Injunction –

Can a final executory ruling be properly executed over a land covered by TCTs but classified as
public forestland?

Which will prevail?

Has the person named in the TCT acquired valid title to the parcels of land?

“prescription does not lie against the State. . . And as provided in Article 1113 of the Civil Code:
'All things which are within the commerce of men, are susceptible of prescription, unless
otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character
shall not be the object of prescription.' ||| (East Asia Traders, Inc. v. Republic, G.R. No. 152947,
[July 7, 2004], 477 PHIL 848-865)”

WHETHER LOT 4355 IS ALIENABLE

We hold that this issue can only be properly determined during
the hearing on the merits of Civil Case No. CT-98-001 wherein both
parties may present their respective evidence.
  (East Asia Traders, Inc. v. Republic, G.R. No. 152947, [July 7, 2004], 477
|||

PHIL 848-865)

Basic as a hornbook principle is that  prescription does not run

against the government. In Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 10 we held:
"In so far as the timeliness of the action of the
Government is concerned, it is basic that  prescription does not
run against the State  . . . The case law has also been:
'When the government is the real party in interest, and is
proceeding mainly to assert its own rights and recover its own
property, there can be no defense on the ground of laches or
limitation.' . . .
'Public land fraudulently included in patents or
certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to the State in
accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land
Act. Prescription does not lie against the State in such cases for
the Statute of Limitations does not run against the State.  The right
of reversion or reconveyance to the State is not barred by
prescription."

  (East Asia Traders, Inc. v. Republic, G.R. No. 152947, [July 7, 2004], 477
|||

PHIL 848-865)

as a general rule, the parties will not be allowed, after final judgment,
to object to the execution by raising new issues of fact or of law, except
when there had been a change in the situation of the parties which
makes such execution inequitable or when it appears that the
controversy has ever been submitted to the judgment of the court; or
when it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently
issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the
wrong party, or that judgment debt has been paid or otherwise
satisfied; or when the writ has been issued without authority   (Vargas
|||

v. Cajucom, G.R. No. 171095 , [June 22, 2015], 761 PHIL 43-63)

Possible Argument
And equally settled is the rule that when a judgment is final and
executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. 44 It may no longer
be modified in any respect, except to correct clerical errors or to
make nunc pro tunc entries, or when it is a void judgment. Outside of
these exceptions, the court which rendered judgment only has the
ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution. (Ramos v. Ramos, G.R. No.
144294, March 11 2003.)

Possible counter-argument
A decision that has attained finality becomes the law of the case
regardless of any claim that it is erroneous. Any amendment or
alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is
null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings
held for that purpose   (Vargas v. Cajucom, G.R. No. 171095 , [June 22,
|||

2015], 761 PHIL 43-63)

The simple matter is that petitioners herein may not do indirectly, by

assailing the writ of execution, what they cannot do directly, which is
attacking the final, immutable and unalterable judgment of the RTC.
They may not raise in their opposition to the writ of execution issues
that they should have raised in the case during the trial proper or
against the judgment via an appeal. They may not object to the
execution by raising new issues of fact or law, except under the
following circumstances:   |||

(1) the writ of execution varies the judgment;

(2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties
making execution inequitable or unjust;
(3) execution is sought to be enforced against property
exempt from execution;
(4) it appears that the controversy has been submitted to the
judgment of the court;
(5) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there
remains room for interpretation thereof; or
 (6) it appears that the writ of execution has been
improvidently issued, or that it is defective in
substance, or issued against the wrong party, or that
the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied,
or the writ was issued without authority.
  (Vargas v. Cajucom, G.R. No. 171095 , [June 22, 2015], 761 PHIL 43-63)
|||

  (Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Borreta, G.R. No. 142669, [March

15, 2006], 519 PHIL 637-643)

In the case of Lorzano v. Tabayag, Jr., 60 the Court reiterated

that a Torrens title emanating from a free patent which was secured
through fraud does not become indefeasible because the patent
from whence the title sprung is itself void and of no effect
whatsoever. Thus:
Once a patent is registered and the corresponding
certificate of title is issued, the land covered thereby ceases
to be part of public domain and becomes private property,
and the Torrens Title issued pursuant to the patent becomes
indefeasible upon the expiration of one year from the date
of such issuance. However, a title emanating from a free
patent which was secured through fraud does not become
indefeasible, precisely because the patent from whence the
title sprung is itself void and of no effect whatsoever. 61
On this point, the Court's ruling in Republic v. Heirs of Felipe
Alejaga, Sr. 62 is instructive:
True, once a patent is registered and the
corresponding certificate of title [is] issued, the land covered
by them ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes
private property. Further, the Torrens Title issued pursuant
to the patent becomes indefeasible a year after the issuance
of the latter. However, this indefeasibility of a title does not
attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation.
Well-settled is the doctrine that the registration of a patent
under the Torrens System does not by itself vest title; it
merely confirms the registrant's already existing one. Verily,
registration under the Torrens System is not a mode of
acquiring ownership.
|||  (Yap v. Republic, G.R. No. 199810, [March 15, 2017], 807 PHIL 456-479)
 A fraudulently acquired free patent
may only be assailed by the
government in an action for
reversion
Nonetheless, a free patent that was fraudulently acquired,
and the certificate of title issued pursuant to the same, may only be
assailed by the government in an action for reversion, pursuant to
Section 101 of the Public Land Act. In Sherwill Development
Corporation v. Sitio Sto. Niño Residents Association, Inc., 64 the Court
pointed out that:
It is also to the public interest that one who succeeds in
fraudulently acquiring title to a public land should not be
allowed to benefit therefrom, and the State should,
therefore, have an even existing authority, thru its duly-
authorized officers, to inquire into the circumstances
surrounding the issuance of any such title, to the end that
the Republic, thru the Solicitor General or any other officer
who may be authorized by law, may file the corresponding
action for the reversion of the land involved to the public
domain, subject thereafter to disposal to other qualified
persons in accordance with law. In other words, the
indefeasibility of a title over land previously public is not a
bar to an investigation by the Director of Lands as to how
such title has been acquired, if the purpose of such
investigation is to determine whether or not fraud had been
committed in securing such title in order that the
appropriate action for reversion may be filed by the
Government.
|||  (Yap v. Republic, G.R. No. 199810, [March 15, 2017], 807 PHIL 456-479)

In instances where a parcel of land considered to be inalienable land of

the public domain is found under private ownership, the Government
is allowed by law to file an action for reversion, 21 which is an action
where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land to the
government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land
subject of the action originated from a grant by the government, its
cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.   (Saad |||

Agro-Industries, Inc. v. Republic, G.R. No. 152570, [September 27, 2006],

534 PHIL 648-663)
 It has been held that a complaint for reversion involves a
serious controversy, involving a question of fraud and
misrepresentation committed against the government and it is
aimed at the return of the disputed portion of the public domain. It
seeks to cancel the original certificate of registration, and nullify the
original certificate of title, including the transfer certificate of title of
the successors-in-interest because the same were all procured
through fraud and misrepresentation. 23 Thus, the State, as the
party alleging the fraud and misrepresentation that attended the
application of the free patent, bears that burden of proof. Fraud and
misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of patent and
annulment of title, should never be presumed but must be proved
by clear and convincing evidence, mere preponderance of evidence
not even being adequate. 24
It is but judicious to require the Government, in an action for
reversion, to show the details attending the issuance of title over
the alleged inalienable land and explain why such issuance has
deprived the State of the claimed property.
  (Saad Agro-Industries, Inc. v. Republic, G.R. No. 152570, [September 27,
|||

2006], 534 PHIL 648-663)

In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 40 the Court, finding that the

disputed land was classified as timberland 25 years after private
individuals had commenced their continuous possession and
cultivation thereof in good faith, declared that they have the better
right. The Court held:
It is not disputed that the aforesaid Land Classification
Project No. 3, classifying the 22-hectare area as timberland,
was certified by the Director of Lands only on December 22,
1924, whereas the possession thereof by private respondents
and their predecessor-in-interest commenced as early as
1909. While the Government has the right to classify
portions of public land, the primary right of a private
individual who possessed and cultivated the land in good
faith much prior to such classification must be recognized
and should not be prejudiced by after-events which could
not have been anticipated. Thus, We have held that the
Government, in the first instance may, by reservation,
decide for itself what portions of public land shall be
considered forestry land, unless private interests have
intervened before such reservation is made.
   (Saad Agro-Industries, Inc. v. Republic, G.R. No. 152570, [September 27,
|||

2006], 534 PHIL 648-663)

The Regalian doctrine is well-enshrined not only in the

present Constitution, but also in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. The
Court has always recognized and upheld the Regalian doctrine as the
basic foundation of the State's property regime. Nevertheless, in
applying this doctrine, we must not lose sight of the fact that in
every claim or right by the Government against one of its citizens,
the paramount considerations of fairness and due process must
be observed   (Saad Agro-Industries, Inc. v. Republic, G.R. No. 152570,
|||

[September 27, 2006], 534 PHIL 648-663)

What if we file a Petition to Annul the Judgment on the ground of lack
of due process?

An action on this ground may be filed on the ground of estoppel or

laches.