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Author(s): Jonathan Hecht

Article Title: Freedom of the Will in Plato and Augustine
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 RBJH888643 Techset Composition India (P) Ltd., Bangalore and Chennai, India 2/6/2014

British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2014

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2014.888643

A RTICLE

5 FREEDOM OF THE WILL IN PLATO AND AUGUSTINE

Jonathan Hecht

There has been a recent surge of interest in ancient accounts of free will.
10 It is surprising, then, that there have been virtually no attempts to
discuss whether Plato had such an account. Those who have made an
attempt quickly deny that such an account is present in the dialogues.
I shall argue that if we draw a distinction between two notions of free
will, it is plausible that some account of free will is, in fact, present
in the dialogues, the Republic in particular. This is the first in depth
15 search into the question and I demonstrate that the defender of a
Platonic free will thesis has more resources than she first appears to.
It also has the benefiting of giving us an obvious source material for
Augustine’s discussion.
NS QA: Coll:

KEYWORDS: free will; Plato; Augustine; freedom of the will;

20 Republic

There has been a recent surge of interest in ancient accounts of free will.1 It is
25 surprising, then, that there have been virtually no attempts to discuss whether
Plato had such an account.2 Those who have made an attempt quickly deny
CE:

I am indebted to Paul Vincent Spade, Pieter Sjoerd Hasper, Tanya Kostochka, Paul Adamski,
Zac Ferrell, Michel-Antoine Xhignesse, my anonymous referees, and especially Alicia Finch
for a number of helpful comments and suggestions. I am also grateful to audiences and com-
30 mentators at the Illinois Philosophical Association, the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy
at the Central APA, and the San Diego State Philosophy Club for their valuable insights.
1
Susanne Bobzien has been one of the leading recent discussants (see Bobzien, ‘The Inadver-
tent Conception’; Bobzien, ‘Did Epicurus Discover’; Bobzien, ‘Choice and Moral Responsi-
bility’ and Bobzien, ‘Free Choice’) while the most significant survey, Dihle, The Theory of
Will in Classical Antiquity, received a major update in the form of the posthumously published
35 Frede, A Free Will; much of the discussion surrounds the significance of things being ‘up to
us’ (ἐw᾿ ἡμι̃ν), as Epictetus said, though Frede provides an ambitious analysis that goes
beyond this. While his work is fascinating, it would lead me too far astray to enumerate
and discuss the points at which we agree and disagree. Also notable is Irwin, Classical Phil-
osophy, 225–49.
2
Due to highly contentious issues at the heart of Plato scholarship, I am hesitant to attribute
40 views to Plato. For simplicity’s sake, I write this way, but an exacting and skeptical reader
should replace any mention of ‘Plato’s view’ with ‘the dialogic character’s view’, and
similar phrases with their counterparts.

© 2014 BSHP
 2 JONATHAN HECHT

that such an account is present in the dialogues.3 I shall argue that if we draw
a distinction between two notions of free will, it is plausible that some
account of free will is, in fact, present in the dialogues, the Republic in par-
ticular. This is the first in depth search into the question and I demonstrate
45 that the defender of a Platonic free will thesis has more resources than she
first appears to. It also has the benefit of giving us an obvious source for
Augustine’s discussion – a connection that I try to make some remarks
about in this paper.
In Augustine’s De Libero Arbitrio, there are two accounts of free will; one
states that S is free at t with respect to p iff it is up to S at t whether p or not-p,
50 and the other is called ‘perfect freedom of the will’ or ‘genuine freedom’. A
person has genuine freedom just in case her soul is rightly ordered – that is,
when reason dominates (domino) – and it is oriented towards God.4 As will
be explained in Section 4, genuine freedom might be understood as a kind of
self-mastery or freedom from internal constraints. In the Republic, of course,
55 we have an account of wisdom under which it is defined as reason’s ruling,
and when an effective reason rules properly, one is oriented towards the form
of the good. Wisdom is in turn essential to justice, or harmony of the soul
(ψυχή), according to which the rational part (λογιστικόν, νου̃ ς) rules over
the spirited (θυμοɛιδής) and appetitive (ἐπιθυμητικόν) parts, which are per-
forming their proper functions.
60
By comparing Augustine’s genuine freedom and Plato’s discussion of a
properly ordered and oriented soul, I argue, contra common opinion, that
an account of free will is present in the Republic.5 Where I make use of
other dialogues, these excerpts are supplementary rather than
complementary.
65
3
While Ferguson, Plato, 120 and Seung, Plato Rediscovered, 234 inexplicably state without
providing explanation that Plato reconciles free will and determinism, Zeller, Plato and the
Older Academy, 419–21 briefly argues along the same lines with only a bit more evidence.
Shorey, The Unity of Plato’s Thought, 10 by contrast affirms that ‘It is, then, unprofitable
to inquire whether Plato taught free-will or determinism.’
70 4
Although genuine free will sometimes gets short shrift relative to freedom of choice, it has
long been recognized as a significant part of Augustine’s work on free will (e.g. Scott, The
Works of the Late Rev. Thomas Scott, 86). This account, or one like it, has been championed
recently by Watson (‘Free Agency’) – and arguably Wolf (Freedom Within Reason) – with
Watson acknowledging his debt to Plato despite the lack of scholarship on the topic
(Watson, ‘Free Agency’: passim). Wright Neely also defends a similar account and briefly dis-
75
cusses its origins in Plato (Neely, ‘Freedom and Desire’, 41–3); an analysis with which I
largely agree.
5
Stalley, ‘Plato’s Doctrine of Freedom’ seems to be getting at much the same point as I do
while providing an analysis of freedom in the Republic, but he does not (a) account for the
will or (b) compare Plato to Augustine and in doing so both demonstrate Plato’s impact on
the development of accounts of freedom of will and show that the discussion in the dialogue
should actually be considered one about free will rather than something we are merely calling
80 free will. While I largely agree with Stalley’s analysis – indeed, we find many of the same pas-
sages to be significant – I hope that in this essay makes clear the historical significance of
Plato’s discussion.
 FREEDOM OF THE WILL IN PLATO AND AUGUSTINE 3

I begin by explicating a straightforward reading of Augustine’s genuine

freedom of the will in De Libero Arbitrio. Subsequently, I analyse the
Republic to see whether Augustine’s genuine freedom and Plato’s account
of a properly and oriented soul are in agreement in the relevant ways.6 In
85 doing so, I hope to show that even if we should not attribute an account of
free will to Plato, he deserves a place in the canon of the free will debate.
Plato provides an account that comes extremely close to Augustine’s
genuine freedom, which overturns what seems to be a near-standard assump-
tion that there is nothing resembling an account of free will in the Platonic
corpus.7 Further, by tentatively tracing the development from Plato to Ploti-
90 nus to Augustine, we can make a reasonable conclusion that Plato is the ulti-
mate source for Augustine’s genuine freedom, though the transfer process
from Plato to Augustine is unclear because of insufficient evidence.

95 AUGUSTINE

Augustine’s conception of the soul is very Platonic; indeed, he says expli-

citly in Confessiones that it was through reading the works of unspecified
Platonists that he came to abandon his earlier materialism.8 It is unclear
100 whether Augustine had access to Plato’s dialogues themselves, though it is
generally thought that Augustine did not read Plato directly. If he did read
Plato, however, he would have done so through Cicero’s translations due
to his weak Greek.9
Despite this Platonic influence, it is best to begin the discussion of genuine
freedom not with what the soul is, but with Augustine’s account of that to
105
6
While both Plato and Augustine provide accounts of the soul in which each soul contains
three parts, these parts are not the same for Plato and Augustine. Both provide an intellect
and appetites, which perform most of the same functions. Despite the tripartite souls
working on the whole similarly, the analogy starts to diverge with Plato’s spirit and Augus-
tine’s will. Plato’s spirit does not have a clear and unique analogue in Augustine, nor does
110 Augustine’s will in Plato. Augustine’s will is multi-faceted (and some would argue inconsist-
ent) across works. It incorporates diverse traits, while Plato was concerned with a single main
role for each part of his soul, which means that the analogy must break down when we discuss
the specific parts of each soul.
7
This is not to mention the point that akrasia might be considered a kind of determinism.
8
Conf. 7.20.26 where he notes that the Platonists compelled him to search for ‘incorporeal
115
truth’ (incorpoream veritatem). For a discussion of who wrote these Platonist texts, see Bea-
trice, ‘Quosdam Platonicorum Libros’; Courcelle, Recherches sur les Confessions de saint
Augustin, more than any work before, demonstrated the Platonic influence on Augustine.
9
Augustine says that he read the previously mentioned Greek Platonists through Latin trans-
lation (Conf. 7.9.13). Augustine may also have known quotations from the Phaedo and the
Phaedrus through Porphyry (Courcelle, Les Lettres grecques en Occident de Macrobe à Cas-
siodore, 226–9 via O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind, 10; Courcelle, Les Lettres grec-
120 ques en Occident de Macrobe à Cassiodore, 183–94 and Marrou, Saint Augustin et la fin de la
culture antique, 27–56 remain some of the better discussions of Augustine’s knowledge of
Greek).
 4 JONATHAN HECHT

which the genuinely free soul is directed. Augustine states that ‘This is our
liberty, when we are subject to the truth (subdimur veritati): and the truth is
our God himself, who frees us from death, that is, from the condition of sin
(conditione peccati)’ (Lib. 2.13.37).10 Under Augustine’s account, God is all
125 good (Lib. 1.1) and is the source of all good things, which is everything that
exists (Conf. 7.12, 12.11; Bon., passim). God is more than just the source of
good, however. To quote Scott MacDonald,

Augustine takes the notions of being supreme (summe, optime), being that
than which nothing is higher or better (aliquid quo nihil melius sit), and
130 being the highest good (summum bonum) to be equivalent. Hence, he takes
it to be a conceptual truth not only that God is supreme but that God is the
highest good. (MacDonald, ‘The Divine Nature’, 79)

God grants to all souls (anima) memory, sense and appetite, but rational
souls (animus) also have intelligence and will (voluntas).11
135
Liberum arbitrium, or freedom of choice, as opposed to genuine freedom
of will, liberum arbitrium voluntatis, is something that all rational souls
have. It is simply the ability to choose something by means of one’s
will.12 The person with free choice may use her will to choose poorly,
thus her inordinate passions (or blameworthy cupidity [culpabilis cupiditas])
140 (Lib. 1.4–11). The inordinate passions are what drive every evil deed (Lib.
1.4.10) and are defined as ‘the love of those things, which one is able to
lose unwillingly’.13 Alternatively, a person may use her will to choose
well – that is, to choose God. Only in the latter case are we genuinely
free. The genuinely free person must be able to choose to live a life of sin,
145 turning away from God. It is only in freely choosing to love (amor)14
God, rather than turning away from Him, that one is genuinely free. This
might be seen as the difference between mere liberum arbitrium, where
persons are free because of the voluntas, and liberum arbitrium voluntatis,
where the voluntas itself is free because of Lib. 1.7.16. God’s grace,
which he might grant to those who love Him (Cor. 8.17). While amor is a
150

10
Translations are my own unless otherwise stated.
11
Civ. 5.11: ‘qui et animae inrationali dedit memoriam sensum adpetitum, rationali autem
insuper mentem intellegentiam voluntatem’.
12
Augustine does not think that natural necessity and freedom of choice conflict. Nat. 46.54.
13
155
Lib. 1.4.10: ‘Quam esse iam apparet earum rerum amorem, quas potest quisque invitus
amittere’.
14
There are different types of voluntas, according to Augustine. These can be divided into
‘will as the free movement of a rational soul (motus animi), will as consent (consensus),
and will as love (amor)’ (Djuth, ‘Will’, 883). Focusing on amor,
Augustine uses the word and concept ‘voluntas’ not only to point to beliefs and wants, but
to do some of the work of the word and concept ‘eros’ – the love of the good and the Beautiful,
160 and the perversions of that love – in the Platonic tradition. Hence we should not be surprised
that voluntas is often interchangeable with amor and in its perfect form identified with it: that
is, as the Holy Spirit. ([Trin]. 15.17.31; 15.20.38; 15.21.41) (Rist, ‘Faith and Reason’, 36)
 FREEDOM OF THE WILL IN PLATO AND AUGUSTINE 5

form of voluntas, and amor of God is necessary for genuine freedom, this
love of God can only be achieved through reason (ratio) and its rule
(Conf. 10.6.8–10).
Augustine divides the human soul into two polarities, rational and
165 irrational, each of which has associated parts.15 According to eternal law,
in the properly ordered soul (ordinatissimus) (Lib. 1.7.16), reason rules, con-
trolling the irrational impulses.16 The possession of reason is what separates
humans from animals and reason’s rule makes humans superior (Lib.
1.9.19).
In the properly ordered soul, one has a good will. A good will ‘is a will by
170 which we seek to live rightly and honorably (recte honesteque) and to reach
the highest wisdom (summam sapientiam)’ (Lib. 1.12.25). Human wisdom is
in turn defined as reason’s ruling, thereby keeping inordinate passions in
check (Lib. 1.10.20) – reason can do so because nothing but God is superior
to the rational and wise mind (rationali et sapienti mente) (Lib. 1.10.21).
175 Further, ‘she who loves her own good will resists and opposes in every
manner inordinate passions’17 which is to say, she is wise and her reason
rules. As a benefit, those who have good wills and love their good wills
are happy (Lib. 1.14.30). From this we can conclude that while the will is
not compelled by nature to obey reason, the good will in the properly
ordered soul does so and the person is better off for it. Wisdom is also
180
later discussed as ‘nothing other than the truth in which the highest good
[God] is seen (cernitur) and possessed (tenetur)’ (Lib. 2.9.26). Further,
‘no one is happy (beatus) except with the highest good, which is seen and
possessed in the truth, which we call wisdom’.18 From the distinct definitions
of wisdom here, we should not infer inconsistency on the part of Augustine,
185 but rather that it is when reason rules, when the soul is properly ordered, that
we can attain the highest good – God. We also arrive at the Platonic con-
clusion that we cannot be happy without the rational part of the soul
ruling the irrational.

190 15
I borrow ‘polarity’ from O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind, 13 as it seems to capture
the division more adequately than ‘part’.
16
Lib. 1.8.18: ‘Ratio ista ergo, vel mens, vel spiritus cum irrationales animi motus regit, id
scilicet dominatur in homine, cui dominatio lege debetur ea quam aeternam esse comperi-
mus’. Augustine here uses ratio, mens and spiritus interchangeably but indicates shortly there-
after that he means for ratio to do the work if they are not identical (Lib. 1.9.19). He also seems
195
to use intellegentia in the same way.
Augustine is even more explicit about the rule of reason when he writes ‘Illud est quod
volo dicere: hoc quidquid est, quo pecoribus homo praeponitur, sive mens, sive spiritus,
sive utrumque rectius appellatur (nam utrumque in divinis Libris invenimus), si dominetur
atque imperet caeteris quibuscumque homo constat, tunc esse hominem ordinatissimum’.
(Lib. 1.8.18)
17
Lib. 1.13.27: ‘[ … ]istum bonae voluntatis suae amatorem resistere omni modo, atque
200 adversari libidinibus[ … ]’.
18
Lib. 2.9.26: ‘Nemo enim beatus est, nisi summo bono, quod in ea veritate, quam sapientiam
vocamus, cernitur et tenetur’.
 6 JONATHAN HECHT

In summary, Augustine, at least in the treatises cited, believes that a person

has genuine freedom of will if and only if her soul is properly ordered (that
is, reason rules) and the will, guided by reason, makes us choose to love God
(the truth and the source of all good).19
205

PLATO

In the Republic, the embodied human soul is divided into three parts 20: the
210
rational part, which is the source of reason; the spirited part, which loves
honor and courage and which is the source of anger and shame; and the appe-
titive part, which desires base things such as food and drink. In a just man,
the soul is well-ordered, which is to say the rational part rules over the appe-
titive part with the help of the spirited part. For justice (δικαιοσύνη) is the art
that concerns one’s self, and the healthy soul – in which one has self-mastery
215 – is one in which its three parts are harmonized (συναρμόσαντα τρία ὄντα)
(Rep. 443c–d). In turn, the just action is that which preserves or achieves
harmony and the unjust action is that which destroys it, while wisdom is
the knowledge (ἐπιστήμην) that oversees just actions (Rep. 443e).
Only reason truly desires the good (ἀγαθόν), so it is only when the soul is
220 well-ordered and reason rules that the soul can be directed towards the
good.21 A soul is wise when reason rules (Rep. 428d), and a soul is just
when both reason rules and the appetites and spirit function properly,
doing that which is appropriate for them, given their natures (Rep. 432b–
434c, 441d–e). Further, in the best soul, in which reason rules and is well-
developed – which is to say, the soul of a philosopher – the soul is directed
225
19
It is worth noting that it is not clear that Augustine entirely maintained this account of free
will in his later works (though he probably did). While Augustine expresses reticence about
views presented in De Libero Arbitrio,
As far as his account of free will in De Libero Arbitrio is concerned, what Augustine
himself says in the Retractationes is just that his views of grace were undeveloped, not that
230 his views of free will were wrong. On the contrary, in the Retractationes he asserts vigorously
that the Pelagians are mistaken to think he ever held a view of free will like theirs, that is, a
view of free will which makes the freedom of the will independent of divine grace. (Stump
2001, 130; Stump cites Ret. 1.9) AQ1
Even if he did not keep his account of free will in his later writings, so that what I pre- ¶
sented above does not represent Augustine’s mature view, my overall argument should not
235
be affected. All that matters is that we accept this as some view of free will before moving
on to see if a comparable discussion is present in Plato’s dialogues.
Many scholars argue that De Libero Arbitrio is best understood as being divided into two
contrasting parts, book 1 on one side, and books 2 and 3 on the other. Others, however, resist
such a division (see Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology, ch. 6).
20
Rep. 435b–c: ‘καὶ τὸν ἕνα ἄρα, ὦ wίλɛ, οὕτως ἀξιώσομɛν, τὰ αὐτὰ ταυ̃ τα ɛἴδη ἐν τῃ̃ αὑτου̃
ψυχῃ̃ ἔχοντα, διὰ τὰ αὐτὰ πάθη ἐκɛίνοις τω̃ ν αὐτω̃ ν ὀνομάτων ὀρθω̃ ς ἀξιου̃ σθαι τῃ̃ πόλɛι’
240 (referring to the city’s three parts).
21
The question of what is ἀγαθόν is too complex to explore here; see Cairns et al., Pursuing
the Good for a recent collection of essays on the topic.
 FREEDOM OF THE WILL IN PLATO AND AUGUSTINE 7

towards the good. The very explanation for why reason is the natural ruler is
just that it knows what is best for the soul and its parts.22 This is an essential
fact about reason – it is just that thing the proper object of which is the form
of the good, and which has the tool to bring about the right relation to it.
245 Further, I take it that it is an essential feature of wisdom that it orients the
soul towards the form of the good, regardless of whether the other parts of
the soul play their roles and allow the pursuit to take place. To be clear,
all souls, whether ruled by reason or not, desire the good and good
things.23 Not only this, but they desire that which is actually good and not
simply that which appears to be good (Rep. 505d).
250 It is only reason, however, that can have knowledge of the good, and so it
is only the soul that is ruled by reason that can actually desire and pursue the
good (Rep. 506a–b). It is only through reason that one can come to have
knowledge of the form of the good (του̃ ἀγαθου̃ ἰδέαν); the form of the
good is the cause of knowledge and truth (αἰτίαν δ᾽ ἐπιστήμης οὖσαν καὶ
255 ἀληθɛίας). Knowledge and truth are both beautiful (καλόν), while the
form of the good is itself more beautiful (κάλλιον). The good is, then, the
most prized thing of all (Rep. 508d–9a). As with Augustine’s God, the
form of the good is the cause of all good things. Knowledge of the form
of the good is the most important knowledge that we can have; without
knowledge of the form of the good, no other knowledge can be beneficial
260
to us (Rep. 505a–b).
Reason does not always rule, however, as there are unjust people, and
when it does rule, it does not do so on its own. The appetite is the lowest
part of the soul and needs to be restrained by reason. Reason needs the
help of spirit to do so, and spirit is in turn the natural ally of reason (ἐπί-
265 κουρον ὂν τῷ λογιστικῷ wύσɛι) (Rep. 441a) unless corrupted by evil (ἐὰν
μὴ ὑπὸ κακῆς τροwῆς διαwθαρῃ̃ ).24 While not stated, it follows that when
spirit acts in accordance with reason, it also attempts to act in accordance
with justice (reason is aimed towards justice).25 We agree that it is only
right to be angry when one is justly angry (Rep. 440c–e). One’s anger,
270
which comes from the spirit (Rep. 439e), is only right when one is angry
in response to some injustice. On the other hand, if one is harmed justly,
22
Rep. 441c: ‘οὐκου̃ ν ἐκɛι̃νό γɛ ἤδη ἀναγκαι̃ον, ὡς πόλις ἦν σοwὴ καὶ ᾧ, οὕτω καὶ τὸν
ἰδιώτην καὶ τούτῳ σοwὸν ɛἶναι’.
23
Rep. 505d–e. Similar statements are made at Sym. 205d–6a, Men. 77a–78c, Pro. 358b–d. For
275
a discussion of desire for the good, see Barney, ‘Plato on the Desire for the Good’. It used to be
the orthodox reading that Plato in the Republic abandoned the view that all desire is for the
good, even if the good is false (e.g. Irwin, Plato’s Ethics and Reeve, Philosopher-Kings,
135–6), but this does not seem right and has been subject to backlash (e.g. Lesses, ‘Weakness,
Reason, and the Divided Soul in Plato’s Republic’; Carone, ‘Akrasia in the Republic’; Bobo-
nich 2002 and Moss, ‘Pleasure and Illusion in Plato’).
24
Rep. 441a; at 440b and 441e, the θυμός is referred to as reason’s ‘ally’ (σύμμαχον and
280 συμμάχῳ, respectively).
25
While the discussion in the dialogue is about how easily spirit pairs with reason versus appe-
tite, if the soul is just, spirit should always work alongside reason.
 8 JONATHAN HECHT

since reason dictates that the harm is in accordance with justice and the spirit
dutifully obeys, one should not be angry. This restraint does not occur in all
people, but the nobler (γɛνναιότɛρος) one is, the less capable one is of unjust
anger (Rep. 440c).
285 The nature of the relationship between spirit and reason – particularly how
obsequious the spirit really is – is a matter of controversy. Thomas Robinson,
for example, suggests that we must either accept a minor contradiction in the
dialogue or that the spirit and appetite might occasionally join together
against reason. Even so, he sides with Francis Cornford in thinking that
Plato was simply careless.26 The justification for thinking such a mutiny is
290 possible is that the spirit may turn against reason when corrupted (Rep.
441a) and there is evidence that the appetite can corrupt it.27
The appetites, in contrast to spirit, regularly act contrary to reason and
constrain persons (Rep. 440a–b). Unlike the spirit, the appetites are comple-
tely irrational (ἀλόγιστον).28 While reason rationally desires the good, the
295 appetites desire pleasure because it appears to be good and the appetite
cannot itself rationally determine that a pleasure is not good. As Jessica
Moss argues,

appetite does desire things qua good: it desires pleasures just because it takes
them to be good. Because appetite is separate from the rational part of the soul
300 both in its desires and its beliefs, however, a person may continue appetitively
desiring a particular pleasure qua good even while rationally believing that
pleasure bad. (Moss, ‘Pleasure and Illusion in Plato’, 528)

Despite the conflict among parts, the soul can come to be properly ordered
305 with reason ruling. When a well-trained reason rules and the soul is harmo-
nious, one can be genuinely oriented to the good. And as Socrates argues, it
is the person whose reason rules who is happy. Incidentally, the tyrant whose
reason is impotent is described as being ‘enslaved’ and not ‘free’.29

310
FREEDOM, SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

Given Augustine and Plato’s discourses, it is natural for the modern reader to
wonder in what respects Augustine’s notion of genuine freedom resembles
our ordinary notion of freedom. As noted earlier, we often think of
315
26
Robinson, Plato’s Psychology, 45, and he refers to Cornford, ‘Psychology and Social Struc-
tures’, 264.
27
Robinson has in mind Rep. 553c and 572a. At 440b, we also see Socrates stating that spirit
does not act against reason.
28
Rep. 439d. Some have thought that Plato was mistaken and the appetites have rational
320 aspects, but for a detailed defense of Plato, see part one of Lorenz, The Brute Within.
29
Rep. 577d–e. ‘τί οὖν; δούλην ἢ ἐλɛυθέραν τὴν τοιαύτην wήσɛις ɛἶναι ψυχήν; δούλην
δήπου ἔγωγɛ’.
 FREEDOM OF THE WILL IN PLATO AND AUGUSTINE 9

freedom as freedom to choose, or the ability to do otherwise, and genuine

freedom is not that. Freedom as the ability to do otherwise is a very particular
kind of freedom, however. More generally, freedom might be roughly con-
strued as freedom from constraint.
325 This constraint need not be external, as in the case of determinism or, more
directly, chains and manacles. If, for example, I identify one part of myself as
most truly me, I might then be constrained internally by my other parts.
When my true self is not constrained, I am free in a way that is distinct
from something simply being up to me. While a state of affairs’ being up
to an agent is a matter of what relation is borne by the agent to the state of
330 affairs, genuine freedom just is a particular state obtaining. To highlight
the importance of this freedom: I might technically have the ability to do
otherwise, but if I am constantly overwhelmed by my heroin addiction
such that I always go for the heroin despite wanting desperately to quit, it
seems that I am not free. Ignoring the fact that it seems natural to speak
335 about freedom this way, Socrates himself appears to express similar senti-
ments in book IX of the Republic; as previously said, he describes the
tyrant who is controlled by appetitive desires as being ‘not free’ and
‘enslaved’. It is notable that moral responsibility does not need to come
into play in this conversation, and I have been careful to avoid any discus-
sion of it until now, as it is not required and would distract from my
340
central thesis.
Even if one denies that reason is the true self in Plato,30 there is something
to be said for freedom as requiring the ability to act in one’s own best inter-
est. When reason does not rule, this is not the case, and when it does (and the
other parts dutifully obey), it is. When reason rules, it seeks what is best for
345 the soul as a whole – not just for itself. Even the appetites are better off when
reason rules, so the appetites do not only constrain the other parts of the soul,
but are self-constraining.31 This makes reason’s ruling a necessary condition
for freedom. Thus we have the misery of Plato’s tyrant:

350

30
By, say, interpreting the parts as all desiderative, none is given priority with regard to being
the soul’s true self.
31
Translated block quotes from the Platonic corpus are from Plato 1997.
Rep. 586d–7a affirmatively states:
355
Then cannot we confidently assert that those desires of even the money-loving and honor-
loving parts that follow knowledge and argument and pursue with their help those pleasures
that reason approves will attain the truest pleasures possible for them, because they follow
truth, and the ones that are most their own, if indeed what is best for each thing is most its
own?
And indeed, it is best.
Therefore, when the entire soul follows the philosophic part, and there is no civil war in it,
360 each part of it does its own work exclusively and is just, and in particular it enjoys its own
pleasures, the best and truest pleasures possible for it.
Absolutely.
 10 JONATHAN HECHT

Mustn’t [the tyrant’s] soul be full of slavery and unfreedom, with the most
decent parts enslaved and with a small part, the maddest and most vicious,
as their master?
It must.
365 What will you say about such a soul then? Is it free or slave?
Slave, of course.
And isn’t the enslaved and tyrannical city least likely to do what it wants?
Certainly.
370
Then a tyrannical soul – I’m talking about the whole soul – will also be least
likely to do what it wants and, forcibly driven by the stings of a dronish gadfly,
will be full of disorder and regret.
How could it be anything else? (Rep. 577d–e)

375 In truth, then, and whatever some people may think, a real tyrant is really a
slave, compelled to engage in the worst kind of fawning, slavery, and pander-
ing to the worst kind of people. He’s so far from satisfying his desires in any
way that it is clear – if one happens to know that one must study his whole soul
– that he’s in the greatest need of most things and truly poor. And, if indeed his
state is like that of the city he rules, then he’s full of fear, convulsions, and
380 pains throughout his life. (Rep. 579d–e)

A similar thread exists in other dialogues as well. Not only is there the case
in the Gorgias in which Socrates gives a similar account of the tyrant as the
one above, but the importance of freedom from constraint is mentioned in the
Sophist. At 230c–d, the Eleatic Stranger indicates that one can only receive
385
benefit when one is liberated from the relevant bonds (τὰ ἐμποδίζοντα). In
the case of a body, constraints might block the ability to enjoy (ἀπολαύɛιν)
food, and in the case of the soul, constraints might block the ability to enjoy
teaching. Furthermore, being liberated (ἀπαλλαγω̃ ν) from these constraints
brings about the most pleasure (ἡδίστην). Returning to the Republic, but
390 away from the tyrant, we also have the appetitive desires described as bur-
densome ‘leaden weights’ (μολυβδίδας) at 519a–b.
Having dealt with the question of whether genuine freedom is freedom, we
may now proceed to compare Augustine and Plato. A significant difference
between them is that Socrates describes psychic order as each part of the soul
395
functioning properly, while Augustine describes it simply as reason’s ruling.
For Socrates, reason’s ruling is wisdom, not psychic order (or justice). It may
be that when reason truly rules in the Republic, the appetites and spirit fall in
line, establishing psychic order. Hence, while wisdom and justice are con-
ceptually distinct, wisdom is not only a necessary but a sufficient condition
for justice, so they will always be coextensive. John Cooper takes a soul’s
400 being wise to require that reason’s ‘decisions are effective’ (Cooper, ‘The
Psychology of Justice in Plato’, 152). That is, not only must reason issue
 FREEDOM OF THE WILL IN PLATO AND AUGUSTINE 11

commands, the other parts must obey these decrees. It seems that what
reason would command the other parts to do is just those things that properly
functioning parts ought to do. So we have some further basis to think that
wisdom entails justice. One might think that justice requires the appetites
405 to obey willingly, as Charles Kahn intimates in his summary of 441d–e,
and that reason cannot effectively command an attitudinal change. It is not
clear to me what the motivation is, given the Greek at 441, for Kahn to
have included this requirement on justice (Kahn, ‘The Meaning of
“Justice”’, 572).32 Christopher Shields agrees with Kahn and says that the
‘willingly’ requirement is ‘implied’ by 441d12–442b4, 443c9–443a3 [sic,
410 presumably 444a3], and 553c–d (Shields, ‘Unified Agency and Akrasia in
Plato’s Republic’, 74). I, once again, do not see this implication. In fact, at
442a–b, Socrates states that the appetites, even in the properly ordered
soul, must be under constant guard by reason and spirit so the appetitive
part does not become too big and enslave spirit and reason.33 If the appetitive
415 part obeyed willingly, it seems that reason and spirit should not need to be
constantly vigilant. By contrast, however, Plato refers to a man as being
both vicious and wise (πονηρω̃ ν μέν, σοwω̃ ν δέ) at 519a – though one
might try to push back and claim that sophos here should be translated as
smart or quick-witted rather than wise, since the rest of the passage refers
to this man as being able to discern things quickly.
420
In any case, this difference between Plato and Augustine is worth noting
but should not cause too many problems for my overarching thesis, as
wisdom and justice for Socrates are, at least, extremely close. What will
be affected is not whether there is a tight analogy between Augustine’s
genuine freedom and Plato’s discussion in the Republic, but the degree to
425 which it holds.
Another major difference between Plato’s discussion and Augustine’s is
that Plato does not have an account of the will in the sense of being able
to do otherwise. This makes sense; when reason rules effectively, there is
only one path to take: the path of reason. The same is true for Augustine;
430
the problem for Augustine, however, is that he needed to introduce the
will to deal with problems that arose with the advent of Christianity, most

32
Kahn’s summary and the original text:
Justice in the individual is the doing of its proper work by each of the three psychic con-
435
stituents: the rational power ruling and caring for the whole soul, the spirited element as its
obedient ally, and the appetitive as its willing subject (441D12–E6; cf. 443D–E).
μνημονɛυτέον ἄρα ἡμι̃ν ὅτι καὶ ἡμω̃ ν ἕκαστος, ὅτου ἂντὰ αὑτου̃ ἕκαστον τω̃ ν ἐν αὐτῷ
πράττῃ, οὗτος δίκαιός τɛ ἔσται καὶ τὰ αὑτου̃ πράττων.τὰ αὑτου̃ ἕκαστον τω̃ ν ἐν αὐτῷ
πράττῃ, οὗτος δίκαιός τɛ ἔσται καὶ τὰ αὑτου̃ πράττων. καὶ μάλα, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, μνημονɛυτέον.
οὐκου̃ ν τῷ μὲν λογιστικῷ ἄρχɛιν προσήκɛι, σοwῷ ὄντι καὶ ἔχοντι τὴν ὑπὲρ ἁπάσης τῆς
ψυχῆς προμήθɛιαν, τῷ δὲ θυμοɛιδɛι̃ ὑπηκόῳ ɛἶναι καὶ συμμάχῳ τούτου.
440 33
At 553c–d we have the oligarchic man who is an example of a man in whom the appetite has,
indeed, conquered over spirit and reason, enslaving them and forcing them to take pleasure
only in that in which the appetite takes pleasure.
 12 JONATHAN HECHT

notably the problem of evil – i.e. how it is that the existence of a Christian
God is consistent with the existence of evil. Augustine famously argues
that evil is the privation of good, which arises from man’s freely turning
away from God. For this solution to work, Augustine needed to introduce
445 the will as the thing that grants us the ability to do otherwise. But this is
not the only role that Augustine’s voluntas plays. It is multifaceted,
serving many functions, and is far from the sleek will of later medieval phi-
losophers. Indeed, it is somewhat unclear what the relevant connection is
between many of these different functions. Once we reach the discussion
of genuine freedom of the will, the voluntas continues to play an important
450 role – it is the voluntas that loves God, and love is the proper relation that one
has to God when the soul is rightly ordered – but the voluntas’ position as the
chooser drops out of the picture. This is not to say that it disappears comple-
tely, but it only operates as a background assumption, while the real work is
done by reason and the voluntas qua amor.
455 I contend that λόγος fills the role that the voluntas plays in genuine
freedom, as λόγος is the thing that has the form of the good as its
proper object. Thus, we do not need to have a distinct voluntas in order
to have an account of free will; we still have free will as self-mastery,
though it might be better just to call it freedom. Since the role of the
will as a chooser is mostly irrelevant once we reach genuine freedom
460
of the will, the analogy between Augustine’s genuine freedom and
Plato’s description of the wise soul is extremely tight. The lack of a
will qua chooser in Plato reflects the fact that he did not have to
engage with the problem of evil, but it does not lessen the significance
of Plato’s concept of wisdom for freedom in the sense of self-mastery.
465 The addition of a will as chooser would needlessly complicate things
for Plato, as he would have to deal with the problem of how to coherently
discuss the wise soul both having the ability to do otherwise, and never, in
fact, doing so.
As for what the relation is between reason and the form of the good, it is
470
worth noting that the Symposium is often read as taking the primary object of
love (πρω̃ τον wίλον)34 to be the form of beauty, which is in turn thought to
be identical to the form of the good, though this is by no means clear.35 ‘The
form of the good’ is not itself mentioned in the Symposium but Diotima talks
about beauty and good in such a way that one might think they are inter-
changeable. Indeed, she says at 206a that ‘men love the good’ (οἱ ἄνθρωποι
475
34
To borrow a phrase from Lys. 219d.
35
Many scholars speak of the relationship with the good as a loving relationship (e.g. Bobo-
nich 2002, 201 and passim; Murdoch, The Sovereignty of the Good, 90). Dilman, Free Will, 97
explicitly says that ‘For Plato to know goodness is to love it; the knowledge in question
belongs to the will, not to the intellect.’ It is not clear to me what Dilman means by ‘will’
480 here, as identifying such an entity in Plato is difficult and it seems that the type of relation
we bear to the good must stem from intellect; it is possible that he was reading Augustine
into Plato, since this interpretation holds for Augustine.
 FREEDOM OF THE WILL IN PLATO AND AUGUSTINE 13
36
τἀγαθου̃ ἐρω̃ σιν). Of course, it makes sense for that which bears the loving
relation to be part of reason – for it is only through reason that one can come
to know the forms, at least one of which is the ultimate object of love. There
is no need to speculate about these matters, however, as Socrates explicitly
485 says something along these lines at 253e–254b in the Phaedrus:

Now when the charioteer [i.e., reason] looks love in the eye, his entire soul is
suffused with a sense of warmth and starts to fill with tingles and the goading
of desire [ … ] When the charioteer sees that face, his memory is carried back
to the real nature of Beauty [ … ]37
490
We see here clearly that it is reason, rather than some other part of the
soul, that identifies the beloved and is the source of (loving) desire for
him. Not only this, but it is reason that moves from desire for and knowledge
of the beloved to desire for and knowledge of the form of beauty. And so,
495
moving back to our comparison with Augustine, it is natural to attribute
the role that the voluntas plays in genuine freedom of the will – loving the
ultimate object of love – to the λόγος in Plato.38
It is also worth noting that some scholars think that Augustine believed
that we come to love God through the love of divine beauty (Harrison,
Beauty and Revelation). Moreover, one of the few dialogues that Augustine
500 may have had partial access to is the Phaedrus.
This leads us to another apparent but ultimately minor difference between
Plato and Augustine, viz., the primary object of love being God for Augus-
tine and the form of the good for Plato; identifying the form of the good with
the Latin summum bonum (Augustine’s God) is not uncommon. In his
505 immensely useful lexicon, for example, Francis Peters gives summum
bonum as a definition of Plato’s ἀγαθόν (Peters, Greek Philosophical
Terms, 4–5). Specialists and non-specialists alike recognize the apparent

36
For an argument against this fairly common reading, see White, ‘Love and Beauty in Plato’s
510 Symposium’. White argues compellingly against both the thesis that the form of Beauty is the
primary object of love and that the form of Beauty is identical with the form of the Good. If his
arguments are correct, then the primary object of love simply is the form of the Good without
mediation from Beauty. Therefore, the conclusion I put forth is reached regardless of whether
one agrees with White’s paper.
37
ὅταν δ᾽ οὖν ὁ ἡνίοχος ἰδὼν τὸ ἐρωτικὸν ὄμμα, πᾶσαν αἰσθήσɛι διαθɛρμήνας τὴν ψυχήν,
515
γαργαλισμου̃ τɛ καὶ πόθου κέντρων ὑποπλησθῃ̃ [ … ] ἰδόντος δὲ του̃ ἡνιόχου ἡ μνήμη πρὸς
τὴν του̃ κάλλους wύσιν ἠνέχθη[ … ].
38
There is a major difference stemming from the fact that Augustine is Christian and Plato is
not, but it is not directly relevant for the purposes of this paper. That is to say, Augustine’s God
is personal and the form of the good is not. Being genuinely free in Augustine, therefore,
involves being loved in return, in a personal way, by God. It is also worth being explicit
that voluntas and logos are not entirely analogous, but rather insofar as they play equivalent
520 roles – that is, in most cases ratio will be a more fitting counterpart to logos, but Augustine’s
voluntas is enough of a hodgepodge of functions that there are cases, such as this one, in which
it comes closer to logos than ratio does.
 14 JONATHAN HECHT

near-equivalence of Augustine’s God and the form of the good.39 It is even

more evident that the practice of identifying God with the form of the good
was not uncommon among ancients, with Plutarch apparently doing so (see
Ferrari, ‘Der Gott Plutarchs und der Gott Platons’; Brenk, ‘Plutarch’s
525 Middle-Platonic God’, and, as Brenk notes, Hirsch-Luipold, Plutarchs
Denken in Bildern, 189–91).
At this point, it is appropriate to look back on our conclusions and see
where we are. There are obvious differences between Augustine and Plato
with regard to what it is to be properly ordered; Plato’s definition of
wisdom is identical to Augustine’s definition of a properly ordered soul,
530 but wisdom, for Plato, is only one (albeit important) component of a
soul’s proper ordering and orientation. The appetites in each seem to line
up, so difference arise at the point of thumos and voluntas. The thumos
does not have an obvious analogue and the voluntas, being variegated,
cannot be paired uniquely with Plato’s single-function parts. These differ-
535 ences are not trivial, but it is evident that in both Plato and Augustine, it
is reason that does most of the legwork in their respective descriptions of
the properly ordered soul. Whether we can stop with reason ruling and
assume that this fact entails that the other parts of the soul do their job is phi-
losophically significant and interesting. Disagreement on this point,
however, does not mean that the two accounts differ on the whole or,
540
indeed, mutatis mutandis, on any other important matters.
Augustine provides an account in which the genuinely free person is
oriented towards God in a loving relation. In the Republic, the just person,
primarily as a result of wisdom, is oriented towards the form of the good,
possibly by means of a loving relation. There is good reason to think that
545 the form of the good is the near-equivalent of God. The genuinely free
person has her tripartite soul ordered properly; in this ordering, we have
reason ruling over appetite and will. The just person has her tripartite soul
ordered properly; she is wise just in case reason rules the appetites and the
spirit, and she is just when she is wise and her appetites and spirit function
550
properly. It is by means of her proper ordering that the genuinely free person
can bear the relevant relation to God. It is by means of her proper ordering
that the just person can bear the relevant relation to the form of the good.
Genuine freedom is that which provides true happiness. Justice, the relevant
aspect of which is wisdom, is that which provides happiness.
Given all this, we might see Augustine’s account of free will not as a
555 newborn idea springing from his head fully formed as Athena did from
Zeus’, but rather as a continuation of the Platonic tradition. There is the
important addition of the will to deal with the problem of evil and perhaps
various situations in Christian scripture. The addition of grace in Augustine
deals with yet another novel problem – that of original sin. Original sin
560
39
Cary, Inner Grace, 19–20 seems to make such a claim, while Spade, ‘Medieval Philosophy’,
59 and Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, 4 also note the similarities.
 FREEDOM OF THE WILL IN PLATO AND AUGUSTINE 15

makes it such that a person cannot reach the highest good without the grace
of God, but Plato, who lacks the doctrine of original sin, is not so pessimistic.
Plato’s account of the just person has everything that we would expect
Augustine’s account of genuine freedom to contain if it were modified to
565 remove his Christian commitments. All the essential parts are in play in
Plato’s discussion.
Excepting that Augustine is Christian and Plato is not, the biggest differ-
ence between the two accounts is that one is called free will and the other is
not (although Plato does use the language of being ‘free’ and being
‘enslaved’); it is a difference in sense rather than reference. What is interest-
570 ing is not that there is much in Plato to be found in Augustine – it is already
well known and accepted that Plato influenced Augustine in various ways
(though the precise nature and extent of the Platonic influence on Augustine
is, ultimately, shrouded in mystery).40 Rather, the interesting point to be
taken from my analysis is just how much is already in Plato. If some
575 aspects of my interpretation prove to be controversial, the differences
between Augustine and Plato grow but the similarities remain overwhelm-
ing. Indeed, even if there were quite a few such controversial aspects of
my interpretation, the analogy would still be too tight to be ignored; Plato
deserves a place in the literature on the history of the free will debate.
580

WHAT IS THE PAY-OFF?

One might wonder whether the appellation ‘free will’ is just a label and ques-
tion whether applying it to Platonic ideas contributes to our understanding of
585 Plato’s writings. While applying the term ‘free will’ to Platonic ideas does
not alter our direct understanding of what Plato said, it has at least two sig-
nificant benefits: it helps trace back a still important conception of free will to
its possible origins and it corrects many scholarly assumptions that there is
nothing like free will to be found in the Platonic corpus.
590 Before elaborating on the first point, the second warrants brief discussion.
A reader might wonder why the labels matter, as scholars can still recognize
that Plato discussed an account that is similar to Augustine’s without it being
called free will. This may be so, but the similarity has mostly gone unrecog-
nized (at least publicly). If it had been recognized, we would see more men-
tions of it in histories of the free will debate, maybe not as an account of free
595 will, but as something importantly similar to early accounts of free will. This
is not the case – rather, we merely see dismissals of the notion that the idea of
free will existed in the Platonic corpus. This might be because of the associ-
ation of free will with determinism, and Plato clearly lacked a discussion of
determinism. As we see from Susan Wolf and Gary Watson, however, it is
600
40
Were the infamous ‘books of the Platonists’ a reference to Plotinus, or quotes from
Ambrose’s sermons?
 16 JONATHAN HECHT

possible to provide sophisticated accounts of free will in which discussions

of determinism seem to be peripheral rather than essential – indeed, it does
not matter all that much to them whether the determinist thesis is true (e.g.
Wolf, Freedom Within Reason and Watson, ‘Free Agency’).41 At the very
605 least, the lack of the appropriate label appears to have caused confusion in
the literature as to whether Plato provides an account similar to one of
free will. While I have been trying to mostly avoid discussions of determin-
ism and freedom of choice, it may yet be an important topic for scholars to
investigate. One might think of the vast literature on akrasia in the Platonic
corpus to be a literature on free will in the Platonic corpus; akrasia is about
610 weakness of will, which is, in a way, about whether an action is up to an
agent. While I am unaware of any works in the akrasia literature that identify
the discussion to be one concerning free will, I would both welcome such an
argument and take it to complement the present paper rather than supplant it.
(Indeed, I am very open to such an interpretation of akrasia!) For if discus-
615 sions of akrasia were discussions of free will, then it seems that they would
be so in the freedom of choice way, rather than in the genuine freedom way.
Thus, we would have the origins of both kinds of free will in the Platonic
corpus. While it is certainly worth devoting time to exploring this aspect
of akrasia, as well as its connection to later philosophy, I am presently con-
cerned with the issue of genuine freedom.
620
Going back to the first point, Augustine might be thought of as having
merged two accounts of free will: genuine freedom and freedom as an
action’s being up to an agent. We have had some success tracing the
origin of the latter account. Some would say that it is present in the
Stoics, though Susanne Bobzien argues convincingly otherwise, contending
625 instead that it arose as a result of confusion in the early second century A.D.
(see, for example, Bobzien, ‘The Inadvertent Conception’).
In the present work, I am attempting to trace back the former. While
freedom of the will as genuine freedom is less popular than ‘up to us’
freedom, it is not moribund. Those unfamiliar with the contemporary free
630
will literature might think that genuine freedom is just a quirk of Augustine
and this aspect of Plato is not freedom in any important sense because it lacks
a discussion of free will; it is only free will insofar as Augustine made it an
account of free will, but the line of thought in Augustine does not end there,
but continues in the modern tradition with Watson and Wolf expounding
similar accounts. If we find the pursuits of those who track down the
635 history of ‘up to us’ freedom to be valuable, then we, as intellectual histor-
ians, ought also to value the tracking of the history of genuine freedom.
By looking at Plotinus, we might be able to see where Augustine may have
gotten the Platonic aspects of his account of free will. Plotinus indicates that

640 41
Freedom for Watson requires aligning one’s desires with one’s values, comparing this to
appetite being subservient to reason in Plato. Wolf’s freedom requires acting from reason
in accordance with the Truth and the Good.
 FREEDOM OF THE WILL IN PLATO AND AUGUSTINE 17

the embodied human soul has a tripartite division, though this is not so clear
for the disembodied soul. In any case, he attributes to the soul, just as Plato
does, an ἐπιθυμητικόν, a θυμοɛιδής and a λογιστικόν (Blumenthal, Ploti-
nus’ Psychology, 23–25). Unlike Plato who does not take a clear position
645 on the matter, ‘Plotinus frequently maintains that our intellect is our truest
self … ’ and the ‘highest part of our soul’ (Blumenthal, ‘On Soul and Intel-
lect’, 96). The Good and the One are equivalent in Plotinus and he says that
‘the soul also loves that Good, moved by it to love from the beginning’.42
Moreover, as Gerd Van Riel says in his article discussing, inter alia, the
relation of Augustine’s voluntas to Plotinus, Plotinus expresses at Ennead
650 VI 8 that ‘This freedom … consists in a power to act in accordance with
the Good, and thus, in a power to pursue the Good’ (Van Riel, ‘Augustine’s
Will, an Aristotelian Notion’, 264).
The fact is, however, that we simply do not know the authorship of the
‘books of the Platonists’ that Augustine said in the Confessiones influenced
655 him.43 The works may have been by Plotinus, who is mentioned several
times by Augustine in various writings, but the evidence for this is,
frankly, slim. It may also be a reference to Saint Ambrose’s sermons or to
the works of Porphyry (though both, especially Porphyry, share Plotinian
features). The text is not clear enough to give us a definitive answer. What
we can see from the earlier discussion of Plotinus at least is that the Platonic
660
elements that appear in Augustine were still alive and well among the neo-
Platonists. This does not mean that it is specifically Plotinus whom Augus-
tine read – though Van Riel is ‘convinced’ that Augustine was aware of Plo-
tinus’ views on freedom and the will (Van Riel, ‘Augustine’s Will, an
Aristotelian Notion’, 263) – but it does make it seem likely that Augustine
665 received the Platonic elements discussed in this paper from some neo-Plato-
nist. Unfortunately, due to our meager information from Augustine about the
libri Platonicorum, this is the most we can say.
I hope that I have corrected misunderstandings both about the free will
debate and Plato’s place in its history. Even if we cannot go from text to
670
text to see the steps that link Plato and Augustine, we can reasonably infer
both that there is some path that existed and that Plato’s discussion comes
so close to Augustine’s that we might consider Plato to have provided an
account of free will. Plotinus, at least, took himself to be very close to
Plato, and he uses ‘freedom’. If we strip away the names, ‘genuine
freedom’ and ‘justice’ (or, perhaps, ‘wisdom’) and look merely at the defi-
675 nitions, it is extremely difficult to narrow down the significant differences

42
I was made aware of this quote by Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plo-
tinus, 174 and borrow his translation. The original text is ‘ψυχὴ ἐρᾷ μὲν ἐκɛίνου ὑπ’ αὐτου̃ ἐξ
ἀρχῆς ɛἰς τὸ ἐρᾶν κινηθɛι̃σα’ and is from Ennead VI.7 31.17–18.
680 43
Courcelle, Recherches sur les Confessions de saint Augustin devotes time to discussing the
authorship issue but O’Donnell, Augustine in his commentary on the passage argues effec-
tively for our ignorance while clearly explaining what we are warranted in believing.
 18 JONATHAN HECHT

between the two; the answer to our initial inquiry, then, does not seem as
obvious as most scholars have previously thought.

Submitted 21 June 2013; revised 26 January; accepted 26 January

685 Indiana University

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Ancient/Medieval Author Citation Key

690

Augustine
Bon., De Nature Boni contra Manichaeos
Civ., De Civitate Dei contra Paganos
695
Conf., Confessiones
Cor., De Correptione et Gratia
Trin., De Trinitate
Lib., De Libero Arbitrio
Nat., De Natura et Gratia
Ret., Retractiones
700
Aquinas
S.T., Summa Theololgiae

705 Plato
Lys., Λύσις
Men., Μένων
Laws, Νόμοι
Rep., Πολιτɛία
Pro., Πρωταγόρας
710
Sym., Συμποσίον
Phd., Φαι̃δρος

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