Historiography: Bletchley Park

INTRODUCTION

In an unsuspecting and quiet English country house, dubbed Station X, miles away from the bustling city
of London, groups of men and women are hard at work trying to solve an almost unsolvable puzzle; the
German Enigma. The British are at war with Germany and the year is 1939. The genius minds that are
busy cracking the enemy’s codes are painstakingly aware of the enormous stakes involved in this gamble,
for it is the lives of their own men. However, the victory can be theirs if they can decipher the enemy’s
next move, wrapped perfectly in strings of codes made to look like gibberish. Every minute that the
codebreakers fail, men are being slain to death. The clock is ticking. And then, in a moment of
magnanimous genius, the code-breakers build a machine that no one ever dreamt of, that can break the
codes at speeds unprecedented. The Allies, led by the British, are winning battles that they never thought
possible, all thanks to the acquired intelligence. The codebreakers have shortened the war and the enemy
is weakened. A few more blows to the head and the war is over. The Allies emerge victorious. It is
Britain’s finest hour1. Long live the king.

Numerous movies, books, leaders, and scholars mimic this loosely written plot. However, if history is to
be more than refined fables, then the above would be a gross oversimplification.
Bletchley Park (B.P), located in Milton Keynes, UK, is an English country house turned museum and a
former home of Britain’s Government Code and Cypher School, which played a crucial role in signals
intelligence communications during World War II. However, Bletchley’s history remains a subject of
debate and revision, reflecting a range of perspectives and interpretations on its role in World War II and
its impact on history. Historians have viewed it as a critical component in ‘winning the war’2, a
technological hub for many firsts, a cultural icon or simply dismissed it as ‘overrated’3. One of the major
hurdles in analyzing its significance is the lack of primary sources, which further adds to the mystification
surrounding the site. In fact, according to the Channel 4 documentary, Station X, that aired in 1999, most
files and reports of works at Bletchley, including the machine Colossus4, were burned at PM Churchill’s
orders to maintain the site's secrecy. However, many have embarked upon the journey and tried to give us
a glimpse into its role during the war. This essay aims to examine the historiography of Bletchley Park;
the motivations, perceptions and methodologies of two historians that have tried to tell the story of
‘Britain's best kept secret’5.

1
“'Their finest hour' speech by Winston Churchill, 1940.” 1940. The British Library.
2
“How we won the war... |.” 1999. The Guardian.
3
Corera, Gordon. 2020. “Bletchley Park's contribution to WW2 'overrated.'” BBC.
4
“The Colossus Machine.” n.d. Stanford Computer Science.
5
Lewis, Katy. 2014. “Bletchley Park: No longer the world's best kept secret.”
WRITING HISTORY

Benedict Cumberbatch starrer The Imitation Game ends with the following note:
Historians estimate that breaking Enigma shortened the war by more than two years, saving
over 14 million lives6.

This claim is in perfect synchronization with the views of Sir Francis Harry Hinsley, who served at
Bletchley Park during the war and was later made the official historian of British Intelligence during the
war, authorized to elaborate on the work carried out at the code-breaking site. While he has authored
various books and articles about the same, he is most quoted on Bletchley’s role in shortening the war by
an estimate of ‘no less than two years and probably by four years’7. During a talk in November of ‘96, the
celebrated authority elaborated on the reasons for the ‘success’ of the British efforts and his subsequent
claims. The first, he said, was that the British government was ‘alone, among the governments of those
years’8, to concentrate all their intelligence prowess into one place; Government Code and Cypher School
and then later Station X or B.P. The next were ‘the methods and machineries of a sophistication hitherto
undreamt of’9, which included the ‘first ever operational electronic computer, Colossus’10, and the keen
regulations put in place for secrecy as the enemy remained blissfully unaware of the intelligence advances
at breaking their ‘unbreakable systems’11, one of which was the infamous German Enigma. He notes that
the secrecy was a double-edged sword for the British, as it kept hidden from the enemy their monumental
strides towards victory, but hindered those involved, in mentioning these progresses, therefore, leaving
behind the task of piecing together its contributions to the historians. But he assures the historians that it
is a rather straightforward task once they indulge in a reasonable and careful use of counterfactual history,
and examine what would it be like if these intelligence strides did not exist.

The deployment of counterfactuals, or ‘what ifs’ is a rather furious debate among historians and readers
alike, and is worthy of an essay of its own. However, for the purposes of this argument, focus must be
centered on Sir Hinsley’s justifications and causal analysis of his proposed alternative. He insists on the
removal of Bletchley from history in order to fully grasp its historical influence. The amount of codes that
were decrypted at Bletchley and the lack of delay in that process are the reasons stated by the historian for
its undeniable impact on the war’s outcome. He remains preoccupied with establishing continuous causal
ramifications of events that transpired, without stable empirical evidence. For instance, he states that
Bletchley’s work was directly responsible in keeping Rommel out of Egypt in the summer of ‘41 and
bases his causal enquiry on the same speculation. Had Rommel got hold of Egypt, what would follow
would be a catastrophic domino for the Allies, he adds. Sir Hinsley takes imaginative liberties in
concluding that with the loss of Egypt, the Allies would abandon North West Africa, lose Malta and head
back to the North Sea. In an alternate timeline, if the Allies mustered courage and went for North Africa,
which would cost them at least a year, they would jeopardize the Normandy Landings of ‘44, hence

6
Tildom, Morten. “The Imitation Game” (2014).
7
Internet Archive. 1996. “Interview Transcript: The Influence of ULTRA in the Second World War.”
8
Internet Archive. 1996.
9
Internet Archive. 1996.
10
Internet Archive. 1996.
11
Internet Archive. 1996.
delaying or threatening the Allied victory. While counterfactuals can be a ‘handmaiden of agency’12, or ‘a
powerful corrective tool that undoes the tendency to hide plausible alternatives’13, Sir Hinsley’s use of it
seems more of a means to an already imagined end, rather than an inquiry into uncertainty. The
self-assured theory about Bletchley’s role in shortening the war then becomes baseless, as the historian
forms an incoherent argument that dwells more under the work of speculative fiction, rather than History.

Another historian, Michael Smith pays homage to Sir Hinsley in the concluding chapter of his book ‘The
Secrets of Station X: How The Bletchley Park Codebreakers Helped Win the War’ and asserts while
counterfactual history ‘remains a risky endeavor, only a few could argue the role of Bletchley in
shortening the war’14. Smith served in the British Army’s Intelligence Corps, before becoming a journalist
and author of a number of published books on intelligence services, spies and Bletchley Park. He also
serves as the chair of the Historical Advisory Committee at Bletchley Park Trust, where he is a trustee
himself. His book, ‘The Secrets of Station X’ was published in 2011, around the same time when the
Trust was planning a complete restoration and raising funds for the same and is currently donned by the
museum’s store. His first book on Bletchley was accompanied by a Channel 4 documentary- Station X,
and was inspired from his ‘own role working on enciphered Warsaw Pact messages during the Cold
War’15.
The Secrets of Station X takes a microscopic view of history, zooming in on individuals, to provide a
portrayal of the people behind the historical site, sometimes showcasing their eccentricities, quirks and
snippets of their personalities. His portrayals are drawn from a rich source of interviews of codebreakers
and quotes by their colleagues who worked at Bletchley. There seems to be a special focus on the more
famous names, like Turing and Hugh, as Smith quotes fellows mentioning Turing chaining his coffee mug
to the radiator16 or Hugh’s elaborate utensils' washing ritual17. The book also provides a thorough and
remarkable account of the technical aspects and challenges involved in breaking codes, including the
difficulties of building and operating complex machinery, like the Enigma or the Purple, sometimes even
devoting whole sections to technical anecdotes:
No letter could ever be represented by itself. This was of great assistance in using cribs, pieces of plain
text that were thought likely to appear in an Enigma message. This might be because it was in a common
proforma, or because there was an obvious word or phrase it was expected to contain18.

It touches upon some social and political interactions between organizations and individuals involved in
code-breaking effort, like the hospitality extended by the British when their American allies visited
Bletchley, or Churchill’s secret afternoon stopover at the site.
Although Smith draws on a wide range of primary and secondary sources, much of the information about
the code-breaking effort at Bletchley Park remains classified, unavailable to researchers or has been
destroyed. This means that some parts of the story may be missing or incomplete, and that some of the
details may not be entirely accurate. Because of the lack of sources, Smith is often forced to reach his
conclusions about the significance of Bletchley and its role in the Allied victories through the interview

12
Kaye, Simon T. “Challenging Certainty: The Utility and History of Counterfactualism.” History and Theory 49, no. 1 (2010): 38–57.
13
Kaye, Simon T. “Challenging Certainty: The Utility and History of Counterfactualism.” History and Theory 49, no. 1 (2010): 38–57.
14
Smith, Michael. 2011. The Secrets of Station X: How the Bletchley Park codebreakers helped win the war. Oxfordshire: Biteback Publishing.
15
“Bletchley Park and related books by Michael Smith.” n.d. Michael Smith - Author.
16
Smith, Michael. 2011.
17
Smith, Michael. 2011.
18
Smith, Michael. 2011.
accounts. While these sources can provide valuable insights, they may not always be entirely reliable, and
they may be biased or have a limited perspective on events. For instance, Smith quotes Peter Lucas,
reporter from Hut 3, ‘The intercepted messages told the British virtually every detail of what Germans
were doing’, to establish the prowess of the work at Station X during the German occupation of Denmark
and Norway in 1940. Here, Jürgen Kocka’s ‘liquification’19 of history comes to mind. This seamless
translation of small gradual changes to ‘history’ comes only in retrospect. The historical actors involved
possessed no such knowledge at the time. Psychologists call it ‘hindsight bias’. To separate what people
could and could not have known is perhaps the greatest task of a historian. Unfortunately, both Smith and
Hinsley seem to indulge, rather unapologetically and without any warning to the reader, in all sorts of
biases. Such unwavering belief in an institution, and in its complete and absolute power over historical
events, can interfere with a thorough study of history, and hence, giving way to skepticism about the
same.

In conclusion, while both historians are celebrated for their efforts, their works have exposed a blinding
bias towards their own narratives of history. The aim of this essay is not to undermine their efforts, or
dismiss them as farce, in fact it is far from it. This essay has only tried to shed light on what history might
be. It is not necessarily an exact science that can be studied or replicated in a lab; nor is it just stories from
the past. It seems to tread a fine line between the two. While history is dependent on its historians'
theories, speculations, methodologies and construction, it remains a form of truth seeking that aims to be
more than the biases of those who write it. This essay, in its limited capacity, illuminates some of these
biases and methodologies in the hope of future research on the role of Bletchley Park in the second world
war, and the larger question of how one can write history.
19
Cited in Neitzel, Sonke. 2013. “Soldaten: On fighting, killing and dying”: 13-15
BIBLIOGRAPHY

“Bletchley Park and related books by Michael Smith.” n.d. Michael Smith - Author.

https://michaelsmithauthor.com/the-codebreakers-of-bletchley-park.html.

“The Colossus Machine.” n.d. Stanford Computer Science.

https://cs.stanford.edu/people/eroberts/courses/soco/projects/2008-09/colossus/colossus.html.

Corera, Gordon. 2020. “Bletchley Park's contribution to WW2 'over-rated.'” BBC.

https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-54604895.

“How we won the war... |.” 1999. The Guardian.

https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/1999/jan/18/features11.g2.

Kaye, Simon T. “Challenging Certainty: The Utility and History of Counterfactualism.” History

and Theory 49, no. 1 (2010): 38–57. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25621451.

Lewis, Katy. 2014. “Bletchley Park: No longer the world's best kept secret.” BBC.

https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-beds-bucks-herts-27808962.

Smith, Michael. 2011. The Secrets of Station X: How the Bletchley Park codebreakers helped

win the war. Oxfordshire: Biteback Publishing.

“'Their finest hour' speech by Winston Churchill, 1940.” 1940. The British Library.

https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/their-finest-hour-speech-by-winston-churchill-1940.
Welzer, Harald, and Sönke Neitzel. 2013. Soldaten - On Fighting, Killing and Dying: The Secret

Second World War Tapes of German POWs. Edited by Sönke Neitzel and Harald Welzer. N.p.:

Simon & Schuster Limited.

web.archive.org. 1996. “Interview Transcript: The Influence of ULTRA in the Second World War.”

Internet Archive. http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/Research/Security/Historical/hinsley.html.