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REMREV 2 TOPICS 4 CASES AND REFERENCE COMPILATIONS

SECTION 1, RULE 128 . Evidence defined. — Evidence is the means, sanctioned by these rules, of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a
matter of fact. (1)

Sec. 2 . Scope. — The rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in all trials and hearings, except as otherwise provided by law or these rules.

Factum Probans- is the evidentiary fact which establishes the proposition.

Factum Probandum-is the ultimate fact or the proposition to be established.

Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951)

Hoffman v. United States

Syllabus

1. Claiming that answers might tend to incriminate him of a federal offense, petitioner refused to answer certain questions asked him by a special federal
grand jury making a comprehensive investigation of violations of numerous federal criminal statutes and conspiracies to violate them. He had been
publicly charged with being known as an underworld character and a racketeer with a 20-year police record, including a prison sentence on a narcotics
charge.
2. The questions he refused to answer pertained to the nature of his present occupation and his contacts and connections with, and knowledge of the
whereabouts of, a fugitive witness sought by the same grand jury and for whom a bench warrant had been requested.
3. The judge who had impaneled the grand jury and was familiar with these circumstances found no real and substantial danger of incrimination to
petitioner and ordered him to answer.
4. Petitioner stated that he would not obey the order, and he was convicted of criminal contempt.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is liable for criminal contempt of court.

Held: No.The conviction is reversed. Pp. 341 U. S. 480-490.

(a) The privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment extends not only to answers that would in themselves support a conviction under
a federal criminal statute, but also to those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal crime. Blau v.
United States, 340 U. S. 159. P. 341 U. S. 486.
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(b) To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the
question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result. Pp. 341 U. S. 486-487.

(c) In this case, the court should have considered that the chief occupation of some persons involves evasion of federal criminal laws and that truthful answers
by petitioner to the questions as to the nature of his business might have disclosed that he was engaged in such proscribed activity. Pp. 341 U. S. 487-488.Page
341 U. S. 480

(d) Answers to the questions as to his contacts and connections with the fugitive witness and knowledge of his whereabouts at the time might have exposed
petitioner to peril of prosecution for federal offenses ranging from obstruction to conspiracy. P. 341 U. S. 488.

2. Two weeks after his conviction of contempt and denial of bail pending appeal, petitioner filed in the District Court a paper captioned "Petition for
Reconsideration of Allowance of Bail Pending Appeal," accompanied by an affidavit and exhibits explaining his refusal to answer the questions and presenting
facts to justify his fear that answers would tend to incriminate him. These papers were filed in the Court of Appeals as a supplemental record on appeal, but that
Court struck them from the record and affirmed the conviction.

Held: the supplemental record should have been considered by the Court of Appeals, since it was actually directed to the power of the committing court to
discharge the contemnor for good cause -- a power which courts should be solicitous to invoke when important constitutional objections are renewed. Pp. 341
U. S. 489-490.

185 F.2d 617 reversed.

Evidentiary and Exclusionary Rules in the Constitution, statute and procedural issuances

Sec. 3 . Admissibility of evidence. — Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law of these rules. (3a)

REPUBLIC ACT No. 4200

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AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND PENALIZE WIRE TAPPING AND OTHER RELATED VIOLATIONS OF THE PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or
by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as
a dictaphone or dictagraph or dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described:

It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape
record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective
date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either
verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies
thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.

Section 2. Any person who willfully or knowingly does or who shall aid, permit, or cause to be done any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the preceding
section or who violates the provisions of the following section or of any order issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes such violation shall, upon conviction
thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than six months or more than six years and with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification from public office if the offender be a public official at the time of the commission of the offense, and, if the offender is an alien he shall be
subject to deportation proceedings.

Section 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render it unlawful or punishable for any peace officer, who is authorized by a written order of the Court,
to execute any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the two preceding sections in cases involving the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty
in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit
sedition, inciting to sedition, kidnapping as defined by the Revised Penal Code, and violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing espionage and other
offenses against national security:

Provided, That such written order shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and
the witnesses he may produce and a showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been
committed or is being committed or is about to be committed: Provided, however, That in cases involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to
commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and inciting to sedition, such authority shall be granted only upon prior proof that
a rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case may be, have actually been or are being committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence will
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be obtained essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any of such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means
readily available for obtaining such evidence.

The order granted or issued shall specify: (1) the identity of the person or persons whose communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words are to be
overheard, intercepted, or recorded and, in the case of telegraphic or telephonic communications, the telegraph line or the telephone number involved and its
location; (2) the identity of the peace officer authorized to overhear, intercept, or record the communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words; (3)
the offense or offenses committed or sought to be prevented; and (4) the period of the authorization. The authorization shall be effective for the period
specified in the order which shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the date of issuance of the order, unless extended or renewed by the court upon being satisfied
that such extension or renewal is in the public interest.

All recordings made under court authorization shall, within forty-eight hours after the expiration of the period fixed in the order, be deposited with the court in a
sealed envelope or sealed package, and shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the peace officer granted such authority stating the number of recordings made,
the dates and times covered by each recording, the number of tapes, discs, or records included in the deposit, and certifying that no duplicates or copies of the
whole or any part thereof have been made, or if made, that all such duplicates or copies are included in the envelope or package deposited with the court. The
envelope or package so deposited shall not be opened, or the recordings replayed, or used in evidence, or their contents revealed, except upon order of the
court, which shall not be granted except upon motion, with due notice and opportunity to be heard to the person or persons whose conversation or
communications have been recorded.

The court referred to in this section shall be understood to mean the Court of First Instance within whose territorial jurisdiction the acts for which authority is
applied for are to be executed.

Section 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any
information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any
judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.

Section 5. All laws inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or accordingly amended.
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Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved: June 19, 1965

G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986

EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner,

vs.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act (RA) No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act, on the issue of whether or not
an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful
interception of communications between the two parties using a telephone line.

FACTS:

In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant's residence discussing
the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they
had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 3-5).

That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his
regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip. According to the request, appellant went to the office of Laconico where he was briefed about the
problem. (Exhibit 'D', tsn, April 22, 1982, pp. 4-5).
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When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear
personally the proposed conditions for the settlement.

Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered 'Yes'. Complainant then told
Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money. (tsn, March 10, 1983, pp. 2-12).

Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier
alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the
money. (tsn, March 10, 1982, pp. 26-33). When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine
Constabulary.

Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault.
Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened to the
telephone conversation without complainant's consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

After trial on the merits, the lower court, in a decision dated November 22, 1982, found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act
No. 4200. The two were each sentenced to one (1) year imprisonment with costs. Not satisfied with the decision, the petitioner appealed to the appellate court.

On August 16, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the communication between the complainant and
accused Laconico was private in nature and, therefore, covered by Rep. Act No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard such communication without the
knowledge and consent of the complainant; and that the extension telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear the telephone conversation
between complainant and Laconico is covered in the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200.

ISSUE:

(b) whether or not an extension telephone is covered by the term "device or arrangement" under Rep. Act No. 4200;

RULING: NO
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We rule for the petitioner.

The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves around the meaning of the phrase "any other device or arrangement."

Xxxx

The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the
communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear,
intercept, or record the spoken words.

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as
the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that
purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.

Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to
comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It
refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of
common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.

An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit does not have to be connected by wire to the main
telephone but can be moved from place ' to place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely presume that the party he is calling at the
other end of the line probably has an extension telephone and he runs the risk of a third party listening as in the case of a party line or a telephone unit
which shares its line with another.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 16, 1984 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner
is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
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SO ORDERED.

Salcedo-Ortanez v. CA G.R. No. 110662 August 4, 1994 235 SCRA 111 (1994)

Facts: On 2 May 1990, private respondent filed with the RTC a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez,
on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner. Private respondent, after presenting his evidence, orally formally offered
in evidence Exhibits including three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.

Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent’s oral offer of evidence; on the same day, the trial court admitted all of private
respondent’s offered evidence.

A motion for reconsideration from petitioner was denied.

A petition for certiorari was then filed by petitioner in the CA assailing the admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes. The CA dismissed the
said petition. From this adverse judgment, petitioner filed the present petition for review.

Issue:

Whether “Tape Recordings” obtain in violation of RA 4200 is admissible as evidence in court

Held:

No, RA 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes”
expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence.

“Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information
therein contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-
judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.”

Clearly, RTC and CA failed to consider the afore-quoted provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that
both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
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Section 201, RA 8424(1997). Effect of Failure to Stamp Taxable Document. – An instrument, document or paper which is required by law to be stamped and
which has been signed, issued, accepted or transferred without being duly stamped, shall not be recorded, nor shall it or any copy thereof or any record of
transfer of the same be admitted or used in evidence in any court until the requisite stamp or stamps are affixed thereto and cancelled.

RA 1405, BANK SECRECY LAW

Republic Act No. 1405, or the bank secrecy law, prohibits the disclosure of, or inquiry into, all deposits in banks and banking institutions in the Philippines.

Section 2 of the bank secrecy law provides that all deposits in whatever nature with banks or banking institutions are of an “absolutely confidential nature and
may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office.”

The only exceptions are either written consent of the depositor, in cases of impeachment, upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of
duty or public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of litigation.

Section 8, RA 9745 (ANTI-TORTURE ACT). Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule; Exception. - Any confession, admission or statement obtained as a result of
torture shall be inadmissible in evidence in any proceedings, except if the same is used as evidence against a person or persons accused of committing torture.

Section 6, RA 8505. Rape Shield. - In prosecutions for rape, evidence of complainant's past sexual conduct, opinion thereof or of his/her reputation shall not be
admitted unless, and only to the extent that the court finds, that such evidence is material and relevant to the case.

SEC. 15, RA 9372 (HUMAN SECURITY ACT). Evidentiary Value of Deposited Materials. - Any listened to, intercepted, and recorded communications, messages,
conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words, or any part or parts thereof, or any information or fact contained therein, including their existence,
content, substance, purport, effect, or meaning, which have been secured in violation of the pertinent provisions of this Act, shall absolutely not be admissible
and usable as evidence against anybody in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or administrative investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or hearing.

ADR ACT OF 2004

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of this Act, the term:

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(h) "Confidential information" means any information, relative to the subject of mediation or arbitration, expressly intended by the source not to be disclosed, or
obtained under circumstances that would create a reasonable expectation on behalf of the source that the information shall not be disclosed. It shall include (1)
communication, oral or written, made in a dispute resolution proceedings, including any memoranda, notes or work product of the neutral party or non-party
participant, as defined in this Act; (2) an oral or written statement made or which occurs during mediation or for purposes of considering, conducting,
participating, initiating, continuing of reconvening mediation or retaining a mediator; and (3) pleadings, motions manifestations, witness statements, reports
filed or submitted in an arbitration or for expert evaluation;

SEC. 9. Confidentiality of Information. - Information obtained through mediation proceedings shall be subject to the following principles and guidelines:

(a) Information obtained through mediation shall be privileged and confidential.

(b) A party, a mediator, or a nonparty participant may refuse to disclose and may prevent any other person from disclosing a mediation communication.

(c) Confidential Information shall not be subject to discovery and shall be inadmissible if any adversarial proceeding, whether judicial or quasi-judicial,
However, evidence or information that is otherwise admissible or subject to discovery does not become inadmissible or protected from discovery solely by
reason of its use in a mediation.

(d) In such an adversarial proceeding, the following persons involved or previously involved in a mediation may not be compelled to disclose confidential
information obtained during mediation: (1) the parties to the dispute; (2) the mediator or mediators; (3) the counsel for the parties; (4) the nonparty
participants; (5) any persons hired or engaged in connection with the mediation as secretary, stenographer, clerk or assistant; and (6) any other person who
obtains or possesses confidential information by reason of his/her profession.

(e) The protections of this Act shall continue to apply even of a mediator is found to have failed to act impartially.

(f) a mediator may not be called to testify to provide information gathered in mediation. A mediator who is wrongfully subpoenaed shall be reimbursed the full
cost of his attorney's fees and related expenses.

SEC. 10. Waiver of Confidentiality. - A privilege arising from the confidentiality of information may be waived in a record, or orally during a proceeding by the
mediator and the mediation parties.

A privilege arising from the confidentiality of information may likewise be waived by a nonparty participant if the information is provided by such nonparty
participant.
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A person who discloses confidential information shall be precluded from asserting the privilege under Section 9 of this Chapter to bar disclosure of the rest of
the information necessary to a complete understanding of the previously disclosed information. If a person suffers loss or damages in a judicial proceeding
against the person who made the disclosure.

A person who discloses or makes a representation about a mediation is preclude from asserting the privilege under Section 9, to the extent that the
communication prejudices another person in the proceeding and it is necessary for the person prejudiced to respond to the representation of disclosure.

Section 2. Admissibility. RULE ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE – An electronic document is admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility
prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by these Rules.

Section 18, Confidentiality Rule in Adoption Cases. Confidential Nature of Proceedings and Records. – All hearings in adoption cases, after compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements shall be confidential and shall not be open to the public. All records, books and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of
the court, the Department, or any other agency or institution participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential.

If the court finds that the disclosure of the information to a third person is necessary for security reasons or for purposes connected with or arising out of the
adoption and will be for the best interests of the adoptee, the court may, upon proper motion, order the necessary information to be released, restricting the
purposes for which it may be used.

A.M. NO. 004-07-SC November 21, 2000

RULE ON EXAMINATION OF A CHILD WITNESS

Section 1. Applicability of the Rule. - Unless otherwise provided, this Rule shall govern the examination of child witnesses who are victims of crime, accused of
a crime, and witnesses to crime. It shall apply in all criminal proceedings and non-criminal proceedings involving child witnesses.

Section 2. Objectives. - The objectives of this Rule are to create and maintain an environment that will allow children to give reliable and complete evidence,
minimize trauma to children, encourage children to testify in legal proceedings, and facilitate the ascertainment of truth.

Section 3. Construction of the Rule. - This Rule shall be liberally construed to uphold the best interests of the child and to promote maximum accommodation of
child witnesses without prejudice to the constitutional rights of the accused.

Section 4. Definitions. -
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(a) A "child witness" is any person who at the time of giving testimony is below the age of eighteen (18) years. In child abuse cases, a child includes one over
eighteen (18) years but is found by the court as unable to fully take care of himself or protect himself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination
because of a physical or mental disability or condition.

Section 6. Competency. - Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. However, the court shall conduct a competency examination of a child, motu
proprio or on motion of a party, when it finds that substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish
truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court.

(a) Proof of necessity. - A party seeking a competency examination must present proof of necessity of competency examination. The age of the child by itself is
not a sufficient basis for a competency examination.

(b) Burden of proof. - To rebut the presumption of competence enjoyed by a child, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging his competence.

(c) Persons allowed at competency examination. Only the following are allowed to attend a competency examination:

(1) The judge and necessary court personnel;

(2) The counsel for the parties;

(3) The guardian ad litem;

(4) One or more support persons for the child; and

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(5) The defendant, unless the court determines that competence can be fully evaluated in his absence.

(d) Conduct of examination. - Examination of a child as to his competence shall be conducted only by the judge. Counsel for the parties, however, can submit
questions to the judge that he may, in his discretion, ask the child.

(e) Developmentally appropriate questions. - The questions asked at the competency examination shall be appropriate to the age and developmental level of the
child; shall not be related to the issues at trial; and shall focus on the ability of the child to remember, communicate, distinguish between truth and falsehood,
and appreciate the duty to testify truthfully.

(f) Continuing duty to assess competence. - The court has the duty of continuously assessing the competence of the child throughout his testimony.

Section 7. Oath or affirmation. - Before testifying, a child shall take an oath or affirmation to tell the truth.

Section 8. Examination of a child witness. - The examination of a child witness presented in a hearing or any proceeding shall be done in open court. Unless the
witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally.

The party who presents a child witness or the guardian ad litem of such child witness may, however, move the court to allow him to testify in the manner
provided in this Rule.

Section 16. Testimonial aids. - The court shall permit a child to use dolls, anatomically-correct dolls, puppets, drawings, mannequins, or any other appropriate
demonstrative device to assist him in his testimony.
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Section 19. Mode of questioning. - The court shall exercise control over the questioning of children so as to (1) facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, (2)
ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the child, (3) protect children from harassment or undue embarrassment,
and (4) avoid waste of time.

The court may allow the child witness to testify in a narrative form.

Section 20. Leading questions. - The court may allow leading questions in all stages of examination of a child if the same will further the interests of justice.

Section 31. Protection of privacy and safety. -

(a) Confidentiality of records. - Any record regarding a child shall be confidential and kept under seal. Except upon written request and order of the court, a
record shall only be released to the following:

(1) Members of the court staff for administrative use;

(2) The prosecuting attorney;

(3) Defense counsel;

(4) The guardian ad litem;

(5) Agents of investigating law enforcement agencies; and

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(6) Other persons as determined by the court.

(b) Protective order. - Any videotape or audiotape of a child that is part of the court record shall be under a protective order that provides as follows:

(1) Tapes may be viewed only by parties, their counsel, their expert witness, and the guardian ad litem.

(2) No tape, or any portion thereof, shall be divulged by any person mentioned in sub-section (a) to any other person, except as necessary for the trial.

(3) No person shall be granted access to the tape, its transcription or any part thereof unless he signs a written affirmation that he has received and read a copy
of the protective order; that he submits to the jurisdiction of the court with respect to the protective order; and that in case of violation thereof, he will be
subject to the contempt power of the court.

(4) Each of the tape cassettes and transcripts thereof made available to the parties, their counsel, and respective agents shall bear the following cautionary
notice:

"This object or document and the contents thereof are subject to a protective order issued by the court in (case title) , (case number) . They shall not be
examined, inspected, read, viewed, or copied by any person, or disclosed to any person, except as provided in the protective order. No additional copies of the
tape or any of its portion shall be made, given, sold, or shown to any person without prior court order. Any person violating such protective order is subject to
the contempt power of the court and other penalties prescribed by law."

(5) No tape shall be given, loaned, sold, or shown to any person except as ordered by the court.

(6) Within thirty (30) days from receipt, all copies of the tape and any transcripts thereof shall be returned to the clerk of court for safekeeping unless the period
is extended by the court on motion of a party.
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(7) This protective order shall remain in full force and effect until further order of the court.

(c) Additional protective orders. - The court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, the child, his parents, legal guardian, or the guardian ad litem, issue
additional orders to protect the privacy of the child.

(d) Publication of identity contemptuous. - Whoever publishes or causes to be published in any format the name, address, telephone number, school, or other
identifying information of a child who is or is alleged to be a victim or accused of a crime or a witness thereof, or an immediate family of the child shall be liable
to the contempt power of the court.

(e) Physical safety of child; exclusion of evidence. - A child has a right at any court proceeding not to testify regarding personal identifying information, including
his name, address, telephone number, school, and other information that could endanger his physical safety or his family. The court may, however, require the
child to testify regarding personal identifying information in the interest of justice.

(f) Destruction of videotapes and audiotapes. - Any videotape or audiotape of a child produced under the provisions of this Rule or otherwise made part of the
court record shall be destroyed after five (5) years have elapsed from the date of entry of judgment.

(g) Records of youthful offender. - Where a youthful offender has been charged before any city or provincial prosecutor or before any municipal judge and the
charges have been ordered dropped, all the records of the case shall be considered as privileged and may not be disclosed directly or indirectly to anyone for any
purpose whatsoever.

Where a youthful offender has been charged and the court acquits him, or dismisses the case or commits him to an institution and subsequently releases him
pursuant to Chapter 3 of P. D. No. 603, all the records of his case shall also be considered as privileged and may not be disclosed directly or indirectly to anyone
except to determine if a defendant may have his sentence suspended under Article 192 of P. D. No. 603 or if he may be granted probation under the provisions
of P. D. No. 968 or to enforce his civil liability, if said liability has been imposed in the criminal action. The youthful offender concerned shall not be held under
any provision of law to be guilty of perjury or of concealment or misrepresentation by reason of his failure to acknowledge the case or recite any fact related
thereto in response to any inquiry made to him for any purpose.
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"Records" within the meaning of this sub-section shall include those which may be in the files of the National Bureau of Investigation and with any police
department or government agency which may have been involved in the case. (Art. 200, P. D. No. 603)

RULE ON DNA EVIDENCE

SEC. 11. Confidentiality. – DNA profiles and all results or other information obtained from DNA testing shall be confidential. Except upon order of the court, a
DNA profile and all results or other information obtained from DNA testing shall only be released to any of the following, under such terms and conditions as
may be set forth by the court:

(a) Person from whom the sample was taken;

(b) Lawyers representing parties in the case or action where the DNA evidence is offered and presented or sought to be offered and presented;

(c) Lawyers of private complainants in a criminal action;

(d) Duly authorized law enforcement agencies; and

(e) Other persons as determined by the court.

Whoever discloses, utilizes or publishes in any form any information concerning a DNA profile without the proper court order shall be liable for indirect
contempt of the court wherein such DNA evidence was offered, presented or sought to be offered and presented.
18 | P a g e

Where the person from whom the biological sample was taken files a written verified request to the court that allowed the DNA testing for the disclosure of the
DNA profile of the person and all results or other information obtained from the DNA testing, the same may be disclosed to the persons named in the written
verified request.

PART V-RULE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CASES

EVIDENCE

RULE 20

PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

Section 1. Applicability. - When there is a lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between human activity and environmental effect, the
court shall apply the precautionary principle in resolving the case before it.

The constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology shall be given the benefit of the doubt.

Section 2. Standards for application. - In applying the precautionary principle, the following factors, among others, may be considered: (1) threats to human life
or health; (2) inequity to present or future generations; or (3) prejudice to the environment without legal consideration of the environmental rights of those
affected.

RULE 21

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
19 | P a g e

Section 1. Photographic, video and similar evidence. - Photographs, videos and similar evidence of events, acts, transactions of wildlife, wildlife by-products or
derivatives, forest products or mineral resources subject of a case shall be admissible when authenticated by the person who took the same, by some other
person present when said evidence was taken, or by any other person competent to testify on the accuracy thereof.

Section 2. Entries in official records. - Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

Section 4, RULE 1, RULES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE. In what cases not applicable. - These Rules shall not apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral,
naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable
and convenient. (4)

G.R. No. 177188 December 4, 2008

EL GRECO SHIP MANNING AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION

vs.

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, filed by petitioner El Greco Ship Manning and Management
Corporation (El Greco), seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc dated 14 March 2007 in C.T.A. EB No. 162. In its
assailed Decision, the CTA En Banc affirmed the Decision2 dated 17 October 2005 of the CTA Second Division in CTA Case No. 6618, ordering the forfeiture of
the vessel M/V Criston, also known as M/V Neptune Breeze, for having been involved in the smuggling of 35,000 bags of imported rice.

FACTS:
20 | P a g e

On 23 September 2001, the vessel M/V Criston docked at the Port of Tabaco, Albay, carrying a shipment of 35,000 bags of imported rice, consigned to Antonio
Chua, Jr. (Chua) and Carlos Carillo (Carillo), payable upon its delivery to Albay. Glucer Shipping Company, Inc. (Glucer Shipping) is the operator of M/V Criston.

Upon the directive of then Commissioner Titus Villanueva of the Bureau of Customs (BOC), a Warrant of Seizure and Detention, Seizure Identification No. 06-
2001, was issued by the Legaspi District Collector, on 23 September 2001 for the 35,000 bags of imported rice shipped by M/V Criston, on the ground that it
left the Port of Manila without the necessary clearance from the Philippine Coast Guard.

Since the earlier Warrant covered only the cargo, but not M/V Criston which transported it, a subsequent Warrant of Seizure and Detention, Seizure
Identification No. 06-2001-A, was issued on 18 October 2001 particularly for the said vessel.

The BOC District Collector of the Port of Legaspi thereafter commenced proceedings for the forfeiture of M/V Criston and its cargo under Seizure Identification
No. 06-2001-A and Seizure Identification No. 06-2001, respectively.4

To protect their property rights over the cargo, consignees Chua and Carillo filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tabaco, Albay, a Petition for
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) assailing the authority of the Legaspi District
Collectors to issue the Warrants of Seizure and Detention and praying for a permanent injunction against the implementation of the said Warrants. Their
Petition was docketed as Civil Case No. T-2170.5

In the meantime, while M/V Criston was berthing at the Port of Tabaco under the custody of the BOC, the Province of Albay was hit by typhoon "Manang." In
order to avert any damage which could be caused by the typhoon, the vessel was allowed to proceed to another anchorage area to temporarily seek shelter.
After typhoon "Manang" had passed through Albay province, M/V Criston, however, failed to return to the Port of Tabaco and was nowhere to be found.8

Alarmed, the BOC and the Philippine Coast Guard coordinated with the Philippine Air Force to find the missing vessel.

On 8November 2001, the BOC received information that M/V Criston was found in the waters of Bataan sporting the name of M/V Neptune Breeze.

Based on the above information and for failure of M/V Neptune Breeze to present a clearance from its last port of call, a Warrant of Seizure and Detention
under Seizure Identification No. 2001-208 was issued against the vessel by the BOC District Collector of the Port of Manila.
21 | P a g e

For the same reasons, the Legaspi District Collector rendered a Decision on 27 June 2002 in Seizure Identification No. 06-2001 and Seizure Identification No.
06-2001-A ordering the forfeiture of the M/V Criston, also known as M/V Neptune Breeze, and its cargo, for violating Section 2530 (a), (f) and (k) of the Tariff
and Customs Code.11

=========================================================================

In the meantime, El Greco, the duly authorized local agent of the registered owner of M/V Neptune Breeze, Atlantic Pacific Corporation, Inc. (Atlantic Pacific),
filed with the Manila District Collector, in Seizure Identification No. 2001-208, a Motion for Intervention and Motion to Quash Warrant of Seizure Detention
with Urgent Prayer for the Immediate Release of M/V Neptune Breeze. El Greco claimed that M/V Neptune Breeze was a foreign registered vessel owned by
Atlantic Pacific, and different from M/V Criston which had been involved in smuggling activities in Legaspi, Albay.

Acting favorably on the motion of El Greco, the Manila District Collector issued an Order13 dated 11 March 2002 quashing the Warrant of Seizure and
Detention it issued against M/V Neptune Breeze in Seizure Identification No. 2001-208 for lack of probable cause that the said vessel was the same one known
as M/V Criston which fled from the jurisdiction of the BOC Legaspi District after being seized and detained therein for allegedly engaging in smuggling activities.

On automatic review by BOC Commissioner Antonio Bernardo, the Order dated 11 March 2002 of the District Collector of the Port of Manila was reversed
after finding that M/V Neptune Breeze and M/V Criston were one and the same and that the Legaspi District Collector had already acquired prior jurisdiction
over the vessel

Seeking the reversal of the Decision dated 15 January 2003 of the BOC Commissioner, El Greco filed a Petition for Review with the CTA which was lodged
before its Second Division as CTA Case No. 6618. El Greco averred that the BOC Commissioner committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the forfeiture
of the M/V Neptune Breeze in the absence of proof that M/V Neptune Breeze and M/V Criston were one and the same vessel. According to El Greco, it was
highly improbable that M/V Criston was merely assuming the identity of M/V Neptune Breeze in order to evade liability since these were distinct and
separate vessels as evidenced by their Certificates of Registry. While M/V Neptune Breeze was registered in St. Vincent and the Grenadines as shown in its
Certificate of Registry No. 7298/N, M/V Criston was registered in the Philippines. Additionally, El Greco argued that the Order dated 11 March 2002 of the Manila
District Collector already became final and executory for failure of the BOC Commissioner to act thereon within a period of 30 days in accordance with Section
2313 of the Tariff and Customs Code.

On 17 October 2005, the CTA Second Division rendered a Decision in CTA Case No. 6618 sustaining the 15 January 2003 Decision of the BOC Commissioner
ordering the forfeiture of M/V Neptune Breeze. Referring to the crime laboratory report submitted by the Philippine National Police (PNP) stating that the serial
22 | P a g e

numbers of the engines and the generators of both M/V Criston and M/V Neptune Breeze were identical, the CTA Second Division concluded that both
vessels were indeed one and the same vessel. The CTA Second Division further ruled that nothing in the provisions of Section 2313 of the Tariff and Customs
Code could buttress El Greco’s contention that the Order dated 11 March 2002 of the Manila District Collector already became final and executory

Undaunted, El Greco elevated its case to the CTA En Banc through a Petition for Review, docketed as C.T.A. EB No. 162, this time lamenting that it was being
deprived of its property without due process of law. El Greco asserted that the CTA Second Division violated its constitutional right to due process when it
upheld the forfeiture of M/V Neptune Breeze on the basis of the evidence presented before the Legaspi District Collector in Seizure Identification No. 06-2001
and Seizure Identification No. 06-2001-A, of which El Greco was not notified and in which it was not able to participate.

In its Decision promulgated on 14 March 2007, the CTA En Banc declared that the CTA Second Division did not commit any error in its disquisition, and
dismissed the Petition of El Greco in C.T.A. EB No. 162 for lack of merit. According to the CTA En Banc, the appreciation and calibration of evidence on appeal
(from the ruling of the BOC) lies within the sound discretion of its Division, and the latter’s findings and conclusions cannot be set aside unless it has been
sufficiently shown that they are not supported by evidence on record.

Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration with the CTA, El Greco already sought recourse before this Court via this Petition for Review on Certiorari, raising the
following issues:

ISSUE:

Whether M/V Neptune Breeze is one and the same as M/V Criston which had been detained at the Port of Tabaco, Albay, for carrying smuggled imported
rice and had fled the custody of the customs authorities to evade its liabilities.

RULING OF THE COURT:

Yes. We sustain the determination of the CTA En Banc on this matter.

A review of the records of the present case unveils the overwhelming and utterly significant pieces of evidence that more than meets the quantum of
evidence necessary to establish that M/V Neptune Breeze is the very same vessel as M/V Criston, which left the anchorage area at Legaspi, Albay, without the
consent of the customs authorities therein while under detention for smuggling 35,000 bags of imported rice.
23 | P a g e

The crime laboratory report of the PNP shows that the serial numbers of the engines and generators of the two vessels are identical. El Greco failed to rebut
this piece of evidence that decisively identified M/V Neptune Breeze as the same as M/V Criston. We take judicial notice that along with gross tonnage, net
tonnage, length and breadth of the vessel, the serial numbers of its engine and generator are the necessary information identifying a vessel. In much the
same way, the identity of a land motor vehicle is established by its unique motor and chassis numbers. It is, thus, highly improbable that two totally different
vessels would have engines and generators bearing the very same serial numbers; and the only logical conclusion is that they must be one and the same vessel.

Equally significant is the finding of the Legaspi District Collector that all the documents submitted by M/V Criston were spurious, including its supposed
registration in the Philippines. In a letter dated 14 March 2002, Marina Administrator Oscar M. Sevilla attested that M/V Criston was not registered with the
Marina.

Finally, Customs Guard Adolfo Capistrano testified that the features of M/V Criston and M/V Neptune Breeze were similar; while Coast Guard Commander
Cirilo Ortiz narrated that he found documents inside M/V Criston bearing the name M/V Neptune Breeze. These testimonies further fortified the conclusion
reached by the Legaspi District Collector that M/V Criston and M/V Neptune Breeze were one and the same.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 180291 July 27, 2010

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS)

vs.

DINNAH VILLAVIZA.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the August 31, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 98952, dismissing the petition for certiorari of Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) assailing the Civil Service
Commission's Resolution No. 062177.
24 | P a g e

THE FACTS:

Petitioner Winston Garcia (PGM Garcia), as President and General Manager of the GSIS, filed separate formal charges against respondents Dinnah Villaviza,
Elizabeth Duque, Adronico A. Echavez, Rodel Rubio, Rowena Therese B. Gracia, Pilar Layco, and Antonio Jose for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial
to the Best Interest of the Service pursuant to the Rules of Procedure in Administrative Investigation (RPAI) of GSIS Employees and Officials, III, D, (1, c, f) in
relation to Section 52A (3), (20), Rule IV, of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS), in accordance with Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987, committed as follows:

That on 27 May 2005, respondent, wearing red shirt together with some employees, marched to or appeared simultaneously at or just outside the office of
the Investigation Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of protest and support for Messrs. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, the latter having surreptitiously
entered the GSIS premises;

xxx xxx xxx

That some of these employees badmouthed the security guards and the GSIS management and defiantly raised clenched fists led by Atty. Velasco who was
barred by Hearing Officer Marvin R. Gatpayat in an Order dated 24 May 2005 from appearing as counsel for Atty. Molina pursuant to Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A.
6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees;

That respondent, together with other employees in utter contempt of CSC Resolution No. 021316, dated 11 October 2002, otherwise known as Omnibus Rules
on Prohibited Concerted Mass Actions in the Public Sector caused alarm and heightened some employees and disrupted the work at the Investigation Unit
during office hours.

This episode was earlier reported to PGM Garcia, through an office memorandum dated May 31, 2005, by the Manager of the GSIS Security Department (GSIS-
SD), Dennis Nagtalon. On the same day, the Manager of the GSIS Investigation Unit (GSIS-IU), Atty. Lutgardo Barbo, issued a memorandum to each of the seven
(7) respondents requiring them to explain in writing and under oath within three (3) days why they should not be administratively dealt with.
25 | P a g e

Respondents Duque, Echavez, Rubio, Gracia, Layco, and Legarda, together with two others, submitted a letter-explanation to Atty. Barbo dated June 6, 2005.
Denying that there was a planned mass action, the respondents explained that their act of going to the office of the GSIS-IU was a spontaneous reaction after
learning that their former union president was there. Aside from some of them wanting to show their support, they were interested in that hearing as it might
also affect them. For her part, respondent Villaviza submitted a separate letter explaining that she had a scheduled pre-hearing at the GSIS-IU that day and
that she had informed her immediate supervisor about it, attaching a copy of the order of pre-hearing. These letters were not under oath.

PGM Garcia then filed the above-mentioned formal charges for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service against each
of the respondents, all dated June 4, 2005. Respondents were again directed to submit their written answers under oath within three (3) days from receipt
thereof. None was filed.

On June 29, 2005, PGM Garcia issued separate but similarly worded decisions finding all seven (7) respondents guilty of the charges and meting out the
penalty of one (1) year suspension plus the accessory penalties appurtenant thereto.

On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) found the respondents guilty of the lesser offense of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations and
reduced the penalty to reprimand. The CSC ruled that respondents were not denied their right to due process but there was no substantial evidence to hold
them guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Instead,

x x x. The actuation of the appellants in going to the IU, wearing red shirts, to witness a public hearing cannot be considered as constitutive of such offense.
Appellants' (respondents herein) assembly at the said office to express support to Velasco, their Union President, who pledged to defend them against any
oppression by the GSIS management, can be considered as an exercise of their freedom of expression, a constitutionally guaranteed right.6 x x x

PGM Garcia sought reconsideration but was denied. Thus, PGM Garcia went to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure.7

The CA upheld the CSC in this wise:

26 | P a g e

The Civil Service Commission is correct when it found that the act sought to be punished hardly falls within the definition of a prohibited concerted activity or
mass action. The petitioners failed to prove that the supposed concerted activity of the respondents resulted in work stoppage and caused prejudice to the
public service. Only about twenty (20) out of more than a hundred employees at the main office, joined the activity sought to be punished. These employees,
now respondents in this case, were assigned at different offices of the petitioner GSIS. Hence, despite the belated claim of the petitioners that the act
complained of had created substantial disturbance inside the petitioner GSIS' premises during office hours, there is nothing in the record that could support the
claim that the operational capacity of petitioner GSIS was affected or reduced to substantial percentage when respondents gathered at the Investigation
Unit. Despite the hazy claim of the petitioners that the gathering was intended to force the Investigation Unit and petitioner GSIS to be lenient in the handling of
Atty. Molina's case and allow Atty. Velasco to represent Atty. Molina in his administrative case before petitioner GSIS, there is likewise no concrete and
convincing evidence to prove that the gathering was made to demand or force concessions, economic or otherwise from the GSIS management or from the
government. In fact, in the separate formal charges filed against the respondents, petitioners clearly alleged that respondents "marched to or appeared
simultaneously at or just outside the office of the Investigation Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of protest and support for Mssrs. Mario Molina and Albert
Velasco, the latter surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises." Thus, petitioners are aware at the outset that the only apparent intention of the respondents in
going to the IU was to show support to Atty. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, their union officers . The belated assertion that the intention of the respondents
in going to the IU was to disrupt the operation and pressure the GSIS administration to be lenient with Atty. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, is only an
afterthought.

Not in conformity, PGM Garcia is now before us via this Petition for Review presenting the following:

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

WHETHER THE CONCERTED ABANDONMENT OF EMPLOYEES OF THEIR POSTS FOR MORE THAN AN HOUR TO HOLD AN UNRULY PROTEST INSIDE OFFICE
PREMISES ONLY CONSTITUTES THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE OF VIOLATION OF REASONABLE OFFICE RULES AND REGULATIONS.

RULING OF THE COURT

NONE

The Court finds no merit in the petition.

Petitioners primarily question the probative value accorded to respondents' letters of explanation in response to the memorandum of the GSIS-IU Manager. The
respondents never filed their answers to the formal charges. The petitioners argue that there being no answers, the allegations in the formal charges that they
filed should have been deemed admitted pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court which provides:
27 | P a g e

SECTION 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted.- Material averment in the complaint, other than those as to the amount of liquidated
damages, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Allegations of usury in a complaint to recover usurious interest are deemed admitted if not
denied specifically and under oath.

According to the petitioners, this rule is applicable to the case at bench pursuant to Rule 1, Section 4 of the Rules of Court which reads:

SECTION 4. In what cases not applicable. - These Rules shall not apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings,
and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. (underscoring supplied)

The Court does not subscribe to the argument of the petitioners. Petitioners' own rules, Rule XI, Section 4 of the GSIS' Amended Policy and Procedural Guidelines
No. 178-04, specifically provides:

If the respondent fails to file his Answer within five (5) working days from receipt of the Formal Charge for the supporting evidence, when requested, he shall be
considered to have waived his right to file an answer and the PGM or the Board of Trustees, in proper cases, shall render judgment, as may be warranted by the
facts and evidence submitted by the prosecution.

A perusal of said section readily discloses that the failure of a respondent to file an answer merely translates to a waiver of "his right to file an answer."
There is nothing in the rule that says that the charges are deemed admitted. It has not done away with the burden of the complainant to prove the charges
with clear and convincing evidence.

It is true that Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules can be applied in a "suppletory character." Suppletory is defined as "supplying
deficiencies." It means that the provisions in the Rules of Court will be made to apply only where there is an insufficiency in the applicable rule. There is,
however, no such deficiency as the rules of the GSIS are explicit in case of failure to file the required answer. What is clearly stated there is that GSIS may
"render judgment as may be warranted by the facts and evidence submitted by the prosecution."
28 | P a g e

Even granting that Rule 8, Section 11 of the Rules of Court finds application in this case, petitioners must remember that there remain averments that are not
deemed admitted by the failure to deny the same. Among them are immaterial allegations and incorrect conclusions drawn from facts set out in the complaint.
Thus, even if respondents failed to file their answer, it does not mean that all averments found in the complaint will be considered as true and correct in their
entirety, and that the forthcoming decision will be rendered in favor of the petitioners. We must not forget that even in administrative proceedings, it is still
the complainant, or in this case the petitioners, who have the burden of proving, with substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint or in the formal
charges.

A perusal of the decisions of the CA and of the CSC will reveal that the case was resolved against petitioners based, not on the absence of respondents'
evidence, but on the weakness of that of the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 96492 November 26, 1992

ROMEO REYES

vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS

Petitioners Romeo Reyes, Angel Parayao and Emilio Mananghaya question the respondent Court's decision promulgated on November 22, 1990, which affirmed
with modification the agrarian court's decision promulgated January 10, 1990,2 which ordered them and the other defendants therein to, among others, restore
possession of the disputed landholding to private respondent, Eufrocina Vda. dela Cruz. Said respondent court's decision is now final and executory as to
Olympio Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo, the other petitioners in the respondent court, since they did not appeal the same.

FACTS:

It appears from the records that Juan Mendoza, father of herein defendant Olympio Mendoza, is the owner of Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106, Block 2, Psd-38453
of the Bahay Pare Estate, Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, with an area of 23,000 square meters and 19,000 square meters, respectively. Devoted to the
production of palay, the lots were tenanted and cultivated by Julian dela Cruz, husband of plaintiff Eufrocina dela Cruz.

Julian died on September 25, 1979.

29 | P a g e

In her complaint, Eufrocina alleged that upon the death of Julian, she succeeded him as bona fide tenant of the subject lots.

On July 7 to July 15, 1984, Olympio Mendoza, in conspiracy with the other defendants, prevented her daughter Violeta and her workers through force,
intimidation, strategy and stealth, from entering and working on the subject premises; and that until the filing of the instant case, defendants had refused to
vacate and surrender the lots, thus violating her tenancy rights.

Plaintiff therefore prayed for judgment for the recovery of possession and damages with a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in the meantime.

Defendants Reyes, Parayao, Aguinaldo and Mananghaya, duly elected and/or appointed barangay officials of Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, denied
interference in the tenancy relationship existing between plaintiff and defendant Mendoza, particularly in the cultivation of the latter's farm lots. Claiming
that they have always exercised fairness, equity, reason and impartiality in the discharge of their official functions, they asked for the dismissal of the case and
claimed moral damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P165,000.00 (Answer with Counterclaim, Records, pp. 48-51).

For his part, defendant Mendoza raised abandonment, sublease and mortgage of the farm lots without his consent and approval, and non-payment of
rentals, irrigation fees and other taxes due the government, as his defenses. He also demanded actual and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees
(Answer, pp. 77-78).

The respondent Court rendered judgment affirming the appealed agrarian court's decision with the modification that Lot 106 is not covered by it.

Defendants who are the petitioners in this case, in a Petition for Review on Certiorari, present for the consideration of the Court:

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondents is liable for forcible entry.

RULING: Yes.

Yes, We find for the private respondents.

We also concur with the trial court's finding on the participation of the other appellants in the dispossession of appellee. They not only knew Olympio
personally, some of them were even asked by Olympio to help him cultivate the land, thus lending credence to the allegation that defendant Olympio, together
with his co-defendants, prevented plaintiff and her workers from entering the land through "strong arm methods". (Decision of RTC, records, vol. II p. 564).

Finally, we rule that the trial court did not err when it favorably considered the affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson (Annexes "B" and "C") although the
affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-examination. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that the "Rules of Court shall not be applicable in
30 | P a g e

agrarian cases even in a suppletory character." The same provision states that "In the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or
controversy, affidavits and counter-affidavits may be allowed and are admissible in evidence".

Moreover, in agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence required is no more than substantial evidence. This substantial evidence rule was incorporated in
section 18, P.D. No. 946 which took effect on June 17, 1976 (Castro vs. CS, G.R. No. 34613, January 26, 1989). In Bagsican vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA
226, the Supreme Court defined what substantial evidence is:

Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderant evidence, as is required in an ordinary civil case. It has been defined to be such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and its absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence on
record, direct or circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment or criteria for that of the trial court in determining wherein lies the
weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to belief.

G.R. No. 154108 December 10, 2008

FIRST UNITED CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION

vs.

MENANDRO G. VALDEZ

On March 29, 1999, FUCC, through its Executive Vice-President Ben S. Dumaliang (Dumaliang) and the Project Manager Samuel A. Aquino (Aquino), filed an
administrative complaint against respondents before the Office of the Ombudsman for dishonesty, grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

FUCC alleged that respondents tried to extort money from it but failed, hence, they refused to act with dispatch on its Second Progress Billing and to officially
document various variation orders despite instructions by their superiors.
31 | P a g e

FUCC further alleged that respondents consistently arrived late at the Project site, used for personal purposes the service vehicles leased by it to NHA for the
Project, and used the Project site as their private gun firing range.

In their Joint-Counter Affidavit, respondents alleged that FUCC filed the complaint to coerce them into recommending full payment of its Second Progress
Billing amounting to P50,701,846.80 and force them to assist the NHA Management and FUCC in the cover-up on the investigations resulting from the
allegations in Borjal’s newspaper articles.

Respondents further alleged that the Project OIC Raner and the NHA General Manager Angelo F. Leynes (Leynes) pressured them to attribute the collapse of the
road to natural causes and to justify payment on the works done outside of the specifications.

By Decision of January 13, 2000 bearing his January 28, 2000 approval, the Ombudsman absolved respondents of negligence in acting on FUCC’s Second
Progress Billing, but found them liable for extortion and using the vehicles leased to the NHA for personal use, and accordingly dismissed them from the
service.

By Decision of February 28, 2002 rendered in C.A. G.R. No. 62534, the Court of Appeals, finding FUCC’s administrative complaint to be bereft of substantial
evidence, reversed the Ombudsman’s decision and accordingly dismissed the administrative cases against respondents.

ISSUES:

W/N THE CA ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE OMBUDSMAN, DISMISSING THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS AGAINST RESPONDENTS.

RULING: NO

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving with substantial evidence the allegations in the complaint. While rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling, this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go as far as to justify
orders without basis in evidence having rational probative force.

In the administrative case against respondents subject of G.R. No. 157505, the Ombudsman found them liable for extortion based on the affidavits of FUCC’s
witnesses, holding that "cases of extortion virtually depend on the credibility of complainant’s testimony because of [their] intrinsic nature where only the
participants can testify to [their] occurrences."
32 | P a g e

The records show that Valdez’ recommendation to pay the FUCC only P16,342,226.23 came about in light of his finding that FUCC failed to lay subbase in
accordance with the specifications of the Project.

FUCC itself admits not having laid subbase, even as it charged the NHA for the cost thereof despite its claim that it omitted the subbase "to save funds". The
FUCC claims that the NHA approved the substitution of CTBC for conventional base course and subbase. However, FUCC showed no evidence of such approval
other than its own letters to the NHA stating its intention to use CTBC instead of the conventional base course and subbase required by the contract.

Respecting the charge that respondents used for personal purposes the vehicles leased by FUCC to the NHA, the same is unsupported by substantial
evidence. Valdez’s signature on the entries in the logbook reflecting the vehicles’ trips does not necessarily indicate that he and/or Adea took the trips. It could
indicate that he was attesting to the authenticity of the trips. At any rate, FUCC did not refute the claim that there were instances when other NHA personnel
used the vehicles.

IN SUM, FUCC having failed to support its charges against respondents with substantial evidence, the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the Ombudsman
decision and accordingly dismissing the administrative complaint against respondents to thus render NHA’s petition in G.R. No. 157505 moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

When Evidence Not Required

- No Factual Issue/Question of Law

G.R. No. 193986 January 15, 2014

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES INC
vs.
33 | P a g e

BPI/MS INSURANCE CORP. and MITSUI SUM TOMO INSURANCE CO. LTD., Respondents.
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking
the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 88361, which affirmed with modification the
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), of Makati City, Branch 138 in Civil Case No. 04-1005.

The facts follow:

On August 29, 2003, Sumitomo Corporation (Sumitomo) shipped through MV Eastern Challenger V-9-S, a vessel owned by
petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. (petitioner), 31 various steel sheets in coil weighing 271,828 kilograms from
Yokohama, Japan for delivery in favor of the consignee Calamba Steel Center Inc. (Calamba Steel).4 The cargo had a declared
value of US$125,417.26 and was insured against all risk by Sumitomo with respondent Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Co., Ltd.
(Mitsui).
On or about September 6 2003, the shipment arrived at the port of Manila. Upon unloading from the vessel, nine coils were
observed to be in bad condition as evidenced by the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargo No. 67327.
The cargo was then turned over to Asian Terminals, Inc. (ATI) for stevedoring, storage and safekeeping pending Calamba
Steel’s withdrawal of the goods. When ATI delivered the cargo to Calamba Steel, the latter rejected its damaged portion,
valued at US$7,751.15, for being unfit for its intended purpose.

Subsequently, on September 13, 2003, a second shipment of 28 steel sheets in coil, weighing 215,817 kilograms, was made by
Sumitomo through petitioner’s MV Eastern Challenger V-10-S for transport and delivery again to Calamba Steel.6 Insured by
Sumitomo against all risk with Mitsui,7 the shipment had a declared value of US$121,362.59. This second shipment arrived at
the port of Manila on or about September 23, 2003. However, upon unloading of the cargo from the said vessel, 11 coils
were found damaged as evidenced by the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargo No. 67393. The possession of the said cargo
34 | P a g e

was then transferred to ATI for stevedoring, storage and safekeeping pending withdrawal thereof by Calamba Steel. When ATI
delivered the goods, Calamba Steel rejected the damaged portion thereof, valued at US$7,677.12, the same being unfit for
its intended purpose.8

Lastly, on September 29, 2003, Sumitomo again shipped 117 various steel sheets in coil weighing 930,718 kilograms through
petitioner’s vessel, MV Eastern Venus V-17-S, again in favor of Calamba Steel.9 This third shipment had a declared value of
US$476,416.90 and was also insured by Sumitomo with Mitsui. The same arrived at the port of Manila on or about October
11, 2003. Upon its discharge, six coils were observed to be in bad condition. Thereafter, the possession of the cargo was
turned over to ATI for stevedoring, storage and safekeeping pending withdrawal thereof by Calamba Steel. The damaged
portion of the goods being unfit for its intended purpose, Calamba Steel rejected the damaged portion, valued at
US$14,782.05, upon ATI’s delivery of the third shipment.10

Calamba Steel filed an insurance claim with Mitsui through the latter’s settling agent, respondent BPI/MS Insurance
Corporation (BPI/MS), and the former was paid the sums of US$7,677.12, US$14,782.05 and US$7,751.15 for the damage
suffered by all three shipments or for the total amount of US$30,210.32.
Correlatively, on August 31, 2004, as insurer and subrogee of Calamba Steel, Mitsui and BPI/MS filed a Complaint for
Damages against petitioner and ATI.

On September 17, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the plaintiff and against defendants Eastern Shipping
Lines, Inc. and Asian Terminals, Inc., jointly and severally, ordering the latter to pay plaintiffs actual damages and attorney’
fees.

Aggrieved, petitioner and ATI appealed to the CA.

35 | P a g e

On July 9, 2010, the CA in its assailed Decision affirmed with modification the RTC’s findings and ruling, holding, among
others, that both petitioner and ATI were very negligent in the handling of the subject cargoes. Pointing to the affidavit of
Mario Manuel, Cargo Surveyor, the CA found that "during the unloading operations, the steel coils were lifted from the
vessel but were not carefully laid on the ground. Some were even ‘dropped’ while still several inches from the ground while
other coils bumped or hit one another at the pier while being arranged by the stevedores and forklift operators of ATI and
[petitioner]."
The CA added that such finding coincides with the factual findings of the RTC that both petitioner and ATI were both
negligent in handling the goods. However, for failure of the RTC to state the justification for the award of attorney’s fees in
the body of its decision, the CA accordingly deleted the same. Petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration16 which the CA,
however, denied in its Resolution dated October 6, 2010.

Both petitioner and ATI filed their respective separate petitions for review on certiorari before this Court.
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES:
In its Memorandum, petitioner essentially avers that the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC because the survey
reports submitted by respondents themselves as their own evidence and the pieces of evidence submitted by petitioner
clearly show that the cause of the damage was the rough handling of the goods by ATI during the discharging operations.
Petitioner attests that it had no participation whatsoever in the discharging operations and that petitioner did not have a
choice in selecting the stevedore since ATI is the only arrastre operator mandated to conduct discharging operations in the
South Harbor. Thus, petitioner prays that it be absolved from any liability relative to the damage incurred by the goods.

On the other hand, respondents counter, among others, that as found by both the RTC and the CA, the goods suffered
damage while still in the possession of petitioner as evidenced by various Turn Over Surveys of Bad Order Cargoes which
were unqualifiedly executed by petitioner’s own surveyor, Rodrigo Victoria, together with the representative of ATI.
Respondents assert that petitioner would not have executed such documents if the goods, as it claims, did not suffer any
36 | P a g e

damage prior to their turn-over to ATI. Lastly, respondents aver that petitioner, being a common carrier is required by law to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods it carries.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed any reversible error in finding that petitioner is solidarily liable with ATI on account of
the damage incurred by the goods.
RULING OF THE COURT:
The Court resolves the issue in the negative.

x x x The Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes (TOSBOC, for brevity) No. 67393 and Request for Bad Order Survey No.
57692 show that prior to the turn over of the first shipment to the custody of ATI, eleven (11) of the twenty-eight (28) coils
were already found in bad order condition. Eight (8) of the said eleven coils were already "partly dented/crumpled " and the
remaining three (3) were found "partly dented, scratches on inner hole, crumple (sic)". On the other hand, the TOSBOC No.
67457 and Request for Bad Order Survey No. 57777 also show that prior to the turn over of the second shipment to the
custody of ATI, a total of six (6) coils thereof were already "partly dented on one side, crumpled/cover detach (sic)". These
documents were issued by ATI. The said TOSBOC’s were jointly executed by ATI, vessel’s representative and surveyor while
the Requests for Bad Order Survey were jointly executed by ATI, consignee’s representative and the Shed Supervisor. The
aforementioned documents were corroborated by the Damage Report dated 23 September 2003 and Turn Over Survey No.
15765 for the first shipment, Damage Report dated 13 October 2003 and Turn Over Survey No. 15772 for the second
shipment and, two Damage Reports dated 6 September 2003 and Turn Over Survey No. 15753 for the third shipment.

It was shown to this Court that a Request for Bad Order Survey is a document which is requested by an interested party that
incorporates therein the details of the damage, if any, suffered by a shipped commodity. Also, a TOSBOC, usually issued by the
37 | P a g e

arrastre contractor (ATI in this case), is a form of certification that states therein the bad order condition of a particular cargo,
as found prior to its turn over to the custody or possession of the said arrastre contractor.

The said Damage Reports, Turn Over Survey Reports and Requests for Bad Order Survey led the Court to conclude that
before the subject shipments were turned over to ATI, the said cargo were already in bad order condition due to damage
sustained during the sea voyage. Nevertheless, this Court cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that there was also negligence
on the part of the employees of ATI and [Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.] in the discharging of the cargo as observed by
plaintiff’s witness, Mario Manuel, and [Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.’s] witness, Rodrigo Victoria.

In ascertaining the cause of the damage to the subject shipments, Mario Manuel stated that the "coils were roughly handled
during their discharging from the vessel to the pier of (sic) ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. and even during the loading operations of
these coils from the pier to the trucks that will transport the coils to the consignee’s warehouse. During the aforesaid
operations, the employees and forklift operators of EASTERN SHIPPING LINES and ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. were very negligent
in the handling of the subject cargoes. Specifically, "during unloading, the steel coils were lifted from the vessel and not
carefully laid on the ground, sometimes were even ‘dropped’ while still several inches from the ground. The tine (forklift
blade) or the portion that carries the coils used for the forklift is improper because it is pointed and sharp and the centering of
the tine to the coils were negligently done such that the pointed and sharp tine touched and caused scratches, tears and dents
to the coils. Some of the coils were also dragged by the forklift instead of being carefully lifted from one place to another.
Some coils bump/hit one another at the pier while being arranged by the stevedores/forklift operators of ASIAN TERMINALS,
INC. and EASTERN SHIPPING LINES.29 (Emphasis supplied.)

Verily, it is settled in maritime law jurisprudence that cargoes while being unloaded generally remain under the custody of the
carrier. As hereinbefore found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA based on the evidence presented, the goods were
damaged even before they were turned over to ATI. Such damage was even compounded by the negligent acts of
38 | P a g e

petitioner and ATI which both mishandled the goods during the discharging operations. Thus, it bears stressing unto
petitioner that common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them. Subject to certain exceptions enumerated under
Article 1734 of the Civil Code, common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods. The
extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession
of, and received by the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the
consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them.32 Owing to this high degree of diligence required of them,
common carriers, as a general rule, are presumed to have been at fault or negligent if the goods they transported
deteriorated or got lost or destroyed. That is, unless they prove that they exercised extraordinary diligence in transporting the
goods. In order to avoid responsibility for any loss or damage, therefore, they have the burden of proving that they observed
such high level of diligence.33 In this case, petitioner failed to hurdle such burden.

In sum, petitioner failed to show any reversible error on the part of the CA in affirming the ruling of the RTC as to warrant
the modification, much less the reversal of its assailed decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

- Pleadings in civil case do not tender issue of fact

- Parties agree to stipulate on facts (Sections 2 [c] and 7 [a], Rule 18, and
Section 7, Rule 30, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure a& amended by A.M. No.
10-20-SC)
39 | P a g e

Section 2 (a), RULE 18. Nature and Purpose. — The pre-trial is mandatory and should be terminated promptly. The court shall
consider:

(a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to alternative modes of dispute resolution;
Section 7, Rule 18. Pre-Trial Order. — Upon termination of pre-trial, the court shall issue an order within ten (10) calendar
days which shall recite in detail the matters taken up. The order shall include:

(a) An enumeration of the admitted facts;

Matters of Judicial Notice (Secs. 1 to 3, Rule 129)

What Need Not Be Proved

SECTION 1 . Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of
nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the
measure of time, and the geographical divisions.

Sec. 2 . Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or
are capable to unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. (1a)
40 | P a g e

Sec. 3 . Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. — During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party,
may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.

After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take
judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.
(n)

Matters Judicially Admitted (Sec. 4, Rule 129).

Sec. 4 . Judicial admissions. — An admission, verbal or written, made by the party in the course of the proceedings in the
same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made. (2a)

Kinds of Evidence
Object (real)-evidence of the thing or object which is produce in court, or evidence furnished by things.
Documentary-consists of written instruments offered as proof of their contents.
testimonial -evidence given by a competent witness under oath or affirmation by means of verbal statements.
Relevant-logical nexus of factum probans with factum probandum. Evidence is relevant to the fact in issue as to induce belief
in its existence or nonexistence. It excludes a collateral matter unless it can establish probability or improbability of the factual
issue.
Material-it proves a disputed fact
competent – it Is not excluded by law or rule
41 | P a g e

Direct and circumstantial (cf. Section 4, Rule 133)

Cumulative- evidence of the same kind for an identical disputed fact; evidence of the same kind, to the same point.
corroborative – evidence of a different kind for the same disputed fact.
Prima facie- sufficient for a proposition, in default of a contrary proposition.
conclusive -insuperable or incontrovertible evidence.
Primary- utmost evidence for a contested fact, ordinarily applied to documentary evidence through Best Evidence Rule.
secondary -evidence in lieu of primary evidence.
Positive-an assertion of the existence or nonexistence of a disputed fact.
and negative -a disclaimer of knowledge over a disputed fact.
Expert evidence -it emanates from a testimonial sponsor with special knowledge, skill, experience, or training.
Electronic evidence
Preponderant evidence (Rule 133, Section 1 - for civil cases)
SECTION 1 . Preponderance of evidence, how determined. — In civil cases, the party having burden of proof must establish
his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the
issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying,
their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which there are testifying, the nature of the facts to
which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal
credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses,
though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
42 | P a g e

Equipoise rule
When the scales shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline it to one side or the
other, the court will find for the defendant.

Under said principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weaknesses of defendant’s claim.
Even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on
his side if such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action."

G.R. No. 149802 January 20, 2006

ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO AND REALTY CORPORATION
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN

The case is for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, among which are shares of stock in the Philippine
Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC): 76,779 shares in the name of Ramon U. Cojuangco, 21,525 shares in the
43 | P a g e

name of Imelda O. Cojuangco, and 111,415 shares in the name of Prime Holdings Incorporated (PHI). PTIC is the biggest
stockholder of PLDT, it owning some 28% of the outstanding shares in PLDT at the time Civil Case No. 0002 was filed.

In the course of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 0002, the first three petitions assailing interlocutory orders of the
Sandiganbayan were filed before this Court.

Thus, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 149802 and 150320, filed by Alfonso Yuchengco and Y Realty Corporation, complainants-in-
intervention in Civil Case No. 0002, assail via petition for certiorari orders and resolutions of the Sandiganbayan denying
their motions to suspend trial pending discovery proceedings and to re-set trial dates (with alternative prayer for a change
in the order of trial), and declaring them as having waived their right to present evidence.

The petition in G.R. No. 150367, filed by the Republic, assails via petition for certiorari the Sandiganbayan Orders denying its
Respectful Motion for Additional Time to Complete the Presentation of Evidence and directing it to submit its offer of
evidence within 30 days.

During the pendency of these first three petitions, the Sandiganbayan continued with the proceedings in Civil Case No.
0002, no restraining order enjoining the same having been issued by this Court.

The Sandiganbayan, still during the pendency of the first three petitions, promulgated in Civil Case No. 0002 a Partial
Decision on May 6, 2002 the dispositive portion of which reads:
44 | P a g e

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint of plaintiff Republic of the Philippines on the PLDT shares subject
of separate trial is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.”

The Motion for Summary Judgment [filed by Imelda Cojuangco, et al] is hereby GRANTED, and the Complaint-in-
Intervention [filed by the Yuchengcos] DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. (Underscoring supplied)

The last two of the five petitions at bar, both for review on certiorari, were thereupon filed.
The petition in G.R. No. 153207 filed by the complainants-in-intervention Yuchengcos, and that in G.R. No. 153459 filed by
the Republic, both challenge the Partial Decision.

The incidents that gave rise to the filing of the petitions are stated in the minority’s dissenting opinion penned by Justice
Cancio Garcia which immediately follows this majority opinion. The dissenting opinion substantially reiterates the draft that
Justice Garcia prepared which was used by this Court as a working basis for its deliberations.

ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED THE CIVIL CASE INVOLVING THE SHARES BEING HELD
BY PHI FOR PTIC.
RULING OF THE COURT
45 | P a g e

Yes, preponderant of evidence lies with the Republic; PHI is a dummy corporation held by nominees for the Marcos Family
based on the sworn statements of Campos, Gapud and De Guzman which were set aside by the Sandiganbayan together
with the photocopies of the Deed of Assignment which were presented as evidence by the prosecution.

There is no disagreement with respect to the disposition-dismissal by the minority of the first three petitions – the first having
become moot, and the second and third for lack of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan. There is also
no disagreement with respect to the disposition-denial by the minority of the fourth petition (G.R. No. 153207) in the absence
of reversible error on the part of the Sandiganbayan.

It is with respect to the disposition-denial by the minority of the fifth petition (G.R. No. 153459) insofar as it denied the
prayer of the Republic for a judgment ordering the Estate of Ramon U. Cojuangco (Cojuangco), Imelda O. Cojuangco, PHI,
their assigns, nominees and agents to reconvey to the Republic 111,415 PTIC shares registered in the name of PHI that the
majority does not agree, in light of the immediately following discussions.

The Sandiganbayan having held in its 73-page Partial Decision that the Republic has failed to prove that the PLDT shares
sought to be recovered are ill-gotten, thus:

“the Republic has failed to provide such "proof of authenticity or reliability" of the documents offered by it in
evidence. Thus almost all the documents offered by the Republic are photocopies, and no effort was undertaken . . . to
submit the originals of said documents, or to have them properly identified, or to otherwise justify the admission of
mere photocopies. Not surprisingly, defendants . . . objected to the admission of the Republic’s documentary exhibits,
citing violation of the Best Evidence Rule (Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure ["Rules"], the
46 | P a g e

Rules of Presentation of Documentary Evidence (Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules). The Hearsay Evidence Rule, and the
rule as to Purpose/s of Documentary Evidence (Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules).”

Section 3, Rule 130 Rules of Evidence. Original document must be produced; exceptions._ Whent the object of inquiry is the
content of a document, writing, recording, photograph, or other record, no evidence is admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
a. When the original is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror.
b. When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the
latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice, or the original cannot be obtained judicial process or procedures;
c. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without
great loss of time and the facts sought to be established from them is only a general result of the whole;
d. When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in the public office; and
e. When the original is not closely-related to the controlling issue.
Section 2, Rule 132, Rules of Evidence. Proof of private documents. Before any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:
a. By anyone who saw the document executed or written;
b. By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker; or
c. By other evidence showing its due execution and authenticity.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.

Section 34, Rule 132, Rules of Evidence. Offer of Evidence. The court shall not consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered for a specified purpose.
47 | P a g e

QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE
E.O. No. 14-A clearly states that the degree of proof required in cases such as the one at bar is preponderance of evidence.
Sec. 3. The civil suits to recover unlawfully acquired property under Republic Act No. 1379 or for restitution, reparation
of damages, or indemnification for consequential and other damages or any other civil actions under the Civil Code or
other existing laws filed with the Sandiganbayan against Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, members of their
immediate family, close relatives, subordinates, close and/or business associates, dummies, agents and nominees, may
proceed independently of any criminal proceedings and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence. (Underscoring
supplied)
 
 
The Sandiganbayan, therefore, was not to look for proof beyond reasonable doubt, but to determine, based on the evidence
presented, in light of common human experience, which of the theories proffered by the parties is more worthy of credence.
 
The evidence presented by the parties shows that the preponderance clearly lies with the Republic, but the Sandiganbayan
grossly misappreciated it and, therefore, committed a reversible error.
 

 
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE LIES WITH THE REPUBLIC
 
48 | P a g e

Clearly, the Republic's thesis that President Marcos is the beneficial owner of PHI 'is deduced from established facts which,
weighed by common experience, engender the inference as a very strong probability.[53] Only a Marcos ownership can make
sense of the circumstances surrounding the origins of PHI, especially its close ties with UNILAB and the Camposes.
 
Only a Marcos ownership of PHI can plausibly account for the substantially corroborated admissions of Campos and Gapud
that they organized PHI in behalf of Marcos. Indeed, even the minority had to acknowledge that Gapud was a mere nominee,
merely denying that his principal was Marcos, contrary to Gapud's own admission. However, perhaps unable to account for
the undeniable fact that all the incorporators of PHI are Campos associates, the minority implies that the true owner was
neither Marcos nor Cojuangco, but Campos himself ' contrary to the Cojuangcos' submission that Ramon Cojuangco was the
beneficial owner, and to Campos' admission that he organized PHI for President Marcos.
 
Moreover, the thesis that Marcos owned PHI is able to make more sense of the undisputed assignment of PTIC shares to PHI
by Cojuangco. If PHI were beneficially owned by Cojuangco, then the transfer of these PTIC shares to PHI would merely have
been a transfer to himself. On the other hand, on the thesis that PHI is beneficially owned by Marcos, the assignment thereof
to PHI was a transfer from Cojuangco to President Marcos.
 
On the basis of the evidence, therefore, President Marcos owned PHI and all the incorporators thereof acted under his
direction. Once this is acknowledged, the following conclusions inevitably follow:
 
1. Cojuangco was elected President and took over the management of PHI in 1981 with the cooperation of the Marcos
nominees who, it must be emphasized, still held the majority stockholding as of that date;
2. As the remaining incorporators on the Board divested their shares only in 1983, Cojuangco managed a Marcos-controlled
corporation for at least two years;
49 | P a g e

 
3. The simultaneous divestment of shares by the three remaining incorporators on the Board to Cojuangco's close relatives in
1983 were with the knowledge and authorization of their principal ' President Marcos.
 
Clearly, all these circumstances mark out Cojuangco either as a nominee of Marcos as was Gapud whom he replaced as
President of PHI or, at the very least, a close associate of Marcos. As such, the PCGG which is charged, under E.O. No.
1[54] issued by President Aquino pursuant to her legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution, with assisting the
President in regard to, inter alia,
The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all
business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by
taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or
relationship[55] (Underscoring supplied), can and must recover for the Republic the 111,415 PTIC shares being held by
PHI, they bearing the character of ill-gotten wealth whether they be in the hands of Marcos or those of Cojuangco.
 
On the other hand, respecting the thesis that PHI was, from its inception, beneficially owned by Ramon Cojuangco, the
Cojuangcos can only point to the deeds of assignment of PHI shares to members of their family as confirming the same. The
Sandiganbayan considered these deeds as competent evidence, as opposed to the purported lack of such evidence on the
part of the Republic. The most these deeds could show, however, is that the Cojuangcos acquired PHI shares in the years 1981
and 1983, long after the 111,415 PTIC shares were acquired in 1978 by PHI. On the decisive question of whether the
incorporators who organized PHI in 1977 acted as Marcos (or Cojuangco) nominees, these deeds are absolutely silent. '
 
50 | P a g e

In marked contrast, the testimonies of Campos, Gapud, and de Guzman, persons who actually participated in the formation
and early years of operation of PHI, constitute evidence that directly addresses the critical issue.
 
Indubitably, the preponderance of evidence lies with the Republic.
 
WHEREFORE, the petition of the Republic of the Philippines in G.R. No. 153459 is GRANTED to the extent that it prays for
the reconveyance to the Republic of 111,415 PTIC shares registered in the name of PHI.
'The petitions in G.R. Nos. 149802, 150320, 150367, and 153207 are DENIED for lack of merit.
 
SO ORDERED.

SEPARATE DISSENTING OPINION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

I join Mr. Justice Cancio C. Garcia in his well-crafted Dissent in G.R. No. 153459 denying the Republic’s petition and affirming
respondent Sandiganbayan’s Decision.
51 | P a g e

In civil suits for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, like the instant case, the Republic must meet the burden of proof and
establish with a preponderance of evidence that the property in question –

". . . are assets and properties purportedly pertaining to former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and/or his wife Mrs. Imelda
Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents or nominees which had been or
were acquired by them directly or indirectly, through or as a result of the improper or illegal use of funds or properties owned
by the Government of the Philippines or any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or financial institutions, or
by taking advantage of their office, authority, influence, connections or relationships, resulting in their unjust enrichment, and
causing damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines."

The alleged ill-gotten assets in this case are shares of stock in Prime Holdings Inc. (PHI) which, in turn, holds shares in
Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC), a shareholder in the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company (PLDT). The Republic’s case is premised on the theory that PHI is a "dummy corporation," not owned by private
respondent Cojuangco family, but merely held in beneficial trust for former President Ferdinand E. Marcos.

I have closely reviewed the records and revisited both factual and legal bases of the Sandiganbayan Decision, and found that
the Republic failed to prove its case by preponderance of evidence.

The Republic’s case is anchored almost entirely upon the testimonies of Messrs. Jose Y. Campos, Rolando Gapud and
Francisco de Guzman. They attempted to prove that PHI was a corporate vehicle "organized for" Marcos. As "beneficial
owner" of PHI, Marcos used Ramon U. Cojuangco as a "dummy" controlling PHI and its assets.
52 | P a g e

The same witnesses identified the modus operandi employed by Marcos to hide his ill-gotten wealth. Unfortunately, the
evidence for the Republic fails to show that PHI is Marcos’ "dummy corporation."

Considering the fact that Campos – by his own admission – was the organizer of dummy corporations for Marcos, it is contrary
to human experience that he never had any discussion with the former President about PHI, if indeed it was such a dummy
corporation.

Obviously, there was nothing to discuss with President Marcos about PHI because it was not one of his dummy corporations.
In fact, the Republic’s other witness, Atty. Francisco de Guzman, admitted that PHI did not meet the description of a Marcos
dummy corporation
If, according to the Republic’s own witness, the shares of a Marcos dummy corporation are covered by a Deed of
Assignment endorsed to an unnamed beneficiary, then Atty. De Guzman’s above admissions are fatal to the Republic’s
case. His categorical declaration is that the blank Deeds of Assignment and Deeds of Trust covering PHI shares were not
delivered to Marcos, but to Ramon U. Cojuangco.

Now, delivery of the blank deeds of Assignment and Deeds of Trust was a crucial element of the modus operandi. Considering
that Marcos was not in possession of the Deeds over PHI shares, he could not have controlled or managed PHI. To be sure,
there was no point organizing PHI as a dummy corporation for Marcos since he could not perform these functions.

The majority of my colleagues hold that "Gapud’s statement relating to subsequent execution of deeds of assignment to
Cojuangco and his kin does not detract from the prior delivery of blank deeds to the former President, especially so in this
case where, by Gapud’s own recounting, he and his co-incorporators executed the 1981 and 1983 Deeds of Assignment with
the knowledge and authorization of the same person to whom the earlier deeds were delivered – President Marcos."
53 | P a g e

But the ponencia conveniently sidesteps the reality that there is no evidence of such prior delivery to Marcos. Witness de
Guzman declared that the blank Deeds of Assignment over PHI shares were placed in the custody of the Legal Department,
and thereafter delivered to Ramon Cojuangco, together with all the records of PHI.

The majority also hold that the alleged execution by the incorporators, as "nominees" of Marcos, of the Deeds of
Assignment/Deeds of Trust is consistent with Gapud’s statement that he received virtually nothing in return for PHI shares.
But to my mind, this is fallacious – a conjecture made to fit an insignificant fact. A straightforward explanation is simply that
when the PHI shares were assigned to Ramon U. Cojuangco – the true beneficial owner -Gapud’s role as a nominee became
untenable. Obviously, a nominee’s role ends when the principal’s exercise of his right begins.

Nor is it accurate to say that there was an absence of consideration for the transfer of the PHI shares. Gapud himself admitted
that the consideration for the assignment of his shares to Cojuangco was the termination of his fiduciary responsibilities as
nominee and the extinguishment of his liabilities under the subscription.

The ponencia does not explain why Marcos allowed the execution of the Deeds of Assignment in favor of respondent
Cojuangcos. If PHI was indeed a dummy corporation, then it would be contrary to human experience for President Marcos to
deprive himself of the legal mechanism to assert his alleged beneficial ownership.

Indeed, if the transfer of PHI shares to the Cojuangco family was with the "blessings" of President Marcos, then it can only
mean the he was never interested in those shares – a fact consistent with Campos’ statement that he "never discussed" the
PHI shares with Marcos. Therefore, the plausible reason for this is that Marcos never owned the shares in the first place.
54 | P a g e

The realistic scenario, therefore, is that these shares actually pertained to Ramon U. Cojuangco from the beginning and the
assignments to him and members of his family merely confirmed what already existed in fact. In other words, Cojuangco –
not Marcos – has been the beneficial owner of the shares from the start. This explains why no blank Deeds of Trust or
Assignment were executed and delivered by the stockholders of PHI, and the reason why they executed and delivered Deeds
of Assignment specifically naming Ramon U. Cojuangco and the members of his family as the assignees of the PHI shares. This
also explains why PHI’s capitalization was not increased despite its acquisition of PTIC shares. An increase was unnecessary
because Ramon U. Cojuangco actually did not part with the ownership of the PTIC shares transferred to PHI, since after all, he,
not Marcos, owned the PHI.

Additionally, the Republic failed to prove that Marcos had a subsisting interest in PHI. There had been no intervention on his
part in the affairs of PLDT, PTIC, or PHI. Nor did he issue instructions that "hugely and inexplicably benefited" these companies
indicating he had any actual interest therein.

Another source of debate in this case has been the evidentiary standard applicable to this and other ill-gotten wealth cases,
given the Sandiganbayan’s reliance on Baseco vs. PCGG and related jurisprudence. The ponencia stresses that this Court
never intended to lay down evidentiary standards in Baseco and, therefore, the Sandiganbayan’s reference to such
standards is nothing more than its "inference from its reading of the Decision."

I disagree. To my mind, Baseco is applicable.

Baseco is a landmark ruling that confirms the modus operandi described by the Republic’s witnesses here. In that case, "street
certificates" (i.e. stock certificates endorsed in blank) and Deeds of Assignment to various corporations including Baseco, also
55 | P a g e

assigned in blank, were among the documents found to have been in Marcos’ possession in Malacañang. We were
convinced that based on such proof, Marcos "actually owns well nigh one hundred percent of its outstanding stock."

But unlike Baseco, here there is no such documentary evidence. Neither PHI stock certificates nor PHI Deeds of Assignment
have turned up in Marcos’ hands. Witness de Guzman testified that assignments of PHI shares were delivered to Cojuangco,
not Marcos. Documentary evidence (Exhibits "1" to "5", for instance) clearly identify Ramon U. Cojuangco and the members of
his family as the assignees of PHI shares – certainly removing any idea that these were assigned in blank to an "unnamed
beneficiary."
***************************************************************************************************
Because this is a civil forfeiture case, then the Republic must establish, by a "preponderance of evidence," that the PHI
shares were "ill-gotten wealth." Its burden is explained by this Court, thus:

"Equiponderance of evidence rule states:

When the scales shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline it to one side or the
other, the court will find for the defendant.

Under said principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weaknesses of defendant’s claim.
Even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on
his side if such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action."
56 | P a g e

Similarly:

"We are at a loss to determine which position is correct. Under the circumstances, we are constrained to decide the issues
under the rule of burden of proof.

Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is any doubt on which the evidence preponderates the party
having the burden of proof falls upon that issue, that is to say, if the evidence touching on disputed facts is equally balanced,
or if it does not produce a just, rational belief of its existence, or it leaves the mind in a state of perplexity the party holding
the affirmative as to such fact must fail. (23 C.J. 11-12)"7

So must it be in this case. On the assumption that the Republic has presented a persuasive case, it may not be said that the
defendants do not have in their favor an equally persuasive one. Even were we to find the balance of evidence to be just
about at equipoise, the Republic’s instant claim – as a matter of law – must fall.

Some might argue that the evidentiary requirement in civil forfeiture cases has an even higher standard, that is, proof beyond
reasonable doubt. In Cabal vs. Kapunan, we ruled that proceedings for forfeiture of property in favor of the State (under the
Anti-Graft Law) is criminal and penal in nature because such actions are primarily to punish for violation of a duty or a public
wrong and to deter others from offending in the like manner. Forfeiture of property is in substance a criminal proceeding, and
such forfeiture has been held to partake of the nature of a penalty.

WHEREFORE, I vote to DENY the petition in G. R. No. 153459 and AFFIRM respondent Sandiganbayan’s Partial Decision.
57 | P a g e

G.R. No. 150762 January 20, 2006

COVERDALE ABARQUEZ, y EVANGELISTA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 23 June 2000 Decision and the 7 November 2001 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21450. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 30 September 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 50 ("trial court") in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-135055-56.
The trial court found Coverdale Abarquez y Evangelista ("Abarquez") guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the
crime of homicide in Criminal Case No. 94-135055.

The Charge

The prosecution charged Abarquez with the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide in two Informations,
The Ruling of the Trial Court

In its Decision dated 30 September 1997, the trial court found Abarquez guilty as an accomplice in the crime of homicide.
The trial court held that the prosecution failed to prove that Abarquez was a co-conspirator of Almojuela in the killing of
Quejong. Hence, Abarquez could not be convicted as a principal in the crime of homicide. However, the trial court ruled that
Abarquez, in holding and restraining Paz, prevented the latter from helping Quejong and allowed Almojuela to pursue his
criminal act without resistance.
58 | P a g e

In its Decision of 23 June 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s Decision. The Court of Appeals sustained the
trial court in giving more credence to the testimony of Paz. The Court of Appeals held that the prosecution was able to
establish that Abarquez aided Almojuela in fatally stabbing Quejong. The Court of Appeals rejected Abarquez’s allegation
that he was merely at the crime scene to pacify the quarreling parties.

In its November 2001 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied Abarquez’s motion for reconsideration.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issues

1. Whether the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice the
crime as charged;
The Ruling of This Court: No

The petition is meritorious.

The rule is that the trial court is in the best position to determine the value and weight of the testimony of a witness. The
exception is if the trial court failed to consider certain facts of substance and value, which if considered, might affect the result
of the case. This case is an exception to the rule.
59 | P a g e

Concurrence in Criminal Design

Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as "those persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in
the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts."

Two elements must concur before a person becomes liable as an accomplice: (1) community of design, which means that the
accomplice knows of, and concurs with, the criminal design of the principal by direct participation; and (2) the performance by
the accomplice of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime. Mere commission
of an act, which aids the perpetrator, is not enough. Thus:

The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly rendered, which cannot exist without the previous
cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. It is therefore required in order to be liable as an accomplice, that
the accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct participation.

Indeed, in one case, the Court ruled that the mere presence of the accused at the crime scene cannot be interpreted to mean
that he committed the crime charged.

Here, in convicting Abarquez, the trial court and the Court of Appeals relied mainly on the testimony of Paz. Paz testified that
he was held by Abarquez on the shoulders, thus preventing him from helping Quejong who was grappling with Almojuela.
XXXX
60 | P a g e

Paz’s testimony does not show that Abarquez concurred with Almojuela’s criminal design. "Tumigil" literally means "stop."
Clearly, Abarquez was trying to stop Paz from joining the fray, not from helping Quejong. Paz claims that he was only trying
to talk to Almojuela. However, Paz could not have been merely talking to Almojuela, as he tried to portray, because Almojuela
was already grappling with Quejong at that time. Paz interpreted Abarquez’s action as an attempt to prevent him from
helping Quejong. His interpretation was adopted by the trial court and sustained by the Court of Appeals. Yet, in his
testimony, Paz admitted that while restraining him, Abarquez was scolding or reprimanding him and telling him to stop. It was
not shown that Abarquez was stopping Paz from helping Almojuela. It is more likely that Abarquez was trying to stop Paz
from joining the fight. Abarquez’s act of trying to stop Paz does not translate to assistance to Almojuela.

xxxx
When there is doubt on the guilt of an accused, the doubt should be resolved in his favor. Thus:

Every person accused has the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The
presumption of innocence stands as a fundamental principle of both constitutional and criminal law. Thus, the prosecution
has the burden of proving every single fact establishing guilt. Every vestige of doubt having a rational basis must be removed.
The defense of the accused, even if weak, is no reason to convict. Within this framework, the prosecution must prove its case
beyond any hint of uncertainty. The defense need not even speak at all. The presumption of innocence is more than sufficient.

We apply in this case the equipoise rule. Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in issue or there is doubt on which side
the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. Hence:

xxx The equipoise rule finds application if, as in this case, the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the
61 | P a g e

evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly stated, the needed
quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is found lacking.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 23 June 2000 Decision and 7 November 2001 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21450, which affirmed the 30 September 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 50 in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-135055-56. We ACQUIT Coverdale Abarquez y Evangelista as an accomplice in the crime
of homicide in Criminal Case No. 94-135055. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 171348 November 26, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
LARRY ERGUIZA, accused-appellant.

The Court is confronted with another case of rape. The victim, a 13-year-old girl. And although the Court may be moved by
compassion and sympathy, the Court, as a court of law, is duty-bound to apply the law. Basic is the rule that for conviction of a
crime, the evidence required is proof beyond reasonable doubt -- conviction with moral certainty.
For review before this Court is the November 18, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR H. C. No. 00763
which affirmed with modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, Branch 57,
finding Larry Erguiza (appellant) guilty of one count of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Information, dated April 10, 2000, in Criminal Case No. SCC 3282 charged Erquiza of the crime of rape of a 13 year old girl.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded "not guilty". Thereafter trial ensued.
62 | P a g e

On November 27, 2000, the RTC found appellant guilty of the crime of rape
In its Decision dated November 18, 2005, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, but modified the amount of the award of
exemplary damages and costs
Hence, herein appeal.
In his appeal Brief, appellant raises the following errors:
ISSUE:
2. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THE PROSECTUION EVIDENCE FAILED TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
RULING: yes
The appeal is meritorious. The prosecution's evidence does not pass the test of moral certainty.

This Court does not agree with the CA.

XXXX
After a judicious examination of the records of the case, the Court finds that there is testimonial evidence that contradicts
the findings of the RTC and CA on the basis of which no conviction beyond reasonable doubt could arise. It is the
unrebutted testimony of a credible defense witness. The testimony of Joy Agbuya (Joy) casts doubt as to the possibility of
rape having taken place as narrated by complainant. In addition, the testimony of a disinterested defense witness, Juanita
Angeles (Juanita) corroborated the alibi of appellant.
63 | P a g e

Before dwelling on the testimonies of Juanita and Joy, the Court shall first scrutinize the testimonial evidence presented by
the prosecution and the defense.
Aside from the testimony of complainant, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Dr. James Sison, BBB, and CCC.
The pertinent portions of their testimonies may be summarized as follows:
Dr. James Sison testified that he conducted the medical examination of complainant. His diagnosis was that there was a
significant laceration completely healed at the 11:00 o'clock position. However, Dr. Sison testified that his findings were not
conclusive, but were rather suggestive that complainant was raped. Furthermore, as to the question of paternity of the child
of complainant, Dr. Sison suggested doing a DNA match.
XXXX
In sum, with the exception of the claim of AAA that she was raped by appellant, other evidence presented by the
prosecution did not identify appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.
Moreover, the testimonies of the witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense conflict on certain points, more notably
the claim by BBB and CCC that the family of appellant offered to settle the case. This, however, was denied by Albina, who
claimed that it was BBB and CCC who demanded P1,000,000.00.
The offer of compromise allegedly made by Albina is critical to the case at bar in light of law and jurisprudence that an offer of
compromise in a criminal case may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
The alleged offer of the parents of appellant to settle the case cannot be used against appellant as evidence of his guilt.
Appellant testified that he did not ask his parents to settle the case. Moreover, appellant was not present when the offer to
settle was allegedly made.
An offer of compromise from an unauthorized person cannot amount to an admission of the party himself. Although the
Court has held in some cases that an attempt of the parents of the accused to settle the case is an implied admission of guilt,
we believe that the better rule is that for a compromise to amount to an implied admission of guilt, the accused should have
been present or at least authorized the proposed compromise.61 Moreover, it has been held that where the accused was not
64 | P a g e

present at the time the offer for monetary consideration was made, such offer of compromise would not save the day for the
prosecution.
In addition, the Court, in weighing the evidence presented, may give less weight to the testimonies of Albina, on the one
hand, and BBB and CCC, on the other, as they are related to the appellant and the victim, respectively. Their testimonies
relating to the offer of settlement simply contradict each other. As a matter of fact, even the lower courts did not consider the
alleged offer of settlement in resolving the case.
XXXX
Put simply, complainant could not have been raped because Joy waited for complainant when the latter's shorts got hooked
to the fence and thereafter both went home together. The Court finds no cogent reason for Joy to lie and say that she had
waited for complainant and that they both went home together. She had nothing to gain for lying under oath. Moreover, the
records are bereft of any showing or claim that Joy was related to or was a close friend of appellant or his family. On the
contrary, Joy considers herself the "best-friend" and playmate of complainant.
When Prosecutor Reintar questioned her as to her understanding of the oath she took, Joy answered, "That I will swear to
God, sir. x x x The truth, sir."75 Furthermore, Joy did not succumb to pressure even as she was being conscientiously examined
by Prosecutor Reintar. Joy boldly testified that BBB, the mother of complainant, was forcing her to change her statement.
The testimony of Joy clearly lays down the following facts which are damaging to the case of the prosecution: first, that Joy
did not leave behind AAA when the latter's shorts got hooked to the fence; and secondly, that Joy and AAA left the orchard,
went home together and separated at their Aunt Beth's house, indicating that no untoward incident, much less rape, was
committed by appellant at the time and place that complainant had testified on.
Necessarily, either Joy or AAA lied under oath. It was thus critical for the prosecution to show that Joy gave false statements.
Unfortunately for AAA, the prosecution miserably failed to rebut Joy's testimony. Neither complainant nor Ricky, BBB or
any other witness was called to the witness stand to refute Joy's testimony. True, it is up to the prosecution to determine
who to present as witnesses.However, considering that the testimony of Joy critically damaged the case of the prosecution, it
behooved the prosecution to present evidence to rebut the defense evidence. Witnesses such as Ricky, AAA and BBB should
65 | P a g e

have been presented by the prosecution to demolish Joy's testimony. The testimony of Ricky is particularly significant,
especially since AAA claimed that he was with her and his sister Joy at the mango orchard on the day of the alleged rape
incident. The failure on the part of the prosecution to present Ricky or AAA bolsters the defense evidence, that no rape
happened on the date and time claimed by AAA.
The prosecution presented CCC, the father of complainant, as it's lone rebuttal witness. However, the testimony of CCC
covered facts and issues not related to the testimony of Joy. The testimony of CCC merely rebutted the allegation made by
appellant's family that the present case was filed because appellant's family did a poor job of preparing for the wedding of
CCC's daughter DDD and apellant's brother Carlito. To this, CCC testified that on the contrary, the wedding went smoothly.
Furthermore, CCC claimed that the family of appellant knelt before him crying and offered money to settle the case. In
addition, CCC testified that appellant left his house at 4:00 p.m. on January 5, 2000. Thus, the testimony of CCC did not in any
way rebut the testimony of Joy.
Further, Joy testified that during the three times she went with AAA to the mango orchard, the time was 1:00 p.m. However,
AAA testified that she went to the mango orchard with Joy at 4:00 p.m. The variance in the testimonies of Joy and AAA as to
the time they went to the mango orchard on the day of the alleged rape incident may be disregarded as they are de minimis
in nature and do not relate to the commission of the crime. There is a common point uniting the testimonies of both Joy and
AAA; that is, that both referred to the day when AAA's short got hooked to the fence.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that the variance between the testimonies of AAA and Joy as to the time they were together at
the mango orchard is an indicia that AAA may have been raped by appellant on a different day, not on January 5, 2000, to still
impute to appellant the crime of rape is not plausible.
The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the exact date of the commission of the crime of rape is extraneous to and is not
an element of the offense, such that any inconsistency or discrepancy as to the same is irrelevant and is not to be taken as a
ground for acquittal. Such, however, finds no application to the case at bar. AAA and Joy may differ in their testimonies as to
the time they were at the mango orchard, but there could be no mistake as to the actual day when AAA was supposed to have
been raped; it was the day when AAA's shorts got hooked to the fence at the mango orchard.
66 | P a g e

The RTC and CA unwittingly brushed aside the testimonies of Juanita and Joy and gave full credence to the testimony of
AAA. As a matter of fact, their probative weight were not considered or evaluated in the text of the lower courts' decision.
As mentioned earlier, the prosecution could have rebutted the testimony of Joy, but for some reason or oversight, it chose
not to do so.
Consequently, in view of the unrebutted testimony of Joy, appellant's defense of alibi and denial assumes considerable
weight. It is at this point that the issue as to the time that the rape was committed plays a significant factor in determining the
guilt or innocence of appellant. This Court must therefore address this issue for a thorough evaluation of the case.
XXXX
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated November 18, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR H. C. No. 00763 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Larry Erguiza is ACQUITTED and ordered immediately RELEASED from custody, unless he is being held for some
other lawful cause.

*pro reo doctrine –“ in case of doubt, rule for accused”

This is when the law created the principle of in dubio pro reo which literally means “in cases of doubt, then for the
accused” or in layman’s term “innocent until proven guilty”.

* evidence that is beyond reasonable doubt (Section 2, Rule 133 - for

criminal cases)
Sec. 2, Rule 133, Revised Rules on Evidence. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to
an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree
67 | P a g e

of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainly. Moral certainly only is required, or that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. (2a)
(cf. on inconsistencies, no universal application of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, which deals with the weight of evidence)
It does not really lay down a categorical test of credibility.xxx It is not a positive rule of law or of universal application. It
should not be applied to portion of the testimony corroborated by other evidence, particularly where the false portions
could be innocent mistakes.
Moreover, the rule is not mandatory but merely to sanctions a disregard of the testimony of a witness if the circumstances
so warrant. To completely disregard all testimony of a witness on this ground, such testimony must have been false on a
material points and the witness must have a conscious and deliberate intention to falsify and material point.

G.R. Nos. L-32957-8 July 25, 1984

PEOPLE vs. PANTALEON PACIS, ET AL.
The said accused, Guillermo Agdeppa, Pantaleon Pacis, Ely Navarro, and Gines Dominguez were charged before the Court of
First Instance of Cagayan with the crimes of Murder and Frustrated Murder, docketed as Crim. Case Nos. 288-S and 289-S,
respectively
The accused interposed denial and alibi as grounds for their defense.
After hearing the evidence adduced by the parties during a joint trial, the trial court found the accused Pantaleon Pacis and
Elly Navarro guilty of the crime of Murder, as charged in Crim. Case No. 288-S and sentenced each of them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased Manuel Franco in the amount of
P1,200.00 plus P25,000.00 for the loss of earning capacity, P12,000.00 indemnity for the death of the said Manuel Franco and
P10,000.00 as moral damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Their co-accused
Guillermo Agdeppa and Gines Dominguez were acquitted of the charge.
68 | P a g e

Gines Dominguez was also acquitted in Crim. Case No. 289-S, a prosecution for Frustrated Murder. Guillermo Agdeppa,
however, and his co-accused Pantaleon Pacis and Elly Navarro were found guilty of the charge and sentenced to suffer the
penalty heretofore stated.
From this judgment, the accused Pantaleon Pacis, Elly Navarro, and Guillermo Agdeppa appealed to this Court. However,
sometime later, the accused Pantaleon Pacis and Elly Navarro withdrew their respective appeals. Under consideration is the
appeal of Guillermo Agdeppa from the judgment of the trial court which found him guilty of Frustrated Murder.
ISSUE: W/N THE PROSECUTION ESTABLISHED THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF ACCUSED
PACIS.
RULING: YES
Counsel for the appellant now contends that the trial court erred in convicting the appellant on the testimonies of the
witnesses for the prosecution which the lower court itself considered to be incredible and unworthy of belief. Counsel argues
that all the witnesses for the prosecution implicated Gines Dominguez in the shooting of Basco and Franco but' the trial court
gave no credence to their testimonies and acquitted Gines Domingez; however, the trial court gave credence to the
testimonies of the same witnesses in convicting the appellant for the shooting of Basco. Counsel cites the maxim of "falsus in
uno falsus in omnibus."
Counsel for the appellant also claims that the trial court erred in convicting the accused on the highly improbable,
contradictory, and incredible tale of the witnesses for the prosecution, since all the bullet "pock" marks on the cement wall
show conclusively that the shooting came from the street where the gravel and sand truck was, and not from the top of the
stairs where Pacis, Navarro, and Agdeppa were standing, and that the said witnesses failed to notify the authorities or anyone
until after the lapse of several months.
The trial court, however, discounted the defense theory that the shots came from the gravel and sand truck. The trial court
said:
69 | P a g e

From these photographs, with Macario Basco and Manuel Franco sitting on the elevated cemented portion facing a little to
the southeast, back of them would be just behind the railing of the porch (p. 75 of Criminal Case No. 288-S; pp. 230 and 231 of
the petition to bail; pp. 160-165 of Criminal Case No. 289-S) where Pantaleon Pacis, Eliseo Navarro and Guillermo Agdeppa
were when they started to fire their guns. This is borne by the evidence.
To follow the defense theory that the firing came from the sand and gravel truck that was passing by would be absurb and
downright preposterous for the following reasons:
1. The defense claim that those aboard the truck were armed partisans of Negre whose campaign manager Franco and
political leader Basco were sitting by the stairs clearly visible from the truck a distance of forty meters.
2. If the armed partisans fired at Pacis as claimed by the defense at the time that the truck was moving slowly on the national
road and at a time when Pacis had just gone up the stairs one to two minutes just after greeting Franco and Basco (testimony
of Pacis) then it is incredible that these armed partisan would fire indiscriminately at Pacis from a moving vehicle when Basco
and Franco their political leaders were very close to Pacis and could be shot.
3. The defense would assume too much credulity and childish credibility to the Court to make the Court believe that the
alleged armed partisans of Negre were the same persons who fired at and wounded his own political leaders Manuel Franco
and Macario Basco at the time these two were sitting by the stairs.
4. The testimony of Macario Basco is to the Court very natural, credible and from a witness who only told nothing but truth. In
spite of thorough and provoking cross examination Basco was calm and very natural. He gave answers directly, never
evasively, a sure and unmistaken Sign that he was faithfully relating to the Court the actual events and factual circumstances.
The defense failed to show cause or motive on the part of Basco why he should so testify against Pacis with whom he had
cordial relations and who was born and a native of Namuac, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, the birth place of Pacis — where his
father and other relatives still reside nor against Eliseo Navarro and Guillermo Agdeppa.
5. On the defense theory that the evidence and theory of the prosecution is incredible because of the nature and number of
wounds sustained by Macario Basco and Manuel Franco the evidence shows that Basco suffered fourteen (14) wounds, seven
bullet wounds of entry, six wounds of exit and abrasions; and Basco suffered three gunshot wounds. The defense assumes (a)
70 | P a g e

that if Pacis, Navarro, Agdeppa and three others as claimed by Basco and Bagasol were the ones who fired at both Basco and
Franco — these six persons the defense assume are all good, dead shots, marksmen but there is no evidence to that effect
— could have inflicted more wounds — Franco would not have been able to run away. (b) The defense also claims that these
persons — three in front and three behind —with Franco and Basco in between could have shot each other.
With regards to the first, there is no showing that these persons are good shots or marksman; neither is there evidence that
they concentrated their fire on both so that Franco could have suffered more wounds right at the stairs and would not have
been able to run. It is apparent that the gunshots was more concentrated on Basco because of the evidence that the accused
Pantaleon Pacis had to say never and that he is already dead go after the vice mayor he was able to escape and kill him. To
show that the three who fired from the front were not good shots the Court can appreciate the exhibits more particularly the
pictures (previously cited) with pop marks. The pop marks on the exhibits evidently were fired by the three men in front.
It is not true that the witnesses for the prosecution did not notify the authorities about the shooting incident, as claimed by
the appellant. As early as November 19, 1967, Rogelio Bagasol executed a sworn statement before one Capt. Liganor and
another one before CIS agents on December 9, 1967. 4 Macario Basco also executed an affidavit on December 8, 1967. 5
Other eyewitnesses were afraid to notify the authorities because Pantaleon Pacis and his men were in power.
It should be stated, in conclusion, that the appellant's defense of alibi has nothing to support it except the doubtful
testimony of Jose Tabian and the uncorroborated time record he had allegedly filled up that day, which certainly cannot
prevail over the positive testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution who saw him shoot Macario Basco. Besides, there
is no conclusive proof that it was physically impossible for him to be at the Namuac school building on that fateful morning
of November 15, 1967. The place is only 18 kilometers from his office at Taguiporo, and he could have left his office on his
motorcycle after accomplishing the time record for arrival, go to Namuac, and be back in his office in time for his lunch break
without his absence being noted.
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WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be as it is hereby, AFFIRMED, with the modification that the accused-
appellant should be given 4/5 credit for the period of preventive imprisonment he had undergone, pursuant to Rep. Act No.
6127, approved on June 17, 1970. With proportionate costs against the appellant in this instance.

* "clear and convincing" evidence (for charges to be filed against judges )

(more probable that true)

A.M. No. 755-MJ January 31, 1978

ROGELIO PESOLE, complainant,
vs.
MUNICIPAL JUDGE LUCIO L. RODRIGUEZ, of Tabogon, Cebu. respondent.
FACTS:
In his verified complaint, dated may 16, 1974, complainant Rogelio Pesole of Cebu City charged respondent Lucio L Rodriguez,
Municipal Judge of Tabogon, Cebu, with "Misconduct and/or Misbehavior" for having acted as counsel of one Pedro Apa in
the preliminary investigation for falsification before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Cebu, and for having notarized the
documents of said Pedro Apa, which documents became the basis of the falsification charge.

Required to comment on the complaint, respondent Judge vehemently denied the charged, explaining that he notarized the
affidavit of Pedro Apa in his capacity as ex-officio notary public and that during the preliminary investigation of the
falsification charge against Pedro Apa, a cultivator of a piece of land belonging to him (respondent), he acted not as counsel
but as "moderator" or amicus curiae", with the implied permission of the Fiscal. Subsequent to the filing of said comment,
72 | P a g e

respondent filed with this Court no less than four (4) petitions, all praying for the formal investigation of the complaint or its
dismissal for being malicious or groundless.
Pending investigation of the administrative charges, the President of the Philippines accepted respondent's courtesy
resignation. In view thereof, this Court, in a Resolution dated March 10, 1976 be set aside and that his urgent petition dated
May 7, 1976 praying, among other things, for formal investigation of this case at the earliest date convenient to the Court, be
entertained.
On august 10, 1976, this Court resolved to set aside its previous order and to refer the complaint to the Executive Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu City for investigation, report and recommendation.
Pursuant to said referral, Judge Mariano A. Zosa, Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu City, set the complaint
for hearing on September 20, 21, and 22, but because the complainant was not duly notified thereof, the hearing was reset to
October 6, 8, and 11, 1976.
Meanwhile, Judge received a letter, dated September 30, 1976, from complainant Rogelio Pesole formally withdrawing his
complaint against respondent on the ground of lack of interest with the further information that he was no longer appearing
in the scheduled investigation to substantiate his complaint.
Notwithstanding the formal withdrawal of the complaint by the complainant, respondent insisted on presenting his
evidence which the Investigating Judge accordingly received on October 6, 1976. The evidence presented by the respondent
to prove the falsity of the charges consisted of documents, namely: letter of the respondent dated August 13, 1974 address to
the Provincial' Fiscal of Cebu requesting for -clarification on the question of whether or not he appeared as counsel for Pedro
Apa (Exhibit "1"), and the 1st Indorsement thereon dated August 19. 1974 of Provincial Fiscal Santiago N. Medina stating that
as per record of the investigation there is no such appearance (Exhibit "1-A"); certification of the stenographer during the
formal investigation, stating that nobody entered his appearance counsel for Pedro Apa (Exhibit "2"): transcript of
stenographic notes evidencing that, respondent did not enter any appearance a counsel for Pedro Apa (Exhibit "5"); and the
certification of Judge Eusebio Arnoco, Acting Municipal Judge of Tabogon, Cebu, to the effect that the affidavit executed by
73 | P a g e

Pedro Apa was subscribe and sworn to before respondent Judge in his capacity as Municipal Judge and ex-officio notary
public of Tabogon Cebu.
In his Findings and Recommendation the Investigating Judge recommends the dismissal of the complaint and the
exoneration of the respondent on the ground that the charges have not been substantiated.

RULING OF THE COURT

Upon an examination of the records of this case, We find the of the Investigating Judge well-taken. The rule is that charges of
misconduct against judges should be proven by clear and convincing evidence, otherwise they should be dismissed.
We dismissed the complainant to substantiate the charges. Considering that in the present case complainant not only failed
to present any evidence to substantiate his complaint but, on the other hand, respondent has presented proofs which show
the falsity of the charges, We can do no less than approve the recommendation of the Investigating Judge.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the present complaint is DISMISSED and the respondent exonerated of the charges therein

* "substantial" evidence - Section 6, Rule 133

Sec. 6, Rule 133 . Power of the court to stop further evidence. — The court may stop the introduction of further testimony
upon any particular point when the evidence upon it is already so full that more witnesses to the same point cannot be
reasonably expected to be additionally persuasive. But this power should be exercised with caution. (6)

G.R. Nos. L-34267-68 January 25, 1991

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BIAK-NA-BATO MINING COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
TANCO, JR.
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul and set aside the September 17, 1971 decision of the Honorable
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources * in DANR Case Nos. 3613-3613-A entitled "Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company vs.
Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. and Mountain Mines, Inc." affirming the decision of the Director of Mines ** dated December
17, 1970 in Mines Administrative Cases Nos. V-494 and V-495, finding the respondents to have a better right to the 170 mining
claims of about 1,520 hectares located at the Cordillera Mountains, in Pasil, Municipality of Balatoc, Province of Kalinga-
Apayao.
FACTS:
That in September 1936, Mountain Mines, Inc. acquired the entire eighty-eight (88) claims under a deed of sale executed in its
favor by Feliciano Arceo, the attorney-in-fact of Jose Moldero, Saturnino Moldero and Miguel Moldero as claimowners and
attorney-in-fact of the other claimowners (Rollo, Vol. I, Annexes "C", "F", pp. 287-289; 296-297). That all these mining claims
were located under the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (Rollo, Vol. III, Appellees' Brief, p. 1144 [p. 21]).
On February 8, 1969, the petitioner Biak-na-Bato Mining Co. was created as a partnership in accordance with law. And on
November 19, 1969, the above-named locators, namely: Bernardo Ardiente, Emilio Peralta, Mario Villarica, Anastacio Cano
and Salvador Ellone, each executed a Deed of Transfer of Mining Rights assigning, transferring and conveying to the petitioner
the mining claims covered by the aforesaid declarations of location (Rollo, Ibid., pp. 41-42).

On December 4,1969, Biak-Na-Bato Mining Co. filed with the Bureau of Mines the application for lease and a petition for an
order of lease survey of the aforementioned mining claims (Rollo, Ibid., p. 42). However, it received a notice of the letter of
the Director of Mines refusing to issue the order of lease survey because the areas covered by the mining claims were
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allegedly in conflict with the four (4) groups of mining claims purportedly owned by the Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. and
Mountain Mines, Inc. (Rollo, Ibid., pp. 45-46)
On January 12, 1970, Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company filed its separate protest with the Bureau of Mines against Balatoc-
Lubuagan Mines, Inc. docketed as MAC No. 494 and the other against Mountain Mines, Inc. docketed as MAC No. 495. In said
protest, Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company contests and disputes the right of Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. to eleven (11) mining
claims and the right of Mountain Mines, Inc. to another nine (9) mining claims (Rollo, Vol. I, Petition, p. 12).
Actually, Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company raised in its protest only the issue of abandonment while Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines,
Inc. and Mountain Mines, Inc. questioned the validity of the former's location as "table location". Biak-Na-Bato Mining
Company without amending its pleadings questioned the reconstitution proceedings in MAC Cases Nos. V-79 and V-80 by
claiming that the two (2) deeds of sale over the 88 lode claims in favor of Mountain Mines, Inc. and the other two (2) deeds
of sale over 52 lode claims of Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. were fake, fictitious or manufactured. However, Biak-Na-Bato
Mining Company did not contest the validity of the reconstitution of the declarations of location of the 170 lode claims (Rollo,
Vol. III, Solicitor's Brief, p. 1156 [p. 13]).
xxx
To determine the truth of the Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company's claim in its motion as well as to ascertain the assessment work
done in the area claimed by both parties, the Director of Mines ordered an ocular inspection of the mining area in May 1970
(Rollo, Ibid.).
On June 8, 1970, after the ocular inspection was conducted and having determined the falsity of the allegations of
petitioner's motion, the Director of Mines lifted the restraining order (Rollo, Ibid.).

After the ocular inspection conducted by the Bureau of Mines inspection team, a report was submitted with topographic map
and pictures of the improvements. According to the report, the ground works improvements and other form of assessment
works in the mining properties of said respondents were significant and extensive, all evaluated and assessed at P582,996.60
(Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 621-690).
76 | P a g e

On December 17,1970, the Director of Mines promulgated its decision in both cases, MAC Cases Nos. V-494 and V-495,
holding that as against Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company, the Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. and Mountain Mines, Inc., have a
better right to the 170 mining claims of about 1,520 hectares located at the Cordillera Mountains, in Pasil, Municipality of
Balatoc, Province of Kalinga-Apayao (Rollo, Annex "B", pp. 134-145).
From the said decision of the Director of Mines, petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
docketed as DANR Case No. 3613 entitled "Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company vs. Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc." and DANR Case
No. 3613-A entitled "Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company vs. Mountain Mines, Inc." (Rollo, Petition, p. 9).
ARGUMENT OF BIAK NA BATO
In its appeal, the Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company questioned the first ocular inspection report. The Secretary in the exercise of
his appellate power and in justice to the petitioner ordered a second ocular inspection, after which the second inspection
team submitted a report confirming the findings of the first ocular inspection team, and also reported that Biak-Na-Bato
Mining Company despite opportunity afforded was not able to show its location in the area (Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 693-701).
On September 17, 1971, the Secretary rendered his decision on the appeal, affirming the findings of facts of the Director of
Mines and declaring Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. and Baguio Mines, Inc.'s mining area not open for relocation in 1967-
1968 and therefore Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company's locations null and void.
The Secretary also declared that its mining claims are table located, and therefore, null and void, and that it had no legal
personality to file the protest in the Bureau of Mines.
Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company questions the findings of fact of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources that: (a) its
mining claims are mere table locations: (b) that Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. and Mountain Mines, Inc. did not abandon their
claims; and (c) that the documents presented by the latter for reconstitution are not fraudulent.

RULING OF THE COURT:

The petition is devoid of merit.
77 | P a g e

There is no question that the decision of the Director of Mines as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources is substantially supported by evidence. Substantial evidence has been defined or construed to mean not
necessarily preponderant proof as required in ordinary civil cases but such kind of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion (Castro v. CA, 169 SCRA 383 [1989]; Bagsican v. CA, 141 SCRA 226 [1980];
Lustre v. CAR, 10 SCRA 659 [1964]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Open Source Evidence - Open Source Evidence and the International Criminal Court

Introductio
On August 15, 2017, the Office of the Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant, based
heavily on information derived from social media, for Libyan military commander Mahmoud Mustafa Busayf Al-Werfalli.
Allegedly responsible for murder as a war crime connected to hostilities in Libya, Al-Werfalli reportedly committed or ordered
the commission of murder in seven incidents against 33 people from June 3, 2016 to July 17, 2017 in Eastern Benghazi.[4] A
video uploaded to Facebook on June 3, 2011 depicts one incident in which Al-Werfalli shouts to a hooded individual, “Put
your hands up! Put your hands up! Put your hands up!” and subsequently shoots the hooded individual several times. Al-
Werfalli then approaches the body, shoots again, and mutters, “You have been misled by he who did you harm. You have
been misled by Satan.”
With the realization that news often spreads faster on social media than through conventional media, and the unprecedented
autonomy that comes with self-publishing, citizens are increasingly uploading vast amounts of digital imagery and videos to
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social media platforms to spread awareness of human rights violations and possible war crimes. Such footage has the power
not only to bring attention to atrocities, but also to strengthen legal accountability processes if collected, preserved,
transmitted, and analyzed in ways that adhere to the admissibility requirements for evidence in criminal and civil cases.
One challenge, however, is that content obtained from social media can raise issues of veracity, as metadata—information
about content as well as non-content details such as when, where, how, and by whom the information was collected—is
frequently stripped away and therefore cannot be used to corroborate critical information about the videographer and
uploader, as well as the time, date, and place of filming. Thus, it is imperative to establish standards around corroboration
and verification that help maximize the evidentiary weight of information derived from open sources
In this essay, we discuss the significant and increasing potential for open source information derived from online platforms—
which can include, but is not limited to, “profile pages, public messages, digital photographs, video, chat transcripts, [and
other] messages” often secured from social media—to contribute to international criminal legal processes.[6] We also discuss
the need for legal guidelines to support the proper collection, preservation, and analysis of digital open source information,
how such guidelines might be developed, and the principles that could be incorporated to maximize the probative weight
assigned to such information in court
A. Admission of Evidence at the ICC
The ICC’s approach to the admission of evidence is outlined in the Rome Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, as
well as its e-protocol.[17] For an item to be admitted into evidence it must satisfy a three-part test involving: (i) relevance, (ii)
probative value, and (iii) absence of prejudicial effect.[18]

As for the first prong, the ICC defines relevance as making the “existence of a fact at issue more or less probable.”[19] The
person or organization introducing the evidence, the plausibility, and the clarity established by a connection to the matter at
hand, are crucial.
Probative value, the second prong, is comprised of two parts: a) reliability of the exhibit, and b) the extent to which the exhibit
is likely to influence the determination of a particular issue.[20] The purpose of reliability is to determine whether a piece of
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evidence is what it purports to be. Reliability can be established in two ways: by authentication, the preferred method, or
“other indicia,” as outlined in the chart below.
The purpose of authentication is to confirm that evidence has not been tampered with or manipulated. The ICC has developed
specific markers of authenticity for open source, video, photographic, and audio-based information. With regard to open
sources, verifiable information is needed that establishes where the item was obtained, or if no longer publicly available, then
the date and location of acquisition. For video, film, photographic, or audio evidence, proving its origin and integrity (that it
was not digitally altered) is recommended.[21] The ICC requires metadata be attached to all submissions, as well as
documentation showing chain of custody, the identity of the source, the original author and recipient information, and the
author and recipient’s respective organization.[22]
The ICC also offers alternative authentication methods, as outlined in the diagram above, that can establish the item’s
probative value. Determining reliability and the evidence’s provenance, chain of custody, and content are crucial.[23] Experts
are often required to articulate what information the evidence provides, versus what is a matter of mere speculation.[24]
Courts have discretion, however, to exclude evidence that is unfairly and illegally obtained (e.g., via deception, surveillance, or
theft), in violation of the accused’s or procedural rights, or that is irrelevant and repetitious.[25] The final weight afforded to
that evidence is the paramount consideration, as most relevant information will be admitted.[26]
As for the third prong of the test, admitting the evidence must not have any prejudicial effect on the rights of the accused.
Open source evidence may raise substantial concerns in this area, especially if the underlying information is compiled in such a
way that it seems determinative of the case; editing can have substantial effects on the apparent guilt of a party in ways that
are problematic because they may deviate from the objective truth underlying a particular event. In addition, because open
source investigations consist of relatively new methods, opposing counsel (and chambers) may not have the necessary
expertise to adequately interrogate how professionally and/or even-handedly those methods have been applied.

Rule 128, Sections 3 and 4

Sec. 3 . Admissibility of evidence. — Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law of
these rules. (3a)
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Sec. 4 . Relevancy; collateral matters. — Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable
degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue. (4a)

Evidentiary and Exclusionary Rules in the Constitution (as well as in statute and rules of procedure)

* Bill of Rights, Article III, Sections 2 and 3 (unlawful search and seizures)
(privacy of communication and correspondence)
Sec 2. 1987 Constitution
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Sec 3, 1987 Constitution

The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public
safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

* Bill of Rights, Article III, Section 12 (inadmissible confessions and admissions)

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Sec 12, 1987 Constitution. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel
* Bill of Rights, Article III, Section 17 (right v. self-incrimination)
Sec 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

G.R. No. 135406 July 11, 2000

DAVID GUTANG Y JUAREZ, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated September 9, 1998 rendered by the former
Twelfth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19463. The assailed Decision affirmed the judgment2 dated October
13, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, finding petitioner David J. Gutang guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for violation of Sections 8 and 16 of RA 6425, as amended, (for illegal possession and use of prohibited drugs) as charged in
Criminal Cases Nos. 2696-D and 2697-D, respectively.

FACTS:
Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 2696-D and 2697-D were filed in court against the petitioner and his companions for
violation of Sections 8 and 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, (otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act) as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659. Incidentally, the charge against accused Oscar de Venecia, Jr. was dismissed by the trial court in an
82 | P a g e

Order9 dated August 3, 1994 on the ground that he voluntarily submitted himself for treatment, rehabilitation and
confinement at the New Beginnings Foundation, Inc., a private rehabilitation center accredited by the Dangerous Drugs Board.
Upon arraignment, petitioner Gutang entered a plea of not guilty. His co-accused, Regala and Jimenez, likewise pleaded not
guilty. Thereafter, joint trial of the cases proceeded. However, petitioner Gutang did not present any evidence.
After trial, the lower court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the Court finds 1) accused DAVID GUTANG and ALEXANDER JIMENEZ in Criminal Case
No. 2696-D, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 as amended (Possession and use of
prohibited drug); and are hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor to two (2) years, four (4)
months of prision correccional and to pay the costs;
2) In Criminal Case No. 2697-D (Possession) accused DAVID GUTANG, NOEL REGALA and ALEXANDER JIMENEZ, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16 (ibid) and are hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor to two (2) years, four (4) months of prision correccional and to pay the costs; 3) accused NOEL REGALA, in Criminal Case
No. 2698-D (Possession of regulated drugs) is hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor to two
(2) years, four (4) months of prision correccional and to pay the costs.
The judgment of conviction of the lower court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner raises the following assignments of error:

ISSUE:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED HAS NOT BEEN
OVERCOME BY PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
RULING OF THE COURT:
We affirm the conviction of the petitioner.
83 | P a g e

Petitioner insists that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence Exhibits "I" and "R", which are the Receipts of Property
Seized, considering that it was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. The said Receipts for Property Seized, which
described the properties seized from the petitioner by virtue of the search warrant, contain his signature. According to
petitioner, inasmuch as the said evidence were obtained without the assistance of a lawyer, said evidence are tantamount to
having been derived from an uncounseled extra-judicial confession and, thus, are inadmissible in evidence for being "fruits
of the poisonous tree."
We agree. It has been held in a long line of cases that the signature of the accused in the Receipt of Property Seized is
inadmissible in evidence if it was obtained without the assistance of counsel. The signature of the accused on such a receipt is
a declaration against his interest and a tacit admission of the crime charged for the reason that, in the case at bar, mere
unexplained possession of prohibited drugs is punishable by law. Therefore, the signatures of the petitioner on the two (2)
Receipts of Property Seized (Exhibits I and R) are not admissible in evidence, the same being tantamount to an
uncounselled extra-judicial confession which is prohibited by the Constitution.
Petitioner further contends that since the Receipts for Property Seized (Exhibits I and R) are inadmissible in evidence, it
follows that the Physical Science Reports Nos. D-168-94 and DT-107-94 (Exhibit D and M) and Chemistry Report No. DT-107-
94 (Exhibit L) finding the said items seized to be positive for marijuana and shabu, are also inadmissible inasmuch as they are
mere conclusions drawn from the said Receipts and hence a part thereof.

We disagree. The fact that the Receipts of Property Seized (Exhibits I and R) are inadmissible in evidence does not render
inadmissable the Physical Science Reports (Exhibit D and M) and the Chemistry Report (Exhibit L) inasmuch as the examined
materials were legally seized or taken from the petitioner’s bedroom on the strength of a valid search warrant duly issued
by Judge Villarama, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. Since the said materials were validly seized or
taken from the bedroom of the petitioner in his presence, the laboratory tests conducted thereon were legally and validly
done. Hence, the said Reports containing the results of the laboratory examinations, aside from the testimonial and other real
evidence of the prosecution, are admissible in evidence and sufficiently proved that the petitioner used and had the said
84 | P a g e

prohibited drugs and paraphernalia in his possession. In other words, even without the Receipts of Property Seized (Exhibits
I and R) the alleged guilt of the petitioner for the crimes charged were proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioner also posits the theory that since he had no counsel during the custodial investigation when his urine sample was
taken and chemically examined, Exhibits "L" and "M", which are the respective Chemistry and Physical Reports, both dated
March 9, 1994, are also inadmissible in evidence since his urine sample was derived in effect from an uncounselled extra-
judicial confession. Petitioner claims that the taking of his urine sample allegedly violates Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution, which provides that:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things
to be seized.
We are not persuaded. The right to counsel begins from the time a person is taken into custody and placed under
investigation for the commission of a crime, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information
and/or confession or admissions from the accused. Such right is guaranteed by the Constitution and cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel. However, what the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be
material. In fact, an accused may validly be compelled to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or
replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done, without running afoul of the proscription against
testimonial compulsion. The situation in the case at bar falls within the exemption under the freedom from testimonial
compulsion since what was sought to be examined came from the body of the accused. This was a mechanical act the accused
was made to undergo which was not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by
simple observation. In fact, the record shows that petitioner and his co-accused were not compelled to give samples of their
urine but they in fact voluntarily gave the same when they were requested to undergo a drug test.
85 | P a g e

Assuming arguendo that the urine samples taken from the petitioner are inadmissible in evidence, we agree with the trial
court that the record is replete with other pieces of credible evidence including the testimonial evidence of the prosecution
which point to the culpability of the petitioner for the crimes charged.
xxxx
All told, in the face of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it is clear that petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crimes charged.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 109242. January 26, 1999.]

LITO C. MARCELO, Petitioner,
v.
SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Lito Marcelo from a decision of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) convicting
him and two others of qualified theft.
FACTS:
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Arnold Pasicolan, Ronnie Romero, and herein petitioner Lito Marcelo, former employees Makati Central Post Office, were
charged with infidelity in the custody of documents, for stealing mails of various recipients.
The case was later withdrawn and another information for qualified theft was filed before the Sandiganbayan.
On March 8, 1993, the Sandiganbayan found all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of
qualified theft.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari based on the following assignment of errors:
ISSUE:
Respondent Honorable Court erred in admitting as evidence of petitioner’s guilt the letters signed by the accused during
custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel, in utter disregard of his constitutional right.
RULING: NO.
The petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in admitting in evidence the letters signed by him because he was
asked to sign them during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel. The following provisions of the
Constitution are involved by petitioner:

ARTICLE III. §12(1). — Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.

x x x
87 | P a g e

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
§17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Petitioner’s counsel says that the signing of petitioner’s and his co-accused’s names was not a mere mechanical act but one
which required the use of intelligence and therefore constitutes self-incrimination. Petitioner’s counsel presumably has in
mind the ruling in Beltran v. Samson 20 to the effect that the prohibition against compelling a man to be a witness against
himself extends to any attempt to compel the accused to furnish a specimen of his handwriting for the purpose of comparing
it with the handwriting in a document in a prosecution for falsification. "Writing is something more than moving the body, or
the hand, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act because it requires the application of intelligence and
attention," so it was held.
To be sure, the use of specimen handwriting in Beltran is different from the use of petitioner’s signature in this case. In that
case, the purpose was to show that the specimen handwriting matched the handwriting in the document alleged to have been
falsified and thereby show that the accused was the author of the crime (falsification) while in this case the purpose for
securing the signature of petitioner on the envelopes was merely to authenticate the envelopes as the ones seized from
him and Ronnie Romero. However, this purpose and petitioner’s signatures on the envelope, when coupled with the
testimony of prosecution witnesses that the envelopes seized from petitioner were those given to him and Romero,
undoubtedly help establish the guilt of petitioner. Since these signatures are actually evidence of admission obtained from
petitioner and his co-accused under circumstances contemplated in Art. III. §§12(1) and 17 of the Constitution, they should be
excluded. For indeed, petitioner and his co-accused signed following their arrest. Hence, they were at the time under
custodial investigation, defined as questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way. Under the Constitution, among the rights of a
person under custodial investigation is the right to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice and
if the person cannot afford the services of counsel, that he must be provided with one.
However, the letters are themselves not inadmissible in evidence. The letters were validly seized from petitioner and
Romero as an incident of a valid arrest. A ruling that petitioner’s admission that the letters in question were those seized
from him and his companion on February 17, 1989 is inadmissible in evidence does not extend to the exclusion from evidence
88 | P a g e

of the letters themselves. The letters can stand on their own, being the fruits of a crime validly seized during a lawful arrest.
That these letters were the ones found in the possession of petitioner and his companion and seized from them was shown by
the testimonies of Vela and Tumagan. Indeed, petitioner and his co-accused were not convicted solely on the basis of the
signatures found on the letters but on other evidence, notably the testimonies of NBI agents and other prosecution
witnesses.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967

STONEHILL
vs.
DIOKNO

Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-
Prosecutors — several judges — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges — issued, on different dates, a total of 42
search warrants against petitioners herein and/or the corporations of which they were officers, directed to any peace officer,
to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take
possession of the following personal property to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts,
balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
89 | P a g e

as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be
used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."

Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court
— because, inter alia:
(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against
them;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed
of in accordance with law.
On March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus
and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or
any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and
that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null
and void,
90 | P a g e

and commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section
3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search
warrants in question.

In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in
accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any
event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the
aforementioned searches and seizures.

On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution
dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the
offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers,
documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into two
(2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found
and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
ISSUES:
(1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or
not, and
(2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in
evidence against petitioners herein.
91 | P a g e

As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested
warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or
of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well
settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that
the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently,
petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from
the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in
evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the
corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.

With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned
resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, thereby, in effect,
restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that accordingly, the
seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this connection, the Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
92 | P a g e

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall
particularly describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon
applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in
said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was
impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes
the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed
specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do
not alleged any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict
anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," —
as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights
guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be
remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to
imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest
it, even though by legal means.

Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court
deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised
93 | P a g e

Rules of Court that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense ." Not
satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more
than one specific offense."

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the
description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance
sheets and related profit and loss statements.

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners
herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal . The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the
petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of
our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective:
the elimination of general warrants.

Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches and
seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in
evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position
taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the
criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has blundered," upon the theory that the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of
94 | P a g e

evidence unlawfully obtained, such as the common-law action for damages against the searching officer, against the party
who procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their
criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by
other laws.

However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule,
realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
XXX
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for
the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that
the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection
with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent;
that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned
residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby,
denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other
effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special
pronouncement as to costs.

It is so ordered.

Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967) Digests

FACTS:
95 | P a g e

Respondents herein secured a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein and/or the corporations of which they
were officers, to search “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers),” as “the subject of
the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense,” or “used or intended to be used as the means of
committing the offense,” which is described in the applications adverted to above as “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code.”
The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated the Constitution and the Rules
of Court for being general warrants.
The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2)
major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and
seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court,
petition filed to petition for injunction with the Court.
Issues:
(1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or
not; and
(2) whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners herein.
Ruling:
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants.    Indeed, the same were issued upon appli-
cations stating that the natural and juridical persons therein named had committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in
96 | P a g e

said applications.  The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were... abstract.  As a consequence, it was
impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes
the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has... performed particular acts, or committed
specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners
herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal.
The warrants sanctioned the... seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their
nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights - that the things to be seized be particularly
described - as well as tending to defeat... its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Principles:
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely:  (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the... manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall
particularly describe the things to be seized.
FALLO:
The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus
seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent.

Knapp v. State
168 Ind. 153, 79 N.E. 1076 (1907)
FACTS:
1.Knapp was accused of murdering a police officer.
2.In his defense, he offered testimony that it was self-defense.
97 | P a g e

3. Knapp stated that he'd heard a story (from some unidentified person) about how the police officer had beaten an old man
to death.
4. In rebuttal, the State offered evidence that the old man died of "senility and alcoholism" not from being beaten by the
police officer.
5. The Trial Court found Knapp guilty. He appealed.
6. Knapp argued that the testimony about what really killed the old man should not have been admitted.
ISSUE: Whether the facts of the old man's death were relevant to the case
8.The Indiana Supreme Court upheld the conviction.
The Indiana Supreme Court agreed with Knapp that the true question was whether Knapp had heard the story, not the
actual facts of the old man's death.
However, the Court felt that the testimony about the old man's death was relevant because it showed that somewhere
between the fact and the testimony there was a person who was not a truth speaker.
9.Since Knapp couldn't point to who told him the story, the implication was that Knapp's claim wasn't probably telling the
truth.
10. Even if there had been a witness that testified that they personally told Knapp that the old man was beaten to death,
evidence about whether the cop actually killed the old man is still relevant, because it is for the jury to decide how much
weight to give to the witness' testimony.
The jury was free to believe that Knapp had genuinely thought that the cop killed the old man. The job of the jury is to listen
to opposing arguments and make a decision on who to believe.Knapp v. State, Supreme Court of Indiana, 1907, 168 Ind. 153,
79 N.E. 1076
98 | P a g e

(conditional and multiple admissibility)

1. Conditional admissibility
Where the evidence at the time of its offer appears to be immaterial or irrelevant unless it is connected with the other
facts to be subsequently proved, such evidence may be received on condition that the other facts will be proved thereafter,
otherwise the evidence given will be stricken out.
This is subject to the qualification that there should be no bad faith on the part of the proponent.
2. Multiple admissibility
Where the evidence is relevant and competent for two or more purposes, such evidence should be admitted for any or all
the purposes for which it is offered provided it satisfies all the requirements of law for its admissibility therefore.

G.R. No. L-9181 November 28, 1955

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
THE HON. NICASIO YATCO

In an amended information filed by the City Attorney of Quezon City on March 22, 1955, Juan Consunji, Alfonso
Panganiban, and another whose identity is still unknown, were charged with having conspired together in the murder of
one Jose Ramos (Criminal Case No. Q-1637 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City).
Trial of the case started on May 3, 1955, and in several hearings the prosecution had been presenting its evidence.
During the progress of the trial on May 18, 1955, while the prosecution was questioning one of its witnesses, Atty. Arturo
Xavier of the National Bureau of Investigation, in connection with the making of a certain extra-judicial confession
99 | P a g e

(allegedly made before him) by defendant Juan Consunji to the witness, counsel for the other defendant Alfonso
Panganiban interposed a general objection to any evidence on such confession on the ground that it was hearsay and
therefore incompetent as against the other accused Panganiban.
The Court below ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected to, but on an altogether different ground: that the
prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the confessions of defendants Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban to
prove conspiracy between them, without prior proof of such conspiracy by a number of definite acts, conditions, and
circumstances.

The prosecution then moved in writing for a reconsideration of the order of exclusion, but again the motion was denied.
Wherefore, this petition for certiorari was brought before this Court by the Solicitor General, for the review and annulment
of the lower Court's order completely excluding any evidence on the extrajudicial confessions of the accused Juan Consunji
and Alfonso Panganiban without prior proof of conspiracy.
ISSUE:
W/N THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OF THE ACCUSES ARE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE
RULING: YES.
We believe that the lower Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the complete exclusion of the
prosecution's evidence on the alleged confessions of the accused Juan Consunji at the stage of the trial when the ruling was
made.

Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court, is specific as to the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession of an accused, freely and
voluntarily made, as evidence against him.
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SEC. 14. Confession. — The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging the truth of his guilt as to the offense
charged, may be given in evidence against him.

Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji's confession may not be competent as against his co-
accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being
established by other evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the declarant's own
guilt and should have been admitted as such.

The rule cited by the Court below in support of its exclusion of the proffered evidence is Sec. 12 of Rule 123, providing that:
The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against
the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprises ("during
its existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had
been brought to an end (U. S. vs. Empeinado, 9 Phil., 613; U. S. vs. Raymundo, 14 Phil., 416; People vs. Badilla, 48 Phil., 718;
People vs. Nakpil, 52 Phil., 985).
Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the confessions to prove conspiracy between the two accused, nor as evidence
against both of them. In fact, the alleged confessions (both in writing and in tape recordings) had not yet even been identified
(the presentation of Atty. Xavier was precisely for the purpose of identifying the confessions), much less formally offered in
evidence. For all we know, the prosecution might still be able to adduce other proof of conspiracy between Consunji and
Panganiban before their confessions are formally offered in evidence. Assuming, therefore, that section 12 of Rule 123 also
applies to the confessions in question, it was premature for the respondent Court to exclude them completely on the
ground that there was no prior proof of conspiracy.
101 | P a g e

FALLO:
Wherefore, the order excluding the confessions of the accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban is annulled and set
aside and the Court below is directed to proceed with the trial in accordance with law and this opinion. Costs against
respondents Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban. So ordered.

G.R. No. 28607. February 21, 1929.]

PRATS & COMPANY
v.
PHOENIX INSURANCE COMPANY

1. FIRE INSURANCE; AVOIDANCE OF POLICY; INCENDIARISM; FRAUDULENT PROOF OF LOSS. — The insurance policy which
was the subject of action in this case was held to have been avoided by the connivance of the insured in setting fire to the
insured goods and the submission by the insured of fraudulent proof of loss.

2. EVIDENCE; ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE; LIBERAL ATTITUDE INDICATED. — The court commends the maintenance of a liberal
attitude on the part of trial judges in the matter of admission of proof. The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful
objections to its materiality, or relevancy, or technical objections to the questions, should be avoided.

This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila by Prats & Co., a mercantile partnership, for the
purpose of recovering from the Phcenix Insurance Co., of Hartford, Connecticut, the sum of P117,800.60, with interest, by
reason of a loss alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff, on August 21, 1924, from a fire, it being alleged that said loss
was covered by policy of insurance No. 600217, for the sum of P200,000, issued by the defendant company to the plaintiff.
102 | P a g e

For answer, the defendant, Phcenix Insurance Co., admitted the issuance of the policy of insurance but, by way of special
defense, alleged, among other things, that the fire in question had been set by the plaintiff, or with its connivance, and that
the plaintiff had submitted under oath to the defendant a fraudulent claim of loss, in contravention of the express terms of
the policy.
Upon hearing the case, the trial court absolved the defendant from the complaint with respect to the obligation created by
the policy which was the subject of the suit, but ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P11,731.93, with
interest from the filing of the complaint, upon account of moneys received from salvage sales, conducted by the defendant, of
remnants of the insured stock. From this judgment the plaintiff appealed.

ISSUE:
W/N THE DEFENDANT SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED TO AVOID LIABILITY TO THE PLAINTIFF UNDER THE INSURANCE POLICY.
RULING: YES
So far as liability under the policy of insurance which is the subject of this action is concerned, we are of the opinion that
the defendant has sufficiently established two defenses, either of which would be fatal to the right of recovery, namely:
1. first, that the fire which caused this loss was of incendiary origin, and that it was set by the procurance or connivance of
the plaintiff for the purpose of defrauding the insurer; and,
2. secondly, that the plaintiff, after the fire, submitted to the defendant a fraudulent claim, supported by false proof, in
violation of the terms of the policy.

XXXX
The finding of the trial court to the effect that the plaintiff had submitted false proof in support of his claim is also, in our
opinion, well founded. That conclusion appears to have been based upon three items of proof and, with respect to at least
103 | P a g e

two of these, we think that the conclusion of his Honor was correctly drawn. These two facts are, first, that the plaintiff had
submitted a claim for jewelry lost in the fire as of a value of P12,800 when the true value of said jewelry was about P600; and,
secondly, that the plaintiff had sought to recover from the insurance company the value of goods which had been
surreptitiously withdrawn by it from the bodega prior to the fire. Neither of these two facts are consistent with good faith on
the part of the plaintiff, and each constituted a breach of the stipulations of the policy against the use of fraudulent devices
and false proof with respect to the loss.

The other point relied upon by his Honor to sustain the conclusion that the plaintiff had attempted to deceive the defendant
with respect to the extent of the loss was at least competent in its general bearing on the good faith of the plaintiff, even if,
as is probably true, not alone sufficient to constitute a breach of the same stipulations.
The point is this: After the fire the plaintiff presented to the adjuster certain cost sheets and copies of supposed invoices in
which the prices and expenses of importation of a quantity of goods were stated at double the true amount. The adjuster
soon discovered the artificial nature of these documents, and, with his consent, they were withdrawn by Prats and
subsequently destroyed. At the hearing Prats stated that these documents had been fabricated in order that they might be
exhibited to intending purchasers of the goods, thereby making it appear to them that the cost of the merchandise had been
much greater than it in fact was — a ruse which is supposed to have been entirely innocent or at least not directed against the
insurer. But a question naturally arises as to the purpose which these documents might have been made to serve if the fire, as
doubtless intended by its designers, had been so destructive as to remove all vestiges of the stock actually involved. Upon the
whole we are forced to state the conclusion, not only that the plaintiff caused the fire to be set, or connived therein, but also
that it submitted fraudulent proof as the trial judge found.

xxxThe practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality or technical objections to the form of the
questions should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first instance, in the early stages of the
development of the proof, to know with any certainty whether testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no indication
104 | P a g e

of bad faith on the part of the attorney ordering the evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the
statement of the attorney that the proof ordered will be connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat
of the battle over which he presides a judge of first instance may possibly fall into error in judging of the relevancy of proof
where a fair and logical connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the proof is erroneously ruled out, the
Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the effects of the error without
returning the case for a new trial, — a step which this court is always very loath to take.
On the other hand, the admission of proof in a court of first instance, even if the question as to its form, materiality, or
relevancy is doubtful, can never result in much harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to know the law;
and it is its duty, upon final consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and material from the irrelevant and
immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this court then has all
the material before it necessary to make a correct judgment.
Our examination of the case leads to the conclusion that the result reached by the trial court was correct.
The appealed decision will therefore be affirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs.

Certain Doctrines or Rules of Admissibility

1. Conditional admissibility
Where the evidence at the time of its offer appears to be immaterial or irrelevant unless it is connected with the other facts
to be subsequently proved, such evidence may be received on condition that the other facts will be proved thereafter,
otherwise the evidence given will be stricken out.
This is subject to the qualification that there should be no bad faith on the part of the proponent.
2. Multiple admissibility
Where the evidence is relevant and competent for two or more purposes, such evidence should be admitted for any or all
the purposes for which it is offered provided it satisfies all the requirements of law for its admissibility therefore.
105 | P a g e

3. Curative admissibility
This treats upon the right of the party to introduce incompetent evidence in his behalf where the court has admitted the
same kind of evidence adduced by the adverse party.

* Collateral matters - basis for inference as to the existence or non-existence of

facts in issue (Section 4, Rule 128)
Section 4, Rule 128. Relevancy; Collateral Matters. Evidence must be such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce in belief
in its existence or non-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable
degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue.

* Notion of "curative admissibility" - American rule, English rule, and

Massachusetts rule
Three theories on curative admissibility:
1. American rule – the admission of such incompetent evidence, without objection by the opponent does not justify such
opponent in rebutting it by similar incompetent evidence.
2. English rule – if a party has presented inadmissible evidence, the adverse party may resort to similar inadmissible evidence.
3. Massachusetts rule – the adverse party may be permitted to introduce similar incompetent evidence in order to avoid a
plain and unfair prejudice caused by the admission of the other party’s evidence.
106 | P a g e

Ephemeral electronic communication-refers to telephone conversations, text messages, chatroom sessions, streaming audio,
streaming video, and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained.

A.M. No. CA-05-18-P April 12, 2005

ZALDY NUEZ, Complainant,
vs.
ELVIRA CRUZ-APAO, respondent.

This is an administrative case for Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct against Elvira Cruz-Apao (Respondent), Executive
Assistant II of the Acting Division Clerk of Court of the Fifteenth (15th) Division, Court of Appeals (CA).
The complaint arose out of respondent’s solicitation of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from Zaldy Nuez (Complainant) in
exchange for a speedy and favorable decision of the latter’s pending case in the CA, more particularly, CA-G.R. SP No. 73460
entitled "PAGCOR vs. Zaldy Nuez."
Complainant initially lodged a complaint with the Action Center of the Television program Imbestigador of GMA Network, the
crew of which had accompanied him to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Commission–Special Projects Group (PAOCC-
SPG) in Malacañang where he filed a complaint for extortion against respondent. This led to the conduct of an entrapment
operation by elements of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) on 28 September 2004 at the Jollibee
Restaurant, 2nd Floor, Times Plaza Bldg., corner Taft and United Nations Avenue, Manila, the place where the supposed hand-
over of the money was going to take place
Respondent’s apprehension by agents of the PAOCTF in the course of the entrapment operation prompted then CA
Presiding Justice (PJ) Cancio C. Garcia (now Supreme Court Justice) to issue Office Order No. 297-04-CG9 (Order) which
created an ad-hoc investigating committee (Committee).1 The Committee was specifically tasked among others to conduct a
107 | P a g e

thorough and exhaustive investigation of respondent’s case and to recommend the proper administrative sanctions against
her as the evidence may warran
In accordance with the mandate of the Order, the Committee conducted an investigation of the case and issued a Resolution
dated 18 October 2004 where it concluded that a prima facie case of Dishonesty and Serious Misconduct against
respondent existed. The Committee thus recommended respondent’s preventive suspension for ninety (90) days pending
formal investigation of the charges against her.
On 28 January 2005, the Committee submitted a Report to the new CA Presiding Justice Romeo A. Brawner with its
recommendation that respondent be dismissed from service.
xxxx
During the hearing of this case, respondent maintained that what happened was a case of instigation and not an
entrapment. She asserted that the offer of money in exchange for a favorable decision came not from her but from
complainant. To support her contention, she presented witnesses who testified that it was complainant who allegedly offered
money to anyone who could help him with his pending case. She likewise claimed that she never touched the money on 28
September 2004, rather it was Capt. Maclang who forcibly held her hands and pressed it to the envelope containing the
money. She thus asked that the administrative case against her be dismissed.
ISSUES: W/N THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT.
Ruling: YES.
This Court is not persuaded by respondent’s version. Based on the evidence on record, what happened was a clear case of
entrapment, and not instigation as respondent would like to claim.
In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of ensnaring and capturing the law-breakers in the
execution of their criminal plan. On the other hand, in instigation, the instigator practically induces the would-be defendant
into the commission of the offense, and he himself becomes a co-principal.
108 | P a g e

In this case, complainant and the law enforcers resorted to entrapment precisely because respondent demanded the amount
of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from complainant in exchange for a favorable decision of the latter’s pending case.
Complainant’s narration of the incidents which led to the entrapment operation are more in accord with the circumstances
that actually transpired and are more credible than respondent’s version.
Complainant was able to prove by his testimony in conjunction with the text messages from respondent duly presented
before the Committee that the latter asked for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) in exchange for a favorable decision of
the former’s pending case with the CA. The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now
covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence which provides:
"Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text messages . . . and other electronic forms of
communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained."
Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, "Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the
testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge thereof ."
In this case, complainant who was the recipient of said messages and therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified
on their contents and import.
Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in complainant’s cellphone from which the messages
originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the admissibility of the text messages had been
laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text messages between her and
complainant. It is also well to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
strictly applied. We have no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages as evidence in determining the guilt or lack
thereof of respondent in this case.
Complainant’s testimony as to the discussion between him and respondent on the latter’s demand for One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) was corroborated by the testimony of a disinterested witness, Siringan, the reporter of Imbestigador who was
present when the parties met in person. Siringan was privy to the parties’ actual conversation since she accompanied
complainant on both meetings held on 24 and 28 of September 2004 at Jollibee.
109 | P a g e

FALLO:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Elvira Cruz-Apao is found GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT and violation of
SECTIONS 1 and 2 of the CODE OF CONDUCT FOR COURT PERSONNEL and is accordingly DISMISSED from government service,
with prejudice to re-employment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-owned
and controlled corporations. Her retirement and all benefits except accrued leave credits are hereby FORFEITED.

SO ORDERED.

testifying on text messages in criminal cases

Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was party to the same or has
personal knowledge thereof. In the absence or unavailability of such witnesses, other competent evidence may be
admitted.

G.R. No. 204894 March 10, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
NOEL ENOJAS y HINGPIT
On September 4, 2006 the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas charged appellants Noel Enojas y Hingpit (Enojas), Arnold Gomez y
Fabregas (Gomez), Fernando Santos y Delantar (Santos), and Roger Jalandoni y Ari (Jalandoni) with murder of PO2 Pangilinan
before the Las Pinaas Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case 06-0854.1
XXXX
110 | P a g e

FACTS:
Enojas. Et al. were charged for murder of PO2 Pangilinan before the RTC of Las Piñas.
During the trial, PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito testified that they monitored the messages in accused Enojas’ mobile phone
and, posing as Enojas, communicated with the other accused. The police then conducted an entrapment operation that
resulted in the arrest of accused Santos and Jalandoni. Subsequently, the police were also able to capture accused Enojas
and Gomez. The prosecution presented the transcripts of the mobile phone text messages between Enojas and some of his
co-accused.
Manifesting in open court that they did not want to adduce any evidence or testify in the case, the accused opted to instead
file a trial memorandum on March 10, 2008 for their defense. They pointed out that they were entitled to an acquittal since
they were all illegally arrested and since the evidence of the text messages were inadmissible, not having been properly
identified.
On June 2, 2008 the RTC rendered judgment, finding all the accused guilty of murder qualified by evident premeditation and
use of armed men with the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms.

Upon review in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 03377, on June 14, 2012 the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto
the conviction of the accused. The CA, however, found the absence of evident premeditation since the prosecution failed to
prove that the several accused planned the crime before committing it. The accused appealed from the CA to this Court.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH AMPLE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONERS.
RULING: YES
111 | P a g e

2.As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the Court’s earlier Resolution
applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person
who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged
text messages with the other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from
and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages and was competent to
testify on them.
The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest.But, assuming that this was so, it cannot be a
ground for acquitting them of the crime charged but for rejecting any evidence that may have been taken from them after an
unauthorized search as an incident of an unlawful arrest, a point that is not in issue here.
At any rate, a crime had been committed—the killing of PO2 Pangilinan—and the investigating police officers had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the persons they were to arrest had committed it. The text messages to and from the
mobile phone left at the scene by accused Enojas provided strong leads on the participation and identities of the accused.
Indeed, the police caught them in an entrapment using this knowledge.

FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the Court of Appeals Decision of June 14, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC 03377. The Court instead
FINDS accused-appellants Noel Enojas y Hingpit, Arnold Gomez y Fabregas, Fernando Santos y Delantar, and Roger Jalandoni y
Ari GUILTY of the lesser crime of HOMICIDE with the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court SENTENCES each of them to 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The Court also MODIFIES the award of exemplary damages by increasing it to
₱30,000.00, with an additional ₱50,000.00 for civil indemnity.

SO ORDERED.
112 | P a g e

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DELILAH A.M. No. CA-05-20-P

VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS, COURT (Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-OF APPEALS, 81-CA-P)

V.
CIELITO M. SALUD, CLERK IV, COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Cielito Salud, Clerk IV, Mailing Section of the Judicial Records Division, Court of Appeals (CA) stands charged with the following
offenses:
1. Inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties;
2. Conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and
3. Directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in an official transaction, under Section 22, paragraphs (p),
(t) and (u), Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Civil Service Law.
It was alleged that respondent delivered the Order of Release of PDL Melchor Lagua, whose case in on appeal in the CA, to the
wrong person (Art Baluran), and that he allegedly extorted some amount of money from the relative of the said PDL.

During trial, Justice Magtolis testified that Atty. Madarang reported having received a telephone call from the alleged relative
of Lagua. She narrated that she gave the name 'Arlyn to the caller, and, thereafter, exchanged text messages with the
respondent. Justice Magtolis instructed Atty. Madarang to continue communicating with the respondent and, if possible, to
see it through a possible pay-off where a National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent would be asked to assist them.
113 | P a g e

However, the entrapment did not materialize.Judge Magtolis presented as evidence the text messages between Atty.
Madarang and respondent to prove the fact he indeed extorted money from the said PDLs.

The Findings of the Investigating Officer

In her Report dated January 21, 2005, Atty. Longalong found that the respondent was guilty as charged and recommended
his dismissal from service.
Hence, this petition. The respondent claim that the admission of the text messages as evidence against him constitutes a
violation of his right to privacy
ISSUE:
Whether or not the text messages between responded and Atty. Madarang are admissible in evidence in the
administrative case filed against the respondent.
RULING: Yes
The Ruling of the Court
The respondent's claim that the admission of the text messages as evidence against him constitutes a violation of his right
to privacy is unavailing. Text messages have been classified as ephemeral electronic communication under Section 1(k), Rule
2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, and 'shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or
has personal knowledge thereof. Here, said text messages was proven by the testimony of Atty. Madarang who was party to
the same, so it is admissible as evidence. Nethertheless, any question as to the admissibility of such messages is now moot
and academic, as the respondent himself, as well as his counsel, already admitted that he was the sender of the first three
messages on Atty. Madarang's cell phone.
114 | P a g e

FALLO:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING , respondent Cielito M. Salud is found GUILTY of inefficiency and gross misconduct. He is
SUSPENDED for a period of One (1) Year and Six (6) Months, effective immediately. He is further DIRECTED to inform the Court
as to the date of his receipt of this Decision to determine when his suspension shall have taken effect.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 170633 October 17, 2007

MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
SSANGYONG CORPORATION, respondents.

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 82983 and its
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
FACTS:
Ssangyong filed, on November 16, 2001, a civil action for damages due to breach of contract against defendants MCC,
Sanyo Seiki and Gregory Chan before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. In its complaint, Ssangyong alleged that
defendants breached their contract when they refused to open the L/C in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the remaining
100MT of steel under Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2.
After Ssangyong rested its case, defendants filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that Ssangyong failed to present the
original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was based.
In an Order dated April 24, 2003, the court denied the demurrer, ruling that the documentary evidence presented had
already been admitted in the December 16, 2002 Order41 and their admissibility finds support in Republic Act (R.A.) No.
115 | P a g e

8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000. Considering that both testimonial and documentary
evidence tended to substantiate the material allegations in the complaint, Ssangyong's evidence sufficed for purposes of a
prima facie case.
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision43 on March 24, 2004, in favor of Ssangyong. The trial court ruled that
when plaintiff agreed to sell and defendants agreed to buy the 220MT of steel products for the price of US$1,860 per MT, the
contract was perfected. The subject transaction was evidenced by Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-
POSTS0401-2, which were later amended only in terms of reduction of volume as well as the price per MT, following Pro
Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS080-1 and ST2-POSTS080-2. The RTC, however, excluded Sanyo Seiki from liability for lack of
competent evidence.
On August 31, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the ruling of the trial court, but absolving Chan of any liability.
The appellate court ruled, among others, that Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E",
"E-1" and "F") were admissible in evidence, although they were mere facsimile printouts of MCC's steel orders.
Aggrieved, MCC filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court, imputing the following errors to the Court of
Appeals:
ISSUE
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE ADMISSIBILITY IN EVIDENCE OF THE PRO-FORMA INVOICES
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME WERE MERE PHOTOCOPIES OF FACSIMILE PRINTOUTS.
RULING: YES
The ruling of the Appellate Court is incorrect. R.A. No. 8792,64 otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000,
considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document for
evidentiary purposes.
The Rules on Electronic Evidence regards an electronic document as admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on
admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws, and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the said
116 | P a g e

Rules. An electronic document is also the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, if it is a printout
or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately.
Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as the functional equivalent of an
original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing must foremost be an "electronic data message" or an
"electronic document."
XXX
Since a facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document," and cannot be considered
as electronic evidence by the Court, with greater reason is a photocopy of such a fax transmission not electronic evidence.
In the present case, therefore, Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E" and "F"), which
are mere photocopies of the original fax transmittals, are not electronic evidence, contrary to the position of both the trial
and the appellate courts.

Admissibility of 'Void" Document

G.R. No. 190846
TOMAS P. TAN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE G. HOSANA, Respondent.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 challenging the August 28, 2009 decision2 and November 17, 2009 resolution3
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 88645.
117 | P a g e

The Facts

The respondent Jose G. Hosana (Jose) married Milagros C. Hosana (Milagros) on January 14, 1979.4 During their marriage,
Jose and Milagros bought a house and lot located at Tinago, Naga City, which lot was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 21229.5

On January 13, 1998, Milagros sold to the petitioner Tomas P. Tan, Jr. (Tomas) the subject property, as evidenced by a deed
of sale executed by Milagros herself and as attorney-in-fact of Jose, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by
Jose in her favor. The Deed of Sale stated that the purchase price for the lot was P200,000.00. After the sale, TCT No. 21229
was cancelled and TCT No. 32568 was issued in the name of Tomas.

On October 19, 2001, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale/Cancellation of Title/Reconveyance and Damages
against Milagros, Tomas, and the Register of Deeds of Naga City.9 The complaint was filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 62, Naga City. In the complaint, Jose averred that while he was working in Japan, Milagros, without his consent
and knowledge, conspired with Tomas to execute the SPA by forging Jose’s signature making it appear that Jose had
authorized Milagros to sell the subject property to Tomas.10

In his Answer, Tomas maintained that he was a buyer in good faith and for value. Before he paid the full consideration of the
sale, Tomas claimed he sought advice from his lawyer-friend who told him that the title of the subject lot was authentic and in
order. Furthermore, he alleged that the SPA authorizing Milagros to sell the property was annotated at the back of the title.
118 | P a g e

The RTC Ruling

In its decision dated December 27, 2006,25 the RTC decided in favor of Jose and nullified the sale of the subject property to
Tomas. The RTC held that the SPA dated June 10, 1996, wherein Jose supposedly appointed Milagros as his attorney-in-fact,
was actually null and void.

Tomas and Milagros were ordered to jointly and severally indemnify Jose the amount of P20,000.00 as temperate damages.26

The CA Ruling

In a decision dated August 28, 2009,27 the CA affirmed the RTC ruling that the deed of sale and the SPA were void. However,
the CA modified the judgment of the RTC: first, by deleting the award of temperate damages; and second, by directing Jose
and Milagros to reimburse Tomas the purchase price of P200,000.00, with interest, under the principle of unjust enrichment.
Despite Tomas’ allegation that he paid P700,000.00 for the subject lot, the CA found that there was no convincing evidence
that established this claim.28

The CA denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit" in a resolution dated November 17, 2009.30

The Petition
119 | P a g e

Tomas filed the present petition for review on certiorari to challenge the CA ruling which ordered the reimbursement of
P200,000.00 only, instead of the actual purchase price he paid in the amount of P700,000.00.

Tomas argues that, first, all matters contained in the deed of sale, including the consideration stated, cannot be used as
evidence since it was declared null and void; second, the deed of sale was not specifically offered to prove the actual
consideration of the sale; third, his testimony establishing the actual purchase price of P700,000.00 paid was
uncontroverted;33 and, fourth, Jose must return the full amount actually paid under the principle of solutio indebiti.34

Jose, on the other hand, argues that first, Jose is estopped from questioning the purchase price indicated in the deed of dale
for failing to immediately raise this question; and second, the terms of an agreement reduced into writing are deemed to
include all the terms agreed upon and no other evidence can be admitted other than the terms of the agreement itself.35

The Issues
(1) whether the deed of sale which was declared null and void can be used as the basis for the amount of consideration
paid.
OUR RULING: YES
We uphold the CA’s finding.
The force and effect of a void contract is distinguished from its admissibility as evidence.
The petitioner argues that the CA erred in relying on the consideration stated in the deed of sale as basis for the reimbursable
amount because a null and void document cannot be used as evidence.
We find no merit in the petitioner’s argument.
120 | P a g e

XXX
While the terms and provisions of a void contract cannot be enforced since it is deemed inexistent, it does not preclude the
admissibility of the contract as evidence to prove matters that occurred in the course of executing the contract, i.e., what
each party has given in the execution of the contract.
The deed of sale as documentary evidence may be used as a means to ascertain the truthfulness of the consideration stated
and its actual payment. The purpose of introducing the deed of sale as evidence is not to enforce the terms written in the
contract, which is an obligatory force and effect of a valid contract. The deed of sale, rather, is used as a means to determine
matters that occurred in the execution of such contract, i.e., the determination of what each party has given under the void
contract to allow restitution and prevent unjust enrichment.
Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law of these rules. There is no provision in
the Rules of Evidence which excludes the admissibility of a void document. The Rules only require that the evidence is
relevant and not excluded by the Rules for its admissibility.

Hence, a void document is admissible as evidence because the purpose of introducing it as evidence is to ascertain the truth
respecting a matter of fact, not to enforce the terms of the document itself.
XXXX
Accordingly, the CA correctly ordered Jose to return the amount of P200,000.00 since this the consideration stated in the
Deed of Sale and given credence by the lower court. Indeed, even Jose expressly stated in his comment that Tomas is entitled
to recover the money paid by him in the amount of P200,000.00 as appearing in the contract.

SO ORDERED.
121 | P a g e

Competent Evidence (Section 3, Rule 128)

Sec. 3 . Admissibility of evidence. — Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law of
these rules. (3a)

Admissibility v. Weight of the Evidence (Rule 133)

G.R. No. 137757; August 14, 2000

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
RODEGELIO TURCO, JR.
Accused-appellant Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (aka "Totong") was charged with the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 2349-272,
Branch I of the Regional Trial Court of Basilan of the 9th Judicial Region, stationed in Isabela, Basilan.
At his arraignment on November 8, 1995, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty, after which trial ensued.
In reaching a moral certainty of guilt, the trial court held:
While the accused denies the charge of rape, his witness, Mrs. Leonora Cabase was trying to project that the complainant
Escelea Tabada and the accused Rodegelio Turco, Jr. are sweethearts.
ISSUE:
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROSECUTION, BASED ON THE AFFIDAVITS
AND ORAL TESTIMONIES OF THE COMPLAINANT AND ITS WITNESSES WAS ABLE TO PROVED [sic] BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED THE CRIME OF RAPE AGAINST THE COMPLAINANT.
122 | P a g e

He particularly argues that his conviction is not supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt considering that other than the
written statement of the complainant before the Police Station of Isabela and before the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial
Court, and her testimony during direct examination, no other evidence was presented to conclusively prove that there was
ever rape at all;
RULING OF THE COURT: NO
We agree with the trial court.
Accordingly, the primordial consideration in a determination concerning the crime of rape is the credibility of complainant's
testimony.
The trial court described complainant as "a young girl, a little over twelve (12) years old and almost illiterate, having attended
school up to Grade III only. So poor that her family cannot even buy the cheapest television set and she has to go to a house of
a neighbor for the meager joy of seeing a television show ... and exposes herself to the danger of the dark night." But verily,
age, youth, and poverty are not guarantees of credibility.
xxxx
Withal, although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay rule, hence admissible as evidence, it has very little
probative value due to the absence of the examining physician. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the prosecution relied
solely on the medical certificate (stating that there was "[h]ymen rupture, secondary to penile insertion" as well as "foul-
smelling discharges." The diagnosis was "[r]uptured hymen secondary to rape" [p. 68, Record]). In fact, reliance was made on
the testimony of the victim herself which, standing alone even without medical examination, is sufficient to convict (People
vs. Topaguen, 369 SCRA 601 [1997]). It is well-settled that a medical examination is not indispensable in the prosecution of
rape (People vs. Lacaba, G.R. No. 130591, November 17, 1999; People vs. Salazar, 258 SCRA 55 [1996]; People vs. Venerable,
supra). The absence of medical findings by a medico-legal officer does not disprove the occurrence of rape (People vs. Taneo,
supra). It is enough that the evidence on hand convinces the court that conviction is proper (People vs. Auxtero, supra). In the
instant case, the victim's testimony alone is credible and sufficient to convict.
123 | P a g e

SO ORDERED.

"Liberal" Construction of the Rules of Evidence, Section 6, Rule 128

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 2, Rule 2, A.M. No. 017-01-SC

Rule 129, Sections 1- 3 (What Need Not Be Proved)

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. – A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of
the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the
law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the
measure of time, and the geographical divisions. (1a)

SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. – A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or
are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. (1a)

SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. – During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party,
may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon. After the trial,
and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice
of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.

Mandatory judicial notice -

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Discretionary judicial notice -

Principle of Notoriety -
When hearing necessary for judicial notice -
Judicial notice of laws versus ordinances -
Judicial notice of court records, pending cases -
Judicial notice of government agencies and practices -
Judicial notice of foreign laws -
Judicial decisions as "evidence of what the law means"-

G.R. No. 177809 October 16, 2009

SPOUSES OMAR and MOSHIERA LATIP, Petitioners,

vs.
ROSALIE PALAÑA CHUA, Respondent.
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 89300:1 (1) reversing
the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 274, Parañaque City in Civil Case No. 04-0052;2 and (2) reinstating and
affirming in toto the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 78, of the same city in Civil Case No. 2001-315.3
FACTS:
The facts parleyed by the MeTC show that respondent Rosalie Chua (Rosalie) is the owner of Roferxane Building, a commercial
building, located at No. 158 Quirino Avenue corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran, Parañaque City.
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On July 6, 2001, Rosalie filed a complaint for unlawful detainer plus damages against petitioners, Spouses Omar and Moshiera
Latip (Spouses Latip). Rosalie attached to the complaint a contract of lease over two cubicles in Roferxane Bldg., signed by
Rosalie, as lessor, and by Spouses Latip, as lessees thereof.
A year after the commencement of the lease and with Spouses Latip already occupying the leased cubicles, Rosalie, through
counsel, sent the spouses a letter demanding payment of back rentals and should they fail to do so, to vacate the leased
cubicles. When Spouses Latip did not heed Rosalie’s demand, she instituted the aforesaid complaint.
In their Answer, Spouses Latip refuted Rosalie’s claims. They averred that the lease of the two (2) cubicles had already been
paid in full as evidenced by receipts showing payment to Rosalie of the total amount of ₱2,570,000.00.
Spouses Latip asseverated that sometime in October 1999, Rosalie offered for sale lease rights over two (2) cubicles in
Roferxane Bldg. Having in mind the brisk sale of goods during the Christmas season, they readily accepted Rosalie’s offer to
purchase lease rights in Roferxane Bldg., which was still under construction at the time. According to Spouses Latip, the
immediate payment of ₱2,570,000.00 would be used to finish construction of the building giving them first priority in the
occupation of the finished cubicles.
Thereafter, in December 1999, as soon as two (2) cubicles were finished, Spouses Latip occupied them without waiting for the
completion of five (5) other stalls. Spouses Latip averred that the contract of lease they signed had been novated by their
purchase of lease rights of the subject cubicles. Thus, they were surprised to receive a demand letter from Rosalie’s counsel
and the subsequent filing of a complaint against them.
The MeTC ruled in favor of Rosalie and ordered the [Spouses Latip] and all persons claiming rights under them are hereby
ordered to VACATE the property subject of this case located at the 1st and 2nd floors of a Roferxane Building situated at No.
158 Quirino Avenue corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran, Parañaque City.
[Spouses Latip’s] counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The RTC reversed the MeTC and ruled in favor of Spouses Latip. The RTC did not give credence to the contract of lease,
ruling that it was not notarized and, in all other substantial aspects, incomplete. Further on this point, the RTC noted that
the contract of lease lacked: (1) the signature of Ferdinand Chua, Rosalie’s husband; (2) the signatures of Spouses Latip on the
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first page thereof; (3) the specific dates for the term of the contract which only stated that the lease is for "six (6) y[ea]rs only
starting from December 1999 or up to December 2005"; (4) the exact date of execution of the document, albeit the month of
December and year 1999 are indicated therein; and (5) the provision for payment of deposit or advance rental which is
supposedly uncommon in big commercial lease contracts.
The RTC believed the claim of Spouses Latip that the contract of lease was modified and supplemented; and the entire lease
rentals for the two (2) cubicles for six (6) years had already been paid by Spouses Latip in the amount of ₱2,570,000.00.
The CA, as previously mentioned, reversed the RTC and reinstated the decision of the MeTC. The CA ruled that the contract
of lease, albeit lacking the signature of Ferdinand and not notarized, remained a complete and valid contract. As the MeTC
had, the CA likewise found that the alleged defects in the contract of lease did not render the contract ineffective. On the
issue of whether the amount of ₱2,570,000.00 merely constituted payment of goodwill money, the CA took judicial notice of
this common practice in the area of Baclaran, especially around the Redemptorist Church. According to the appellate court,
this judicial notice was bolstered by the Joint Sworn Declaration of the stallholders at Roferxane Bldg. that they all had paid
goodwill money to Rosalie prior to occupying the stalls thereat.
ISSUE:
whether Spouses Latip should be ejected from the leased cubicles.
RULING: YES
As previously adverted to, the CA, in ruling for Rosalie and upholding the ejectment of Spouses Latip, took judicial notice of
the alleged practice of prospective lessees in the Baclaran area to pay goodwill money to the lessor.
We disagree.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the taking of judicial notice is mandatory or discretionary on
the courts, thus:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. – A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of
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nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the
measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. – A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
On this point, State Prosecutors v. Muro is instructive:
I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be
exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the
subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and
general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known
to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be
judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records
and facts of general notoriety.
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be
dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so
notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge
is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally
or professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are "commonly"
known.
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men
generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as
true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be
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found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety
and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person.11
From the foregoing provisions of law and our holdings thereon, it is apparent that the matter which the appellate court took
judicial notice of does not meet the requisite of notoriety. To begin with, only the CA took judicial notice of this supposed
practice to pay goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran area. Neither the MeTC nor the RTC, with the former even ruling
in favor of Rosalie, found that the practice was of "common knowledge" or notoriously known.
XXX
However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of attaching documentary evidence, i.e., the Joint
Affidavit of the stallholders, to Rosalie’s appeal before the CA. In short, the alleged practice still had to be proven by Rosalie;
contravening the title itself of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court – What need not be proved.
Apparently, only that particular division of the CA had knowledge of the practice to pay goodwill money in the Baclaran
area. As was held in State Prosecutors, justices and judges alike ought to be reminded that the power to take judicial notice
must be exercised with caution and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be ample reason for the claim of judicial
notice to be promptly resolved in the negative.
whether Spouses Latip ought to be ejected from the leased cubicles, what remains in evidence is the documentary evidence
signed by both parties – the contract of lease and the receipts evidencing payment of ₱2,570,000.00.
We agree with the RTC’s holding only up to that point. There exists a lease agreement between the parties as set forth in the
contract of lease which is a complete document. It need not be signed by Ferdinand Chua as he likewise did not sign the other
two receipts for ₱500,000.00 and ₱70,000.00, respectively, which contained only the signature of Rosalie. Besides, it is
undisputed that Rosalie owns and leases the stalls in Roferxane Bldg.; thus, doing away with the need for her husband’s
consent. The findings of the three lower courts concur on this fact.
The contract of lease has a period of six (6) years commencing in December 1999. This fact is again buttressed by Spouses
Latip’s admission that they occupied the property forthwith in December 1999, bearing in mind the brisk sales during the
holiday season.
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On the conflicting interpretations by the lower courts of the receipts amounting to ₱2,570,000.00, we hold that the practice of
payment of goodwill money in the Baclaran area is an inadequate subject of judicial notice. Neither was Rosalie able to
provide sufficient evidence that, apart from the belatedly submitted Joint Affidavit of the stallholders of Roferxane Bldg., the
said amount was simply for the payment of goodwill money, and not payment for advance rentals by Spouses Latip.
In interpreting the evidence before us, we are guided by the Civil Code provisions on interpretation of contracts, to wit:
Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be
principally considered.
Art. 1372. However general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are
distinct and cases that are different from those which the parties intended to agree.

Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several meanings, it shall be understood as bearing that import
which is most adequate to render it effectual.
The RTC was already on the right track when it declared that the receipts for ₱2,570,000.00 modified or supplemented the
contract of lease.
There is nothing on the receipts and on record that the payment and receipt of ₱2,570,000.00 referred to full payment of
rentals for the whole period of the lease. All three receipts state Rosalie’s receipt of cash in varying amounts. The first receipt
for ₱2,000,000.00 did state payment for two (2) cubicles, but this cannot mean full payment of rentals for the entire lease
period when there are no words to that effect. Further, two receipts were subsequently executed pointing to the obvious fact
that the ₱2,000,000.00 is not for full payment of rentals. Thus, since the contract of lease remained operative, we find that
Rosalie’s receipt of the monies should be considered as advanced rentals on the leased cubicles. This conclusion is bolstered
by the fact that Rosalie demanded payment of the lease rentals only in 2000, a full year after the commencement of the lease.
Finally, we note that the lease ended in 2005. Consequently, Spouses Latip can be ejected from the leased premises. They
are liable to Rosalie for unpaid rentals on the lease of the two (2) cubicles in accordance with the stipulations on rentals in
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the Contract of Lease. However, the amount of ₱2,570,000.00, covering advance rentals, must be deducted from this
liability of Spouses Latip to Rosalie.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 186635

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor,
vs.
SEGUNDINA ROSARIO

Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated October 17, 2008 and the Resolution2 dated
February 10, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 85519, which affirmed the Decision3 dated January 5, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, and in effect ordered the reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
269615 in the name of respondent Segundina Rosario (Rosario).

Factual Background

The property subject of the present controversy is located in the Diliman campus of the University of the Philippines, and is
now the site of various buildings and structures along Commonwealth A venue, including the PHILCOA Wet Market, the Asian
Institute of Tourism, the Philippine Social Sciences Building, the National Hydraulic Center, the UP Sewerage Treatment Plant,
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the Petron Gas Station, the UP Arboretum, the Campus Landscaping Office, the Philippine Atomic Energy Commission Building,
the INNOTECH Building, and the UP-Ayala Land TechnoHub.4

On November 12, 1997, respondent Rosario filed a petition for the reconstitution of TCT No. 269615 before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City (RTC), claiming that her title covers lots 42-A-1, 42-A-2 and 42-A-3 of subdivision plan Psd 77362 and Psd
4558.5 This petition was docketed as LRC No. Q-9885 (97).
[S]he presented the owner's duplicate copy of said title (TCT No. 269615) and a certification issued by Atty. Samuel Cleofe of
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to prove that the original copy of said title was among those burned during the fire
that razed the Quezon City Hall on 11 June 1998. In addition, she presented a sketch plan of the subject piece of land, which
was recorded in the Bureau of Lands and Tax Bill Receipt Nos. 52768, 63268 and 442447, together with a certification issued
by the City Treasurer of Quezon City stating that she paid all the real property taxes due on the subject piece of land. Lastly,
she maintained that she is in possession of the subject piece of land through a caretaker named Linda Salvacion.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and oppositor University of the Philippines (UP) opposed the petition. They
contend that the documents presented by respondent Rosario are of suspicious authenticity and, more importantly, that
the land supposedly covered by TCT No. 269615 is already covered by RT-58201 (192687) and RT-107350 (192689) in the
name of UP.

Proceedings before the RTC

The RTC granted reconstitution and ordered the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered to reconstitute in its
records the original TCT No. 269615 in the name of the Petitioner Segundina Rosario WITHOUT PREJUDICE to an existing or
better title over the same lot covered thereby.
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The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC

The Court of Appeals held that as the case was one for reconstitution of title, it does not pass upon the ownership of the land
covered by the lost or destroyed title, and thus, the R TC was correct in ordering the reconstitution of TCT No. 269615 on the
basis of the owner's duplicate copy of the title presented by respondent Rosario.
The appellate court further held that the petition for reconstitution filed by respondent Rosario cannot be said to have
attacked, collaterally or otherwise, the titles of UP because the latter failed to sufficiently prove the existence of its title over
the subject land.
Issues

WHETHER OR NOT OTHER DOCUMENTS ADDUCED IN EVIDENCE BY SEGUNDINA ROSARIO SUPPORT THE RECONSTITUION
(sic) OF TCT NO. 269615 IN HER FAVOR.
Our Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court mandates that a court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of
evidence, of the official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the Philippines.
Thus, as both Congress and this Court have repeatedly and consistently validated and recognized UP's indefeasible title
over its landholdings, the RTC and the Court of Appeals clearly erred when it faulted the Republic and UP for presenting
certified true copies of its titles signed by its records custodian instead of either the duplicate originals or the certified true
copies issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. Indeed, the RTC and the CA should have taken judicial notice of UP's
title over its landholdings, without need of any other evidence.
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It may be, as pointed out by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, that a petition for reconstitution of title does not treat of the
issue of ownership. However, in the case at bar, as it was established that TCT No. 269615 overlaps with UP's titles, and as
UP's indefeasible titles are recognized by law and jurisprudence, adopting the myopic view of the RTC and the Court of
Appeals will only result into an unnecessary and pointless relitigation of an issue that has already been repeatedly settled by
this Court.
We remind the courts that we are duty-bound to abide by precedents, pursuant to the time-honored principle of stare decisis
et non quieta movere.

G.R. Nos. 135695-96 October 12, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
TOMAS TUNDAG
THE CASE
For automatic review is the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, in Criminal Cases Nos.DU-6186
and DU-6203, finding appellant Tomas Tundag guilty of two counts of incestuous rape and sentencing him to death twice.
FACTS OF THE CASE
On November 18, 1997, two informations were filed with the Mandaue City Prosecutor’s Office against Tomas Tundag for
alleged incestuous rape for allegedly raping his daughter, who is 13 years old.
Upon arraignment appellant, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charges.
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The two cases were consolidated and a joint trial ensued.

Appellant’s defense was bare denial. He claimed that private complainant had fabricated the rape charges against him
since he and his daughter, "had a quarrel when he accordingly reprimanded her for going out whenever he was not at
home."
Appellant did not present any witness to reinforce his testimony.
On August 31, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision, convicting the accused of the crime as charged and sentenced him
to death.
In its judgment, the court below gave credence to complainant’s version of what accused did to her.
The evidence for the prosecution as adduced during the trial on the merits clearly shows that private complainant Mary
Ann Tundag is a 13 year old girl who does not know how to read and write and has an IQ of 76% which is a very low general
mental ability and was living with her father, the herein accused, at Galaxy Compound, Mandaue City.

Appellant’s claim that the complainant’s charges were manufactured did not impress the trial court, which found him twice
guilty of rape. Now before us, appellant assails his double conviction, simply contending that:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is liable to the penalty death despite the fact the prosecution failed to prove the real age of the
victim when the crime was committed.
RULING OF THE COURT:
Indeed, appellant is guilty. But the penalty of death imposed on him is not correct since the prosecution failed to present
independent evidence to prove the exact age of the victim. Thus, the accused is only liable for simple rape, not qualified
rape.
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“We stressed that the prosecution must present independent proof of the age of the victim, even though it is not contested
by the defense. The minority of the victim must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself.”
Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659,25 penalizes rape of a minor daughter by
her father as qualified rape and a heinous crime. In proving such felony, the prosecution must allege and prove the elements
of rape: (1) sexual congress; (2) with woman; (3) by force or without her consent and in order to warrant the imposition of
capital punishment, the additional elements that: the victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the rape and (5) the
offender is a parent of the victim.

In this case, it was sufficiently alleged and proven that the offender was the victim’s father. But the victim’s age was not
properly and sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt. She testified that she was thirteen years old at the time of the
rapes. However, she admitted that she did not know exactly when she was born because her mother did not tell her. She
further said that her birth certificate was likewise with her mother.
================================================================

Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without proof because they
already know them. Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may either be mandatory or discretionary. Section 1 of Rule 129
of the Rules of Court provides when court shall take mandatory judicial notice of facts -

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice without the introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of
nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the
measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
136 | P a g e

Section 2 of Rule 129 enumerates the instances when courts may take discretionary judicial notice of facts -

SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. - A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.

Thus, it can be considered of public knowledge and judicially noticed that the scene of the rape is not always nor
necessarily isolated or secluded for lust is no respecter of time or place. The offense of rape can and has been committed in
places where people congregate, e.g. inside a house where there are occupants, a five (5) meter room with five (5) people
inside, or even in the same room which the victim is sharing with the accused’s sister.

The Court has likewise taken judicial notice of the Filipina’s inbred modesty and shyness and her antipathy in publicly airing
acts which blemish her honor and virtue.

On the other hand, matters which are capable of unquestionable demonstration pertain to fields of professional and
scientific knowledge. For example, in People v. Alicante, the trial court took judicial notice of the clinical records of the
attending physicians concerning the birth of twin baby boys as "premature" since one of the alleged rapes had occurred 6 to 7
months earlier.

As to matters which ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions, an example would be facts which are
ascertainable from the record of court proceedings, e.g. as to when court notices were received by a party.
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****************************************************************************************************
With respect to other matters not falling within the mandatory or discretionary judicial notice, the court can take judicial
notice of a fact pursuant to the procedure in Section 3 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which requires that -
SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. - During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party,
may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereto.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take
judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.

In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper, despite the defense counsel’s admission, thereof acceding
to the prosecution’s motion. As required by Section 3 of Rule 129, as to any other matters such as age, a hearing is required
before courts can take judicial notice of such fact. Generally, the age of the victim may be proven by the birth or baptismal
certificate of the victim, or in the absence thereof, upon showing that said documents were lost or destroyed, by other
documentary or oral evidence sufficient for the purpose.
******************************************************************************************************
In several recent cases, we have emphasized the need for independent proof of the age of the victim, aside from testimonial
evidence from the victim or her relatives. In People v. Javier,35 we stressed that the prosecution must present independent
proof of the age of the victim, even though it is not contested by the defense. The minority of the victim must be proved with
equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself. In People v. Cula,36 we reiterated that it is the burden of the prosecution to
prove with certainty the fact that the victim was below 18 when the rape was committed in order to justify the imposition of
the death penalty. Since the record of the case was bereft of any independent evidence thereon, such as the victim’s duly
certified Certificate of Live Birth, accurately showing private complainant’s age, appellant could not be convicted of rape in its
qualified form. In People v. Veloso,37 the victim was alleged to have been only 9 years of age at the time of the rape. It held
that the trial court was correct when it ruled that the prosecution failed to prove the victim’s age other than through the
testimony of her father and herself.
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Considering the statutory requirement in Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No. 7659 and R.A. No.
8353, we reiterate here what the Court has held in Javier without any dissent, that the failure to sufficiently establish
victim’s age by independent proof is a bar to conviction for rape in its qualified form. For, in the words of Melo, J.,
"independent proof of the actual age of a rape victim becomes vital and essential so as to remove an ‘iota of doubt’ that the
case falls under the qualifying circumstances" for the imposition of the death penalty set by the law.

G.R. No.172551 January 15, 2014

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
YATCO AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES

We resolve the Land Bank of the Philippines’ (LBP s) Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari challenging the decision dated
January 26, 2006 and the resolution3 dated May 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87530. This CA
decision affirmed the decision dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, San Pablo City, acting as a Special
Agrarian Court (RTC-SAC), in Agrarian Case No. SP-064(02).

The Factual Antecedents

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Respondent Yatco Agricultural Enterprises (Yatco) was the registered owner of a 27.5730-hectare parcel of agricultural land
(property) in Barangay Mabato, Calamba, Laguna, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-49465.
On April 30, 1999, the government placed the property under the coverage of its Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP).

Pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) No. 405,7 the LBP valued the property at ₱1,126,132.89.8 Yatco did not find this
valuation acceptable and thus elevated the matter to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) of San Pablo City, which then conducted summary administrative proceedings for the determination of
just compensation.9

The PARAD computed the value of the property at ₱16,543,800.00;10 it used the property’s current market value (as shown
in the tax declaration11 that Yatco submitted) and applied the formula "MV x 2." The PARAD noted that the LBP did not
present any verified or authentic document to back up its computation; hence, it brushed aside the LBP’s valuation.

The LBP did not move to reconsider the PARAD’s ruling. Instead, it filed with the RTC-SAC a petition for the judicial
determination of just compensation.

The RTC-SAC’s Decision

The RTC-SAC fixed the just compensation for the property at ₱200.00 per square meter.The RTC-SAC arrived at this valuation
by adopting the valuation set by the RTC of Calamba City,
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Branch 35 (Branch 35) in Civil Case No. 2326-96-C,14 which, in turn, adopted the valuation that the RTC of Calamba City,
Branch 36 (Branch 36) arrived at in Civil Case No. 2259-95-C15 (collectively, civil cases). The RTC-SAC did not give weight to the
LBP’s evidence in justifying its valuation, pointing out that the LBP failed to prove that it complied with the prescribed
procedure and likewise failed to consider the valuation factors provided in Section 17 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988 (CARL).16

The CA’s Ruling

The CA dismissed the LBP’s appeal.Significantly, it did not find the LBP’s assigned errors – the RTC-SAC’s reliance on the
valuation made by Branches 35 and 36 in the civil cases – to be persuasive. First, according to the CA, the parcels of land in the
civil cases were the very same properties in the appealed agrarian case. Second, Branch 36’s valuation was based on the
report of the duly appointed commissioners and was arrived at after proper land inspection. As the determination of just
compensation is essentially a judicial function, the CA thus affirmed the RTC-SAC’s valuation which was founded on factual
and legal bases. The LBP filed the present petition after the CA denied its motion for reconsideration20 in the CA’s May 3,
2006 resolution.21

The Petition

The LBP argues in the present petition that the CA erred when it affirmed the RTC-SAC’s ruling that fixed the just
compensation for the property based on the valuation set by Branches 35 and 36.22 The LBP pointed out that the property in
the present case was expropriated pursuant to its agrarian reform program; in contrast, the land subject of the civil cases was
expropriated by the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) for industrial purposes.
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Yatco argues that the RTC-SAC correctly fixed the just compensation for its property at ₱200.00 per square meter. It points to
several reasons for its position. First, the RTC-SAC’s valuation was not only based on the valuation fixed by Branch 36 (as
adopted by Branch 35); it was also based on the property’s market value as stated in the current tax declaration that it
presented in evidence before the RTC-SAC. Second, the RTC-SAC considered the evidence of both parties; unfortunately for
the LBP, the RTC-SAC found its evidence wanting and in total disregard of the factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No.
6657. And third, the RTC-SAC considered all of the factors enumerated in Section 17 when it set the property’s value at
₱200.00 per square meter. Procedurally, Yatco claims that the present petition’s issues and arguments are purely factual and
they are not allowed in a petition for review on certiorari and the LBP did not point to any specific error that the CA
committed when it affirmed the RTC-SAC’s decision.

The Issue
whether the RTC-SAC’s determination of just compensation for the property was proper.

The Court’s Ruling

Petition of the LBP is granted. Case is remanded to the RTC.
The rules allow the courts to take judicial notice of certain facts; the RTC-SAC’s valuation is erroneous

The taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and convenience for it fulfills the purpose that the evidence is intended
to achieve, and in this sense, it is equivalent to proof. Generally, courts are not authorized to "take judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the
same judge.” They may, however, take judicial notice of a decision or the facts prevailing in another case sitting in the same
142 | P a g e

court if: (1) the parties present them in evidence, absent any opposition from the other party; or (2) the court, in its discretion,
resolves to do so.45 In either case, the courts must observe the clear boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court.

We note that Yatco offered in evidence copies of the decisions in the civil cases, which offer the LBP opposed. These were
duly noted by the court.48 Even assuming, however, that the April 21, 2004 order49 of the RTC-SAC (that noted Yatco’s offer
in evidence and the LBP’s opposition to it) constitutes sufficient compliance with the requirement of Section 3, Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court, still we find the RTC-SAC’s valuation – based on Branch 36’s previous ruling – to be legally erroneous.

Remand of the case

Considering that both parties failed to adduce satisfactory evidence of the property s value at the time of taking, we deem it
premature to make a final determination of the matter in controversy. We are not a trier of facts and we cannot receive new
evidence from the parties to aid them in the prompt resolution of this case. We are thus compelled to remand the case to the
RTC-SAC for the reception of evidence and the determination of just compensation, with a cautionary reminder for the proper
observance of the factors under Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and the applicable DAR regulations. In its determination, the RTC-
SAC may exercise the authority granted to it by Section 58 of R.A. No. 6657.

G.R. No. L-24318 August 29, 1969

BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS
vs.
RICMA TRADING CORPORATION
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The Case:
Appeal from the decision dated December 23, 1964, as well as from the orders dated April 29, 1963, June 8, 1963, June
29, 1963 and July 27, 1963 of the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch XVII) in its Civil Case No. 52674, entitled Board of
Liquidators, etc., et al. vs. Ricma Trading Corporation, et al.

On August 15, 1962, plaintiff-appellee Board of Liquidators, as trustee of the defunct Land Settlement & Development
Corporation (LASEDECO), filed a complaint in the Municipal Court of Manila, to recover from the defendants Ricma Trading
Corporation and its President and General Manager, Ricardo Maipid, the sum of P2,800.00 as unpaid balance of the
purchase price of certain personal properties consisting of equipment, tools, engine blocks, spare parts, supplies, junk and
others located in its Bodega No. 2, on Sta. Mesa Boulevard, Manila, which are described in the said complaint as "Lots Nos. 1
and 2, Bodega 2, Sta. Mesa Compound," with interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of the filing thereof.

On September 29, 1962, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on two grounds, namely: (1) that appellee's cause
of action is barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) that the complaint states no cause of action in so far as defendant
Ricardo Maipid 1 is concerned. With regard to the first ground, the contention was that inasmuch as there was no written
contract evidencing the sale between the appellee and the defendants nor any written promise or commitment on the part of
the latter to pay the alleged unpaid balance of P2,800.00, the former's cause of action was merely based on an oral contract,
which, pursuant to Art. 1139 of the Civil Code, should have been filed within six (6) years from the accrual of the cause of
action, i.e., from October 24, 1955, the date when the last partial payment was made, to the same day in 1961. So, according
to the motion, prescription had already set in on August 15, 1962, the date when the complaint of appellee was filed.

The MTC and RTC denied the defendants’motion to dismiss.

144 | P a g e

The Court of Appeals held defendant Ricardo Maipid should be held liable for the payment of said indebtedness, the Court
finds that inasmuch as it is evident that in purchasing said equipment and tools from the Land Settlement & Development
Corporation, he acted for and on behalf of the Ricma Trading Corporation of which he was then the President and General
Manager and not in his personal capacity, it is said corporation which is primarily liable for the payment of said balance of
P2,800.00. Consequently, plaintiff has no cause of action against him."
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CASE AS AGAINST DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, RICMA TRADING
CORPORATION, ON THE GROUND THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE'S CAUSE OF ACTION HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED.

RULING OF THE COURT:

Again, this assignment of error is without merit.

The main thesis of appellant in regard to this alleged error is that the transaction upon which appellee's action is based
was not evidenced by any written agreement and, being verbal, said action prescribes in six years, and, therefore, appellee's
complaint should have been dismissed, considering that it was filed only on August 15, 1962 whereas the said transaction
took place in October, 1955. Overruling this contention, the court a quo sustained the claim of appellee that even if the said
transaction was verbal "the renewal of the bond executed by the Manila Underwriters Insurance Co., Inc., on December 28,
1955, to secure the payment of said balance of P2,800.00, has interrupted the running of said period of limitation."

In the opinion of the Court, this letter is a manifest acknowledgment on the part of the defendant corporation to pay
said balance of P2,800.00 for it is certainly difficult to understand why the defendant should renew the bond precisely to
145 | P a g e

secure the payment of said balance of P2,800.00 if it was not willing any more to recognize it as its legitimate obligation and
to pay the same. It is true that the execution of said bond was for the purpose of securing the verbal obligation of the
defendant with the Land Settlement and Development Corporation but when it renewed said bond, especially upon the
request of the plaintiff, Board of Liquidators, as trustee of the Land Settlement and Development Corporation, the defendant
expressly acknowledged that it was still indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of P2,800.00. According to Article 1155 of the New
Civil Code, "The prescription of actions is interrupted ... when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the
debtor." Consequently, the contention of the defendants that plaintiff's cause of action has already expired is devoid of any
legal merit. (pp. 151-152, Record on Appeal)

This ruling is on the whole correct, but the truth of the matter is that although, according to His Honor, "it is admitted
that the transaction is not evidenced by any written contract of purchase and sale, and, therefore, it is verbal," it is clear from
the record that by this statement, His Honor must have meant only that there was no formal contract executed in due form by
the parties. For in the stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, which this court may not disregard, it is clearly stated:

Thus, while there was no formal written contract signed by the parties, it cannot be denied that the Resolution 7173
of appellee Board, signed by all its members, a transcript of which is quoted on pp. not to speak of the official receipts
issued for the payment of the articles in question, constitute written evidence of the agreement because these documents,
although actually separate ones, if taken together, embody not only all the elements of a contract but even all the terms and
conditions of the agreement of purchase and sale between the appellant and appellee. Besides, judicial notice may be taken
of the fact that contractual transactions with government or any of its instrumentalities are invariably in writing.

G.R. No. L-22301 August 30, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MARIO MAPA
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The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is whether or not the appointment to and
holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for
the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. We hold that it does not.
FACTS:
The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated August 14, 1962 reading as follows: "The
undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as
follows: That on or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22,
without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the necessary license or permit
therefor from the corresponding authorities. Contrary to law."

When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at the outset asked the counsel for the accused:
"May counsel stipulate that the accused was found in possession of the gun involved in this case, that he has neither a permit
or license to possess the same and that we can submit the same on a question of law whether or not an agent of the governor
can hold a firearm without a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary."
After counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he would not question the authenticity of his exhibits, the
understanding being that only a question of law would be submitted for decision, he explicitly specified such question to be
"whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for his firearm."

Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that he could pass on their authenticity, the
fiscal asked the following question:
147 | P a g e

"Does the accused admit that this pistol cal. 22 revolver with six rounds of ammunition mentioned in the information was
found in his possession on August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having secured the necessary license or
permit thereof from the corresponding authority?"
The accused, now the appellant, answered categorically: "Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a statement:
"The accused admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused admits."

Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision."
Counsel for the accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the Hon.
Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962; another document likewise issued by Gov. Leviste also
addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City on a confidential mission; the oath of
office of the accused as such secret agent, a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect that the accused "is a secret agent"
of Gov. Leviste. Counsel for the accused then stated that with the presentation of the above exhibits he was "willing to submit
the case on the question of whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the provincial governor is
exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm." The exhibits were admitted and the parties were given time to
file their respective memoranda.1äwphï1.ñët

Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal
possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to pay the
costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him are forfeited in favor of the Government."
ISSUE:
whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would
constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
RULING:
148 | P a g e

The decision must be affirmed.

The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm,
detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition
regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine
Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant
governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not
covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official
duties."

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. Our task is equally clear.
The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them." The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot
be set aside.

Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang, where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption
that the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and
detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal
police expressly covered by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of this Court to set aside the
clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts with what was held in
People v. Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority.
149 | P a g e

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

G.R. No. 108028 July 30, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
CRISTINA M HERNANDEZ
Accused-appellant Cristina Hernandez was charged with the crime of illegal recruitment committed in large scale in violating
of Article 38 (a) and (b) in relation to Article 13 (b) and (c) of the New Labor Code.
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits ensued. Of the fourteen (14) private complainants,
four (4) were presented as witnesses for the prosecution, namely: Benito L. Bernabe, Robert P. Velasquez, Gregorio P.
Mendoza and Arnel Mendoza.
They testified to the following essential facts: Private complainants' first encounter with the appellant was on December 12,
1988 when one Josefa Cinco accompanied them to the office of the Philippine Thai Association, Inc. (Philippine-Thai) in Ermita,
Manila to meet the appellant. Introducing herself as the general manager of Philippine-Thai, appellant asserted that her
company recruited workers for placement abroad and asked private complainants if they wanted to work as factory workers
in Taipeh. Enticed by the assurance of immediate employment and an $800 per month salary, private complainants applied.
Appellant required private complainants to pay placement and passport fees in the total amount of P22,500.00 per applicant,
to be paid in three installments, to wit: P1,500 on December 14, 1988, P10,000.00 on December 16, 1988, and P11,000.00 on
December 22, 1988. When the complainants-witnesses paid the first two installments, they were issued receipts by Liza
Mendoza, the alleged treasurer of Philippine-Thai signed by the latter in the presence of the appellant. The receipts for the
last installment paid by them were signed by Liza Mendoza, and the appellant. After having received the entire amount3 from
the witnesses, appellant assured them that they would be able to leave for Taipeh sometime before the end of December,
1988. But contrary to appellant's promise, complainants-witnesses were unable to leave for abroad. They demanded for the
150 | P a g e

return of their money but to no avail. Appellant's unfulfilled promise of employment and her refusal to return the money that
had been paid by way of placement and passport fees, triggered the filing of the complaint.

For its part, the defense presented as its lone witness, the appellant whose testimony consisted mainly in denying the charges
against her. Appellant claimed that she never met any of the complainants nor did she ever recruit any of them. She
likewise denied having received money from anyone and asserted that she did not know any Liza Mendoza who is the
alleged treasure of Philippine-Thai. Appellant maintained that although she had an office in Ermita Building located at
Arquiza Street, Ermita, Manila, the said office belonged to B.C. Island Wood Products Corporation which was engaged in the
logging business. However, when questioned further, appellant admitted being the president of Philippine-Thai but only in a
nominal capacity, and claimed that as nominee-president, she did not participate in any of its transactions. Appellant likewise
insisted that Philippine-Thai was engaged solely in the barong tagalog business.

The lowered convicted the accused of the crime as charged.

Hence, this petition.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE "FACT THAT ACCUSED CRISTINA M. HERNANDEZ HAD BEEN
CHARGED . . . OF ANOTHER ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT . . . DOCKETED AS CRIMINAL CASE NO. 88-62599" AND IN CONSIDERING
THE PENDENCY THEREOF AS EVIDENCE OF THE "SCHEME AND STRATEGY ADOPTED BY THE ACCUSED . . . AND PRACTICED
WITH THE HELP OF HER AGENTS AND OTHER PERSONS WORKING UNDER THE SHADE OF HER PROTECTION."
151 | P a g e

The prosecution and the defense agreed to stipulate/admit that from the record of the POEA Licensing and Regulation
Office, Dept. of Labor and Employment, accused Cristina Hernandez/Phil. etc., Ass. . . . is neither licensed nor authorized by
the office to recruit workers overseas abroad and that if the duly authorized representative from the POEA Administration is
to take the witness stand, he will confirm to this fact as borne by the records.12 (Emphasis supplied.)

From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution and the defense counsel stipulated on two things: that ". . . from the
record of the POEA, . . . accused Cristina Hernandez, Phil. etc. Ass. . . . is neither licensed nor authorized by that office to
recruit workers for overseas abroad and that if the duly authorized representative from the POEA Administration (sic) is to
take the witness stand, he will confirm to this fact . . . ." The claim that the lower court mistakenly interpreted defense
counsel's acquiescence to the prosecution's proposed stipulation as an admission of non-possession of the requisite POEA
license or authority is belied by the fact that after the above enunciation by the court, no objection was interposed by defense
counsel.

Appellant further contends that granting arguendo that defense counsel had in fact agreed to the above stipulation of facts,
the same is null and void for being contrary to the well-established rule that a stipulation of facts is not allowed in criminal
cases.
xxxx
The rule prohibiting the stipulation of facts in criminal cases is grounded on the fundamental right of the accused to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty, and corollary duty of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. It is therefore advanced that the prosecution being duty-bound to prove all the elements of the crime, may
not be relieve of this obligation by the mere expedient of stipulating with defense counsel on a matter constitutive of the
essential elements of the crime charged.
152 | P a g e

The rationale behind the proscription against this class of agreements between prosecution and defense was enunciated in
the case of U.S. vs. Manlimos:17

It is not supposed to be within the knowledge or competence of counsel to predict what a proposed witness shall say under
the sanction of his oath and the test of cross-examination. A conviction for crime should not rest upon mere conjecture. Nor is
it possible for a trial court to weigh with exact nicety the contradictory declaration of witnesses not produced so as to be
subjected to its observation and its judgment as to their credibility.18

However, in the light of recent changes in our rules on criminal procedure, particularly the pre-trial provisions found in Rule
118, the prohibition against a stipulation of facts in criminal cases no longer holds true. Rule 118 provides the following:

Sec. 1. Pre-trial; when proper — To expedite trial, where the accused and counsel agree, the court shall conduct a pre-trial
conference on the matters enunciated in Section 2 hereof, without impairing the rights of the accused.

Sec. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects . . . The pre-trial conference shall consider the following:

(a) Plea bargaining;

(b) Stipulation of facts;

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)

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By virtue of the foregoing rule, a stipulation facts in criminal cases is now expressly sanctioned by law. In further pursuit of
the objective of expediting trial by dispensing with the presentation of evidence on matters that the accused is willing to
admit, a stipulation of fact should be allowed not only during pre-trial but also and with more reason, during trial proper itself.
Parenthetically, although not expressly sanctioned under the old rules of court, a stipulation of facts by the parties in criminal
cases has long been allowed and recognized as declarations constituting judicial admissions, hence, binding upon the parties.
In the case of People vs. Mapa19 where the accused was charged with illegal possession of firearms, the prosecution and the
defense stipulated on the fact that the accused was found in possession of gun without the requisite permit or license. More
at point is the case of People vs. Bocar20 wherein the fiscal proposed the admission by the accused of the affidavits and other
exhibits already presented by the prosecution to dispense with oral testimonies on the matter. Holding that the admissions
made by the parties were binding, this Court stated that:

. . . [T]here is nothing unlawful or irregular about the above procedure. The declarations constitute judicial admission, which
are binding on the parties, by virtue of which the prosecution dispensed with the introduction of additional evidence and the
defense waived the right to contest or dispute the veracity of the statements contained in the exhibits.21 (Emphasis supplied.)

The collorally issue left for the determination of this Court is whether or not Section 4 of Rule 118—requiring an agreement
or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference to be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and his
counsel before the same may be used in evidence against the accused-equally applies to a stipulation of facts made during
trial. We resolved this issue in the negative.

A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and defense counsel during trial in open court is automatically
reduced into writing and contained in the official transcript of the proceedings had in court. The conformity of the accused
in the form of his signature affixed thereto is unnecessary in view of the fact that: ". . . an attorney who is employed to
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manage a party's conduct of a lawsuit . . . has prima facie authority to make relevant admissions by pleadings, by oral or
written stipulation, . . . which unless allowed to be withdrawn are conclusive."24 (Emphasis supplied.)
In fact, "judicial admission are frequently those of counsel or of the attorney of record, who is, for the purpose of the trial, the
agent of his client. When such admissions are made . . . for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some fact, . . . they bind
the client, whether made during, or even after, the trial."

The foregoing find basis in the general rule that a client is bound by the acts of his counsel who represents him.26 For all
intents and purposes, the acts of a lawyer in the defense of a case are the acts of his client. The rule extends even to the
mistakes and negligence committed by the lawyer except only when such mistakes would result in serious injustice to the
client.27 No cogent reason exists to make such exception in this case. It is worth noting that Atty. Ulep, appellant's counsel in
the lower court, agreed to the stipulation of facts proposed by the prosecution not out of mistake nor inadvertence, but
obviously because the said stipulation of facts was also in conformity of defense's theory of the case. It may be recalled that
throughout the entire duration of the trial, appellant staunchly denied ever having engaged in the recruitment business either
in her personal capacity or through Philippine-Thai. Therefore, it was but logical to admit that the POEA records show that
neither she nor Philippine-Thai was licensed or authorized to recruit workers.

It is true that the rights of an accused during trial are given paramount importance in our laws on criminal procedure. Among
the fundamental rights of the accused is the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against
him.28 But the right of confrontation guaranteed and secured to the accused is a personal privilege which may be waived.29
Thus, in the case of U.S. vs. Anastasio,30 this Court deemed as a waiver of the right of confrontation, the admission by the
accused that witnesses if present would testify to certain facts stated in the affidavit of the prosecution.31
155 | P a g e

In the same vein, it may be said that such an admission is a waiver of the right of an accused to present evidence on his behalf.
Although the right to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution itself for the protection of the accused,
this right may be waived expressly or impliedly.32 This is in consonance with the doctrine of waiver which recognizes that ". . .
everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of
the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right, and
without detriment to the community at large."33

The abovementioned doctrine is squarely applicable to the case at bar. Appellant was never prevented from presenting
evidence contrary to the stipulation of facts. If appellant believed that the testimony of the Chief Licensing Officer of the
POEA would be beneficial to her case, then it is the defense who should have presented him. Her continuous failure to do so
during trial was a waiver of her right to present the pertinent evidence to contradict the stipulation of facts and establish
her defense.

In view of the foregoing, the stipulation of facts proposed during trial by prosecution and admitted by defense counsel is
tantamount to a judicial admission by the appellant of the facts stipulated on. Controlling, therefore, is Section 4, Rule 129
of the Rules of Court which provides that:

An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof.
The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission
was made.

We now go to appellant's second and third assignment of errors. In her second assignment of error, appellant makes much
ado of the "judicial notice" taken by the lower court of the fact that appellant had been charged with another illegal
156 | P a g e

recruitment case, and in considering the pendency thereof as evidence of the scheme and strategy adopted by the accused.
Appellant cites a violation of Section 3 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which provides that before the court may take judicial
notice of any matter, the parties shall be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case. It is claimed
that the lower court never announced its intention to take judicial notice of the pendency of the other illegal recruitment case
nor did it allow the accused to be heard thereon.

It is true that as a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other
cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both
cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge. However, this rule is subject to the exception that:

. . . in the absence of objection and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or any part
of the original record of the case filed in its archives as read into the records of a case pending before it, when with
the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it, by name and number or in some other manner by
which it is sufficiently designated, . . . (emphasis supplied.)

The judicial notice taken by the lower court of the pendency of another illegal recruitment case against the appellant falls
squarely under the above exception in view of the fact that it was the appellant herself who introduced evidence on the
matter when she testified in open court.
Even assuming, however, that the lower court improperly took judicial notice of the pendency of another illegal
recruitment case against the appellant, the error would not be fatal to the prosecution's cause. The judgment of conviction
was not based on the existence of another illegal recruitment case filed against appellant by a different group of
complainants, but on the overwhelming evidence against her in the instant case.
157 | P a g e

G.R. No. 130730 October 19, 2001

HERNANDO GENER
vs.
GREGORIO DE LEON and ZENAIDA FAUSTINO
The Case
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated May 30, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No.
37346 reversing the Decision2 dated April 3, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 11 in Civil Case No.
370-M-93 which set aside the Decision3 dated February 19, 1993 of the Municipal Trial Court of Norzagaray, Bulacan in a
forcible entry case filed by respondents spouses Gregorio de Leon and Zenaida Faustino against petitioner Hernando Gener.
FACTS:
The forcible entry case was initiated on April 30, 1990 before the Municipal Trial Court of Norzagaray, Bulacan. The
respondents, as plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are the original claimants and actual possessors in good faith under a bona
fide claim of ownership of a parcel of agricultural land situated at Poblacion, Norzagaray, Bulacan with an area of
approximately Four Thousand Four Hundred Four (4,404) square meters.
The said parcel of land and the adjoining lots on the north and south thereof were originally part of the course or bed of the
Angat River which was formerly adjacent thereto and the boundary on the east or north-east of Lot No. 1050, Cad-350, plan
Ap-03-003056, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-1208 (M) of respondent Gregorio de Leon.4

During the big flood in 1978, the Angat River allegedly changed its course by moving more than one hundred (100) meters far
to the east or north-east, leaving its former course or bed along the eastern or north-eastern boundary of Lot No. 1050 which
is elevated so that the said lot dried up. Then, the respondents extended their occupation and cultivation to this elevated
and dried up land, planting and cultivating thereon coconuts, bananas and vegetables until May 8, 1989 when petitioner
158 | P a g e

allegedly through force, threat and intimidation, unlawfully entered the property and deprived respondents of the
possession thereof, removing the barbed wire fence placed by respondents on the northern boundary of the land in dispute
and transferred it to the eastern boundary. Since demands to vacate fell on deaf ears and subsequent efforts toward
amicably settling the dispute through the Barangay Justice System proved futile, respondents instituted the complaint for
forcible entry against the petitioner.5

Petitioner, as defendant in the ejectment case, denied the material allegations of the complaint. Instead, he alleged that he
is the real owner and lawful and actual possessor of the land in dispute evidenced by a notarized deed of sale executed on
October 10, 1988 by Benjamin Joaquin, heir of the previous owner, Proceso Joaquin. Upon acquisition of the land in dispute,
he immediately caused the declaration of the land for taxation purposes in the Office of the Municipal Assessor of Norzagaray,
Bulacan and paid realty taxes thereon. Further, he claimed that the land is a private land which was previously owned by
Proceso Joaquin and that the said fact is admitted and recognized by Gorgonio de Leon, the late father and predecessor-in-
interest of respondent Gregorio de Leon, in an affidavit he executed on November 13, 1961 in which he mentioned Proceso
Joaquin as a neighboring landowner in the east of his land.

Petitioner further averred that it was respondents who forcibly entered his lot in question as evidenced by two (2) criminal
cases which petitioner filed, namely, (a) Criminal Case No. 3998 for malicious mischief against Rosendo Buen and Ignacio
Cadungcol alias Lolong, two (2) alleged helpers of the land of Gregorio de Leon, who allegedly entered the disputed land on
October 24, 1988 and destroyed coconut trees, papaya and langka trees which belonged to petitioner, and (b) Criminal Case
No. 4043 against Hugo de Leon and Rolly de Leon, brothers of Gregorio de Leon, who allegedly entered the disputed land on
March 12, 1989 and destroyed mango trees and other plants belonging to the petitioner Gener. Thus, considering that his
occupation of the land in dispute allegedly started on October 10, 1988, the Municipal Trial Court has no jurisdiction over
the action since the forcible entry suit filed by respondents was filed beyond the one year period.
The Municipal Trial Court of Norzagaray, Bulacan rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant.
159 | P a g e

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, on April 3, 1995, reversed the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of
Norzagaray, and thereby dismissed herein respondents’ complaint for forcible entry.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution promulgated on September 16,
1997.11 Hence, the instant petition for review before this Court.
ISSUE:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING THE CASE IN VIEW OF
THE FAILURE OF THE RESPONDENTS TO ALLEGE IN THE COMPLAINT PRIOR POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN QUESTION;
RULING: NO

The Municipal Trial Court of Norzagaray should have taken judicial notice of the said criminal cases involving the subject
parcel of land and pending in its docket. While, as a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and
notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge, this rule is
subject to the exception that "in the absence of objection and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly
treat all or any part of the original record of the case filed in its archives as read into the records of a case pending before it,
when with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it, by name and number or in some other manner by
which it is sufficiently designated."
Respondents did not impugn nor object to the evidence of petitioner on the existence of the said criminal cases of
malicious mischief that sprung from the alleged forcible entry of petitioner’s alleged property. Thus, the said Municipal
Trial Court should have taken judicial notice of these facts in resolving the issue of prior possession.
160 | P a g e

In view of the evidence on the possession of petitioner prior to May 8, 1989, as shown by the incidents on October 24, 1988
and March 12, 1989, the cause of action of respondents for forcible entry against the petitioner has already prescribed when
they filed the complaint for ejectment on April 30, 1990. Because forcible entry cases must be filed within one year from the
date of actual entry on the land.26 Forcible entry is a quieting process and the one year time bar to the ejectment suit is in
pursuance of the summary nature of the action. After the lapse of the one year period, the remedies of the party dispossessed
of a parcel of land is to file either an accion publiciana which is a plenary action to recover the right of possession or an accion
reinvindicatoria which is an action to recover ownership as well as for the recovery of possession. Consequently, since
respondent’s cause of action for forcible entry has prescribed, the Municipal Trial Court was without jurisdiction to hear
and decide the subject ejectment case.

G.R. No. 85423 May 6, 1991

JOSE TABUENA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

The Case:
The petitioner faults the decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the respondent court, for lack of basis. It is argued that the
lower courts should not have taken into account evidence not submitted by the private respondent in accordance with the
Rules of Court.
FACTS:
The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land consisting of about 440 square meters and situated in Poblacion,
Makato, Aklan.
In 1973, an action for recovery of ownership thereof was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Aklan by the estate of Alfredo
Tabernilla against Jose Tabuena, the herein petitioner. The complaint was filed when demand was made upon Tabuena to
surrender the property and he refused, claiming it as his own.
161 | P a g e

After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant was required to vacate the disputed lot.
As the trial court found, the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. sometime in 1926 to Alfredo Tabernilla while the two were in the
United States; that Tabuena was only living on the said by mere tolerance of Tabernilla under the condition that the latter
shall pay for the realy tax on the property.
The trial court rejected his defense that he was the absolute owner of the lot, which he inherited from his parents, who
acquired it even before World War II and had been living thereon since then and until they died. Also disbelieved was his
contention that the subject of the sale between Peralta and Tabernilla was a different piece of land planted to coconut trees
and bounded on three sides by the Makato River.
In so ruling, the trial court motu proprio took cognizance of Exhibits "A"(letter dated October 4, 1921 addressed in Makato,
Capiz, Philippines, indicating the amount of consideration); "B"(a Spanish document); and "C" (deed of conveyance filed by
Tomasa Timtiman and Alfredo Tabernilla in 1923), which had been marked by the plaintiff but never formally submitted in
evidence. The trial court also resolve the ownership of the subject lot by the proceedings in another case involving the same
parties but a different parcel of land.
The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC; that, contrary to the allegations of the appellant, the said exhibits were in fact formally
submitted in evidence as disclosed by the transcript of stenographic notes, which it quoted at length. The challenged decision
also upheld the use by the trial court of testimony given in an earlier case, to bolster its findings in the second case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court on motu proprio may took cognizance of Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had been marked
by the plaintiff but never formally submitted in evidence for admission of plaintiff-administratix.
RULING: NO
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides in Section 35 thereof as follows:
162 | P a g e

Sec. 35. Offer of evidence.—The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which
the evidence is offered must be specified.
The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not mean it has thereby already been offered as part
of the evidence of a party. It is true that Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" were marked at the pre-trial of the case below, but this
was only for the purpose of identifying them at that time. So, such documents cannot be considered evidence, nor can they
be given any evidentiary value."

It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, "in the absence of objection," "with the knowledge of the
opposing party," or "at the request or with the consent of the parties," the case is clearly referred to or "the original or part
of the records of the case are actually withdrawn from the archives" and "admitted as part of the record of the case then
pending." These conditions have not been established here. On the contrary, the petitioner was completely unaware that his
testimony in Civil Case No. 1327 was being considered by the trial court in the case then pending before it. As the petitioner
puts it, the matter was never taken up at the trial and was "unfairly sprung" upon him, leaving him no opportunity to
counteract.
The respondent court said that even assuming that the trial court improperly took judicial notice of the other case, striking off
all reference thereto would not be fatal to the plaintiff's cause because "the said testimony was merely corroborative of other
evidences submitted by the plaintiff." What "other evidences"? The trouble with this justification is that the exhibits it
intends to corroborate, to wit, Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", have themselves not been formally submitted.

Considering the resultant paucity of the evidence for the private respondent, we feel that the complaint should have been
dismissed by the trial court for failure of the plaintiff to substantiate its allegations . It has failed to prove that the subject
lot was the same parcel of land sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. to Alfredo Tabernilla and not another property, as the petitioner
contends. Even assuming it was the same lot, there is no explanation for the sale thereof by Juan Peralta, Jr., who was only
the son of Damasa Timtiman. According to the trial court, "there is no question that before 1934 the land in question
163 | P a g e

belonged to Damasa Timtiman." Juan Peralta, Jr. could not have validly conveyed title to property that did not belong to
him unless he had appropriate authorization from the owner. No such authorization has been presented.

It is true that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, as we have held in many cases. However, that rule is
also not absolute and yields to the accepted and well-known exception. In the case at bar, it is not even disputed that the
petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest have possessed the disputed property since even before World War

The conclusions of the trial court were based mainly on Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had not been formally offered as
evidence and therefore should have been totally disregarded, conformably to the Rules of Court. The trial court also erred
when it relied on the evidence submitted in Civil Case No. 1327 and took judicial notice thereof without the consent or
knowledge of the petitioner, in violation of existing doctrine. Thus vitiated, the factual findings here challenged are as an
edifice built upon shifting sands and should not have been sustained by the respondent court.

Our own finding is that the private respondent, as plaintiff in the lower court, failed to prove his claim of ownership over
the disputed property with evidence properly cognizable under our adjudicative laws. By contrast, there is substantial
evidence supporting the petitioner's contrary contentions that should have persuaded the trial judge to rule in s favor and
dismiss the complaint.

G.R. No. 171406 April 4, 2011

ASIAN TERMINALS, INC
vs.
MALAYAN INSURANCE, CO., INC.
164 | P a g e

THE CASE:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the July 14, 2005 Decision2 and the February
14, 2006 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CV No. 61798.

Factual Antecedents

On November 14, 1995, Shandong Weifang Soda Ash Plant shipped on board the vessel MV "Jinlian I" 60,000 plastic bags of
soda ash dense (each bag weighing 50 kilograms) from China to Manila. The shipment, with an invoice value of
US$456,000.00, was insured with respondent Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. under Marine Risk Note No. RN-0001-21430,
and covered by a Bill of Lading issued by Tianjin Navigation Company with Philippine Banking Corporation as the consignee
and Chemphil Albright and Wilson Corporation as the notify party.

On November 21, 1995, upon arrival of the vessel at Pier 9, South Harbor, Manila,6 the stevedores of petitioner Asian
Terminals, Inc., a duly registered domestic corporation engaged in providing arrastre and stevedoring services,7 unloaded the
60,000 bags of soda ash dense from the vessel and brought them to the open storage area of petitioner for temporary storage
and safekeeping, pending clearance from the Bureau of Customs and delivery to the consignee. When the unloading of the
bags was completed on November 28, 1995, 2,702 bags were found to be in bad order condition.9

On November 29, 1995, the stevedores of petitioner began loading the bags in the trucks of MEC Customs Brokerage for
transport and delivery to the consignee.10 On December 28, 1995, after all the bags were unloaded in the warehouses of the
consignee, a total of 2,881 bags were in bad order condition due to spillage, caking, and hardening of the contents.11
165 | P a g e

On April 19, 1996, respondent, as insurer, paid the value of the lost/ damaged cargoes to the consignee in the amount of
₱643,600.25.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On November 20, 1996, respondent, as subrogee of the consignee, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 35, a Complaint for damages against petitioner, the shipper Inchcape Shipping Services, and the cargo broker MEC
Customs Brokerage.14

The RTC rendered a Decision16 finding petitioner liable for the damage/loss sustained by the shipment but absolving the
other defendants. The RTC found that the proximate cause of the damage/loss was the negligence of petitioner’s stevedores
who handled the unloading of the cargoes from the vessel.
The RTC emphasized that despite the admonitions of Marine Cargo Surveyors Edgar Liceralde and Redentor Antonio not to
use steel hooks in retrieving and picking-up the bags, petitioner’s stevedores continued to use such tools, which pierced the
bags and caused the spillage.18 The RTC, thus, ruled that petitioner, as employer, is liable for the acts and omissions of its
stevedores under Articles 217619 and 2180 paragraph (4)20 of the Civil Code.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

166 | P a g e

The CA agreed with the RTC that the damage/loss was caused by the negligence of petitioner’s stevedores in handling and
storing the subject shipment. The CA likewise rejected petitioner’s assertion that it received the subject shipment in bad
order condition as this was belied by Marine Cargo Surveyors Redentor Antonio and Edgar Liceralde, who both testified that
the actual counting of bad order bags was done only after all the bags were unloaded from the vessel and that the Turn Over
Survey of Bad Order Cargoes (TOSBOC) upon which petitioner anchors its defense was prepared only on November 28, 1995
or after the unloading of the bags was completed.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the CA denied the same in a Resolution28 dated February 14, 2006 for lack of merit.

Issues

(1) whether the non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy is fatal to respondent’s cause of action;
(2) whether the proximate cause of the damage/loss to the shipment was the negligence of petitioner’s stevedores; and
(3) whether the court can take judicial notice of the Management Contract between petitioner and the Philippine Ports
Authority (PPA) in determining petitioner’s liability.

Our Ruling

Judicial notice does not apply

167 | P a g e

The Management Contract entered into by petitioner and the PPA is clearly not among the matters which the courts can
take judicial notice of. It cannot be considered an official act of the executive department. The PPA, which was created by
virtue of Presidential Decree No. 857, as amended,68 is a government-owned and controlled corporation in charge of
administering the ports in the country. Obviously, the PPA was only performing a proprietary function when it entered into a
Management Contract with petitioner. As such, judicial notice cannot be applied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed July 14, 2005 Decision and the February 14, 2006 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61798 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 131516 March 5, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
RONNIE RULLEPA Y GUINTO
FACTS:
On complaint of Cyra May Francisco Buenafe, accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto was charged with Rape of a minor (3
years old) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City allegedly committed as follows:
168 | P a g e

Arraigned on January 15, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.2

RTC found the accused RONNIE RULLEPA y GUINTO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape, and he is accordingly sentenced
to death.
Hence, this automatic review, accused-appellant assigning the following errors to the trial court:
ISSUE:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH UPON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.11
(Emphasis supplied.)

RULING: YES
As it has not been established with moral certainty that Cyra May was below seven years old at the time of the commission of
the offense, accused-appellant cannot be sentenced to suffer the death penalty. Only the penalty of reclusion perpetua can
be imposed upon him.

The victim's age is relevant in rape cases since it may constitute an element of the offense. Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,29 provides:

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:

xxx xxx xxx.

169 | P a g e

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age . . .

xxx xxx xxx.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

xxx xxx xxx.

Furthermore, the victim's age may constitute a qualifying circumstance, warranting the imposition of the death sentence. The
same Article states:

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity with the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim:

xxx xxx xxx.

170 | P a g e

4. when the victim is . . . a child below seven (7) years old.

xxx xxx xxx.

Because of the seemingly conflicting decisions regarding the sufficiency of evidence of the victim's age in rape cases, this
Court, in the recently decided case of People v. Pruna, established a set of guidelines in appreciating age as an element of
the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, to wit:

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth
of such party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records
which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable,
the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity
who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party
pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
171 | P a g e

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim's mother or relatives
concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the
accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the
testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.

6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.

Applying the foregoing guidelines, this Court in the Pruna case held that the therein accused-appellant could only be
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua since:

. . . no birth certificate or any similar authentic document, such as a baptismal certificate of LIZETTE, was presented to prove
her age. . . . .

xxx xxx xxx.

172 | P a g e

However, the Medico-Legal Report relied upon by the trial court does not in any way prove the age of LIZETTE, for there is
nothing therein which even mentions her age. Only testimonial evidence was presented to establish LIZETTE's age. Her
mother, Jacqueline, testified (that the victim was three years old at the time of the commission of the crime).

xxx xxx xxx

Likewise, LIZETTE testified on 20 November 1996, or almost two years after the incident, that she was 5 years old. However,
when the defense counsel asked her how old she was on 3 January 1995, or at the time of the rape, she replied that she was 5
years old. Upon further question as to the date she was born, she could not answer.

For PRUNA to be convicted of rape in its qualified form and meted the supreme penalty of death, it must be established
with certainty that LIZETTE was below 7 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. It must be stressed that the
severity of the death penalty, especially its irreversible and final nature once carried out, makes the decision-making process
in capital offenses aptly subject to the most exacting rules of procedure and evidence.

In view of the uncertainty of LIZETTE's exact age, corroborative evidence such as her birth certificate, baptismal certificate or
any other authentic document should be introduced in evidence in order that the qualifying circumstance of "below seven (7)
years old" is appreciated against the appellant. The lack of objection on the part of the defense as to her age did not excuse
the prosecution from discharging its burden. That the defense invoked LIZETTE's tender age for purposes of questioning her
competency to testify is not necessarily an admission that she was below 7 years of age when PRUNA raped her on 3 January
1995. Such being the case, PRUNA cannot be convicted of qualified rape, and hence the death penalty cannot be imposed on
him.
173 | P a g e

However, conformably with no. 3 (b) of the foregoing guidelines, the testimony of LIZETTE's mother that she was 3 years
old at the time of the commission of the crime is NOT sufficient for purposes of holding PRUNA liable for statutory rape, or
rape of a girl below 12 years of age.
Under the second paragraph of Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, in relation to no. 3 of the first paragraph thereof,
having carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age is punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, the penalty to be
imposed on PRUNA should be reclusion perpetua, and not death penalty. (Italics in the original.)

Several cases suggest that courts may take "judicial notice" of the appearance of the victim in determining her age. For
example, the Court, in People v. Tipay, qualified the ruling in People v. Javier,33 which required the presentation of the birth
certificate to prove the rape victim's age, with the following pronouncement:

This does not mean, however, that the presentation of the certificate of birth is at all times necessary to prove minority. The
minority of a victim of tender age who may be below the age of ten is quite manifest and the court can take judicial notice
thereof. The crucial years pertain to the ages of fifteen to seventeen where minority may seem to be dubitable due to one's
physical appearance. In this situation, the prosecution has the burden of proving with certainty the fact that the victim was
under 18 years of age when the rape was committed in order to justify the imposition of the death penalty under the above-
cited provision. (Emphasis supplied.)

On the other hand, a handful of cases holds that courts, without the requisite hearing prescribed by Section 3, Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court,35 cannot take judicial notice of the victim's age.
174 | P a g e

This is not to say that the process is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court; on the contrary, it does. A person's appearance,
where relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the same being addressed to the senses of the court. Section 1, Rule 130
provides:

SECTION 1. Object as evidence. — Objects as evidence are those addressed to the senses of the court. When an object is
relevant to the fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court.

XXXX
There can be no question, therefore, as to the admissibility of a person's appearance in determining his or her age. As to the
weight to accord such appearance, especially in rape cases, Pruna laid down guideline no. 3, which is again reproduced
hereunder:

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the
testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is
qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to
Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
175 | P a g e

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.

Under the above guideline, the testimony of a relative with respect to the age of the victim is sufficient to constitute proof
beyond reasonable doubt in cases (a), (b) and (c) above. In such cases, the disparity between the allegation and the proof of
age is so great that the court can easily determine from the appearance of the victim the veracity of the testimony. The
appearance corroborates the relative's testimony.

As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, the person's appearance, as object evidence of her age, loses
probative value. Doubt as to her true age becomes greater and, following Agadas, supra, such doubt must be resolved in favor
of the accused.

This is because in the era of modernism and rapid growth, the victim's mere physical appearance is not enough to gauge
her exact age. For the extreme penalty of death to be upheld, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime must be substantiated. Verily, the minority of the victim should be not only alleged but
likewise proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself. Be it remembered that the proof of the victim's age in
the present case spells the difference between life and death.47

In the present case, the prosecution did not offer the victim's certificate of live birth or similar authentic documents in
evidence. The victim and her mother, however, testified that she was only three years old at the time of the rape.
Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the age sought to be proved (below twelve
years), the trial court would have had no difficulty ascertaining the victim's age from her appearance. No reasonable doubt,
therefore, exists that the second element of statutory rape, i.e., that the victim was below twelve years of age at the time of
the commission of the offense, is present.
176 | P a g e

Whether the victim was below seven years old, however, is another matter. Here, reasonable doubt exists. A mature three
and a half-year old can easily be mistaken for an underdeveloped seven-year old. The appearance of the victim, as object
evidence, cannot be accorded much weight and, following Pruna, the testimony of the mother is, by itself, insufficient.

As it has not been established with moral certainty that Cyra May was below seven years old at the time of the commission of
the offense, accused-appellant cannot be sentenced to suffer the death penalty. Only the penalty of reclusion perpetua can
be imposed upon him.

G.R. No. 198172

REGULUS DEVELOPMENT, INC.
vs.
ANTONIO DELA CRUZ

The Case
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Regulus Development, Inc. (petitioner) to challenge the
November 23, 2010 Decision1 and August 10, 2011 resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 105290. CA
Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. penned the rulings, concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Fiorito S.
Macalino.

ANTECEDENT FACTS
177 | P a g e

The petitioner is the owner of an apartment (San Juan Apartments) located at San Juan Street, Pasay City. Antonio dela Cruz
(respondent) leased two units (Unit 2002-A and Unit 2002-B) of the San Juan Apartments in 1993 and 1994. The contract of
lease for each of the two units similarly provides a lease period of one (1) month, subject to automatic renewals, unless
terminated by the petitioner upon written notice.

The petitioner sent the respondent a letter to terminate the lease of the two subject units. Due to the respondent’s refusal to
vacate the units, the petitioner filed a complaint3 for ejectment before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Pasay City,
Manila, on May 1, 2001.

The MTC resolved the case in the petitioner’s favor and ordered the respondent to vacate the premises, and pay the rentals
due until the respondent actually complies.

The respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Pending appeal, the respondent consigned the monthly rentals to
the RTC due to the petitioner’s refusal to receive the rentals.

The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC in toto and denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the respondent.

In a Petition for Review filed by the respondent, the CA reversed the lower courts’ decisions and dismissed the ejectment
case. On March 19, 2003, the dismissal of the case became final and executory.
178 | P a g e

Execution of RTC Orders

The petitioner returned to the RTC and moved for the issuance of a writ of execution to allow it to proceed against the
supersedeas bond the respondent posted, representing rentals for the leased properties from May 2001 to October 2001, and
to withdraw the lease payments deposited by respondent from November 2001 until August 2003.19 The RTC granted the
motion.

The RTC issued an Alias Writ of Execution21 dated April 26, 2007, allowing the withdrawal of the rental deposits and the value
of the supersedeas bond.

The petitioner claimed that the withdrawn deposits, supersedeas bond, and payments directly made by the respondent to the
petitioner, were insufficient to cover rentals due for the period of May 2001 to May 2004. Hence, the petitioner filed a
manifestation and motion22 dated October 23, 2007, praying that the RTC levy upon the respondent’s property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 136829 to satisfy the judgment credit.

The RTC granted the petitioner’s motion in an order dated June 30, 2008.23 The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied by the RTC in an order dated August 26, 2008.24

CA-G.R. SP No. 105290: Assailed the levy of the respondent’s property

179 | P a g e

On October 3, 2008, the respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari with application for issuance of a temporary
restraining order. The petition sought to nullify and set aside the orders of the RTC directing the levy of the respondent’s real
property. The CA dismissed the petition. Thereafter, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration26 dated November 3,
2008.

Pursuant to the order dated June 30, 2008, a public auction for the respondent’s property covered by TCT No. 136829 was
held on November 4, 2008,27 where the petitioner was declared highest bidder. Subsequently, the Certificate of Sale28 in
favor of the petitioner was registered.

Meanwhile, on January 7, 2010, the respondent redeemed the property with the RTC Clerk of Court, paying the equivalent of
the petitioner’s bid price with legal interest. The petitioner filed a motion to release funds29 for the release of the redemption
price paid. The RTC granted30 the motion.

On February 12, 2010, the respondent filed a manifestation and motion31 before the CA to withdraw the petition for the
reason that the redemption of the property and release of the price paid rendered the petition moot and academic.

Thereafter, the petitioner received the CA decision dated November 23, 2010, which reversed and set aside the orders of the
RTC directing the levy of the respondent’s property. The CA held that while the approval of the petitioner’s motion to
withdraw the consigned rentals and the posted supersedeas bond was within the RTC’s jurisdiction, the RTC had no
jurisdiction to levy on the respondent’s real property.
180 | P a g e

The CA explained that the approval of the levy on the respondent’s real property could not be considered as a case pending
appeal, because the decision of the MTC had already become final and executory. As such, the matter of execution of the
judgment lies with the MTC where the complaint for ejectment was originally filed and presented.

The CA ordered the RTC to remand the case to the MTC for execution. The petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration
which was denied by the CA.

THE PETITION

The petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari to challenge the CA ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 105290 which
held that the RTC had no jurisdiction to levy on the respondent’s real property.

The petitioner argues: first, that the RTC’s release of the consigned rentals and levy were ordered in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction; second, that the respondent’s petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 105290 was already moot and academic with the
conduct of the auction sale and redemption of the respondent’s real property; third, that the petition in CAG. R. SP No.
105290 should have been dismissed outright for lack of signature under oath on the Verification and Certification against
Forum Shopping.

The respondent duly filed its comment33 and refuted the petitioner’s arguments. On the first argument, respondent merely
reiterated the CA’s conclusion that the RTC had no jurisdiction to order the levy on respondent’s real property as it no longer
falls under the allowed execution pending appeal. On the second argument, the respondent contended that the levy on
181 | P a g e

execution and sale at public auction were null and void, hence the CA decision is not moot and academic. On the third
argument, the respondent simply argued that it was too late to raise the alleged formal defect as an issue.

THE ISSUE

Whether or not the Court can take judicial notice the validity of the RTC Orders has been upheld in a separate petition
before this Court

OUR RULING

This Court takes judicial notice that the validity of the RTC Orders has been upheld in a separate petition before this Court,
under G.R. SP No. 171429 entitled Antonio Dela Cruz v. Regulus Development, Inc.

The levy of real property was ordered by the RTC in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction.

The levy of the respondent’s property was made pursuant to the RTC orders issued in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction,
independent of the ejectment case originally filed with the MTC.
182 | P a g e

An examination of the RTC order dated June 30, 2008, directing the levy of the respondent’s real property shows that it was
based on the RTC order dated July 25, 2003. The levy of the respondent’s property was issued to satisfy the amounts due
under the lease contracts, and not as a result of the decision in the ejectment case.

xxxx
The subsequent order of the RTC to levy on the respondent’s property was merely a reiteration and an enforcement of the
original writ of execution issued.

Since the order of levy is clearly rooted on the RTC Orders, the only question that needs to be resolved is which court has
jurisdiction to order the execution of the RTC orders.

G.R. No. 119184 July 21, 1997

THE HEIRS OF FELICIDAD CANQUE
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS

SYNOPSIS:
183 | P a g e

In deciding this appeal, this Court reiterates the dictum that the mortgagor of titled real estate acquired under the Public
Land Act but foreclosed by a rural bank, may redeem said property within two (2) years from the registration of the sheriff's
certificate of sale; and if the said mortgagor fails to exercise such right, he or his heirs may still repurchase the land within
five years from the expiration of the two-year redemption period. It also finds occasion to remind lower courts to keep
abreast of decisions of this Court and apply them in resolving identical cases before them.
The Antecedent Facts
The facts as found by the Respondent Court of Appeals appear undisputed. They are as follows:
Spouses Marcelino Canque and Felicidad Canque were the registered owners of a parcel of land under Original Certificate of
Title No. P-(20559)-3409, of the Register of Deeds of Davao del Sur issued by virtue of Free Patent No. 40336, with an area of 2
hectares, 43 ares, and 58 centares.
On May 21, 1976, said spouses sold a portion of the parcel of land to the Iglesia ni Kristo Church to the extent of 750 square
meters. A new Transfer of Title No. T-8730 was issued to said spouses by the Register of Deeds of Davao del Sur.
On October 12, 1977, said spouses obtained a loan of Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) from defendant bank secured by a real
estate mortgage over the parcel of land under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8730 with an area of 23,608 square meters.
The spouses' loan of P15,000.00 with the defendant bank was duly paid.
On February 2, 1980, Felicidad Canque passed away. More than a month later, on March 7, 1980, widower Marcelino
Canque obtained by himself, another loan with defendant bank in the amount of P25,000.00 with the same conjugal
property under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8730 as collateral. The defendant bank allegedly considered this second
loan as an extension of the first loan as the real estate mortgage of the first loan had remained uncancelled, despite the
earlier payment of the first loan by the said spouses.
For failure of Marcelino Canque to pay the second loan, defendant bank extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage
and sold the property to itself as the highest bidder in a public sale.
184 | P a g e

On September 9, 1983, the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was registered. On October 18, 1985, defendants executed an affidavit
of consolidation of ownership and deed of absolute sale. On December 23, 1985, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18357 was
issued in the name of defendant bank by the Register of Deeds of Davao del Sur.
After seven years from the registration of the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale, plaintiffs Marcelino Canque and his children
offered to redeem the property in question but defendant bank refused.
Hence, the complaint filed before the lower court on September 7, 1990.
After hearing on the merits, the lower court first issued a partial judgment on January 8, 1992, the decretal portion of which
reads:
1. Declaring the real estate mortgage between the plaintiffs and defendants valid; and

2. Allowing the plaintiffs to exercise their right of redemption and/or repurchase pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 119, of
Commonwealth Act 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act.
Dissatisfied with the verdict of the lower court plaintiffs appealed to the Court [of Appeals].

The principal issue is whether or not the lower court erred in ruling that plaintiff Mario Canque's right of redemption as well
as that of the other plaintiffs-appellees, heirs of Felicidad Canque, has not prescribed.

The respondent appellate court disagreed with the trial court's decision, viz:

Clearly, the lower court erred in ruling that plaintiffs-appellees' redemption period commenced on October 18, 1985, date of
defendants-appellants execution of an affidavit of consolidation of ownership and deed of absolute sale. The correct date to
185 | P a g e

reckon with the start of the plaintiffs-appellees' prescriptive period of five years is September 9, 1983, the date of the
registration of the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale.
Plaintiffs-appellees' instant suit to compel defendants-appellees to allow them to redeem the property was only filed on
September 7, 1990, or almost seven (7) years from the registration of the Sheriff's certificate of sale, or beyond the five-year
prescriptive period as provided under Sec. 119 of Commonwealth Act 141. Thus, plaintiffs-appellees' right of redemption
had already prescribed.

All is not lost, however for the plaintiffs-appellees as heirs of Felicidad Canque for the lost right of redemption of the parcel of
land in question only applies to the conjugal share of 50% of plaintiff Marcelino Canque considering that at the time the
second loan of P25,000.00 was entered by said plaintiff with defendant bank, his spouse Felicidad Canque, who had a share of
the other 50% of the conjugal property, had already passed away (Art. 185, New Civil Code). Thus, when plaintiff Mario
Canque entered into the said loan agreement with defendant bank giving the parcel of land in question as security in the form
of real estate mortgage, it was only valid insofar as his 50% of the conjugal property share from the said parcel of land is
concerned. Defendant-appellant bank had acquired, therefore, no right over the other 50% of the conjugal property
pertaining to the late Felicidad Canque which share of 50% automatically passed to her heirs, herein plaintiffs-appellees from
the moment of her (Felicidad Canque) death (Art. 777, New Civil Code).7
Not satisfied with the above, petitioner filed this recourse to this Court.

The Issues

I — The Court of Appeals committed a serious error of low in holding that the period to repurchase of foreclosed lands issued
thru free patent by Rural Banks is only five (5) years.
186 | P a g e

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

First Issue: Prescriptive Period to Repurchase
In Rural Bank of Davao City vs. Court of Appeals, this Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. explicitly and cogently
ruled:
. . . If the land is mortgaged to a rural bank under R.A. No. 720, as amended, the mortgagor may redeem the property within
two (2) years from the date of foreclosure or form the registration of the sheriff's certificate of sale at such foreclosure if the
property is not covered or is covered, respectively, by a Torrens title. If the mortgagor fails to exercise such right, he or his
heirs may still repurchase the property within five (5) years from the expiration of the two (2) year redemption period
pursuant to Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141). If the land is mortgaged to parties other than rural banks, the
mortgagor may redeem the property within one (1) year from the registration of the certificate of sale pursuant to Act No.
3135. If he fails to do so, he or his heirs may repurchase the property within five (5) years from the expiration of the
redemption period also pursuant to Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act.

In the case at bar, the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was registered on September 9, 1983. Thus, based on the foregoing dictum,
the petitioners, whose land was mortgaged to and foreclosed by a rural bank, had a period of two years or until September 9,
1985 to exercise their right of redemption. And in line with the mandate of Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act, they had an
additional period of five years from the latter date or until September 9, 1990 to exercise their right to repurchase. Thus,
the petitioners' right to redeem their land had not expired on September 7, 1990 when they filed suit against private
respondent to compel the latter to allow the former to repurchase their land.
187 | P a g e

G.R. No. L-3097 March 5, 1951

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CASAMIRO BERSAMIN (alias MIRONG), appellant.

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for robbery with homicide sentencing the herein appellant, Casimiro
Bersamin, to reclusion perpetua, P6,000 indemnity to the heirs of the deceased to be paid jointly and severally with Saturnino
de la Vega, to return the goods robbed or pay their value in the sum of P65, and costs. Convicted with the appellant was
Saturnino de la Vega, who did not appeal, and prosecuted with these two were Pablo Calugay, Isabelo Gusto and Alfredo
Arellano who were acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt.
FACTS:
It appears that on the night of October 24, 1948, Dalmacio Caguing slept alone in his home in barrio Malabobo, municipality of
Mangatarem, Province of Pangasinan, his wife having spent the night with her parents in another barrio of the same
municipality two kilometers away. When Macaria Dalag, the wife, came home the next morning her husband was dead with
two gunshot wounds, and she found household articles scattered all over the house and merchandise missing. The deceased
and his wife had been running a small business, and the missing goods were salted fish, canned sardines, canned salmon,
Chinese wine, threads, glass jars with biscuits, and one Bible, the total value of which was calculated at P80.

There were no eye-witnesses to the crime, and the main evidence for the prosecution was furnished by alleged companions of
the defendants in the robbery — Emiliano Tolentino and Francisco Bulatao.
188 | P a g e

Briefly, Emiliano Tolentino testified that on the night of October 24, 1948, about eight o'clock, he was "taken or asked" by
Francisco Bulatao and Casimiro Bersamin to accompany them. From his house, they set out for the place of Dalmacio Caguing,
and on the way, at the "junction," they were joined by other people among whom he recognized Saturnino de la Vega.
Arriving at Dalmacio Caguing's house, Bersamin and De la Vega went upstairs, Bersamin with a .45 caliber "rifle", which
seemed to be Exhibit C, and De la Vega a carbine. Thereafter he heard two shots from the house while he was standing
about six meters away, and noted a commotion although he could not tell what they were doing inside the house. Those
who remained downstairs were around the house. A few moments after the shots Saturnino de la Vega and Casimiro
Bersamin came down, the former with a knapsack and the latter with a sack. He did not know what the sack contained but
he saw some of the contents of the knapsack, and they were bottled sarsaparilla, bottled orange and a box of gaffs. Exhibit A,
a Bible, seemed to him one of the things Bersamin brought down. On the way from Caguing's house, they stopped at the
"junction" and were handed a bottle of soft drinks, each.

Francisco Bulatao's testimony run substantially as follows:

He was left at the road by Casimiro Bersamin and Saturnino de la Vega while these walked toward the house of Dalmacio
Caguing, Bersamin carrying a revolver and De la Vega a carbine. It was about eight o'clock, rather dark, and he could not see
Bersamin and De la Vega when they climbed up stairs. Afterward shots rang out inside the house. By and by Bersamin and De
la Vega came down bringing with them a sack and a knapsack respectively, the latter of which contained bottle soft drinks.
When the band arrived at the "junction" after the crime they were given a bottle each by Bersamin. A book, Exhibit A, was also
taken from the house and was given to him (witness) by Bersamin when they were returning home.

Explaining how he came to be with the band, Bulatao said that Casimiro Bersamin came to his house and house and requested
him to come long to Emiliano Tolentino's house: that with Tolentino they proceeded to Caguing's house; that on the way they
were joined by Saturnino de la Vega and others whom he did not know:
189 | P a g e

On minor matters other witness were called.

Anastacio Zamuco, justice of the peace of Bugallon and Aguilar, identified Exhibit D as alfredo Arellano's statement sworn to
before him; and Deogracias C. Andaya, PC T/ SGT, identified Exhibit C, a pistol, which he said had been "mortagage" by
Casimiro Bersamin to one Jacinto Viperas in barrio Caturay, Bayambang. Andaya also identified the bible and said it had been
turned over to him by Pfc. Pedro Sison of his company.

For the defense, Saturnino de la Vega, Alfredo Arellano, Casimiro Bersamin, Felisa Dalag (Arellano's wife) and Francisco
Cuaresma took the stand. Saying nothing about his part in the crime, De la Vega confined his testimony to the alleged
conversation in the provincial jail between Bulatao and Bersamin, by which, it will be seen later, Bersamin undertook to
impeach Bulatao's in which he said, among other things, that Bulatao and Bersamin entered Caguing's house was signed and
sworn to by him before the justice of the peace when he was dizzy. He put up an alibi. Arellano's wife and Francisco Cuaresma
gave evidence in support of Arellano's purported alibi.

Casimiro Bersamin testified substantially as follows:

On October 24, 1948, he was in his house in barrio Galarin, Urbiztondo, about eight or nine kilometers from Mangatarem.
Between his house and Mangatarem there are unbridged rivers and houses. On foot, the trip from one place to the other
would take three and one-half hours. About six o'clock in the afternoon he went with Domingo Palisoc to Caturay,
Mangatarem, near the barrio school, which was about ten or twelve kilometers from barrio Malabobo, not even once.
Francisco Bulatao's testimony was untrue, and Exhibit C was not his pistol. Bulatao "has reason against me or that he is mad
with me" because the Chief of Police showed Bulatao an affidavit "wherein he (Bulatao) was imputed (by me) to be the person
who has committed the crime." The chief of police informed Bulatao that the affidavit was Bersamin's. Furthermore, the chief
of police told Bulatao: "If you will not say that it was Bersamin who has committed the killing in the vicinity, he will testify
against you in court." He said he learned of this conversation because while he was still in jail he asked Bulatao; "Brother, why
190 | P a g e

did you testify something false against me?" and Bulatao answered, "why should I not do that when you are trying to
implicate me." He proceeded to repeat what he said was a dialogue between him and Bulatao in jail.

We agreed with counsel for appellant that Arellano's confession was inadmissible against Bersamin.
We also agree that the pistol identified by Andaya as having been pawned by Bersamin has not shown to have any bearing
on the perpetration of the crime in question.
Besides, the testimony in hearsay. And it must be admitted that the probative value of the bible which Bulatao said had
been handed to him by Bersamin can be no greater than Bulatao's credibility.

But the lower court did not take Arellano's confession, the pistol and the bible into cannot. The court below rested its
findings solely on Bulatao's and Tolentino's testimony given in open court. The question thus is reduced to whether Bulatao
and Tolentino spoke the truth.

There is no sufficient justification for reversing the trial court's findings on the appellant's guilt on the basis of the two
principal witnesses' evidence.
The record discloses no ground for doubting the veracity of these witnesses. Their testimony rings true in all its material
aspects, while Casimiro Bersamin's testimony and his attempt to discredit Bulatao sounds irrational and is conflicting. In our
opinion, the said witnesses' statements are as convincing as the appellant's are unconvincing. It is noteworthy that Bersamin
did not impeach Emiliano Tolentino's testimony, nor did he call any witness to corroborate him in his alleged alibi, easy as it
was even to fabricate this kind of evidence.
191 | P a g e

That none of the witnesses saw who killed the aggrieved party is absolutely immaterial. There is no gainsaying that there
was not only conspiracy to rob, but Casimiro Bersamin was the moving and directing spirit behind it, and that the killing
was a part and the direct result of the robbery. Conspiracy being established, each and every one of the conspirators who
took active part in its execution is equally responsible for the ensuing crime embraced in the plan.

The court below found the presence of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, superior strength, and use of unlicensed
firearms. The Solicitor General would substitute dwelling for the use of unlicensed firearm. We think that the prosecution is
right in eliminating the last-mentioned circumstance. The use of unlicensed firearm is special aggravating circumstance
applicable only in cases of robbery in band (Art. 296, Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 3, Republic Act No. 12). The
crime here established was one of simple robbery with homicide since only two of the malefactors are shown to have been
armed, Bersamin and de la Vega.

There is one other proof of moral perversity which, added to the circumstances already mentioned, compels the Court to deal
with the appellant with utmost severity. When Bersamin pretreated the crime at bar, he had been the ringleader in the case
for murder and another case for double murder and was in hiding to avoid arrest prosecution in those cases. In the case for
double murder, docketed in this court on appeal as G.R. No. L-3098, he has been found guilty in decision which affirmed that
of the Court of First Instance sentecing him to life imprisonment, and which is being promulgated with this decision. In the
other case, one of the defendants, Crispin Licuanan, was found guilty and sentenced to prison for life by the Court of First
Instance and by this Court (G.R. No. L-2960). As far as can be gathered from the record of the present appeal, that case was
pending preliminary investigation with reference to Casimiro Bersamin at the time of the trial of the instant case for robbery
with homicide.
192 | P a g e

The decision of the lower court is reversed as to the principal penalty, and the appellant, Casimiro Bersamin, is hereby
sentenced to death to be carried out in the manner provided by law. The appealed judgment is affirmed as to the rest of the
sentence. Costs of this appeal will be taxed against the appellant.

G.R. NO. 160236 : October 16, 2009]

"G" HOLDINGS, INC. v. NATIONAL MINES AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION Local 103 (NAMAWU)
The Facts
The petitioner, "G" Holdings, Inc. (GHI), is a domestic corporation primarily engaged in the business of owning and holding
shares of stock of different companies.2 It was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 3, 1992.
Private respondent, National Mines and Allied Workers Union Local 103 (NAMAWU), was the exclusive bargaining agent of the
rank and file employees of Maricalum Mining Corporation (MMC),3 an entity operating a copper mine and mill complex at
Sipalay, Negros Occidental.

MMC was incorporated by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and the Philippine National Bank (PNB) on October
19, 1984, on account of their foreclosure of Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation's assets. MMC started its
commercial operations in August 1985. Later, DBP and PNB transferred it to the National Government for disposition or
privatization because it had become a non-performing asset.5

On October 2, 1992, pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement executed between GHI and Asset Privatization Trust (APT),
the former bought ninety percent (90%) of MMC's shares and financial claims. These financial claims were converted into
three Promissory Notes issued by MMC in favor of GHI totaling P500M and secured by mortgages over MMC's properties.
XXX
193 | P a g e

Upon the signing of the Purchase and Sale Agreement and upon the full satisfaction of the stipulated down payment, GHI
immediately took physical possession of the mine site and its facilities, and took full control of the management and operation
of MMC.

Almost four years thereafter, or on August 23, 1996, a labor dispute (refusal to bargain collectively and unfair labor practice)
arose between MMC and NAMAWU, with the latter eventually filing with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of
Bacolod City a notice of strike.
Then Labor Secretary, now Associate Justice of this Court, Leonardo A. Quisumbing, later assumed jurisdiction over the
dispute and ruled in favor of NAMAWU. In his July 30, 1997 Order in OS-AJ-10-96-014 (Quisumbing Order), Secretary
Quisumbing declared that the lay-off (of workers) implemented on May 7, 1996 and October 7, 1996 was illegal and that
MMC committed unfair labor practice. He then ordered the reinstatement of the laid-off workers, with payment of full
backwages and benefits, and directed the execution of a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) incorporating the terms
and conditions of the previous CBA providing for an annual increase in the workers' daily wage.
In two separate cases─G.R. NOS. 133519 and 138996─filed with this Court, we sustained the validity of the Quisumbing Order,
which became final and executory on January 26, 2000.13

On May 11, 2001, then Acting Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Secretary, now also an Associate Justice of this
Court, Arturo D. Brion, on motion of NAMAWU, directed the issuance of a partial writ of execution (Brion Writ), and ordered
the DOLE sheriffs to proceed to the MMC premises for the execution of the same.
Much later, in 2006, this Court, in G.R. NOS. 157696-97, entitled Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Brion and NAMAWU,
affirmed the propriety of the issuance of the Brion Writ.

The Brion Writ was not fully satisfied because MMC's resident manager resisted its enforcement.
194 | P a g e

On motion of NAMAWU, then DOLE Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas ordered the issuance of the July 18, 2002 Alias Writ of
Execution and Break-Open Order (Sto. Tomas Writ).
On October 11, 2002, the respondent acting sheriffs, the members of the union, and several armed men implemented the
Sto. Tomas Writ, and levied on the properties of MMC located at its compound in Sipalay, Negros Occidental.18

On October 14, 2002, GHI filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental, Special Civil
Action (SCA) No. 1127 for Contempt with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and to Nullify the Sheriff's Levy on Properties.
GHI contended that the levied properties were the subject of a Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage, dated September
5, 199620 executed by MMC in favor of GHI to secure the aforesaid P550M promissory notes; that this deed was registered on
February 24, 2000; and that the mortgaged properties were already extrajudicially foreclosed in July 2001 and sold to GHI as
the highest bidder on December 3, 2001, as evidenced by the Certificate of Sale dated December 4, 2001.

Resolving, among others, NAMAWU's separate motions for the reconsideration of the injunction order and for the dismissal of
the case, the RTC issued its December 4, 2002 Omnibus Order,26 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent NAMAWU Local 103's Motion for Reconsideration dated October 23, 2002 for
the reconsideration of the Order of this Court directing the issuance of Writ of Injunction prayed for by petitioner and the
Order dated October 18, 2002 approving petitioner's Injunction Bond in the amount of P5,000,000.00 is hereby DENIED.
195 | P a g e

Respondent's Motion to Dismiss as embodied in its Opposition to Extension of Temporary Restraining Order and Issuance of
Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Motion to Dismiss and Suspend Period to File Answer dated October 15, 2002 is likewise
DENIED.

Petitioner's Urgent Motion for the return of the levied firearms is GRANTED. Pursuant thereto, respondent sheriffs are
ordered to return the levied firearms and handguns to the petitioner provided the latter puts [up] a bond in the amount of
P332,200.00.

Respondent's lawyer, Atty. Jose Lapak, is strictly warned not to resort again to disrespectful and contemptuous language in his
pleadings, otherwise, the same shall be dealt with accordingly.

SO ORDERED.27

Aggrieved, NAMAWU filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, assailing the October 17, 18 and December 4,
2002 orders of the RTC.

After due proceedings, on October 14, 2003, the appellate court rendered a Decision setting aside the RTC issuances and
directing the immediate execution of the Sto. Tomas Writ. The CA ruled, among others, that the circumstances surrounding
the execution of the September 5, 1996 Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage yielded the conclusion that the deed was
sham, fictitious and fraudulent; that it was executed two weeks after the labor dispute arose in 1996, but surprisingly, it
was registered only on February 24, 2000, immediately after the Court affirmed with finality the Quisumbing Order.
196 | P a g e

The CA also found that the certificates of title to MMC's real properties did not contain any annotation of a mortgage lien,
and, suspiciously, GHI did not intervene in the long drawn-out labor proceedings to protect its right as a mortgagee of virtually
all the properties of MMC.29

The CA further ruled that the subsequent foreclosure of the mortgage was irregular, effected precisely to prevent the
satisfaction of the judgment against MMC.

The Issues

whether, given the factual circumstances obtaining, the RTC properly issued the writ of injunction to prevent the enforcement
of the Sto. Tomas Writ.
RULING:

Judicial Notice.

Judicial notice must be taken by this Court of its Decision in Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Hon. Arturo D. Brion and
NAMAWU, in which we upheld the right of herein private respondent, NAMAWU, to its labor claims.
Upon the same principle of judicial notice, we acknowledge our Decision in Republic of the Philippines, through its trustee,
the Asset Privatization Trust v. "G" Holdings, Inc., in which GHI was recognized as the rightful purchaser of the shares of
stocks of MMC, and thus, entitled to the delivery of the company notes accompanying the said purchase. These company
notes, consisting of three (3) Promissory Notes, were part of the documents executed in 1992 in the privatization sale of MMC
197 | P a g e

by the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) to GHI. Each of these notes uniformly contains stipulations "establishing and constituting
in favor of GHI" mortgages over MMC's real and personal properties. The stipulations were subsequently formalized in a
separate document denominated Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage on September 5, 1996. Thereafter, the Deed was
registered on February 4, 2000.

We find both decisions critically relevant to the instant dispute. In fact, they should have guided the courts below in the
disposition of the controversy at their respective levels. To repeat, these decisions respectively confirm the right of
NAMAWU to its labor claims and affirm the right of GHI to its financial and mortgage claims over the real and personal
properties of MMC, as will be explained below.
The assailed CA decision apparently failed to consider the impact of these two decisions on the case at bar. Thus, we find it
timely to reiterate that: "courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to determine whether or not the case
pending is a moot one or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable to the case under consideration."

However, the CA correctly assessed that the authority of the lower court to issue the challenged writ of injunction depends on
the validity of the third party's (GHI's) claim of ownership over the property subject of the writ of execution issued by the
labor department. Accordingly, the main inquiry addressed by the CA decision was whether GHI could be treated as a third
party or a stranger to the labor dispute, whose properties were beyond the reach of the Writ of Execution dated December
18, 2001.

In this light, all the more does it become imperative to take judicial notice of the two cases aforesaid, as they provide the
necessary perspective to determine whether GHI is such a party with a valid ownership claim over the properties subject of
the writ of execution.
198 | P a g e

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 14, 2003 is SET ASIDE. The
Omnibus Order dated December 4, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61 of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental is
AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PILIPINAS SHELL FOUNDATION, INC. , VS. TOMAS M. FREDELUCES

SYNOPSIS:
When a motion to dismiss is filed, only allegations of ultimate facts are hypothetically admitted. Allegations of evidentiary
facts and conclusions of law, as well as allegations whose falsity is subject to judicial notice, those which are legally
impossible, inadmissible in evidence, or unfounded, are disregarded.
FACTS
XXX
In May 1998, the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority and Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. entered into a Lease and
Development Agreement for the construction of the concrete gravity structure in Sitio Agusuhin. The Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority undertook to relocate the affected households, while Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. undertook to give financial
assistance to them.[16]

The undertakings of Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. were implemented through Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc. By the end of
May 1998, Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc. concluded agreements with some of the affected households. In exchange for
financial assistance, some of the claimants voluntarily dismantled their houses and relocated to nearby areas within the
Subic Seaport Economic Free Zone. Other claims, however, were denied by Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. for the
claimant's failure to show that he or she resided in Sitio Agusuhin prior to the construction project. [17]
199 | P a g e

On December 1, 2000, a Complaint for damages was filed against Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and Pilipinas Shell
Foundation, Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City by Tomas Fredeluces, et. Al, for allegedly being evicted
from their residence, in violation of their rights; that the given financial assistance given were "insufficient to compensate the
damages they sustained[.]" Worse, they were allegedly "pressured, coerced or . . . 'sweet talked'" into signing quitclaims and
waivers. They prayed for damages according to the land that they occupied.

Instead of answering the Complaint, Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc. moved to
dismiss[34] the complaint based on the grounds of litis pendentia, failure to state a cause of action, and lack of cause of
action.

That Fredeluces, et al. were not entitled for payment of damages corresponding to the value of the land they previously
occupied, because they never owned the land in Sitio Agusuhin; that Sitio Agusuhin belonged to the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority pursuant to Republic Act No. 7227; hence, lands in Sitio Agusuhin are government property not subject to private
ownership.[41] In addition, Fredeluces, et al.'s claims for the value of the improvements they introduced in Sitio Agusuhin were
allegedly paid as evidenced by the quitclaims they had signed.[42] Consequently, the Complaint for damages failed to state a
cause of action.[43]

The trial court held that the Complaint for damages failed to state a cause of action. According to the trial court, Fredeluces,
et al. based the amount of actual damages they sought on the fair market values of the parcels of land they occupied and of
the improvements introduced on the property. Fredeluces, et al. effectively prayed for payment of just compensation, a relief
they cannot avail themselves of because they do not own the land in Sitio Agusuhin.[64]

As for the quitclaims, the trial court held that they were valid since Fredeluces, et al. voluntarily executed them. Fredeluces, et
al. even voluntarily vacated Sitio Agusuhin after they received financial assistance from Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and
Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc.[65]
200 | P a g e

In contrast with the trial court, the Court of Appeals appreciated in evidence a Revocation of Special Power of Attorney
allegedly executed by plaintiffs Dante U. Santos, Efren U. Santos, Miguel Santos, Ric U. Santos, and Bebiana San Pedro.
[73]
 The Complaint for sum of money was, thus, filed without their authority, and there was no  litis pendentia so as to bar the
filing of the Complaint for damages on December 1, 2000.

Despite Fredeluces, et al.'s admission that they did not own the parcels of land they occupied in Sitio Agusuhin, the Court of
Appeals nonetheless held that Fredeluces, et al. may file a complaint for damages for having been "adversely affected by
[Shell Philippines Exploration B.V.'s] construction works." Fredeluces, et al. may likewise repudiate the quitclaims they
executed.[75

ISSUES:
Whether or not the Motion to Dismiss was correctly granted by the RTC on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.

RULING: YES

In filing a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, a defendant "hypothetically admits the truth of
the facts alleged in the complaint. Since allegations of evidentiary facts and conclusions of law are omitted in pleadings,
"[t]he hypothetical admission is limited to the relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint and inferences
fairly deducible therefrom." However, it is mandatory that courts "consider other facts within the range of judicial notice,
as well as relevant laws and jurisprudence" in resolving motions to dismiss.

There are exceptions to the rule on hypothetical admission. In Dabuco v. Court of Appeals:[157]
There is no hypothetical admission of the veracity of allegations if their falsity is subject to judicial notice, or if such
allegations are legally impossible, or if these refer to facts which are inadmissible in evidence, or if by the record or
document included in the pleading these allegations appear unfounded. Also, inquiry is not confined to the complaint if
201 | P a g e

there is evidence which has been presented to the court by stipulation of the parties, or in the course of hearings related to
the case.
Even assuming the truth of the ultimate facts alleged in the Complaint for damages, the Complaint states no cause of
action. Respondents may have resided in Sitio Agusuhin, constructed their houses, and planted fruit trees in the area.
However, they failed to allege any circumstance showing that they had occupied Sitio Agusuhin under claim of ownership for
the required number of years. In their Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, respondents admitted that they do not own Sitio
Agusuhin. The property belongs to the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, pursuant to Republic Act No. 7227; hence, it is a
government property the possession of which, however long, "never confers title [to] the possessor[.]"

It follows that respondents may not ask compensation equivalent to the value of the parcels of land they previously occupied
in Sitio Agusuhin. The right to demand compensation for deprivation of property belongs to the owner.

Moreover, respondents may not claim damages equivalent to the value of the structures they built and the improvements
they introduced in Sitio Agusuhin. Having admitted that they do not own Sitio Agusuhin, they were possessors in bad
faith[ who lose whatever they built, planted, or sown on the land of another without right to indemnity .

Specifically with respect to respondents Tomas M. Fredeluces and Ludivico F. Bon, the allegation that they resided in Sitio
Agusuhin prior to the construction of the concrete gravity structure may not be hypothetically admitted. Based on the
evidence available during the hearing of the Motion to Dismiss on April 20, 2001, respondents Tomas M. Fredeluces and
Ludivico F. Bon were indeed non-residents of Sitio Agusuhin prior to the construction of the concrete gravity structure.

Respondents' own evidence—the Report of the Compensation Community Relations Study Group attached to the Opposition
to the Motion to Dismiss—declared respondent Tomas M. Fredeluces a non-resident of Sitio Agusuhin. [164] Moreover, as
certified by the Punong Barangay of Barangay Cawag, none of the other residents of Sitio Agusuhin recognized respondent
Tomas M. Fredeluces as a fellow resident.[165]
202 | P a g e

As for respondent Ludivico F. Bon, the Office of the Punong Barangay of Barangay Matain, Subic, Zambales certified that he
was a resident of Barangay Matain, not of Sitio Agusuhin. This was corroborated by Hadji, Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc.'s
Community Coordinator, in his Affidavit.[167]

These pieces of evidence were never controverted by respondents Tomas M. Fredeluces and Ludivico F. Bon in their
Opposition to or during the hearing of the Motion to Dismiss. Therefore, respondents Tomas M. Fredeluces and Ludivico F.
Bon should be deemed to have admitted that they never resided in Sitio Agusuhin prior to the construction of the concrete
gravity structure.

Respondents nevertheless argue that they are entitled to damages because of their unlawful and summary eviction from Sitio
Agusuhin. Their own allegations, however, belie their claim that they were unlawfully and summarily evicted. As alleged in
their Complaint, petitioners "tried to work out an acceptable compensation package for the [respondents.]" [168] Also alleged in
the Complaint[169] and as evidenced by quitclaims and the Final Report on the Compensation Claims in receiving the previously
enumerated amounts, respondents declared in their respective quitclaims that they waived, released, and abandoned any
claims thait they might have had over the parcels of land they occupied in Sitio Agusuhin as well as the improvements they
introduced in the property.

All told, the Motion to Dismiss was correctly granted on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
================================================================================================

WILLIAM ENRIQUEZ AND NELIA-VELA ENRIQUEZ

VS.
ISAROG LINE TRANSPORT, INC. AND VICTOR SEDENIO
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This is a Petition for Review which petitioners William Enriquez and Nelia Vela-Enriquez filed assailing the Court of Appeals
(CA) Decision[1] dated June 13, 2013 and Resolution[2] dated March 4, 2014 in CA-G.R. CV No. 97376.

The pertinent antecedents of the case as disclosed by the records are as follows:

Sonny Enriquez was a passenger of a bus owned and operated by respondent Isarog Line Express Transport, Inc. (Isarog Line)
driven by Victor Sedenio on July 7, 1998. While traversing the diversion road at Silangang Malicboy, Pagbilao, Quezon, said bus
collided with another bus owned by Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. (Philtranco) which was being driven by Primitivo Aya-
ay. As a result of the impact between the two (2) buses, several passengers died, including Sonny, who was twenty-six (26)
years old at that time.

On September 7, 1999, Sonny's parents, petitioners William Enriquez and Nelia Vela-Enriquez (the Spouses Enriquez), filed
a complaint for damages against Isarog Line and Philtranco as well as their drivers before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Libmanan, Camarines Sur.

On February 24, 2011, the RTC rendered a Decision finding Isarog Line, Sedenio, Philtranco, and Aya-ay solidarity liable for
Sonny's death,
Isarog Line then appealed before the CA. On June 13, 2013, the appellate court affirmed the RTC Decision, with
modification, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. ACCORDINGLY, the challenged
Decision dated 24 February 2011 and Resolution dated 02 June 2011 of the RTC, Branch 29, Libmanan, Camarines Sur are
204 | P a g e

AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION in that the monetary award in the amount of P1,038,960.00 by way of unrealized income
is DELETED; and that Appellant is ordered to pay Appellees the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages.

The Spouses Enriquez then filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, which the CA denied.[5]

Hence, the instant petition.

Whether or not the Spouses Enriquez are entitled to the amount of P1,038,960.00 as damages for their son's loss of earning
capacity.
Ruling of the Court:
Under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, the heirs of the victim are entitled to indemnity for loss of earning capacity, thus:
Article 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even
though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the
heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account
of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;

xxx
Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings, but for loss of capacity to earn. The indemnification for loss
of earning capacity partakes of the nature of actual damages which must be duly proven by competent proof and the best
obtainable evidence thereof. Thus, as a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for
205 | P a g e

damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the
absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased was self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of work no
documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased was employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the
'minimum wage under current labor laws.

Here, contrary to the CA's pronouncement, the Spouses Enriquez were able to present competent proof and the best
obtainable evidence of their departed son's income. There is no showing that the defense objected when they presented the
certification from ASLAN Security Systems, Inc. (ASLAN) during the trial.

In the case at bar, while the CA itself ruled that the certification from ASLAN stating that Sonny was earning P185.00 per
day as a security guard is admissible in evidence, it held that the same has no probative value since the signatory was never
presented to testify. However, the rule is that evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly considered
by the court in arriving at its judgment, as what the RTC in this case aptly did, since it was indubitably in a better position to
assess and weigh the evidence presented during trial.

Serra v. Mumar,[10] as relied upon by the appellate court, does not apply because in said case they only presented
testimonial evidence to prove damages for loss of earning capacity. No documentary evidence was submitted. The Court
ruled that damages for loss of earning capacity is in the nature of actual damages, which must be duly proven by documentary
evidence, not merely by the widow's self-serving testimony. Also, in People v. Villar,[11] the prosecution merely relied on the
widow's self-serving statement on her deceased husband's monthly earning. Here, however, there is actual documentary
evidence to support the claim. The Spouses Enriquez presented a certification from Sonny's employer to duly prove his
income.
206 | P a g e

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated June 13, 2013 and Resolution dated March 4, 2014 in CA-G.R. CV No. 97376, and REINSTATES the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, Branch 29 dated February 24, 2011 in Civil Case No. L-896, with interest
at six percent (6%) per annum of the amount of damages awarded from the time of the finality of this Decision until its full
satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 215723

DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA vs. MICHIYUKI KOIKE

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1are the Decision2 dated July 31, 2014 and the Resolution3 dated November
28, 2014, of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106 (RTC), in Sp. Proc. No. Q-13-72692, denying petitioner's
petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Article 26 of the Family
Code.

The Facts
207 | P a g e

Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and respondent Michiyuki Koike (Michiyuki), a Japanese national,
were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City, Philippines. Their union bore two children, Masato Koike, who was born on
January 23, 2006, and Fuka Koike who was born on April 4, 2007.5

On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for divorce before the Mayor of Ichinomiya City,
Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They were divorced on even date as appearing in the Divorce Certificate and the same was duly
recorded in the Official Family Register of Michiyuki Koike.

Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of Marriage on file with the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of
capacity to remarry pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code before the RTC, docketed as Sp. Proc.
No. Q-13-72692.

At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition. On the other hand, Doreen presented several foreign documents,
namely, "Certificate of Receiving/ Certificate of Acceptance of Divorce" and "Family Register of Michiyuki Koike" both issued
by the Mayor of Ichinomiya City and duly authenticated by the Consul of the Republic of the Philippines for Osaka, Japan. She
also presented a certified machine copy of a document entitled "Divorce Certificate" issued by the Consul for the Ambassador
of Japan in Manila that was authenticated by the Department of the Foreign Affairs, as well as a Certification issued by the City
Civil Registry Office in Manila that the original of said divorce certificate was filed and recorded in the said Office. In addition,
photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan and their corresponding English translation, as well as two (2) books entitled "The Civil
Code of Japan 2000" and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009" were likewise submitted as proof of the existence of Japan's law on
divorce.
The RTC Ruling
208 | P a g e

In a Decision19 dated July 31, 2014, the RTC denied Doreen's petition, ruling that in an action for recognition of foreign
divorce decree pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code, the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence.
The RTC ruled that while the divorce documents presented by Doreen were successfully proven to be public or official records
of Japan, she nonetheless fell short of proving the national law of her husband, particularly the existence of the law on
divorce. The RTC observed that the "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009," presented were not
duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan as required by Sections 24 and 25 of the said Rules, adding too that the
testimony of Doreen relative to the applicable provisions found therein and its effect on the matrimonial relations was
insufficient since she was not presented as a qualified expert witness nor was shown to have, at the very least, a working
knowledge of the laws of Japan, particularly those on family relations and divorce. It likewise did not consider the said books
as learned treatises pursuant to Section 46, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, since no expert witness on the subject
matter was presented and considering further that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign judgments and
law.

Doreen's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated November 28, 2014; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

whether or not the RTC erred in denying the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce.

The Court's Ruling

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At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.
However, Article 26 of the Family Code - which addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner - allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by an alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The provision reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the above-highlighted paragraph, the law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.

In Corpuz v. Sta. Tomas,27the Court had the occasion to rule that:

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial
notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its
dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity
210 | P a g e

must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of
the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose
or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.28 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citation omitted)

Thus, in Garcia v. Recio,29 it was pointed out that in order for a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse to be recognized
in our jurisdiction, it must be shown that the divorce decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Both the
divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven.30 Since our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and
the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.31

Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent laws
of Japan on the matter are essentially factual that calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented before the RTC, the issue
raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review.

Well entrenched is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower
courts, whose findings on these matters are received with respect and are in fact binding subject to certain exceptions.32 In
this regard, it is settled that appeals taken from judgments or final orders rendered by RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law should be brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) in
accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.33

Nonetheless, despite the procedural restrictions on Rule 45 appeals as above-adverted, the Court may refer the case to the CA
under paragraph 2, Section 6 of Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
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SEC. 6. Disposition of improper appeal. -x x x

An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court submitting issues of fact may be referred to
the Court of Appeals for decision or appropriate action. The determination of the Supreme Court on whether or not issues of
fact are involved shall be final.

This, notwithstanding the express provision under Section 5 (f) thereof that an appeal likewise "may" be dismissed when there
is error in the choice or mode of appeal.34

Since the said Rules denote discretion on the part of the Court to either dismiss the appeal or refer the case to the CA, the
question of fact involved in the instant appeal and substantial ends of justice warrant that the case be referred to the CA for
further appropriate proceedings. It bears to stress that procedural rules were intended to ensure proper administration of law
and justice. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure,
not override, substantial justice. A deviation from its rigid enforcement may thus be allowed to attain its prime objective, for
after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of the courts.35

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, the case is hereby REFERRED to the Court of Appeals
for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to DETERMINE and RESOLVE the pertinent factual issues in
accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
212 | P a g e

G.R. No. 205837

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION (PITC) vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

This treats of the petition for certiorari1 filed by Philippine International Trading Corporation (PITC), which seeks to annul and
set aside the Decision2 No. 2013-016 dated January 30, 2013 of the Commission on Audit (COA). In the assailed decision, the
COA denied PITC's request for the amendment of certain provisions of the 2010 Annual Audit Report (AAR)3 of PITC, which
relate to the payment and accrual of liability for retirement benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756.

The Facts

PITC is a government-owned and controlled corporation that was created under Presidential Decree No. 2524 issued by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos on July 21, 1973. Thereafter, said law was repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1071, which was
issued on January 25, 1977.

On December 28, 1981, President Marcos issued Executive Order No. 756, which authorized the reorganization of PITC.
Section 6 thereof states:

SECTION 6. Exemption from OCPC. - In recognition of the special nature of its operations, the Corporation shall continue to
be exempt from the application of the rules and regulations of the Office of the Compensation and Position Classification or
any other similar agencies that may be established hereafter as provided under Presidential Decree No. 1071 . Likewise, any
officer or employee who retires, resigns, or is separated from the service shall be entitled to one month pay for every year
of service computed at highest salary received including all allowances, in addition to the other benefits provided by law,
213 | P a g e

regardless of any provision of law or regulations to the contrary; Provided, That the employee shall have served in the
Corporation continuously for at least two years: Provided, further, That in case of separated employees, the separation or
dismissal is not due to conviction for any offense the penalty for which includes forfeiture of benefits: and Provided, finally,
That in the commutation of leave credits earned, the employees who resigned, retired or is separated shall be entitled to the
full payment therefor computed with all the allowance then being enjoined at the time of resignation, retirement of
separation regardless of any restriction or limitation provided for in other laws, rules or regulations. (Emphasis supplied.)

On February 18, 1983, President Marcos issued Executive Order No. 877 that further authorized the reorganization of PITC.
Section I thereof reads:

1. Reorganization. - The Minister of Trade and Industry is hereby designated Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation with
full powers to restructure and reorganize the Corporation and to determine or fix its staffing pattern, compensation structure
and related organizational requirements. The Chairman shall complete such restructuring and reorganization within six (6)
months from the date of this Executive Order. All personnel of the Corporation who are not reappointed by the Chairman
under the new reorganized structure of the Corporation shall be deemed laid off; provided, that personnel so laid off shall be
entitled to the benefits accruing to separated employees under Executive Order No. 756 amending the Revised Charter of the
Corporation. (Emphasis supplied.)

Apparently, PITC continued to grant the benefits provided under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 to its qualified
employees even after the lapse of the six-month period specified in Executive Order No. 877.

The legality of such policy was put in issue and directly resolved by this Court in the Decision dated June 22, 2010 in G.R. No.
183517, entitled Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit (hereinafter, the Decision in G.R. No.
214 | P a g e

183517). In said case, the COA disapproved the claim of a retired PITC employee for the payment of retirement differentials
based on Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756. PITC's bid to oppugn the COA's disallowance via a petition for certiorari was
dismissed by the Court, ruling in this wise:

As an adjunct to the reorganization mandated under Executive Order No. 756, we find that [Section 6 of Executive Order No.
756] cannot be interpreted independent of the purpose or intent of the law. Rather than the permanent retirement law for its
employees that [PITC] now characterizes it to be, we find that the provision of gratuities equivalent to "one month pay for
every year of service computed at highest salary received including all allowances" was clearly meant as an incentive for
employees who retire, resign or are separated from service during or as a consequence of the reorganization [PITC's] Board of
Directors was tasked to implement. As a temporary measure, it cannot be interpreted as an exception to the general
prohibition against separate or supplementary insurance and/or retirement or pension plans under Section 28, Subsection (b)
of Commonwealth Act No. 186, amended. Pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 4968 which was approved on June 17,
1967, said latter provision was amended to read as follows:

Section 10. Subsection (b) of Section twenty-eight of the same Act, as amended is hereby further amended to read as follows:

(b) Hereafter no insurance or retirement plan for officers or employees shall be created by any employer. All supplementary
retirement or pension plans heretofore in force in any government office, agency, or instrumentality or corporation owned
or controlled by the government, are hereby declared inoperative or abolished: Provided, That the rights of those who are
already eligible to retire thereunder shall not be affected.

PITC moved for a reconsideration of the above ruling, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated August 10, 2010. The
Decision in G.R. No. 183517 became final on September 27, 2010.
215 | P a g e

Pending the resolution of the above motion, PITC still allocated part of its Corporate Operating Budget for retirement
benefits pursuant to Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756. The amount allocated therefor was ₱46.36 million.

On September 30, 2010, PITC resident COA Auditor Elizabeth Liberato informed PITC that the accrual of the retirement
benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 was bereft of legal basis, in accordance with the Decision in G.R. No.
183517. PITC was advised to stop the payment of such benefits or reverse the amount already accrued. PITC, on the other
hand, argued that it could continue to allocate part of its budget for the aforesaid benefits while its motion for
reconsideration was still pending. Should the Court deny its motion, PITC believed that the Decision in G.R. No. 183517
should be applied prospectively.

PITC filed a Motion to Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration (MR) with attached Second MR of the Decision in G.R. No.
183517, but the second MR was denied in the Court's Resolution dated November 23, 2010. It was only then that PITC
allegedly stopped the monthly accrual of the retirement benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756.

However, the request is DENIED and the assailed observation in the 2010 AAR of the PITC STANDS.

PITC, thus, filed the present petition for certiorari.

The Arguments of PITC

216 | P a g e

According to PITC, the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 should be applied prospectively from the time it became final on
September 27, 2010. To apply said decision retroactively would allegedly unjustly divest qualified PITC employees of their
vested rights to receive the benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756. The six-month period in Executive Order No.
877 was only for the purpose of implementing reorganization, but not for the purpose of amending Section 6 of Executive
Order No. 756.

PITC claims that the COA itself deemed Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 as permanent in nature since the latter never
issued any notice of suspension, notice of disallowance or audit observation memorandum against the grant of the retirement
benefits in said provision during the years that PITC granted them to its retiring employees.

Prior to the finality of the Decision in G.R. No. 183517, the interpretation that Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 was
permanent in nature was allegedly an existing operative fact upon which PITC and its employees relied in good faith. As
such, PITC argues that its employees' entitlement to the benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 after two years
of service in the company and the computation and allocation of said benefits in PITC's books should only end on September
27, 2010.

PITC prayed for the annulment of the assailed COA Decision No. 2013-016 and the amendment of the 2010 AAR to reflect the
fact that PITC's estimated liability for employees' benefits account balance of ₱52.70 million was not misstated.

The Arguments of the COA

217 | P a g e

In praying for the dismissal of the petition, the COA asserts that when the Court renders a decision that merely interprets a
particular provision of law - one that neither establishes a new doctrine nor supplants an old doctrine - the interpretation
takes effect and becomes part of the law as of the date when the law was originally passed. The COA points out that the
Decision in G.R. No. 183517 did not overrule an old doctrine nor adopt a new one. The Decision simply interpreted Section
6 of Executive Order No. 756 and clarified that the provision was effective in a temporary and limited application when it
was correlated with other laws.

The COA also posits that no vested or acquired right can arise from acts or omissions that are against the law or which
infringe upon the rights of others.
In the Decision in G .R. No. 183 51 7, the Court already declared the illegality of the disbursements and payments of the
retirement benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 that were granted beyond the period of the reorganization
of PITC. The same were held to be contrary to Section 28(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended by Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 4968. Thus, the granting of the benefits, no matter how long practiced, cannot give rise to any vested right.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court may apply retroactively the Decision in GR NO.. 183515 that declared the illegality of the
disbursement and payments of the retirement benefits under Section 6 of EO 756 that were granted beyond the period of
reorganization of PITC.
The Ruling of the Court: YES
Jurisprudence, in our system of government, cannot be considered as an independent source of law; it cannot create law.
While it is true that judicial decisions which apply or interpret the Constitution or the laws are part of the legal system of
the Philippines, still they are not laws. Judicial decisions, though not laws, are nonetheless evidence of what the laws mean,
and it is for this reason that they are part of the legal system of the Philippines. Judicial decisions of the Supreme Court
assume the same authority as the statute itself.
218 | P a g e

xxxx
Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present case, the Court disagrees with PITC's position that the Decision in G.R. No.
183517 should be applied prospectively.

As the COA correctly argued, the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 neither reversed an old doctrine nor adopted a new one. The
Court merely construed therein the meaning and application of Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 by taking into
consideration the rationale behind the provision, its interplay with pre-existing retirement laws, and the subsequent
enactments and statutes that eventually repealed the same. Prior to the Decision in G.R. No. 183517, there was no other
ruling from this Court that explained the nature of the retirement benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756. Thus,
the Court's interpretation of the aforesaid provision embodied in the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 retroacts to the date when
Executive Order No. 756 was enacted.

Article 8 of the Civil Code declares that "[j]udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form
a part of the legal system of the Philippines." While decisions of the Court are not laws pursuant to the doctrine of separation
of powers, they evidence the laws' meaning, breadth, and scope and, therefore, have the same binding force as the laws
themselves.

Article 4 of the Civil Code, on the other hand, enunciates the rule on non-retroactivity of laws, in that ''(l)aws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided."

PITC's misinformed argument deserves scant consideration.

219 | P a g e

Jurisprudence, in our system of government, cannot be considered as an independent source of law; it cannot create law.
While it is true that judicial decisions which apply or interpret the Constitution or the laws are part of the legal system of the
Philippines, still they are not laws. Judicial decisions, though not laws, are nonetheless evidence of what the laws mean, and it
is for this reason that they are part of the legal system of the Philippines. Judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the
same authority as the statute itself.

Interpreting the aforequoted correlated provisions of the Civil Code and in light of the above disquisition, this Court
emphatically declared in Co vs. Court of Appeals, et al. that the principle of prospectivity applies not only to original
amendatory statutes and administrative rulings and circulars, but also, and properly so, to judicial decisions. x x x.

xxxx

The reasoning behind Senarillos vs. Hermosisima that judicial interpretation of a statute constitutes part of the law as of the
date it was originally passed, since the Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that
the interpreted law carried into effect, is all too familiar. Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the passage of a new law
but consists merely of a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one, x x x.

It is consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed,
subject only to the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, and more so
when there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied
on the old doctrine and acted in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice
then, if there is no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.)
220 | P a g e

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present case, the Court disagrees with PITC's position that the Decision in G.R.
No. 183517 should be applied prospectively.

As the COA correctly argued, the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 neither reversed an old doctrine nor adopted a new one. The
Court merely construed therein the meaning and application of Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 by taking into
consideration the rationale behind the provision, its interplay with pre-existing retirement laws, and the subsequent
enactments and statutes that eventually repealed the same. Prior to the Decision in G.R. No. 183517, there was no other
ruling from this Court that explained the nature of the retirement benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756. Thus,
the Court's interpretation of the aforesaid provision embodied in the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 retroacts to the date
when Executive Order No. 756 was enacted.

PITC' s position cannot be legally supported by our decision in Co. In Co, the Court gave prospective effect to its ruling in Que
v. People23 - that even checks to guarantee the performance of an obligation were covered by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 - as
the accused in Co relied on an official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such checks were not within the ambit of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22. In this instance, there is no previous administrative interpretation issued by a competent body that PITC
could claim to have relied on in good faith.

There is likewise no merit in PITC's contention that the retroactive application of the Decision in G.R. No. 183 517 would divest
qualified PITC employees of their vested rights to receive the retirement benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756.
221 | P a g e

The fact that PITC continued to grant the retirement benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 from the time of the
issuance of said executive order until the Court's Decision in G.R. No. 183517 does not mean that said benefits ripened into a
vested right.

In this case, the Court already ruled in G.R. No. 183517 that the grant of the retirement benefits under Section 6 of
Executive Order No. 756 was temporary and limited in nature and the same should have been restricted to the six-month
period of the mandated reorganization of PITC.

All told, there is no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the COA for refusing to
amend the questioned provisions of the 2010 AAR.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-28100 November 29, 1971

GABRIEL BAGUIO vs. TEOFILA L. VDA. DE JALAGAT
SYNOPSIS:
The specific legal question raised in this appeal from an order of dismissal by the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental,
presided by the Hon. Benjamin K. Gorospe, one which has not as yet been the subject of a definitive ruling is whether or not
on a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment, a lower court may
222 | P a g e

take judicial notice of such previous case decided by him resulting in the prior judgment relied upon. Judge Gorospe answered
in the affirmative. So do we. An affirmance is thus called for.
FACTS:
The case started with the complaint for the quieting of title to real property filed by plaintiff, now appellant, Gabriel
Baguio, on February, 14, 1966. There was on March 7, 1966 a motion to dismiss filed by defendants, now appellees, on the
ground that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment. This was the argument advanced: "The instant complaint or
case, besides being clearly unfounded and malicious, is identical to or the same as that Civil Case No. 1574 filed by the same
plaintiff and against Melecio alias Mening Jalagat, now deceased and whose legal heirs and successors in interest are the very
defendants in the instant complaint or Civil Case No. 2639. Said Civil Case No. 1574 was filed on October 7, 1958 for 'Recovery
of Possession and Ownership of Real Estate' and entitled Gabriel Baguio, plantiff, versus Melecio alias Mening Jalagat,
defendant, involving practically the same property and practically the same parties as defendants are the widow and the
children, respectively, thus the legal or forced heirs of the deceased Melecio Jalagat. That the said Case No. 1574, which is
identical to or is the same case as the instant one, has already been duly and finally terminated as could be clear from [an]
order of this Honorable Court [dated December 6, 1965]."
There was an opposition on the part of plaintiff made on March 26, 1966 on the ground that for prior judgment or res
judicata to suffice as a basis for dismissal it must be apparent on the face of the complaint. It was then alleged that there
was nothing in the complaint from which such a conclusion may be inferred.
Then, on September 26, 1966, came the order complained of worded thus: "Acting on the motion to dismiss filed by counsel
for the defendants under date of March 4, 1966, anchored on the ground that plaintiff's cause of action is barred by a prior
judgement which this Court finds to be well-founded as it has already dismissed plaintiff's complaint in Civil Case No. 1574
against Melecio Jalagat alias Mening Jalagat, defendants predecessor in interest from whom they have derived their rights, in
an order dated December 6, 1965, pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 17 of the new Rules of Court, which case involved the same
parcel of land as the one in the instant case, as prayed for, Civil Case No. 2639 should be as it is hereby [dismissed].
223 | P a g e

The Court's previous dismissal of Civil Case No. 1574 has the effect of an adjudication upon the merits and consequently is a
bar to and may be pleaded in abatement of any subsequent action against the same parties over the same issues and the
same subject-matter by the same plaintiff. [So ordered]"
Hence, this appeal.

The order of dismissal, as noted at the outset, must be sustained. It is in accordance with law.

1. The sole error assigned is that a bar by prior judgement cannot be raised in a motion to dismiss when such ground does
not appear on the face of the complaint.
What immediately calls attention in the rather sketchy and in conclusive discussion in the six-page brief of applicant is that
there was no denial as to the truth of the statement made by Judge Gorospe that there was a previous dismissal the same
plaintiff's complaint against the predecessor-in-interest of defendants, who as expressly admitted by appellant was the
deceased husband of one of them and father of the rest. There was no denial either of the property involved being the same
and of the finality of the decsion in the previous case which would show that appellant's claim was devoid of any support in
law. It would be therefore futile for the court to continue with the case as there had been such a prior judgment certainly
binding on appellant. What then was there for the lower court to do? Was there any sense in its being engaged in what was
essentially a fruitless, endeavor as the outcome was predictible?

Certainly, the law would lend itself to a well-deserved reproach if the Rules of Court would sanction such a proceeding
distinguished by nothing but its futility. It ought to be clear even to appellant that under the circumstances, the lower court
certainly could take judicial notice of the finality of a judgment in a case that was previously pending and thereafter
decided by it. That was all that was done by the lower court in decreeing the dismissal. Certainly such an order is not contrary
to law. A citation from the comments of former Chief Justice Moran is relevant. Thus: "Courts have also taken judicial notice of
224 | P a g e

previous cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one, or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable
in the case under consideration."

2. There is another equally compelling consideration. Appellant undoubtedly had recourse to a remedy which under the law
then in force could be availed of. It would have served the cause of justice better, not to mention the avoidance of needless
expense on his part and the vexation to which appellees were subjected if he did reflect a little more on the matter. Then the
valuable time of this Tribunal would not have been frittered away on a useless find hopeless appeal. It has, ever been the
guiding principle from Alonso v. Villamor,4 a 1910 decision, that a litigant should not be allowed to worship at the altar of
technicality. That is not to dispense justice according to law. Parties, and much more so their counsel, should ever keep such
an imperative of our legal system in mind.5

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of September 26, 1966 is hereby affirmed. With costs against plaintiff.

G.R. No. L-28693. September 30, 1974.]

VIVE CHEMICAL PRODUCTS, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS
The important question raised in this petition for the review of a decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, sustaining respondent
Commissioner of Customs, relates to the manner the constitutional power of the President to fix within specified limits tariff
rates as duly authorized by Congress was exercised. 2 As noted by Justice Laurel, such presidential competence is an exception
to the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. 3 The legislation on which it is made to rest must then be strictly
followed as indicated by Justice Tuason. 4 Petitioner would assert it was not so. The Court of Tax Appeals, in a well-reasoned
opinion by Judge Umali, was of a different mind. It is understandable why. Now the matter is once again put in issue. As will be
shown, a similar ruling is called for. We affirm.
225 | P a g e

This is one petition for review where the comprehensiveness, the thoroughness, and the lucidity with which the opinion of the
lower court did result in lightening the burden on this Tribunal.
Accordingly, Judge Umali’s opinion will be quoted in extenso. It opens with a statement of the case:
"On March 22, 1966, the petitioner imported from Taiwan 250 drums of glutamic acid, an article used in the
manufacture of a food seasoning known as ‘vetsin’, on which it was required to pay, as it did pay, the sum of P27,274.00
as customs duty. Contending that it is liable only for the amount of P3,519.00, and not P27,274.00, it filed the necessary
protest and requested the refund of the difference in the sum of P23,656.00." 5 Why such a sum was arrived at was
next discussed: "The sum of P27,274.00 as customs duty on 250 drums (11,340 kilos) of glutamic acid was levied and
collected pursuant to Section 104, par. 29.23, of the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 225,
dated December 13, 1965, which imposes an alternate customs duty, i.e., a specific duty of P2.40 per kilo of glutamic
acid or an ad valorem duty of 40%, whichever is higher. The specific duty at the rate of P2.40 per kilo was applied to
petitioner’s importation as the same is higher than the ad valorem duty of 40%. 40% of P35,190.00 is P14,076.00. Prior
to the amendment of Par. 29.23 of Section 104 of the Tariff and Customs Code by Executive Order No. 225, the customs
duty on glutamic acid was 10% ad valorem, which, if applied to petitioner’s importation of glutamic acid valued at
P35,190.00, it would be liable to pay only the sum of P3,519.00." 6 The basic issue raised by petitioner was then set
forth: "Petitioner contends that Executive Order No. 225 is invalid for failure to comply with Section 401 of the Tariff
and Customs Code authorizing the President to increase or decrease tariff rates under the conditions specified therein,
hence, it filed the corresponding protest with the Collector of Customs of Manila. The Collector denied the protest
solely on the ground that he has no power to nullify an executive order issued by the President. On appeal to
respondent Commissioner of Customs, the Collector’s decision was sustained also on the same ground." 7

The issue was expressed in these words: "In this appeal, the sole issue relates to the legality of Executive Order No. 225. The
parties submitted the case on the basis of the pleadings and the records of the Bureau of Customs and after filing their
respective memorandum." 8 After referring to Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code, the stand of petitioner was taken
up with greater particularity: "
226 | P a g e

The grounds relied upon by petitioner in assailing the legality of Executive Order No. 225 may be summarized as follows:
(1) There was no prior investigation by the Tariff Commission and recommendation by the National Economic Council in
regard to the increase of the customs duty on imported glutamic acid;
(2) it has not been shown that the increase in the customs duty on said article is necessary in the interest of national
economy, general welfare and/or national defense; and
(3) the duty on said article was increased in said Executive Order by more than five times the former rate of duty . . ."
As to the first ground, this is what was said: "As to the first ground, it appears that a public hearing was conducted by the
Tariff Commission before it recommended the increase in the tariff duty on glutamic acid and that the same was favorably
recommended by the National Economic Council." 10 As to the objection grounded on lack of necessity for such increase, the
opinion stated: "
The protection of local industries justifies the imposition of high tariff duties. (See Secs. 301, 302 and 304, Tariff and Customs
Code.) Petitioner admits that the purpose behind the increase of duty on glutamic acid as provided in Executive Order No. 225
is to protect local industries engaged in the manufacture of said article. Consequently, we are of the opinion that the increase
in the duty on glutamic acid by executive order is necessary in the interest of national economy and general welfare." 11
Lastly, Judge Umali made clear that the increase was not more than five times the limit under Section 401 of the Tariff and
Customs Code:
"It will be seen from the foregoing computation that at the time of the promulgation of Executive Order No. 225, the
maximum rate of duty on glutamic acid which could be imposed by the President by virtue of Section 401 of the Tariff
and Customs Code is P2.42 per kilo, which is more than the specific duty of P2.40 per kilo actually imposed by Executive
Order No. 225.
The flaw in the computation of petitioner is that it is based on the value of glutamic acid imported by it in 1966. The
Tariff Commission based its computation on the value of said article imported from Taiwan in 1963, there being no
record of any other foreign country from which glutamic acid was imported.
227 | P a g e

Petitioner claims that the year 1963 is not ‘the most recent representative period’ within the meaning of Section 401 of
the Tariff and Customs Code for the purpose of determining the maximum rate of duty which may be imposed by the
President under said section. What should have been taken into account, according to petitioner, should be the value of
said article in 1964 or 1965 or 1966. However, petitioner failed to produce evidence of the value of glutamic acid in
1964 and 1965. In fact, according to the Tariff Commission, there is no record of any importation of said article during
those years. The value of glutamic acid imported by petitioner in 1966 (P3.38 per kilo) could not have been considered
in the computation of the maximum increase in said duty because Executive Order No. 225 was promulgated on
December 13, 1965.
When the law mentions ‘the most recent representative period’ which must be taken into account in determining the
value of an imported article, it could refer only to the immediate past and present and not to the future. To sustain
petitioner’s contention would render compliance with the statutory requirements extremely difficult, if not impossible.
It would require the Tariff Commission, the National Economic Council and the President to delve into the future, which
is purely speculative. It is our considered opinion that the validity of the action of the President in the exercise of his
power to increase or decrease tariff rates pursuant to Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code must be determined
by the circumstances obtaining at the time the action is taken, or previous thereto, and not those prevailing thereafter.
Tested by this rule, there can be no doubt as to the validity of Executive Order No. 225."

The decision, as could be expected then, was in favor of respondent Commissioner. It is sought to be reversed. It is no
reflection on the vigorous and earnest efforts of counsel for petitioner, the law firm of De Santos and Delfino, that the Court
of Tax Appeals must be, as noted earlier, sustained.

The first error assigned would find fault with the Court of Tax Appeals, for its finding that there was compliance with the
statutory grant of authority to the President under Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code. With the skill of advocacy, it
was made to appear that what is involved is a legal question, one of gravity no less. A closer analysis would, however, reveal
228 | P a g e

that at bottom, the matter in question is essentially factual. Thus the objection raised anew was that the required
investigation was not held.
The Court of Tax Appeals, as shown above, considered such ground and found it insubstantial. Then petitioner, by its system
of computation followed, would impress on this Court that the statutory limit of the increase not to exceed five times was
exceeded. Again, the Court of Tax Appeals, as made clear in the excerpt above-quoted found that it simply was not so. There
is relevance to what was said in Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue:
"That the question thus involved is inherently factual, appears to be undeniable. This Court is bound by the finding of
facts of the Court of Tax Appeals, especially so, where as here, the evidence in support thereof is more than substantial,
only questions of law thus being left open to it for determination. Without ignoring the various factors which petitioner-
appellant would have this Court consider in passing upon the determination made by the Court of Tax Appeals but with
full recognition of the fact that the two officials were non-residents, it cannot be said that it committed the alleged
errors, calling for the interposition of the corrective authority of this Court. Nor as a matter of principle is it advisable for
this Court to set aside the conclusion reached by an agency such as the Court of Tax Appeals which is, by the very
nature of its function, dedicated exclusively to the study and consideration of tax problems and has necessarily
developed and expertise on the subject, unless, as did not happen here, there has been an abuse or improvident
exercise of this authority."

The second alleged error of the Court of Tax Appeals was that no judicial notice was taken of the similarity in the chemical
components of propionic glycine and glutamic acid. Petitioner discussed this assignment of error thus: "The error of the
Court of Tax Appeals could be attributed to its findings . . . that petitioner failed to produce evidence of the value of glutamic
acid in 1964 and 1965. However, importations of glutamic acid under the commercial name of ‘[propionic glycine]’ had been
made in the years 1964 and 1965. The unit cost of glutamic acid for this period ranged from U.S. $0.39 to U.S. $0.42
The Court of Tax Appeals, however, held that ‘the chemical components of these article [propionic glycine and glutamic acid]
are technical in nature and only persons possessed of the required knowledge know their similarity or difference.’ . . .
229 | P a g e

We respectfully submit that the similarity in the chemical components of propionic glycine and glutamic acid should have
been taken judicial notice of by the Court of Tax Appeals because it is a matter ‘which is capable of immediate and accurate
determination by resort to easily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy’ (Model Code of Evidence, American Law
Institute, p. 66). That the matter is ‘capable of immediate and accurate determination’ is shown by the fact that even the very
decision of the Court of Tax Appeals admitted that the case was submitted on the pleadings and the records of the Bureau of
Customs. Furthermore, there is already a certification that propionic glycine is just another name for glutamic acid . . ."
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals of July 31, 1967 is affirmed. Costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. 152392 May 26, 2005

EXPERTRAVEL & TOURS, INC.vs. COURT OF APPEALS and KOREAN AIRLINES

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 61000 dismissing
the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by Expertravel and Tours, Inc. (ETI).

The Antecedents

Korean Airlines (KAL) is a corporation established and registered in the Republic of South Korea and licensed to do business in
the Philippines. Its general manager in the Philippines is Suk Kyoo Kim, while its appointed counsel was Atty. Mario Aguinaldo
and his law firm.

On September 6, 1999, KAL, through Atty. Aguinaldo, filed a Complaint2 against ETI with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, for the collection of the principal amount of P260,150.00, plus attorney’s fees and exemplary damages. The
230 | P a g e

verification and certification against forum shopping was signed by Atty. Aguinaldo, who indicated therein that he was the
resident agent and legal counsel of KAL and had caused the preparation of the complaint.

ETI filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Atty. Aguinaldo was not authorized to execute the verification
and certificate of non-forum shopping as required by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. KAL opposed the motion,
contending that Atty. Aguinaldo was its resident agent and was registered as such with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) as required by the Corporation Code of the Philippines. It was further alleged that Atty. Aguinaldo was also
the corporate secretary of KAL. Appended to the said opposition was the identification card of Atty. Aguinaldo, showing that
he was the lawyer of KAL.

During the hearing of January 28, 2000, Atty. Aguinaldo claimed that he had been authorized to file the complaint through a
resolution of the KAL Board of Directors approved during a special meeting held on June 25, 1999. Upon his motion, KAL was
given a period of 10 days within which to submit a copy of the said resolution. The trial court granted the motion. Atty.
Aguinaldo subsequently filed other similar motions, which the trial court granted.

Finally, KAL submitted on March 6, 2000 an Affidavit of even date, executed by its general manager Suk Kyoo Kim, alleging that
the board of directors conducted a special teleconference on June 25, 1999, which he and Atty. Aguinaldo attended. It was
also averred that in that same teleconference, the board of directors approved a resolution authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to
execute the certificate of non-forum shopping and to file the complaint. Suk Kyoo Kim also alleged, however, that the
corporation had no written copy of the aforesaid resolution.
231 | P a g e

On April 12, 2000, the trial court issued an Order4 denying the motion to dismiss, giving credence to the claims of Atty.
Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim that the KAL Board of Directors indeed conducted a teleconference on June 25, 1999, during
which it approved a resolution as quoted in the submitted affidavit.

ETI filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order, contending that it was inappropriate for the court to take judicial
notice of the said teleconference without any prior hearing. The trial court denied the motion in its Order5 dated August 8,
2000.
XXX
ETI then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, assailing the orders of the RTC.
On December 18, 2001, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition, ruling that the verification and certificate of non-
forum shopping executed by Atty. Aguinaldo was sufficient compliance with the Rules of Court . According to the appellate
court, Atty. Aguinaldo had been duly authorized by the board resolution approved on June 25, 1999, and was the resident
agent of KAL. As such, the RTC could not be faulted for taking judicial notice of the said teleconference of the KAL Board of
Directors.

ETI filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, which the CA denied. Thus, ETI, now the petitioner, comes to the
Court by way of petition for review on certiorari and raises the following issue:

DID PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS DEPART FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS WHEN IT RENDERED ITS QUESTIONED DECISION AND WHEN IT ISSUED ITS QUESTIONED RESOLUTION,
ANNEXES A AND B OF THE INSTANT PETITION?
232 | P a g e

In its April 12, 2000 Order, the RTC took judicial notice that because of the onset of modern technology, persons in one
location may confer with other persons in other places, and, based on the said premise, concluded that Suk Kyoo Kim and
Atty. Aguinaldo had a teleconference with the respondent’s Board of Directors in South Korea on June 25, 1999. The CA,
likewise, gave credence to the respondent’s claim that such a teleconference took place, as contained in the affidavit of Suk
Kyoo Kim, as well as Atty. Aguinaldo’s certification.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and
general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known
to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be
judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records
and facts of general notoriety.[15] Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that
it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.16

xxxx
Even given the possibility that Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim participated in a teleconference along with the respondent’s
Board of Directors, the Court is not convinced that one was conducted; even if there had been one, the Court is not inclined
to believe that a board resolution was duly passed specifically authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to file the complaint and execute
the required certification against forum shopping.

SO ORDERED.
233 | P a g e

G.R. No. L-32636 March 17, 1930

In the matter Estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased.
A.W. FLUEMERN vs. ANNIE COUSHING HIX

The special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix appeals from a decision of Judge of First Instance Tuason
denying the probate of the document alleged to by the last will and testament of the deceased. Appellee is not authorized to
carry on this appeal. We think, however, that the appellant, who appears to have been the moving party in these proceedings,
was a "person interested in the allowance or disallowance of a will by a Court of First Instance," and so should be permitted to
appeal to the Supreme Court from the disallowance of the will (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 781, as amended; Villanueva vs.
De Leon [1925], 42 Phil., 780).

It is theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by Hix who had
his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Verginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg, Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p.
1690, and as certified to by the Director of the National Library. But this was far from a compliance with the law. The laws of a
foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. the courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take
American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. (In re Estate of Johnson [1918], 39 Phil., 156.)
Here the requirements of the law were not met. There was no was printed or published under the authority of the State of
West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the
certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the sale of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 301
of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in
force at the time the alleged will was executed.
234 | P a g e

In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. The only evidence on this point is to be found in the testimony
of the petitioner. Aside from this, there was nothing to indicate that the will was acknowledged by the testator in the
presence of two competent witnesses, of that these witnesses subscribed the will in the presence of the testator and of each
other as the law of West Virginia seems to require. On the supposition that the witnesses to the will reside without the
Philippine Islands, it would then the duty of the petitioner to prove execution by some other means (Code of Civil Procedure,
sec. 633.)

It was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator had his domicile in West Virginia and not establish this fact
consisted of the recitals in the CATHY will and the testimony of the petitioner. Also in beginning administration proceedings
orginally in the Philippine Islands, the petitioner violated his own theory by attempting to have the principal administration in
the Philippine Islands.

While the appeal pending submission in this court, the attorney for the appellant presented an unverified petition asking the
court to accept as part of the evidence the documents attached to the petition. One of these documents discloses that a
paper writing purporting to be the was presented for probate on June 8, 1929, to the clerk of Randolph Country, State of West
Virginia, in vacation, and was duly proven by the oaths of Dana Wamsley and Joseph L. MAdden, the subscribing witnesses
thereto , and ordered to be recorded and filed. It was shown by another document that, in vacation, on June 8, 1929, the clerk
of court of Randolph Country, West Virginia, appointed Claude W. Maxwell as administrator, cum testamento annexo, of the
estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased. In this connection, it is to be noted that the application for the probate of the will in
the Philippines was filed on February 20, 1929, while the proceedings in West Virginia appear to have been initiated on June 8,
1929. These facts are strongly indicative of an intention to make the Philippines the principal administration and West Virginia
the ancillary administration. However this may be, no attempt has been made to comply with Civil Procedure, for no hearing
on the question of the allowance of a will said to have been proved and allowed in West Virginia has been requested. There is
no showing that the deceased left any property at any place other than the Philippine Islands and no contention that he left
any in West Virginia.
235 | P a g e

Reference has been made by the parties to a divorce purported to have been awarded Edward Randolph Hix from Annie
Cousins Hix on October 8, 1925, in the State of West specific pronouncements on the validity or validity of this alleged divorce.

For all of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.

* Proving foreign law - Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 (Presentation of

Evidence)
SEC. 24.  Proof of official record.— The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate
that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by
a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office. (25a)   
 
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of
evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as
the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of
a court having a seal, under the seal of such court. (

Section 46, Rule 130 (Rules of Admissibility)

SEC. 46.  Learned treatises. – A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history, law, science or art is
admissible as tending to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if the court takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in the
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subject testifies, that the writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his profession or
calling as expert in the subject. 

* Doctrine of Processual Presumption – Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the
presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours

G.R. No. L-11622             January 28, 1961

COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. FISHER/CTA

This case relates to the determination and settlement of the hereditary estate left by the deceased Walter G. Stevenson, and
the laws applicable thereto.
Walter G. Stevenson (born in the Philippines on August 9, 1874 of British parents and married in the City of Manila on January
23, 1909 to Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson another British subject) died on February 22, 1951 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
whereto he and his wife moved and established their permanent residence since May 10, 1945.
In his will executed in San Francisco on May 22, 1947, and which was duly probated in the Superior Court of California on April
11, 1951, Stevenson instituted his wife Beatrice as his sole heiress to the following real and personal properties acquired by
the spouses while residing in the Philippines.

On May 22, 1951, ancillary administration proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the
settlement of the estate in the Philippines. In due time Stevenson's will was duly admitted to probate by our court and Ian
Murray Statt was appointed ancillary administrator of the estate, who on July 11, 1951, filed a preliminary estate and
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inheritance tax return with the reservation of having the properties declared therein finally appraised at their values six
months after the death of Stevenson. Preliminary return was made by the ancillary administrator in order to secure the
waiver of the Collector of Internal Revenue on the inheritance tax due on the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother
Lode Mines Inc. which the estate then desired to dispose in the United States.
Acting upon said return, the Collector of Internal Revenue accepted the valuation of the personal properties declared therein,
but increased the appraisal of the two parcels of land located in Baguio City by fixing their fair market value in the amount of
P52.200.00, instead of P43,500.00. After allowing the deductions claimed by the ancillary administrator for funeral expenses
in the amount of P2,000.00 and for judicial and administration expenses in the sum of P5,500.00, the Collector assessed the
state the amount of P5,147.98 for estate tax and P10,875,26 or inheritance tax, or a total of P16,023.23. Both of these
assessments were paid by the estate on June 6, 1952.
On September 27, 1952, the ancillary administrator filed in amended estate and inheritance tax return in pursuance f his
reservation made at the time of filing of the preliminary return and for the purpose of availing of the right granted by section
91 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
In the meantime, on December 1, 1952, Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson assigned all her rights and interests in the estate to
the spouses, Douglas and Bettina Fisher, respondents herein.
On September 7, 1953, the ancillary administrator filed a second amended estate and inheritance tax return (Exh. "M-N").
This return declared the same assets of the estate stated in the amended return of September 22, 1952, except that it
contained new claims for additional exemption and deduction to wit:
(1) deduction in the amount of P4,000.00 from the gross estate of the decedent as provided for in Section 861 (4) of the U.S.
Federal Internal Revenue Code which the ancillary administrator averred was allowable by way of the reciprocity granted
by Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as then held by the Board of Tax Appeals in case No. 71 entitled
"Housman vs. Collector," August 14, 1952; and
(2) exemption from the imposition of estate and inheritance taxes on the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother
Lode Mines, Inc. also pursuant to the reciprocity proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. In this last
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return, the estate claimed that it was liable only for the amount of P525.34 for estate tax and P238.06 for inheritance tax and
that, as a consequence, it had overpaid the government. The refund of the amount of P15,259.83, allegedly overpaid, was
accordingly requested by the estate.
The Collector denied the claim.
For this reason, action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondents, as assignees of Beatrice
Mauricia Stevenson, for the recovery of said amount. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 1125, the case was forwarded to the
Court of Tax Appeals
The CTA held that: (a) the one-half (½) share of the surviving spouse in the conjugal partnership property as diminished by
the obligations properly chargeable to such property should be deducted from the net estate of the deceased Walter G.
Stevenson, pursuant to Section 89-C of the National Internal Revenue Code;
(b) the intangible personal property belonging to the estate of said Stevenson is exempt from inheritance tax, pursuant to the
provision of section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code in relation to the California Inheritance Tax Law but decedent's
estate is not entitled to an exemption of P4,000.00 in the computation of the estate tax;
(c) for purposes of estate and inheritance taxation the Baguio real estate of the spouses should be valued at P52,200.00, and
210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. should be appraised at P0.38 per share; and (d) the estate
shall be entitled to a deduction of P2,000.00 for funeral expenses and judicial expenses of P8,604.39.
From this decision, both parties appealed.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not, in determining the taxable net estate of the decedent, one-half (½) of the net estate should be
deducted therefrom as the share of tile surviving spouse in accordance with our law on conjugal partnership and in relation
to section 89 (c) of the National Internal revenue Code;
(3) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the deduction of P4,000.00 allowed by Section 861, U.S. Internal Revenue Code
in relation to section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
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RULING OF THE COURT

Ruling of the lower Court is affirmed.
In deciding the first issue, the lower court applied a well-known doctrine in our civil law that in the absence of any ante-
nuptial agreement, the contracting parties are presumed to have adopted the system of conjugal partnership as to the
properties acquired during their marriage. The application of this doctrine to the instant case is being disputed, however, by
petitioner Collector of Internal Revenue, who contends that pursuant to Article 124 of the New Civil Code, the property
relation of the spouses Stevensons ought not to be determined by the Philippine law, but by the national law of the
decedent husband, in this case, the law of England. It is alleged by petitioner that English laws do not recognize legal
partnership between spouses, and that what obtains in that jurisdiction is another regime of property relation, wherein all
properties acquired during the marriage pertain and belong Exclusively to the husband. In further support of his stand,
petitioner cites Article 16 of the New Civil Code (Art. 10 of the old) to the effect that in testate and intestate proceedings, the
amount of successional rights, among others, is to be determined by the national law of the decedent.
In this connection, let it be noted that since the mariage of the Stevensons in the Philippines took place in 1909, the applicable
law is Article 1325 of the old Civil Code and not Article 124 of the New Civil Code which became effective only in 1950. It is
true that both articles adhere to the so-called nationality theory of determining the property relation of spouses where one of
them is a foreigner and they have made no prior agreement as to the administration disposition, and ownership of their
conjugal properties. In such a case, the national law of the husband becomes the dominant law in determining the property
relation of the spouses. There is, however, a difference between the two articles in that Article 1241 of the new Civil Code
expressly provides that it shall be applicable regardless of whether the marriage was celebrated in the Philippines or abroad
while Article 13252of the old Civil Code is limited to marriages contracted in a foreign land.
It must be noted, however, that what has just been said refers to mixed marriages between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
In the instant case, both spouses are foreigners who married in the Philippines
====================================================================================================
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*As correctly observed by the Tax Court, the pertinent English law that allegedly vests in the decedent husband full
ownership of the properties acquired during the marriage has not been proven by petitioner. Except for a mere allegation
in his answer, which is not sufficient, the record is bereft of any evidence as to what English law says on the matter. In the
absence of proof, the Court is justified, therefore, in indulging in what Wharton calls "processual presumption," in
presuming that the law of England on this matter is the same as our law.
Nor do we believe petitioner can make use of Article 16 of the New Civil Code (art. 10, old Civil Code) to bolster his stand. A
reading of Article 10 of the old Civil Code, which incidentally is the one applicable, shows that it does not encompass or
contemplate to govern the question of property relation between spouses. Said article distinctly speaks of amount of
successional rights and this term, in speaks in our opinion, properly refers to the extent or amount of property that each heir
is legally entitled to inherit from the estate available for distribution. It needs to be pointed out that the property relation of
spouses, as distinguished from their successional rights, is governed differently by the specific and express provisions of Title
VI, Chapter I of our new Civil Code (Title III, Chapter I of the old Civil Code.) We, therefore, find that the lower court correctly
deducted the half of the conjugal property in determining the hereditary estate left by the deceased Stevenson.
On the second issue, petitioner disputes the action of the Tax Court in the exempting the respondents from paying
inheritance tax on the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. in virtue of the reciprocity proviso of
Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, in relation to Section 13851 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code,
on the ground that:
(1) the said proviso of the California Revenue and Taxation Code has not been duly proven by the respondents;
(2) the reciprocity exemptions granted by section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code can only be availed of by
residents of foreign countries and not of residents of a state in the United States; and
(3) there is no "total" reciprocity between the Philippines and the state of California in that while the former exempts
payment of both estate and inheritance taxes on intangible personal properties, the latter only exempts the payment of
inheritance tax..
241 | P a g e

*To prove the pertinent California law, Attorney Allison Gibbs, counsel for herein respondents, testified that as an active
member of the California Bar since 1931, he is familiar with the revenue and taxation laws of the State of California. When
asked by the lower court to state the pertinent California law as regards exemption of intangible personal properties, the
witness cited Article 4, section 13851 (a) and (b) of the California Internal and Revenue Code as published in Derring's
California Code, a publication of the Bancroft-Whitney Company inc. And as part of his testimony, a full quotation of the cited
section was offered in evidence as Exhibits "V-2" by the respondents.
It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of them.5 Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
Section 41, Rule 123 of our Rules of Court prescribes the manner of proving foreign laws before our tribunals. However,
although we believe it desirable that these laws be proved in accordance with said rule, we held in the case of Willamette Iron
and Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471, that:
"a reading of sections 300 and 301 of our Code of Civil Procedure (now section 41, Rule 123) will convince one that
these sections do not exclude the presentation of other competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law."
In that case, we considered the testimony of an attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California who quoted verbatim a
section of California Civil Code and who stated that the same was in force at the time the obligations were contracted,
as sufficient evidence to establish the existence of said law.
In line with this view, we find no error, therefore, on the part of the Tax Court in considering the pertinent California law as
proved by respondents' witness.
xxxxx
WHEREFORE, as modified in the manner heretofore indicated, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed in all other
respects not inconsistent herewith. No costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. 136804 February 19, 2003

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MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST CO. vs. RAFAEL MA. GUERRERO

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the Court of Appeals’ Decision of August 24, 1998
and Resolution of December 14, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 423102 affirming the trial court’s denial of petitioners’ motion for
partial summary judgment.

The Antecedents

On May 17, 1994, respondent Rafael Ma. Guerrero ("Guerrero" for brevity) filed a complaint for damages against petitioner
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank ("the Bank" for brevity) with the Regional Trial Court of Manila
("RTC" for brevity). Guerrero sought payment of damages allegedly for (1) illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on
his checking account with the Bank; (2) a returned check worth US$18,000.00 due to signature verification problems; and (3)
unauthorized conversion of his account. Guerrero amended his complaint on April 18, 1995.

On September 1, 1995, the Bank filed its Answer alleging, inter alia, that by stipulation Guerrero’s account is governed by
New York law and this law does not permit any of Guerrero’s claims except actual damages. Subsequently, the Bank filed a
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal of Guerrero’s claims for consequential, nominal, temperate,
moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees on the same ground alleged in its Answer. The Bank contended that
the trial should be limited to the issue of actual damages. Guerrero opposed the motion.

The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a New York attorney, supported the Bank’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Alyssa
Walden’s affidavit ("Walden affidavit" for brevity) stated that Guerrero’s New York bank account stipulated that the governing
243 | P a g e

law is New York law and that this law bars all of Guerrero’s claims except actual damages. The Philippine Consular Office in
New York authenticated the Walden affidavit.

The RTC denied the Bank’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and its motion for reconsideration on March 6, 1996 and
July 17, 1996, respectively. The Bank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals assailing the RTC
Orders. In its Decision dated August 24, 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. On December 14, 1998, the Court
of Appeals denied the Bank’s motion for reconsideration.

Hence, the instant petition.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals sustained the RTC orders denying the motion for partial summary judgment. The Court of Appeals ruled
that the Walden affidavit does not serve as proof of the New York law and jurisprudence relied on by the Bank to support
its motion. The Court of Appeals considered the New York law and jurisprudence as public documents defined in Section 19,
Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence, as follows:

"SEC. 19. Classes of Documents. – For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.

Public documents are:

244 | P a g e

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

x x x."

The Court of Appeals opined that the following procedure outlined in Section 24, Rule 132 should be followed in proving
foreign law:

"SEC. 24. Proof of official record. – The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible
for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that
such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office."

The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the Bank’s argument that Section 2, Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court allows the Bank to
move with the supporting Walden affidavit for partial summary judgment in its favor. The Court of Appeals clarified that the
Walden affidavit is not the supporting affidavit referred to in Section 2, Rule 34 that would prove the lack of genuine issue
between the parties. The Court of Appeals concluded that even if the Walden affidavit is used for purposes of summary
judgment, the Bank must still comply with the procedure prescribed by the Rules to prove the foreign law.
245 | P a g e

The Issues

WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT [THE BANK’S] AFFIDAVIT, WHICH PROVES FOREIGN LAW
AS A FACT, IS "HEARSAY" AND THEREBY ‘CANNOT SERVE AS PROOF OF THE NEW YORK LAW RELIED UPON BY PETITIONERS
IN THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT x x x’.
Argument of the Parties

First, the Bank argues that in moving for partial summary judgment, it was entitled to use the Walden affidavit to prove that
the stipulated foreign law bars the claims for consequential, moral, temperate, nominal and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees. Consequently, outright dismissal by summary judgment of these claims is warranted.

Second, the Bank claims that the Court of Appeals mixed up the requirements of Rule 35 on summary judgments and those of
a trial on the merits in considering the Walden affidavit as "hearsay." The Bank points out that the Walden affidavit is not
hearsay since Rule 35 expressly permits the use of affidavits.

Lastly, the Bank argues that since Guerrero did not submit any opposing affidavit to refute the facts contained in the Walden
affidavit, he failed to show the need for a trial on his claims for damages other than actual.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is devoid of merit.

246 | P a g e

The Bank filed its motion for partial summary judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court which reads:

"Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party. – A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted
or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all
or any part thereof."

A court may grant a summary judgment to settle expeditiously a case if, on motion of either party, there appears from the
pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no important issues of fact are involved, except the amount of
damages. In such event, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.4

In a motion for summary judgment, the crucial question is: are the issues raised in the pleadings genuine, sham or fictitious, as
shown by affidavits, depositions or admissions accompanying the motion?

A genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is
fictitious or contrived so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.

A perusal of the parties’ respective pleadings would show that there are genuine issues of fact that necessitate formal trial.
Guerrero’s complaint before the RTC contains a statement of the ultimate facts on which he relies for his claim for damages.
He is seeking damages for what he asserts as "illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking account with
the Bank, a returned check worth US$18,000.00 due to signature verification problems, and unauthorized conversion of his
account." In its Answer, the Bank set up its defense that the agreed foreign law to govern their contractual relation bars the
247 | P a g e

recovery of damages other than actual. Apparently, facts are asserted in Guerrero’s complaint while specific denials and
affirmative defenses are set out in the Bank’s answer.

True, the court can determine whether there are genuine issues in a case based merely on the affidavits or counter-affidavits
submitted by the parties to the court. However, as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the Bank’s motion for partial
summary judgment as supported by the Walden affidavit does not demonstrate that Guerrero’s claims are sham, fictitious or
contrived. On the contrary, the Walden affidavit shows that the facts and material allegations as pleaded by the parties are
disputed and there are substantial triable issues necessitating a formal trial.

There can be no summary judgment where questions of fact are in issue or where material allegations of the pleadings are in
dispute.7 The resolution of whether a foreign law allows only the recovery of actual damages is a question of fact as far as the
trial court is concerned since foreign laws do not prove themselves in our courts.8 Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial
notice.9 Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proven. Certainly, the conflicting allegations as to whether New York
law or Philippine law applies to Guerrero’s claims present a clear dispute on material allegations which can be resolved
only by a trial on the merits.

Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by (1) an
official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof. Such official publication or
copy must be accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal
custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be, and must be under the
official seal of the attesting officer.
248 | P a g e

Certain exceptions to this rule were recognized in Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals which held that:

"x x x:

Although it is desirable that foreign law be proved in accordance with the above rule, however, the Supreme Court held in the
case of Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, that Section 41, Rule 123 (Section 25, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court) does not exclude the presentation of other competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law.
In that case, the Supreme Court considered the testimony under oath of an attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California,
who quoted verbatim a section of California Civil Code and who stated that the same was in force at the time the
obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to establish the existence of said law. Accordingly, in line with this view,
the Supreme Court in the Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher et al., upheld the Tax Court in considering the pertinent law
of California as proved by the respondents’ witness.
XXX
The Bank, however, cannot rely on Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal or Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher to
support its cause. These cases involved attorneys testifying in open court during the trial in the Philippines and quoting the
particular foreign laws sought to be established. On the other hand, the Walden affidavit was taken abroad ex parte and the
affiant never testified in open court.The Walden affidavit cannot be considered as proof of New York law on damages not only
because it is self-serving but also because it does not state the specific New York law on damages.

The Walden affidavit states conclusions from the affiant’s personal interpretation and opinion of the facts of the case vis a
vis the alleged laws and jurisprudence without citing any law in particular. The citations in the Walden affidavit of various
U.S. court decisions do not constitute proof of the official records or decisions of the U.S. courts. While the Bank attached
249 | P a g e

copies of some of the U.S. court decisions cited in the Walden affidavit, these copies do not comply with Section 24 of Rule
132 on proof of official records or decisions of foreign courts.

The Bank’s intention in presenting the Walden affidavit is to prove New York law and jurisprudence. However, because of
the failure to comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on how to prove a foreign law and decisions of foreign courts, the Walden
affidavit did not prove the current state of New York law and jurisprudence. Thus, the Bank has only alleged, but has not
proved, what New York law and jurisprudence are on the matters at issue.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated August 24, 1998 and the Resolution dated December
14, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42310 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 119602               October 6, 2000

WILDVALLEY SHIPPING CO., LTD. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT LINES INC.
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision
of the lower court in CA-G.R. CV No. 36821, entitled "Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd., plaintiff-appellant, versus Philippine
President Lines, Inc., defendant-appellant."
FACTS:

Sometime in February 1988, the Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine President Lines, Inc., private respondent
herein, arrived in Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron ore. Upon the completion of the loading and when the vessel was
250 | P a g e

ready to leave port, Mr. Ezzar del Valle Solarzano Vasquez, an official pilot of Venezuela, was designated by the harbour
authorities in Puerto Ordaz to navigate the Philippine Roxas through the Orinoco River. 1 He was asked to pilot the said vessel
on February 11, 19882 boarding it that night at 11:00 p.m.3
The master (captain) of the Philippine Roxas, Captain Nicandro Colon, was at the bridge together with the pilot (Vasquez), the
vessel's third mate (then the officer on watch), and a helmsman when the vessel left the port 4 at 1:40 a.m. on February 12,
1988.5 Captain Colon left the bridge when the vessel was under way.6
The Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations when it entered the San Roque Channel at mile 172. 7 The vessel proceeded
on its way, with the pilot assuring the watch officer that the vibration was a result of the shallowness of the channel. 8
Between mile 158 and 157, the vessel again experienced some vibrations. 9 These occurred at 4:12 a.m.10 It was then that the
watch officer called the master to the bridge.11
The master (captain) checked the position of the vessel12 and verified that it was in the centre of the channel.13 He then went
to confirm, or set down, the position of the vessel on the chart. 14 He ordered Simplicio A. Monis, Chief Officer of the President
Roxas, to check all the double bottom tanks.15
At around 4:35 a.m., the Philippine Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco River, 16 thus obstructing the ingress and egress of
vessels.
As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel owned by herein petitioner Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd., was
unable to sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that day.
Subsequently, Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a suit with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch III against
Philippine President Lines, Inc. and Pioneer Insurance Company (the underwriter/insurer of Philippine Roxas) for damages
in the form of unearned profits, and interest thereon amounting to US $400,000.00 plus attorney's fees, costs, and expenses
of litigation. The complaint against Pioneer Insurance Company was dismissed in an Order dated November 7, 1988. 17
The trial court rendered its decision on October 16, 1991 in favor of the petitioner, Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd.
After the requisite pleadings had been filed, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision.
251 | P a g e

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration22 but the same was denied for lack of merit in the resolution dated March 29,
1995.23
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
3. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING VENEZUELAN LAW DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
SAME HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY PROVED IN THE TRIAL COURT WITHOUT ANY OBJECTION FROM PRIVATE
RESPONDENT, AND WHOSE OBJECTION WAS INTERPOSED BELATEDLY ON APPEAL;
RULING OF THE COURT:
The petition is without merit.
We do not dispute the competency of Capt. Oscar Leon Monzon, the Assistant Harbor Master and Chief of Pilots at Puerto
Ordaz, Venezuela,28 to testify on the existence of the Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje (pilotage law of
Venezuela)29 and the Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco (rules governing the navigation of the Orinoco
River). Captain Monzon has held the aforementioned posts for eight years. 30 As such he is in charge of designating the pilots
for maneuvering and navigating the Orinoco River. He is also in charge of the documents that come into the office of the
harbour masters.31
Nevertheless, we take note that these written laws were not proven in the manner provided by Section 24 of Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court.
The Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje was published in the Gaceta Oficial32 of the Republic of Venezuela. A photocopy
of the Gaceta Oficial was presented in evidence as an official publication of the Republic of Venezuela.
The Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco is published in a book issued by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of
Venezuela.33 Only a photocopy of the said rules was likewise presented as evidence.
252 | P a g e

Both of these documents are considered in Philippine jurisprudence to be public documents for they are the written official
acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers of Venezuela. 34
For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are mandatory: (1) It must be attested by
the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and (2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary
of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal
of his office.35 The latter requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full faith and credit to the
genuineness of a document in a foreign country.36
It is not enough that the Gaceta Oficial, or a book published by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela, was presented
as evidence with Captain Monzon attesting it. It is also required by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court that a
certificate that Captain Monzon, who attested the documents, is the officer who had legal custody of those records made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in Venezuela, and authenticated by the seal of his office accompanying the copy of the
public document. No such certificate could be found in the records of the case.
With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable, for the written law itself is the best evidence. According to
the weight of authority, when a foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule requires that it be proved by a duly
authenticated copy of the statute.37
At this juncture, we have to point out that the Venezuelan law was not pleaded before the lower court.
A foreign law is considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in the pleading about the existence of the foreign law, its
import and legal consequence on the event or transaction in issue. 38
A review of the Complaint39 revealed that it was never alleged or invoked despite the fact that the grounding of the M/V
Philippine Roxas occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of Venezuela.
We reiterate that under the rules of private international law, a foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In
the absence of pleading and proof, the laws of a foreign country, or state, will be presumed to be the same as our own local or
domestic law and this is known as processual presumption.40
253 | P a g e

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No.
36821 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. L-27860; L-27896; L-27936; L-27937 – 56 SCRA 266 – Civil Law – Preliminary Title – Application of Laws –
Nationality Principle – Renvoi Doctrine
In November 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas made a will. In May 1957, while she was domiciled
here in the Philippines (Iloilo City), she died.

In her will, she left all her estate in favor of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges. Linnie however also stated in her will that
should her husband later die, said estate shall be turned over to her brother and sister.

In December 1962, Charles died (it appears he was also domiciled here). Atty. Leon Gellada, the lawyer of Charles filed a
motion before the probate court (there was an ongoing probate on the will of Linnie) so that a certain Avelina Magno may be
appointed as the administratrix of the estate. Magno was the trusted employee of the Hodges when they were alive. Atty.
Gellada manifested that Charles himself left a will but the same was in an iron trunk in Charles’ office. Hence, in the
meantime, he’d like to have Magno appointed as administratrix. Judge Venicio Escolin approved the motion.

Later, Charles’ will was found and so a new petition for probate was filed for the said will. Since said will basically covers the
same estate, Magno, as admininistratrix of Linnie’s estate opposed the said petition. Eventually, the probate of Charles’ will
was granted. Eventually also, the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank was appointed as administrator. But Magno
refused to turn over the estate.
254 | P a g e

Magno contended that in her will, Linnie wanted Charles to turn over the property to Linnie’s brother and sister and since that
is her will, the same must be respected. Magno also contended that Linnie was a Texan at the time of her death (an alien
testator); that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, successional rights are governed by Linnie’s national law; that under Texas
law, Linnie’s will shall be respected regardless of the presence of legitimes (Charles’ share in the estate).

PCIB argued that the law of Texas refers the matter back to Philippine laws because Linnie was domiciled outside Texas at the
time of her death (applying the renvoi doctrine).

ISSUE:
Whether or not Texas Law or Philippine should apply to the case.
RULING OF THE COURT
The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the lower court. Both parties failed to adduce proof as to the law of Texas. The
Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that
would be presented in the probate court. The Supreme Court however emphasized that Texas law at the time of Linnie’s
death is the law applicable (and not said law at any other time).
Costs against petitioner-appellant PCIB.

G.R. No. 178551 October 11, 2010

ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH-KUWAIT Petitioners,
255 | P a g e

vs.
MA. JOSEFA ECHIN, Respondent.

Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas Corporation in behalf of its principal-co-petitioner, the
Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait (the Ministry), for the position of medical technologist under a two-year contract,
denominated as a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), with a monthly salary of US$1,200.00.

Under the MOA, all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of one (1) year and are covered by Kuwait’s Civil
Service Board Employment Contract No. 2.

Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from employment on February 11, 2001, she not having
allegedly passed the probationary period.

As the Ministry denied respondent’s request for reconsideration, she returned to the Philippines on March 17, 2001,
shouldering her own air fare.

On July 27, 2001, respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint2 for illegal dismissal
against petitioner ATCI as the local recruitment agency, represented by petitioner, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry, as
the foreign principal.
256 | P a g e

By Decision3 of November 29, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, finding that petitioners neither showed that there was just cause to
warrant respondent’s dismissal nor that she failed to qualify as a regular employee, held that respondent was illegally
dismissed and accordingly ordered petitioners to pay her US$3,600.00, representing her salary for the three months
unexpired portion of her contract.

On appeal of petitioners ATCI and Ikdal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision by Resolution4 of January 26, 2004.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution5 of April 22, 2004, they appealed to the Court of
Appeals, contending that their principal, the Ministry, being a foreign government agency, is immune from suit and, as
such, the immunity extended to them; and that respondent was validly dismissed for her failure to meet the performance
rating within the one-year period as required under Kuwait’s Civil Service Laws. Petitioners further contended that Ikdal
should not be liable as an officer of petitioner ATCI.

By Decision6 of March 30, 2007, the appellate court affirmed the NLRC Resolution.

In brushing aside petitioners’ contention that they only acted as agent of the Ministry and that they cannot be held jointly and
solidarily liable with it, the appellate court noted that under the law, a private employment agency shall assume all
responsibilities for the implementation of the contract of employment of an overseas worker, hence, it can be sued jointly and
severally with the foreign principal for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment.

As to Ikdal’s liability, the appellate court held that under Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the "Migrant and Overseas Filipinos’
Act of 1995," corporate officers, directors and partners of a recruitment agency may themselves be jointly and solidarily liable
with the recruitment agency for money claims and damages awarded to overseas workers.
257 | P a g e

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court by Resolution7 of June 27, 2007, the
present petition for review on certiorari was filed.
ARGUMENTS
Petitioners maintain that they should not be held liable because respondent’s employment contract specifically stipulates that
her employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait. They thus conclude that it was patent
error for the labor tribunals and the appellate court to apply the Labor Code provisions governing probationary employment
in deciding the present case.

Further, petitioners argue that even the Philippine Overseas Employment Act (POEA) Rules relative to master employment
contracts (Part III, Sec. 2 of the POEA Rules and Regulations) accord respect to the "customs, practices, company policies and
labor laws and legislation of the host country."

Finally, petitioners posit that assuming arguendo that Philippine labor laws are applicable, given that the foreign principal is a
government agency which is immune from suit, as in fact it did not sign any document agreeing to be held jointly and
solidarily liable, petitioner ATCI cannot likewise be held liable, more so since the Ministry’s liability had not been judicially
determined as jurisdiction was not acquired over it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait or the Labor Code.
RULING: LABOR CODE

The petition fails.

258 | P a g e

As to petitioners’ contentions that Philippine labor laws on probationary employment are not applicable since it was
expressly provided in respondent’s employment contract, which she voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her
engagement shall be governed by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord respect to
such rules, customs and practices of the host country, the same was not substantiated.
XXX
It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the
law, under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case, petitioners failed to discharge.
XXXX

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the
foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter
cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law.

Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the International Law doctrine
of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if
pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in
determining the issues presented before us. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
259 | P a g e

The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven. To
prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court which reads:

SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible
for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that
such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office. (emphasis supplied)

SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of the
evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as
the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of
a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.

To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the following: MOA between respondent and the Ministry, as represented by
ATCI, which provides that the employee is subject to a probationary period of one (1) year and that the host country’s Civil
Service Laws and Regulations apply; a translated copy11 (Arabic to English) of the termination letter to respondent stating
that she did not pass the probation terms, without specifying the grounds therefor, and a translated copy of the certificate of
termination,12 both of which documents were certified by Mr. Mustapha Alawi, Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs-
Office of Consular Affairs Inslamic Certification and Translation Unit; and respondent’s letter13 of reconsideration to the
260 | P a g e

Ministry, wherein she noted that in her first eight (8) months of employment, she was given a rating of "Excellent" albeit it
changed due to changes in her shift of work schedule.

These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not sufficiently prove that respondent was validly terminated as a
probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws. Instead of submitting a copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly
authenticated and translated by Embassy officials thereat, as required under the Rules, what petitioners submitted were mere
certifications attesting only to the correctness of the translations of the MOA and the termination letter which does not prove
at all that Kuwaiti civil service laws differ from Philippine laws and that under such Kuwaiti laws, respondent was validly
terminated.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

In re Siemen's Estate, 346 Pa. 610, 31A.2d280, 153 ALR 483 (1943)
January 20, 1943.

March 22, 1943.

Wills — Construction — Legatee — Latent or patent ambiguity — Name of corporation — Abbreviation — "Penna. S. P. C. A."
— Evidence — Judicial notice.
261 | P a g e

1. Where a subject exists which satisfies the term of the will, and to which it is perfectly applicable, there is no latent
ambiguity in it. [613]

2. Evidence is admissible to show that a corporation is ordinarily known by the name used in the bequest or devise. [613]

3. Judicial notice does not depend on the actual knowledge of the judge of the court; when the fact is alleged, it must
investigate and may refresh its recollection by resorting to any means deemed safe and proper. [613]

4. Judicial notice may be taken of such ordinary abbreviations as by common use may be regarded as universally understood.
[613]

5. The test of judicial notice of the meaning of an abbreviation used in a will is whether it is of such general and public
notoriety that every reasonably informed person within the limits of the jurisdiction may fairly be presumed to be acquainted
with it. [613]

6. Where a will contained a residuary bequest to "the Penna. S. P. C. A.," an award to the Pennsylvania Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals was Held to be proper. [611-14]
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5914a28dadd7b0493469a32c

In re Marriage ofTresnak, 297 NW 2d 109 (1980)

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/59149258add7b04934596a3d
262 | P a g e

This appeal involves a parental dispute over custody of two sons, Rick, age eleven, and Ryan, age nine. The parents are Emil
James Tresnak (Jim) and Linda Lou Tresnak (Linda) who were married in 1965. In the August 1979 decree dissolving the
marriage, the trial court awarded custody of the children to Jim. Linda appeals. We reverse and remand.
Jim was twenty-four at the time of the marriage and had three years of college. Linda was nineteen, had one year of college
and had worked for one year. They resided in Dodge, Nebraska, where Jim worked with his father in the insurance business. In
1969 he sold his interest in the insurance agency and the parties sold their home. Jim returned to college and obtained his
degree. In 1970 the family moved to Omaha where Jim taught in a private girls' college. In 1971 they moved to Chariton where
Jim taught high school business courses, a position which he still held at the time of trial.
Linda worked in a nursing home in 1967 but otherwise was not employed outside the home during the marriage.
Jim obtained a master's degree in 1978 after three years of summer school study at Northeast Missouri State University in
Kirksville.
In the fall of 1975 Linda entered junior college at Centerville. She attended summer sessions at the university in Kirksville in
1976 through 1978, while Jim was there. In addition, she attended the university full-time from January 1978 until the spring
of 1979. At that time she graduated *111 with a B.A. degree in psychology. She planned to enter law school at the University
of Iowa in the fall of that year.
The children stayed in Chariton with Jim from January through May 1978 while Linda was in school at Kirksville. The whole
family was in Kirksville that summer while both parents were in school. In the fall, the children remained with Linda and
enrolled in school in Kirksville for the 1978-79 school year while Jim returned to Chariton. The children have been in the
continuous custody of Linda since then.
In awarding custody of the children to Jim, the trial court said:
The Petitioner at this time in life now desires to continue her education by attending law school at the University of Iowa.
Although this is commendable insofar as her ambition for a career is concerned, in the opinion of the Court, it is not
263 | P a g e

necessarily for the best interest and welfare of her minor children, who are now ten and eight years of age. Anyone who has
attained a legal education can well appreciate the time that studies consume. Although the Petitioner, during her
undergraduate work, was able to care for the children while attending the Northeast Missouri University at Kirksville by
studying after the children were placed in bed, the study of law is somewhat different in that it usually requires library study,
where reference material is required. Also, other than time in class during the day, there will be study periods during the day
in the library necessary, as well as in the evening, and which would necessarily require the children being in the hands of a
babysitter for many hours a day when not attending school. The weekends are usually occupied by study periods, and
although the Petitioner has a high academic ability, she will find that by reason thereof there will be additional activities
bestowed upon her, such as becoming a member of a law review, which is time-consuming. Although the Petitioner may
believe that she would not have to engage in such, she by [not] doing so would be interfering with her own achievements for
her own benefit and welfare in future years. The Respondent father has a stable position in the Chariton school system,
president of the teachers' association, and, so far as known now, can remain in the Chariton schools for many years in the
future. The Respondent's salary, though not exceptionally high, is adequate to maintain the children properly, and give them
all the necessities of life. The Respondent father will be able to engage in various activities with the boys, such as athletic
events, fishing, hunting, mechanical training, and other activities that boys are interested in. It would also be a benefit to the
children if they were allowed to remain in the Chariton school system where they have attended school and have many
friends and acquaintances. Placing custody with the Petitioner would require the children to be placed in the Iowa City school
system for only a temporary time of three years, and again undoubtedly removed and placed in another system where the
Petitioner would locate to practice her profession.
Linda, supported by the amicus briefs, challenges the trial court's statements concerning the demands of law school and
the appropriateness of awarding custody of male children to their fathers. She asks that the custody decision be reversed.
I. The trial court's analysis. In challenging the trial court's reasoning, Linda contends no evidentiary support existed for the
court's assumptions about law school and the children's activities. She also contends the assumed facts are not a proper
subject of judicial notice.
264 | P a g e

A. The demands of law school. The only evidence about the demands of law school appeared in Linda's testimony. She
acknowledged on cross-examination that law school would require many hours of study. However, she also said she did not
expect to leave the children with babysitters often, she would take them to the library with her if necessary, and she did not
believe her studies would interfere with her care of the children. Thus, while the *112 record supports the trial court's
inference that law school studies would occupy much of Linda's time, it does not lend much support to the court's statements
about the necessity of library work away from the children, the likelihood of her involvement in extracurricular activities, or
the effect of such factors on her care of the children.
Nor are these matters subject to judicial notice. "To be capable of being judicially noticed a matter must be of common
knowledge or capable of certain verification." Motor Club of Iowa v. Department of Transportation, 251 N.W.2d 510, 517
(Iowa 1977). Courts are permitted to dispense with formal proof of matters which everyone knows. See City of Cedar Rapids v.
Cox, 252 Iowa 948, 958, 108 N.W.2d 253, 259 (1961), appeal dismissed, 388 U.S. 3, 82 S. Ct. 16, 7 L. Ed. 2d 17.
In this case, in overruling Linda's motion for new trial, the trial court defended its findings by asserting a "personal
acquaintanceship with the studies of law school." However, judicial notice "`is limited to what a judge may properly know in
his judicial capacity, and he is not authorized to make his personal knowledge of a fact not generally or professionally known
the basis of his action.'" Bervid v. Iowa State Tax Commission, 247 Iowa 1333, 1339, 78 N.W.2d 812, 816 (1956). See J.
Wigmore, 9 Evidence § 2569 at 540 (3d ed. 1961). It is common knowledge in the legal profession that law school studies are
demanding and time-consuming, but the requirements of a specific law school curriculum are not generally or professionally
known.
The trial court's statements about the necessity of extensive library study and likelihood of Linda's work on the law review
at the University of Iowa law school are not matters of common knowledge or capable of certain verification within the
meaning of the judicial notice principle. Because the statements have only tenuous support in the evidence, they are entitled
to little weight in evaluating the merits of the custody dispute. In saying this, however, we do not suggest the court could not
consider the demands of law school which were shown in the evidence.
B. The children's preferred activities. Linda testified that the boys enjoy fishing, reading, baking cookies, bicycling, swimming,
soccer, and basketball. They do not play baseball or football. She fishes, reads, bakes cookies, bicycles and swims with them.
265 | P a g e

Jim testified he swam and played soccer with the children, although he said his age and smoking limited his participation in
soccer to about fifteen minutes. Linda said he refused to take the boys fishing.
This record does not support the court's statement that Jim "will be able to engage in various activities with the boys, such as
athletic events, fishing, hunting, mechanical training and other activities that boys are interested in." No evidence was
received that these boys were interested in hunting or mechanical training, that the enumerated pursuits are more
appropriate to males, that "other activities" exist in which males have a necessary interest, or that these children will
necessarily have the same interests as other males. Nor does the record contain any evidence that Jim was capable of
participating in any activities with the children that Linda could not participate in with them equally well.
Apart from the lack of evidentiary support, the statement has at least two other flaws. It contains matters which are not
subject to judicial notice, and it represents a stereotypical view of sexual roles which has no place in child custody
adjudication.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292 (1937)

Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio
No. 539
Argued April 6, 7, 1937
Decided April 26, 1937
301 U.S. 292
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Syllabus
266 | P a g e

1. As bases for an order requiring a telephone company to refund to its patrons "excess" earnings collected during a series of
years, a state commission valued the company's property for each of those years by applying to the value in an earlier year,
which it had determined on hearings, price trend percentages said to have been derived from evidence of which the
commission took judicial notice but which it withheld from its records and refused to reveal.  Held a denial of due process of
law. P. 301 U. S. 300.
2. A fair hearing is essential to due process; without it, there is condemnation without trial. P. 301 U. S. 300.
3. Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that there has been an economic depression, with decline of market values, but
judicial notice cannot be taken of the values of land, labor, buildings, and equipment, with their yearly fluctuations. P. 301
U. S. 300.
4. This distinction is the more important in cases where the extent of the fluctuations is not collaterally involved, but is the
very point in issue. P. 301 U.S. 301.
5. Taking of judicial notice has no other effect than to relieve one of the parties to a controversy of the burden of resorting to
the usual forms of evidence; his opponent is at liberty to dispute the matter by evidence. P. 301 U.S. 301.
6. To press the doctrine of judicial notice to the extent attempted in this case, and to do that retroactively, after the case had
been submitted, would be to turn the doctrine into a pretext for dispensing with a trial. P. 301 U. S. 302.
7. From the standpoint of due process -- the protection of the individual against arbitrary action -- a deeper vice than the
unreasonable extension of judicial notice is in this case the concealment from the party affected of the particular or evidential
facts of which judicial notice was taken by the commission, and on which it rested its conclusion. P. 301 U. S. 302.
8. Under the statutes of Ohio, no provision is made for a review of the order of the Public Utilities Commission by a separate
or independent suit. The sole method of review is by petition in error to the Supreme Court of the State, which considers both
the
Page 301 U. S. 293
267 | P a g e

law and the facts upon the record made below, and not upon new evidence. If, as in this case, that court merely accepts
findings of the commission attributed to judicial notice and unsupported by any known or knowable evidence, judicial review
is denied. P. 301 U. S. 303.
9. In view of the power and discretion reposed in regulatory commissions, the inexorable safeguard of a fair and open hearing
must be maintained in its integrity in their proceedings. P. 301 U. S. 304.
10. The right to such a hearing is one of the rudiments of fair play assured to every litigant by the Fourteenth Amendment as a
minimal requirement. There can be no compromise on the footing of convenience or expediency, or because of a natural
desire to be rid of harassing delay, when that minimal requirement has been neglected or ignored. P. 301 U. S. 304.
11. The appellant in this case has not estopped itself from objecting to the use of price trends gathered in its absence. P. 301
U. S. 306.
131 Oh.St. 539, 3 N.E.2d 475, reversed.
THE CASE:
Appeal from a judgment sustaining on appeal an order of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio requiring the Telephone
Company to refund "excess earnings" to its patrons.
MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO delivered the opinion of the Court.
The rates chargeable by the appellant, the Ohio Bell Telephone Company, for intrastate telephone service to subscribers and
patrons in Ohio are the subject matter of this controversy.
Page 301 U. S. 294
FACTS:
Appellant was reorganized in September, 1921, by consolidation with the Ohio State Telephone Company, till then a
competitor. Soon afterwards, it filed with the Public Utilities Commission of the state schedules of new rates to be charged in
those communities where an increase was desired for the unified service. Except in the case of toll charges, the rates were not
268 | P a g e

statewide, but were separately stated for each of the company's exchanges, of which there were many. By the statutes then
in force (the Robinson law, passed December 19, 1919, 108 Ohio Laws, p. 1094, as amended by the Pence law, passed April 4,
1923, 110 Ohio Laws, p. 366), the operation of an increase might be suspended for 120 days, at the end of which time the rate
was to go into effect upon the filing of a bond for the repayment to consumers of such portion of the increased rate as the
Commission, upon final hearing, should determine to have been excessive, with interest thereon. Construing these statutes,
the Ohio courts have held that a refund must be limited to rates collected under a bond, jurisdiction being disclaimed when
that condition was not satisfied. Lima v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 106 Ohio St. 379, 386, 140 N.E. 147; Great Miami Valley
Taxpayers Assn. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 131 Ohio St. 285, 286, 2 N.E.2d 777. Some of the new exchange schedules were the
subject of protests, and, in proceedings to revise them (known as Pence Law proceedings), were made effective by bonds, a
separate one for each exchange. Protest was also aimed at the new schedule for toll service, which was to apply throughout
the state. On the other hand, schedules for other exchanges became effective without protest, and therefore without bond,
and are not now at issue.
By October, 1924, thirty-one Pence Law proceedings aimed at separate exchanges had been begun, but had not been fully
tried. Already several thousand pages of testimony
Page 301 U. S. 295 had been taken, and many exhibits received in evidence. Soon afterwards, twelve additional proceedings
were begun, making the total number forty-three, exclusive of the toll case. Two other proceedings were started later on.
While the number stood at forty-three, the Commission, of its own motion, by order dated October 14, 1924, directed a
company-wide investigation of appellant's property and rates, and consolidated the bond cases therewith. The order recites
that, in all the pending proceedings, the important issues are identical, and that a single consolidated case will enable rates to
be determined for all services within the state at a minimum expenditure of time and money. Accordingly, the company was
required to file with the Commission, on or before December 1, 1924, a complete inventory of all its property used and useful
in its business, and, upon the filing of such inventory, the consolidated case was to "proceed to a hearing for the
determination of the fair value of said property and of the just and reasonable rates for the service thereby to be furnished by
said company to its patrons throughout the State of Ohio."
269 | P a g e

The statewide investigation thus initiated, as distinguished from the Pence Law proceedings consolidated therewith, had its
legal basis in provisions of the General Code of Ohio (§ 499-8, 499-9), and its scope was confined to the rates chargeable in the
future (§ 614-23), the Pence Law being the basis for any refund of rates collected in the past. The statute (§ 499-9) makes it
mandatory that, in fixing rates for the future, the Commission shall ascertain the value of the property as "of a date certain" to
be named. The date adopted for that purpose was June 30, 1925.
The company filed an inventory as required by the Commission, with supplemental inventories every six months thereafter
showing additions and retirements. A long investigation followed, the evidence being directed
Page 301 U. S. 296
in the main to the value of the property on the basis of historical cost and cost of reproduction, and to the deductions
chargeable to gross revenues for depreciation reserve and operating expenses generally. As early as February, 1927, the case
was submitted to the Commission for the fixing of a tentative value as of the date certain, a tentative value being subject
under the Ohio Code to protest and readjustment. At the request of the Attorney General, however, the proceeding was
reopened and new evidence introduced. At last, on January 10, 1931, the Commission announced its tentative conclusion. The
valuation then arrived at was $104,282,735, for all the property within the state, whether used in interstate or in intrastate
business. Protests were filed both by the company and by the state and municipalities. They were followed by new hearings.
On January 16, 1934, the Commission made its findings and order setting forth what purports to be a final valuation. The
intrastate property, as of June 30, 1925, was valued at $93,707,488; the total property, interstate and intrastate at
$96,422,276.
The Commission did not confine itself, however, to a valuation of the property as of the date certain. It undertook also to fix a
valuation for each of the years 1926 to 1933, inclusive. For this purpose, it took judicial notice of price trends during those
years, modifying the value which it had found as of the date certain by the percentage of decline or rise applicable to the
years thereafter. The first warning that it would do this came in 1934, with the filing of its report. "The trend of land valuation
was ascertained," according to the findings, "from examination of the tax value in communities where the company had its
largest real estate holdings."
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"For building trends, resort was had to price indices of the Engineering News Record, a recognized magazine in the field
Page 301 U. S. 297
of engineering construction."
"Labor trends were developed from the same sources." Reference was made also to the findings of a federal court in Illinois
(Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Gilbert, 3 F. Supp. 595, 603) as to the price levels upon sales of apparatus and equipment by
Western Electric, an affiliated corporation. The findings were not in evidence, though much of the testimony and exhibits on
which they rested had been received by stipulation for certain limited purposes, and mainly to discover whether the prices
paid to the affiliate were swollen beyond reason. * Cf. Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 292 U. S. 290, 292
U. S. 295. The Commission consulted these findings as indicative of market trends, and learned upon them heavily. By resort
to these and cognate sources, the value at the beginning of 1926 was fixed at 98.73% of the value at the date certain; the
1927 value at 95.7%; the 1928 value at 95%; the 1929 value at 96.3%; the 1930 value at 92.2%; the 1931 value at 86.6%; the
1932 value at 76.8%; the 1933 value at 79.1%. Upon that basis, the company was found to have been in receipt of excess
earnings of $13,289,172, distributed as follows: for 1925, $1,822,647; for 1926, $2,041,483; for 1927, $1,986,610; for 1928,
$1,925,301; for 1929,
Page 301 U. S. 298
$1,463,347; for 1930, $1,481,689; for 1931, $1,659,760; for 1932, $908,335; for 1933, nothing. The excess was arrived at by
figuring a return of 7% upon the value as a reasonable rate for the years 1925 to 1929, inclusive; 6.5% for the years 1930 and
1931, and 5.5% for the years 1932 and 1933. There being no excess revenue for the year 1933, the last year covered by the
report, the Commission did not fix any percentage of reduction for the rates in future years. It did, however, prescribe a
refund of the full amount of the excess for the years in which excess earnings were found to have been realized. The
statewide proceeding to fix rates for the future on the basis of a date certain was thus transformed finally into a refund
proceeding, similar in function to proceedings under the Pence law for the refund of charges collected under bonds. The
report of the Commission determining the excess was signed by a majority of the members, the Chairman dissenting. It was
accompanied by an order similar in tenor.
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The company protested and moved for a rehearing. In its protest, it stated that the trend percentage accepted in the
findings as marking a decline in values did not come from any official sources which the Commission had the right to notice
judicially; that they had not been introduced in evidence; that the company had not been given an opportunity to explain or
rebut them, and that, by their use, the Commission had denied a fair hearing in contravention of the requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Demand was made that an opportunity be conceded for explanation and rebuttal; demand was
made also that the company be permitted to submit evidence showing separately for each year the fair value of its property,
its revenues, expenses, and net income in each of the several cases wherein rates had been collected under bond. This last
was a renewal of a demand which had been made several times in the course of the inquiry, as the Commission in its report
concedes.
By order dated March 1, 1934, the protests were overruled and the demands rejected. By order dated July 5 of the same
year, the Commission modified to some extent its findings as to the excess income referable to bonded rates, and directed the
company to show cause why refunds of the excess should not be made upon that basis. Again there was protest, with a
renewal of the request that evidence be received along the lines already indicated. Again the Commission reaffirmed its
previous position.
The outcome of these manoeuvres was the filing of a final order, dated September 6, 1934, apportioning the excess income
between bonded and nonbonded rates by allocating to the former class a total of $11,423,137 for exchange subscribers and
$409,127 for toll patrons (in all, $11,832,264) and directing payment accordingly. Distribution was to be made among the
several exchanges upon the basis of the percentage relation of the gross exchange revenues in the exchanges where bonds
were in effect to the total gross exchange revenues, bonded and unbonded. If even a single rate in a particular exchange
-- e.g., in the city of Cleveland -- had been collected under bond, all the revenues of that exchange were included in reckoning
the percentage of the total that should go to the Cleveland customers. So much of the excess as was not used up in that way
was apportioned to the tolls. This method of allocation was made the subject of another protest, the company insisting that it
was arbitrary and unequal, and a denial of due process. Petitions in error were filed with the Supreme Court of Ohio in
accordance with the state practice (General Code, § 544 et seq.) to review the final order of September 6, 1934, and the
several intermediate orders supporting it. There was timely and adequate assertion of the infringement
272 | P a g e

Page 301 U. S. 300

of the petitioner's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed with an opinion per curiam.
131 Ohio St. 539, 3 N.E.2d 475. The case is here upon appeal. Judicial Code, § 237, 28 U.S.C. § 344.
First. The fundamentals of a trial were denied to the appellant when rates previously collected were ordered to be refunded
upon the strength of evidential facts not spread upon the record.
The Commission had given notice that the value of the property would be fixed as of a date certain. Evidence directed to the
value at that time had been laid before the triers of the facts in thousands of printed pages. To make the picture more
complete, evidence had been given as to the value at cost of additions and retirements. Without warning or even the hint of
warning that the case would be considered or determined upon any other basis than the evidence submitted, the Commission
cut down the values for the years after the date certain upon the strength of information secretly collected and never yet
disclosed. The company protested. It asked disclosure of the documents indicative of price trends, and an opportunity to
examine them, to analyze them, to explain and to rebut them. The response was a curt refusal. Upon the strength of these
unknown documents, refunds have been ordered for sums mounting into millions, the Commission reporting its conclusion,
but not the underlying proofs. The putative debtor does not know the proofs today. This is not the fair hearing essential to
due process. It is condemnation without trial.
An attempt was made by the Commission and again by the state court to uphold this decision without evidence as an instance
of judicial notice. Indeed, decisions of this Court were cited (Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.
Page 301 U. S. 301
Co. v. United States, 284 U. S. 248, 284 U. S. 260; Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, supra, p. 292 U. S.
311; Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission, 290 U. S. 264, 290 U. S. 274-275) as giving support to the new
doctrine that the values of land and labor and buildings and equipment, with all their yearly fluctuations, no longer call for
evidence. Our opinions have been much misread if they have been thought to point that way. Courts take judicial notice of
matters of common knowledge. 5 Wigmore, Evidence, §§ 2571, 2580, 2583; Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, pp. 277,
302. They take judicial notice that there has been a depression, and that a decline of market values is one of its
273 | P a g e

concomitants. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. United States, supra; Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of
Ohio, supra; Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, supra. How great the decline has been for this industry or
that, for one material or another, in this year or the next, can be known only to the experts, who may even differ among
themselves. For illustration, a court takes judicial notice of the fact that Confederate money depreciated in value during the
war between the states (Wood v. Cooper, 2 Heisk. 441, 447; Hix v. Hix, 25 W.Va. 481, 484-485), but not of the extent of the
depreciation at a given time and place. Modawell v. Holmes, 40 Ala. 391, 405. Cf. Feemster v. Ringo, 5 T.B.Mun. 336-
337; Baxter v. McDonnell, 155 N.Y. 83, 93, 49 N.E. 667. The distinction is the more important in cases where, as here, the
extent of the fluctuations is not collaterally involved, but is the very point in issue. Moreover, notice, even when taken, has no
other effect than to relieve one of the parties to a controversy of the burden of resorting to the usual forms of evidence.
Wigmore, Evidence, § 2567; 1 Greenleaf, Evidence, (16th Ed.) p. 18. "It does not
Page 301 U. S. 302
mean that the opponent is prevented from disputing the matter by evidence if he believes it disputable." Ibid. Cf. Shapleigh v.
Mier, 299 U. S. 468. Such, at least, is the general rule, to be adhered to in the absence of exceptional conditions. Here, the
contention would be futile that the precise amount of the decline in values was so determinate or notorious in each and every
year between 1925 and 1933 as to be beyond the range of question. So much is indeed conceded on the face of the report
itself. No rational concept of notoriety will include these variable elements. True, the category is not a closed one.
"The precedents of former judges, in declining to notice or assenting to notice specific facts, do not restrict the present judge
from noticing a new fact, provided only that the new fact is notorious to the community."
5 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2583. Even so, to press the doctrine of judicial notice to the extent attempted in this case, and to do
that retroactively after the case had been submitted, would be to turn the doctrine into a pretext for dispensing with a trial.
What was done by the Commission is subject, however, to an objection even deeper. Cf. Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S.
172, 175 U. S. 174-175; West v. Louisiana, 194 U. S. 258, 194 U. S. 262-263. There has been more than an expansion of the
concept of notoriety beyond reasonable limits. From the standpoint of due process -- the protection of the individual against
arbitrary action -- a deeper vice is this, that even now we do not know the particular or evidential facts of which the
274 | P a g e

Commission took judicial notice and on which it rested its conclusion. Not only are the facts unknown; there is no way to find
them out. When price lists or trade journals or even government reports are put in evidence upon a trial, the party against
whom they are offered may see the evidence or hear it and parry its effect. Even if they are copied in the findings without
preliminary proof, there is at least an opportunity in connection with a judicial review of the decision to challenge the
deductions made from them. The opportunity is excluded here. The Commission, withholding from the record the evidential
facts that it has gathered here and there, contents itself with saying that, in gathering them, it went to journals and tax lists, as
if a judge were to tell us, "I looked at the statistics in the Library of Congress, and they teach me thus and so." This will never
do if hearings and appeals are to be more than empty forms.
We have pointed out elsewhere that, under the statutes of Ohio, no provision is made for a review of the order of the
Commission by a separate or independent suit. West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n (No. 1), 294 U. S. 63, 294 U. S. 68.
A different question would be here if such a suit could be maintained with an intermediate suspension of the administrative
ruling. Porter v. Investors' Syndicate, 286 U. S. 461, 286 U. S. 470-471; United States v. Illinois Central R. Co., 291 U. S. 457, 291
U. S. 463; Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 393, 292 U. S. 396; Wells Fargo & Co. v. Nevada, 248 U. S. 165, 248 U. S. 168. Cf.
Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294, 288 U. S. 318-319. In Ohio, the sole method of review is by petition in
error to the Supreme Court of the State, which considers both the law and the facts upon the record made below, and not
upon new evidence. In such circumstances, judicial review would be no longer a reality if the practice followed in this case
were to receive the stamp of regularity. To put the problem more concretely: how was it possible for the appellate court to
review the law and the facts and intelligently decide that the findings of the Commission were supported by the evidence
when the evidence that it approved was unknown and unknowable? In expressing that approval, the court did not mean that,
traveling beyond the record, it had consulted price lists for itself and had reached its own conclusion as to the percentage of
decline in value from 1925 onwards. It did not even mean that it had looked at the particular lists made use of by the
Commission, for no one knows what they were in any precise or certain way. Nowhere in the opinion is there even the hint of
such a search. What the Supreme Court of Ohio did was to take the word of the Commission as to the outcome of a secret
investigation, and let it go at that. "A hearing is not judicial, at least in any adequate sense, unless the evidence can be
known." West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Commission (No. 1) supra, p. 294 U. S. 69. Cf. Interstate Commerce Comm'n v.
275 | P a g e

Louisville & N. Ry. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 227 U. S. 91; United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry. Co., 265 U. S. 274, 265 U. S.
288; Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258, 264 U. S. 263-265.
Regulatory commissions have been invested with broad powers within the sphere of duty assigned to them by law. Even
in quasi-judicial proceedings, their informed and expert judgment exacts and receives a proper deference from courts when it
has been reached with due submission to constitutional restraints. West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n (No. 1),
supra, p. 294 U. S. 70; West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n (No. 2), 294 U. S. 79; Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Railroad Commission, 289 U. S. 287, 289 U. S. 304. Indeed, much that they do within the realm of administrative discretion is
exempt from supervision if those restraints have been obeyed. All the more insistent is the need, when power has been
bestowed so freely, that the "inexorable safeguard" (St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 298 U. S. 73) of a
fair and open hearing be maintained in its integrity. Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 298 U. S. 480-481; Interstate
Commerce Comm'n v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co., supra. The right to such a hearing is one of "the rudiments of fair play" (Chicago,
M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Polt, 232 U.S.
Page 301 U. S. 305
165, 232 U. S. 168) assured to every litigant by the Fourteenth Amendment as a minimal requirement. West Ohio Gas Co. v.
Public Utilities Commission (No. 1), (No. 2), supra; Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673, 281 U. S. 682. Cf. Norwegian
Nitrogen Co. v. United States, supra. There can be no compromise on the footing of convenience or expediency, or because of
a natural desire to be rid of harassing delay, when that minimal requirement has been neglected or ignored.
In an endeavor to sustain the judgment, the state shifts its line of argument from the course pursued below, so far, at least, as
the course then followed is reflected in the record. Both the Commission and the Supreme Court of Ohio tell us that they have
applied the price trends to the value on the day certain by resort to judicial notice. The state now suggests that, whatever the
court or the Commission may have professed to be doing, there was a basis in the evidence for the conclusion ultimately
reached. To give aid to that suggestion, reference is made to the findings of a federal court as to the prices charged by
Western Electric for telephone equipment, which findings were not in evidence, though they were founded upon evidence
received by stipulation for purposes narrowly defined and exclusive of any others. The terms of the stipulation have already
been stated in this opinion. Even if we assume in favor of the state that the evidence, when in, could be considered as
276 | P a g e

indicative of the trend of market values generally, the judgment is not helped. The Commission did not take the prices paid by
appellant to the affiliated corporation as the only evidence of market trends, but merely as one factor along with many others.
What weighting it gave them, the record does not disclose, and the Commission denied the appellant an opportunity to
inquire. According to appellant's computation, telephone apparatus and equipment
Page 301 U. S. 306
make up less than 30% of the value of appellant's plant. Even for that portion of the plant, the Western Electric prices were
not accepted as decisive, but were supplemented and corrected from sources dehors the record. For the other 70%, they were
without probative significance, at all events, until supplemented by evidence that the decline in the value of apparatus and
equipment was less than that in the value of land or buildings or other components of the plant. To fix the value of these
components, the Commission had recourse to statistics which it collected for itself. There was no "suitable opportunity
through evidence and argument . . . to challenge the result." West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Commission (No. 1),
supra, p. 294 U. S. 70.
Second: The appellant has not estopped itself from objecting to the use of price trends gathered in its absence.
The company did not oppose the consolidation of the statewide investigation with the Pence law proceedings. This did not
amount, however, to a waiver of its right to have the value of its property determined upon evidence. At no stage of the
inquiry was there any suggestion by the Commission that a different course would be pursued. We have no need to consider
how the separate proceedings would have been affected by a valuation of the property in the general investigation if the
evidence of value had been gathered in the usual way. In the thought of the state, such a course would have obviated the
necessity for separate evidence of value as to the exchanges under bond, but the company contended otherwise, and made
offers of proof in support of its contention. The merits of the opposing views in that regard may be put aside as irrelevant
upon the record now before us. What is certain, in any event, is this -- that nothing in the course of the trial gave warning
Page 301 U. S. 307
of the purpose of the Commission, while rejecting evidence of value in respect of exchanges under bond, to wander afield and
fix the composite value of the system without reference to any evidence, upon proofs drawn from the clouds. As there was no
277 | P a g e

warning of such a course, so also there was no consent to it. We do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental
rights.
Third: The allocation of excess income among the subscribers to exchanges and also among toll patrons is challenged by the
appellant, the state retorting with the contention that there has been no denial of due process in the manner of partition,
whatever may be said as to the possibility of inaccuracy or error.
We find it unnecessary at this time to choose between these two contentions. A court is not required to define the proper
method of allocation until there has been a proper ascertainment of the thing to be allocated. When that has been done,
there may be agreement or acquiescence in respect of the manner of division. Moreover, upon another hearing, the problem
may be eliminated if value, revenues, and expenses are proved for each exchange.
Fourth: The same reasons that make it unnecessary to fix the method of allocation relieve us of the duty of passing upon other
problems, such as those of going concern value and depreciation reserve, which cannot be disposed of adequately until the
value of the physical plant has first been ascertained.
The decree is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed.
* The stipulation states that the testimony and exhibits
"shall, however, be considered upon four issues involved in this cause and four only, viz.:"
"1. The earnings of the Western Electric and the reasonableness of such earnings."
"2. The cost to the American Telephone and Telegraph Company of rendering services under the license contract and the
reasonable amount which should be allocated in that respect to The Ohio Bell Telephone Company."
"3. The separation and apportionment of the property, revenues, and expenses of The Ohio Bell Telephone Company as
between its intrastate and interstate property, revenues, and expenses."
"4. Rate of return."
278 | P a g e

G.R. No. 134972       March 22, 2001

SPS. ERNESTO and MINA CATUNGAL, petitioners,
vs.
DORIS HAO, respondent.
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 10 March 1998 and Resolution dated 30 July 1998 in
the case entitled Doris Hao vs. Sps. Ernesto and Mina Catungal docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 46158. Said decision affirmed with
modification the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court.
The antecedents of this case are as follows:
On December 28, 1972, the original owner, Aniana Galang, leased a three-storey building situated at Quirino Avenue,
Baclaran, Parañaque, Metro Manila, to the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) for a period of about fifteen (15) years, to
expire on June 20, 1986. During the existence of the lease, BPI subleased the ground floor of said building to respondent Doris
Hao. 
On August 24,1984, Galang and respondent executed a contract of lease on the second and third floors of the building. The
lease was for a term of four (4) years commencing on August 15, 1984 and ending on August 15, 1988.
On August 15, 1986, petitioner spouses Emesto and Mina Catungal bought the property from Aniana Galang.
Invoking her "right of first refusal" purportedly based on the lease contract between her and Aniana Galang, respondent filed
a complaint for Annulment of Sale with Damages docketed as Civil Case No. 88-491 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati,
Metro Manila.
Meanwhile, the lease agreement between BPI and Galang expired.
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Upon expiration of the lease agreements, petitioner spouses sent demand letters to respondent for her to vacate the building.
The demand letters were unheeded by respondent causing petitioners to file two complaints for ejectment, docketed as Civil
Cases Nos. 7666 and 7667 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Paranaque, Metro Manila.
The institution of the ejectment cases prompted respondent to file an action for injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 90-758
of the RTC of Makati, to stop the MeTC of Parafiaque from proceeding therewith pending the settlement of the issue of
ownership raised in Civil Case No. 88-491.
These two cases for annulment of sale and for injunction were also consolidated before Branch 63 of the RTC of Makati
which rendered a Decision dated September 19, 1991, granting the injunction and annulling the contract of sale between
Aniana Galang and petitioners.
On appeal,1 the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and the complaints in Civil Cases Nos. 88-
491 and 90-758 were accordingly dismissed.
Not satisfied, respondent elevated the above decision of the CA before this Court. We, however, denied respondent's petition
on April 10, 1996.2
The MeTC of Parañaque, after the reversal of the decision in Civil Case No.90-758 for injunction, proceeded with the trial of
the ejectment cases.
On January 22, 1997, the MeTC of Parañaque rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant Doris T. Hao who is in actual possession of
the property and all persons claiming rights under her to vacate the premises in question and to pay the plaintiffs the amount
of P20,000.00 a month from June 28, 1988, until she finally vacates the premises and to pay attorney's fees of P20,000.00.
With costs against the defendant.3
Petitioners filed a motion for clarificatory or amended judgment on the ground that although MeTC " ordered the defendant
to vacate the entire subject property, it only awarded rent or compensation for the use of said property and attorney's fees
for said ground floor and not the entire subject property. Compensation for the use of the subject property's second and third
280 | P a g e

floors and attorney's fees as prayed for in Civil Case No. 7767 were not awarded." 4 In response to said motion, the MeTC
issued an Order dated March 3, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision of this Court is hereby clarified in such a way that the dispositive portion would
read as follows: "IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant Doris T. Hao who is in
actual possession of the property and all persons claiming rights under her to vacate the premises and to pay the plaintiffs the
amount of P8.000.00 a month in Civil Case No. 7666 for the use and occupancy of the first floor of the premises in question
from June 28. 1998 until she finally vacates the premises and to pay the plaintiff a rental of P5,000.00 a month in Civil Case
No. 7667 from June 28 1988, until she finally vacates the premises and to pay attorney's fees of P20,000.00.  With costs against
defendant.
SO ORDERED.5
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the above order, praying that respondent be ordered to pay P20,000.00 monthly for the
use and occupancy of the ground floor and P10,000.00 each monthly for the second and third floors.
Respondent, on the other hand, filed a notice of appeal.
Instead of resolving the motion for reconsideration, on May 7, 1997, the MeTC of Parañaque issued an Order, elevating the
case to the Regional Trial Court:
Considering the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of this Court dated March 3, 1997 and the Comment and Opposition
thereto of the counsel for the defendant, the Court finds that the said Motion for Reconsideration should already be
addressed to the Regional Trial Court considering that whatever disposition that this Court will award will still be subject to
the appeal taken by the defendant and considering further that the supersedeas bond posted by the defendant covered the
increased rental.6
On September 30, 1997, the RTC of Parañaque, Branch 259, rendered a Decision modifying that of the MeTC, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
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IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision, being in accordance with law, is hereby AFFIRMED as to the order to
vacate the property in question and MODIFIED as to the amount of rentals which is hereby increased to P20,000.00 a month
for the ground floor starting June 28,1988 and P10,000.00 a month for the second floor and also P10,000.00 a month for the
third floor (or) a total of P40,000.00 monthly rentals commencing June 28, 1988 until the subject property has been vacated
and possession thereof turner [sic] over to the plaintiffs-appellees; to pay attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00; and
with costs:7
In her Motion dated October 6, 1997, respondent sought a reconsideration of the above ruling of the RTC. The same was
denied on November 25, 1997.
Respondent elevated her case to the Court of Appeals. The CA rendered the Decision subject of this petition the dispositive
portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED by reducing the amount of rentals for both the second and third
floors from P20,000.00 to P10,000.00 monthly. With this modification, the judgment below is AFFIRMED in all other respects. 8
The parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration to the Court of Appeals. Petitioners asked that the decision of
the Regional Trial Court fixing the total monthly rentals at P40,000.00 be sustained.
On the other hand, respondent sought a revival of the decision of the MeTC on the ground that since petitioners did not
interpose an appeal from the amended judgment of the MeTC, the RTC could not validly increase the amount of rentals
awarded by the former.
In its Resolution dated 30 July 1998, the Court of Appeals resolved the parties' motions for reconsideration in favor of the
respondent. It ruled that the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners before the MeTC was a prohibited pleading
under the Rules of Summary Procedure. Such being the case, said motion for reconsideration did not produce any legal effect
and thus the amended judgment of the MeTC had become final and executory insofar as the petitioners are concerned. The
dispositive portion of the CA's resolution reads as follows:
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WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED by reducing the monthly rentals for the first/ground floor from
P20,000.00 to P8,000.00 and for the second and third floors from P10,000.00 each to P5,000.00 for both floors. With this
modification the judgment below is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.9
Petitioners now come before this Court assigning the following errors:
A.
IN THE ASSAILED DECISION, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING THE FINDINGS OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BY USING AS BASIS FOR REDUCING THE RENTAL ONLY THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE PARTIES
AND IGNORING CIRCUMSTANCES OF WHICH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT PROPERLY TOOK JUDICIAL NOTICE.
In ruling that the increased rental rates of P40,000.00 should be awarded the petitioners, the regional trial court based its
decision on the doctrine of judicial notice. The RTC held, thus:
While this Court is fully in agreement with the Court of Origin that plaintiffs-appellees have the better right to the possession
of the premises in question being the present owners and the contract of lease between the former owner and herein
defendant-appellant had already expired, the amount of rentals as laid down in the Clarificatory Order dated 3 March 1997 is
inadequate if not unreasonable.
The Court a quo misappreciated the nature of the property, its location and the business practice in the vicinity and indeed
committed an error in fixing the amount of rentals in the aforementioned Order. Said premises is situated along Quirino
Avenue, a main thoroughfare in Barangay Baclaran, Parañaque, Metro Manila, a fully developed commercial area and the
place where the famous shrine of the Mother of Perpetual Help stands. Withal, devotees, traders, tourists and practically
people from all walks of life visit said barangay making it suitable for commerce, not to mention thousand of residents therein.
Needless to say, every square meter of said community is valuable for all kinds of business or commerce of man.
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Further, considering that the questioned property has three floors and strategically located along the main road and
consistent with the prevailing rental rates in said business area which is between P20,000.00 and P30,000.00 as testified to by
Divina Q. Roco, a real estate agent and Mina Catungal, this Court finds the amount of P20,000.00 a month for the ground floor
and P10,000.00 a month each for the second floor and third floor or a total of P40,000.00 monthly rentals as appropriate and
reasonable rentals for the use and occupation of said premises.
Finally, worth mentioning here as parallel is [the] ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Manila Bay Oub Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 715 and 731-732 citing Licmay vs. Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 1 (1992) and Commander Realty Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 181. It reads as follows:
It is worth stressing at this juncture that the trial court had the authority to fix the reasonable value for the continued use and
occupancy of the leased premises after the termination of the lease contract, and that it was not bound by the stipulated
rental in the contract of lease since it is equally settled that upon termination or expiration of the Contract of Lease, the rental
stipulated therein may no longer be the reasonable value for the use and occupation of the premises as a result or by reason
of the change or rise in values. Moreover, the trial court can take judicial notice of the general increase in rentals of real
estate especially of business establishments like the leased building owned by the private respondents. 15
We find that the RTC correctly applied and construed the legal concept of judicial notice in the case at bench.
XXXX
The RTC correctly took judicial notice of the nature of the leased property subject of the case at bench based on its location
and the commercial viability. The above quoted assessment by the RTC of the Baclaran area, where the subject property is
located, is fairly grounded.
Furthermore, the RTC also had factual basis in arriving at the said conclusion, the same being based on testimonies of
witnesses, such as real estate broker Divina Roco and the petitioner Mina Catungal.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 160795             June 27, 2008

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CORINTHIAN GARDENS ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES REYNALDO and MARIA LUISA TANJANGCO, and SPOUSES FRANK and TERESITA CUASO, respondent.
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of
the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision2 dated January 31, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 43217, which reversed and set aside the
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, dated March 30, 1993.
The Antecedents:
Respondents-spouses Reynaldo and Maria Luisa Tanjangco (the Tanjangcos) own Lots 68 and 69 covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) No. 2422454 and 2829615 respectively, located at Corinthian Gardens Subdivision, Quezon City, which
is managed by petitioner Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. (Corinthian). On the other hand, respondents-spouses Frank
and Teresita Cuaso (the Cuasos) own Lot 65 which is adjacent to the Tanjangcos’ lots.
Before the Cuasos constructed their house on Lot 65, a relocation survey was necessary. As Geodetic Engineer Democrito De
Dios (Engr. De Dios), operating under the business name D.M. De Dios Realty and Surveying, conducted all the previous
surveys for the subdivision's developer, Corinthian referred Engr. De Dios to the Cuasos. Before, during and after the
construction of the said house, Corinthian conducted periodic ocular inspections in order to determine compliance with the
approved plans pursuant to the Manual of Rules and Regulations of Corinthian. 6 Unfortunately, after the Cuasos constructed
their house employing the services of C.B. Paraz & Construction Co., Inc. (C.B. Paraz) as builder, their perimeter fence
encroached on the Tanjangcos’ Lot 69 by 87 square meters.
No amicable settlement was reached between the parties. Thus, the Tanjangcos demanded that the Cuasos demolish the
perimeter fence but the latter failed and refused, prompting the Tanjangcos to file with the RTC a suit against the Cuasos
for Recovery of Possession with Damages.7
Eventually, the Cuasos filed a Third-Party Complaint8 against Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios. The Cuasos ascribed
negligence to C.B. Paraz for its failure to ascertain the proper specifications of their house, and to Engr. De Dios for his failure
to undertake an accurate relocation survey, thereby, exposing them to litigation. The Cuasos also faulted Corinthian for
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approving their relocation survey and building plans without verifying their accuracy and in making representations as to Engr.
De Dios' integrity and competence. The Cuasos alleged that had Corinthian exercised diligence in performing its duty, they
would not have been involved in a boundary dispute with the Tanjangcos. Thus, the Cuasos opined that Corinthian should also
be held answerable for any damages that they might incur as a result of such construction.
On March 30, 1993, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the Tanjangcos. It ruled that the Cuasos’ perimeter wall
encroached on the land of the Tanjangos by 87 square meters. It, however, ruled that the Cuasos were builders in good
faith, and gave the Tanjangcos the option to sell and the Cuasos the option to buy the encroaching portion of the land, at a
price to be agreed upon by the parties within sixty (60) days from receipt of the said Decision. In the event that the Cuasos
were unable and unwilling to purchase the said portion, the perimeter wall should be demolished at the latter’s expense.
The RTC also ordered the Cuasos to pay monthly rentals of P2,000.00 commencing from the time of the filing of the
complaint. The RTC likewise held that C.B. Paraz was grossly negligent in not taking into account the correct boundaries of
Cuasos’ lot when it constructed the house. It, thus, ordered C.B. Paraz to pay moral and exemplary damages as well as
attorney’s fees to the Tanjangcos and the Cuasos. The third-party complaint against Corinthian and Engr. De Dios, on the other
hand, was dismissed for lack of cause of action.
The Tanjangcos filed a Motion for Reconsideration9 of the said RTC Decision which the RTC, however, denied in its
Order10 dated June 28, 1993.
Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling, the Tanjangcos, the Cuasos, and C.B. Paraz all appealed to the CA.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision. It held that the Cuasos acted in bad faith in land-grabbing the 87
square meter-portion of Lot 69 as of April 5, 1989. Correlatively, the CA allowed the Tanjangcos to exercise the rights granted
under Articles 449, 450, 451 and 549 of the New Civil Code, which include the right to demand the demolition of the offending
perimeter wall after reimbursing the Cuasos the necessary expenses for the preservation of the encroached area. The Cuasos
were ordered to pay monthly rentals of P10,000.00 for the use, enjoyment and occupancy of the lot from 1989 up to the time
they vacate the property considering the location and category of the same. They were, likewise, ordered to pay the
Tanjangcos P100,000.00, as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P150,000.00 as attorney’s fees. The CA
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also imposed six percent (6%) interest per annum on all the awards. The Cuasos’ appeal against the Tanjangcos, on the other
hand, was dismissed for lack of merit. On the third-party complaints, Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios were all found
negligent in performing their respective duties and so they were ordered to contribute five percent (5%) each, or a total of
fifteen percent (15%) to all judgment sums and amounts that the Cuasos shall eventually pay under the decision, also with
interest of six percent (6%) per annum.
Only Corinthian filed a Motion for Reconsideration11 of the CA Decision within the 15-day reglementary period. No motion for
reconsideration was filed by the Cuasos, C.B. Paraz and/or Engr. De Dios.
About six (6) months later, or on August 12, 2003, the Cuasos filed a Comment/Manifestation 12 praying that they be allowed
to adopt Corinthian’s Motion for Reconsideration.
In its Resolution13 dated November 14, 2003, the CA denied Corinthian’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, Corinthian filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA Decision and Resolution, and impleading
the Cuasos as one of the respondents being the third-party plaintiffs in the RTC.
ISSUE:
b) Whether or not the Court of Appeals has legal basis to increase unilaterally and without proof the amount prayed for in
the Complaint, i.e., P2,000.00, as reasonable compensation for the use and enjoyment of the portion of the lot encroached
upon, to P10,000.00.
RULING OF THE COURT: YES

Indeed, courts may fix the reasonable amount of rent for the use and occupation of a disputed property. However, petitioners
herein erred in assuming that courts, in determining the amount of rent, could simply rely on their own appreciation of
land values without considering any evidence. As we have said earlier, a court may fix the reasonable amount of rent, but it
must still base its action on the evidence adduced by the parties.
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In Herrera v. Bollos [G.R. No. 138258, January 18, 2002], the trial court awarded rent to the defendants in a forcible entry
case. Reversing the RTC, this Court declared that the reasonable amount of rent could be determined not by mere judicial
notice, but by supporting evidence:
x x x A court cannot take judicial notice of a factual matter in controversy. The court may take judicial notice of matters of
public knowledge, or which are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their
judicial functions. Before taking such judicial notice, the court must "allow the parties to be heard thereon." Hence, there can
be no judicial notice on the rental value of the premises in question without supporting evidence.
Truly, mere judicial notice is inadequate, because evidence is required for a court to determine the proper rental value. But
contrary to Corinthian's arguments, both the RTC and the CA found that indeed rent was due the Tanjangcos because they
were deprived of possession and use of their property. This uniform factual finding of the RTC and the CA was based on the
evidence presented below. Moreover, in Spouses Catungal v. Hao,43 we considered the increase in the award of rentals as
reasonable given the particular circumstances of each case. We noted therein that the respondent denied the petitioners the
benefits, including rightful possession, of their property for almost a decade.
Similarly, in the instant case, the Tanjangcos were deprived of possession and use of their property for more than two decades
through no fault of their own. Thus, we find no cogent reason to disturb the monthly rental fixed by the CA.
All told, the CA committed no reversible error.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 156052             February 13, 2008

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO and BONIFACIO S. TUMBOKON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila, respondent.
x----------------------x
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CHEVRON PHILIPPINES INC., PETRON CORPORATION and PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, movants-
intervenors.
X===================================X
The facts are restated briefly as follows:
Petitioners Social Justice Society, Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and Bonifacio S. Tumbokon, in an original petition
for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, sought to compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the
City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. This ordinance was enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila on
November 20, 2001,5 approved by respondent Mayor on November 28, 2001,6 and became effective on December 28, 2001
after publication.7 Sections 1 and 3 thereof state:
SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and ensuring health, public safety, and general welfare of the
residents of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use of [those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig
River in the north, PNR Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in the south, Palumpong St. in the southwest, and Estero de
Pandacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River in the
southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero
St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from Industrial II to Commercial I.
xxx       xxx       xxx
SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the operation of which are no longer permitted under
Section 1 hereof, are hereby given a period of six (6) months from the date of effectivity of this Ordinance within which to
cease and desist from the operation of businesses which are hereby in consequence, disallowed.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and
operators of businesses disallowed under the reclassification to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six
months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan
Terminals" of the oil companies.
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On June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of understanding
(MOU)8 with the oil companies. They agreed that "the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and
practicable option."
The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.9 In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that
the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. 10 Thereafter, on January 30, 2003,
the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 1311 extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing the
mayor of Manila to issue special business permits to the oil companies. 12
This was the factual backdrop presented to the Court which became the basis of our March 7, 2007 decision. We ruled that
respondent had the ministerial duty under the Local Government Code (LGC) to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to
the governance of the city,"13 including Ordinance No. 8027. We also held that we need not resolve the issue of whether the
MOU entered into by respondent with the oil companies and the subsequent resolutions passed by the Sanggunian could
amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027 since the resolutions which ratified the MOU and made it binding on the City of Manila
expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. We concluded that there was nothing that legally hindered
respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.
After we rendered our decision on March 7, 2007, the oil companies and DOE sought to intervene and filed motions for
reconsideration in intervention on March 12, 2007 and March 21, 2007 respectively. On April 11, 2007, we conducted the oral
arguments in Baguio City to hear petitioners, respondent and movants-intervenors oil companies and DOE.
The oil companies called our attention to the fact that on April 25, 2003, Chevron had filed a complaint against respondent
and the City of Manila in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 39, for the annulment of Ordinance No. 8027 with
application for writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction. 14 The case was docketed as
civil case no. 03-106377.
On the same day, Shell filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus likewise assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 8027 and
with application for writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction. 15 This was docketed as
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civil case no. 03-106380. Later on, these two cases were consolidated and the RTC of Manila, Branch 39 issued an order dated
May 19, 2003 granting the applications for writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction:
WHEREFORE, upon the filing of a total bond of TWO MILLION (Php 2,000,000.00) PESOS, let a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory
Injunction be issued ordering [respondent] and the City of Manila, their officers, agents, representatives, successors, and any
other persons assisting or acting in their behalf, during the pendency of the case, to REFRAIN from taking steps to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027, and let a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction be issued ordering [respondent] to issue [Chevron
and Shell] the necessary Business Permits to operate at the Pandacan Terminal. 16
Petron likewise filed its own petition in the RTC of Manila, Branch 42, also attacking the validity of Ordinance No. 8027 with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO). This was docketed as civil
case no. 03-106379. In an order dated August 4, 2004, the RTC enjoined the parties to maintain the status quo. 17
Thereafter, in 2006, the city council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8119, also known as the Manila Comprehensive Land
Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006.18 This was approved by respondent on June 16, 2006.19
Aggrieved anew, Chevron and Shell filed a complaint in the RTC of Manila, Branch 20, asking for the nullification of Ordinance
No. 8119.20 This was docketed as civil case no. 06-115334. Petron filed its own complaint on the same causes of action in the
RTC of Manila, Branch 41.21 This was docketed as civil case no. 07-116700.22 The court issued a TRO in favor of Petron,
enjoining the City of Manila and respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8119. 23
Meanwhile, in civil case no. 03-106379, the parties filed a joint motion to withdraw complaint and counterclaim on February
20, 2007.24 In an order dated April 23, 2007, the joint motion was granted and all the claims and counterclaims of the parties
were withdrawn.25
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS IS NOT APPLICABLE TO RESPONDENTS.
Ruling of the Court:
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While it is true that a party making a judicial admission cannot subsequently take a position contrary to or inconsistent
with what was pleaded,83 the aforestated rule is not applicable here. Respondent made the statements regarding the
ordinances in civil case nos. 03-106379 and 06-115334 which are not "the same" as this case before us. 84 To constitute a
judicial admission, the admission must be made in the same case in which it is offered.
Hence, respondent is not estopped from claiming that Ordinance No. 8119 did not supersede Ordinance No. 8027. On the
contrary, it is the oil companies which should be considered estopped. They rely on the argument that Ordinance No. 8119
superseded Ordinance No. 8027 but, at the same time, also impugn its (8119’s) validity. We frown on the adoption of
inconsistent positions and distrust any attempt at clever positioning under one or the other on the basis of what appears
advantageous at the moment. Parties cannot take vacillating or contrary positions regarding the validity of a statute 85 or
ordinance. Nonetheless, we will look into the merits of the argument of implied repeal.
XXX
WHEREFORE, the motions for leave to intervene of Chevron Philippines Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation, and the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Energy, are hereby GRANTED. Their
respective motions for reconsideration are hereby DENIED. The Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 39
is ORDERED to DISMISS the consolidated cases of Civil Case No. 03-106377 and Civil Case No. 03-106380.
We reiterate our order to respondent Mayor of the City of Manila to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. In coordination with the
appropriate agencies and other parties involved, respondent Mayor is hereby ordered to oversee the relocation and transfer
of the Pandacan Terminals out of its present site.
To ensure the orderly transfer, movement and relocation of assets and personnel, the intervenors Chevron Philippines Inc.,
Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation shall, within a non-extendible period of ninety (90) days, submit
to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 39, the comprehensive plan and relocation schedule which have allegedly been
prepared. The presiding judge of Manila RTC, Branch 39 will monitor the strict enforcement of this resolution.
Atty. Samson Alcantara is hereby ordered to explain within five (5) days from notice why he should not be disciplined for his
refusal, or inability, to file a memorandum worthy of the consideration of this Court.
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Treble costs against petitioners’ counsel, Atty. Samson Alcantara.

SO ORDERED.

Republic vs CA, 277 SCRA 633, 641 (1997)

”Judicial notice will be taken of the record, pleading or judgment of a case in another court between the same parties or
involving one of the same parties as well as of the record of another case between different parties in the same court. Judicial
notice will also be taken of court personnel.”

Facts:
Josefa Gacot claimed a parcel of land, the area of which is not indicated, in Palawan. Gacot claims that she has been in actual
possession of the property for more than 30 year and bought the land from Cipriana Dantic-Llanera by virtue of a deed of sale
and introduced improvement thereon and paid taxes for the land in her name.
It appears that a certain Ceferino Sabenacio is a co-owner of the land who later waived his claim in favor of Gacot and
admitted that he was only a boundary owner of the land and it was Gacot who is in actual possession of it. Prior to the
hearing, the Land Registration Authority intervened, calling the attention of the court on the decision made by Judge Lorenzo
Garlitos declaring the property as owned by the Republic. However, it did not bar Gacos from filing her answer, presenting
evidence of her actual possession of the said property and tax declaration and payment made in her name. The counsel of the
petitioner did not present evidence and submitted the case for resolution.

The court rendered a decision in favor of Gacot thus the Solicitor General elevated the case to the CA and filed a motion for
the court to reopen and remand the case back to the trial court to allow the Republic to present the decision of Judge Garlitos
293 | P a g e

which motion was granted by the court. The hearing was set several times and Gacot was able to submit her memorandum
while the Republic was unable to submit any evidence to support the claim of the government in court. For failure of the
government to refute and to present their evidence contrary to Gacot’s claim, the court decided not to disturb its former
decision.

The Republic assailed the decision of the court invoking 2061 that set the time limit of filing an application for the reopening
of judicial proceedings on certain lands declared as public land, a provision thereof provides that the application for judicial
proceeding should not extend beyond Dec. 31, 1968. Gacot only filed her claim on June 7, 1971 thus the court did not
acquired jurisdiction on her claim as she did not file her answer within the period fixed by RA 2061.

Issue: Whether or not the court properly apply the rule on judicial notice

Ruling:

It is a settled rule that the court shall not consider evidence that has not been formally offered before it. The court cannot
take judicial knowledge of the contents of the record of other cases, in the adjudication of the cases pending before them
even if the trial judge knows or remember the contents thereof. While the case is on trial, Josefa Gacot passed away and her
heirs were impleaded to substitute her as the party to the case. The court held to lax on the technical rules of procedure in
the case and to expedite the proceeding take a liberal construction on the laws to meet advance the cause of substantial
justice. Because the lot area awarded to Gacot was not specified in the records and based on the certification of the Forest
Management Services of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, some of the lots in the area are classified as
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alienable and disposable land, while some portion are timber land that forms part of the Mangrove Swamp Forest Reserve.
The court decided to remand back to the trial court the case for proper disposition of the conflicting claims of the parties. 

G.R. No. L-35851 October 8, 1974

MARCELO STEEL CORPORATION, and BENITO MACROHON, in his capacity as Sheriff of Quezon City, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PETRA R. FARIN and BENJAMIN FARIN, respondents.
Petition for certiorari and mandamus against the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 49342-R, Petra Farin, et al.
vs. Benito Macrohon, et al., denying the motion of private respondents therein (herein petitioners) to dismiss the appeal of
therein petitioners (herein private respondents) upon the ground that the latter's record on appeal does not contain any
statement to the effect that an appeal bond has been filed by them, contrary to the requirement of Section 6 of Rule 41 and
the consistent jurisprudence of this Court interpretative thereof to the effect that such omission is a fatal jurisdictional defect.
In resolving herein petitioners' motion to dismiss, the Court of Appeals held:
There is likewise no question that in her Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss appellant herein admits that there is no mention
in the Record on Appeal regarding fact that an appeal bond was filed on time. But counsel for appellant argues that that fact
appears on the face of the record of the case, as evidenced by a certification of the City Treasurer of Quezon City (copy
attached to the opposition as Annex A) to the effect that petitioner-appellants' cash bond was actually filed on October 30,
1970, simultaneously with the filing of petitioners-appellants' Notice of Appeal. Appellants' counsel further contends that
"obviously, because said cash appeal bond was riled simultaneously with the Notice of Appeal, the undersigned counsel,
through oversight, failed to state or make mention of the filing of the said cash appeal bond in the record.
Appellant also calls attention to petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction docketed with this Court as CA-G.R. NO.
47519-R entitled Petra R. Farin, et al., vs. Hon. Walfrido de los Angeles, et al., in which a decision was promulgated by this
Court on August 20, 1971.
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One of the reasons for Section 3, Rule 41 is to appraise the appellate court whether an appeal is seasonably filed or not. The
purpose of adding the clause "together with such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time" was "to avoid
disputes in the appellate court concerning the fact of the perfection of the appeal." (Araneta vs. Madrigal, G.R. No. 26227-28,
Oct. 25, 1966).
Now, it is to be noted that in the petition for certiorari above-mentioned the private parties were the same as appellants and
appellees herein. Paragraphs 8 and 9 thereof contained the following allegations:
"8) That on October 15, 1970, petitioner thru counsel, received a copy of the decision of the respondent judge;
"9) That on October 30, 1970, petitioner filed their Notice of Appeal, from the said decision, together with their Appeal Bond
and Record on Appeal (Petition, dated February 22, 1971, p. 3 emphasis supplied)
Respondents therein, Honorable Judge Walfrido de los Angeles, Sheriff Benito Macrohon (now Leonidas F. Villasenor) and
Marcelo Steel Corporation, in par. 1 of their Answer, averred:
Admissions
1. That, respondents admit ... the allegations in paragraphs 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, of the petition." (Answer
dated March 1, 1971, pp. 1-2; note italicize)
There is no specific admission of petitioner's par. 8, but neither is there any specific denial thereof.
In consonance with the petitioner's allegations and respondents "Admissions" (above) this Court, in its statement of the case
said:
"On Oct. 30, 1970, petitioners filed their notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal ... (p. 4, Decision, in CA-G.R. No.
47519-R)
Under the circumstances, therefore, it cannot be said that this Court has no way of determining whether the present appeal is
seasonably filed inasmuch as it has not only been appraised thereof in the petition for certiorari but it has even made a clear,
unequivocal pronouncement based on the admissions in the pleadings in that case, that all the requisites of a valid appeal
296 | P a g e

have been complied with. Judicial admissions contained in pleadings bind the parties and the principle of estoppel operates.
Hence, there would be no justification to dismiss this appeal for failure to state in the Record on Appeal a fact about which
there can no longer be any dispute inasmuch as it has already been  judicially admitted in the pleadings of C.A. G.R. No. 47519-
R.
Under the facts thus found by the appellate court, We are more inclined to hold that the present petition cannot prosper.
Prescinding from the other grounds discussed in the impugned resolution, which We do not deem necessary to pass upon in
this decision, We are of the considered view that the Court of Appeals did not in anyway abuse its discretion, but, on the
contrary, acted in accordance with law in refusing to dismiss the appeal of the Farins.
Indeed, the main purpose of the rules requiring that a record on appeal should show on its face, by means of statements of
the corresponding specific data, that the notice of appeal, the appeal bond and the record itself have been filed on time is to
enable the appellate court to determine on the basis of the record on appeal itself and without the need of any independent
evidence, that the appeal has been made on time. To allow the parties to indulge in a controversy regarding the timeliness of
the appeal and to present their respective conflicting evidence on that point, which could take much of the time of the court
that it could otherwise devote to the disposition of other cases demanding its attention, is detrimental to the interests of
justice and contrary to the public policy intended to be served by the provision in question. But, as illustrated in the
circumstances of the case at bar, there could be instances when the timeliness of an appeal is a matter which the court can
take judicial notice of and, consequently, it would be inconceivable that any controversy between the parties in respect
thereto could arise. In such instances, the court is no longer supposed to receive any conflicting evidence. It would be bound
by what it has judicial notice of and none of the parties may be permitted to prove the contrary. In the words of Chief Justice
Moran, "Where a fact is one of which the court may judicially take notice, no proof thereof is necessary. The maxim is "what is
known need not be proved." Judicial notice takes the place of proof and is of equal force. As a means of establishing facts it is
therefore superior to evidence. In its appropriate field it displaces evidence since, as it stands for proof, it fulfills the object
which the evidence is designed to fulfill and makes evidence unnecessary. (Beardsley v. Irving, 81 Conn 489, 71 A., 580; State
v. Main, 69 Conn., 123, L.R.A. 623.) Indeed, it is frequently said that neither averment, nor proof or admission, will prevail
against matters which are judicially known to the court. (Alzua v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308; Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202;
297 | P a g e

Graves v. Kelly, 62 Ind. A., 164, 112 N.E. 899, 901; Charles Boldt Co. v. Turner Bros. Co., 199 Fed. 139; Davis v. Southern Ry.
Co., 170 N.C., 582, 87 S.E. 745.)." (Moran, Rules of Court Vol. 5, p. 39).
In the light of these considerations, the reason behind the subject rule is not in any sense violated when, as in the case at
bar, the appellate court relies on what it has judicial notice of in determining whether or not appellants filed an appeal
bond on time. When a matter of fact supposed to be proven to the court is one capable of being taken judicial notice of, being
already known to the court because it has already been proven or was undisputed or judicially admitted in a related
proceeding before it, it would be the height of absurdity and contrary to one's sense of justice and propriety to still require
the parties to reopen the issue and litigate relative to the same matter all over again.
Both upon principle and pragmatic considerations, courts are not supposed to ignore facts that the same parties have in a
related case considered as beyond dispute or no longer subject to proof. Any other ruling would only give occasion to the
court to arrive at contradictory findings on points which the parties themselves may not controvert without being inconsistent
and unfair. In other words, Section 6 of Rule 41 and the jurisprudence cited by petitioners have no application to the situation
obtaining in this case. The view We have taken here does not constitute a relaxation, much less a modification of the standing
rulings of this Court invoked by petitioners.
Before closing, it is necessary to state here that this case is related somehow to the other cases pending in this Court between
the same parties, namely, G. R. Nos. L-34317 and 34335. To avoid any misconception or misunderstanding, it is here made
clear that the result of the instant case has no bearing whatsoever on the outcome of the case just mentioned and vise versa.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is dismissed, with costs against petitioners

G.R. No. 127158      March 5, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
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JULIO HERIDA y BERNABE @ "JUN TAGAY" and NONITO JAMILA, JR., y CANTO, accused,
JULIO HERIDA y BERNABE @ "JUN TAGAY", accused-appellant.
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-61405, convicting
appellant Julio Herida y Bernabe, alias "Jun Tagay," of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In an Information dated May 16, 1995, Julio Herida and Nonito Jamila, Jr., were charged by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
with murder of Herlito Delara
On July 31, 1995, Herida and Jamila, Jr., were arraigned. They respectively pleaded not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial on
the merits ensued.
On September 20, 1996, the trial court
finds accused JULIO HERIDA y BERNABE GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, (as) defined and penalized
by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659
As to the accused NONITO JAMILA y CANTO, he is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of MURDER, as charged, defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, for failure of the prosecution to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Accused Nonito Jamila y Canto may now be released unless he is being held for some other legal cause.
Hence, the instant appeal. Appellant now assigns the following as errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
1. THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT ALL ELEMENTS TO QUALIFY THE KILLING OF DECEASED DELARA
INTO MURDER WERE ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT BY THE PROSECUTION.
In his first assigned error, appellant contends that there is neither treachery nor evident premeditation present in this case. He
relies on People v. Escoto, 244 SCRA 87 (1995) where we held that the aggravating circumstances which would qualify a killing
to murder must be proven as indubitably as the crime itself.
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There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure the execution without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make.17 
We agree with appellant that nowhere in the assailed judgment is it shown how the trial court arrived at its conclusion that
the killing of Delara was attended by treachery. In convicting appellant of murder qualified by treachery and evident
premeditation, the trial court gave great weight to the testimony of prosecution eyewitness Tomas Baniquid. The latter
testified, however, that he only peeped through the window some ten (10) minutes after the gunshots had ceased and after
hearing a commotion outside his house. He saw the three assailants, appellant included, ganging up on the victim who was
already lying on the ground, but nonetheless doing his best to fend off the attack.
Clearly, when Baniquid looked outside, the tumult was already well in progress. There is absolutely no showing from his
testimony how the attack commenced; no indicia whether the attack was so sudden and unexpected that it afforded the
victim no chance to defend himself.
In the absence of this information, treachery cannot be established from the circumstances. Treachery cannot be presumed; it
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as clearly as the killing itself.18 Where the attack was not treacherous, the
number of aggressors would constitute abuse of superior strength. 19 Abuse of superior strength, therefore, qualifies the killing
as murder.20
In finding the killing aggravated by evident premeditation, the trial court characterized the method of attack as deliberately
and consciously adopted by the three attackers. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following must be proven:
(1) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his
determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the decision and the execution to allow the accused to reflect upon
the consequences of his act.21 In the instant case, however, there is no showing of the time when appellant and his
confederates decided to commit the crime. Neither is there proof to show how appellant and the other two assailants
planned the killing of the victim. Nor is there any evidence showing how much time elapsed before the plan was executed.
Absent all these, the conclusion by the trial court that evident premeditation qualified the killing of Delara is devoid of any
factual mooring.
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Appellant next claims that there is absolutely no showing that assailants conspired to kill Delara. He insists that the record
does not show that he participated in the planning, preparation, and killing of Delara. Appellant contends that, assuming
without admitting, that he did bash the victim with a concrete hollow block, his acts were spontaneous and independent of
the attack with the bladed weapons of the other two assailants. He could only be liable for the abrasions caused by the blows
he delivered with a concrete hollow block, which were neither fatal nor the primary cause of death.
Conspiracy is deemed to arise when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be shown by direct proof of an agreement of the parties to commit the crime. 22 It
may be inferred from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or from the acts of the accused before,
during, and after the crime which point to a joint design, concerted action and commonality of sentiment or interest. 23 Once
proved, the act of one becomes the act of all. All the conspirators are answerable as co-principals regardless of the extent or
degree of their participation.
In this case, the prosecution's evidence indubitably shows that appellant acted in concert with Edmund and Rene to kill
Delara.
First, while Rene and Edmund were hacking and stabbing the victim, appellant was with them, pounding him with a concrete
hollow block. Evidently, appellant was performing overt acts, which directly or indirectly contributed to the execution of the
crime. Second, after the victim somehow managed to fend off his attackers and flee, all three attackers pursued him. This is a
transparent manifestation of their common sentiment to inflict harm and injury upon Delara. Clearly, the aforementioned acts
point to a common purpose, concert of action, and community of interest among the assailants. In conspiracy, it is immaterial
who inflicted the fatal blows. A conspirator, no matter how minimal his participation, is as guilty as the principal perpetrator
of the crime.
On the second assigned error, appellant avers that the trial court judge exhibited bias or prejudice against him. Appellant
points out that over seventy percent (70%) of the testimonies of the prosecution's material witnesses were elicited by the
judge, while the cross-examination of the defense witnesses was to a large extent conducted by the judge himself. He submits
that under these circumstances, his right to a fair and impartial trial was violated.
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The transcripts of the proceedings show that the trial court did intensively question the witnesses. For instance, of the 182
questions asked of prosecution eyewitness Tomas Baniquid, 79 or roughly 43% of the total came from the judge. However, we
note that the judge also intensively questioned witnesses of the defense. When appellant took the stand, 63 questions were
added, with 27 or approximately 43% asked by the judge. The intensive questioning of the witnesses, however, was necessary.
The sworn affidavits of the material witnesses were adopted as their direct testimonies, subject to cross-examination. Since
affidavits are generally taken ex parte and are often incomplete or even inaccurate for lack of searching inquiries by the
investigating officer,24 the trial court had to ask many questions to clarify important matters. The judge's behavior under
this circumstance cannot be considered biased or prejudiced. Judges are, after all, not mere referees in a boxing bout, whose
only task is to watch and decide the results.25 Judges have as much interest as counsel in the orderly and expeditious
presentation of evidence and have the duty to ask questions that would elicit the facts on the issues involved, clarify
ambiguous remarks by witnesses, and address the points that are overlooked by counsel.
On the third assigned error, appellant questions the award of damages in favor of the victim's common-law wife, since she
is neither a legal heir of the victim nor the offended party in this case.
A careful reading of the decretal portion of the assailed judgment will show, however, that no such award was made to Delina
Duyon a.k.a. "Delina Delara." Rather, the award of damages was made in favor of "the heirs of Herlito Delara."
To reiterate, prosecution eyewitness Tomas Baniquid positively identified appellant as one of the three assailants who, acting
in concert, assaulted and killed Herlito Delara. Appellant has shown no reason why Baniquid, who has been his long-time
neighbor, should falsely testify against him. Against such positive identification, appellant's bare denial of any participation in
the killing of Delara must fall.26 The testimony of a single witness, when positive and credible, is sufficient to sustain a
conviction even for murder.27 We find that the prosecution has successfully proven appellant's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, and the award of damages to "the heirs" of the victim is legally justified.
Some modifications in the award of damages, however, are necessary. The trial court awarded the heirs of the victim
P40,000.00 as actual damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. Award for actual
damages are given only to claims that are duly supported by receipts. 28 In the present case, the records show that the claims
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duly supported by receipts are the funeral services amounting to P18,000.00 29 and P1,380.00 representing the cost of
materials30 for the wooden crate used in shipping the remains of the victim to Occidental Mindoro for burial. All the other
claimed expenses lack documentary proof. The actual damages awarded must therefore be reduced to P19,380.00, as
substantiated by the evidence. Moral damages can be awarded only upon sufficient proof that the aggrieved party is entitled
thereto.31 Here, the fact that the heirs of Herlito Delara suffered mental anguish, nervous shock or serious anxiety was not
adequately shown. We must, therefore, delete the award of moral damages. The award of exemplary damages must likewise
be struck down, since no aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime. 32 Finally, we note that the trial
court did not grant an indemnity ex delicto which current jurisprudence sets at P50,000. Hence, it is now in order to award
such amount to the victim's heirs.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-61405 finding
appellant Julio Herida y Bernabe @ "Jun Tagay" guilty of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED. He is
also ordered to pay the heirs of Herlito Delara the amounts of P50,000 as death indemnity and P19,380.00 as actual damages.
Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.