becoming through a de也卜
ritorialisation/re-territorialisation process. Deleuze further differentíates
this process by distínguishing between 'relative de-territorialisations' and
Deleuze 0 1l the Pwpose mzd Place ofPhilosophy 181
'absolute de-ten让orialisations' ， with the latter being broken into positive

and negative forms (Patton, 2000: 106-107, 2012: 208-209).
Deleuze explains that 'de-territoria1isation is relative insofar as it
concerns the historical relationship of the earth with the ten让Olies that
take shape and pass away on it' ("气1P: 88). Relative de-territorialisation
refers to the way actual 'things' , whether these are social, geographic,
linguistic, or cultural, alter and change as a consequence of alterations
in their component parts. Absolute de-territorialisation entails a different
form of alteration, which, far from entailing alterations in the constella-
tion of component parts , entails an escape from these ac阳 al component
parts to another I‘ ealm. Negative fo创rnηI mηlS of 拍
盯 absωolut忧 e 岱
de。e-
心刷翩嗣忙
ent汩 ail a flight from the 缸 a ct阳 ua挝1 tωo a 扫t r‘a
缸nscend 出er时1t 陀
I ea
挝1m丑1 divorced from 缸
aC机阳l嗣
丛li让ty
a 弘， af自li培ghttha 挝t， in A Thousω1d Plateaus , is associated with subjectivity
(ATP: 149) , but can also be God or some other transcendent first principle.
This is an absolute de-territoria1isation because the transcendent is abso-
lutely transcendent to the actual and is negative because it is (1) viewed
as an imposition on actuality; and (2) a flight to transcendence, a move-
ment that , for Deleuze, violates the immanence of being. In contrast, a
positive absolute de-territorialisation entails a movement from the actual
to the vi1tual and is a movement that Deleuze associates with the pure
differential open-ended 'possibility' of virtuality. This movement is abso-
lute because it entails a movement away from the actual, but is positive
because it accords with , affirms , and expresses the open-ended 'possibility'
inherent to being's different/cial becoming. Because it is linked to pure
virtual 'possibility', Deleuze claims that positive forms of absolute de-ter-
ritorialisation are the source of revolutions, insofar as they 'return' to the
virtual 1'ealm that 'underpins' actuality to express an alternative to actuality.
a1'e, in other words, linked to a call 'for a new emth, a new people'
(认TP: 101). Absolute de ←唰t忧 er口r让01'时iali妇sa挝ti始on 'can [however] only be thoug 哥h孜t
acc ∞or叫.吐
di怡ng tωo certain 挝 s ti泪
II瞒tωO 刷巾
be-唰-de
时te 臼1'm丑li汩
ned r‘它吼ela
挝ti讪onshi
182 Ontology 111 Heidegger mzd Deleuze
history of philosophy entails a theatre of syster丑 s designed to engage

with different concrete problems and formations; it does not entail a
linear development of systems engaged with the same concrete reality.
Second, Deleuze concludes that philosophical planes of immanence
emanate from and are intimately tied to the unique configuration of
being constitutive of their socio 蜀 historical territory. As Deleuze puts it ,
'the histo 1'Y of philosophy ... is marked by national cha1'acteristics or
rathe 1' by nationalita1'ianisms , which a1'e like philosophical "opinions' lJ
(认TP: 104). While Deleuze notes this tendency in a1' t by distinguishing

between the European p1'ivileging of o1'ganic totality ove1' f1' agment in
contrast to the American privileging of the fragment ove1' the organic
totality (ECC: 56) , he also 1'ecognises that the1' e is, fo 1' example, a F1'ench ,
Gennan , and American way of doing philosophy. The thinkers of these
geog1'aphical spaces tend to share a common 'physical , psychological
[and] social' (WP: 88) horizonal world-view that influences and impacts
on their way of thinking and the concepts created from this thinking.
This does not mean the thinkers from these spaces think the same way
or arrive at the same conclusions , but Deleuze thinks it does explain:
(1) why thinkers from the 'same' locale tend to write in similar ways,
discuss certain topics and not others , and generally come to the con c1u幡
sions they do; and (2) why certain philosophies appear mo 1'e suited to
certain geographical spaces: the pre-conceptual , background horizon
from which they emanate appears to some cultures as more natu l'址。r
plausible than others. Philosophical concepts from one geographical
space constituted by a particular pre蠕 conceptual ， background horizon
can intuitively appear to be wholly a1ien to another with a different
pre-conceptual, background horizon. Third , philosophical systems are
not just distinguished from one another spatially; they are also disti卧
guished from one another historically. It is not simply us , living in other
parts of the world, who fail to connect with what a Greek understood
and conceptualised two thousand yea1' s ago , conter丑po1'a1'y G1'eeks also
do not think in the same manne 1' as their ancestors. Each works on and
through different planes of immanence despite emanating from similar
geog1'aphical locations. This
Deleuze 011 the Pwpose and Place of Plzilosophy 183
be successfully applied wholesale to another area , or time , because the

concrete conditions that created the philosophy will not be the same.
Rather than copy another or look to another for solutions to our prob刷
lems , Deleuze extols us to create our own concepts to solve the problems
we have formulated from the changing nature of our concrete environω
ment. This feeds into Deleuze's criticism of the image of thought.
As noted in Chapter 7, the image of thought insists that there is a
stock pile of ready-made problems to which philosophical thinking
‘
attends , a position that not only affirms continuity across the history of
philosophy, but also maintains an ahistoric , universal standard against
which the different ph i1 0sphies can be evaluated to determine which
accurately represents the correct answer. Put differently, the image of
thought claims that philosophy dispassionately searches for the answer
that will represent what being truly is. Deleuze rips away the i1l usion of
objectivity inherent to the image of thought to show that this objec-
tivity is a manifestation of a particular plane of immanence rooted in a
particular ontology of presence. The image of thought may take itself to
be objectively searching for an ahistoric truth , but it is , in fact , creating
subjective first principles from where its ahistoric 'objective' truth is
determined. Being's rhizomic , chaotic different/ciation means that
there cannot be a linear, objective becoming to being which , given that
thinking emanates from being, ensures that there is no linear, objective
becoming to thought. Each epoch and mode of thinking is different
from others.
认Thile it luay be tempting to conclude that Deleuze's critique of the
image of thought links him inextricably to a unitary reading of history,
Deleuze's insistence that the image of thought pervades the history
of philosophy should not be taken to mean that he thinks all past
philosophy has thought in this way. Vγhile it has been dorninant, the
image of thought has not been total. Deleuze's own commentaries on
a number of others , such as Spinoza, Hume , and Nietzsche , attempt to
show that, alongside the representational model , there exists another
strand, one often ignored but crucially important. It is to this other
strand that he turns to try to think against the representational model
(LHC: 6). Deleuze's comm
in terms of how they picture the future of philosophy. It will be remem斟

bered that, for Heidegger, metaphysics can be traced back to its originary
domain in ancient Greece. Heidegger's problem , however, is the growth
that grew was detrimental to subsequent thinking. Such is its influence
that Heidegger even comes to recommend the abandonment of philos-
ophy as a way to salvage thinking. Philippe Mengue (2006: 179) points
out that Deleuze objects to this because it fails to recognise and affirm the
difference of philosophy. Not only does each philosophy orientate itself
to different questions to come up with different conceptual solutions , but
each emanates from alternative spatio-temporal places. It is not possible
to reduce these differences to a unitary logic , such as the logic of meta输
physics , or origin , such as ancient Greece. Whi1e Heidegger claims ancient
Greece instantiated the metaphysical mode of thinking that continued
until Nietzsche completed it, Deleuze claims that the image of thought is
itself differentiated along spatio-temporallines, which ensures its reach ,
while diverse and deep , is not unitary.
This feeds into Deleuze's general critique of any thinking that focuses
solely on history to determine how it should act and, indeed, his critique
of the idea that history impacts on or shapes being's becoming. 叭Thereas
Heidegger's notion of trace maintains that past thinking must continue
to effect and affect thinking, a view he would presumably charge applies
to Deleuze given the latter's interest in the history of phi1 osophy and
discussion of the image of thought, Deleuze maintains that looking to,
taking care of, correcting, or valorising history cannot be creative; it is
thoroughly reactive and life-denying 口气lP: 111). While we can engage
with past thinking to create from it , we must always 'push off' from this
thinking; we should not get bogged down in the past nor should we try
to re-create it. This conclusion emanates from Deleuze's ontology, which
insists that being becomes through a process of affirmative different!
ciation which creates multiplicities and , in the case of philosophical
thought , concepts to understand and solve the problems that accom刷
pany the creation of multiplicities. The actualities created by being's
different!ciation do not and cannot subsequen t1 y shape the becoming
of being. If the
Deleuze 011 the Purpose mzd Place ofPhilosoplzy 185
questions regarding the relationship between the autopoietic act of

philosophical creation and the concrete situation this act is embedded
within. If philosophical concepts result frOl丑 reactions to the geo圄
historical position of the philosopher that creates them , it appears that,
to be able to create original conceptual solutions to concrete problems ,
philosophical thinking must detach itself from its historical circum-
stances. The danger of this , however, is , as Keith Ansell-Pearson notes ,
that Deleuze courts
the 1'isk of rende 1'ing the event of thought and the tasks of philos-
ophy not simply indete1'minate but without connection to anything
othe1' than philosophy's own desi 1'e as it floats abst 1'actly on a plane
of immanence uninfo 1'med by historical praxis and the historically
specific p1'edicaments of mode 1'n thought. (1999: 202)
队Thile Deleuze does not intend fo 1' philosophy to inhabit this unencum幡
bered , abstract plane of immanence devoid of contact with or relevance
to concrete 1'eality (LJM: 367) , Ansell-Pearson does identify a possible
consequence of his insistence that philosophical creation is autopoietic
and instantiates and is supported by its own pre-conceptual horizonal
world-view: philosophical thought may turn away from the concrete
world to simply create an abstract world devoid of contact with and
relevance to the concrete world. While Deleuze attempts to bind philo-
sophical thought to concrete reality by emphasising philosophy's inti-
mate relationship to the embodied philosopher, concrete problems , and
the geo-historical configuration of being it creates from , this attempt is
threatened by the sheer autopoietic , self-positing nature of philosoph-
ical creation. V飞lhi1 e born from specific social circumstances and geo-
historical position , defining philosophy as a self币。 siting creative act
may lead thought to cut itself off from its concrete reality and retreat
into its own abstract world.
The danger arises because it is not quite clear to what extent the
concepts and plane of immanence instantiated by philosophical crea-
tion impact on the concrete world. 认lhile Deleuze clearly states that
philosophical creation aims to offer innovative conceptual solutions/
perspectives to concrete problems , and that this attempt is always
situated within specific geo 翩 historical circumstances , his attεmpt to
identify the geo-historic , background horizon from , on , and through
which philosophical thought emanatεis not matched by a discus唰
sion of the subsequent impact creation has on the geo-
historic , background horizon that philosophical though t.
Overcoming this lacuna would require that Deleuze complement the

attentíon he pays to the affírmative act of philosophical creation by
focusing on the ways the act of philosophical creation subsequently
i日lpacts on the concrete world that instantiates and supports that phil-
osophical creation, a position that would also require alterations to his
ontology of pure affirmative rhizomic different/ciation. 的 it stands ,
however, while Deleuze's analysis of philosophical creation offers an
unparalleled analysis of the explosive manner in which philosophical
concepts are created, his ontology of pure, different/cial becoming
prevents philosophical thought from having any impact on being's
becoming.
This means that , second , while philosophy is always creating concep-
tual solutions to solve the problems it formulates out of the obstacles
that result from being's different/ciation , ph i1 osophical thought never
shapes being, but only ever reacts to being's different/ciation. In other
words , being different/ciates itself and throws up obstacles which phi1 o-
sophical thinking formulates problems out of and creates concepts to
solve. No sooner has it created its concept to solve the initial problem
than being different/ciates , thereby creating new obstacles , which can
be formulated as problems requiring that phi1 osophical thought create
new concepts to solve these new conditions. Philosophical thought only
ever reacts to being's different/ciation; it never shapes or affirms the
course of 'the' becoming. This calls into question just how affírmative
phi1 osophical thought really is. If philosophical thought is dependent
on being's confíguration , which it is unable to shape , and only ever
reacts to being's different/ciation , it appears that phi1 osophical creation
emanates fror丑 pure reaction. But as Deleuze points out in his critique
of Hegel , thought that bases itself on another or that affirms in reac-
tion to anything else is 110t affirmative , but is thoroughly 11egative a11d
reactionary. By maintaining that thought ema11ates from a reaction to
bei11g's differe11t/ciation , Deleuze 110t only reveals that philosophy is 110t
purely affirmative , but also u11dermines his claim that 110thing positive
results from 11egativity.
Despite this issue , Deleuze seeks to further elucidate philosophy's
purpose a11d c011te11t by disti11guishi11g it f
Deleuze 011 the Purpose and Place of Philosophy 187
The place of phHosophy in relation to science and art
Deleuze offers an account of the relationship between philosophy,

science, and art that differs from Heidegger 、 which holds that philos翩
ophy is the unique foundational source of science because science rests
'on presuppositions which can never be established scientifically, though
they can be demonstrated philosophically' (叭TCT: 131). For Deleuze ,
philosophy, science , and art are all creative although their creativity is
expressed differently: philosophy creates concepts , art creates through
percepts and affects, and science creates through quantifiable functions.
Importantly, while 气he exclusive right of concept creation secures a func唰
tion for philosophy, ... it does not give it any pre-eminence or privilege
since there are other ways of thinking and creating , other modes of idea幡
tion that, like scientific thought , do not have to pass through concepts'
σγP: 8). For this reason , Benoît Dillet explains that 'Heidegger's defini俐
tion of thinking remains an aristocratic one: real thought only occurs in
philosophy ... On the contrary, in Deleuze the task of thinking is democ-
ratised ...]ust as there is not only one "thinking" discipline, there is not
only one correct way to think' (2013: 265). For Deleuze , philosophy,
science, and art cannot be placed in a hierarchy of importance , crea-
tivity, or legitimacy as Heidegger maintains. Each attempts to under-
stand being and create different ways of seeing the world, each of which
is as legitimate and necessary as the others (Beistegui, 2004: 23-24).
To outline the structure and content of science and art , 1 will follow
Deleuze's recommendation and use the chaos of being as the lens through
which to delineate their respective structures (WP: 117 188 , 20 4-206). We
…
have to remernber, however, that each discipline approaches this chaos

creatively. For Deleuze, thought 'must confront chaos... not in order to
vanquish chaos , but to delineate a plane of consistency that makes chaos
productive and usable, a force of creativity' (Bogue, 2011: 87). This is
different to Heidegger whose notion of the enframing of technology
maintains that technological being, of which science is a late manifesta-
tion , is inherently uncreative in that it tries to impose a unitary meaning
on being. For Deleuze, however, thinking always confr‘ onts the chaos
of being and is always challe
'science' as a homogeneous bloc , as it Deleuze maintains that ,

while philosophy creates concepts to explain the chaosrnos of being,

science creates functions , which exist across nurnerous sub-discip 1i nes
such as rnathernatics and biology. While Deleuze does not provide an
analysis of thern in the way he does the rnultiplicity of concepts , it is
clear that functions are cornplex rnultip 1icities cornposed of elernents
called functives which explain being in quantifiable terrns. Irnpo 1'tantl弘
howeve 1', functions do not sirnply exist on their own , but 'derive all
their power frorn reference, whethe1' this reference be reference to
states of affair飞 things ， 0 1' other propositions' (叭1P: 138). Given func-
tions gain their rneaning through points of reference, the background
horizon of scientific functions is not the sarne as the background
horizon that inforrns philosophical concepts. 叭Thile philosophy sets
up a plane of irnrnanence, science sets up a plane of reference consti跚
tuted by fixed , constant points that give it a consistency lacking frorn
the plane of irnrnanence. The plane of reference is not 1irnitless , but
is structured around and entails constants such as 'the speed of 1ight,
absolute zero , the quanturn of action , [and] the Big Bang' (认1P: 119).
These constants are not created frorn the plane of reference , but are
the conditions that define the plane of reference. In other words,
these absolutes are the conditions upon which scientific functions are
based. Whereas the chaosrnos of being is infinite and lirnitless in that
it constantly becornes in a rhizornic rnanner, science slows down this
chaos by placing it within points of reference that delineate its rnove-
rnent. It is only by placing the chaos of being within a 'freeze幡frarne'
(叭TP: 119) that it can be observed, rneasured , and quantified. The conclu幡
sion dra飞Nn is that , whereas philosophy is at horne in the chaos of being
and tries to live with it by continuously creating concepts and setting
up a plane of irnrnanence that continuously changes , science charts the
variations that occur within specific reference points (认1P: 121). 叭1hile
philosophy entails a process of pure creation , science entails creation
within constant lirnits. This does not rnean that philosophy entails a
'better' , or rnore holistic, forrn of creation than science; in line with his
valorisation of difference, Deleuze sirnply rnaintains that science and
philosophy entail different kinds of inquiry.
Bec
Deleuze 011 the Purpose al1 d Place otPhilosophy 189
created and plane of immanence set up , whereas the scientific function

becomes through the scientific observer who sets it up , monitors , and
calibrates the results of the experiments designed to test the function.
Scientific observers do not create the results of the experiments , but
collate them in accordance with the terms of the plane of reference that
underpins the experiment. In contrast , conceptual personae are part of
the act of ph i1 osophical creation; they are not distinct from it.
These features ensure that science's understanding of being's
becoming is different to philosophy's. While philosophical becoming
entails a rhizomic唰becoming devoid of historical influence , scientific-
becoming is more linear and homogeneous. There is , in other words ,
greater continuity to scientific-becoming because the direction of
scientific knowledge proceeds from the results of past experimenta-
tion. While ph i1 osophy must break with its history to creatively affin丑
original perspectives and concepts , scientific翩becoming takes its cue
from its history and develops experiments and functions based on the
data collected from its previous experiments. This is not to say that
science works on the same plane of reference throughout its history, just
that the alterations between planes of 把ference are less frequent and
rhizomic than found in philosophy. Scientific-becoming is less jolting
and chaotic than the becoming inherent to philosophical creation
(认rp: 124). There are , therefore , numerous differences between philos-
ophy and science in that philosophy creates concepts , sets up a plane
of immanence, and invents conceptual personae to provide concep唰
tual solutions to the problems that emanate from being's continuous
differentjciation , whereas science establishes constants that define a
plane of reference that lead to functions which are tested by experiments
observed by observers who collate the data fr‘ om these experiments to
chart the variations of being within the parameters established by its
plane of reference.
Science and philosophy are not, however, the only forms of thinking;
Deleuze contrasts the two with art, which is defined not by functions or
concepts , but by the creation of percepts and affects. ，八Thi1 e art's relation-
ship to creativity has long been noted, Deleuze insists it entails a speci白c
fo
sensation seems to be that the sensation does not create the material
thing; the sensation emanates from the thing, but does so in a way that
animates or imbues the thing with sensation. RatheI‘ than create something
entirely nev飞T， art is a creative act whereby material is imbued with percepts
and affects (WP: 193). In Francis Bαcon: Th e Logic of Sensation, Deleuze
extends this to explain that sensation is important because it is dual-faced,
having one face turned to the subject and one to the object. 'Sensation... is
being-in-the-world, as the phenomenologists would say: at one and the
same time 1 become in the sensation and something happens through the
sensation , one thI‘ ough the other, one in the other' (FB: 31). Sensation is
that by which and through which the world becomes interesting: sensa耐
性on gives the individual a sensation of the sensible, while bringing about
alterations 'in' the sensible. But sensations do not simply arise out of the
blue; much like philosophy and science, the creative thinking of art is also
dependent on a background horizon against and from which sensations
arise. Whereas philosophical concepts are tied to a plane of immanence
and scientific functions gain meaning through a plane of reference, artistic
creation entails the laying out of a plane of composition, which forms the
background assumptions, style, and content that leads to the creation of
specific percepts and affects.
Artistic creation occu1's on this plane of composition across two axes:
the images to be c1'eated and the techniques to produce the work of art.
The 1'elationship between the two axes will diffe 1' from a1'tist to artist
depending on the sensation to be created and the techniques to be
employed. Indeed, it is from the continuous alteration between these
two axes that the creativity of art emanates (叭lP: 195). The originality
of each artist emanates from the ways they configure these axes. While
this is similar to philosophical creation in that philosophical creation
is also highly individualistic, it distinguishes art from science , which
is based on a homogeneous method necessary to ensure replication of
experimental results (WP: 167). 丁his allows art to explore new avenues
and possibilities and means its creative endeavours are more hetero嗣
geneous than those of the sciences. Furthermor飞 while philosophy
invents conceptual personae and sci
Deleuze 011 the Purpose and Place ofPhilosophy 191
conceptual persona are always subordinate to the concept's created ,

whereas in a1't the 1'e exists a more symbiotic 1'elationship between figures
and sensations in that it is through the presentation of the figure that
the sensation a1'ises (队1P: 65 , 177).
A furthe 1' diffe1'ence between philosophy and art emanates from
thei 1' 1'elationship to vi 1'tua1ity. 飞气lhe1'eas ph i1osophical creation creates
concepts unhindered by const1'aints and limits , and science entails
the c1'eation of functions which map variations in being within the
constraints of its plane of reference, a1't entails a c1'eative resemblance.
A1't aims to re-produce something already the1'e, whether it is an imp 1'es-
sion of a landscape 0 1' the exp 1'ession of an idea 0 1' image, but does so in
a way that is always c1'eative. Rather than re-produce the image 0 1' thing
as it t1'uly is , art c1'eates a new entity that resembles , but is never the
same as , that intended to be produced (叭'P: 173). Because a1'tistic crea-
tion entails a p 1'econceived idea of the thing to be c1'eated , it simply adds
1'eality to the possibility inhe1'ent to its preconceived idea. As Deleuze
puts it , 'the monument does not actualize the virtual event but incorpo-
1'ates 0 1' embodies it: it gives it a body, a life , a unive1'se' (WP: 177). A1't
produces a finite 1'esemblance that aims to captu1'e the feeling of being's

infinity (\厅 P: 197). By wo 1'king on or through actual concrete material ,
basing its c1' eation on realisation not virtuality, and producing a precon-
ceived image , artistic creation entails less 1丑ultiplicity than the purely
affirmative creation of philosophical concepts , but more multiplicity
than the creativity inherent to science , bound as it is by the limits and
constants of its plane of reference. These differences are not, however,
normative differences; that is , the 'more' and 'less' used to describe their
relationship to other fonns of thinking does not entail a nonnative
judgement about their worth. 1n contrast to Heidegger, Deleuze claims
that 'thinking is thought through concepts, or functions , or sensations
and no one of these thoughts is better than another, or more fully,
completely, or synthetically "thought'" (WP: 198). Philosophy, science ,
and a1't are equal forms of thought that are , nonetheless , different in
kind.
the betwee豆豆由e
This does , however, give rise to the following question: what is the rela-
tionship between the discip 1ines? After all , if philosophy, science , and
art entail fundamentally different forms of it is difficult to see
how can interact with one another and coherent
way. While having the 'same' in that each discusses
the chaos of being, not only is the chaos of each different but each
relates to this chaos differently, with the 1' esult that each p 1' oduces a
completely different analysis with nothing in common with other disci唰
plines. Each discipline is independent, exists in its own realm , applies its
own methods , and comes to conclusions that are independent from
other disciplines. We saw this type of relationship lies at the bafflement
that tends to greet non-philosophers who read philosophy or listen to
philosophers speak. 叭Thile philosophe 1's and non-ph i1 osophe1' s engage
with being, the way the diffe 1'ent disciplines approach and engage with
being a1'e antithetical to one anothe 1'.
Deleuze's conclusion that philosophy, science , and a1't a1'e funda-
mentally and irreducibly different is suppo 1'ted by his (1) insistence
that being is nothing but pu1'e diffe 1'entjcial becOIning that resists and
lacks common unity that would allow the various disciplines to influ唰
ence 0 1' speak to each othe 1'; and (2) comments on the difficulty which
philosophe1's and non-philosophers experience when engaging with
one anothe r. Elsewhere , however, Deleuze claims that 'every entity is
multiple , and at the same t iIne is linked with va 1'ious othe1' entities'
(ECC: 120), a statement that hints at the possibility that the various
fo 1'ms of thought can unde 1'stand , relate to , and influence each othe1'. Fo 1'
example, he notes that , while philosophy and a1't are distinct forms of
thought , concepts are not opposed to percepts and affects , concepts have
perceptual and affectual significance (OP: 137; RBS: 164).τhis ensures
that philosophy and art 'often pass into each other in a becoming that
sweeps them both up in an intensity which co-ordinates them' (WP:
66). Similarly, 'philosophy has a fundamental need for the science that
is contemporary with it... because science constantly intersects with the
possibility of concepts and because concepts necessarily involve allu-
sions to science that are neither examples no 1' applications , nor even
1'eflections' (叭TP: 162). Wh i1 e Deleuze leaves it to scientists to dete1'-
mine whether science has need of philosophy, he clearly thinks there

is a 1'eciprocal 1'elationship between the two (WP: 162). To outline this
further, Deleuze differentiates between two types of scientific statement,
one exact in nature, quantitative , and mathematical , which can only be
alluded to by philoso
Deleuze 011 the Purpose and Place of Philosophy 193
Deleuze clearly thinks , therefore , that the disciplines interact with and
shape one anothe 1'. The question a1'ises , however, as to how the various
discip1ines , which entail diffe 1'ent kinds of thought , inte1'act with and
influence each othe1"?
1n relation to this problem , E1'ic A1liez (2013) looks to the 1'elation-
ship between (a type of non-institutionalised) aesthetics and philosophy
to dete1'mine ways the former can help the latte1' ove1'come the model
of rep 1'esentation and develop a 1'esponse to the question of t 1'ansdisci-
plinarity. Unf如or挝tuna挝tely 弘.， his cωom
丑lments a 1'e ra挝the
臼1' u泣
lnde
臼l'飞飞飞唰-d
do not engage with Deleuze'、scomm 丑lent怡s on the topic or, 剖 a s we will see
5血hoω1't址ly
弘~ some key questions. 1n cont1'ast to Alliez's approach , 1sabelle
Stenge1's tries to develop an understanding of the science-philosophy
relationship whe1'e the fo 1'mer engages with the actual state of affai 1's and
the latter focuses on the event that creates the actual to p1'ovide concep-
tual 1'esou1'ces to unde 1'stand 'it'. The conclusion reached is that science
and philosophy enrich one anothe1'. The problem is that she does not
engage with Deleuze's comments on this issue, but simply assUI丑es that it
is possible fo 1' the two 1'adically diffe 1'ent discip1ines to communicate and
discuss the 'same' problelll with one anothe1'.飞tVh i1 e admitting that 'such
a pe1'spective has a d 1'eamlike quality' (2005: 158) , Stenge1's concludes by
SiI丑ply asse 1' ting that 'as philosophers , [we must] put scientific achieve唰
ments on the same plane of imlnanence' (2005: 162) so that philoso刷
phers and scientists can
share... the pragmatic conce1'ns for the itinerant process of c1'eation

of new 'it works' as t妇ey ma 1'k the process of empowe1'ment of new
minorities, with new actively diverging 'habits' that must be cele翩
brated each time as something new entering the world and indeed as
modifying it. (2005: 162)
This, howeve 1', 1'aises a numbe 1' of questions , the most important ofwhich
include: Why should philosophy and science be focused on the same
issue? Can philosophy and science be placed on the same background,
ho 1'izonal plane'? Can the modes of thinking that Deleuze claims a1'e so
diffe 1'ent actually talk to one anothe r'? And what is the mediating factor
that facilitates this creative discussion?
The main problem with their analyses is that, in their lush to develop
a transdisciplinary programme from Deleuze's thinking, Alliez and
Stengers simply take it fo 1' granted within Deleuze's diffe 1'ential
there is a mediating factor that allows the very different forms
of thinking to communicate and create from one another. They may be
right , but they do not discuss what this mediating factor is. If Heidegger
has taught us anything, however, it is that fully thinking through an
issue cannot be based on assumptions. In this spirit , my suggestion is
that , rathe 1' than simply taking off from Deleuze to develop a Deleuzian
transdisciplinary research agenda , we first have to return to Deleuze to
determine whether it is possible, within the terms of Deleuze's onto-
logical categories , to develop this agenda.
Mathias Schänher is one of the few commentators to have actually
turned to Deleuze's own words , in particular What is Philosophy? , to try
to identify the mechanism that allows the diffe 1'ent modes of thinking
to impact on and shape each other. The conclusion reached is that while
the modes of thinking are diffe 1'ent from one another, they do interact
with one another and are capable of doing so through the notion of taste.
Sch凸 nher quotes Deleuze's claim that 'if the laying-out of the plane [of
immanence] is called Reason , the invention of personae Imagination ,
and the creation of concepts Understanding, then taste appears as the
triple faculty of the still-undetermined concept, of the pe1' sona still in
limbo , and of the still唰transparent plane' (WP: 77) , before concluding
from it that 'taste guides not only the construction of the elements and
their mutual coadaptation but also , starting from this basis , the positing
of the concept as event in each singular moment of creation' (Sch凸 nhe巳
2013: 49). Sch凸 nher then controversially claims that 'A1't serves as
Imagination' (2013: 50) and that, because philosophy and a1't share the
faculty of imagination , they overlap and can influence one another二
The problem with Schänher's conclusion , however, is that it depends
on a number of questionable interpretations of Deleuze's thinking. In
particular, while Deleuze's comments on taste apply to the philosoph-
ical and aesthetic modes of cognition indep臼zdently so that 'taste' is that
which binds the three conditions of each mode of thinking togethe 1' to
ensure it is 'aesthetic' 0 1' 'philosophical' , Schönhe1' reads taste as being
that which binds the philosophical , scientific, and aesthetic modes
of thinking together. 认Thile Deleuze applies the notion of taste to the
minutiae of philosophical and aesthetic thinking to show how their
planes of immanence 0 1' consistency, concepts or affec
Deleuze 011 tl1 e PUψose al1 d Place o(Philosoplzy 195
and so concludes that , because philosophy and art share the common
ground of the imagination , art 'help[s] philosophy [invent] conceptual
personae and [b rings] them to life' (2013: 50). But there are at least two
problems with this: (1) how can art and philosophy be radically different
if they share the commonality of imagination? and (2) Schönher's entire
argument depends on art being able to help philosophy invent concep-
tual personae. But, for Deleuze, art is not linked to conceptual personae;
it is linked to fi♂ues ， which , as 1 demonstrated above , are very different
to philosophy's conceptual personae. Sch凸nher arrives at his conclusion
because he radically redraws the boundaries between the disciplines so
that art is placed 'within' philosophy, thereby undermining the radical
difference in kind of each , and reconceptualises art around conceptual
personae , which fundamentally alters the transcendental conditions
through which Deleuze defines the aesthetic mode of thinking.
As I will suggest in the next chapter, Sch 凸 nher runs into this problem
because Deleuze's account of the interaction between the various modes
of thinking tries to reconcile the radical difference of each mode of
thinking with the notion that the modes of thinking are not separate.
The irreconcilability of the two strands has serious implications for his
attempt to affirm difference as and from difference. Before getting to
this , however, and rather than reconstruct his thinking to determine
how the various modes of thinking interact with one another, we first
have to follow Deleuze to determine how he actually concεptualises and
describes the relationship between the modes of thinking. In particular,
1 will suggest that there are three differ它 nt interpretations revolving
around independence , al1iance , and echo that can be found in Deleuze's
thinking on this issue. 1 have already mentioned that the difference in
kind of each mode of thinking secures their independence , a relation-
ship that is really a non-relationship , insofar as the different modes
of thinking do not interact with or shape one another. As such , I will
suggest that Deleuze's thinking on the relationship between the various
modes of thinking traverses two lines constituted by alliances and/or
echoes.
Starting with the first , we find that , in the 'Pref缸 e' to the English
edition 0
various disciplines work independently from one another, utilise their

particular forms of thought, and having created a concept, affect, or
function depending on the mode of thinking employed, subsequently
look to the creations of other disciplines to determine if and where it
is possible to use the results of the other disciplines to aid future crea幡
tion. 认1e see an exal丑ple of this in Deleuze's cinema books , where
he claims 'cinema itself is a new practice of images and signs , whose
theory philosophy must produce as conceptual practice' (C2: 280).
Whereas cinema creates images and signs, it is the job of philosophy
to complement cinema's creativity by engaging with a philosophical
analysis of cinema itself. While Heidegger claims philosophy underpins
the arts (and sciences) by explaining the conceptual understandings
of the various disciplines and so establishes a disciplinary hierarchy,
Deleuze resists such a hier盯chy by claiming that , in actuality, philoso-
phy's engagement with cinema does not underpin cinema , but offers a
different take on cinema than cinema is capable of undertaking itself.
Presumably, this is reciprocated so that cinema is capab1e of undertaking
a cinematic inquiry into philosophy. In other words, having worked
independent1y to create their individual perspectives on the prob1ems
each formulates independently and individually, the various disciplines
are able to form alliances to combine results already created to s01ve a
particular problem. This working together does not , however, mean the
various disciplines impact on each other's work methods or content,
but that they direct their individual creative efforts towards the 'same
issue and come up with solutions independent1y from one another to
then combine the results after they have been independently created.
While cinema entails a practice of image-sign creation , De1euze claims
an alliance with philosophy will a1so reveal cinema as concept; a revela回
tion that opens cinema to alternatives. 丁he important point regarding
this form of cross-disciplinary interaction is that the various disciplines
remain independent from one another, but po01 their conclusions or
insights to aid further creation. Forming alliances does not mean the
methods of one discipline shape the methods of another. A re1ationship
based on alliances is a results-based re1ation
Deleuze 011 the Pwpose and Place o(Pl1 ilosop l1 y 197
philosophy, science, and art entail different forms of thinking, there are
'echoes and resonances between them' (M: 123). These echoes ensure
that, while the three disciplines are structured around different ways
of perceiving and creating , the content of each echoes throughout
the others. To highlight what he means , Deleuze points towards some
concrete examples , including the way Riemannian space , which sets up
little neighbouring portions that can be joined in infinite ways , echoes
throughout cinema. This does not rnean that cinema is Riemannian , or
that the cinematic director is Riemann, but that the spatial co-ordina-
tion of Riemann finds expression in and through cinema. This is not
to say that cinema mirrors or copies the example of Riemann , but that
Ri emannian space dissipates imperceptibly throughout the different
forms of thought, each time taking on new, sOInetimes exp 1icit, some-
times implicit , forms and directions (M: 124).
Another example given comes from physics and, in particular, its
notion of a baker's transformation which involves the stretching and
folding of a square in on itself. Deleuze maintains that the film Je t'aime,
je t'aime employs the same technique with regards to time so that the
hero is taken back to one moment in his life which is folded into another
to create a disjointed, overlapping, folding and 'very striking conception
of time [... that] echoes the "baker's transformation"' (M: 124). 'There are
[therefore] r它markable similarities between scientific creators of functions
and cinematic creators of images. And the same goes for philosophical
concepts , since there are also concepts of these spaces' (M: 124-125). We
may also point towards Deleuze's own philosophy, which borrows from
0 1' is influenced by botanics, mathematics, and the bar‘ oque, to name
but a few of the echoes of other disciplines found in his works. Deleuze's
conclusion is that a philosophical concept entails a multiple existence
that extends beyond its own domain. Brian Massumi nicely summa-
rises Deleuze's position by saying that the constructions of all disciplines
entail "'double becomings 飞 [which] cascade' (2010: 7) , before going on
to illuminate this through the example of a mathematical construction
which spills over into the philosophical arena , thereby moving from a
functive to a conceptual construct
various disciplines; thought echoes and cascades throughout the various

disciplines , with the echo and cascade being different each time. As such ,
the notion of echo points towards an intimate relationship between the
three disciplines that overcomes their irreducible difference. This is not
a results-based relationship , but a relationship where the content of the
various disciplines imperceptibly infiltrates and shapes the content of
the others. This is very different to an alliance where both disciplines
remain distinct during their individual processes of gestation but subse-
quently seek ways to come together to combine results. Perhaps , the
difference between a relationship based on an alliance and one based
on an echo is best summarised by Karen Barad's distinction between
'inter-action' , defined as the idea 'that there are separate individual
agencies that precede their interaction' , and 'intra-action' which 'recog-
nizes that distinct agencies do not precede , but rather emerge through,
their intra幡 action' with the 'distinct' agencies of intra-action only being
'distinct' in a relational , not an absolute sense, that is , agencies are
only distinct in relation to theit mutual entanglement; they don't exist as
individual elements (Barad , 2007: 33). Alliances are inter.翩-a
as the disciplines re臼n丑lain di祀st柱inct 扛fron丑1 one another and subsequent甘ly
interact by explicit吐-Iy seeking ways to pool their individual conclusions,
while a relationship based on echoes would be intra-active insofar as
the disciplines emanate from an implicit onto恻 genetic entanglement.
The way each shapes the othe1' is neve 1' singula1', 0 1' linea1', but develops
and occu1' s th 1'ough the becoming of each ensuring that the disciplines
are 'separate melodic lines in constant interplay with one another'
(M: 125). This melodic interplay is not a thought心ut occurrence nor is
it located in any specific point of reference; it reverberates throughout
the disciplines at the p1'e- 1'eflective level , thereby allowing each to spon-
taneously shape and impact on the conclusions and mode of thinking
of the othe 1' s (M: 125).
With this, we see that Deleuze is trying to navigate a position that
secu 1'es the diffe 1'ence in kind of each discipline all the while maintaining
that each is influenced by the others. While we have already seen that
Deleu
Deleuze 011 the PUψose and Place o(Philosoplzy 199
But is it possible for discip 1i nes to be different in kind and connected in

the way the notion of echo demands? If so, what is it that 'binds' the
various discip 1i nes together to allow each to echo throughout the others
without this usurping the fundamental difference of each? And if not,
does this apparent contradiction undennine Deleuze's attempt to think
difference as and from difference or does it not matter given his rejec-
tion of philosophical consistency? 认1hile these questions are interesting
and ir丑portant in themselves , they are also fundar丑 entally important
for Deleuze's attempt to affirm difference as and from difference and ,
indeed , for any evaluation of his atteI丑 pt. To show this , the final chapter
engages with the ways in which Deleuze's notion of echo is but one
manifestation of a wider problem in his thinking, a problem that reveals
that traces of a form of identity continue to adhere to the onto-genetic
level of his differential ontology.
Deleuze's Differential
0日tology
Having described Deleuze's main ontological categories , stitched them

together to reveal the systemic nature of his thinking, argued that his
onto-genetic account goes beyond Heidegger、 engaged with the tran-
scendental conditions he suggests define the various modes of thinking,
and traced the various ways he tries to think the inter/intra恻relationships
between the various modes of thinking , the purpose of this concluding
chapter is to start to evaluate Deleuze's attempted affirmation of differ刷
ence as and from difference to come to some sort of conclusion regarding
how we are to approach it in terms of its success 0 1', as Deleuze would
insist on , inte 1'esting features. This is important because most commen唰
tato 1's on Deleuze tend to content themselves 斗vith explanatory accounts
of his , admittedly, difficult thinking and shy away from engaging with
the philosophical veracity of his arguments. In cont1'ast, 1 take this to be
of pa1'ticular importance , both in itself and due to the topic of this book,
because , as Deleuze and Heidegger suggest , the critical aspect inherent
to any questioning is central to the discursive nature of phi1osophy; it is
this critical questioning that prevents the descent into authoritarianism.
The moment a thinke 1" s a1'guments a1'e simply taken fo 1' granted is the
moment when thinking is abandoned. Having engaged in a critical
questioning of Heidegge 1" s thinking in p1'evious chapters , it is now time
to do the same to Deleuze's. Because 1 take Deleuze's overall project to
be guided by the attempt to affi 1'm difference as and from difference , 1
suggest that it is here , in the 1'elationship between difference and identity,
that the real crux of Deleuze's thinking 1'esides. The aim is not so much
to show that Deleuze is 'right' or 'wrong' , but to try to determine the
success of his attempted affi 1'mation of diffe 1'ence to see if it can be taken
to be the last word on this problem with the consequence that thinking
can and should attend to othe1' s; 0 1' whether despite , or indeed because
200
Identity in Deleuze's Difl它的 ztial Ol1 tology 201
of, Deleuze's thinking on this problem , thinking that wants to affirm

difference over identity must continue to attend to this relationship.
In othe臼r words孔，让
i t ai让ms to det忧
er口口m
丑
时nlÎ ne whe
创tt且le
凹l' the way 01'巳7斗， in Heidegge
凹1"
ter口.'ms
‘ 孔， the path that Deleuze travels along to af缸fir口 .1日
n dif旺fe 臼rence as and
from difference actually manages to achieve this. Admittedly, for many,
Deleuze's thinking does , indeed , offer us a way to think difference as
and from difference, but too often this affirmative conclusion is simply
stated or taken for granted without an actual engagement with his
arguments. Once we start to seriously look at Deleuze's categories and
arguments , 1 will suggest that we actually find that hidden within his
ontological categories are remnants of the identity he seeks to escape.
By highlighting this tension in Deleuze's account, and showing that it
leads back to the question of the relationship between difference and
identity, the problem(s) that Deleuze's formulation falls into can be used
to stimulate a re-thinking of the difference/identity relationship , while
doing so in a way that reveals what ontologies of difference have to
do to overcome all forms of identity and affinn difference as and from
difference.
the irreco日cilable
To proceed , we return to the end of the prevíous chapter, which showed

that Deleuze's outline of the various modes of thinking leads to a position
where he affirms the difference in kind of each mode of thinking while
maintaining, through his notion of echo , that each is intimately and
constitutively entwined. In other words , Deleuze's thinking on the rela-
tionship between philosophical and non蝇 philosophical thinking tries to
reconcile two contradictory positions. The first details a specific content
and unique purpose for philosophy, a purpose and content that, in more
than some ways , is dependent on no日帆philosophy， insofar as concep-
tual (philosophical) thought is intimately connected to and dependent
on the non-conceptuality of its plane of immanence. The second tries
to think philosophy's relationship to non-philosophy, in the form of
non偏 philosophical disciplines , by thinking the inter/intra-disciplinary
connections between the different modes of thinking. Deleuze tries to
combine both strands to determine 'how something can be different
without being separate' (Kaiser, 2010: 209). Thinking this paradox is no
doubt part of Deleuze's challenge , but my suggestion is that , ultimately,
it is one that Deleuze's ontological are unable to meet. The
problem Deleuze has is that factor is required to allow
'things' to be different and joined. This mediating factor
202 Ontolog)';11 Heidegger and Deleuze
must exist at the onto榈genetic level of each multiplicity so it can allow

the becoming of each mode of thinking to int1uence the onto-genetic
becomings , operations, and content of the other disciplines. Deleuze
not only fails to explain what this unnamed factor is , but his ontology
of affirmative difference and rejection of any ontological mediation
seem to explicitly reject its existence.
To show this , 1 start with Lutz Ellrich (1996: 484) who offers two
arguments that question the extent to which Deleuze's valorisation
of difference entails a break from identity. Fi rst , Ellrich maintains that
Deleuze's attempt is t1awed because it fails to recognise that difference
cannot exclude identity, but is dependent on , and necessarily points
towards , identity. While we have seen that Deleuze agrees that identity
can emanate from difference, he forcibly rejects the notion that identity
precedes difference or that difference depends on identity. According
to Ellrich , however, difference can exclude identity from itself only if it
identifies differentiation as that which it is. This , however, posits differ-
ence in opposition to identit弘 which ， far from eliminating identity,
actually leads to the identity of differential non-identity. In other words ,
Deleuze fails to see that , somewhat paradoxically, identity is differential
and difference entails a form of identity.
Ellrich's conclusion , on this point , has, however, been contested by,
amongst others, Jeffrey Bell who associates Deleuze with a dynamic
metaphysical system and so concludes that a dynamic system is never
based on nor does it entail identity; it is 'in between' identity and non-
identity. Ellrich's insistence that Deleuze's differential ontology culmi-
nates in an identity is simply wrong because , for Bell, identity entails
a fixed , static identity which Deleuze's dynamic metaphysical system
is opposed to and so avoids (2007: 173). While Bell is correct to main-
tain that Deleuze's ontology recognises that , while identity exists , it
emanates from difference , this must be complemented by pointing out
that Deleuze also maintains that any identity attained is momentary for
the simple reason that no sooner has being 'unified' than it different/
ciates into a new form. As a consequence , Bell rightly understands that
Deleuze holds that difference precedes identity, but fails to engage wit
Identi句) in Deleuze's Dil和rentiaZ Ontology 203
to order thern in a hierarchical fashion delineating one as foundationa l.

Bell would , no doubt , respond that difference is not opposed to identity,
but is different to it and so cannot be collected back up into identity,
but it is not entirely clear that this solves the problern. By clairning that
difference is different to identity, Ellrich would presurnably retort that
difference continues to be defined through its relationship to identity.
飞Nith this , we rnove to Ellrich's second charge which states that , by
insisting on the self-generation of difference, Deleuze fails to recognise
that, while the rnultiplicities created frorn being's different/ciation rnay
be different, the process or act through which they exist - being's affirrn岳
tive different/ciation 一 is cornrnon to all actualities. This is not to say
the content of the act is the sarne; after all, as one cornrnentator notes ,
'difference is the only recurring feature of being, the only trait of being
that keeps on recurring. It is, if you will , the essence of being. Yet because
it is difference alone that recurs, it recurs always di萨的1tly' (Beistegui ,
2004: 328). It rneans the forrn through which each rnultiplicity becornes
different/ciated shares cornrnon structures. While Ellrich does not spell
out what this act of different/citation entails, if we return to the categories
of Deleuze's differential ontology we can flesh it out.
For Deleuze, being becornes through a process of different/citation
whereby a differentiated , but undifferenciated , virtual Idea is differend-
ated into actual rnultiplicities. There are two key cornponents to this
rnovernent that appear to point towards cornrnon features linking the
differendation of the different virtual Ideas: (1) difference; and (2) the
virtual actual rnovernent. Starting with the first, we rnust rernernber
…
that , for Deleuze , difference is intirnately connected to being's univocity,

a relationship that has left rnore than one cornrnentator confused. Most
farnously, it led Alain Badiou to insist that the univocity of being under-
rnines the difference of each rnultiplicity to the extent that Deleuze's
thinking reduces difference to the One of Platonisrn (2000: 10, 16,
25). Badiou's interpretation has , however, been forcibly challenged
by, arnongst others , Nathan 叭Tidder who explains that , by being's
univocity, Deleuze is not 'concerned with establishing a uni
204 Ontology ín Heídegger í1 nd Deleuze
This reveals that difference , by virtue of always being different, is not

and cannot be that which is common to all multiplicities. As such, my
suggestion is that it is the virtual-actual movement that reveals that
common features continue to exist in Deleuze's onto-genetic account
of being. With this , we return to the claim made in Chapter 6 that
along with multiplicity, difference , and immanence , virtuality (and its
relationship to actuality) is one of the cornerstones of Deleuze's differ幽
ential ontology. Besides Difference and Repetition and his writings on
Bergson, Deleuze employs it in 'The Method of Dramatization' (MD:
101 , 110) , 'How do we Recognize Structuralisnγ(HRS: 178…179) , 'Doubts
about the Imaginary' (DI: 66) , Dialoglles (DII: 112-115) , Cinel刀。 2 (C2:
68…70 , 79-81 , 273) , The Logic of' Sense (LS: 48 , 67 , 304) , Anti-Oedipus
(AO: 140…141 , 145 , 270, 277 , 392) , A Thousand Plateaus (ATP: 104一 110，
153 , 396 , 445 , 549 , 561) ，讥lhat is Philosophy? (WP: 40 , 118 , 121-123 ,
140, 153 161 , 177 , 181 , 210 , 217 , 228-229) , and his last published
…
piece , 'Immanence: A Li fe' (I AL: 392). The scope of these writings and
the time that passes between them indicates the central role it plays
and continues to play in Deleuze's thinking, a centrality that emanates
from the way it binds difference , multiplicity, and becoming 'together'
to allow Deleuze to propose a coherent, systematic, but differentiated,
onto-genetic account of being. For example, in Di萨fence and R ψetition，
Deleuze maintains that difference is different/ciated between a virtual
differentiated Idea and a differenciated actuality, a distinction that
reveals the central role the virtual-actual movement occupies in the
process of different/ciation through which multip 1icities become. This
is further seen from A Thousand Plateaus' discussion of the rhizome,
which is , on my understanding, dependent on the virtual-actual move唰
ment because , as noted in Difference and Repetition , multiplicities , which
Deleuze claims are best described by the term 'rhizome' (LJM: 366) , arise
from the different/ciation process that proceeds from virtuality to actu-
a1ity. As a consequence, Deleuze writes that differentiat/ciation entails
a 'movement that creates multiplicities, which are composed of actual
and virtual elements' (DII: 112). Similarly, Deleuze's insistence , in What
is Philosophy? , that phi1 oso
ldent的， in Deleuze's Dil如rential Ontology 205
temporary and ultimately clarificatory, insofar as it allows their later

thinking to recognise and affirm that virtuality (1) is necessa 1'y for their
system; and (2) cannot be thought in purely ideal 0 1' real terms , but must
be thought in terms of ideality and reality. While it may be thought that
this temporary abandonment contradicts my insistence that the virtual
is a fundamental component of Deleuze's differential ontology, Deleuze
and Guattari's flirtatious abandomnent of virtuality in Anti-Oedipus and
subsequent re嗣 introduction of it in A Thollsand Plateaus , the second
volume of Capit，α lism and Schizophrenia , not only re-affirms my point
regarding the central role it plays in Deleuze's differential ontology,
but also re也nforces my decision to use it to examine whether Deleuze's
ontology is able to think and affirm difference as and from difference.
This is not to say, however, that Deleuze maintains that the virtual-
actual movement is a linear movement or that it always entails the same
movement. Deleuze is very clear that the virtual 'itself' is always differen-
tiated, with this differentiation moving at a speed and timeframe 'shorter
than the shortest continuous period imaginable' (DII: 112), that the move-
ment through which virtualities become actual multiplicities is multiple,
as evidenced by his discussions of the different ways actualities become
through , fo 1' example , sense , crystallisations, folds and inflections (FLB:
3, 6 8, 14-15) , echoes, conceptualisation , functionality, and a旺ectuality，
…
and that actual multiplicities continue to become through rhizomic-

becomings. While Deleuze is clearly trying to show the ways in which
the onto幡genesis of actual multiplicities emanates from difference and
remains as difference , my argument is that, irrespective of the different
forms the virtual-actual movement takes (intensit弘 sense， crystallisation,
εcho ， fold , and so on) , each multiplicity only is by passing from virtual
being to actual being and that this movement entails, by virtue of simply
passing from virtual being to actual being, a commonality inherent to
all multiplicities. The origin , way, and 'end' of each virtual-actual move-
ment may be different , but, at its simplest, the path is common: to be
actual , multiplicities must pass from virtual being to actual being. 飞tVhile
it is true tha
206 Ontology in Heídegger and Deleuze
Different senses of identity
Identity in the sense of the identical describes the notion that there is
a closed , unified totality that precedes and is , therefor飞 the primordial
source of difference. This unified totality, which has often been thought
to be transcendent, is the undifferentiated focal point that is subse-
quently differentiated into different entities. As a consequence, identity
in the sense of the identical tends to maintain a two-realm metaphysics
based on a primordial undifferentiated realm of identity and a secondary,
empirical realm of difference. Deleuze's notion of multiplicity forcibly
rejects this by rejecting the notion that being is: (1) split into two
realms; and (2) foundationally unified , with difference resulting from
this unity. Deleuze's notion of multiplicity makes clear that at no point
does difference emanate from a closed, fixed unit其 while any momen鹏
tary unity that appears emanates from the different cor口ponents of the
multiplicity coalescing to form a temp 01' ary unity bef01' e dissolving into
another configuration. There is no actual closed, fixed unity, only the
temp 01' ary configuration of unity as a consequence of difference.
This brings us to the second sense of identity: identity of the same.
叭Thereas identity in the sense of the identical posits a foundational ,
unified entity as the source of difference, identity in the sense of the same
entails (1) a unified source which is subsequently manifested differently
before clllminatingin unity; 01', more straightf01'wardly, (2) a differentiated
source that culminates in unity. What is imp 01' tant fo 1' OU 1' purposes is that
this sense of identity collects difference at the end of a particular process
and, in so doing, reduces difference to the same. Whereas identity in the
sense of the identical maintains that difference is grounded in an iden-
tical source with the consequence that detennining what each particu-
larity entails requires that we return to its unified foundational source, a
p1'ocess that can be described as going backwa1'ds 0 1' downwards, identity
in the sense of the same is ma 1'ked by a teleological movement that goes
forward 0 1' upwa 1'ds to its culminating end. If the first sense of identity
of the same is adopted (i. e. an initial unity that is expressed diffe 1'ently
bef01' e culminating in unity) , the impo1'tant point is not the unity that
initiates the development as this would reduce thi
Idellti句， ;11 Deleuze ,s Dífferential Ontology 207
end-point, or goal (B: 106) , nor is there any 'preformed logical order to
becomings and multiplicities' (ATP: 277). Being's differentjciation entails
a random, independent , spontaneous , imI口 anent becoming that 'cannot
be brought bacl< to Some Thing as a unity superior to all things, nor to
a Subject as an act that brings about a synthesis of things' (l AL: 389). As
a consequence, Deleuze's notion of multiplicity rejects identity in the
senses of the identical and the same to affirm an open蝇 ended process of
differential becoming.
认lhile Deleuze claims that Heidegger aims to think difference and
does so by placing 'identity in the sense of the identical' in opposition
to a privileged 'identity in the sense of the same' , Deleuze claims that
this does not go far enough in thinking as and from difference because
difference is always reduced to the question of the meaning of being
(DR: 66). Heidegger's thinking starts from a unitary point (the question
of the meaning of being) and ends in the same point (the question of
the meaning of being). While Heidegger claims the same entails the
other as a way of defending himself against the claim that his privi-
leging of the question of the meaning of being re-instantiates the unity
of metaphysics (丁PR:89…90) ， Deleuze maintains that, because Heidegger
always returns to the same question even if thÌs question Ìs posed differ-
ently, Heidegger's thinking is but another‘ manifestation of the tradi-
tion's privileging of identity. For Deleuze , it is only by thinking being as
di斤érence， as opposed to thinking being through (the ontological) d仰的1ce，
that we can overcome the image of thought's privileging of identity. As
a consequence , Deleuze learns from , what he takes to be, Heidegger's
failure to overcome identity's privileged place and takes great care to
ensure that (1) all aspects of his analysis emanate from differ ence; and‘
(2) any identity that arises not only emanates from a t l'anscendental
difference , but also continues to differentiate (DR: 66). However, while
Deleuze's differential ontology offers a forceful challenge to what 1 have
called identity in the senses of the identical and same , my argument is
that it does so by relying on a third sense of identity, which 1 will call
identity in the sense of the common.
叭Thereas identity in the senses of the identical and same posit a
closed , undifferentiated unity as t
208 Ontology ill Heídegger L7 nd Deleuze
subsequently rnanifested differently before culrnìnating in unity, a posi-

tion that reveals identity exists at the start and end of the process; or
(2) a differentiated source that (‘ulminates in unity, a position that points
towards a teleological end that underrnines being's becorning, identi命
in the sense of the commO l1 starts frorn a differentiated source that creates
different entities through a differentiated process. 飞气lhile this appears to
think as and frorn difference, the irnportant part is the process through
which the differentiated source becornes different entities , because it is
here that 1 will suggest that, in actuality, the appearance of difference
rnasks and is dependent on cornrnon features or processes that continue
the becorning. Relating this rather abstract description to Deleuze's
ontology reveals that while Deleuze clairns the virtual-actual relationship
is inherently differential , insofar as each virtual Idea is differentiated, each
virtual-actual rnovernent is differenciated, and the actual rnultiplicity
produced is differenciated and continues to different/ciate, the rnere
existence of this cornmon virtual-actual rnovernent points to the conclu-
sion that, no rnatter how particular the rnovernent , all mu1tiplicities are
structured around this cornmon virtual-actual transcendental structural
movernent. While each actuality rnay be individual and emanate frorn a
unique process of differenciation , the transcendental nature of Deleuze's
ontology ensures that there are transcendental features , such as the virtual-
actual rno飞7ernent， that are cornrnon to each actuality.
Of course , it may be questioned whether cornrnonality can be placed
under the rubric of identity, but , 1 want to suggest that , for ontolo-
gies of difference , it rnust be for the sirnple reason that , by claiming
that identity emanates from difference , Deleuze rnust sever any internal
onto-genetic unifying linkage between multiplicities. Only this will
truly allow hirn to affirm the prirnacy of difference over identity. To
do so , Deleuze's affirrnation of difference rnust not only overcorne
identity in the senses of the identical and same , but also identity in
the sense of cornmonality to truly remove all fonns of unity from the
onto-genesis of being. My suggestion, however, is that, while Deleuze's
dif
Identi牛 in Deleuze's Diñ如mtial 011 ωlogy 209
Examples of identity in Deleuze's differential ontology
While Deleuze claims that each multiplicity emanates from a unique

virtual-actual movement that produces a unique , open-ended , concrete
m口1ul垃tiplici让ty (KCP: 68) , this com 丑1mηlO n principle of production r
each multiplicity is underpinned by a cω: 刀omm口
mon diffe1'陀.它
ent 时
t/cia
挝ting 白
s t柱1'u
盯1汇
C跚
tur陀.它e 由
t ha
剖t actualises a vi 1' tual Idea. Deleuze appea 1's to be committed to
the claim that: (1) these transcendental featu 1' es are nothing and so do
not entail a priori commitments 1' ega1'ding the content of the p1'oduc-
tion process that actualises the vi 1'tual of each multiplicity; and (2) the
t 1' anscendental features of each multiplicity a1'e unique to that pa1'ticula 1'
multiplicity, the1'eby safegua1'ding the diffe 1'ence of each multiplicity,
but it is difficult to see how he can squa1'e this with his claim that the
actualisation of each multiplicity emanates from a vi 1'tual-actual st1'uc-
ture that produces each individuated multiplicity. This is not to say that
each multiplicity is the same or diffe 1'enciates itself in the same way; it
is to say that each multiplicity, by virtue of the vi1'tual一actual st1'ucture
differenciates itself and , irrespective of the actual multiplicity produced,
shares this common vi 1'tual-actual production movement with other
multiplicities.
Again , it may be questioned whethe 1' this is sufficient to call into
question Deleuze's affi 1'mation of difference, after all he does show
that the virtual Ideas are differentiated , that the virtual-actual move-
ment is differenciated, and that the multiplicities produced continue
to different/ciate, leading to the conclusiol1 that 'while actual forms or
products can 1'esemble each other, the movements of p 1'oduction do not
resemble each othe1', no 1' do the products resemble the virtuality that
‘
they embody' (B: 104) , but 1 want to suggest it does fo 1' the simple reason
that if my suggestion that commonality is a form of identity is correct
and if it is accepted that Deleuze posits a transcendental structu1'al
movement common to all acts of production so that each only is by
passing from virtual being to actual being, it follows that a fo 1'm of iden-
tity continues to constitute the onto-genetic level of being's becoming.
vVhile not suggesting that each multiplicity is identical 0 1' the same , 1
am suggesting that, by claim
which means that a form of identity runs through and so unites each
multiplicity at the ontologicallevel.
Strategies to defend Deleuze against this charge would be to: (1) reject
the idea that the virtual-actual movement is central to his thinking;
and (2) suggest that there is a fundamental rupture between an 'early'
and 'late' Deleuze meaning that my criticism , at best, only undermines
one aspect of Deleuze's attempt to affirm difference as and from differ四
ence , a failing that is subsequently corrected in his later writings. 1 have,
however, already noted that the virtual-actual movement plays a central
and continuous role throughout Deleuze's writings , a continuity that
undermines the idea that there is a fundamental rupture between an
'early' and 'late' Deleuze. Furthermore, Deleuze's dependence on a form
of identity does not disappear in his later writings , but actually becomes
more pronounced as he not only continues to depend on the virtual-
actual movement , but also makes use of common structures to describe
the transcendental conditions that define the various modes of thinking
and identify how they interac t.
For example, we saw that Deleuze defines philosophy as the discipline
that creates concepts , sets up a background plane of immanence , and
invents conceptual personae. While the specifics of each philosophical
system may be different , they all share these formal conditions. 1'he same
holds for the other modes of thinking. Science creates functions from
a plane of reference and depends on observers who set up and observe
experiments in I‘ elation to the constants of the plane of reference, and
art is linked to percepts and affects based on a background horizon
called the plane of composition populated by figures. 1'0 be defined as
philosophical or scientific or aesthetic , thinking must conform to the
transcendental conditions that define that mode of thinking 1丑 eaning
that all systems of philosophical , scientific, and aesthetic thinking share
the common conditions that define that particular mode of thinking.
However, by defining the formal conditions that delineate the various
forms of thought , Deleuze points towards common conditions that
precede, define , and unite all manifestations of philosophical, scientific,
and aesthetic thinking , a pointing towards that sits uneasily with his
claim that each act of thinking is creat
Identity in Deleuze's Di伊rential Gntology 211
such , the different manifestations of thought emanate from and conform

to a priori common features which , if my suggestion that commonality
entails a form of identity is accepted , means that Deleuze thinks the
various forms of thinking from universal unchanging structures (= iden-
tity) not difference as his differential ontology aims to.
认1hile this reveals that the 'internal' structure of each mode of thinking
is dependent on a common identity, this common identity is also
seen from the inter/intra-relationship between the disciplines. 叭lhile
Deleuze claims that the transcendental conditions that define each
mode of thinking secure the radical difference of each , a position that
appears to preclude the possibility of inter/intra唰 disciplinary exchange ,
he also recognises that inter/intra-disciplinary exchange is possible. For
example , it will be remembered that the English 'Preface' to Di伊rence
and Repetition suggests that , despite their irreducibly different methods ,
contents , and purposes , the various disciplines can form alliances with
one another to combine the results they have achieved independently
in ways that stiInulate future research. As I mentioned, however, the
problem with this is that it requires a mediating aspect that brings the
two radically different modes of thinking together to al1 0w them to
exchange and learn from the other's radically different ideas. Without
this mediating aspect , it is difficult to see how a philosopher who deals
in concepts can discuss that concept with an artist who deals in affects
without turning the latter into the forme r. Deleuze points to this possi-
bility, but never explains how the two can remain as a philosopher and
an artist and discuss the 'same' thing, a problem of particular difficulty
because the transcendental conditions of each mode of thinking mean
that a philosopher and artist never look at the same object; the object
is always completely different for the two. Indeed, we saw that this is
the main problem that confronts any interaction between philosophers
and non-philosophers; their ways of thinking are so radically different
that they simply cannot countenance the other's ideas. Not only does
Deleuze not describe this mediating aspect , but his ontology of radical
affirmative difference explicitly rejects it. Each manifestation of differ蝴
ence is an effect of a spon
212 Ontology Ìn Heidegger and Deleuze
structure and content of others. But for an echo to reverberate between

the disciplines requires an aspect that joins the two. Deleuze again
does not mention what this is , but if we try to think with him , we may
conclude that the univocity of being means that the mediating aspect is
difference. In other words , each discipline would be different , but would
share the same voice with the consequence that , through this 'thread' ,
one could echo through the other二 The probler丑 with this 'solution' is
that, because the voice that is said across all entities is diffe 1'ence , it is
always said diffe1'ently. We saw this in Deleuze's analysis of the t1'an胃
scendental conditions of each mode of thinking where each form of
thinking emanates from being and so shares this voice , but does so in
radica l1y different ways. But if the disciplines a1'e so radically different,
how can the voice of one be transferred to or deciphered by another
without majo 1' distortion'? Becaus巳 the modes of thinking are different
and because difference is always said differently, any echo that does reso-
nate will be so different f1'om its source that it may not be clear whether:
(1) it actually is an echo from another mode of thinking 0 1' simply an act
of pure creation by the 'recipient' , which would mean that there is actu-
ally no disciplinary interchange; and/or (2) the recipient discipline will
be able to make sense of it or recognise that it emanates from another
discipline , both of which are surely necessary conditions for any inter楠
disciplinary research. If the echo found in the recipient discipline does
not resonate with the message of the source or if the disciplines cannot
make sense of the echo that resonates between them , how are they to
interact with one another to not only create from one another but to
do so in a way that secures their radical difference'? To my mind , the
categories of Deleuze's differential ontology are unable to respond to
this question with the consequence that 1 am led to conclude that his
analysis of the transcendental conditions that distinguish the disciplines
and discussion of the various ways that the disciplines interact with one
another must depend on common ontological structures that his differ-
ential ontological explicitly rejects.
Concluding remarks
With this , we see that there are at least three separate moments where
identity in the sense of the common slips into Deleuze's affirmation of
difference: the virtual-actual movement that indicates that a common
movement of becoming runs through the supposedly irreducibly
different moments of onto-genesis , the transcendental conditions of the
various modes of thinking that shows that the various modes of thinking
Identity ill Deleuze's Di伊rential Olltology 213
share common structur它 s ， and Deleuze's notion of echo that reveals

that a common thread runs through the various modes of thinking.
The question now becomes: 认1here do these moments of identity reside
within Deleuze's thinking? After all , if they emanate from a prior differ-
ence , we can conclude that they do not undermine Deleuze's attempt to
show that identity is grounded in difference. If, however, the common
moments are found to reside 'in' his analysis of being's onto-genesis
then Deleuze's atter丑 pt to affirm difference will continue to depend on
a form of the identity he seeks to overcome, an occurrence that would,
at the very least, call into question the path he takes.
Given he is one of the few commentators to address this issue, we
return again to Lutz Ellrich who agrees that moments of identity continue
to adhere to Deleuze's differential ontology, but suggests that, rather
than undermine his attempt , they disclose that his thinking operates on
two distinct and contradictory levels. Whereas the first is purely logical
and allows Deleuze to successfully affirm an ontology of radical differ-
ence , the second is observational and takes its cue from er丑pirical reality.
According to Ellrich , it is on the second level that Deleuze's ontology of
difference breaks down with the result that his analysis 'must admit iden唰
tity' (1 996: 484). Once Deleuze starts to enter the world of observation
and practice , Ellrich maintains that he must start to introduce moments
of identity into his analysis to account for the moments of common
identity, such as language , ethics , and nonns , observed. The movement
from a logic of pure difference to empirical observation accounts for
the moments of identity found in Deleuze's differential ontology. While
it is true Ellrich uses this explanation to account for why moments of
identity can be found in Deleuze's thinking as a precursor to arguing
that Deleuze fails to affirm difference as and from difference, Ellrich's
conclusion , one 1 support , is reached through arguments that 1think are
suspect. In particular, Ellrich claims that Deleuze fails in his attempt to
affirm difference as and from difference because , while he successfully
offers a logic of difference as and from difference, once this logic enters
the empirical , moments of identity enter his analysis. But this conclu-
sion is based on a
Deleuze's analysis is rooted in the transcendental nature of his ontology.

For Bryant, the transcendental conditions of Deleuze's ontology explain
the process of self陆 generation ， even if the means and ends of each self-
generation are differen t. In other words , because Deleuze's ontology
defines the means through which each multiplicity produces itself,
'the variations of difference must be conceived as a unity of difference
by virtue of having a common principle of production underlying the
飞Tariations' (2008: 43). This not only contradicts Ellrich's analysis , but
also appears to support my argument that Deleuze's attempt to affirm
difference as and from difference depends upon , and at times actually
affir在lS ， transcendental features , such as the virtual-actual movement ,
that are common to the onto-genetic formation of all multiplicities. The
difference between Bryant's and my own position appears to be that,
whereas Bryant distinguishes sameness from commonality, maintains
that identity only refers to sameness, and so concludes that Deleuze's
ontology 'undermines the notion of identity' (2008: 119), 1 suggest that
we need a more nuanced notion of identity that does not reduce it to
the identical or same. Identity must also be thought in terms of commo-
nality with the result that , while Deleuze's differential ontology offers a
stringent critique of identity in the senses of the identical and same, its
reliance on transcendental features common to each multiplicity means
that a form of identity remains at the onto唰genetic level of Deleuze's
analysis. 亏Vhile Deleuze's appeal to common features expressed differ-
ently through each multiplicity may ensure each escapes identity in the
senses of the identical or the same, by failing to sever all commonalities,
it fa i1 s to fully and continually think as and from difference. A more
nuanced analysis of identity and its relationship to difference is needed
if difference as and from difference is to be affirmed and all forms of
identity are to be overcome.
By way of conclusion then, we find that while Deleuze offers an
account of being's becoming that goes beyond Heidegger's in terms
of thinking the onto-genesis of being and opening thinking to new
vistas, his reliance on the virtual-actual movement and insistence that
the various modes of thinking are distinguished by c
Identity in Deleuze's Di伊rential011 的logy 215
cornplex, and differentiated account of identity, difference, and the

relationship between thern. In rnany respects , this is a conclusion that
Heidegger and Deleuze would appreciate; after all , it not only affirrns the
irnportance they give to the question of being, but returns us , in differ-
entiated forrn , to the question of the relationship between identity and
difference and , in so doing, appears to affirrn Deleuze's conclusion that
difference repeats and repetition is always different.
斗气10rks Cited
Alliez, E. (2013) , 'Ontology of the Diagram and Biopolitics of Philosophy: A

丑esearch Programme on Transdisciplinarity' , Deleuze Studies , vol. 7, no. 2,
pp.217-230.
Ansell♂earson ， K. (1999) , Germinal Li fe: The Diffáence and Repetition of Deleuze ,
Routledge: New Yor k.
Ansell-Pearson, K. (2009) , Viroid Li fe: Perspectives 011 Nietzsche and the Transhwnan
Condition , Routledge: New York.
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Index
ab酬 ground， 80-1 , 96 , 98 , 112, 135 evelation of, 87…8, 97

l'
absence , 14 , 17, 22 , 80-1 , 87 , 96 , 110, sense of, 117…18

113 , 129 spatial manifestation of, 35
abyss， 36一 7 ， 96 virtual , 139 , 142, 205 , 209
act being-in-the-world, 143 , 190
auto-poietic, 185 Beistegui , Miguel , 31 , 116, 122, 153,
intuitive , 154 187 , 203 , 216
of pure creation , 94 , 212 Bell , ]effrey, 118, 177 , 202-3 , 216
actíon Bergson, Henri , 129 , 173 , 204
human, 66-7 , 114 binary oppositions, 7 ， 28一31 ， 40-2，
political , 7, 44 50 , 79-80 , 89 , 100… 1, 103, 105 ,
social , 47 , 65… 6 108-10, 112…13
aesthetics, 193… 4, 217 logic of, 7, 28 , 30-1 , 40-1 , 50
affirmation, 6, 27…8, 42, 82, 85, metaphysics, 37, 40, 80, 96, 120
105--6, 122, 125 , 130-2, 135-6, boundarie~ 7~ 12~ 159-6~ 16~ 195
148 , 154, 162, 185-6, 202 Boundas, Constantin , 3, 218
alliances , 14, 195--6, 198 Bl' yant , Levi , 213
Alliez，且ric， 193 , 216
animals , 29 , 31 , 36 , 38, 117, 216 Caputo, John , 7, 108, 113, 216
annihilation, 46 , 48 , 62-4 , 85 , 95 , 103 chaos , 171 , 187… 8, 192, 216
Ansell-Pearson, Keith , 32 , 185 cinema , 196--7, 204
anthropocentrisITI , 6, 8, 13, 33 , 47 , commonality, 5, 21 , 23 , 25 , 137 , 156 ,
50-1 , 58-60 , 66-~ 73 , 7~ 87 , 91 , 158 , 195 , 205 , 208-9 , 211 , 213…14
93 , 95 , 102, 106, 108-9 , 125 , 136, concealment, 18, 49 , 60, 92
154 concepts , 6, 8 , 31-2, 87 , 116, 121 ,
anti-humanisITI , 32, 219 123 , 125-7, 132, 137, 152-6,
art , 10, 15 , 71 , 101 , 145 , 152--3, 157, 158… 64 , 166-8, 171-3 , 176-9 ,
166, 180, 182, 186-7 , 189-92, 182…92, 194, 196一 7 ， 210-11 ，
194-7, 210-11 , 217 , 219-20 218-19
al' tists , 153 , 166, 190, 192, 211 creation of, 8…9 , 12, 107 , 146,
152-4, 161 , 164, 166, 168, 180
background horizon , 163 , 167, 182, new, 154-5 , 160-1 , 168, 171 , 186
185 , 188 , 190, 210 conceptual
Badiou , Alain , 139 , 203 personae, 9, 12, 172, 188-90, 194-5 ,
Ba l' ad , Karen , 198 , 216 210
being solutions , 9 , 146, 148, 162, 173 ,
actual , 22, 205 , 209 175一 7， 184, 186, 189
becoming, 119, 127 concrete reality, 62, 153 , 173 , 181-2,
chaosmos of, 188 185-6
language, 38, 102 consciousness , 34 , 42, 139, 164-5
master of, 69 , 111 consistency, 179 , 187-8 , 194
onto-genesis of, 8-9 , 137, 148, 204 , control , 53 , 55 , 58 , 101-2, 111 , 113 ,
208, 214 154
221
222 Index
creation , 79 , 81-3 , 93 , 135 , 141 , 1481 differential

152, 154-5 , 160, 167, 172, 174, non-identity, 202
176, 180, 184, 188-91 , 193-4, ontology, 5, 9 , 11…12, 15 , 137-8,
196, 217 , 219 151-3 , 157-8 , 175 , 177, 186, 193,
artistic , 190-1 199-205 , 207-9 , 211-16
differentiation , 24 , 118 , 121 , 123 , 133 ,
Dahlstrom , Daniel, 64 , 216 142, 147, 202 , 205 , 207
dark precursor, 156-7 Dillet, Benoît, 187, 217
Davies, Bret, 111 Dreyfus , Hubert , 60…1, 98…9, 217
decision , 45 , 48, 75 , 109-101
114, 205 echo , 11-12, 157 , 195 , 198… 9, 201 ,
Delanda , Manuel , 137, 139, 177, 187, 205 , 212… 13
217 ek-sistence, 35 , 37 , 60, 90
Deleuze, Gilles Ellrich, Lutz , 202… 3, 213 , 217
affirmation of difference , 122, 208 , enframin&4~55-61 ， 65 ， 6~ 7~ 114
212 metaphysics, 57 , 96
ontology of difference , 8, 10, 15 entities , 4…6, 10-12, 18-25 , 33…8,
philosophy, 8 , 117 , 152, 172, 177, 40-2 , 44 , 47 , 50, 57-8 , 60, 72,
218 80, 119-21 , 126…8 , 130-2, 134一 7，
problems, 149, 201 158, 192, 202…3, 208
thinking, 3, 8, 12-14, 30 , 82, 106, being of, 25 , 34 , 80
123 , 130, 136, 164 , 170, 174, singular, 20, 22-5 , 35 , 126… 7, 136,
193… 5, 200-1 , 203… 4, 213-14 158
Derrida, ]acques, 22, 32, 41-2, 63 , 95 , truth of, 33 , 136
216-17 equivocal , 21 , 117
Descartes , Rene , 77 , 80, 105 , 148, essence, 2 , 27-9 , 31-5 , 37, 39 , 42-4 ,
160-2, 172--3 47 , 50-1 , 54 , 58-9 , 63 , 74 , 77 , 80,
destruction , 48-9 , 62-4 , 73 , 87-8 , 95 , 88 , 122, 139, 141 , 171
98…100, 103-4, 114, 220 being, 31 , 203
of metaphysics, 6, 62, 99 , 114 existential , 26--7 , 31
de-territorialisation, 181
difference Feenberg, Andrew, 44-5 , 52, 57 , 61 ,
being of, 25 , 42 217, 220
extemal , 24 … 5 , 81 , 131 , 134-6 Foucault，沁fichel， 3… 4 , 167 , 217-18
fundamental , 5, 25 , 183, 198… 9 foundational principles , 29 , 76 , 79 ,
inten~v~ 12~ 133-4 , 136 , 140 96, 147-50
intemal , 24 , 134-5 freedom , 35-6 , 38 , 73 , 85 , 96, 170,
ontological, 5, 10, 18-19, 22-3 , 25 , 219
3ι5 ， 39-42， 88 ， 120-1 ， 136-7 ， functions , 187--9, 191 , 194, 196-7,
175 204 , 210
ontology of, 14, 152, 201 , 208 scientific, 144, 188-9, 192, 197
qualitative, 134 fundamental ontology, 16一 17 ， 19 , 21 ,
radical , 11 , 156, 195 , 211-13 23 , 25-7 , 29 , 31 , 33 , 35 , 37 , 39 ,
differenciation , 118 , 121 , 123-5 , 142, 41 , 62 , 72 , 88
144, 151 , 203
different/ciating, 10, 125 , 134-5 , geo-philosophy, 152, 167, 176, 180
143-4 , 164-5 , 170 Giustiniani , Vito R. , 27…8 , 217
process of, 119 , 123-6, 133-4, 143, God , 4, 19 , 31 , 47 , 50, 78-9 , 98-9 ,
151 , 203-5, 208 117, 180-1
I l/ dex 223
ground , 19-23 , 25 , 29 , 31 , 40-2, 50-1 , rnetaphysics , 4, 20

61-2 , 66 , 71 , 73-4 , 78 , 80-2, 87 , moments of, 12, 205 , 213
91 , 96 , 98 , 132-3 , 135-6, 140, 147 ontology of, 120, 146, 152
Guattari , Felix, 14 , 204 , 216 , 220 sense of, 206一7
tradition's privileging of, 135 , 207
Hegel , Georg , 17, 88 , 105-6, 130, 145 , Ihde, Don , 44
155 ， 162-3 ， 171 ， 186 ， 218一20 irnage of thought , 4, 142, 146-8, 152,
Heidegger, Martin 162, 168, 173-5 , 178, 183-4,
critique of anthropocentrisrn , 6, 58 , 190-1 , 196-7 , 207
108, 136 immanence , 8…9, 12, 82, 116, 130,
critique of rnetaphysics , 3 , 6, 29 , 43 , 146, 152, 163-5 , 167-8, 171-2,
46, 64, 69 181-3 , 185 , 188-90, 193 , 201 ,
destruction , 62, 85 , 95 204 , 210 , 216 , 218… 19
ontology, 4-5 , 9, 13 , 34 , 37 , 116, planes of, 167 , 182 , 194
137, 173 individuation , 8 , 12, 128
problerns, 58 , 77 , 92 inhumane, 29-30
technology, 43 , 46 , 49 , 51 intensity, 122-3 , 125-6, 130, 132-6,
thinking , 2 , 4, 6-8, 10, 15… 16 , 19 , 146 , 150-2, 156, 192, 205
34 , 38-9 , 44-6 , 62, 72, 85 , 92, inter-action, 198
99-10~ 113-1~ 120-1 , 13~20~ intra-action, 198
207
history, 1一2 ， 28-9 ， 32， 58 ， 65 ， 74 ， judgement, 77, 92, 177-8
97 , 99 , 105 , 128, 160, 168, 170,
183-4, 189 , 217 , 219-20 Kant , Immanuel , 105 , 160-1 ,
of philosophy, 1-2, 11 , 14, 98 , 163 , 168
104-5 , 145 , 168 一 71 ， 182-4
horizon Lambert , Greg , 170, 218
non-conceptual, 163-5 language, 37… 8, 42, 63 , 101-2, 107 ,
pre-conceptual , 165-6 213
hurnan leap, 64 , 66 , 72 , 102-4, 112
activity, 7, 53 Leibniz, Gottfried, 77 , 80 , 105 , 141
being, 7, 25-40, 42, 45 , 49-51 , 53 , life, 20, 72 , 74 , 79 , 119 , 135 , 153 , 162,
55 , 57-8 , 61-6 , 69…70, 73 , 75 , 79 , 172-3 , 191 , 195 , 197, 204
90 , 95 , 101 一2， 109 , 112-13, 124 , logic, 6, 18 , 31 , 34 , 50, 61 , 79 , 101 ,
219 112, 150, 213 , 218
hurnanism , 16-17, 19, 21 , 23 , 25 ,
27-35 , 37 , 39-41 , 63 , 69 , 216-17 , McCumber, John , 31 , 218
219-20 Malpas, Jeff, 21
humanitas, 28-9 Massumi , Brian , 137, 197
humanity, 6 , 17, 27, 29, 31-2, 36-8 , Mengue , Philippe , 184, 218
50-1 , 53-5 , 58-60 , 94-5 , 102, 154 metaphysical
anthropocentrism , 6-7 , 33 , 61 ,
identity, 3-5 , 8-9 , 11-12, 14 , 21 , 23-5 , 66-7 , 95 , 105 , 108… 9
42, 88 , 94 , 119… 22 , 128 , 133 , enframing , 69 , 114
135 , 146 , 149 , 151 , 156…7, 175 , humanism , 27 , 29-30 , 32-3 ,
199-203 , 205一 15 39-40, 69
common , 211 , 213 philosophy, 86 , 88-90 , 97 , 107,
differential nonιidentity， 202 146 , 151
indeterminate, 156-7 trace , 66-7 , 113
224 Index
metaphysical - continued philosophical

tradition , 19 , 46 , 48-9 , 56 , 58-9, con c: epts, 162, 173 , 178 , 182, 186,
62-4 , 73 , 77 , 80-1 , 86-9 , 95 , 104, 188 , 190-1 , 197, 204
106, 111 creation , 154-5 , 161 , 164, 170,
metaphysics, 2-4, 6-8 , 10, 15 , 20 , 176-7, 180, 184-6 , 189-91 , 204
27 , 29-30, 32, 34, 37-40, 42-51 , systems, 80-2, 97 , 159, 181-2, 210
57-9 , 61-81 , 83 , 85 , 87-91 , philosophy
95-114 , 119-20, 206-7 , 218-20 authentic , 78, 83-4
movement purpose of, 5, 9, 15 , 72, 82, 145 ,
actual , 125…6, 205 , 208…10 173-5, 177
dialectical, 142, 184 plane
differentiation-differenciation , 13 7 of composition, 190, 210
fold-unfold , 128 of immanence, 9, 12, 146, 152,
intensive, 160 163-5 , 167-8, 171-2, 182, 185 ,
linear, 113 , 205 188-90, 201 , 204
revealing峭 concealing， 87 of reference, 188-91 , 210
teleological , 206 Plato , 1, 17 , 104…5 , 145 , 155 , 168, 171
Mugerauer, Robert, 46, 62, 100-1 , 218 Pöggeler, Otto , 46 , 62, 100, 219
multiplicities , 8 , 11 , 14, 25 , 79 , polyvocal , 21 , 99 , 130, 137
116-19 , 121-3, 125-9, 131…3, possibility, 4, 8, 3 4- 5, 59 , 61 , 74, 94,
135 , 137-41 , 143 , 155-6, 160, 99-100 , 103 , 113 , 137-8, 142 3, …
167 , 184 , 188, 191 , 202-10, 214 159 ， 162 ， 170， 181 ， 191 一2 ， 195 ，
mysticism , 99 100
… 211
posthumanism , 40
negation , 30, 96 , 130-2, 136, 180, 220 presuppositions , 32, 75-6 , 148, 166-7,
Nicholson , Graeme, 46 , 100, 218 187
Nietzsche, Friedrich , 63-4 , 97 , 105--6, problems , 76 , 155 , 161-2, 180, 182,
131 , 169一 70 ， 183-4 , 216 185
11011 c011ceptuality, 97 , 100, 163, 165,
‘
201 quantity, 122, 133-4

non-philosophers , 145 , 166, 192, 211 difference , 133-4
n011-philosophy, 97 , 152, 166, 201 ,
218 reflection , 92-4 , 152-4, 157, 175
110日斗气功 lling， 110-13 , 124 releasement , 66 , 76 , 109 , 111-12
nothing , 20 , 25 , 48 , 56 , 66 , 73 , 80-1 , being、 111
85-6 , 100, 102, 118-19 , 127, 139 , meditative thinking's , 95
161 , 163-4, 178, 186, 192, 209 towards things, 64 , 91
11othingness, 22 , 219 religion , 17, 76 , 98 , 101 , 173 , 219
repetition , 3 , 129 , 132, 147 , 195 , 204 ,
objectivity, 57 , 92, 101 , 183 215…16
Olafson , Frederick, 23 representation , 4-5 , 10, 87 , 92-4 , 101 ,
ontic , 45 , 74 , 217 124 , 133 , 141-2, 149-50, 152,
onto-genesis, 11 , 42, 137, 139 , 143 , 158 , 169 , 175 , 193 , 220
199, 205, 212 model of thinking , 93 , 146-52, 175 ,
ontological categories, 194, 200-1 183
Osborne, Peter, 7, 100, 108, 113 , 218 resemblance , 123, 140-2, 156-7, 209
overturning, 41 , 50 , 63 , 100, 158 , 219 re-territorialisation , 181
rhizome , 9 , 82, 116, 129-30, 142, 155 ,
Penner, Myron , 179 164 , 170-1 , 189 , 204
Index 225
Riis , Søren, 44 , 53 , 146一 7 ， 216 ， 219-20 essence of, 52-3 , 56 , 59 , 114

Rockmore , Tom , 26 , 219 modem , 43…4, 50, 52…60, 65 , 90, 219
Rorty, Richard, 85 sense of, 56-7
Ruin, Hans, 17 thinking
being, 2 , 18, 23-4 , 37 , 64 , 91-2,
Sartr飞 Jean-Paul ， 4, 139 , 164, 94-5 , 107 , 120-1 , 146 , 207
176, 219 calculative, 51 , 62 , 83 , 90… l
Schiωlin ， Kasper, 101 conceptual, 89, 100-1
Schönher, Mathias, 194-5 , 219 difference , 15 , 88 , 123 , 134-5 , 150,
Schürmann , Reiner, 20, 111 157 , 183
science, 10, 15 , 56 , 70-1 , 74 , 76-.7 , genuin~46 ， 71 , 7~ 9~ 10~ 116
84-5 , 90 , 98 , 101 , 137, 144-5 , meditative, 6-8 , 10, 13 , 42 , 46 , 62,
152, 157 , 180, 186-94 , 196-7, 67, 78 , 83 , 86-7 , 89-99 , 101-3 ,
210…11, 217, 219 105-15 , 146, 151 , 165 , 175
essence of, 56 metaphysical , 19一20， 42, 46-8 ,
modem , 56-7 , 98 63 , 66 , 69 , 75 , 78-9 , 87-92 , 94 ,
scientists , 58 , 166, 188-9 , 192-3 96-100 , 102, 104, 107-10, 112-14
sensations, 126, 137, 189-91 , 218 modes of, 4, 10-11 , 13 , 32, 37 , 55 ,
simulacra, 122, 139 , 219-20 69 , 79 , 89-90 , 100, 102-3 , 107,
Smith, Daniel 飞N. ， 117, 140, 149 , 158, 157, 173-4, 183, 187, 193-6, 198,
175-6 ， 216 ， 219一20 200-2, 210一 14
Socrates , 70 , 172 日 on-conceptual modes of, 97 , 100 ,
source, 11, 206-8 166-7, 201
space, 8 , 24 , 30, 34-5 , 65 , 73 , 86 , 101 , philosophical , 14, 74 , 82, 105-7 ,
121 , 159 , 161 , 182, 197 , 217 146-8, 164, 172, 174 , 179 , 182-3 ,
Spinoza, Baruch , 169 , 183 186, 198 , 210
standing-reserve, 54-5 , 58-9 , 62 Thomson , Iain , 20 , 99 , 217 , 220
Stengers , Isabelle, 193 , 220 totality, 25 , 51 , 123, 128, 141 , 171
structures trace ，毯， 7-8 , 47 , 63-7 , 85 , 87-8 , 104,
binary, 40 107-9 , 111-13 , 126, 184, 199
common different/ciating, 209 tradition , 5, 16 , 48-9 , 62-4, 71 , 85 ,
common transcendental, 214 103-4, 120-2, 169 , 175 , 219-20
intemal, 174, 211 transcendence , 139-40, 163-4, 181
logical, 98, 171 illusion of, 164, 180
ontological , 126, 203 transcendent principles, 148-50
subject, 31 , 40, 50 , 57-8 , 70 , 79 , 99 , transcendental
128, 140, 142, 148, 158-9, 169 , conditions , 12, 140, 194-5 , 200,
190, 207 210-12, 214
subjectivity, 125 , 176 , 181 difference , 133-5 , 146, 150-2, 207
transfonnation , 6… 8 , 16, 42, 68 , 74-5 ,
technë , 43 , 52 82, 102, 108, 110, 112-13 , 150-2,
technological 162, 220
being, 42, 187 transition , 6… 7, 67, 85 , 87, 102, 106,
understanding , 60 , 102 110, 114 , 158 , 174
technology, 8, 16, 42-6 , 49-61 , 65 , truth , 1-3 , 5, 9-10 , 23 , 26-9 , 33 , 35-8 ,
69 , 73 , 79 , 90 , 217 , 219-20 41 , 74-5 , 77-9 , 81-2 , 86-8 , 93 ,
critigue of, 15 , 43 , 51 , 64 97 , 145 , 147-50, 153, 165 , 170-1 ,
enframing of, 44 , 55 , 57 , 64 , 69 , 173-80
79 , 84 , 90 , 187 ont.O!oglCll , 31 , 42
226 Index
unity, 5, 11 , 81 , 88, 117-18, 122, Weinberger, Jerry, 55

126一32 ， 135-7 , 150, 156, 158…60 , 叭Tidder， Nathan, 203
164, 170, 203 , 206-8 , 214 , 218 willing, 59 , 67 , 70, 75 , 86 ,
univocal , 21-2, 117一 18 ， 203 ， 212， 91 , 93 , 95-6 , 105 , 108-14,
219-20 157
world , 29 , 53-4 , 57 , 61 , 71 ,
virtualldeas , 12, 118, 123-5 , 134, 79 , 84 , 90-1 , 103 , 105 ,
137-8, 140, 143-4, 151 , 155 , 139 , 146, 154, 162, 182,
203-4, 207-9 187 , 189-90, 193 , 213 ,
differentiated, 124-5 , 141 , 143 217…18
virtual-actual movement, 12, 137, world-飞Tiew， 79-84 , 89 , 91 , 93 ,
177 ， 203-5 ， 208一 10， 212， 214 152, 168, 171-2, 175
virtuality, 8, 116-19 , 121 , 123-5 , 127, 'nae
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Co豆豆豆眼目飞re

Abbreviatio l1 s for Works Cited Xl

Structure of the book

The destruction of metaphysics

Revealing phi1osophy by doing philosophy

6 Deleuze on Being as BecoITlÎng: Multiplicity,

Works Cited 216

What is at issue is philosophy … one of the few great things of

The primary purpose of this book is to offer a comparative analysis of

(1925…1975) , where ontology refers to the study of the nature of being.

that a genuine comparative analysis must be conducted through their

the phenomenological and post-structuralist traditions into discussion

European , so-called 'continental' , philosophy. To highlight their respec ‘

tive understandings and show their historical relevance , 1 suggest that

This book has a diverse history encompassing two continents (Africa

Different versions of various parts of the book have previously been

The following is a list of the abbreviations of the works of Heidegger

τE Heidegger, M. (2013) , The Event, trans. Richard Rojcewicz, lndiana

PIA Heidegger, M. (2001), Phenomenological Interp陀 tations o(Aristotle:

NIV Heidegger, M. (1991) , Nietzsche 1V: Nihilism , trans. ]oan

TB Heidegger, M. (1 972) , On Timea l1 dBeing, trans.Joan Stambaugh ,

叭TCT Heidegger, M. (1 968) ，讥lhat is Called Thinking? , trans. ]ohn Glenn

PRT Deleuze, G. (2007) , IProust Round Table' , in Two Regimes of

PITP Deleuze , G. (2007) , IPreface to the Italian Edition of A

GDTP Deleuze , G. (2004) , 'Gilles Deleuze Talks Philosophy' , in Desert

IP Deleuze, G. (2004) , 'Intellectuals and Power' , in Desert Islands

FPP Deleuze , G. (2004) , 'Five Propositions on Psychoanalysis' ,

DI Deleuze , G. (1995) , 'Doubts about the Imaginary' , inNegotiatiol1 s:

BTO Deleuze, G. (1995) , 'Breaking Things Open , Breaking Words

Columbia University Press: New York, pp. 83…93.

PF Deleuze , G. (1 995) , IA Portrait of Foucault' , in Negotiatiolls:

OP Deleuze , G. (1995) , 10n Philosophy' , in Negotiatiolls: 1972-1990,

crisis relating to its purpose, content, and place , but it is responding to

The thinker in the history of phi1osophy rnost intimately connected

exhausted all its possibilities. lt is caught in a 1'etu1'n of the sarne , which

such , we find that 'philosophy's weighed down with discussions about

entity (NIV: 192-193). While an admíttedly controversial reading of

τhe argument developed

hnportantly, therefore, Deleuze does not simply criticise Heidegger, but

them regarding the nature of philosophy emanate from differences in

become evident as we p 1'oceed, it is important to note that, in general,

means the transition to meditative thinking cannot emanate frorn any

part, effected and affected by a fonn of human willing. By appealing

technological being and thinking; and (3) reconciling Heidegger's

outlining the transcendental features of philosophy, namely the crea-

and (2) the establishment of a world-view is not anything sinister that

Heidegger's insistence that philosophy be abandoned and replaced by

identical and same , 1 offer a number of examples to demonstrate that

Structure of the book

Given this argument is developed from a comparative analysis of two

reader has a good understanding of their ontologies. Not only is this

therefm飞 better allow me to show that, while Heidegger opened up the

Michel Foucault, perhaps jokingly but nonetheless famously, once

one meaning of being over others, we are in danger of misunde1'standing

recognises , thinking this ontological difference is not easy because being

terms of opposition , meaning being is not understood in opposition to

legitimating our changing historical sense of what is' (Thomson , 2011:

meaningbeing is always multiple or, put differently, polyvocal , a summa恻

difference , meaning each is completely different. ln response, Heidegger

Ascertaining the being of an entity and, from this, being as such

'negative' relationship [insofar as] when... we ascertain the di伊rence

Heidegger recognises that it appears as if difference entails a negative rela幡

(B1': 31) ontology that simply focuses on beings. Only fundamental