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How ‘skill’ definition affects the diversity of skilled immigration policies

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 Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies

ISSN: 1369-183X (Print) 1469-9451 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cjms20

How ‘skill’ definition affects the diversity of skilled

immigration policies

Anna Katherine Boucher

To cite this article: Anna Katherine Boucher (2019): How ‘skill’ definition affects the
diversity of skilled immigration policies, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, DOI:
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JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES
https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1561063

How ‘skill’ definition affects the diversity of skilled

immigration policies
Anna Katherine Boucher
Department of Government and International Relations, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
Increasingly, governments focus on skilled immigration not only to Skill; immigration; diversity;
fill labour market gaps but also due to a perceived political discrimination; gender;
preference for such migration. Across debates in major immigrant- ethnicity
receiving nations, we observe an assumption that the ‘skill’ in
‘skilled immigration’ is clearly definable and easily differentiated
from ‘unskilled’ or ‘semi-skilled’ migrant labour. Academic research
in industrial relations and economics provides a more complex
reading of the concept of ‘skill’ by interrogating the ways in which
skill is accumulated. This article reviews concepts of ‘skill’
embedded in skilled immigration policies in five major Western
democratic jurisdictions. It demonstrates the plurality of
approaches to defining ‘skill’ within political and policy debates in
these countries, and links these back to the prevailing theoretical
perspectives. The article argues that greater attention by policy-
makers and scholars of skilled immigration to the theoretical
assumptions underpinning their preferred models of skilled
immigration would better reveal the gendered and racialised
biases of existing approaches to skills definition.

Introduction
Increasingly, governments select skilled immigrants both to fill labour market gaps and to
address popular preference for skilled immigration. Migrants coming through skilled visa
streams are frequently viewed as more easily integrated and less of a burden on the welfare
state than their unskilled economic, familial or humanitarian counterparts (Boucher
2016). Further, although highly skilled immigrants may be substitutable for domestic
workers, there is a public perception in many countries that these immigrants are less
likely to act in competition with local labour (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Hainmueller,
Hiscox, and Margalit 2015). Consistent in such political debates is an assumption that the
‘skill’ in ‘skilled immigration’ is clearly definable and easily differentiated from ‘unskilled’
or ‘semi-skilled’ labour migration. Indeed, policy-makers often present skilled immigra-
tion policies as a ‘win-win’ for both host societies and for immigrants themselves.
Recently, President Donald Trump lauded Australia and Canada, for their skilled immi-
gration programmes, arguing that the United States should emulate this approach
(Morrow 2017).

CONTACT Anna Katherine Boucher anna.boucher@sydney.edu.au

© 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 A. K. BOUCHER

Chief among its purported benefits is that skilled immigration can act as a substitute for
discretionary race-based selection (Joppke 2005; Green and Green 1999, 431). For others,
even if skilled immigration policies renders ethnic-specific effects, this in itself does not
make such policies discriminatory given that that race-based selection is not an explicit
policy goal (Reitz 1998, 93; Borjas 1999). However, at the same time, others have suggested
that skilled immigration can operate as a problematic fig leaf for alternate forms of dis-
crimination on ethnic (Shi 2004), class (Taylor 1991, 10–12; Tannock 2011) or gender
grounds (Boyd 2006; Boucher 2016; Kofman 2014). Yet, these academic critiques of
skilled immigration policies often do not differentiate across the various approaches to
the definition of ‘skill’ within policy design, or for that matter across different skilled
immigration visa subclasses, also known as ‘entry tracks’. This article argues that there
are multifarious approaches to this exercise and that definitional nuance holds important
implications for the gender and ethnicity diversity of skilled immigration policies.
This article explores these arguments in depth through a careful examination of an
array of approaches to defining ‘skill’ within skilled immigration policies. First,
however, it is important to briefly explain why equity considerations matter in an appraisal
of skilled immigration policies. Our justification in part relates to states’ own historical
actions. Naturally, the historical record behind the repeal of non-discriminatory policies
is contested. Some view these policy changes as primarily motivated by realpolitik,
rather than concerns over increasing the diversity of immigration entrants (i.e. Fitzgerald
and Cook-Martín 2014). Yet, we submit here that when governments rejected discrimina-
tory immigration policies in the 1960s and 1970s, they also rejected a system of selection
that differentiated on the basis of people’s uncontrollable innate characteristics (Joppke
2005, 2, see also Ellermann 2019 and Gibney 2019). For instance, the Australian Depart-
ment of Immigration and Citizenship’s (DIAC) Factsheet One summarises that country’s
multicultural immigration selection policy, stating that
Australia’s Migration Program does not discriminate on the basis of race or religion. This
means that anyone from any country, can apply to migrate, regardless of their ethnic
origin, gender or colour, provided that they meet the criteria set out in law (DIAC 2009)

With respect to skilled immigration, in particular, one of the key objectives of the devel-
opment of the points tests in Canada in 1967 was to establish a race-blind, non-discrimi-
natory means to select migrants (Green and Green 1999). Similarly, the abandonment of
national origins quotas through the 1965 Hart-Celler Immigration Act in the United
States, can be viewed as a repudiation of race-based immigration admissions (Fitzgerald
and Cook-Martín 2014).
On this basis, this article argues that the end of discriminatory selection in most
Western countries in the 1960s and 1970s irrevocably restrained the exercise of state
sovereignty by placing an equality check on government’s immigration policies. In
short, morally, this article argues that even if in some instances the foundational commit-
ment to diversity goes array, this alone does not vitiate the nature of the original commit-
ment1 Normatively, this article argues that it is not permissible for a country to select only
Anglo-Saxon migrants or overwhelmingly male migrants because this runs up against the
original commitment to a diverse nation that is a founding feature of non-discriminatory
immigration selection. The more complex question is whether such policies, through their
definition of ‘skill’, may operate to inadvertently select such migrants even if this is neither
 JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 3

the stated nor implicit aim of government (Boucher 2016, 3–4). It is this more subtle issue
that this article explores through its analysis of ‘skill’ definition within policies in five
jurisdictions.
The first challenge in undertaking this appraisal is in mapping the array of theoretical
definitions of ‘skill’ and contrasting this against actual skilled immigration policies. The
academic scholarship in economics and industrial relations offers a useful theoretical
backdrop for this exercise and can be divided into three main approaches: educational,
occupational and human capital. After examining this scholarship, this article then
reviews concepts of ‘skill’ in an array of skilled immigration policies within five major
Western democratic jurisdictions: Canada, Australia, the United States, the European
Union’s Blue Card and the United Kingdom. These five Western jurisdictions are
chosen due to their ‘most similar’ status. Through the analysis of skilled immigration
visas in these five locations, the article demonstrates the plurality of approaches to
defining ‘skill’ and links these approaches back to prevailing theoretical perspectives,
with subsequent and varying implications for the ethnic and gender diversity of selection
policies. In making this argument, the article analyses policy instruments (laws, regu-
lations and policy guidelines) as well as evidence from existing qualitative and quantitat-
ive studies on the effects of skilled immigration policies. The way in which we define
‘skill’ for the purpose of skilled immigration policies has implications both for the pol-
icies themselves and the ways in which countries’ performance along a variety of diver-
sity indicators is evaluated (such as the representation of women in admissions statistics
or the ethnic representation among skilled immigrants). While, in most countries, the
focus of such work has been on employment outcomes (i.e. Green and Green 1995;
Cobb-Clark and Khoo 2006), some research also considers the diversity implications
of skilled immigration selection approaches. It is this latter scholarship that is the
focus of this article.

The importance of skill: policy preference for skilled immigration

The value of defining ‘skill’ lies it is high salience in contemporary immigration debates
globally. Skilled immigration policy is important in its own right but also politically
given growing government preference for the highly skilled (Czaika and Parsons
2016a). Forty percent of the 172 member states of the United Nations in 2013 had an
explicit interest in developing skilled immigration policies and this includes both
OECD and non-OECD countries. Importantly these figures represent an increase from
2005, when only 22 percent of those surveyed expressed such an interest in recruiting
the highly skilled (United Nations World Population Policies Survey, 2013 cited in
Czaika and Parsons 2016a, 2).
Research suggests that incumbent populations in host societies prefer skilled immi-
grants, even if those migrants present direct labour market competition for domestic
skilled workers (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Hainmueller, Hiscox, and Margalit
2015). An emphasis on skill and labour market performance also plays into the post-settle-
ment appraisal of skilled immigrants, thereby reinforcing existing policy preferences for
skilled immigration over family flows (Rinne 2016). Longitudinal studies across a range
of countries demonstrate that immigrants entering through skilled visas are often less
welfare state dependent than those coming through other channels, such as family visas
4 A. K. BOUCHER

that typically do not select on the basis of skill or labour-market readiness (for Australia:
Richardson et al. 2004; Cobb-Clark and Khoo 2006; for Canada: Green and Green 1995;
for Western Europe: Zimmermann 2005; and Singapore, Fong 2006, 161, see also Eller-
mann 2019). These studies have been contested in other analyses that adopt a longer
time frame (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1995; Jasso 2011; Wanner 2003). Nonetheless, their
findings feed into the broader political discourse where skilled immigration is frequently
preferred.

Empirical approaches to defining ‘skill’ in the immigration scholarship

‘Skill’ is defined in a variety of ways within global debates around skilled immigration.
Often, these differing approaches do not acknowledge countervailing definitions, render-
ing analysis of underlying assumptions more opaque. As such, a first contribution of this
article is to set out the array of definitional approaches. Many of these definitions emerge
from the discipline of economics.
The first body of work is based on the OECD’s bilateral migration stock database orig-
inally developed by Docquier and Marfouk 2006 (see also Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk
2009; Dumont and Lemaitre 2004; Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport 2007). More recent
efforts combine these data with population register and labour force survey data from
outside the OECD to give a broader, global picture of patterns of skilled migrants (i.e.
Arslan et al. 2016, 6; Artuç et al. 2014). These approaches define ‘skill’ according to the
level of education a migrant has acquired, with those in possession of post-secondary qua-
lifications or above classified as ‘skilled’.2 Political economists have levelled several cri-
tiques at this educational approach to defining ‘skill’. First, equivalency across sources
of education is assumed under this approach. As such, a tertiary degree from Harvard
is equated to a similar degree from a far less prestigious institution. Furthermore, edu-
cation is taken as the central criterion for skill, although as this article demonstrates
below, governments diverge significantly in the emphasis they place upon tertiary qualifi-
cations. In addition, employers rather than governments may be centrally responsible for
the selection and thereby definition of ‘skill’. They may underplay educational attainment
and instead focus upon other factors, such as practical work experience. It follows that a
focus on education as a proxy for skill can fail to assist us in understanding how such skills
are actually deployed within the ‘black box’ of a firm (Cully 2012). Finally, alternate
approaches to skill definition, such as the Canberra Manual, consider both those with ter-
tiary education, but also those without formal qualifications that are employed in the
science and technology occupations, as ‘highly skilled’ (OECD/Eurostat 1995; cited in
Parsons et al. 2014, 10). An approach to ‘skill’ that focuses upon education can fail to
capture such individuals who might be deemed as such due to their labour market and
sector-specific attributes.
Researchers at the International Migration Institute at Oxford University have devel-
oped an alternative occupationally based definition of ‘skill’. This approach considers
any migrant with occupational qualifications in the top three categories of the Inter-
national Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) as ‘skilled’ and adopts a sophisti-
cated method in order to benchmark this definition across ten countries through
administrative datasets (Czaika and Parsons 2016a, 2016b). A similar approach has also
been utilised by scholars who analyse a smaller number of countries or occupations,
 JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 5

such as doctors, foreign-born scientists, academics or investors (Bhargava, Docquier, and

Moullan 2011; Clemens and Pettersson 2008; Czaika and Toma 2015; Franzoni, Scellato,
and Stephan 2012; Miguelez and Fink 2013). Finally, one set of researchers have adopted a
micro-level dataset that considers both occupation and salary – an increasingly frequent
proxy for ‘skill’ in skilled immigration policy – however, this approach has not been uti-
lised heavily in the immigration literature (Ruggles et al. 2010).
The reviewed studies are principally based upon one standardised definition of ‘skill’.
Yet, a singular definition might not be substitutable for another. Indeed, a validity check
undertaken by Parsons and collaborators (2014, 8) of their occupational measure
demonstrates that of a survey sample of twelve million immigrants in the United
States, only 665,000 qualify as highly skilled on the basis of occupation alone, while
ten million qualify as highly skilled when education is utilised as a proxy.3 Furthermore,
there is variation across occupations in this regard; for instance in business and manage-
ment, only 50 percent of highly skilled workers have completed a university degree
(Parsons et al. 2014, 8). This validity check demonstrates the fundamental importance
of ‘skill’ definition for selection outcomes in actual immigration policies; the way in
which ‘skill’ is defined will have immediate implications for who is accepted and who
is rejected under skilled immigration selection policies. While accounts that rely upon
singular definitions of ‘skill’ provide us with useful benchmarking data across migrants
across countries, they do not clarify which migrants are actually entering via skilled
immigration visas, given that each visa adopts a different, and often, hybrid definition
of ‘skill’. For this, we need to consider actual immigration policies. Yet, before consider-
ing the variation in such policies across and within visa tracks within countries, it is
useful to canvass the theoretical scholarship on skill definition and how this underpins
practical policy design.

Theoretical approaches to defining ‘skill’ in the economic and social

science scholarship
Human capital understandings of ‘skill’ inform many of the reviewed empirical studies.
Situated within neoclassical economic approaches to labour economics, human capital
theory shares with that discipline key assumptions about the effects of individual
decision-making, market mechanisms and personal choice upon educational attainment
and language acquisition (both proxies for skill). Yet, even within the broader human
capital theory, definitions of ‘skill’ are more contested than the prevailing migration scho-
larship indicates. For instance, Gary Becker (1964) described human capital as ‘the
outcome of deliberate investment [in education and work experience] on the part of indi-
viduals deciding to incur present costs for the sake of future benefits’. This definition
suggests that human capital can be acquired not only through educational achievements
but also through occupational training, and that training may be with one or more organ-
isations: It can be acquired through generalist training in firms or educational institutions
(with skills transferable across firms and sometimes even employment sectors) or through
specific training (that benefits the productivity of the particular firm in which that training
occurs) (Becker 1964, 8–29).
Human capital approaches to ‘skill’ make certain assumptions about the relationship
between skill and productivity. In particular, higher levels of knowledge and skills acquired
6 A. K. BOUCHER

primarily through education and workplace training are seen to translate into greater
productivity and therefore higher wages (Becker 1993; McBride 2000, 161). Investment
in training is viewed as an economic trade-off; short-term increases in earnings are fore-
gone in pursuit of long-term investment in future earnings potential (Becker 1964).
Wages are reflective of worker’s skills, which as another human capital theorist,
George Borjas argues, ‘are perfectly transferable between different labour markets’
because ‘profit-maximising employers are likely to value the same factor in any
market economy’ (Borjas 1987, 534). As such, wages are sometimes also taken as a
proxy for ‘skill’ (i.e. Ruggles et al. 2010; see generally Boucher 2016, 22–23). Under
human capital approaches, language skill is sometimes also viewed as a skill that is
itself a product of individual investment in language training (i.e. Chiswick and Miller
2002; Bellante and Kogut 1998).
Table 1 above summarises the main academic approaches to skills definition reviewed
in this article.

‘Skill’ definitions in skilled immigration policies

This full theoretical spectrum of approaches to skill definition is reflected in actual skill
immigration policies. The next section of this article reviews such policies in five jurisdic-
tions (Canada, Australia, the United States, the European Union and the United
Kingdom) in order to consider the ways in which ‘skill’ is defined in a practical policy
sense and also considers some of the implications of these definitions for gender and
ethnic diversity. These five jurisdictions are selected as they are major admitters of
skilled immigrants and world leaders in this area of policy design; their policies have
been emulated elsewhere in the global race for talent (Boucher 2016, Chapter 1). They
are ‘most similar’ countries, with broadly comparable Western democratic systems,
meaning that we can infer basic equivalence in approaches to ‘skill’. This is especially
so when contrasted to countries like the United Arab Emirates and Singapore, that also
rely heavily upon skilled labour but through autocratic governance structures (Boucher
and Gest 2018, Chapter 4). Our analysis considers an array of temporary and permanent
skilled immigration visas to reflect the various ways that ‘skill’ is defined within policy
design. It is important to note that in each of these countries, there are a broad array of
skilled immigration visas or ‘entry tracks’ (Beine et al. 2016, 842). Given space constraints,
this overview is not exhaustive and instead focuses on some of the key skilled immigration
visas but not all of them for each country.4

Table 1. Alternate approaches to skills definition in the intergovernmental and theoretical scholarship.
Approach Proponents
Skill as tertiary education World Bank and OECD studies (i.e. Docquier and Marfouk
2006).
Theoretical underpinnings: Becker 1964
Skill as occupational classifications 1–3 under ISCO Czaika and Parsons (2016a, 2016b)
measure
Parsons et al. (2014)
Skill as wages and occupation Ruggles et al. 2010; Becker 1993
Skill as on-the-job training Becker 1964
Skill as work experience Becker 1964
Skill as language Bellante and Kogut 1998; Chiswick and Miller 1992
 JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 7

Canada
Canada first developed a points test for the selection of skilled migrants in 1962 (Hawkins
1989). Since that time, the points test has taken many different permutations that are
responsive both to market forces but also legislative, bureaucratic and political
demands. The prevailing approach to ‘skill’ within this points test has also shifted, from
a focus first on occupational training, to a more general human capital approach in the
early 2000s (Boucher 2016, Chapter 5; Ellermann 2019). Recently, Canada has moved
back to an occupational focus within its points testing, coupled with an increased focus
on French and English language proficiency and a sliding points test cut-off where
those with higher marks are rewarded greater chances of admission (Boucher 2016,
Chapter 6). Language testing can raise the spectre of ethno-linguistic discrimination
within skilled immigration selection because it is clearly easier for native speakers to
gain access than foreign language speakers. One study found that if the Chinese migrants
who entered Canada in 1995 had been subject to the more difficult 2002 skilled immigra-
tion language test, only one-third would have gained admission (Shi 2004). Furthermore,
some scholars have argued that increasing native language requirements can have a nega-
tive, intersectional gendered and ethnicised effect given the greater challenges women face
in access to foreign language training (Hyndman 1999, 7; Boucher 2016, Chapters 5 and 6;
Chiswick and Miller 2007: 32–36). However, critics of this analysis have argued that it is
also important to consider changing push factors at the sending country end that might
have affected the reduced Chinese flows, in addition to the increased selectivity of
skilled immigration policies themselves (DeVortez 2003, 7–11).
Changes in Canadian skilled immigration policies have been accompanied by a system
known as ‘Express Entry’ that matches the skilled applicant with a prospective employer.
Those with a job receive higher point test scores and are more likely to be successful for
skilled immigration admission (Government of Canada 2017a). This system allows gov-
ernment to retain control over selection by shifting the cut-off for visa grants depending
upon the current needs of employers (Government of Canada 2017b). In essence, the
Express Entry system amounts to a flexible approach to ‘skills’ definition that alters not
only according to the current demand of employers but also according to the supply of
competitive applicants. In some respects, this approach mirrors the types of discretion
that the end of race-based selection sought to eradicate, however, in its contemporary iter-
ation, discretion is placed in the hands of employers rather than bureaucrats.
Given its nascent status, the potential diversity implications of the Express Entry
approach has not been comprehensively evaluated in Canada. However, in New
Zealand where a similar system has been in place since December 2003, analysis indicates
that it has led to both a reduction in an entry in applicants from China over the last decade,
and sharply increased representation of immigrants from English-speaking countries
(Bedford 2012).

Australia
Australia operates a similar points-based system to Canada within its permanent skilled
intake. This selection grid has an old pedigree, first adopted in 1973 but refined on
several occasions since (Hawkins 1989; Boucher 2016, Chapter 5). In contrast to
8 A. K. BOUCHER

Canada, Australia moved from an originally targeted, occupationally focused model, to a

broader human capital model and then back to a targeted model in the late 1990s.
Throughout the 2000s, this targeted, focus expanded due to the inclusion of an increas-
ingly large number of skilled occupations on the government’s Skilled Occupation List
(Boucher 2016, 111). The new points test adopted in 2013 for permanent skilled immigra-
tion both restricted the number of skilled occupations permitted entry (thereby amounting
to a more occupationally focused model) and at the same time granted more discretion to
employers through the creation of an Express of Interest System (known as ‘Skill Select’).
In its design, this system is similar to the Express Entry approach in Canada. Individuals
are placed in a pool where their application is considered against other eligible candidates
for entry. Employers can also use SkillSelect to recruit immigrants into particular positions
(Boucher 2016, 112–113). The general trend in both Canada and Australia is towards an
employer-determined approach to skill definition. Initial evidence suggests that models
such as these that select on the basis of employer-determined attributes contribute to
different gender and ethnicity outcomes than when a government-administered general
human capital points tested is applied. Generally, within the employer-sponsored visa cat-
egories, there is a much stronger preference for applicants from English-Speaking Back-
ground countries than for the permanent points-tested visas that is principally
administered by government (Hawthorne 2011, 157).

The United States

The United States has several entry tracks for skilled immigration. These include the
United States Employment Third Preference Visa and the temporary H1B visa. Criteria
for the permanent visa are set by government (8 USCA 1153 (3)(A)), while the H1B
relies upon petitioning from an employer (INA s101a(a)(15)(H), 212(n)(t)) and is
restricted to ‘speciality occupations’ (INA s214(i)).5 In the case of the permanent Third
Preference Visa, for the ‘skilled’ category, the main requirement is on-the-job training
(8 USCA 1153 (3)(A)(i)). This approach to skill aligns most closely with the notion of
acquired human capital within classic economics accounts. For the ‘professional’ visa
that also attracts skilled immigrants, the focus is on holding a bachelor degree (8 USCA
1153 (3)(A) (ii)) which is akin to the definition of ‘skill’ developed by OECD economists.
As in other countries, women are underrepresented within skilled immigration categories
into the US, ranging from between 17.4 and 38 percent of admissions when compared with
57 percent of the overall immigration programme cohort (Jasso 2009, 36). The same
analysis also demonstrates that Hispanics are vastly unrepresented in skilled flows,
when compared with other visas, such as family-based admissions. Across the three per-
manent skilled categories, their representation ranges between 3 and 15 percent, which is
far lower than other ethnic groups, including Asians and Whites (Jasso 2009, 31). It is well
established that Indians are highly overrepresented in the H1B visa, which is predomi-
nately utilised in the IT sector (Chakravartty 2005, 3).
In part due to the policy stasis inherent to the United States political system, there has
historically been less radical changes to the definition of ‘skill’ there than in other jurisdic-
tions. Indeed, existing American approaches to skills definition may have less serious
diversity implications than those proposed through a points test model. Hills and
Hayes (2011) employ an administrative dataset to measure the possible effects of the
 JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 9

adoption of a points test on the country profile of accepted immigrants into the United
States. Their findings are revealing, indicating that only one percent of Latin American
entrants would pass a points test similar to that in place in Australia and Canada (Hills
and Hayes 2011, 15–16). In contrast, twelve percent of immigrants from East Asia,
South Asia, and the Pacific, six percent from Europe and Central Asia, and fourteen
percent from Canada would succeed (Hills and Hayes 2011, 16–17).

The EU Blue card

With the global rise in skilled immigration policies over the 2000s, member states of the
European Union expressed a desire for guidance from Brussels on a European response to
this phenomenon. In light of these pressures and a broader concern for harmonisation of
European immigration laws, in 2009, the EU created the EU Blue Card Directive. At the
same time, member states did not wish to be unduly tied to a single policy. The compro-
mise that arose was a Directive that sets selection minima for skilled migrants from Third
Countries (those outside the European Economic Area and the European Union) but
which retains strong interpretative scope for individual members (Cerna 2010).
Under the Blue Card rules, an applicant can apply to reside in one European country
and then move to another after eighteen months (Cerna and Czaika 2016, 29). Tertiary
educational qualifications are a necessary criterion, although in key instances, this can
be substituted with on-the-job experience (Council Directive 2009/C50, Article 2(h)).
Indeed, disagreement among member states as to the appropriate definition of the term
‘highly qualified employment’ contributed to a capacious approach adopted within the
EU Blue Card (European Council 2008, 5, footnote 11). Aside from educational and train-
ing requirements, the central mechanism for skill definition is a wage threshold, set at a
minimum of 1.5 times the average annual gross salary in the relevant EU country
(Council Directive 2009/C50, Article 5(3)). In many countries, a significantly higher
threshold has been adopted (Boucher 2016, Table 2.2, 41).
Some scholars have pointed to the discriminatory potential of wage thresholds as a
central mechanism to define ‘skill’. The argument follows that given a deeply entrenched
gendered wage gap globally, female applicants are unduly negatively affected by such
thresholds (Cerna and Czaika 2016, 34–36; European Women’s Lobby 2010; Kofman
2014). Such a gendered effect could be particularly strong across the European Union,
where a 17 percent gendered pay gap operates (Eurostat 2014) and is greater for the
higher skilled occupations that feature in Blue Card admissions (Triandafyllidou and
Isaakyan 2016, 294). Unsurprisingly, as a result of these gendered effects, the majority
of Blue Card holders are men (Triandafyllidou and Isaakyan 2014, 4).6

United Kingdom Tier 2 points test for skilled workers

From 2004 through to 2008, the United Kingdom undertook a major rehaul of its old work
permit scheme through the introduction of a tiered economic immigration system. This
ranges from Tier 1 for entrepreneurs seeking large-scale investment into the United
Kingdom, Tier 2 for skilled immigration and Tier 3 for lower-skilled immigration,
which remains closed at present denying entry of such immigration other than through-
European Union routes. Each of these visa categories carries with it differential
10 A. K. BOUCHER

opportunities to convert to permanent status, which over time affect opportunities for
naturalisation (UK Gov 2018). We focus here on the Tier 2 visa as it is most analogous
with other skilled visas under consideration. Although formally modelled on the Austra-
lian points-tested system, the UK Tier 2 Points Test for Skilled Workers, in essence, oper-
ates according to a job offer coupled with a wage threshold of £35,000 upwards in most
cases (UK Government and Parliament 2016, 2017; UK Visas and Immigration 2015,
5).7 Underpinning the wage threshold approach to skill definition is an assumption of
market equilibrium whereby excess demand for labour self-corrects through salary fluctu-
ation (Ruhs and Bridget 2014, 71). As explained by the Migration Advisory Committee
(2008, 12) that advises the British government on immigration policy: ‘A rational
employer would not pay an employee more than the value of their productive output.
Equally an employee would not accept less, because he or she would be able to secure a
higher wage with a different employer’.
Aside from this focus upon wages, a further layer of complexity is added through the
use of shortage lists to select skilled migrants. These lists set standards for the occupations
where individuals can seek entry into the UK (UK Visas and Immigration 2015). In short,
the British approach to ‘skills’ definition is complex, adopting measures based both in
human capital productivity (wages) and also occupational classification (skills shortages)
(Ruhs and Bridget 2014, 71).
This wage-focused approach to skills definition can have gendered effects that fail to
acknowledge how gender norms play into pay contestation. A practical example arose
in negotiations over the Tier 2 points test in the mid-2000s in the UK. After changes to
the test in 2007, care work was no longer classified as ‘skilled’ as most workers were
not paid over £7.02 per hour – a central requirement for the Tier 2 test. As a result, the
entry of (mostly female) care workers into the United Kingdom plummeted from
22,000 in 2001 down to 1005 by 2007 (Boucher 2016, 46). A further example arose in
2016 when the salary threshold for Tier 2 was raised to £35,000 per annum. Opponents
argued that this change would block entrants from many occupations and would have a
disproportionate impact upon women given gendered wage gaps (Ferguson 2016).
Despite a large-scale petition campaign opposed to the increase, the new thresholds
were introduced that year (UK Government and Parliament 2016, 2017). The Tier 2 selec-
tion stream may take on heightened importance in future years following the Brexit
decision that will close down admission of skilled workers through free movement chan-
nels, and thereby place further pressure on Third Country National immigration to meet
prevailing skills shortages.

Discussion and conclusion

Domestic governments define ‘skill’ in a variety of ways, with differing consequences for
diversity considerations in admissions policies. These definitions are dynamic across time
and country and dependent both upon economic needs and political realities (see Table 2
for an overview). Approaches to ‘skills’ definition are rarely purely scientific and instead
constructed through a variety of economic and social factors. There is a clear disjuncture
between the approaches to ‘skill’ definition adopted by domestic governments and those
adopted in many academic studies that attempt to benchmark ‘skill’ globally. For instance,
the OECD studies focus upon a definition of ‘skill’ that classifies tertiary education or
 JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 11

Table 2. Skills definition and approaches across five jurisdictions.

Approach
Skill as tertiary education
Skill as occupational classifications 1–3
under ISCO measures
Skill as wages and occupation
Skill as on-the-job training
Skill as work experience
Skill as language abilities
Policy examples
United States Professional Visa
Australian Skilled Independent, Canadian Federal Skilled Worker and the
United Kingdom Tier 2 Points Test
United Kingdom’s Tier 2 Points Test and the EU Blue Card
United States’ Third Preference Visa
Elements in Australian Skilled Independent and Canadian Federal Skilled
Worker
Strong language testing in Australia Skilled Independent and the Canadian
Federal Skilled Worker visas; requirement in UK’s Tier 2 and under the EU’s
Blue Card visas

above as ‘highly skilled’ (Docquier and Marfouk 2006 , 7; Docquier et al. 2011; Brücker,
Capuano, and Marfouk 2013). However, as the analysis in this article demonstrates,
only one skilled visa in the United States (the professional visa) equates ‘skill’ to the
length of formal educational attainment, with a hybrid of other factors used in most
other visas in other countries.
The disjuncture between these theoretical approaches to defining ‘skill’ and actual dom-
estic policies on skilled immigration can lead to standardised but incorrect assumptions
around the nature of and changes in skilled migrant stock globally. Such assumptions
relate to broad characterisations of trends, such as whether there has been a net increase
in skilled immigration stock in recent years (i.e. Arslan et al. 2016, 7). Such definitions can
also impact upon the accuracy of claims around the gender and ethnic composition of
skilled immigrants globally, such as how many skilled immigrants are women. For
instance, several studies have argued that women’s global representation as skilled immi-
grants has increased or even reached parity to men over the last decade, because women
are equally represented in skilled migrant stock (Arslan et al. 2016, 8; Artuç et al. 2014;
Brücker, Capuano, and Marfouk 2013; Dumont, Martin, and Spielvogel 2007; IOM/
OECD 2016, 50–56). Yet, such studies (through defining ‘skill’ primarily as the possession
of a tertiary degree) do not accurately account for the actual visa channels by which
migrants actually enter. Many of the female migrants whom these studies capture as
‘skilled migrants’ may, in fact, have entered as spouses, students or even illegally, given
that tertiary education alone is rarely a necessary and sufficient criterion for skilled immi-
gration selection and givenprevailing gendered definitions of ‘skill’ within the selection
policies of many of these countries.
While these migrants may perform skilled work upon arrival, research demonstrates
that entering through other visa classes can render it more difficult for female migrants
to gain accreditation upon settlement, contributing to a ‘deskilling’ effect (Elrick and
Naomi 2014). Relationships of dependency inherent in familial forms of migrant entry
may have implications for the unemployment or underemployment of entrants many
years on from the initial settlement stage (Raghuram 2009). In short, the diversity of
admissions policy matters for the diversity of settlement policy (see also Ellermann
2019 and Gibney 2019). Given these theoretical and practical arguments, the approaches
to skill definition, and its effective measurement, are essential for meaningful evaluation of
skilled immigration policies as they operate in actual countries of destination (Parsons
et al. 2014, 4).8
12 A. K. BOUCHER

In contrast to these broad global studies, individual country level analysis that focuses
on gender disaggregated flow data and which considers actual entry tracks rather than
imposed, benchmarked, definitions of ‘skill’, persistently find that while there have been
some improvements in the gender representation of skilled flows in recent years that
women remain underrepresented (Boucher 2016; Boyd 2006; Dauvergne 2000; Triandafyl-
lidou and Isaakyan 2014). Although stymied in their comparative reach by the paucity of
international comparative flow data, these single-country approaches demonstrate a more
gendered and stratified reality in skilled immigration selection than that reflected in inter-
national benchmarking exercises.
Similarly, approaches to skills definition that focus upon tertiary education as the
central measure of skill may underestimate the ethnic origin bias that operates in
skilled immigration policies. Using tertiary educated bilateral stock as a central measure
of ‘skilled immigrants’ these studies find that migrants from lower-income countries
enjoy the fastest percentage growth (i.e. Arslan et al. 2016, 12–13). Such analysis suggests
that the impediments to immigration for those from the developing world are decreasing
rather than increasing (Arslan et al. 2016, 12–13). Yet, these studies again assume that
highly skilled immigrants are universally defined as those with tertiary education, which
as demonstrated above, is rarely the case in actual policy design. Such an analysis does
not, therefore, consider the various visa channels by which immigrants enter high-
income immigration countries – including via family reunification, tourist or student
visas or frequently undocumented means. They thereby render an inaccurate sense of
the extent of equalisation that is occurring across countries of origin in skilled immigration
selection. In contrast, studies that consider detailed, ethnicity disaggregated flow data
demonstrate evidence of ethnic stratification across skilled and unskilled visas and on
the basis of native language abilities (Sharma 2006; Hawthorne 2011; McLaughlin and
Hennebry 2013; Boucher and Gest 2018, Chapters 4 and 5).
Generally, definitions of ‘skill’ adopted in academic studies of skilled immigration are
more lenient and expansive than those adopted by actual immigrant selecting govern-
ments. To reach more accurate conclusions about actual skilled immigration flows from
a diversity perspective, such studies would be better based in actual administrative datasets
from individual countries linked to the government’s own definitions of what constitutes
‘highly skilled’, even if this renders cross-national comparison more complicated. Further-
more, these international approaches rely upon census data, which may suffer from con-
siderable lags when compared with more dynamic migratory flow data that administrative
datasets provide (Kerr et al. 2016, 6).
Aside from these measurement issues, theoretical assumptions also underpin current
policy approaches to skilled immigration. Such assumptions can, in turn, contribute to
certain forms of bias within selection models. For instance, economic analysis demon-
strates that a points-based system that focuses on educational attainment is more likely
to exclude individuals from poorer countries than richer ones (Borjas 1999). In turn,
approaches to skill definition that focus upon employer selection raise a different array
of concerns. By removing the need to codify sponsorship requirements (as is the case
with a points-based system), these approaches place more power in the hands of employ-
ers (Ruhs and Bridget 2014, 71). This focus upon employer sponsorship is common in
Australia and Canada where the expression of interest and job matching systems prioritise
those migrants who receive a concrete job offer. Such ‘job-offer systems’ are proliferating
 JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 13

as an integral part of many of the skill selection grids across Western Europe (Boucher
2016, Chapter 2). The analysis suggests that employer-driven models lead to more
Western-origin country composition than other models (Hawthorne 2011). This demon-
strates that the arbiter of selection (employers compared with government) is not without
diversity implications. Relatedly, comparison of points tests across an array of countries
demonstrates that those that adopt a general human capital approach based on attributes
such as educational status and years of training are less discriminatory against women
than those which test against specific skill qualifications (such as specific industry or enter-
prise experience) (Boucher 2016, Chapters 2–3). Finally, approaches to skill definition that
focus upon wages can reinforce existing gender and ethnicised inequalities in wage gaps
globally. Although predominately an issue in the United Kingdom with its high (and
increasing) threshold for the Tier 2 points-based system, wage thresholds are also an
important threshold criterion across Western Europe under the EU Blue Card and
deserve more attention in academic appraisals of skill.
This article has only considered a selection of skilled immigration entry tracks in place
in these countries at a particular point in time.9 As such, this analysis does not capture
across time changes, although some of these have been discussed qualitatively. The analy-
sis has also focused upon five Western democratic jurisdictions where debates over skilled
immigration have been crucial. This is not to negate the importance of considering the
reliance upon skilled policies in non-democratic systems, such as the Arabian Gulf or Sin-
gapore, but rather to focus on policies with similar attributes and located within similar
governance structures. Indeed, there is reason to believe that the focus on the financial
aspects of ‘skill’ could be even more heightened in autocratic countries, where the social
rights of migrants are given limited emphasis in immigration selection (Breunig, Cao,
and Luedtke 2012; Boucher and Gest 2018, Chapter 4). Finally, while the article has
emphasised the role of skilled immigration selection policies in informing gendered and
ethnicised outcomes, the self-selection of migrants could play a role, which must also
be incorporated into future studies of the diversity effects of skilled immigration policies
(Cobb-Clark 2003, 659; Reitz 1998). Only through an illumination of definitions of ‘skill’
both in theory and actual policy design, can we adequately address the potential diversity
effects of this increasingly popular basis for migrant admission.

Notes
1. Furthermore, underlying mixed motives on the part of decision-makers do not alone negate
an original commitment for diversity. For support of this theoretical argument, see Shpall
2014.
2. Generally, in these datasets the educational status for a definition of ‘skill’ equates to a tertiary
degree however, for the United States data, it includes those with one year of postsecondary
education: Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk 2009, 318, footnote 12.
3. Employing data from the US Community Survey 2010–2012.
4. For instance, the former Temporary (Long Stay) Business Visa – 457 Visa – in Australia, now
replaced with the Temporary Skill Shortage Visa is not considered in the analysis.
5. This is defined as the ‘[t]heoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized
knowledge in a field of human endeavor including but not limited to biotechnology, chem-
istry, architecture, engineering, mathematics, physical sciences, social sciences, medicine and
health, education, law, accounting, business specialties, theology, and the arts’: 8 US Code
s1184.
14 A. K. BOUCHER

6. While the EU does not publish detailed gender-disaggregated data for its Blue Card, such
figures are available for the Germany Blue Card, which admits 85 per cent of Europe’s
Blue Card holders. These data reveal that 77.5 per cent of holders in 2014 were men
(BAMF 2016, 123).
7. Generally, this pay threshold is set at ‘the 25th percentile for full-time employees in each
occupation, using the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings’: UK Visas and Immigration
2015, 5.
8. The decision by Parsons and collaborators to focus upon occupational classifications as a
benchmarking for skilled immigration definition is surprising given that as they note, such
systems have little direct bearing upon domestic selection systems (Parsons et al. 2014,
12). Such benchmarking exercises may be driven primarily by pragmatism and a concern
to draw large-scale cross-national comparative inferences even if they are not situated
within the real effects of immigration selection policies.
9. This article largely states the laws and policies as at July 2011.

Acknowledgements
Antje Ellermann, Irene Bloemraad, Chris Wright and attendees of the Race, Gender, and Class in the
Politics of Migration: Empiricist and Normative Approaches Workshop at the Social Science Research
Center, Berlin in 2017 provided useful feedback. Some of the article’s arguments are also explored in:
Boucher, A (2016) Gender, Migration and the Global Race for Talent, Manchester University Press,
Manchester. I would like to thank Lieven Brouwers from the European Commission with assistance
in interpreting EU gender-disaggregated data.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding
Tess Deegan provided research assistant on this article, supported by a grant from the Institute of
Public Administration Australia

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