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    Blake and Clark 1994 The Power of Prestige

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    Lans Gaimer

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    In Factional Competition and Political Development in the New World, edited by E, Brumfiel and J. Fox, Press, Cambridge. (1994) 2 The power of prestige: competitive generosity and the emergence of rank societies in lowland Mesoamerica JOHN E. CLARK and MICHAEL BLAKE Introduction Explanations of the origins of institutionalized social inequality and political privilege must resolve the central paradox of political life ~ why people cooperate with their own subordination and exploitation in non- coercive circumstances (Godelier 1986:13). In the fol- lowing pages we address this paradox for an archaeo- logical case from Mesoamerica The first chiefdoms in lowland Mesoamerica, the focus ofthis discussion, appear to have developed some 3300 years ago among the Mokaya in the Mazatan region of Chiapas, Mexico, during the first part of the Early Formative, 1550-1150 BC (all dates are in radi carbon years). This period also witnessed the adoption ‘of maize agriculture in the coastal lowlands, the found- ing of sedentary villages, the adoption of ceramic tech nology. a rapid population increase, and the beginnings of patronized craft specialization To explain these developmenis, we frst offer a generat ‘model for the development of hereditary rank distine- tions as the outcome of competition among political actors vying for prestige and social esteem, We then apply this mode! to the issues of technological and demographic change in the development of social inequality in the Mazatan region Resources, prestige and privilege It's difficult to imagine why people would voluntarily submit to non-egalitarian political systems. Despite this Perception, the institutionalization of political privilege ‘may have been quite simple; it may at fist have been in pp.17-30. Cambridge University people's best interest. Nowadays, in addressing this issue, we are hindered by hindsight and evolutionist and functionalist thinking that regards change as reaction to existing social problems. Binford (1983:221), for ‘example, states: “When I am faced with a question such as why complex systems come into being, my frst reac- tion is to ask what problem people were attempting to solve by a new means.” As will become clear, we disagree with this perspective. The development of social inequality was neither a problem nora solution. Rather, it was a long-term, unexpected consequence of many individuals promoting their own aggrandizement. Briefly, we argue that the transition from egalitarian to rank societies was a process that occurred on a regional scale under special historical and. techno. environmental circumstances. The engine for change was selfinterested competition among political actors vying for prestige or social esteem. We refer to such Political entrepreneurs as “aggrandizers,” paralleling Hayden and Garget’s (1990) term “accumulators.” Over time, some aggrandizers became chiefs with institutionalized authority. Parlaying temporary prestige into legitimate authority was the key process. Primary assumptions Our view of the origins of social inequality rests on several propositions concerning human action, the for- ‘mation of factions, and the creation and deployment of physical and social resources. Our most crtieal assump: tions concern culture, society, and individual behavior. Social systems are regularized practices, They lack reason, purpose, or needs and are incapable of adapt ation (Giddens 1979-7). Only the actors within a system shate these attributes and are capable of adaptive response. Purposive, motivated action becomes the Point of articulation between structure and the human agent (Vincent 1978; Giddens 1979; Callinicos 1988), Importanily, such action often sparks unintended con- sequences forthe system. Its clear that actors are constrained by past practice (history of system and structure) and opportunities for Future practice (e., available technology, physical and social environment, personal social networks, ete,), Each actor knows a great deal about his/her social system and its constraints and limits under varying circumstances ‘even to the extent that (s)he can manipulate aspects of the system for personal advantage. We presume a primary motivation of self-interested action based upon culturally bound rational choice (ie,, “minimal ratio ality,” see Cherniak 1986). Obviously, individual ” 18 John E. Clark and Michael Blake ‘motivations, desires, and reasons for action cannot be the same for everyone (Calliicos 1988). Where numerous people pursue sei-interests, their interaction is char- acterized by frequent conflicts of interests, internal social tensions, and social constraints on behavior. ‘Specifically, in emergent chiefdoms or transegalitarian societies, we postulate the necessary presence of ambi tious males aggrandizers) competing for prestige within regional setting Aggrandizers do not strive to become chiefs; the end result of political competition cannot be foreseen by participants in the system. Agarandizers simply strive to become more influential. It is the suc cessful deployment of resources and labor that ulti ‘mately ensures the social and political longevity of an aggrandizer, and only certain environments can sustain such behavior on a regional scale and a chronic basis, (Hayden and Gargett 1990) Competition for “prestige” consists of rivalry for con. tinual public recognition by supporters (with access to their resources). Prestige is maintained by establishing a coalition of loyal supporters, or a faction (Salisbury and. Silverman 1977; Bailey 1977). In this view, vying for prestige is the equivalent of competing for people or their labor power and support (Binford 1983:219; see also Sahlins 1968:89-90; Gulliver 1977:44; Silverman, 1977:72; Price 1984). It also involves competition over the “management of meaning” and “interpretation of behavior and relationships” (Cohen and Comaroft 1976:102); this probably relates to the emphasis on ‘oratory among tribal leaders (Clastees 1977) Although our argument requites the presence of a particular personality type, we consider psychology a constant. Ambitious individuals are probably present in, most societies. The presence of such individuals is a necessary but insufficient condition for the transition to non-egalitarian systems, Structure and social system ‘We assume that “all social systems, whatever their struc- ture, contain the seeds of inequality” (Josephides 1985:1;, see also Bételle 1977). We do not view social evolution as unfolding from inner forces, but we do maintain that all egalitarian systems mask fundamental structural ‘contradictions which necessitate leveling mechanisms to assert egalitarianism (Woodburn 1982; Matson 1985, Lee 1990), Cohen (197478) argues that all social systems involve hierarchy, which suggests the presence of leadership with attendant prestige, no matter how ephemeral, In egalita- fan groups, hierarchy is likely 10 be based on age, gender, and aptitude. Rivalries for temporary hier- archical positions develop among many of those with requisite ability to il them. In addition to social diffe ‘entiation, all societies require a system of social evalu- ation (Bételle 1977.9). These two necessary conditions for any society lay the basis of social inequalities ‘In our model we assume egalitarian groups or commu nities where great latitude exists in the degree to which individuals may maneuver for prestige, that is, societies, in which prestige is possible, personal ambition is allowed, and agents have control over the fruits of some of theirlabor. The deployment of resources (or property) as actors sec fit involves usufruct rights within a defined territory (Sack 1986, Hayden 1990) Two more specific aspects of structure and social system inform our model. The frst concerns biological reproduction. We concur with Friedman and Rowlands (1978:204) that “reproduction is an areal phenomenon in which a number of separate social units are linked ina large system” (see Wobst 1974), Furthermore, we assume patrilocality, with patrilineal descent favored but not strictly necessary (ef. Allen 1984; Coontz and Hen- derson 1986), Environment and technology Considerations of the environment should acknowledge actors with conventional perceptions and constructions of their “world” in symbolic interaction with other people and objects (Blumer 1969:11). In short, (including resources, physical features, and concepts of space and distance) is subject to interpretive shifts and ‘even manipulation by interested individuals within a siven social system (Sack 1986; Helms 1988) Using these resources, aggrandizers compete for “prestige”; competition over physical resources is not an ‘end in itself. Nature is handed a passive role in this process. Resources and technology circumscribe indi- vidual choice but otherwise neither impede nor promote social competition or development. Only certain kinds of environments and resources will sustain escalating exploitation by aggrandizess. Resources must be accessible, productive, and relatively immune to normal environmental perturbations (Coup: land 1985:219; Matson 1985) ~ characteristics of selected species, such as fish, rodents, and cereals (Hayden 1986, 1990). Resource availability and produc- tivity determine potential levels of accumulation for social display and competition. In addition, the period and extent of resource shortfalls is critical to the evelopment of political inequality on a permanent basis. The power of prestige 19. ‘The environment must be productive enough to support a rapidly growing labar force, the followers attached to an aggrandizer. In other words, aggrandizers, fair best in “intensfiable habitats” (Price 1984-225). Of ‘course, the elasticity of a habitat to labor influx varies according to basic technology, social relations of pro- duction, and subsistence techniques ‘Any transition to a non-egalitarian system requires te emergence of new practices as a necessary prelude to structural change. And these must be maintained and. financed long enough to make the practices habitual (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Bourdiew 1977). There fore, factional leaders must have access to important resources continuously over a petiod of years or even decades (Binford 1983:219; Farle 1987:294), One or two bad seasons can undo years of public posturing, faction building, and prestations, with loss-of-face and depletion of stored resources and social credits. While resource productivity and reliability act as relaxed restraints on individual action, they alone cannot explain the specific location, timing, or extent of social development. An equally important consideration is the ‘geographic configuration of resources and physical features which channel communication and social inter- action, Demography, socal interaction, and rank Demographic increase does not and cannot force people to invent and adopt non-egalitarian social formations (Netting 1990), Although there is a strong correlation, between population size and level of sociopolitical com- plexity (Cohen 1985; Keeley 1988), we view population as a necessary precondition or threshold phenomenon, Population must reach a certain size and density before the complex social interactions that lead to the emer- ence of rank can occur. Both intra- and inter-community interactions are essential in faction building (see Spencer, Chapter 3). Interaction within (1) the community, (2) the region, and {G) various regions (the area) includes both positive and igative social discourse, from trade and marriage to warfare (Price 1977, 1984). Cooperation and. com- Petition are complementary principles. To compete clfectvely, aggrandizers require the cooperation and support of indebted clients, probably including many kin, and other patrons or trade partners. Competition is ‘undertaken to maintain or enlarge this cooperative unit, or interest group. Effective competition atthe communi level requires aggrandizers to trai outside their home communities and establish significant ties to individuals elsewhere, preferably other aggrandizers who also seek outside con tacts. The physical and social resources and knowledge thus gained allow an agerandizer to compete more effectively within his own community. The aggrandizer capitalizes upon innovation and risk taking (Schmookler 1984:28). Enhancing prestige through innovation depends on an aggrandizer’s ability to convince potential beneficiries/clients of the value of his innovations, ‘The conversion of external resources into social lever age locally requires (near) exclusive access to outside goods, material, or information (Gosden 1989), This also allows the aggrandizer to operate partially outside the sanctioning norms of his local group, where local rhorms are more ambiguous and easier to manipulate Our mode! presumes a plurality of structurally similar, autonomous social groups or communities within @ region and a complex web of rivalry and cooperation among aggrandizers and their supporters, in what has been called “peer polity interaction” (Renfrew and Cherry 1986). Even the first steps of an aggrandizer’s career involve interaction both within and beyond his home commu: nity. Building renown commences in the nuclear unit of production. An aggrandizer first accumulates deploy: able resources by the sweat of his brow, and through the efforts of his wife (wives) and children. The more wives and children the better (Coontz and Henderson 1986). Since intensified resource procurement is a consequence of increased labor input, it follows that larger families ‘may produce larger surpluses to invest in prestige com petition. Multiple wives also provide the aggrandizer with a larger group of affies for exchange partnerships (Strathern 1966:360). In addition, multiple wives engen- det more offspring who later become a source of additional alliances (Redmond, Chapter 4) ‘The potential for social development of a community js a function of its access (0 social resources, notably people in neighboring communities and kinship struc- tures. Such access depends upon relative topographic position within the region (Johnson 1977:492). Some basic features of the landscape (e.g., mountains, ‘canyons, and rough ocean) will inhibit travel and com- munication to some areas; other features (e.g., mountain passes, fords, and navigable rivers) funnel social contact into specific areas. Inherent potential for travel, coupled with distribution of critical resources, delimits sette- ‘ment locations, sizes, population densities, permanence, and future growth. Some communities will be central and others peripheral to critical natural and social 20 John E. Clark and Michael Blake Fig. 2.1 Measures of interaction in unrestricted (A) and linear (B) networks. resources. So too, some people are more centrally placed than others visi-vis various social and physical resources and can avail themselves of this advantage. ‘Thus, some aggrandizers will be better placed than others to mobilize resources. Those with the most numerous or strongest ties to different outside resources should be best off ‘The settlement pattern may be linear or non-linear (or open). In linear setlement systems, each agerandizer has unimpeded access to only one or two significant neigh: boring groups, as shown in Fig. 2.1. In open settlement systems, however, potential for interaction varies sig- nificantly from center to periphery; a community's terri tory can border the territories of two to six neighboring groups. Note the difference in mean interaction between linear and open systems shown in Fig. 2.1. Centrally placed aggrandizers within open settlement systems enjoy an advantage with more possibilities for inter- group alliances and for manipulating the ambiguities of several different systems for their own benefit We expect social change at focal points of regional social interaction, or inthe central sectors of open setl- ment systems. Rank societies emerge within a network of interacting groups. One society does not hoist itself from fone social level to another; the process involves the simultaneous emergence of a network of chiefdoms from aa network of interacting chiefs. In this sense, all pristine

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