Sec 27 ART, VI - THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT m vVentiveness of the stealthy and the Sumteptitious. These, however, were disregarded by the Court in Tolentino in favor of contrary American practice This is not to say that conference committees should not be al- lowed. But an effort should be made to lay out the scope of what confer- ence committees may do according to the requirements and the reasons of the Philippine Constitution and not according to the practice of the American Congress, For instance, ifthe two Houses are not allowed to introduce and debate amendments on third reading, can they circum- vent this rule by coursing new provisions through the instrumentality of a conference committee created by Congress and meeting in secret? The effect of the Court’s uncritical embrace of the practice of the Amer- ican Congress and its conference committees is to dismantle the no- amendment rule. As to the secret meeting of the conference committee, Justice Mendoza had this gem: "Nor is there anything unusual or extraordinary about the fact that the conference Committee met in executive sessions. Often the only way to reach agreement on conflicting provisions is to meet behind closed doors, with only the conferees present. Otherwise. no compromise is likely to be made.” This view of the Court may con- stitute a standard of behavior tolerable for board of trustees wanting to protect the interests of majority stockholders. In the matter of behavior of public officials, however, the Constitution has different standards It commands the state to adopt and carry out "a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest." Moreover, the Bill of Rights guarantees the right of all citizens to information on matters of public concer, Finally, however, the Court was willing to paper over everything tule which is treated under Section 16 above. under the "enrolled bill 3. Veto power; “item veto.” In the veto power the Constitution has given to the President an instrument of control over legislation completed by Congress. But Con- gress may override a presidential veto by a vote of two-thirds of all its 2235 SCRA a 667. id.a0672,m ‘THE 1987 CONSTITUTION Sec.27 OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES members. The Constitution says: "If [the President] approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it, If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds ofall the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and ifapproved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law As a general rule, if the President disapproves of a provision in a bill approved by Congress, he should veto the entire bill. He is not al- lowed to voto separate parts of bill while retaining others. tis only in the ease of appropriation, revenue, and tariff bills that he is authorized to exercise item-veto. The item veto in the 1987 Constitution is a carry over from the 1973 and 1935 provisions. The 1935 provision was the outcome of an intense debate during the 1934-1935 Constitutional Convention. Much of the objection to giving the power of item-veto to the President was grounded on the fear of giving too much power to the executive and thereby allowing him to mutilate an integral legislative act to the preju- dice of the public welfare. The defenders of the provision, however, looked on it more as a useful check on improvident use of public funds and on oppressive revenue measures. For the purpose of this provision, an appropriation bill is under- stood as one whose purpose is to set apart a certain sum from the public revenue for a specified pUurpos to make out an appropriation. Moreover, the appropriation bill that is subject to item-veto is any appropriation bill and not just the general appropriation bill. No set form of words is required ‘evenue bills" are those intended to levy taxes in the strict sense of the word and do not include bills for other purposes which inciden- tally create revenue. AV JOURNAL OF THE [1935] CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (Laurel ed) 756 ‘'Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice 62 Pall 912, 916(1936) "Ide 919. But see Villa Real, stenting. *18T0RY.convenranits Sec BHO, citedn CoRNIN, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 134 (1964) explaining the phrase "bills for axing revenue"Sec.27 ART, VI - THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ms A tariff bill is one which imposes duties ot imposts whether for revenue or for regulation. ‘An item in a bill *is the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts s+. ofthe Bill.” It can be an entire section of a bill or @ severable portion of « section. Thus, in Commissioner of internal Rev enue ¥. Court of Tax Appeals;vhere the President vetoed the portion of Section 42 of R.A. 6110 referring to 20% caterers tax on restaurants operated by hotels, motcls and rest houses but leaving the rest of the section intact, the Court upheld the veto saying: An "item" in a revenue bill does not refer to an entire section imposing a particular kind of tax , but rather to the subject of the tax and the tax rate. In the portion of a revenue bill which actually imposes a tax, a section identifies the tax and enumerates the per- sons liable therefore with the corresponding tax rate. To construe the word "item" as referring to the whole section would tie the President's hand in choosing either to approve the whole scetion at the expense of also approving a provision therein which he deems unacceptable or veto the entire section at the expense of foregoing the collection of the kind of tax altogether. The evil which was sought to be prevented in giving the president the power to disap- prove items in a revenue bill would be perpetrated rendering that power inutile. In Bengzon v. Drilon, The case involved the General Appropriations Act of 1992. The lew appropriated 500,000,000 pesos "For general fund adjustment for op- jowever, the veto was declared invalid. erational and special requirements as indicated hereunder." Among the several authorized uses of the fund was the adjustment of pension of justices as authorized by an earlier law. The President vetoed the use of the fund for the adjustment of the pension of justices. In declar- ing the veto invalid, the Court said that it was not the veto of an item. The item was the entire $00,000,000 peso allocation out of which un- avoidable obligations not adequately funded in separate items could be met. What the President had vetoed, according to the Court, was the SeeHlampton & Co. ¥. United States, 276 US. 394,411-12 (1928). SBengzon v. Setretay of Justice, 62 Phil. at 916 “rascRA 329, 334.35 (1990), 6208 SCRA 133 (1992),4 ‘THE 1987 CONSTITUTION See 27 OF THE REPUBLIC OFT ES method of meeting unavoidable obligations or the manner of using the 500,000,000 pesos." ‘The 1935 Constitution had this additional sentence: "When a pro- vision of an appropriation bill affects one or more items of the same, the President cannot veto the provision without at the same time veto- ing the particular item or items to which it relates." Thus, in Bolinao -ctronics v. Valencia veto of a condition in an appropriation bill which did not include a veto of the items to which the condition related was deemed invalid and without effect whatsoever. This sentence in the 1935 Constitution did not appear in the 1973 version; neither does it appear in the 1987 Constitution. It is submitted nonetheless that the rule is also applicable under the present Constitu- tion because all that the sentence does is to emphasize that an item which can be subject of a separate veto must be a "distinct and sever- able part” of a bill?” This view was applied in Philippine Const tion Association v. Enriquez*where the Court invalidated the veto of a restriction on the use of funds for road maintenance and a restriction on the use of funds for the purchase of medicines since the veto did not include a veto of the appropriated funds themselves. 4. The new “doctrine of inappropriate provisions." Gonzales v. Macaraigsr,”* marks the Court's acceptance of what eventually would be referred to as the “doctrine of inappropriate provi- sions.” What the doctrine says is that a provision that is constitutionally inappropriate for an appropriation bill may be singled out for veto even if itis not an appropriation or revenue “item,” Gonzales involved the 1989 and 1990 General Appropriation Acts. The General Appropriations Act of 1989 contained the following provision: Md a 144. Tis cas, however, grow nat so mich out of a fallure to understand itn ‘eto as trom some unfortunate historical misimpressions on the part both of Cangress and ofthe Presiden. Tete are explained inthe decision ‘WAamicle VI, Section 20(2), 1935 Constitut Boling Electronics v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486,492.93 (1964) 2969 Phil. a 916, "235 SCA $06, $3854 (1994). "191 SCRA s2 (1990).See.27 ART. VI. THE LEGISLATIVE. DEPARTMENT bill? Section 55. Prohibition Against the Restoration or Increase Of Recommended Appropriations Disapproved and/or Reduced by Congress.— No item of appropriation recommended by the Pres dent « . « which has been disapproved or reduced in this Act shall be restored or inereased by the use of appropriations authorized for other purposes by augmentation, An item of appropriation for any purpose recommended by the President in the Budget shal be deemed to have been disapproved by Congress if no cortespond- ing appropriation for the specific purpose is provided in this act. 1s ‘The General Appropriations Act for 1990 contained a similar one: See. 16, Use of Savings. —... Provided, ‘That no item of ap- propriation recommended by the President in the Budget .., which has been disapproved or reduced by Congress shall be restored or increased by the use of appropriations authorized for other pur- poses in this Act by aigmentation. An item of appropriation for any purpose shall be deemed to have heen disapproved by Con- ‘gress if no corresponding appropriation for the specifie purpose is provided in this Act Exercising the power of "item veto" the President vetoed the simi- lar provisions. Were the vetoed sections “items” of an appropriation The Court said that they were not “items.” Explaining the Court said” The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and practice are concededly different.An item: in a bill refers to the par- ticulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts x x x ofthe bill It is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to @ stated purposes. The United States Supreme Court ,., declared "that an ‘item’ of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which in itself is 4 specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of Jaw, which happens to be put into an appropriation bill Having said that the sections were not budgetary items, the Court nevertheless said that the veto was an allowable veto of distinct and severable provisions on the basis of Article VI, Section (2) of the 1935 Constitution which said: "When a provision of an appropriation yd a 465.I 1987 CONSTITUTION Sec 27 196 OFTHE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES bill affects one or more items of the SaMe, the President cannot veto the provision without at the same time vetoing the particular item or items to which it relates.” It is submitted, however, that, although the final conclusion is defensible, this is a misapplication of the cited provision of the 1935 Constitution. The BolinagElectronics case cited above involved a pro vision that was related to items of an appropriation bill. The veto of the provision could be allowed but only if the items to which it was related would also be vetoed. In effect, the cited 1935 provision was ‘2 subsidiary rule to the rule that only items may be vetoed separately in an appropriation bill. {t was not a rule saying that separable provi- sions which are not "items" could be vetoed separately from the entire bill. The proper remedy in a case of a provision that has no relation to any other in the appropriation bill is to consider it an unconstitutional "rider" under Section 25(2). Gonzales did in fact consider it a rider.” In Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,?"be Court re- iterated its view that the President possesses the power to veto a provi- sion in an appropriation bill even if it is not an item. This time, however, the Court argued not from the omitted 193$ provision on item veto but from what it called "the doctrine of inappropriate provisions.” It said?” As the Constitution is explicit that the provision which Congress can include in an appropriations bill must "relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein” and "be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates,” it follows that any provision which docs not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered "an inappropriate provision” which ccan be vetoed separately from an item, Also to be included in the category of "inappropriate provisions” are unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are intended to amend other laws, because clearly these kind oflaws have no place in an appropriation Dill. These are matters of general legislation more appropriately dealt within separate enactments Pda 467 235 SCRA 506 (1994) ™midat $34.Sec.27 ART, VI - THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT wor The intent behind this doctrine, which is not original but borrowed by the Court from Hemy v. Edwards is to prevent the legislature from forcing the President to veto an entire appropriation law thereby para- lyzing government, The Philippine Constitution's answer to this pos- sibility is Section 25(7) which provides for the automatic 1 of the General Appropriation Law of the previous year as a provisional measure to serve until a new General Appropriations Law is approved. The Court's answer, however, is an alternative one, namely the formu- lation of the broad doctrine that an unconstitutional provision in an Ap- propriation Law may be singled out for veto. enactment It should be noted that the Philippine Constitution Association ease goes beyond Bolinao Electronics and Gonzales. In Bolinao, the vetoed condition had relation to an appropriation which was not vetoed; the veto of the condition was not allowed. In Gonzales, the provisions vetoed had no relation to any item of appropriation, It was thus rejected der" in the sense of Section 25(2). In Philippine Constitutional Association the President vetoed conditions imposed on the use of ap- propriations for the military equipment. The conditions therefore were not riders. Following the Bolinao Electronic Case, the Court should have invalidated the veto of the conditions because the veto did not include 4 veto of the appropriation, But the condition imposed by the bill was that prot approval by Congress must be obtained forthe release of such funds and that such funds may not be used for the payment of planes al- ready contracted for. The Court upheld the Veto, on the ground that the conditions were “inappropriate provisions,” but allowed the funds to stay in the budget. The condition requiring prior congressional approval was considered "inappropriate" because: "Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a lew or requiring legislative ap- proval of executive action must be incorporated in a separate and sub- stantive bill” The prohibition of the use of the funds for the payment of planes already contracted for was considered "inappropriate" because it would involve violation of the obligation of contracts. What all this comes down to is that under the new doctrine of “inappropriate provisions,” any provision or condition in an appropris- tion bill which in the judgment of the President violates the Constitu- tion may be vetoed separately from the entire bill without need to veto Pa, 346 $0.24, 183 197.8 THE. 1987 CONSTITUTION See.27 OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIFPIN the appropriation to which they are attached. This is a judge-made rule item veto" rule so much debated in 1935, It ex- which expands the pands the power of the President because admittedly it is more expedi- tious than forcing the President to go to court to challenge the validity of a provision in an appropriation bill. 5. Executive “impoundment.” Another way ofexercising executive veto is through what is called "impoundment." Impoundment simply means refusal of the President to spend funds already allocated by Congress for a specific purpose, There is no provision in the Constitution on the subject. Impoundment came up also in Philippine Constitution Association v amount appropriated by Congress for the compensation and separation benefits of members of CAFGU be used for the compensation of CAFGU’s including the payment of their separation benefit not exceeding one (1) year subsistence allow- ance for the 11,000 members who will be deactivated in 1994." The President did not veto the provision but said instead in his veto message that the implementation of the provision would be subject to his prior approval taking into consideration the peace and order situation in the affected localities, Enriquez. To the was attached a provision that "it shall Those who challenged the veto contended that the provision effec tively required the deactivation of the CAFGU's and that the President had no choice but to implement the law, The President on the other hand justified his impoundment of the provision on the basis of his Commander-in-Chief powers and on the dangerous argument that the duty to implement the law includes the duty to desist from implement- ing it when implementation would prejudice public interest. As Justice Roberto Concepcion pointed out in an earlier Case, "after all we still live under @ rule of law.” The Court, however, found in the doctrine on inappropriate provi- sion a way out of-having to decide whether impoundment was legal. It said" D235 SCRA al sus Gonzalez y, Hechanova, GR. No, 21897 (October 26, 1963) The Supreme Court how= vr, has heretofore retrained fom passing judgment onthe constitaionality of "impoundment See pra under Article VI, Section 27, dat 546.