PLOTINUS AND THE DAIMONION OF SOCRATES Jouw M. Rist Il. THE tenth chapter of his Life of Plotinus Porphyry recounts the story of a seance held in the Isaeum at Rome. An Egyptian priest, he tells us, offered to evoke Plotinus’ daimon, but when he had delivered his sum- mons it was not a daimon that appeared, but a god. As a result of meditat- ing on this experience, Porphyry continues, Plotinus wrote a treatise on spirit-guides (3.4) in which he attempted to explain why the guides of all men are not alike. Despite the assurances of the learned that Plotinus had no time for magic, even though he recognized it as a real power,! this tale of the seance makes us wonder about the precise importance Plotinus attached to spirit-guides and the origins of his belief in their significance. In this paper, therefore, I wish to investigate the historical background of Ennead 3.4 and of Porphyry’s account of the seance. Professor Dodds has reminded us that both the incident in the Isaeum and the composition of Ennead 3.4 took place before Porphyry’s arrival in Rome and that the account of the seance is hearsay in which we cannot put much confidence.? Nevertheless, the treatise 3.4 is certainly a genuine work of Plotinus and its conclusions must be considered. In that treatise we find that a few people have a god (@eés) as their daimon and that these are the sages (3.4.6). Since it is certain that Plotinus’ pupils con- sidered their master a sage, we can understand how they came to believe that his daimon was a god. Professor Armstrong? has clearly explained why Plotinus himself could never have called the “god” conjured up in the Isaeum a god at all. The God who is the philosopher’s daimon in 3.4.6 is the One, and the ‘One and Nofs are far beyond the realm where magic can have any effect. This realm is defined in Ennead 4.4.43. All we can say of the story in Porphyry is that it probably grew up partially under the influence of the doctrine of Ennead 3.4 where the sage’s daimon is said to be a god. The story recounts the sort of practical demonstration that Plotinus’ view is true which might have appealed to certain of his more superstitious followers. We are therefore left with the text of Ennead 3.4 itself to help us understand the Plotinian doctrine of spirit-guides, but if we can see clearly the historical origins of some of the ideas in this treatise, we may incidentally throw more light on the passage in Porphyry’s Life. Let us consider the latter part of 3.4.5. Here Plotinus offers an account of 1A. H. Armstrong, “Was Plotinus a Magician?” Phronesis 1 (1955) 73-79. 4B, R, Dodds, Tae Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley 1951) 289. 4A. H. Armstrong, op. cit. (see n.1) 77 13 Puormrx, Vol. 17 (1963) t.4 PHOENIX spirit-guides which, he says, is supported by the Timaeus (90A) and which also contains a quotation from the tenth book of the Republic (620E). Timaeus 90A tells us in fact that we should conceive of the most lordly kind of soul that we possess as a datmon which God has given each one of us. There seems little doubt that this daimon is equivalent to vods or to the Aoyworedy of the Repudlic. It is wholly within us as a gift from God. It is the directing clement in our soul. Two passages from the Laws relating to the daimon, however, give perhaps a slightly different impres- sion. Both 732C and 877A leave the nature of the daimon in doubt, but both seem to imply—more than does Timaeus 90A—the meaning ‘‘spirit- guide” or “guardian-angel.” One might suppose that such a spirit-guide, though called a daimon, would not be the simple equivalent of vots. The notion of the datmom as the guardian of the fate of the individual— and as a guardian chosen by the individual soul—is clear in the myth of Er, especially at 620DE. Plotinus, as we have seen, alludes to this passage in Ennead 3.4.5, and tries to reconcile it with the Timaeus. The two, how- ever, are not easily to be reconciled. Whereas in the Timaeus Plato thinks of the daimon as vois, in the myth of Er the daimon is a principle chosen by the soul, yet still in some respects apparently outside the soul, which watches over the soul’s life. What is inside the soul should be different from what is outside; yet the word daimon is used for both. Plotinus is partially aware of the difficulty of reconciling the passages. He is probably also aware that the Platonists did not always amalgamate them, for he suggests that other interpretations than his own lead to contradictions whereas his own does not. We shall look briefly at other Platonist theories about such daimones later; for the moment we should observe how Plotinus struggles to avoid making the passages contra- dictory. The daimon is not wholly outside, he says in line nineteen. This is a concession to the doctrine of the Timaeus, which would be denied outright if the daimon were thought to be outside vols. Yet on the ground that as individual humans we live a life to which it is superior Plotinus has to add that it is not bound up with us. This addition is almost opposed to the Timaeus, but fits the Republic better. Again, the daimon is said to be ours, if “we” are our souls, though it is not the agent of our actions. (od5' &epydx). It is, of course, hard to see how the daimon of the Timaeus, if it is not the agent of at least our noblest actions, can be the same as vols, as Plato says it is. Plotinus’ interpretation of the Timaeus again seems very odd. In Ennead 3.4 Plotinus devotes a good deal of space to the reconcilia- tion of the Timaeus doctrine of the daimon with that of the Republic. It is a strange fact, however, that he says nothing of the dauémov, or divine sign, of Socrates, that aroused such interest among many of the Platonists.PLOTINUS AND THE D4IMONION 1s I shall suggest in this paper, however, that those pupils who supposed that the seance in the Isacum gave a demonstration that Plotinus’ own daimon was a god, were thinking in terms of Socrates’ daimonfon. It is beyond doubt, as Armstrong has shown, that Plotinus supposed his own spirit-guide to be beyond mere conjuration, to be in fact the One itself. Yet for men without much grasp of the elevated Plotinian metaphysic, the phrase “spirit-guide” would suggest ideas of something like the daimonion of Socrates, or rather like their impression of the daimonion of Socrates. As we shall see, Plotinus himself may have felt that his spirit-guide was akin to the dafmonion of Socrates, but the popular conception of that daimonion may well have been much inferior to his. We must therefore now look at the history of the accounts of the Socratic divine sign itself. The least extreme, and therefore probably truest accounts of the daimonion are to be found in the Platonic dialogues. Apart from the ‘Theages, of which we shall postpone consideration, mention is made of the sign in the Apology (31D, 40AB), Eutayphro (3B), Alcibiades 1 (103A, 105A), Eushydemus (272K), Republic (496C), Phaedrus (242B) and Theaetetus (151A). The information we can derive from these sources is not great, bur it is consistent. We sometimes find the daimonion called détov (Apol. 31D). We learn that it is a voice (4po/. 31D, Phaedrus 242C). We learn that this voice is frequently heard by Socrates; it is 74 lobes onueiov (Eulhydemus 272E, Phaedrus 242B). Yet again and again, Plato insists that ir never exhorts Socrates to a positive action, but continually restrains him from doing what is wrong. This view is expressed most clearly in Apology 31D, but occurs again in the same dialogue (40B, 41D) as well as in the Euthydemus (272E) and the Theaetetus (151A). The most interesting passage of all, however, is Phaedrus 242BC, because although Socrates here points out that the sign “always holds me back from something I am about to do” he adds that “I thought I heard a voice from there, which forbade my going away until I should purify myself.” The addition of the phrase mplv ay é¢oaudsonar seems to attribute to the voice some kind of hortatory power of the kind that the Platonic Socrates normally disclaims. I do not think it likely that this passage from the Phaedrus should be taken to imply an account of the daimonion at variance with the other Platonic evidence, but I am not the first to believe that it may well have been a source from which the idea that the voice gave positive commands was derived. In Phaedrus 242C Socrates tells us that the voice forbade his going away till he had purified himself, since he had offended against the divine. He continues as follows: “I am a prophet, not a very good one, but... good enough for myself.” There seems to be no direct connection between the daimonion and Socrates’ being a prophet. Indeed he later speaks of16 PHOENIX the soul, not the daimonion, as prophetic. But the juxtaposition of the daimonion and the idea of prophecy was too significant for certain Platonists to pass over. Furthermore it is a fact that in Apology 40A the divine sign itself is called prophetic. For those who wished to put the Apology and Phaedrus together, the materials for a more elaborate theory of Socrates the prophet, whose power of prophecy derived from a divine sign, were ready to hand. We can see that, even if the evidence is stretched as far as possible, the knowledge to be derived from Plato about the Socratic divine sign is scanty. This scantiness may well reflect the fact that Plato, who almost certainly regarded his master as especially gifted, felt awed in speaking of the daimonion. In Repuélic 496C the divine sign is said to have been granted to few if any before Socrates himself. This makes it certain that a daimonion of the Socratic type cannot be identical with the daimon in the Timaeus, for this is apparently that higher part of the human soul which everyone possesses to a greater or lesser extent. Nor can it be the daimon of the tenth book of the Repudiic which each man is said to choose for himself. It may however be a superior version of this, possessed by a very few specially fortunate mortals. In other words, the Socratic daimonion may have some kinship with the highest kind of daimon that can guide a human life, perhaps with the only kind that can give a first impulse to philosophy. If such is Plato’s view of it, Socrates’ daimonion was a manifestation that Socrates was guided by something superior to the daimones of other men, that he was under the especial protection of God and that his life fulfilled a specific purpose in the divine scheme. This is in fact the view which the Apology suggests. In 33C Socrates explains how the course of his life was laid down for him by God’s commands sent by oracles, dreams, and any other means God chose. In 41D he tells the judges that the gods do not neglect the good man and that he believes that since his divine sign has remained silent during his trial it is best for him to die. His death does not mean that the gods have abandoned him, but rather the reverse. This much and this much only does Plato tell us about the daimonion. Perhaps the most significant fact for later Platonism is that if the dai- monion bears some resemblance to the daimon of the myth of Er, it is a superior version of it. We must now turn to the evidence of Xenophon. His chief references to the divine sign are Apology 12-13 and Memorabilia 1.1.2-9, 4.3.12, 428.1, and 4.8.5. The account given in these passages differs considerably from that retailed by Plato. One of the most striking differences is that according to Xenophon the sign did not restrict itself to prohibitions. In 4.8.1 we read that it told Socrates both what he should do and what he should not do. 4.3.12 repeats this. Furthermore, according to Keno~PLOTINUS AND THE D4IMONION 17 phon, the sign enabled Socrates to give advice to his friends. Those who followed this advice prospered, those who did not repented of it (1.1.4). Socrates is depicted as the wise counsellor whose advice is inspired by God. This leads to what we can only regard as a vulgarization of the whole concept of the sign in Xenophon’s account. We saw in Plato's version how Socrates spoke of the sign as prophetic and how in the Phaedrus he calls himself, though not because of the sign, a prophet. In the Memorabilia (1.1.3-4) Xenophon compares the ability to prophesy given to Socrates by his sign with prophecies made by seers from the flight of birds and other such things. The only difference Xenophon seems to have seen between Socrates and the ordinary “prophet” is in the manner in which Socrates spoke about the source of his prophetic ability. Ordinary prophets, says Xenophon, say that they are exhorted and discouraged by birds, but Socrates said what he meant, namely that the dafmonion gave him a sign. Xenophon is, perhaps unconsciously, playing down the unique quality of the Socratic experience, which Plato had particularly emphasized in the Repuétic. Socrates the prophet is a more commonplace Socrates, but he proved extremely popular. Again in the 4palogy Xenophon portrays his hero in the réle of prophet, when in chapter twelve he makes him say; “How could I be introducing new divinities by saying that a voice of God indicates to me what I must do? For surely those who take the cries of birds and the utterances of men base their judgements on voices.” An elaboration of the theme follows on lines similar to those in the Memorabilia, and Socrates says he can demonstrate the truth of his words by the fact that he has revealed the counsels he has received from the gods to his friends, and that his fore- casts have always proved correct. It is hard not to conclude that Xeno- phon’s concept of the daimonion is much more materialist than Plato’s. In some respects he has tended to merge into the daimonion a daimon conceived entirely as a guardian in the manner of Plato's myth of Er, thus emphasizing the motif of prophecy. And Socrates was certainly not the only man who claimed the ability to prophesy! The next stage in our investigation must be the pseudo-Platonic Theages. 1 am in agreement with the great majority of recent writers in regarding this dialogue as spurious. The evidence that it is a composition based on passages from genuine Platonic works, in particular the dpalegy, Theaetetus, and the first Alcibiades, is well marshalled by Pavlu‘ and Souilhé.* Against such proof the doubts of Friedlander are of little signi- ficance.* The extraordinary correspondences between Apology 19E. and Theages 128A, and between Apology 31D and Theages 128D by themselves “J. Pavlu, “Der pseudoplatonische Dialog Theages," Wiener Studien 31 (1909) 13-37. ‘J. Souilhé, Platon, Ocurres Compities (Budé) 13° (Paris 1930) 137-142. "P. Priedlinder, Paton 2 (Berlin 1957) 135-142, 299-302,18 PHOENIX are very strong evidence that one of these works is a copy of the other, and few would suggest that the Apology is not by Plato's hand. Souilhé has further pointed, in my opinion rightly, to the actual circumstances which led the author of the Theages to make Theages an important character in a dialogue devoted largely to a discussion of the divine sign.” ‘There is a passage in the sixth book of the Repudlic where Socrates speaks first of Theages and then of the divine sign. In 496B he tells us that Theages—who is only introduced in this passage—did not enter politics because of his weakness of constitution and chronic illness. He then adds that in his own case it was the daimonion which prevented him. The juxtaposition of these two ideas proved fertile in the mind of the author of the Theages. Although there is no connection between Theages and the divine sign in the Republic, such a connection was easily imagined by the scholarly imitator. Assuming then that the dialogue is spurious, our next problem is its date. Since Souilhé has shown beyond doubt that it is influenced by the Theaetetus, we cannot date it before 369. Alleged consideration of style cannot affect this point.? Indeed, if the author is imitating mainly early Platonic works, one would suppose that, if his imitation is at all good, the product would have some stylistic resemblances to the earliest works of Plato, That it has such resemblances cannot be used as evidence for dating it before 369. Souilhé, however, wishes to date it to the end of the fourth century on the ground that in 125E-126A Theages says he would like to be a tyrant and would pray to be a god.® Souilhé supposes that he is thinking of the divine honours voted to Alexander the Great, but this need not be the case. Even if the passage is taken absolutely seriously, Alexander was not, after all, the first Greek to receive divine honours. He had been anticipated in this by Lysander. Furthermore, Theages says that he does not desire (éruyelv) to be a god, but rather that he would pray to be one (citaiuqy ay). The contrast between the two words is stressed. Theages presumably thinks that only by transcending the limits of nature could he be a god, and that therefore there is no point in desiring this. There is, we recall, a Greek phrase for wishful thinking. The object of wishful thinking is said to be duster eixais. Probably in this passage of the Theages, Theages means that it might be a pleasant day-dream to be a god, bur it is a possible abject of desire to be a tyrant. [f this is so, whether the author of the Theages is thinking with Souilhé of Alexander or with me of Lysander becomes irrelevant, as he cannot be thinking of anyone's *Y. Souilhé, Plaron 13%, 138, 'P. Briedlinder (Pfaton 2. 142) attempts to use stylistic arguments without con- sidering what the style of a good imitator would be like. *J. Souilhé, Platon 13%, 142.PLOTINUS AND THE DaIMONION 9 divine honours at all. But if he is not thinking of divine honours, the evidence for a late fourth-century date disappears. I have little constructive to offer on the problem of dating. That the Theages is later than 369 seems certain. That it was written very long afterwards I find difficult to believe both because of the style—for the author manages to weave his snippets from Plato together without intruding transitional passages too suggestive of a much later age—and because, as we shall see, the later Platonists regarded it as genuine, These arguments are not strong, but I should be prepared to risk dating the work to very shortly after Plato’s death in 347. We know that Plato left the Laws unfinished; there has been a great dispute over the authenticity of the Epinomis. After Plato's death all check on the authenticity of works purporting to be his had vanished. The time was ripe for publishing spurious material as genuine. The Teages may then be dated tentatively to 345 B.c, Assuming that the Theages is later than the accounts of the daimonion given both by Plato and by Xenophon, we can now look at the develop- ments in the account of the daimonion which it contains. The first is in 128D, immediately following a passage taken over from the Apology. Socrates repeats that the voice always prevents him from acting wrongly, but never gives a positive command—the doctrine of Plato and not of Xenophon. This is followed, however, by the remark that if one of Socrates’ friends consults him, the voice may well occur and utter a prohibition. This extension of the activity of the “oracle” to replying to the demands of Socrates’ friends is Xenophontic rather than Platonic. Unplatonic too is the list of persons who regretted the fact that they had not taken Socrates’ advice. The transformation of Socrates into the traditional wise man is evident in the stories of Cleitomachus and Sannio. Stranger still, however, is the suggestion, made by Socrates, about the effects of his physical presence. It is of course true that the personality ‘of Socrates drew men to hear his words; this is evident from both Plato and Xenophon. Bur the crude rendering of this theme in the Theages is a development—or degradation—introduced by the later writer. It is said that the nearet one comes to Socrates, the more powerful is his effect, and that the best effect can be obtained by physical contact with him, Doubtless the physical presence of Socrates was commanding and magnetic—the Symposium is a witness of the fact—but Plato emphasizes the effect of his words far more than that of his body. It is his words, for example, that have the numbing effect described by Meno, and that make the philosopher like a “torpedo-fish” (Meno 80A). Gomperz has completely missed the point in remarking of the Theages that “it is hardly possible to depict in a simpler and more convincing manner what to-day20 PHOENIX we might style the charm and the spell of a great and inspiring per- sonality.”"° This is the hagiographical approach of which the Theages itself is redolent." This dialogue is in fact an early stage in the debasing both of Socrates and of the concept of his daimonion. This retrograde movement is advanced a further stage by the closing speech of Theages. We have already seen Socrates as the traditional wise man and prophet whose prophetic powers derive from his daimonion. Now we see the next stage in a process which will help to usher in an age in which the conjuring up of daimones is an accepted part of the Platonic tradition. Neither Xenophon nor Plato says anything about offering sacrifices to the daimonion. It is too personal a thing to be treated in that way. Theages, however, has no such inhibitions. He will make trial of the daimonion by associating with Socrates, and if it does not speak he will be delighted and maintain the association. If, on the other hand, it objects to his presence, he will consider the possibility of placating it with prayers and sacrifices and any other means the prophets may indicate. The Theages was quickly assimilated into the Platonic tradition. Thrasyllus included it in the fifth of his tetralogies," and when Diogenes Laertius (3.62) lists the spurious dialogues which were generally recog- nized as such by the critics, the Theages is not among them. One of these authorities on Plato is said by Diogenes to have been the grammarian Aristophanes. Presumably Aristophanes regarded the Theages as genuine. His floruit is the middle of the third century a.c. Later writers too were equally convinced of its authenticity—a fact which partly accounts for the spread of its unauthentic doctrines. In his Life of Nicias (13.6) Plutarch cites the prophecy of doom which, according to the Theages (129D), Socrates uttered before the sailing of the Sicilian Expedition. Albinus, an aristotelianizing Platonist of the second century a.D., tells us that there are lecturers on Plato who start their courses with the Theages (Eleaywyi 5). Legends about the daimonion began to accumulate. Cicero tells us that Antipater the Stoic made a large and interesting collection of them, and himself recounts a story about Crito of which there is no known source and which presumably derived from the Stoic’s collection." It is Socrates the prophet that interests Cicero. The revival of Platonism in the Imperial period saw a further growth of interest in the daimanion. Plutarch, Maximus of Tyre, and Apuleius all wrote down their views on it. We must therefore look briefly at this 4H. Gomperz, “Plato on Personality,” The Personalist 22 (1941) 30. UHL Gauss, Handkommentar 2a den Dialogen Plates 1" (Bern 1954) 209. MDiog, Laert. 3. 59. "De div. 1. 54.PLOTINUS AND THE D4IMONION a evidence in order to arrive finally at the picture of the deimonion which would have been current among the associates of Plotinus. We may then compare this picture with that drawn by Plato. In Plutarch’s treatise De Genio Socratis the sign is first introduced at 580C. The speaker, Theocritus, emphasizes its mantic nature and says that it was a guide in life which the gods gave to Socrates from his earliest years. This passage is cited by Friedlinder as derived from Theages 128D, and if this is so—which is probable—we should notice how the trends away from the Platonic account, already observable in the Theages, are accentuated by Plutarch. The Theages says that the sign accompanies Socrates (xapeméuevov); Plutarch says that it is his guide (mpowaéyyér). Is he thinking of the guardian daiman of the myth of Er? Both the Theages and Plutarch, however, emphasize the genuinely Platonic view that the sign shows that Socrates enjoyed heaven’s especial favour. In De Genio 581B we hear that the sign was both positive and negative —this version presumably drove out the simpler Platonic account—and there is talk about its being identified with a sneeze, an identification said to originate with Terpsion of Megara but unacceptable to some of the company. Yet in view of such talk it is refreshing to read in 588C that Socrates had been heard to say that people who claimed to have had visual communications with heaven were imposters, but that he himself was most interested in anyone who claimed to have heard voices. The speaker at this point of the dialogue is Simmias—representing Plutarch himself. Simmias adds that when he and his friends discussed the divine sign they supposed it was not a vision but the perception of a voice, a voice analogous to those we think we hear in sleep. The view that the sign was visible—which could clearly be the basis for supposing it might be made visible by conjuration—is here rejected. It is certain from the discussion of it, however, that such a view was current in Plutareh’s day. The less material view given by Simmias is that Socrates’ mind, being pure, unaffected by the passions, and having only the minimum of bodily contamination, was refined enough to enable him to hear the divine commands in his waking hours. Such commands in other men are drowned by the chorus of their passions.'# In his account of the Socratic divine sign, Plutarch does not assimilate this sign to the daimon that is vois in Plato's Timaeus. That he does not make such an assimilation was argued some years ago by W, Hamilton,}* MA similar account is given by Chalcidius (ch. 253). For the idea that in sleep men can learn the divine commands since they are then freed from the tyranny of the body and its passions, cf. Cic. de dis. 1.49, $3, 87. “W. Hamilton, “The Myth in Plutarch’s De Gertio (589F-S92E)," CQ 28 (1934) 180, nl.2 PHOENIX and I need not expatiate on it. Such an amalgamation of Plato's thought— probably presupposed in Porphyry’s account in the tenth chapter of his Life of Plotinus—would be strictly unplatonic, unless Plato’s thought is regarded as monolithic. Platonic too is Plutarch’s association of a theory of daimones with the care of the gods for men that is specifically dis- cussed in 593A-594A. Yet, as in the case of Xenophon, in what way would Plutarch distinguish the daimonion from the daimon of the myth of Er, save by the admission that the daimanion of Socrates is superior to that of ordinary mortals? There is little fresh information to be derived from the fourteenth and fifteenth discourses of Maximus of Tyre which purport to give an account of the daimonion. We hear in 14.8 and 15.1 of the care of gods for mankind. The only feature worthy of emphasis, perhaps, is the attempt that Maximus makes to show that it is not at all unreasonable to suppose that Socrates had a daimonion. No one, he suggests, is amazed at the powers of the priestess of Apollo at Delphi, or of the priests at Dodona and Ammon or elsewhere. All we can say of this comparison is that the uniqueness of the voice of Socrates, so emphasized in the Platonic account, is forgotten. Socrates is just one among many who have pro- phetic powers. Why indeed should he not have them, since they are bestowed on so many inferior mortals? The problem of the existence of daimones does not arise only in the case of Socrates; we must consider the nature and activities of daimones in general (14.6). Finally we may look at the treatise of Apuleius entitled De Deo Socratis. In chapter seventeen we find the words si Socrates... hune deum [the divine sign] suum cognovit et coluit. Colere presumably means at the least “to tend” and at the most “to worship.” Deum coluit presumably implies that Socrates worshipped his daimonion. We recall the suggestion of ‘Theages that he might consider placating the daimonion with prayers and sacrifices. Here the notion that the daimomion is a kind of “spirit within,” rather than a voice from God, is predominant. I suspect that the daimonion of Apuleius owes almost as much to the account of guardian spirits that occurs in the myth of Er (misunderstood) as it does to des- criptions of Socrates’ own life. Again, as in Maximus, we find that accounts of the daimonion have become merged with more general theories of daimones. The notion of the daimonion as a “spirit within,” like the “guardian spirit” that we found in the Laws, is further buttressed in chapter twenty, where, after explaining that the voice heard by Socrates and described by Plato in the Péaedrus was no mere human voice, Apuleius tells us that he thinks that Socrates not only heard his daimonion, but that he also saw it—an entirely new and significant variation. He bases this conclusion on the fact that Socrates not only claimed to have heardPLOTINUS AND THE DAIMONION 23 a voice but also spoke of a sign. This sign is supposed by Apuleius—who thought of it as a vision—to have been species ipsius daemonis. ‘After this long and saddening account of the vulgarization of the concept of the Socratic dafmenion, we must return to Porphyry and Plotinus. It should now be clear that the spirit-guide conjured up in the Isaeum bears a certain similarity to the daimomion as envisaged by Apuleius, but has little in common with the datmonion described by the Platonic dialogues. Plato’s account of the daimonion is very restrained; Apuleius’ is less so. In particular the divinity described by Apuleius can be seen with the eyes. It could probably therefore be revealed to others by magic—as could the “spirit-guide” of Plotinus in the story of the Tsacum. It is of course irrelevant here that the “spirit-guide” of Plotinus turns out to be a gad; Apuleius himself is writing De Deo Socratis. Presumably both Apuleius and those responsible for the seance in the Isaeum supposed thar the sage had a higher kind of spirit-guide than ordinary mortals. Such spitit-guides, possessed in their opinion by Socrates and Plotinus, were gods. All this is very far from Plotinus’ own account of his spirit-guide which, as we have seen, is the One itself. Plotinus tells us little about how such guidance is transmitted. Presumably he felt himself both exhorted and restrained by his guide—and in this respect was different from Socrates. Yet in the immateriality of his conception he is returning to the original master of the Platonists. In the superiority of the spirit-guide, as understood by Plotinus, to mere conjuration, we see the tremendous superiority of Plotinus to his contemporaries. Even as far back as the Theages we hear of attempts to influence the daimonion by other ways than by living the good life. The suggestion of Theages would have seemed to Plotinus as worthless as that of Amelius, who on one occasion wished to embroil his master in a meaningless religiosity. I have already remarked that Plotinus has nothing to say of the Socratic deimonion. Perhaps he was aware of the superstition in which it had become involved. His own account of spirit-guides derives principally from the myth of Er in the Repudlic. Yet he must have been aware that the daimonion of Socrates had by this time become inextricably mixed with more general theories of daimones, and, 1 believe, with the daimon of the myth of Er in particular. He probably also knew that, although Plutarch still distinguished between the daimomn that is vets (derived from the Timaeus) and the particular divine sign or daimonion of Socrates, other Platonists were more confused. And even Plutarch, in the myth of the De Geni, supposes that the vots is able to wander apart from the body, and that in this respect it is akin to the daimonion— a daimon entirely free of bodily ties.au PHOENIX Yet we may ask, since Plotinus does not mention the daimanion, how do we know that Porphyry is thinking of it at all in his remarks about spirit-guides. It should be clear by now that Porphyry’s understanding of a spirit-guide differs radically from Plotinus’. Porphyry’s is probably that of many contemporary Platonists. He is sure that certain kinds of spirit-guides can be conjuted up. The spirit-guide of the Isaeum is certainly not Plotinus’ pois; it seems more like Porphyry's idea of a “guardian-angel.” Such a guardian-angel—which can be made to appear in bodily form—resembles Apuleius’ version of the daimonion. This in its turn looks like a debased version of the datmon of the myth of Er. Throughout the later tradition, the opinion had been growing that the daimonion of Socrates was akin in some ways to the prophetic powers present in seers. Maximus in particular looks at it in this way. This would tally well with the fact that in the seance Plotinus is expected to have a daiman (as the seers would have had), but in fact has a god, as guide. In this he is like Socrates, whose daimonion too is often called eds. All in all we cannot but draw the conclusion that Porphyry’s view of spirit- guides, made manifest in his account of the seance, is deeply influenced by the new accounts of the daimonion, while Plotinus, if he thinks of the daimonion in 3.4, does so rather in the earlier and less materialistic manner of Plato. Porphyry knows that spirit-guides differ in rank. This in itself makes it unlikely that he is thinking in terms of the daimorn as vets. Plotinus, on the other hand, though he bases his theories of -guides on the Republic and Timacus, is far from these dialogues in his belief that the guide of the sage is the One, but perhaps less far from Plato's attitude towards the daimonion itself. At least Plato might have agreed that the daimonion represents the providence of the highest God and his care for man. Plotinus must at the least have been convinced that, if the datmonion was really as his contemporaries supposed, it was not impertant to his philosophy. A second, and more attractive possibility is that, since he valued the Socratic daimanion but put little value on such spirits as could be conjured up, he believed that the account of the daimonion current in his day must be rejected. How his own treatise on spirit-guides was supposed by Porphyry to have arisen from the seance I have already discussed. The unlikelihood of Porphyry’s account being accurate should now be recognized.