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LAWYER’S DUTY TO ITS CLIENT

A. Attorney-client relationship - An attorney-client relationship is established from the


very first moment the client asked the attorney for legal advice regarding the former's
business. To constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client
employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion.

A.1 Nature of relation - The relation of attorney and client is one of trust and confidence
of the highest order. It is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good
faith.

B. A lawyer shall not refuse to the need of the needy – CANON 14

B.1 Right to decline employment - Rule 14.03 – A lawyer may refuse to accept
representation of a client if:
a. He is not in position to carry out the work effectively and competently.
b. He labors under conflict of interest between him and the prospective client
or between a present client and the prospective client.
B.2 Duty to decline employment - Rule 14.02 – A lawyer shall not decline, except for
serious and sufficient cause, an appointment as counsel de oficio or as amicus curiae or a
request from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any of its chapters for rendition of
free legal aid.
B.3 Ethical consideration in bad case –
B.4 Amici Curiae/Counsel de Officio
 Appointment of Amici Curiae
1. by application to the judge the judge
2. on his own initiative may invite the lawyer no right to interfere with
3. or control the condition of the record, no control over the suit.
 Cannot refuse on the ground of insufficient of compensation or lack of it.

 Appointment of Counsel de officio – Rule 116 Rules on Criminal Procedure,


SEC. 7. Appointment of counsel de oficio.—The court, considering the gravity of
the offense and the difficulty of the questions that may arise, shall appoint as
counsel de oficio only such members of the bar in good standing who, by reason
of their experience and ability may adequately defend the accused. But in
localities where such members of the bar are not available, the court may appoint
any person, resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability, to
defend the accused. (4a, R-116)

C. A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client. – CANON 15
Rule on Revealing Client’s Identity
 General Rule:  A lawyer may not invoke privilege communication to refuse revealing a
client’s identity. (Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, 262 SCRA 122, September 20, 1996)
Exceptions:
1. When by divulging such identity, it would implicate the client to that same controversy
for which the lawyer’s services were required.
2. It would open client to civil liability
3. The disclosure of such identity will provide for the only link in order to convict the
accused, otherwise, the government has no case.
 Requisites of Privileged Communication:
1. Atty.-client relationship (or a kind of consultancy relationship with a prospective client
2. Communication made by client to lawyer in the course of lawyer’s professional
employment
3. Communication is intended to be confidential (see Rule 130, Sec. 21(b), Rules of Court)

D. A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come
into his possession. – CANON 16

E. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him. – CANON 17

F. A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. – CANON 18
F.1 duty to protect client’s interest - Rule 18.01 – A lawyer shall not undertake a legal
service which he knows or should know that he is not qualified to render.  However, he
may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating
counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.
F.2 Preparation of Pleadings in Court - Rule 18.02 – A lawyer shall not handle any
legal matter without adequate preparation.
F.3 Keep the client inform - Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
F.4 Doctrine of Imputed Knowledge – means the knowledge attributed to a party
because of his position, or his relationship with or responsibility for another party.
F.5 Duty when the Court intends to pleads guilty
F.6 Duty to comply with client’s legal lawful request- Rule 18.04 –  A lawyer shall
keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable
time to the client’s request for information.

G. A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law. – CAON
19
Rule 19.01 – A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to
present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding.
Rule 19.02 – A lawyer who has received information that his client has, in the course of
the representation, perpetuated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon
the client to rectify the same, and failing which he had to terminate the relationship with
such client in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Rule 19.03 – A lawyer shall not allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the
case.
General Rule:  Negligence binds client
Exception:  Reckless imprudence (deprives client of due process)

Results in outright deprivation of one’s property through technicality


A. Must not present in evidence any document known to be false; nor present a false
witness.
B. Negative pregnant is improper since it is an ambiguous pleading (improper if in
bad faith and the purpose is to confuse the other party)

In defense: present every defense the law permits.

Lawyer should do his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from
perpetrating acts which he himself ought not to do. Or else, withdraw.  But
lawyer shall not volunteer the information about the client’s commission of
fraud to anyone – counter to duty to maintain client’s confidence and secrets.

H. A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees. – CANON 20


h.1 Attorney’s fee - the reasonable compensation paid by the client to his lawyer in
exchange for the legal services rendered by the latter. The compensation is paid for the
cost and/or results of the legal services, as agreed upon by the parties or as may be
assessed by the courts. (Ibid.)
h.2 Quantum Merit – means "the amount one deserves" or "as much as one has earned".
In most cases it denotes a claim for a reasonable sum in respect of services or goods
supplied to the defendant.
h.3 Retainer - an amount of money paid upfront to secure the services of a consultant,
freelancer, lawyer, or other professional. A retainer fee is most commonly paid to
individual third parties that have been engaged by the payer to perform a specific action
on their behalf.
h.4 Contingent fee - a form of payment to a lawyer for their legal services. In contrast to
a fixed hourly fee, in a contingent fee arrangement lawyers receive a percentage of the
monetary amount that their client receives when they win or settle the case.
h.5 Contingent contract - a contract to do or not to do something, if some event,
collateral to such contract, does or does not happen.
h.6 Champertous contract - is considered against public policy as it violates the
fiduciary relations between the lawyer and his or her client, whose weakness or
disadvantage may be exploited by the former.
h.7 Attorney’s Lien - is the right of a lawyer to hold a client's property until the client
pays for legal services provided. 
h.8 Charging lien - the right which the attorney has upon all judgments for the payment
of money, and executions issued in pursuance of said judgments, which he has secured in
litigation of his client (Section 33, Rule 127; Rustia vs. Abeto, 72 Phil., 133).
h.9 Retaining lien - merely a passive right of retainer of papers or moneys reduced to
possession.

I. A lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the
attorney-client relation is terminated. – CANON 21

J. A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice
appropriate in the circumstances. – CANON 22
Rule 22.01 – A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the following cases:
a.      When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection with
the matter he is handling;
b.     When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and
rules;
c.      When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of the
client;
d.     When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to
carry out the employment effectively;
e.      When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to comply
with the retainer agreement;
f.       When the lawyer is elected or appointed to a public office, and
g.     Other similar cases

CASES
BLANZA V ARCANGEL; 21 SCRA 1 (1967)
FACTS: Complainants Olegaria Blanza and Maria Pasion filed a complaint of non-feasance,
stated in their complaint that way back in April, 1955, respondent Atty. Agustin Arcangel
volunteered to help them in their respective pension claims in connection with the deaths of their
husbands, both P.C. soldiers, and for this purpose, they handed over to him the pertinent
documents and also affixed their signatures on blank papers. But subsequently, they noticed that
since then, respondent had lost interest in the progress of their claims and when they finally
asked for the return of their papers six years later, respondent refused to surrender them. 
Respondent answered, he admitted having received the documents, but explained that it was for
the photostating purposes only. That he failed to return the documents due to complainants’
refusal to hand him the money for the payment of photostating costs which prevented him from
withdrawing said documents.
ISSUE: WON the respondent be reprimanded for professional non-feasance.
RULING: No. The Court held that finding the evidence adduced insufficient to warrant the
taking of disciplinary action against respondent attorney. There is no clear preponderance of
evidence substantiating the accusations against him. But the Court cannot but counsel against his
actuations as a member of the Bar. A lawyer has a more dynamic and positive role in the
community than merely complying with the minimal technicalities of the statute. As a man of the
law, he is necessarily a leader of the community, looked up to as a model citizen. His conduct
must, perforce, be par excellence, especially so when, as in this case, he volunteers his
professional services.
---
REGALA V SANDIGANBAYAN; 262 SCRA 122 (1996)
FACTS: The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), raised a complaint before
the Sandiganbayan (SB) against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and Teodoro Regala and his partners
in the ACCRA law firm, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of
stocks in the named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled
"Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al.
PCGG filed a "Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" which excluded private respondent
Raul S. Roco from the complaint on his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the
principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder. In their answer to the Expanded
Amended Complaint, ACCRA lawyers requested that PCGG similarly grant the same treatment
to them as accorded Roco. The PCGG has offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same conditions
availed of by Roco but the ACCRA lawyers have refused to disclose the identities of their
clients. ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for certiorari, invoking that the Honorable
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion.
ISSUE: WON the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing
the identity of their clients and the other information requested by the PCGG.
RULING: ACCRA lawyers & Roco are similarly situated and, therefore, deserving of equal
treatment. Being “similarly situated” in that ACCRA LAWYERS’ and ROCO’s acts were made
in furtherance of “legitimate lawyering, PCGG must show that there exist other conditions and
circumstances which would warrant their treating ROCO differently from ACCRA LAWYERS
in the case at bench in order to evade a violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
We find that the condition precedent required by the respondent PCGG of the petitioners for
their exclusion as parties-defendants in PCGG Case No. 33 violates the lawyer-client
confidentiality privilege. The condition also constitutes a transgression by respondents
Sandiganbayan and PCGG of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
It is grossly unfair to exempt one similarly situated litigant from prosecution without allowing
the same exemption to the others. Moreover, the PCGG's demand not only touches upon the
question of the identity of their clients but also on documents related to the suspected
transactions, not only in violation of the attorney-client privilege but also of the constitutional
right against self-incrimination. Whichever way one looks at it, this is a fishing expedition, a free
ride at the expense of such rights.
PALM V ILLEDAN, JR.; 602 SCRA 12 (2009)
FACTS: Complainant personally met with respondent to review corporate matters,
including potential amendments to the corporate by-laws. Respondent suggested that Comtech
amend its corporate by-laws to allow participation during board meetings, through
teleconference, of members of the Board of Directors who were outside the Philippines.
Comtech decided to terminate its retainer agreement with respondent for the reason that
complainant became uncomfortable with the close relationship between respondent and Elda
Soledad (Soledad), a former officer and director of Comtech, who resigned and who was
suspected of releasing unauthorized disbursements of corporate funds.
Comtech filed a complaint for Estafa against Soledad before the Makati Prosecutor's Office. In
the proceedings before the City Prosecution Office of Makati, respondent appeared as Soledad's
counsel. Subsequently, complainant filed a Complaint for disbarment against respondent for
revealing information obtained in the course of an attorney-client relationship in the IBP.
Respondent alleged that there was no conflict of interest when he represented Soledad in the case
for Estafa filed by Comtech. He alleged that Soledad was already a client before he became a
consultant for Comtech.
ISSUE: WON respondent violated Canon 21 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD: NO. IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found respondent guilty of
violation of Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of representing interest in
conflict with that of Comtech as his former client. But the Court did not adopt and recommend
IBP’s findings.
Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Canon 21. A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even after the
attorney-client relationship is terminated.(Emphasis supplied).
It is settled that the mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of
confidentiality. The client must intend the communication to be confidential. Since the
proposed amendments must be approved by at least a majority of the stockholders, and
copies of the amended by-laws must be filed with the SEC, the information could not have
been intended to be confidential. Thus, the disclosure made by respondent during the
stockholders meeting could not be considered a violation of his client’s secrets and
confidence within the contemplation of Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
-----
DEE V Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 651 (1989)
FACTS: Petitioner and his father went to the residence of private respondent, accompanied by
the latter’s cousin, to seek his advice regarding the problem of the alleged indebtedness of
petitioner’s brother, Dewey Dee, to Caesar’s Palace, a well-known gambling casino at Las
Vegas, Nevada, U.S.A. Private respondent personally talked with the president of Caesar’s
Palace at Las Vegas, Nevada. He advised the president that for the sake and in the interest of the
casino it would be better to make Ramon Sy answer for the indebtedness. The president told him
that if he could convince Ramon Sy to acknowledge the obligation, Dewey Dee would be
exculpated from liability for the account. Upon private respondent’s return to Manila, he
conferred with Ramon Sy and the latter was convinced to acknowledge the indebtedness. In
August, 1981, private respondent brought to Caesar’s Palace the letter of Ramon Sy owning the
debt and asking for a discount. Thereafter, the account of Dewey Dee was cleared and the casino
never bothered him.
Having thus settled the account of petitioner’s brother, private respondent sent several demand
letters to petitioner demanding the balance of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees. Petitioner, however,
ignored said letters.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an attorney-client relationship between parties.
HELD: YES. Court affirmed the decision of the defendant Court of Appeals. Costs against the
petitioner.
The puerile claim is advanced that there was no attorney-client relationship between petitioner
and private respondent for lack of a written contract to that effect. The absence of a written
contract will not preclude the finding that there was a professional relationship which merits
attorney's fees for professional services rendered. Documentary formalism is not an essential
element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish
the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in
any matter pertinent to his profession.
[T]here is no question that professional services were actually rendered by private respondent to
petitioner and his family. Through his efforts, the account of petitioner’s brother, Dewey Dee,
with Caesar’s Palace was assumed by Ramon Sy and petitioner and his family were further freed
from the apprehension that Dewey might be harmed or even killed by the so-called mafia. For
such services, respondent Mutuc is indubitably entitled to receive a reasonable compensation and
this right cannot be concluded by petitioner’s pretension that at the time private respondent
rendered such services to petitioner and his family, the former was also the Philippine consultant
of Caesar’s Palace.
A lawyer is entitled to have and receive the just and reasonable compensation for services
rendered at the special instance and request of his client and as long as he is honestly and in good
faith trying to serve and represent the interests of his client, the latter is bound to pay his just
fees.
----
NAKPIL V VALDEZ, 286 SCRA 758 (1998)
FACTS: Jose Nakpil, husband of the complainant, became interested in purchasing
a summer residence in Moran Street, Baguio City. For lack of funds, he requested
respondent to purchase the Moran property for him. They agreed that respondent would keep the
property in thrust for the Nakpil’s until the latter could buy it back. Pursuant to their agreement,
respondent obtained two (2) loans from a bank which he used to purchase and renovate
the property. Title was then issued in respondent’s name. The ownership of the Moran
property became an issue in the intestate proceedings when Jose Nakpil died. Respondent acted
as the legal counsel and accountant of his widow. Respondent excluded the Moran property from
the inventory of Jose’s estate and transferred his title to the Moran property to his company, the
Caval Realty Corporation. Complainant sought to recover the Moran property by filing with the
then CFI of Baguio City an action for re-conveyance with damages against respondent and his
corporation. In defense, respondent claimed absolute ownership over the property and denied
that a trust was created over it. During the pendency of the action for re-
conveyance, complainant filed this administrative case to disbar the respondent. She charged that
respondent violated professional ethics.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was conflict of interest between the respondent Atty. Valdes and
the complainant.
RULING: In the case at bar, there is no question that the interests of the estate and that of its
creditors are adverse to each other. Respondent's accounting firm prepared the list of assets and
liabilities of the estate and, at the same time, computed the claims of two creditors of the estate.
There is clearly a conflict between the interest of the estate which stands as the debtor, and that
of the two claimants who are creditors of the estate. In fact, at one instance, respondent's law
firm questioned the claims of creditor Angel Nakpil against the estate.
The test to determine whether there is a conflict of interest in the representation is probability,
not certainty of conflict. It was respondent’s duty to inhibit either of his firms from said
proceedings to avoid the probability of conflict of interest. Public confidence in law and
lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the
bar.
We also hold that the relationship of the claimants to the late Nakpil does not negate the conflict
of interest. When a creditor files a claim against an estate, his interest is per se adverse to the
estate. As correctly pointed out by complainant, if she had a claim against her husband's estate,
her claim is still adverse and must be filed in the intestate proceedings. The Court finds
respondent ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES guilty of misconduct. He is suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
----
ORDONIO V EDUARTE, 207 SCRA 229 (1992)
FACTS: This is a complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. Josephine Palogan-Eduarte
originally filed with this Court. The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines confirmed the charge of violation of Art. 1491 of the Civil Code and part of the Oath
of Office of a lawyer and recommending the suspension of herein respondent.
July 18, 1983, Antonia Ulibari filed with the RTC, Branch XXII, Cabagan, Isabela, Civil Case
No. 391 for annulment of a document (known as Affidavit of Adjudication of the Estate of
Felicisimo Velasco and Quitclaim Thereof) against her children. The case was handled by Atty.
Henedino Eduarte, herein respondent's husband, until his appointment as RTC judge on October
26, 1984. His wife, Atty. Josephine Palogan-Eduarte, took over. Antonia Ulibari conveyed some
parcels of her land to her children in the form of deeds of absolute sale, prepared and notarized
by herein respondent. Significantly, on the same day, Antonia Ulibari also conveyed 20 hectares
of land to herein respondent and her husband as their Attorney's fees for legal services rendered.
All the titles of the lands subject of the deeds of absolute sale and the deed of conveyance
however remained in the name of Antonia Ulibari. Dominga Ordonio, filed this complaint for
disbarment against herein respondent on the basis of an affidavit executed by her mother Antonia
Ulibari on March 2, 1988 stating that affiant never conveyed the subject parcel of land to
respondent as her attorney's fees and that the deeds of absolute sale executed in favor of her
children were not known to her.
ISSUE: WON respondent has violated not only Art. 1491 of the Civil Code but also Rule 10 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics.
RULING: YES. Rule 10 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that “A
LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.”
For having improperly acquired the subject property, under the foregoing circumstances,
respondent has violated not only Art. 1491 of the Civil Code but also Rule 10 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics which provides that "the lawyer should not purchase any interest in the
subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting.
In so doing, respondent has manifestly violated that part of her oath as a lawyer that she shall not
do any falsehood. Not only that. In preparing the documents which do not reflect the true
transaction, respondent has likewise violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:
Rule 10.01. A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;
nor shall be mislead or allow the court to be mislead by any artifice.
ACCORDINGLY, for having violated Article 1491 of the Civil Code, respondent is hereby
ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, in violation of the
lawyer's oath and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent is also
ordered suspended from the practice or law for a period of another six (6) months, resulting in a
total period on one year, effective from the date this judgment becomes final.
-----
RUBIAS V BATILLER, G.R. No. L-35702; May 29, 1973
FACTS: Plaintiff Domingo D. Rubias, a lawyer, filed a forcible Entry and unlawful Detainer, a
suit to recover the ownership and possession of certain portions of lot located in Iloilo which he
bought from his father-in-law, Francisco Militante against its present occupant defendant, Isaias
Batiller, who illegally entered said portions of the lot. In his answer defendant claims that it does
not state a cause of action, the truth of the matter being that he and his predecessors-in-interest
have always been in actual, open and continuous possession since time immemorial under claim
of ownership of the portions of the lot in question.
It is contended that the contract of sale between the plaintiff and his father-in-law, Francisco
Militante, Sr., of the property was void, because it was made when plaintiff was the counsel of
the latter in the Land Registration case invoking Articles 1409 and 1491 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contract of sale between plaintiff and his father-in-law over
the property was void because it was made when plaintiff was counsel of his father-in-law in a
land registration case involving the property in dispute.
RULING: The purchase by a lawyer of the property in litigation from his client is categorically
prohibited by Article 1491, paragraph (5) of the Civil Code, and that consequently, plaintiff's
purchase of the property in litigation from his client was void and could produce no legal effect,
by virtue of Article 1409, paragraph (7) of our Civil Code which provides that contracts"
expressly prohibited or declared void by law are inexistent and that these contracts cannot be
ratified.
Article 1491 of our Civil Code prohibits certain persons, by reason of the relation of trustor their
peculiar control over the property, from acquiring such property in their trust or control either
directly or indirectly and "even at a public or judicial auction," as follows:
(1) guardians; (2) agents; (3) administrators; (4) public officers and employees;
judicial officers and employees, prosecuting attorneys, and lawyers; and (6) others
especially disqualified by law.
The rationale for that fundamental consideration of public policy render void and inexistent such
expressly prohibited purchase.
Article 1409 of the Civil Code, declared such prohibited contracts as "inexistent and void from
the beginning." Indeed, the nullity of such prohibited contracts is definite and permanent and
cannot be cured by ratification. The public interest and public policy remain paramount and do
not permit of compromise or ratification.
----
SANTIAGO V FOJAS, 248 SCRA 68 (1995)
FACTS: This was a disbarment case filed against Atty. Fojas in his capacity as the counsel of
the herein petitioners.
Santiago and the other petitioners in their capacity as the officers of the FEUFA allegedly
expelled from the union Paulino Salvador. The later then commenced with the Department of
Labor and Employment to declare that he was illegally expelled from the union. Med-Arbiter
declared illegal Salvador's expulsion and directed the union to reinstate Salvador's name in the
roll of union members with all the rights and privileges appurtenant thereto.
Subsequently, Salvador filed with the RTC a complaint for actual, moral, and exemplary
damages, and attorney's fee. The complainant's counsel, herein respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration. The trial court granted the motion for reconsideration and dismissal of the case.
However it was reinstated and required the complainants to file their answer within 15 days.
Instead of filing an answer, they moved to file a motion but it was denied.
Respondent filed with this Court a petition for certiorari, referred to the CA but was also denied.
Because of failure to still file an answer by the respondent despite such denial,
the complainants, upon Salvador's motion, were declared in default, and Salvador was
authorized to present his evidence ex-parte.
The trial court rendered a decision ordering the complainants herein to pay, jointly and
severally, plaintiff Salvador which was affirmed by CA. The respondent asserts that he was
about to appeal the said decision to SC, but his services as counsel for the complainants and for
the union were illegally and unilaterally terminated by complainant Santiago.
ISSUE: Whether the Atty. Fojas committed culpable negligence, and breached Canon 18 and 15
Rule 18.03 and 15.05 of Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING: Yes. ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is REPRIMANDED and ADMONISHED to be,
henceforth, more careful in the performance of his duty to his clients.
The respondent committed a breach of Canon 18of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) which requires him to serve his clients, the complainants, with
diligence and, more specifically, Rule 18.03 thereof which provides: "A lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable."
The respondent's negligence is not excused by his claim that the case was in fact a
"losing cause" for the complainants since the claims therein for damages were based on the final
decision of the Med-Arbiter declaring the complainants' act of expelling Salvador from the union
to be illegal. This claim is a mere after thought which hardly persuades us. If indeed the
respondent was so convinced of the futility of any defense therein, he should have
seasonably informed the complainants thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon 15of the CPR expressly
provides: “A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the
merits and probable results of the client's case, neither overstating nor understanding the
prospects of the case.”
It is also axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person
who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment, subject, however, to
Canon 14 of the CPR. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes
fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
-----
STEMMERIK VS MAS, AC No. 8010 (2009)
FACTS: Complainant Keld Stemmerik is a citizen and resident of Denmark. In one of his trips
to the Philippines, he was introduced to respondent Atty. Leonuel N. Mas. That was his
misfortune. In his one visit to the Philippines, complainant marveled at the beauty of the country
and expressed his interest in acquiring real property in the Philippines. He consulted respondent
who advised him that he could legally acquire and own real property in the Philippines.
Respondent even suggested an 86,998sq.m. property in Quarry, Agusuin, Cawag, Subic,
Zambales with the assurance that the property was alienable. Trusting respondent, complainant
agreed to purchase the property through respondent as his representative or attorney-in-fact.
Complainant also engaged the services of respondent for the preparation of the necessary
documents.
After the various contracts and agreements were executed, complainant tried to get in touch with
the respondent to inquire about when the property could be registered in his name. However the
respondent suddenly became scarce and refused to answer complainant’s calls and e-mails. The
complainant visited again the Philippines and engaged in the services of a particular law office as
his counsel. He was devastated to know that aliens could not own land under Philippine laws and
that the land supposedly bought was inalienable and was not subject to disposition.
Complainant then filed a disbarment against respondent in the Commission on Bar Discipline.
Respondent failed to file his answer neither did he appear in the scheduled mandatory
conference. The CBD ruled that respondent used his position to mislead complainant, he even
prepared fictitious and falsified contract, deeds and agreements and collected large amount of
money. The CBD found him to be "nothing more than an embezzler" who misused his
professional status to deceive the complainant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING: YES. Respondent spun an intricate web of lies. In the process, he committed
unethical act after unethical act, wantonly violating laws and professional standards. For all this,
respondent violated not only the lawyer’s oath and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He also transgressed the following provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Rule 1.01. – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02. – A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.
CANON 7 – A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.
CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN
ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES
OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE
SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. (emphasis
supplied)
A lawyer who resorts to nefarious schemes to circumvent the law and uses his legal knowledge
to further his selfish ends to the great prejudice of others, poses a clear and present danger to the
rule of law and to the legal system. He does not only tarnish the image of the bar and degrade the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession, he also betrays everything that the legal profession
stands for. It is respondent and his kind that give lawyering a bad name and make laymen
support Dick the Butcher’s call, "Kill all lawyers!"27 A disgrace to their professional brethren,
they must be purged from the bar. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Leonuel N. Mas is hereby
DISBARRED.
ISLAS V PLATON, 47 PHIL 162
FACTS: It appears from the record that herein petitioners filed a petition under the Land
Registration Act for the review of a decree in a land registration case. The Court of first instance
denied the petition without permitting the petitioners to present their evidence. Upon appeal to
this court the order of denying the petition was reversed and the evidence was received but still
denied the petition for review.
The petitioners filed a motion for new trial, this was heard and denied, the notice of denial was
sent to the attorney for the petitioners. The letter containing the notification returned to the clerk
of Court and marked as "unclaimed." Bill of exception was filed but the trial court refused to
approve and certify it on the ground that at the timed for presenting it already expired.
On September 1924, an order was entered declaring the decision in the land registration case
final and a writ of possession was issued directing the Sheriff to place applicant (petitioner) for
registration. The petitioners the brought the present action of writ of mandamus to compel the
respondent Judge to approve and certify the bill of exceptions.
Counsel for the petitioners argues that under section 26 of Act No. 2347 an appellant in a land
registration case has thirty days from the date the appellant receives a copy of decision, within
the meaning of said section; that as he never received a copy of the order, the thirty days period
had not begun to run at the time the bill of exceptions here in question was presented.
ISSUE: Whether or not the counsel of petitioners committed negligence for being unable to
claim the decision issued by the trial court.
RULING: Yes. The respondent judge was nevertheless, in our opinion, fully justified in
declining to certify the bill of exceptions in the present case.
There is nothing in the record to show that the postal authorities did not properly perform their
duty and we must presume that the usual notice of the arrival of the letter at the Manila post
office was delivered at the office of said counsel. He failed to claim the letter and it was returned
to the Court of First Instance marked "unclaimed." His failure to receive a copy of the order in
question was therefore entirely due to his own negligence of which he cannot now be allowed to
take advantage. As a practicing lawyer it was his duty to so arrange matters that official
communications sent by mail would reach him promptly. Having failed to do so, he and his
clients must suffer the consequences of his negligence. That he may have been absent from his
office at the time the notification here in question arrived is no excuse.
---
ALBANO V COLOMA, 21 SCRA 411 (1967)
FACTS: This was a disbarment case filed by the complainant Albano against respondent Atty.
Coloma as their counsel as plaintiffs in a civil case during the Japanese occupation of his mother.
The respondent failed to expedite the hearing and termination of the case, as a result of which
they had presented by another lawyer. The respondent herein intervened in the case to collect her
attorney's fees, it was then alleged that during the hearing they were surprised to know that the
respondent presented in an exhibit a document showing that they promised to pay her a
contingent fee of a particular percentage (33-1/3%) of the recoveries from land or damages. The
more serious charge was that the signature and the writing made under the name of his mother is
not made by them.
Respondent Coloma denied the allegation that complainant was "a victim of injustice," alleging
that the same was "untrue, unfounded, and imaginary." She admited that there is contingent fee
and denied that she did nothing to expedite the hearing and termination of such civil case.
Appellee served as the plaintiff's counsel for a period of seven years. The record shows that she
was diligent in her work. She likewise denied taht she could have been removed for her failure to
comply with her obligations because she served "faithfully, efficiently, continuously and to the
best and to the best of her knowledge and capacity."
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Coloma is entitled to compensation and violated the ethics of legal
profession as to her obligations as a counsel.
RULING: The Court held that Atty. Coloma is entitled for compensation. Any counsel, who is
worthy of his hire, is entitled to be fully recompensed for his services. With his capital consisting
solely of his brains and with his skill, acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in the
expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against
any attempt on the part of a client to escape payment of his fees. It is indeed ironic if after
putting forth the best that is in him to secure justice for the party he represents, he himself would
not get his due.
The facts as found by the Solicitor General in so far as the services of respondent as counsel for
the complainant and his mother were concerned reveal the utmost diligence and
conscientiousness on her part. What she said in her answer was sustained in all respects.
There is this additional point to consider. As Cardozo aptly observed: "Reputation [in the legal
profession] is a plant of tender growth, and its bloom, once lost, is not easily restored."14 This
Court, certainly is not averse to having such a risk minimized. Where, as in this case, the good
name of counsel was traduced by an accusation made in reckless disregard of the truth, an action
prompted by base ingratitude, the severest censure is called for. Thus the charge against the
respondent is hereby dismissed.
------
NOCOM V CAMERINO, et al., GR NO. 182984 (Feb 10, 2009)
FACTS:
----
GENATO V SILAPAN, 453 Phil. 910 (2003)
FACTS: A complaint for disbarment was filed by William Genato against respondent Atty.
Silapan. Complainant alleged that the respondent asked if he could rent a small office space in
his building for his law practice. The respondent was introduce to Atty. Dacanay, complainant's
retained lawyer who accommodated the respondent in the building and made him handle some of
the complainant's cases. Hence, their legal relationship started.
The conflict started when the respondent borrowed P200, 000 to the complainants for his car
down payment. In return, respondent issued postdated checks to cover the six months interest on
the loan. He likewise mortgaged his house and lot but did not surrender its title. The respondent
purchased a new car however, the document of sale of the car was issued in complainant's name
and financed through City Trust Company. One Romero was introduced by respondent to
complainant and lent Romero a money. Subsequently, respondent failed to pay the amortization
on the car and financing firm sent demand letters to complainant. Complainant tried to encash
respondent's postdated check with the drawee bank but it was dishonored due to closed account.
Respondent failed to heed complainant's repeated demands for payment. Complainant then filed
a criminal case against respondent for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and a civil case for
judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage.
Respondent insisted that there was nothing libelous in his imputations of dishonest business
practices and his revelation of complainant's desire to bribe the government. He claimed to have
made these information to defend his case.
Complainant claimed that respondent is guilty of breaking their confidential lawyer-client
relationship and should be held administratively liable therefor. Consequently, he filed this
complaint for disbarment, praying also that an administrative sanction be meted against
respondent for his issuance of a bouncing check.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent committed a breach of trust and confidence by imputing to
complainant illegal practices and disclosing complainant's alleged intention to bribe government
officials in connection with a pending case.
RULING: Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.
The long-established rule is that an attorney is not permitted to disclose communications made to
him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter consents. This obligation to
preserve the confidences and secrets of a client arises at the inception of their relationship. The
protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the
litigation, nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or
by any other change of relation between them.
It must be stressed, however, that the privilege against disclosure of confidential communications
or information is limited only to communications which are legitimately and properly within the
scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer.
Respondent defenses fails to satisfy the Court. It was improper for the respondent to use it
against the complainant in the foreclosure case as it was not the subject matter of litigation
therein and respondent's professional competence and legal advice were not being attacked in
said case. A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with
integrity in a manner that is beyond reproach. His relationship with his clients should be
characterized by the highest degree of good faith and fairness.
----
MONTANO V IBP, 358 SCRA 1 (2001)
FACTS: The complainant hired the services of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as his counsel in
collaboration with Atty. Ronando L. Gerona in a case pending before the Court of Appeals
docketed wherein the complainant was the plaintiff-appellant.
The parties agreed upon attorney’s fees in the amount of P15,000.00 fifty percent (50%) of
which was payable upon acceptance of the case and the remaining balance upon the termination
of the case. Accordingly, complainant paid respondent the amount of P7,500.00 representing
50% of the attorney’s fee.
Thereafter, even before respondent counsel had prepared the appellant’s brief and contrary to
their agreement that the remaining balance be payable after the termination of the case, Atty.
Dealca demanded an additional payment from complainant obliged by paying the amount of
P4,000.00.
Prior to the filing of the appellant’s brief, respondent counsel again demanded payment of the
remaining balance of P3,500.00. When complainant was unable to do so, respondent lawyer
withdraw his appearance as complainant’s counsel without his prior knowledge and/or
conformity.
Thus this complaint charging respondent with misconduct and praying that he be «sternly dealt
with administratively.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent committed misconduct and violated provisions of the CPR?
HELD: Yes. The Court finds respondent’s conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal
profession. Under Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall withdraw
his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances. Although he
may withdraw his services when the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services,
under the circumstances of the present case, Atty. Dealca’s withdrawal was unjustified as
complainant did not deliberately fail to pay him the attorney’s fees. In fact, complainant exerted
honest efforts to fulfill his obligation. Respondent’s contemptuous conduct does not speak well
of a member of the bar considering that the amount owing to him was only P3,500.00. rule 20.4
of Canon 20, mandates that a lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his
compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.
Sadly, for not so large a sum owed to him by complainant, respondent lawyer failed to act in
accordance with the demands of the Code.
The Court, however, does not agree with complainant’s contention that the maximum penalty of
disbarment should be imposed on respondent lawyer. In the present case, reprimand is deemed
sufficient.
Respondent was REPRIMANDED.

---
OBANDO V FIGUERAS, 322 SCRA 148 (2000)
FACTS:
-----
HORNILLA V SALUNAT, 405 SCRA 220 (2003)
FACTS: Benedicto Hornilla is a member of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association
(PPSTA). Along with several other complainants, Hornilla filed intra-corporate cases before the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against PPSTA board members for unlawful
spending and the undervalued sale of real property.
Atty. Ernesto Salunat on the other hand is a member of the ASSA Law and Associates, and a
retained legal counsel of PPSTA. As retained counsel, he represented PPSTA in the cases against
them by Hornilla and other members.
Hornilla alleged that Atty. Salunat is laboring under conflict of interests for engaging with
PPSTA, where his fees are derived from the corporate funds that its members, including himself,
contributed on.
Atty. Salunat refused to withdraw his representation despite being told by PPSTA members
about the conflict of interest. For his part, he contends that his representation was in behalf of
ASSA Law and Associates, being the retained legal counsel of PPSTA, and not under his
personal capacity.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Salunat is indeed representing conflicting interests for representing
members of the same corporation in a derivative suit?
HELD: Atty. Salunat is found guilty of representing conflicting interests. There is conflict of
interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test
is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but
it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument
will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client. This rule covers not only cases in
which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence
has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new
retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in
any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new
relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another
test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an
attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.
Since this is still his first offense, Atty. Salunat is admonished to observe a higher degree of
fidelity in his professional practice, and is further warned that a repetition of such act will be
dealt with severely.
------
FRIAS V LOZADA, 477 SCRA 393 (2005)

PACANA V PASUAL-LOPEZ, 594 SCRA 1 (2009)


BELLEZA V MACAZA, 593 SCRA 549 (2009)

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