we Copia 189 by Amarin Pacha A a an SeTaS Relations Among Emotion, Appraisal, and Emotional Action Readiness Nico H. Frijda, Peter Kuipers, and Elisabeth ter Schure ‘Amsterdam University Amsterdam, the Netherlands Sein 2 sucies were asked to eporton 32 emotional sate. $s were asked to remember instances of experiencing these statesand, foreach experience, to fill outa questionnaire on appraisal dimensions and action readiness modes. Appraisal patterns 2s well as patter of ection readiness show distinct relations to various emotion categories, or names: the contributions ofboth kinds of components ‘emotion distinction aren pat independent and adcitive. Multiple correatjons, predicting action ‘readiness cores from aporsisal sores, demonstrated significant relations between particular modes of ection readiness and particular appraisal patterns, The rsulte ofthese stidie arc interpceted providing eappoct fo th view that emetions ean be regarded both as experiences of forms of ap- praisal and as stats of action readiness, Emotions ean profitably be analyzed in terms of sets of| ‘components in which acca readines components take an important share What distinguishesemotional experience from other kinds of experionce, and what distinguiches the experience of one emo- tion from that of another? These are two ofthe central questions inthe theory of emotion, The traditional answers to these ques- jons have been labeled central, peripheral, and cognitive theo- ies. Emotional experience has been considered to consist pri. (a) of the irreducible experience of pleasute or pain, of central origin (Wundi, 1902), (b) of sensations coming from the bodily periphery, the skeletal muscles and the viscera (lames, 1884; Lange, 1885/1922); or (c) of rather norspecific bodily sensations, combined with cognitions regarding their likely sause (Schachter & Singes, 1962). Differences between emo- tions consist, eccording to central theories, of variants of plea sure and pain experiences (Wundt, 1902) of of different isre- ducible experiences and their blends (Izard. 1977: Oatley é Johnson-Laird, 1987); according to peripheral theory, of different patterns of bodily response; and, according to cogni- live-attributional theory, of ifferent causal attributions. These various approaches either have not fared well empirically (see, for instance, Cannon, 1927; Reisenzein, 1983) or have not re- ceived extensive empirical tests In recent years, a new kind of cognitive emotion theory has ‘emerged. It identifies the distinctive aspect of emotional experi- ence with the experience of pleasure or pain or with its peroep- ‘ual equivalent, the appraisal of eliciting events as pleasant or unpleasant; the experiences of the different emotions are ex- plained by further cognitive appraisals of these evens. A novel aspect ofthis approach that hasclose ties with earlier philesoph- ical approaches (Aristotle, Aquinas, Spinaza) is that these ap- ‘Wegratefully acknowledge the suppor ofthe Maison des Sciences de "Homme, Paris in the preparation ofthis research, We asoare grateful ‘o Craig Smith, Phil Shaver, Nanne van der Pol, Adri van de Wurfl, and two anonyrrous reviewers for teir helpful eritcisms of an eater version ofthis article Eliaboth ter Schureienow at Bosten College. Correspondence concering thisarticls should be addressed to Nico 1. Frijda, Faculteit Pchologie, Universitet van Amsterdam, Wessper- plein 8, 1018 Amsterdam, the Netherlands. praisals are described in terms of a relatively small set of ap- praisal dimensions (Ameld, 1960; Frijda, 1984, 1986; Ortony, ore, & Collins, 1988; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1986; Smith, & Ellsworth, 1985; Weines, 1985), Each emotional experience isthus thought to correspond to a cognitive structure consisting, of a particular pattern of values on these dimensions, The ap- proach claims to provides satisfictory account of what distin= sguishes one emotional exporience from another and of what ifferentiats the meaning of one emotion name fiom that of another. The componential cognitive approach toemotional ex- perience is indeed closely similar in intent and content to the current semantic analysis of emotion names (Wierzbicka, 1985), Recent research has produced sizable support for this ap- proach, by demonstrating strong relations between emotions, and cognitive appraisal structures. Free descriptions of emo- tional incidents have been shown to contain statements of event, appraisals that are systematically diferent for different emo- tions end that can be used to construct prototypes cheracteriz~ ing them (Davi, 1969; Shaves, Schwartz, Kitson, & O'Connor, 1987), When subjects areasked to label recalled emotional inci- dents, and abo to rate these incidents on a set of appraisal scales, different emotions appear to correspond with different, appraisal structures (Frijda, 1987b; Smith & Elsworth 1985, 1987; Weiner, 1985). In Smith and Ellsworth's (1985) study, for instance, 44% of their subjects’ appraisals were assigned by dis- jinant analysis to the correct emotion category from among 15 such eategories Ta study by Frijda (1987b), depree of simi larity between appraisal patterns was shown to correlate with intuitive similarity of the corresponding emotion names as 25- sessed by 2 word-sorting task or by co-occurrence in labeling, ‘mood states. The cognitive approach to emotions therefore ap- pears to be well established Of course, many problems remain. One of these problems cconcems the nature and number of appraisal dimensions needed to distinguish the emotions characterized by different emotion names, Differences between investizators exist in this regard (see Scherer, 1988, for a review). Also, with a few excep- ‘tions analysis has been restricted to the moce ecmmon, more simple (or so-called elementary) emotionsEMOTION RELATIONS “The major problem: conceras the scant attention paid t0 awareness of ation tendency. Action tendencies 2s components that diferentiate between one kind ofemotional experience and [nother ae discussed in empirical studies (c.g Davite, 1969: Frida, 19875; Shaver etal, 1987) and in theoretical desrip- tions (eg, De Rivera, 1977; Scherer, 1984; Solomen, 1976). ‘Systematic empirical treatment, however, isalmost absent. Yet Sion tendencies are important in emotional experience, Ar- fold (1960) defined emotions as “elt action tendencies” be ‘ause, as she argues, aflt tendency is what characterizes such taperience and differentiates it from mere felings of plessant- ters of unpleasantness; different action tendencies are what chareeterize different emotions. Action tendencies oy more generally, changes in action readiness are nct only important Fremotional experience but alo are central in the analysis of Motion as such, Action readiness is what links experience and behavior: felt action readiness ean be considered a reflection of ‘the actual state of bebavioral readiness. in our theocetical view, detailed in Frijda (1986), emotions inveive sates of action readiness elicited by events appraised remotionally relevant; diferent states of action readiness are elicited ty different appraisals. Evenis are apprcised as emo- tionally relevant when they appear Wo favor or harm the indivi Ual's epnceme: his or her major goals, motives, or sensitivities (ihe appraisal proces: thonght to be nonconscious). Stats of Sction readiness may avail themselves, in their execution, f= ‘ain prewited action pattems such as facil expressions ard gross behavior modes (Hight, atack) and of learned behaviors Xistonomie arousal can be considered the logistic support of certain variants of action readiness. ‘State of action readiness is defined asthe iividual’ readi- ress of unreadiness to engage in interaction with the environ nent, Readiness may consist of action tendency, that i, readi- vos to engage in or disengage from interaction with some goal Cbject in some particular fashion. Impulses of “moving 10- vards)""moring away,” and “movingagaint” are examples de- Ted from self-report statements by Davitz (1969): approach nd attentional interest, light and withdrawal, and opposition nd attack aze modes of manifest ehavior resulting from these impulses, A state of action readiness may also consist of Be tral readiness or unfeadiness to engag: ia interaction with the Shvironment, forms of which may be called activation states snd of states ofiehibition. Examples are exuberance (jumping, shouting, eunsing, as in joy), motor restlessness, apathy, lack Of interest, and freezing, asin fear ‘an importaat class of changes in emotional action readiness is formed by changes in general action programming; we refer to these as action control states. A state of helplessness is an Srampe: I is defined as a stats of readiness to welcome a change of stuation, bu! contains some Kind of awareness that So actions are available to effet such change. Wanting a situs- tion to end is the generalized readiness to weleome change and, itpossible, undertake relevant action that is common 10, Sai thevtesire to flee and to helplesiness. Sense of being in com- mand refers'o the aveilzbility of coping actions io. the given Ttuation, Concepts such as these appear to be needed to fully ecount for the structure of emotional behavior as well 2s of fRelings: Helpless behavior can be understood only by relerence toalack of readiness to respond at tho behavior level combined swith a readiness to accept a change in conditions (or 8 passive 213 desire for such change) at a higher control level. Lang (1988) has made useful distinction botween tactical and strategic di ‘mensions of behavior control; action control states correspond to strategie dimensions high up in the control hierarchy. The importance of such notions fits with the view that, generally ‘emotions are best conceived as processes at the level of goals fand action control rather than at the level of incipient or overt sition (Frida, 1986; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987). States of ation readiness generally are viewed as retational goals put ia Teadiness for execution, or as modifications in the degre> 10 ‘wnich such goals are present at all. That, in turn, fits with the eneral property of sates of action readinese: that they tnd {0 ‘assume control over action and thought. “The preceding theory assumes a cousal relation between p= praisats and modes of action recliness. To be precise, a causal Filation is assumed to exist botween an appraisal process, of ‘hich conscious appraisal might be arcflection, and behavioral ‘nd physiological response processes, of which action readiness ‘awareness might be a reflection. Which modes of action read tess should be distinguished for use in theanalysis of emotional experience? Frijda (1986) proposed a list of 17 modes that Seale seem to cover the domain reasonably wel: itwas derived From the functional analysis of facil expressions, gross behav- Jormodes, and behavior systems as identified by analyses of ani ‘pal behavior Plutehik, 1980; Van Hoof, 1982). Additional dis- Tnotions, particularly those referring to contral states, cam be jnferred from self-report data; Davitz (1969), for instance, ob tained a cluster that ke called “incompetence.” A preliminary study (Frida, 19874) led to some changes, Table | lists the hy- pothesized mods of action readiness (with dimension names itere necessary in parentheses) included in one or both of the studies presented in thisarticle. The preceding thecretical considerations ead to a number of | questionsard predictions Fis, it should be possible to pred he names piven by subjects to their emotions from the nature of their action readiness as well as fiom their appraisals. A pre- ious study (Frijda, 1987b) did not allow this question to be lnowered because of the nature of the data acquized. Action teadiness data should contribute toemotion differentiation not nly ai the level of so~alled basic emotions or gross emotion Glasees, but also in finer distinctions; this, at least, = suggested ‘py semantic analyses of emotion words (Wierzbicka, 1986). The jroue of predicting emotion names from appraisals and action readiness is, however, coraplex. Correspondence between emo- tions an¢ eithec appraisals or modes of action readiness cannot be expected t0 be 100 close, considering the variable uses of motion names: They are sometimes used primarily to denote Fesponses (ao in “Lam fled with fear”) and sometimes to ¢e~ fot appraisals (as in “I fear that animal,” see Frijda, 1986, ch. 5). Also, not all emotion differentiation rests on appraisal and “talon readiness feaflfs Several enpotion pames refer primar~ iy to object components (specifications of the typeof eliciting trent rather then to a particular type of action readiness of feven 10 the appraisal aspects covered bere. This s the case for insance, with the emotion name jealousy (Buunk & Bring, 198%), ‘Second, in view ofthe eausal hypothesis the contributions Of both typesoreue should to alarge extent be redundant. Redan ancy cannot be expected to be complete, however, considering the variable uses of emotion words. Some emotion words (in214 LN. FRIUDA, P, KUIPERS, AND E. ten SCHURE “Table 1 Action Readiness Variables: Seudy 2 able” em sess SS Asie ‘ppmiach (ving Toward) Ivanted to approach, tomate Iostd to bye eay lane tobe renin one reamed te pote myelfem omeone or somethin sted ve ting todo with onahingorsonene. Fe ‘tered ty eta posible ‘ote oo Be with (Moving Toward) protection (Moving Away) ‘Avoidance (Moving Avay) vending 1 wanted tn cbsere wel 10 ‘understind, oF | puidatienticn Distance(Rejecton) I wanted 19 heep something outofmy ‘wr to keep itat adistanee 1 did not waat fo have anything todo witheomeone or something. Rejection (Rejection) Disinteres, “Things cing on cid not involve me;1 did not py attention. Don't want I wanted something not tobe 9, not Doitinginardly oiled inside. ‘Moning Asains’) Anagenistc T wanted to oppose, to assault; hurt ot (Moving Against) insult Redvant Moving Apaine) I wanted togoagairst an obstacle or “dificult, oF to conquer it. Intecrptsd (Interruption) interrupted what las doing or ‘wasinterrupte. Precondition) Yequld otc er ere my thoughts In command [stood above the situations felt was in command | held the ropes. Hotpirg | wanted to belp someone, 10 tke ‘are of someone. [wanted tosinkinto the ground, to isippeer fom the Earth, rottobe noticed by anyone. | fet intibited, paralyzed, or rove, {buushed cr wasaraid to tush, 1 didnot want fo oppose, or I wanted {io field 10 sorieone e's wishes. 1 didnot fee like doing anythin; nothinginterested me, 1 Wes Dicappear from view Inhibition (nbiition) ‘Blushine (ahibition) Submiting Apathy (ypeactvation) apathetic Giving up (yposetivation) I qu Leave ap, Shutting of Gypoactvation) saul myslfof from the surroundings. Halplssnese(Helplesiness) I wanted todo something, but Tid ‘not knw what was helpless. ‘ried had tery, oF wanted ocr. T wasexcited, restless, coud a0! i. sil | wanted to mov, beexuterant, sng, “jump, undertake tings Tiaughed, ad Yo laugh, or wanted to Tag. Rest fel atest, thought everything was (ok fit po need todo anything. oh ee coving Helplesness) Excited Emuterant(Pruerance) ‘Laughter Exuberance) "Dimension names are given in paremheses to distinguish alternative the same dimension. particular those that are more common, such as joy distress, Jear, and anger) can be assumed to refer predominantly to 20 tion readiness and others (thase specifying abject components) torefer to appraisels. Third, similarity between profiles should ‘correspond with intuitive similarity of the emotions concerned, ‘achas been demonstrated by Frijda (19876) for some emotion Classes, Moreover, the profiles of appraisal and action readiness features should form the basis of plausible descriptions of the ‘emotions. For appraisal of the more common cr elementary emotion olases, this hes been demonstrated by Smith and Elt- ‘worth (1985), and for more aspects, inclucing ection readiness, by Shaver et al, (1987); it should also hold for more varied and finer emotion distinctions ‘Fourth, structural descriptions should be constructed from ‘an economical and stable set of appraisal dimensions andaction feadiness modes. Hypotheses about mearingful dimensions ‘can be derived from the literature discussed previous, and meaningful proposed modes of action readiness have just been meationed (See Table 1), Profitable appraisal dimensions «re those proposed by Roseman (1984) and Scherer (1984) or those identified at least once in recent empirical investigations (Fajda, 1987b; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, 1987; see Scherer, 1988, and Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, for descriptions and re views). Table 2 lists these appraisal dimensions (except for the Tast entry) in the form in which they were used in Stuy 2. Fifth, we hypothesized that modes of action readiness can be predisted from appraisal patterns. This prediction is required byour cause theory. In tis article, we report wo studies that bear on theze ques- sionsand issues. The two studies differ somewhat inthe emotion names used and in the itemsand item formats ofthe question- naires, In both studies, subjecte wore asked to recall an instance of each of several emotions, each of which were specified by tiven emotion names, and to write down a brief description of the incident. Next, they were asked to fill out an appraisal ques- tonnaire and an action readiness questionnaire for each re- called instance. Study 1 Method Procedure, We assed subjecis 0 recall an instance ofeach of eight emotoas ard to fil out questionsaies concerning cach of them. Different subjects were asked 10 periorm this task fr dierent ses of taht emotion names in such a vay that equal numbers of responses ‘Sore obtained for each of 32 emotion states. Subjects received tight Pootlets. Each booLlethad | ofthe 72 emotion names on its front page td contained the general tsk instructions, space for writin down ‘rie description ofthe recalled emotional incident, ard the appraisal and action eaginess questionnaires. “Subects, One hundred wweny subjects (89 women end 31 men), first-year paychology students from Utrecht University the Netherlands raricipated in Study 1, We collected 30 responses for each of the 32 mation tates. "Emotion names, Emotion nameswere selected soasio span theemo- ‘ion domain, We sdected two worl from each loverorder cust i ther of wo clsteranalyees of Dutch ereotion names. The ist custer SGhalyas came from the resolts obtained with a mood adjestire check fst composed ofall 231 words found ina Dutch dictionary that were onsicered applicable to emotions (sce Sonnevills,Schasp, &Flshout, 1983). The second cluster analyss used the data collected jn astudy of facial exoresion recognition (Frijda, 1970), This method of sampling ‘motion names fesaltedin the inclusion of eral words no: answering {heOrtony Clore, ané Fes(1987)specifcaten of emotion names. OFEMOTION RELATIONS 215 Table2 Appraisal Variables: Study 2 Variabe* tem Pleasantnes (Valence) ‘War ita pleasent or unpleasant situation? Did you fel you could bear the Stintion? Wat the situation conducive or ‘bstructve 10 your gosl Bearable(Valence) Goxl-condusive (Valence) Selteseem Did the situation deerease or enhance sour selfesieen? Frimess ‘Was what happened somet Interestinaness (Gearness (Certaints) ‘Was the situation clear: did you ‘understand what as ene on and tuhat the consequences would be? Qutome Certainty) Did you knowhow the situation ‘wouldend? Stand (Certainty) Did you know where youstood inthe ‘situation, wat the situation meant? Suddenness(Expectedness) Was ita situation that had already Tested forsome time, o: one that hnad developed all ofa sudden? Expectedness (Expectedness) Was itan expected oran unexpected situation" True (Expectedness) ‘Were expociations involved that came ‘tue? Anticipated effort Did you ie! the situation would or ‘would not require efor? Didthe stuation aft you personally? Was the stuation important or not important fr you? ‘Was be stuation’s outcome ‘immutable, or could semeore or Something llchange tin some Could you sill fect the situation in any ay? ‘Were you responsible for what happened orhad happened? ‘Was semeote ese raponsbie for ‘what happened or had happened? Had you experience the situation before; were you familia wih i? asthe stustiona known oranovel ‘Was your emotioa elicted by ‘something tat had occurred inthe ‘ast, occurred nox, or was to o2cur inthe future? ‘Towhet extent id theeventalfeet ‘someone else's well-being? Personal (Importance) Importance (Importance) osifisbitity Conratabity Saresponsible (Agency) (ther esponsiblecAgenes) Famlcriy amitrity) olde (ampiagiy Time of event (Familiarity) Someone else * Dimensib Bkinie a7 Shen in paremhetes to ieingsish alternative _quesionsintended for thessme dimension, {ony etal specified shat emotion names should refer 1 an emotional staeinbom ofthe sentence frames "lam X"and "feel. This would ‘not seem 0 apply tothe words fatigue, haray jl) rebeliows, romantic, ‘seffcorfident, shyness, and warmjceiing. In this article, we use 2s translations the English terms that inthe authors opinions come elbsest tothe Dutch origina." Some snifs in ‘meaningare inevitable. The majorshifsconcera sired, whichisused asa wanslation ofa Dutch word (geschrotken) that probably implies more fight, and fascinated which is used as atslation for geboed, Which Meraly means “ted 10" and has no distinct orenones of pleas nines as fascinated might. Apprisel dimensions. The aporaisal questionnaire contained 19, items each asking for ratings on 7-point bipolar sales (eg. very roa! “andcie to wer goa obstructive). The items were meant to include all dimensions studied by Smith ard Ellsworth (1985) and oursves (Fria, 19979). Attentional activin? na exclade asit wat considered 4 miode of ction rendines rather thar an appraisal dimonsion (so aloo Scherer, 1988); fimess wasaso excluded ductooversght. When it was unclear whether akernative forms referied tothe sume or diferent di- ‘mensions, weincluded several, Action readiness modes. Action readiness questions were derived ‘rom the isting in rida (1986) and augmented onthe basis of empir= cal results (Frida, 1987). few ofthe items do not striily conforma 10 the definitions of action readiness given earlier. We included ering (atandonment of efective interaction) belongingto the Helplessnoe: d mension (soe Fijda, 1986, for arguments). We included Blushing be- causeitis bypotheszed to bea manifestation of inition or response blocking (Dumas, 1948)-The action readinessmode unde (wish to undo ‘an action or event) s not manifested in fail expression or gross betav- ior, but appears so Frequently in introspection and verbal report as to deserve statusasan action tendency. “The questonraire contained 26 yes-no items. We included diferent ‘question refering to the same action readiness mode whenever ne felt ‘hat tcladingl pressed manifestations in one questicn was afeasi= befor instance, we included both interrupted and preoeeupiedasforms of experienced interference with ongoing activity). aia analysts, Foreach emotion, ve compated theaverage score for «ach appraisal question and the proportion of es nsvers fr each ac- tion readiness question, We refer to the strings of average scores and Dreportion fr each emotion as appraise profiles and action readiness profiles, respectively. Missing values were filed by the variable averages, theproportion of missing values was 0.7%. Factor analysis of the questionnaires used Jéreskog's image analysis, ‘which considered a variant of common factor snalsis, We computed ‘multiple correlations by means of epwise forward procedure, using an alpha of 05. Muliple correlation, canonical correlation, and dis. riminantsnalyss used the SPSS new regression muivariateanaysi ‘of variance, and discriminant procedures, respectively Results Prediction of emotion names. One of our major hypotheses was that one should-be able to predict emotion names from action readiness as well 2s from appraisals. Discriminant analy. sis was used to assess the degress of prediction. We performed three analyses: prediction of emotion names from the answers to the appraisal questions, prediction of emotion names from the action readiness questions, and prediction from both sets of ‘data combined. In each of the analyses, the discriminant ansly- sis procedure was to assign all 960 data sets to I of the 32 emo- tion names (chance levels 3%). Results are given in the left balf of Table 3. Study 1 achieved slightly more than 309% correct predictions " Lint ofthe Dutch words used are available from Nico H, Frida on request. 2 Narnes of dimensions are capitalized throughout to differentiate ‘them fom individual items (questionsor emotion words)216 N. FRUDA, P. KUIPERS, AND E. TER SCHURE Table 3 Prediction of Correct Emotion Labels Action Action Emotion tele Avpmial —resdine Both Emotion laelé Appraisal readiness Bath ‘Seudy 1 ‘Study? joy 50 we 3 sodnass B 2 a7 7 37 0 sorrow 38 B ” 30 7 3 upse 10 B 3B » 18 s regret 3 2 3 30 a 7 guilt nD 4 ” 0 a 3 anxiety 3 ar 7 0 0 3 fear x 3 0 3 8 57 started a » o 0 43 20 jealousy a7 D 0 2 1 3 ‘isappotniment 3 x x” 2 6 3 shame a 2 2 a 3” a a a 3 0 2 8 z zB 20 1 27 a 3 eet a 7 47 a a7 @ @ 37 3 3 16 2 a b 3 3 ‘gust 7 B 7 B 2 3 dstust 0 2B 3 50 a 3 boretom a 2 3 37 3 8 Indierence 2 ” 7 0 B 20 nervousness o a a 3 5B a hope 0 B 57 2 2 30 chabenged 8 a 37 ‘enterprising a a a eathusasm 20 8 © reliet 30 30 a rellet 3 3 0 inerest 3 1B 30 pride 8 3 3 Jor 2 2 » 2 2 o happy 1B B 2 a a 50 surprise s 2 2 @ 3 rn watt fcting 20 2 3 5 @ 7 ‘unperturbed 20 37 a 57 0 70 horny 30 2B 2 5 3 @ Mean 2 4 8 ‘Mean 3 6 9 No.of significant No.of sigifcant Functions 9 10 2 fanciioas 9 9 u sevariance 31 % & se variance 8 0 6 [Note Items used in both exudes ae in bole. Tere i no relation between dissimilar tems printed aloneside each oter Items are ordered inthe ‘order ofthe Study? iterasin Table on the basis ofthe separate kinds of data and almost 50% when both kinds of data were combined. Because of the low chance level and the large number of observations (NV = 960), hit rates ‘wore guite close to Cohen’s kappas and can be interpreted as such (see Huberty, 1984, for this argument). These kappas are highly significant. The predictions can practically be regarded as external predictions (that is, predictions based on functions in which the predicted value has played no role), again because. ‘of the large number of observations. The percentages of correct, predictions provide somewhat conservative estimates of actual predictive power, because near misses such as mistaking joy for, happy. fear for anxiety: rage for anger, and sorrow forsadvess (ot ‘vice versa) are counted as errors (mean percentages of eorrect, predictions go up to 37, 37, and 52, respectively, when these confusions are counted as correct; chante level goes up slightly, of course). We therefore coasider our hypothesis to be clearly ‘confirmed, “The question of the relative contributions of appraisal and action readiness to emotion name prediction received a clear answer, The two types of cue make equal contributions; the two percentages are quite similar, The contributions are in part re- undant and in part additive. There is about three-fourths re- dundancy or overlap, and one fourth thatisspecifically contrib- uted to prediction by the particular type of cue. Emotion names differ considerably in how well they can be predicted on the basis of appraisal and action readiness cues Percentages range from 23 (for happy) to 67 (for hope). The data suggest that emotion names also differ considerably with regard ‘to the respective contributions of appraisal and action readiness ‘cues. Some names were better predicted when adding the two kinds of cues; for other names, prediction by the combined set of cues ws not superior to that by either ofthe two kinds sepa- rately; and for other words, again, prediction by one type of cue as as good as that by the other and as good as prediction by the combined sets, We address the extent 10 which the results conformed to expectations together with the results from Study 2 “Appraisal and acticn readiness dimensions. A sscond majorEMOTION RELATIONS 217 Tele Appraisal Factors Appraisal Factors Rector variance pais ihe Study 1 Valence 3 Agency: self-other 1 Importance ‘ Unespected-Eapected 5 Controlable-Uneontrllable 5 [Novelty-Famiiaity 4 Eon 4 Focal-Global 4 Time of Event 3 "Tea 3 ‘Susy 2 Valence 4 Agency: self-other 4 Importance 1 Unexpected-Fapected 7 (Conteclable-Uineontallable 3 3 8 2 2 Novelty-Pamiliaity Gerainty ‘ime of Event sim of the present studios was to investigate which of the hy- pothesized appraisal and action readiness dimensions play = role inthe differentiation of emotions, We submitted both ques- tioanaites to fictor analysis and varimax rotation ofthe factors cxtracted according to the JSreskog criterion. The factors found inthe appraisal data, labeled after the highest loading variables, are presented in the upperhalf of Table 4. We found nine factors. All but two of the hypotbesized ap- praizal dimensions included in the questionnaire appeared as Separate factors. Certainty was absent, and Mocifiability did hhot separate ftom Controllability. Valenes, pleasantness-ur- pleasantness appraisal, was the largest factor, accounting for 1 3%ofthe variance, ais usual in this kind of study. The Agency factor wes bipolas, contrasting responsibility of someone else for what happens with responsibility of the self, as it also hes in other studies (e-., Smith & Elsworth, 1985). The Focal-Global factor that distinguishes responses to specific events from more diffuse emotional states did reappear; items scoring high en Globality were romantic and warm feling. Time of Event (past, present, o future) differeaiated tape from the other emotions, 2s it was supposed to co; however, it did not characterize fear ‘contrary to expectation. Tis probably was because one cat fearan object that is actually present. “The action readiness factors are summarized in the uoper hhalfof Table 5, and arelabeled by the highest-loading variables, ‘Nine factors with eigenvalues lager than 1 appeared. The pria- pal dimension tmexpectedly turned out to be In Command Helpless a‘sirategi’ control-state dimension. Highest loadines were for in command (.45), helplessness (—.71), and inhibited (49). Most predicted readiness modes appcared as separate factors or polar apposites of other factors: In Command and Helpless; Maving Toward (which includes attending); the acti- vation modes Hyperactivation (exuherant or aburcant move~ meat, laughing, singing, etc., and excited or restlessness) and Hypoactivation (epathy and a secondary loading of helpless- res); Inhibited (which includes blushing, as expected on the basis of Dumas’s 1948 theory); and Disinterest (disinterest and resi), In several cases, differentiation did not go as far as we hypothesized. Moving Away and Moving Against, contrary to prediction, did not separate; Rejection (hypothesized to single ut disgus!) did not show independence from Moving Away. Ex- berant and excited, meant 10 differentiate Joy from nervous: ness, eave no evidence of separate status. The two Submission jtems correlated with Helplessness. The relatively large control stale dimensioa Interrupted-In Command (in command hav- ing a second loading of ~-41 on this factor) and Reactant-Pas- sive (reaciant with its only significant loading of .52 and vest witha loading of - 39) were unpredicted. Relations between appraisal and action readiness. We com- puted multiple correlations for esck of the 26 action readiness items, with the appraisal questions as predictors and the scores for an action readiness item as dependent variables. Resultsare presented in the left half of Table 6. ‘Tic average multiple correlation is 42. Appraisals thus oa the average explain 19% of action readiness variance, a highly significant, although somewhat modes, result. Multiple corre- Tations for individual action readiness modes range from .17 (for disinterest) to .61 (for undo). The highest correlations be- tween individual appraisal variables and action readiness ‘modes are 48 (oetweea rest and pleasaniness) and ~.39 (be- ‘ween yield—"lI wished someane else would take the reapensi- bility" —and bearable), Combining appraisal variables thus distinctly contributed only to prediction by individual ap- paisa items. Tables Action Readiness Factors Factor sevariance study 1 in Command-Heiplss Reactant-Pessve ‘Moving Avay~Against ‘Moving Towaré Bypersetvation Inhibited, bust Disinterest Hyposetivation Interupted-ln Commend Total ae ee sSuudy 2 In Command- Helpless, don’t want Moving Against Moving Avay ‘Moving Toward Hyperactiation Dsappsar blush ‘Adending Disintrest iypoactivation Interupted-In Command "Teta les ee Saree218 N. FRUDA, P. KUIPERS, AND E. TER SCHURE Table 6 Muutiple Correlations ef Appraisal Questions With Action Readiness Modes Study 1 Study? Action Action readiness mole R R Approach 3 28 Rewith 40 a Avoidance, 48 37 protection ‘Avoidance 34 Attending tending 46 Unceruin Distance 60 Reiection Rejection 41 Disinterest, Disinterest See Suppress Don't want Bs Bolling 0 32 ‘inwardly ‘Aatagonigic «52 | Antagonistic 7 Readant 4) | Reacint 45 Interrupted = 32 | interrupted 7 Preoccuped —46--|_Preoceupied 50 Incommand 34 | Incommand 66 Yeeld 49, | Halpin 46 Undo 61 | Diaper ra fom view Inhibited 3s | Inhibited Blushing 2a | Blushing Submitting 20 | Submitting ‘Apathy 30, | Apathy Pessivity 40 | Giving up Blocked 46 | Shutingor 3 Helplesiness 37. | Hepesnes 68 Crying 0 | Cong 62 Encited 26 | Becited 30 Exuberant 52. | exuberant 3 Laugier B Rest 59 | Rest ‘39 Average a Average 3s ‘erage R? AvrageR? 23 Note. N= 960, All Rs ae signifcent at 01 er more. *N~ 630. Now cm ~ negate emotions. Multiple correlations are computed over the ‘negativeand acvtral ates only (the frst 21 ortricsin Table 10) Sex differences. Although no sex differences were expected, ‘we computed average scores on all questions for the sexes sepa rately. Sex differences were negligible. Six out of 45 differences, ‘were significant at p = .05; the differences were small in magni tude. Women scored slightly higher on gaa! obsiructive, bear- able and unexpecied: men checked the action readiness items, indiferem, helpless, and crying slightly more frequently. The differences can be ascribed to chance and perhapstoa tendency. ‘toward more exireme ratings by the women, About 5% of the averages for individual emotions differed significantly, a chance result, Such differences.as might not be due to chance could be due either to differences in event ratings or to types of event invalved. Discussion ‘Themajer results of Study 1 supported ourhypothesss. Emo- tion names applied by subjects to their emotional experiences, can to 2 considerable extent be predicted from appraisal and ‘ction readiness cues; both cues to a large extent overlap, but also appear to add some independent contribation to this pre- diction. ‘Multiple correlations between appraisals and action reatl nes left large amaumtof variance ithe latter unexplained. ‘This may have bev dain part toiatisfactory formulations of action readiness questions, their j€s-no format, and incom- ‘pleleness ofthe questiorrset; for instance, no question asked for the action readiness mode was relevant for “anger in” (Spiel- berger etal, 1985). We therefore decided to replicate Study 1 using an improved action readiness questionnaire. Replication also appeared desirable because not all major emotion classes Used in similar stucies were represented in our list of emotion ‘ames (for instance, we did not include equivalentsof challenge nd pride, which were used by Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), ang several ofthe words included could not properly be considered ‘emotion names. Study2 Study 2ifered fom Study 1in the use ofa slightly diferent setofemotion names and appraisal and action readiness ques- tionnares. We made changes in the set of emotion names to improve the study's comparability with Smith and Fllsvorti’s (1985, 1987) studies. Questionnaire changes were intended to improve emotion name prediction and include the appraisal i mensions (Faimess, Rest) leit out in Study 1. Some changes ‘were made tofeilitte the appearance of Certainty dimension found by others and to obtain beter separation of the major lypotheszed action tendencies Moving Avay and Moving ‘Against The item disappear from view vas inluded (end was hypothesized to correspond to shame), as wer items for better exploring Helplessness, We removed focal-alobal because of the removal of the mood words romantic and warm feeling, ‘hich had high scores on global Method Generel procedure. The general procedure was identical to that of Study 1. Sebjetsreccived boollets for different sets of 16 erption names booklets were distributed in uch a vay tht 30 sel of responses {x each ofthe 32 ernaion names were obtained. ‘Subjects. Sisty subjects participated in Study 2 Because Study | bad egipble sex differences we paid no aitetion to thera hee. Each sub- Jeet filed out the questionnaires for 16 recalled emotions. “Emotion names, We removed thse wordsthat in our opinion did rot istinctlyrefertoemotions: only inference was retzinedasa reference item. Also, several words used in Sty I were replaced by merecom- ‘oa alternatives, and come words thet refered to cleatly “complex” emotions wereinsluded (eg, jealousy ditappointment, and in lve). We took care to include several variants of waat are sometimes considered fundamental emotions Ekman, 1982; Iza, 1977; Pluchik, 1980). Appraisal aid action readiness questionnaire. We improved the wording of and removed ambiguities in the quesionnaies. In the

By Byaction epprtisal readiness _——_Byall 230 tas ak st @O. er 6) 8 Oren Saas Meer eae. RB modes, 190, meaningfully distinguish those classes. On the ‘whole, the classes are cistinguisted by only one of the dimen- sions that represent action tendencies; additional dimensions ‘concem either attentional activity or an activation or control state, The patterns of the emotions within each class are all characterized by variables thet are also plausible, considering, traditional descriptions and the results of other empirical stud- ies such as those by Shaver etal. (1987) and Smith and Ells- © worth (1985). Sadness and related emotions (sorrow and disap- ointment) appeared to correspond to the experience of neg tive events appraised as uncontrollable (sat is, they showed negative scores on the variable affect). Suduess an sorrow were further specified by very low scoreson in command and by hely- Tessners and its predicted manifestation, crying (not shown in Tabie 10), These action readiness modes evidently match the ‘uncontrolability appraisal. ‘Fearand anxietcorrespenced to appraisal of negativeevents ‘with uncertain outcomes (low scores on certainty) that were not felt to be inevitable (nigh scores on mrodifibility). These fearful ‘emotions, together with startle, and, in Study 1, despair, also showed low scores on in command. They were distinguished from all other emotions by the tendency to protect oneself, which fits both the outcome uncertainty and the modifiability, appraisal ‘Anger aud rclated emotions corresponded to appraisal of a negative event caused by another person (agency other, and in- volving unfairness. Aporaisal of other's agency, found with an- ger in all studies similar to ours, is shared by distrust, startle, and, understandably, jealonsy Angry emotiors differ from all cihers by Moving Against (antagonistic tendencies such as as- sault or opposition, and Dotling énvardiy). Whereas events ead- ing to sad and fearful emotions tended to be appraised as sud- den, andtthose leading to fearfal emotions in addition, as unex ‘pected, this did not apply tothe angry emotions; also, anger was felt to bea response to events with a certain outcome. Disgust and aversion involved appraisals similar to those in the angry emotions; their targe's evidently were other people rather than objects. Their appraisels differed from those in an- sry states by the absence of the variable unfairness. They fur- ther corresponded with tendencies for avoidance and to retain distance. Tn contrast to the fearful emotions they did not score (on cellprotective tendencies (protect ‘Shame, guilt and regret, together with nervonsnest, al fea tured seffugency (the Dutch word used, spijt, bas more over- tones of sef-agency than does regret). Shame, as expected, cor responded to the desire to disappear from view and ciffered in this regard from guilt and regret. No distinetive state of action readiness corresponded with gulls and regre, although they did score markedly low on antagonistic tendencies. Study 1, howEMOTION RELATIONS ouodmon rere ue ‘yp nsu0d09 Tioga weseodisoo avo éjuo je 01995 € Po 0 1 sane esave yun 1wouodeno esealde we soup sere V 346d shu g 1 Jo tunes afeaas qs Weuodiuco weswesdde we seosp ano (eSEBICY "SHOU 0 ¢" JO WONERLHOA sayedpye ape 2) Nojog aso 10 Zs ou J0 710 ‘payussasda pasts aE tay ey ay + earn + os + = * + + + + 4 + + Es + : = + + + + 4 + + + + + + ' os eerie + 3 + ha ee ee ve + + + : ae + ie a + H + + . soUMORDN, + . sowsaylpur + + - wopad + : i + = areas Me Be gets at. + * + S = mI - +4 * = ite + is + e = duattog + * * + + + = somniovny 3 po ‘uO + + + * bs Ea # + + + -- + + + = + = oa + + 5 + =. = + n z . = - + - + + + = + + = + + - + S + + ae + = SERS RT RO IPS Peay Ameren ound sounaeadea seueePPNS ANNO Fear ema SOT uosmos PU, “wonowa Buay aeRO woupasaha aR < Teoodca poly ‘apo wrIOIaTY 631081N. FRUDA, P. KUIPERS, AND E. ten SCHURE -yoyodprursyesaun x0ce azou 0 zy stuesazsone'sosnkd ‘nutedpren oeas an axoge aout 0} Jo Sunes ates yAs9pOSsauIPEa! UOTTDR SSHOUpsN y “paso st cures, epow eu “porusaidat sis spd spout 940 Ao J 's0100) Ky pach 3 sepoat ssoarpess wry “910UJ9 ¢)jo UOYpANOD sASH|SEAIUL We Es SHFsHIp uosarday SuIEU WOW Waawpq 294d 2504) + z + Be + t tea 2 iz +t seat +t + eae Eo pareusey PIL women shone oto Ss2uStORN soukouuy vloiower uurus oounroddssic, ‘noqesp S Prdaneiay Supeony wom wana WuRDGRT PIB KT smddeaa, peady Sapo uonaMeLy WIE pongraui — sOIdioH een 0 super 22 ee rae ssordiort suey Savord paw a ‘pou soupraruonoy ‘Soong SaPDR UOTE or aana EMOTION RELATIONS ever, which included an wido item ("you wished you had not Some something, orthat you could undo it”), showed highscorts om variable fee shame, guilt and regret, a8 wel 8s for de- spairand anxiety. trarstne emotions pride, rele happy enthusizom aod “chalense all show sefPagency appraisal acd the activation ate caetperant. All oylike emotions share asense of comtroliatitity {hey how postive aces onthe variable aflet) andthe action tendency of approact. TA ailmber of differences between emotions within given €m>- tio tame appeared: we cannot ascertain on the basis ofthe resent data to what extent these diferences relent chacee Tostuations or trac diferences. The differences tend, HOneNeH tesnpport the hypothesis that the more subsle emotion disting= tPonatso relleet diferences in appraisal and action readiness votgce Several ofthese difeencss are worth mentioning, Ser ate sainess, corresponded 10a very fo sore on rid att appraisal, and stronayiempied nteruptin of Peas sa apes to approach and be with. Anxiety and fea appeared ane fer to rather diferent states, with anetyand not /oar SOF +e inkbited, avoidance, and pronounced ands. Sob § ne ence between states is consonant with theoretical analsss Gfanxiety (Gray, 1982) and, moreover, confirms finéings of fained earlier (Frijda, 1987b, Study 1). nea euly angry states, ager and rage, were distinct from anrvpance and eenterpl: anger and rage corresponded to the Gitagonistic tendencies grouped under Moving, Agave ance armtayance and contempt savolved only boiling inside Yhage undersiandably appeared as more excited and to More ae internpt behavior than did anger The semantic diference etween digrrust on the one hard and disgust and aversion mm rarer was reflected inthe involvement of atending in ds- sus, and aveidance in the others pect appeared to refer toa generic unpleasant state: DAT from being unpleasant, it was characterized by no specie 26° tion readiness and no appraisal other than that something im portant and unexpected is involved. "Te emotions featuring negative slFageney showed interest ing. diferences. Guilt involved anicipated effort Gem Oot ie rnin Table 9), sense of controllability (fect) and invoNe, soon of the interests of sermeone else; none of these applied + Tieme and regre. Same wes characterized by disappear fort sages Siudy | (Cogeter wi guilty the desire to uno Fane emotions distinguished themselves fiom one another ‘py a numberof appraisal and actin readiness variates sch, era pvere anes, Agen; antiepaed efor. mplestions for “ifeweenn (not give in Table 9), Coatrolaility,atendin tendency to be with, and excited. “iporaisal and action readiness dimensions, Results of = fader analyses of the appraisal and action readiness questions fregiven in thebottom pari of Tables 4 and 5, respecte Sie major appraisal cimensions are highly similar tp these in Stady 1, thus confirming the hypothescs involved. AS o% pected, a Certainty factor appeared, involving the new clear peteputcome, and stand ems, tether vith 8 someWat scr loading (45) of bearable, The Anticipated Effort factor sraaraved, presumably because we hed removed from Study Seareameich as enterprising and selFassured. As Smith and Eusworth (1987) pointed out, this dimension preduecs diffe entation within postive emotions only. In the present stu, the relevant item is part of th: Importance factor. Faimess did ae rene oul separately, it asa loading (rather low one of 152} onthe Valence facto: 7 on Trion readiness dimensions on the whole conformed to expedations and were ait dimilarto those found in Stuy 1 Fire page factor azain was the strategic contol dimension In eesti Helpless, in which the new items giving up Coading compa dan t want (~ 66) joined the tems fn consmand(-S4), ‘Gaghter (52), helplessness (~84), and inbibited (70) Mis dane Goserving that laugizr was pat of the In Command dr ore ovand notof Hyperacivation. Moving Avay and Movin ‘Resins ceparated, a8 we intended, owing t0 improved item reidings and the addition of the “anger-in” item boing i Wordly: ditentional activity showed up inthe form ofa bipolir recog. Dsinerest dimension (in Study 1. the attention ier fo Moving Toward) Disagpear from view formed & sete factor, ain a5 we intend, wogethet with Bling: Th characterized shame, In Study 2, inhiblied no Tonger permed a more or les independent dimension but Was act of Ketpese Rezcant (“I wanted to eo against an obstacle oF ears, or to conguet It") bad a relatively low loading (47) carne Moving Against factor. The appearance ofa Passive di- coarjon, eparate from Dsinterest, wis new: Itcontained tne Homgrest, submit someone else, and helping. Majatons between appraisal and action readiness. AS in stedi | we computed maliplecorrelatensto examine predic: Ton ar action eadiness modes by appraise. Resulls ere pre si Fin the right half of Table 6. Although correlations do not sraply causation, the resus do support our causal typothess Imply Coupe lpi correlation was S5;apprasas thus onthe erage explained 24% ofthe ection readiness variance, some: aeatenore than in Study 1. Individual multiple correlations Pango Troms 28 (For approach) to 85 (or don’ wana were Gentian Most mulipl coreatons tended to remain atthe Siempre when computed over the scores fr the negative emo ane bay: therefore, they werenot inflated by th pleasantnest— votjoarantness distinction (ee Table 6, Rag ex Colum), The eamdons were don't want and she action readiness modes characteris of the positive emotions. ara died the overall relation between appraisals and action readisen by using canonical analysis, with appraisals ot reat esand eotion readiness mods as dependent variables, We He signifcent variates that together resulted in a redun ‘pus of 30%, 30% ofthe variance of action readiness variables care has accounted for by the appraisal variables, The variates TLtsled after the highest corelating variables following rota: ipa are given in Table 1, Te table shows that appraisal eng aetbn readiness dimensions were coherent at this evel ofanaly- Sis a8 well as which dimensions cohsred. Discussion ‘Emotion namescan be predicted by action readiness and aP- praia variables the two types cr variable tosome extent com> Bement one another. The obtained evel of prediction by oF Patel variabies compares favorably wih that fou by Smith pr Ellvorth (1985). Tho percentage of correct predictions in grey Tis somewhat inferior to and in Stay 2 about equal seein Smith and Ellsworth; however our studies involved ‘odiein fom among 32 emotion names ws opposedtote 1S24 N. FRUDA, P, KUIPERS, AND E. Ter, SCHURE Table 11 ~ Common Dimensions of Appraisal and Action Readiness Variables (From the Canonical Analysis) Actionresdiness. = Canonical ‘dimension variance _corrdation Dor't want, . helplessness 7 ‘earabl sand, ‘Ta command, esr dsiuteres ° n Important, personal No disinterest 5 0 Unexpected Interrupted 6 37 Otnerresponsible Boling nvarcly, ‘antagonisic 6 a Modtinabitiny Reauant 6 35 Outcome, vue Disappear fiom view, are ‘lusting 4 36 Selfresponsitle Helping 5 35 Sudden, noe crying expected 3 32 Fag ntsomeone Excited, be with else a 3 Tineofevent Attending 3 29 in their study, The overall prediction level is not very far re- ‘moved from what theoretically can be achieve. Smith and Ells- worth (1987) and Elsworth and Smith (1988) demonstrated ‘that most emotional incideats involve multipie, mixed emo- tions, One can expect that even when incidents are recalled by ‘means of one single emotion name, multiple emotions are in fact involved. The reculting mixtures of eppraisal and action readiness profiles will blur correspordence with the assigned names, Moreover, emotion names are used somewhat sloppily and are subject to preferences; most people may well use aver- sion when contempt would fit an experience more precisely. ‘Neverticiss, some ofthe incorrect prediction might have been {due to deficiencies in the sets of appraisal and action readiness, ‘variables used, This may be the case with some ofthe confusion ‘evident in Table 8, and in the fact that the discriminant func tions assigned the score patterns of disgusi answers more often, tocentempi than to disgust itself, ‘On the whole, modes of aciion readiness characterized the ‘major emotion groups, as could be expected on the basis of the literature (Dumas, 1948; Frijda, 1986: Izard, 1977; Plutchik, 1980s Shaver otal, 1987; Solomon, 1976; and the alder philo- sophical writers). Not only gross but also more subtle diffe ‘ences between emotions appear to be rellected by action readi- ness aspects. The maior hypothesized dimensions of action readiness did appear, but not ll hypothesized action readiness ‘modes fared equally well. Rejection did not distinguish disgust and aversion (rom fear and anger, ahough the distance item did. There wes some evidence in Study 1 for reactance’s being. fa specific action readiness component of the challenge-like emotions, enterprising and self-confident; perhaps it did not re= appear in Study 2 because these words were deleted. “The emergence in both studies of In Command—Helpless as, the major action readiness factor was surprising. This dimen- sion is clearly the action resdiness equivalent of pleasantness~ ‘unplessantness; it involves the ability or inability to make use of favorable epportunities oto deal with unfavorable ones, and itrests on a numberof variables (helplessness, ~.84; inhubition, 71; giving up, — 54: erying, ~ 50; apathy, ~.48: preoccupied, 395 laughter 52; in commard, 54), Several of these variables are what we termed actiow cantrl state variables, interestingly, laughter and crying form part of this dimension; this supports their interpretation as having to do with control and oss of coa- trol, respectively, = 2 i “Tae major appraisal dimension was Valence or Pleasantness— UnpleasantiaeS, as is YS in this tad of sid. It carr be ar- ‘Bid as to whether Valence should be considered a dimension of. appraisal or of feeling. We are ofthe opinica that ro meaningful distinetion can be made between these two, The words pleasant- ness and unpleasantness refer to feelings, but the content of the ‘questions underlying the Valeace dimension logically refers to appraisals (eg., "Wis it a pleasant or unpleasant situation?”) Furthermore, al appraisal aspects as discussed in this article (and in related artcies) refer to contents of awareness that are the outcomes of some appraisal process that is usually noncon- scious, Pleasentness is one such outcome, a summary evalua tion of unceriying aspects such as goal conduciveness orintrin- sic pleasurableness (Scherer, 1984) of which the subject need not be aware, Goal conduciveness-goal obstructiveness did in factoorrelate 91 with ploasanmness-snpleasaniness (see Fria, 1988, for a fuller discussion). We found no supportin our stud {es for Scherer’s hypothesis ofthe separate status of a Goal Con- uciveness-Goal Obstructiveness dimension (waich Smith & Ellsworth, 1987, did identify under the name Obstacle), al- though tie variable muy characterizea subset of unpleasant sit- uations (disappointment and fear had very low scores on goal conducireness that other negative emotions di¢ not; hope had a very high score, andit madean extra contribution to the predic- tion of religf pride, and enthusiasm in Study 1). ‘As mentioned in the Results section, most of the expected appraisal dimeasions were identified. The position of fairness, ct legitimacy, deserves a comment, Legitimacy has often been bypothesized (eg. Aristotle; Roseman, 1984) as beinga charec- teristic or condition of anger In the various studies by Smith ‘and Ellsworth (1985, 1987), fairness showed itself to be unsia- ble, and it did notemerge asa separate factor in our studies (a0 faimess question was present in Study 1). Yet, fairness singles ‘ont several emotians (the angry emotions, guilt and boredom) from among the other negative emotions. These findings, to- gether with those pertaining to goal conduciveness and some patter distinctions provides by modifiability, suggest that a (partly) hierarchical rather than a Evclidian model is appropri- ‘ate for the space of appraisal dimensions (see also Frijda, 1987b, for consonant evidence). The differences in variance explained by the various appraisal factors may also be due to the fact that they apply tooaly asmall section ofthe emotion domain. ‘The fuctor analyses of both Studies | and 2 yielded 9-10 fac tors for both appraisal and action readiness. In view of the pre- ceding remarks, these figures may represent a conservative et ‘mate of the mumber of separate appraisal and action readiness dimensions relevant for differentiating the emotions included in these studies. This conclusion is also suggested by the fact that 11 separate dimensions (whether appraisal or action read ness) resulted from the canontcal analysis that used appraisal ‘and gction readiness items as the seis £0 be correated (see Table 11). ‘The results relating to prediction of action readiness by ap- praisals, which are based on correlations between individual ap-EMOTION RELATIONS praisal and action reidiness core aross emotions, confirmed erearierfnedngs (Frijda, 19870), which were based on corre Feafons of average scores for different emotions. The signigeance te these results might be contested by argaing that some of the Sppraisl and action readiness items are semantically related. For instance, there may seem to be some sort of semantic rela Fon between unpleasantness and the don’t want variable: the faveer reads, “I wanted something not to be s0, not to exist” Honever unpleasantness is logically a feeling or an event

noted further that no action readiness mode characterizes the emo- onsotten considered complex, of jealousy regret distrust, end disappointment, apart from the general don’t want and, in some, fnatances, attending. This is worth noting because it conflicts with the hypothesis (eg, by Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987) That complex emotions are cognitively complex specications of particular basic ones. “The findines regarding appraisal and action readiness allow ‘us te adopt clear position toward the classical iheoties of emo- tional experience reviewed in the beginning of ths article, AP- praia! awareness centers around the irreducible experiences Of Pressure and pain; Wundk (1902) was correct inthis regard. AS ‘Re have mentioned, these experiences figure prominently in all nalysos ofthe structure of emotions, as apprasel of the pices” sat er unpleasant, or favorable or unfavorable nature of the ‘events, This and other aspects of appraisal generate changes in ction readiness, which subsequently enter experience san aryarenessof one's state of action readiness. Generally speaking, ge eel in a state of emotion because an appraisal has generated ome charge in action readiness. James (1884) can be consid sped correct in this regard: We feel afraid becatise we feel we Grant to run avy (oF feel that we might want to ran aways but Tre frozzn and unabletesmove).Specifcaly, we #1 a particular Gimotion either because ofthe particular appraisil or because of the particular change in action readiness, or because of both. Emotions probably difer inthis regard, but on the whole, com nitive theory, from Arnold (1960) and Schachter and Singer (1962) onward, was correct in emphasizing cognitive ficios Cextto and conaplementary to, those factors stressed by Wundt and James. Tn this article, we made almost no mention of awareness of arousal, a third component of emotional experience. Recent re-226 N. FRUDA, P. KUIPERS, AND E. Tex SCHURF ‘Table 12 Multiple Correlations Between Appraisal us and Action Readiness ‘Scores, Averaged Quer Emotions ‘Action eadivess —_R Approach oI Bewith 89 Protection ct ‘Avoidance 8 Arending 30 Distance sk Rejection 19 = Disinterest 80 Bon't want 38 Bolinginwerdy 36 Antagonistic 24 Reactant A. Interrupted 38 Preoceupied 33 Incommand 94 Beloit 83 Disippearfrom 93) Inhibition 95 Blushing 32 Submitting 37 Apathy 93 Giving up 93 Shatung of 93 Hetplesiness eo Cots, 88 Excited 35 Exuterant 92 Laughter 97 Rest 2 RK 45 2 9 74 81 83 £0 a4 97 92 a7 6 39 87 89 ‘ea 86 en 10 75 & 37 93 m 2 ‘2 4 ‘a Centribatingaporisas fair oadden 2 personal, valence, someone ese, stand, effort Bear persona, clear —effort aie uninteresting, ~ knowledge {teresting ~ sad, otherresponsible onlin bear ime past” ante arson Unfsie uninteresting nimportant uninteresting valeece Tali other responsible, valenee stan for. ‘Unfair other responsible, stand, efort,—interestng ‘ort, unfair, bear, ~sudden hexpected, efor, someone else, ~self responsible ar, fowledge.somen¢ ele, persone, unexpected bear areas someone eb, fait ‘eStesteem, self responsible, —beat — tear, ~sefesteem, unfamiliar ‘infur, someone ese, ~ selFestoem, valence Shatrucive, other fesponsile fir, outcome, ~ stand Setnctve, uninteresting, ~affect~other responsible “eleesteem, ~bear stané, knowledge TEES Satence, ~affect,~other responsible, unnodifable wee beat, someore es, ~ oter response ‘ime future personal, other responsible, ext ence nove ete expected effort, fir ee Tore Neauve beta weighs oe zw by terms corresponding tote nga Pe ofthe eal, or preceded bya minussis. search indicates that patterns of body experience show consid: SMMble differentiation between emotions _(Nieuwenhuyse, Otfeaberg & Frijde, 1987;Rimé & Giovanniri, 1986). Mach of ‘his dferenisting information des not drive from autonomic tion (Feeling and there- farousal, however, but from skeletal muscular ac forchead tension, clenched fists, rid posture, et.) ferefrom action readiness or cutrightaction (Nieawenhy et al, 1987). Arousal proper does seem to play fence; the dimension called /typeractivation in snaljis referred to arousal awareness and conuibuted to the xperienosof some (althongh by ne means ll) emotions. What” Sher arousel’s contributions are, however, Cannon (1927) may fe considered to have been correct ia downplaying the role of arousal awareness. In view of the importance of ation readiness, ts role in emotional experience certainly bat been overzated, ‘Our results raise a number of fundamental theoretical ques" cons, The first ofthese ws raised by Rusell (1987), in crie lowe of studies such as ours, Do these stds illuminate rhe weave sare of emotional experiences or merely the semantics of Emotion names? The dilemma, in our opinion is nota substan- tive one, Emotion names were presumably inv emotional sates; their semantic structure may rellest the structure of those states. To be sure, tose of a given emotion name to label hisor her role in experi- Davitz's (1969) f appraisal and not necessarily imply the presence of the corresposding struc ren The cognitive distinctions involved in the semantics of ‘motion names, however, may be assumed torellect distinctions that in general play a role in experience. Only in one respect is fhe problem a real one. Our investigations (ike others) assume vremeto-one correspondence between namcs and structures ‘The provedures do net allow identification of multiple means {ngy hati, of several different emotion structures denoted by me name, Some of the profiles Found may represent the super postion of several heterogencous profiles The protil of amx- Jann for instance, which sbows high scores om both proteetve™ eaident tendency and inbibition, may reflect a mixture ofthe No diferent emotional response types distinguished by Gray (1982). ‘A related objention isthat the identified stractures reflect not true experiences but stereotyped notions of emotions costs: Spoteing to particular Inbels. The objection i a valid one Dt Mrotably dees not apply toa significant extent. Results closely Billa fo ours (at least insofar as appraisals are concemed) are Sttained in studies in which emotion names are introduced aly after the description of ernotional experiences or incens, ‘oats Smithand Elsworth (1987), fr instance, found esentiahy ed dene arstuctues and dimensions when subjects were esked 10 fanindividual’s _seribeexperiences they had on particaler ‘oovasioas (before and vaberience does ater taking an exam), and again (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988)EMOTION RELATIONS when subjects were asked to recall experiences in which partic- tularappraisals playes a major role. ‘Some of the obtained emotion structures might correspond to accidental ssociations rather than to the inherent structures dfemotional experience, as might be the case with several sud- Gennets entries in Table 9, Ellsworth and Smith (1988) exten~ Giely discussed this same issue under the heading of *eentral- ity” of appraisals in particular emotions. There fs wo casy wey to distinguish between inherent and accidental attributes. One ‘way, perhaps, issementic analysis: There exist attributes that do (and others that do not) change word meaning when they are removed from the semantic description (see Wierzbicka, 1986, for examples). A more empirical approach consists of varying tne procedures forthe elicitation of emotion reports and vary- ing the event types in connestion with which emotional experi- fences are studied, Ellsworth and Smith ilustrated this ap proach in theirseries of studies in which emotions were recalled by labels (“recall an experience of anger” ete; Smith & Ells; ‘worth, 1985), by specific cizcumstances (“how did you fee. ‘hen preparing fo, and passing, your examination”; Smith & Ellsworth, 1987), oF by appraisal specifications (“recall an in- stance in which you did not bave control over an important vent,” ete Ellsworth & Smith, 1988). ‘Tore is one final related question. Do these data reflect the structure of emotional experionces, or the antecedents and con Sequents of emotions? The latter is advanced by theorists for ‘whom basicemotions are irreducible qualia (Izard, 1977; Oat Tey & Jobnson-Laird, 1987). This view is somewhat unassail- ‘bles the qualia concerned are irreducible ky fiat, the validity Of the evidence {rom analytical Wondtian introspection being implicitly denied (Frijda, 19872). The major remaining coun- terargument is that the assumption of irreducible qualla other than pleasantness and unpleasantnessis unnecessary. The qual- ity of emotional experiences, that of presumed basic emations included, can be satisfactorily accounted for by the analyses tiven; also, the differences znd similarities between emotions, ‘even basic ones, can be accounted for by the companential 2>- proach, whereas qualia theory cannot explain that fearandssad- ness, for instance, are morealike thas fear and joy. Tn conclusion, we emphasize a geacral point regarding the ‘componential approach. The findings on emotion constituents fand structure, from the present and from related studies, offer promise of a way to study emotions that aes not depend on the ree of emotion names; this dependences one of the hindrances jn emotion study. 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