Original Research Article

Violence Against Women

2022, Vol. 28(14) 3482–3504
Strategic Submission to Rape © The Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/10778012211054872
Violence in the Colombian journals.sagepub.com/home/vaw

Armed Conflict

Kiran Stallone1

Abstract
Academic literature is only beginning to understand victims’ rational calculations and
agency related to sexual violence in war and conflict. This article deepens that analysis,
emphasizing calculated action rather than passive victimization. This is a systematic
study of victims’ strategic responses to sexual violence, and reports findings from
an in-depth analysis of women who were raped in the context of Colombia’s
armed conflict (1964-present), revealing that this context triggers a strategic response
by victims of rape. Specifically, some women calculate that submitting to unwanted
sex is more likely to protect them and others, such as family members, from signifi-
cant harm than resisting rape. However, while their strategic responses may protect
them and allow them to keep their families safe from greater harm, the methods
adopted by women in these situations may complicate their efforts at being recog-
nized as victims, undercutting their access to legal and social rights in the aftermath
of war and conflict.

Keywords
sexual violence, civilian agency, war, armed conflict, Colombia

Introduction
Existing academic studies on sexual violence in the context of armed conflict have
tended to focus on the strategic calculations of combatant-rapists (Baaz & Stern,
2009; Cohen, 2013; Leiby, 2009; Sharlach, 2000). Although the perspective of the

1
Department of Sociology, University of California Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA
Corresponding Author:
Kiran Stallone, Department of Sociology, University of California Berkeley, 410 Social Sciences Building,
Berkeley, CA 94720, USA.
Email: kiran_stallone@berkeley.edu
Stallone 3483

perpetrator is important for prevention efforts, these studies problematically establish a

one-sided frame and narration of the history of wartime rape in terms of strategies and
behaviors of armed actors. Much of this academic literature overlooks the potential for
victims’ rational calculations and agency, and readers may be left with the impression
that sexual violence victims are passive recipients of that violence.
But agency and victimization sometimes intertwine. Other academic literature has
drawn attention to tiny and unique forms of agency exerted in even the most restricted
wartime circumstances (Baines, 2015; Rudling, 2019; Utas, 2005). This literature has
also called for scholars to expand their consideration of civilian agency in violent
milieus and to think specifically about how gender shapes different possibilities for
action and behavior (Baines, 2015; Hume & Wilding, 2020; Krause, 2019; Utas,
2005). Victims are diverse individuals from a variety of backgrounds who have expe-
rienced and responded to violence in diverse ways and failing to take their diversity
into account ultimately limits our broader understanding of war and conflict
(Krystalli, 2021; Rudling, 2019). Baines (2015, p. 320) eloquently makes a case for
this, writing that war and gender scholars “would do well to incorporate a conceptual-
ization of victim agency, and to avoid reducing men’s and women’s experiences of
sexual and gender-based violence to acts solely done to them.”
This article is an in-depth, systematic study of victims’ strategic responses to sexual
violence. It reports the findings from a detailed study of women who were raped in the
context of Colombia’s armed conflict (1964-present) and reveals that this context trig-
gers a strategic response by victims of rape. Specifically, some women calculate that
submitting to unwanted sex (“strategic submission”) is more likely to protect them
and others, such as family members, from significant harm than resisting rape.
Testimonies highlight victims’ rational thought processes and subsequent actions.
However, while their strategic responses may protect them and allow them to keep
their families safe from greater harm, the methods adopted by women in these situa-
tions may complicate their efforts at being recognized as victims, undercutting their
access to legal and social rights in the aftermath of war and conflict.
To be very clear up front, strategic submission to sexual violence—as it is discussed
in this article—does not imply the victim’s complicity in the sexual violation. It instead
demonstrates that victims show agency—in limited and very restrained ways—even
during sexual violence situations. Put differently, the calculated decision to submit
to sexual violence is not the same as consent. Although fighting back in some contexts
may protect victims of sexual violence, that is not always the case. This article will
show that fighting back can intensify the violence against victims, their families, and
the broader community. Submission to unwanted sexual violence in such cases repre-
sents neither consent nor passivity, but rather a strategic and calculated form of protec-
tive action and agency. Below, the women’s own voices create situated knowledge
(Haraway, 1988), revealing their strategic calculations in deeply restricted circum-
stances. In other words, despite societal assumptions to the contrary, this article
makes clear that agency and victimhood are not antithetical to one another (Baines,
2015; Mardorossian, 2014; Rudling, 2019; Utas, 2005).
3484 Violence Against Women 28(14)

This study exposes a socio-legal conundrum when it comes to different social and
legal responses to sexual violence. Although international and local legal structures
now support women who strategically submit to rape and encourage them to seek
legal recourse after the fact, much of Colombian society lags behind on this issue.
It unjustly discriminates against women who do not fit the typical standard of what
it means to be a rape victim. As a result, these women not only face the trauma of
rape, they are traumatized a second time by society at large through discrimination,
social stigma, and accusations of complicity in their own harm. By analyzing this
socio-legal conundrum, this article sheds light on the connection between strategic sub-
mission and low reporting rates of sexual violence, showing that the anticipated social
repercussions of strategic action may deter women from declaring crimes and seeking
legal recourse or reparations.
To develop the arguments above, the article begins with a discussion of the sources
of information used, followed by definitions of key concepts and terms. It then pro-
vides a brief overview of the academic literature on sexual violence in wartime,
showing the gap in insights on or acknowledgment of strategic victims. It then intro-
duces the idea of the strategically submissive victim using feminist literature on rape,
domestic violence, victimhood, and agency. Next, it situates sexual violence within the
history of Colombia’s conflict, outlining differences across armed actors in their use of
rape. The article then presents empirical analyses of victims’ responses to the threat of
rape in the Colombian conflict, underscoring how the context of armed conflict leads to
strategically submissive victim reactions. Before concluding, the article considers legal
and societal responses to women who strategically submit to rape in order to protect
themselves, pointing out the persistent social problems and discrimination they face.

Research Methods Employed and Discussion of Relevant

Terminology
For this project, I conducted original interview research on sexual violence in the
Colombian armed conflict. From 2015 to 2021, I spoke with approximately 50
female sexual violence victims from conflict regions throughout Colombia while
accompanying the Colombian Victims Unit during victim-focused projects and
events, and also during my work as a freelance journalist for media outlets such as
The Guardian, USA Today, and Al Jazeera. The women were raped between the
ages of 10 and 50 years, and most now live in displaced communities. In addition, I
draw on my interviews with social leaders, government officials, and researchers on
the topic of sexual violence in Colombia. All interviews were semi-structured and
took place in Spanish in the communities of the victims, at government events for
victims in Bogotá, in government offices, and via Skype or telephone. All names
used in the article are fictional to protect the anonymity of my interviewees.
In addition to my interview data, I cite government and NGO reports on Colombian
sexual violence; investigative journalism newspaper articles; and passages from the
Colombian Constitutional Court and Penal Code. I also incorporate testimonies from
Stallone 3485

an interview archive developed by Ruta Pacífica (2013), a women’s rights organization

that interviewed 933 women about displacement, gender discrimination, and sexual
violence over the course of the Colombian conflict. Ruta Pacífica interviewed
women in 11 distinct departments and 80 municipalities located throughout
Colombia, although many narrate stories of displacement from other regions. All orig-
inal sources are in Spanish, and the translations are my own.
The focus of this study is on female victims. Data on male victims is still very
limited. While studies seem to suggest that men are less likely to suffer from a
sexual attack than women, this may be partly a reporting issue. Although women
may experience shame in recounting rape, men and boys may feel an even higher
level of shame and avoid the stigma by failing to report (Touquet & Schulz, 2020).
Within the broad definition of sexual violence, this study concentrates specifically
on rape, defined by the International Criminal Court as the invasion of “the body of
a person by conduct resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body
of the victim or the perpetrator with a sexual organ” or any other object (ICC, n.d.).
Other forms of sexual violence that occur during armed conflict are beyond the
scope of this article.1
There is an ongoing debate over terminology regarding how to refer to individuals
who have experienced sexual violence. Some reject the term victim due to its associ-
ation with weakness, objectification, negativity, or particular social stigmas that
prevent individuals from putting violence behind them and moving on (Jamieson &
Hall, 1995; Leisenring, 2006). Many argue that the term should be abandoned entirely
(Jamieson & Hall, 1995; Mardorossian, 2014). Rape crisis centers stress that women
who experience sexual violence should be called survivors, and survivor therapy
encourages female victims of rape to reconstruct their identities around the term as a
strategy of empowerment (Mardorossian, 2014; McCaffrey, 1998). While acknowl-
edging this terminological debate, I opt to use victim throughout this article. The
word victim is a legal designation and a criminal justice term that allows for the polit-
ical reparation of women who have suffered from acts of sexual violence against their
will. In Colombia, declaring oneself a victim allows a woman to access resources from
the national Victims Unit and other services that would be denied otherwise.
Furthermore, women who “survived” rape are still victims of that criminal act.
Although they did survive, this does not necessarily mean they can put the violence
behind them. Even survivors still live with trauma and traumatic memory (Edkins &
Jenny, 2003).
Third, this article argues that being a victim does not preclude agency or turn
women into mere subjects of a crime. While those who reject the word victim are jus-
tified in their arguments that the term has negative connotations, this rejection perpet-
uates an idea of victim helplessness and negative associations. In her study on sexual
violence stigmatization and terminology surrounding the act of rape, Mardorossian
(2014, p. 33) writes that widespread abandonment of the term victim “testifies to
people’s inability to see victims as capable of agency.” The cases analyzed below
reveal the complexities of women’s responses to violence, making it possible to
surpass victim stereotypes and to see agency beneath the surface, particularly
3486 Violence Against Women 28(14)

that which comes from decisions women made that allowed them to live and tell their
stories.

A History of Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict

Awareness of sexual violence in conflict has long historical roots. Evidence of wartime
sexual violence is present in Titus Livius’ History of Rome on the rape of the Sabines in
750 BC, and in Genghis Khan’s speech to his courtiers, when he cited the “greatest
pleasure” of raping the wives and daughters of his enemies in the 13th century
(Bidwell, 1973, p. 20). However, this awareness did not automatically translate into
the study, analysis, and documentation of rape in war. Only in recent decades have
governments, international organizations, and scholars put their attention on sexual
violence in war.
The first major finding in sexual violence research was that armed actors use rape as
a weapon of war, as “part of a systematic political campaign which has strategic mil-
itary purposes” (Skjelsbaek, 2001, p. 213). The term “weapon of war” became widely
cited in 1994, after the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, during which
state and non-state forces used rape as a form of ethnic cleansing to destroy members of
enemy populations (Sharlach, 2000; Tompkins, 1994). Subsequent scholarly studies of
other conflicts have revealed strategic perpetrator uses of sexual violence, such as for
intimidation; punishment for non-supporters of an armed group (Franco, 2007; Leiby,
2009); as a reward for troops for pleasure (Baaz & Stern, 2009); as a form of stress
relief (Kim, 2012); and as a means to socialize troops and boost combatant status
(Cohen, 2013).
An in-depth analysis of the perspective of the victim is necessary to balance such
coverage of sexual violence in war and conflict from the perspective of the perpetrator.
Despite the proliferation of studies on sexual violence, victims of this type of violence
are rarely written about in the same high-profile way as perpetrators, who are spot-
lighted by the media because “they intrigue audiences” (Payne, 2008, p. 13). Most typ-
ically, victims are included only as a statistic: the objects of violence by armed actors.2
At other times, victim testimonies merely corroborate findings on perpetrator strate-
gies.3 In other words, a strong understanding of the perceptions and behaviors of the
strategic armed actor/rapist has emerged without a corresponding understanding of
the experiences and potential strategies of rape victims during war. In the sexual vio-
lence research cited in the paragraph preceding this one, the researchers’ silences and
lack of questioning regarding the potential for victim strategies during sexual violence
are telling (Krystalli, 2021), further underscoring the gap this study endeavors to
overcome.
A number of academics have focused on civilians who engaged in collective action
and mobilized after suffering conflict-related sexual violence (Kreft, 2019; Schulz,
2019; Stallone & Janetsky, 2021; Touquet & Schulz, 2020; Zulver, 2017). They
have highlighted different ways in which sexual violence victims organize and
provide for themselves after sexual trauma, how they support new victims, and how
they work to prevent future violations. But this mobilization happens when the
Stallone 3487

incidents of sexual violence have already occurred. There is not yet a systematic study
of how victims behave strategically during sexual violence situations. While there are
singular case studies (Baines, 2015; Utas, 2005) and dispersed examples (Boesten,
2010; Theidon, 2012) that lend support to the arguments below, this article aims to
provide a systematic and comprehensive analysis of victim agency during instances
of sexual violence.

Theory on Women’s Strategic Agency in Rape Situations

The focus of this section is on the partial, limited agency that can “emerge against the
backdrop of, and co-exist in tension with, systematic gender-based oppression”
(Abrams, 1995, p. 333). In other words, it demonstrates that rape victims can show
partial agency at the border of pure coercion in the form of small, strategic calculations
under oppressive conditions. Within their victimization, they may analyze their situa-
tions and strategically decide how to react and respond to violence.
Feminist scholarship on domestic violence provides support for this analysis, and
has openly challenged and criticized what Schneider (1993, p. 388) calls the “false
dichotomy between women’s victimization and women’s agency.” In non-war settings,
this literature tells us victims may show agency by resisting, either forcefully by
hitting, kicking, or scratching the attacker, or in nonforceful ways, such as reasoning
with the rapist, screaming, arguing, attempting to escape, or hiding (Marchbanks
et al., 1990). Women are encouraged to resist rape using the aforementioned strategies
in contexts where potential injuries sustained from resistance are likely to be less severe
than the completed rape itself would have been (Heyden et al., 1999; Ullman, 2007).
This is not always a possibility, though.
Ullman writes that “certain places and situations may put women at greater risk of
rape and affect their ability to effectively resist an attacker” (Ullman, 2007, p. 416).
The possession of weapons, situations with multiple offenders, alcohol consumption,
and the absence of a capable guardian can all make resistance a less effective strategy.
When facing rape, the addition of any one of these factors could lead to extreme vio-
lence and even death. In such circumstances, women may sense that they face greater
dangers than rape itself, and suffering from rape becomes secondary to suffering from
worse violence or death. Recognizing these realities, they determine that the prudent
response is to strategically submit to rape. In other words, they show agency not as
resistance, but in the form of what this article will call strategic submission. The tes-
timonies below reveal that in this decision, there is neither consent nor passivity, but
rather an active calculation of the best way to protect oneself and others through sub-
mission to unwanted sexual violence.
In a survey of U.S. female victims of rape, Bart and O’Brien discovered that those
who aimed to avoid death or mutilation were less likely to attempt to avoid rape (Bart
& O’Brien, 1984). Similarly, Abrams (1998) found that battered women might strate-
gically decide not to resist their aggressors. Instead of running away or fighting back,
battered women may reason that they should remain in abusive relationships to avoid
worse violence (Abrams, 1998). Often, they determine that resisting or trying to escape
3488 Violence Against Women 28(14)

could lead to their own deaths or those of their children (Hydén, 2005; Mahoney, 1991;
Picart, 2003). In addition, Abrams (1998) discovered that many battered women
believe that the law cannot protect them from the violent situations they face (see
also Mahoney, 1991). Each time these women attempted to escape, their abusers
found them and forced them to return home (Mahoney, 1991). Although not explicitly
about rape, these cases demonstrate that women may strategically submit to certain
forms of violence as a means to protect themselves from other worse forms of violence.
Their reactions represent “the subtle, self-preserving moves of one who understands
her social and societal constraint” (Abrams, 1995, p. 365). Abrams shows that their
reactions are manifestations of partial agency, and that the context in which women
find themselves contributes to their calculated responses to violence (Abrams,
1995). Scott (1985) was one of the first to draw attention to everyday micro-acts of
resistance in Malaysia, referring to them as “ordinary weapons of relatively powerless
groups” or “weapons of the weak.” Scott focused specifically on rural, oppressed peas-
ants who resisted the elite via “foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compli-
ance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so on” (1985,
p. xvi). Problematically, though, “the dominant cultural discourses of resistance are
based on such preconceptions about what characterizes resistance that they allow no
space for everyday resistance” (Hydén, 2005, p. 171).
As argued above, the literature on wartime rape does not yet comprehensively
address victim agency or strategy during sexual violence situations. There are,
however, many dispersed discussions of agency in sexual violence situations that
support this analysis. Baines (2015) and Utas (2005) wrote singular case studies on
victim agency in war. They bring up many examples, and among those are instances
of agency in sexual violence situations. Utas wrote about a Liberian woman called
Bintu, a “social navigator” who calculated her odds during Liberia’s conflict and deter-
mined she could obtain protection from worse forms of violence by submitting to long-
term sexual relationships with higher-ranking soldiers, becoming their girlfriends
(Utas, 2005). Baines, on the other hand, tells the story of Sara, a Ugandan woman
who shows agency when facing her rapist—“although she cannot stop him from vio-
lently raping her and forcing her to assume domestic work, she exerts her resistance in
the refusal of a smile” that he demanded (p. 328). In the Peruvian internal armed con-
flict in the 1980s, civilian women submitted to sexual demands of armed actors to
protect their family members from death (Theidon, 2012) and sexually committed to
one particular soldier in order to avoid experiencing violent mass rapes by other sol-
diers (Boesten, 2010; Theidon, 2012). This also occurred during the Russian invasion
of Berlin from 1944 to 1948, during which resident German women committed to spe-
cific Russian soldiers to avoid mass rape by many others (Anonymous, 2000). These
examples, although brief, all draw attention to how victimhood and agency intersect in
particular ways during sexual violence. They also reveal that strategic submission is
not unique to Colombia, making an in-depth analysis of this type of victim response
to rape all the more necessary.
The conditions in areas affected by Colombia’s armed conflict frequently mean that
women are trapped in violent circumstances. Victims of rape often live in occupied
Stallone 3489

conflict zones and face a violent environment from which there is no clear escape or
legal protection. In many cases, the law cannot and does not reach them. Screaming
would be futile in these areas, where armed actors are both the law and the enforcer.
The women providing the testimonies below recognized these limitations and
responded in pragmatic ways. Their testimonies show that the rape victim can simul-
taneously “act” and be “acted upon” by a perpetrator (MacKinnon, 1983, p. 651). Even
though these women are restricted by their circumstances, they are still capable of
making difficult choices to survive conflict.

The Colombian Armed Conflict and Sexual Violence

Sexual violence has taken a dramatic toll during over 50 years of war in Colombia.
According to the country’s Constitutional Court, sexual violence was “a habitual,
extensive, systematic and invisible practice in the context of the Colombian armed con-
flict, perpetrated by all of the illegal armed groups and in isolated areas, by individual
agents of the national armed forces” (Auto, 092/08, 2015).
Colombia’s governmental Victims’ Unit (Unidad para las Víctimas) currently has a
registry of 33,026 victims of “crimes against sexual integrity” (RUV, 2021). The
majority of victims in Colombia are female (∼88%), particularly women from
Afro-Colombian and indigenous backgrounds (C-754/15, 2015). Although the govern-
ment’s statistics may seem high, they do not represent reality.4 According to the
Constitutional Court, there are no reliable or “unified figures on Colombian sexual vio-
lence” (C-335-13, 2013). In Colombia, as in many other parts of the world, the vast
majority of conflict-related sexual violence crimes remain undeclared (ABColombia,
2017; C-335-13, 2013; Oxfam, n.d.).
The lack of certainty about rape victims or their experiences results from low report-
ing levels. According to studies by Oxfam, Casa de la Mujer, and Humanidad Vigente,
only between 18% and 22% of Colombian victims of sexual violence in the armed con-
flict have reported their experiences to authorities (C-335-13, 2013; ABColombia
2017). Many rape victims do not report because they believe the Colombian state
cannot protect them or effectively provide for them in the aftermath of rape
(C-335-13, 2013). Some receive death threats from armed actors and fear that their
lives would be in danger were they to talk about what happened to them (C-335-13,
2013). Others do not trust the justice system or the reporting process and believe it
to be ineffective (C-335-13, 2013). While some women choose not to report
because they expect perpetrator impunity,5 others are unaware of their rights or that
a reporting system even exists (C-335-13, 2013). In rural areas, the lack of financial
means to travel to a city where one could make a report also affects the figures
(Auto 009/15, 2015). Finally, many women do not report because they are ashamed,
because they feel that they are at fault, or because they believe that their community
or family members will discriminate against them if they do so (Auto 009/15, 2015).
With the caveat of data shortcomings, this section discusses Colombia’s armed
groups and what is currently known about how they used sexual violence in the coun-
try’s internal war. The focus is on Colombia’s two largest armed groups: the
3490 Violence Against Women 28(14)

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas and the paramilitary

United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). Although much smaller armed
groups have also contributed to the Colombian conflict, they will not be discussed
here because so little information exists on these groups in general and on their use
of sexual violence in particular.6
The FARC is the largest and oldest guerrilla group in Latin America. Inspired by the
communist revolution in Cuba, peasant FARC guerrilleros came together in 1966 with
the aim to defeat the Colombian government and liberate poor rural masses via a
Marxist-Leninist revolution. As the FARC expanded its size and support base, it threat-
ened the economic interests of local elites. In response, these local elites formed
regional “self-defense” paramilitary organizations to protect themselves and eliminate
the “communist threats” that these groups posed. Distinct regional paramilitary orga-
nizations eventually coalesced to become the United Self-Defense Forces of
Colombia (AUC) in 1997.
Both armed groups became increasingly violent and criminal during the 1990s. The
AUC partnered with drug cartels to profit from trafficking illegal substances. Similarly,
the FARC became aggressively militant and used kidnapping, drug trafficking, extor-
tion, and “taxes” on appropriated lands as a means to support itself. The opposing
groups competed violently for territory and established de facto rule in controlled
areas, inflicting irreparable damage on Colombian society. The conflict has killed
over 262,197 people, including 215,005 civilians (Romero, 2018).
Although the Colombian government and the various armed groups have made
extensive efforts to establish peace, the violence continues. The FARC began peace
negotiations with the government in November 2012, and in December 2016 the agree-
ment passed through Congress after initially being rejected by the population in a
nationwide referendum. Paramilitaries demobilized and signed a similar peace agree-
ment with the government in 2005, but smaller and more dispersed violent criminal
bands (BACRIM) rose to take over their drug operations. Combatants and civilians
continue to be executed, displaced, kidnapped, and tortured. They also still suffer
from different forms of sexual violence, including rape, sexual slavery, sexual
torture, and forced abortion.
Researchers on wartime rape in Colombia have attempted to determine patterns and
motivations behind the use of sexual violence in the war. Interestingly, both paramil-
itary and FARC leadership claim to prohibit the use of rape in their codes of conduct
(Humanas, 2012; HRW, 2003). These bans, if they indeed existed, did not translate to
reality. Colombian armed actors used sexual violence in numerous ways, often with
specific objectives in mind (Paz, 2009). The Constitutional Court has documented
the following forms of sexual violence in the conflict:
During invasions, massacres and looting operations; 2) Deliberate individual acts: of
terror, as retaliation against the other side, personal retaliation while advancing territori-
ally and to acquire more resources, coercion for different purposes, territorial advance-
ment strategies, submission for information (forms of torture), simple ferocity; 3)
Against women in emotional relationships with the other side; 4) Against recruited
women (various forms); 5) Against young women and girls for sexual pleasure; 6)
Stallone 3491

Punishment for not complying with the armed group’s codes of conduct; 7) Against
female human rights leaders as a silencing strategy; 8) Forced prostitution and sexual
slavery; 9) Threats to commit acts of sexual violence. (Auto 092/08, 2008)

Lack of data prevents robust conclusions on how the various armed groups differed in
their use of sexual violence. It is difficult to establish more specific perpetration pat-
terns because both the FARC and paramilitaries were made up of many different fac-
tions, led by different commanders.7 In her research on sexual violence in Sri Lanka
and El Salvador, Wood (2009, p. 132) found that not only does the use of sexual vio-
lence vary across armed groups, it also may vary across units within a group.8 As of
yet, there are only inconclusive and limited studies on the variation of sexual violence
across particular factions in Colombia,9 but Wood’s research suggests that those who
attempt to compare sexual violence patterns by different armed groups must do so
cautiously.
Rather than contradicting or verifying the patterns of violence perpetration, this
project takes the study of sexual violence in armed conflict in a different direction.
Specifically, it examines the perspective of the female rape victim and her responses
to sexual violence. This analysis is important in framing how women protect them-
selves and their families during conflict, and how the choices that women make
relate to the types of violence they confront.

Colombian Women: Strategic Submission to Rape

During War
Submission and silence as strategic responses can be difficult to differentiate from
cases where victims are so crippled by fear that they are unable to react in any
way at all. To distinguish between these two types of reactions, this project uses
victim testimonies to reveal the thought processes that led women to submit to
rape. The process by which they assessed their situations, recognized the dangers
they faced, and reacted becomes explicit in their voices. This study reveals three dif-
ferent victim strategies behind submission: (1) Strategic Submission as
Self-Sacrifice to Protect Others and Redistribute Violence; (2) Strategic
Submission as Non-Resistance for Self-Protection; and (3) Long-term Strategic
Submission.

Strategic Submission as Self-Sacrifice to Protect Others

The cases below are examples of women who strategically negotiated with perpetrators
in order to redistribute violence, directing it away from others and sacrificing them-
selves in the process. These women consciously submitted to the sexual advances of
armed perpetrators with the hope of protecting others from worse harm. Most fre-
quently, I heard accounts from mothers protecting their children, and siblings protect-
ing one another.
3492 Violence Against Women 28(14)

Carolina grew up in Acacias Meta, a central-Colombian area that was controlled by

paramilitaries until the group demobilized in 2006. After paramilitary demobilization,
violent criminal bands (BACRIM) rose in place of the armed paramilitaries and took
over their drug operations. These criminal bands plagued the community and its inhab-
itants with violence. In July 2015, Carolina, then 35 years old, faced some of those
violent criminal actors.
At the time, her husband had just completed a construction job for a local, uniden-
tified group of armed men. The criminal actors did not pay him for the job and
requested more work from him, for free. He refused, and said he wouldn’t complete
the new job until they paid him for the first. The armed men left, but returned that
same night:

At 10:30 at night four men arrived in a truck. Our three daughters were sleeping and we
were outside. They held us at gunpoint. […] They told my husband that since he didn’t
want to take the job, they no longer needed him. Then they said they were going to
take the girls and me. I started to cry and told them please don’t take the girls. [I said]:
“Don’t do anything to the girls or to him [my husband].” They were going to take the
girls. One is 11, the other is 13, and the other is 9. I thought: “no, they are going to
rape the girls, who knows what they will do to the girls.” I cried and told them not to
take the girls, to leave them, and that I would go instead […] For my daughters, [I
would do] anything. […] So they took me, they took me in the truck and locked me in
a room all night. They made me do housework. And then at night they did not let me
rest. […] I did not count, but there were many of them.**10

In this case, Carolina negotiated, sacrificed, and submitted to rape and other forms of
abuse in order to protect her husband and prevent the rape of her young daughters.
According to the Ruta Pacífica (2013), a testimony archive organization, this type of
response is not unusual. If Colombian mothers sensed that their daughters were at
risk of rape, they would make their “aggressors understand that they prefer[ed] to
suffer the sexual assault themselves than allow their daughters to suffer” (Ruta
Pacífica, 2013, p. 384). Carolina’s act of strategic protection is evident from her state-
ment that she wanted to go with the armed actors to save her daughters and prevent
their rape. Although Carolina offered herself to the armed men, her act of submission
certainly does not represent consent. A perceived threat pushed her to engage in sexual
activity with the armed perpetrators to protect her daughters, showing that violent cir-
cumstances caused her submission.11
Through my research, I documented cases of strategic submission by mothers to
protect their children not just in Central Colombia, but also in other conflict zones
throughout the country. In 2002, paramilitaries invaded Diana’s farm in La Guajira,
a province in the Northeast. She was 49 years old at the time, and at home with her
young children. The armed actors told her to leave her property immediately. When
she did not, they returned the next day to punish her:

They came back at night. When they arrived, I told my children: “Go to the mountain.
Hide.” My children were still very young. […] They ran. Everyone ran. I told them to
Stallone 3493

hide in the woods so they would not be raped, too. They hid and heard my shouts. I was
left alone. I tried to run too, but [the paramilitaries] overtook me. And since I was a pretty
girl … [silence] I fainted. I do not know how many [raped me].**

Due to the violence of the sexual acts, Diana still suffers from internal organ damage
over 15 years later. Her case, just as those above, reveals her awareness of her violent
circumstances, her quick calculations, and her decision to sacrifice herself in order to
protect her children.
In addition to mothers protecting their daughters, there is also evidence of women
who strategically submitted to sexual violence in order to protect other individuals
(non-children). Julia, age 27 years, lived in a paramilitary-occupied region of La
Guajira Province. In 2014, paramilitaries arrived on her family’s property and threat-
ened her and her brother. In response, she sought to protect her brother and save his life
by sacrificing her own wellbeing:

Several men arrived at four in the morning, dressed in black hoods and wearing rubber
boots. […] One of them wanted to take my brother away. I said no, that they could do
anything they wanted to me but that they could not take my brother, that they should
let him live. I put myself between them. They raped me and beat me … After they did
everything to us, they told us that we had to leave immediately, and that if we did not,
they were going to kill us.**

After the violence, Julia and her brother left their family farm immediately. Three years
later, she told me that they still have not been able to return, and that they continue to
fear for their lives. Rather than demonstrating consent, these testimonies collectively
show that rape victims strategically reasoned and attempted to negotiate with armed
actors to achieve a particular purpose, redistributing the impending violence.
Like Julia, Rocio grew up in a paramilitary-occupied region. San Blas was origi-
nally controlled by the FARC, where the group produced cocaine. In 1998, paramili-
taries from the Bloque Central Bolívar invaded the area, and San Blas became their
epicenter. The paramilitaries exercised control over the region, trapping community
members and forcing them to abide by their rules as they took over the FARC’s
cocaine production (Céspedes, 2011). In 2005, Rocio submitted to a paramilitary
armed actor in order to protect her family members:

Edwin was from the AUC and he took me by force from my house. He threatened my
mother. I lived with my mother and my brother, and he took me from my house to San
Blas. My mother went to look for us, but there was no [state] law there. They [the para-
militaries] were the law, and I had to do as they said or my family would pay [with their
lives]. I was a child; I had no experience. I did what … what he told me to do, because I
was afraid he would kill my mother and my brother if I did not. (Ruta Pacífica, 2013,
p. 360)

While it is evident that Rocio did not make a full choice about her circumstances, her
testimony highlights the reasoning behind her decision to submit. Her final sentence
3494 Violence Against Women 28(14)

reveals that she prioritized the survival of her family by not resisting the paramilitary
rapist, and that she complied with his demands out of fear. Rocio’s testimony also
draws attention to the sense of captivity generated by armed occupation. The
Colombian government was often absent in occupied areas, meaning that state protec-
tion was not an option. Rocio shared her perception that illegal armed actors were the
law in the area where she lived, suggesting that there was no state protection for com-
munity members.

Strategic Submission as Non-Resistance for Self-Protection

In addition to protecting others, women sexually submitted to perpetrators in order to
avoid their own deaths or to reduce other forms of violence. The following testimonies
reveal their assessments of their circumstances and subsequent decisions to strategi-
cally submit to sexual violence.
Maria lived with her family in La Guajira. In July 2006, she was with her children
on the family farm when a group of armed men approached. Her testimony speaks to
the mental process behind her decision not to resist her rapists and their violent
advances:

The group arrived in the afternoon. I was feeding the children, and the men told us that we
had to leave the farm immediately. They took the cattle and started beating my daughter
and me. Two people raped us. At that moment, I realized: “We can’t resist because they
will kill us.”**

Maria’s testimony suggests her awareness of the dangers that she and her daughter
faced, and her recognition that resisting could have caused further harm, or even
death. I heard similar statements from a number of women, all of whom shared an
understanding that resistance was not an option if they wanted to survive. For instance,
a different female victim of rape explained to me that it simply did not make sense to
struggle against her aggressors, stating: “[W]hen there are so many [paramilitary
actors], one cannot fight against them.”** There was no state presence in the areas
where these women faced violent armed actors, and they were aware of the power
that these groups held over them.
During Colombia’s internal conflict, strategic submission to prevent death occurred
in a variety of situations. The following case concerns a group of sex workers in La
Gabarra, a paramilitary-occupied community in the Norte de Santander department.
Andrea recalled the story of two sex workers and how they protected themselves
from death in 1999 by submitting to armed actors:

They went and they grabbed those girls [the sex workers]. You, you, you, you [they
selected them] and they took them up there where there were more of them [armed
actors]. They took up ten and returned with only four or five [girls]. The rest stayed up
there; the others got killed over there. Two of them told us that they had gone several
times [to the armed actors] and nothing happened to them. Well, [we asked], “Why
Stallone 3495

didn’t anything happen to you?” They said: “Because we let them do whatever they
wanted with us.” (Ruta Pacífica, 2013, p. 382)

Sex workers often ran a higher risk of rape because of the nature of their profession.
During the Colombian conflict, armed actors assumed that they had the right to sexu-
ally abuse sex workers (Ruta Pacífica, 2013). The final sentence in Andrea’s testimony
shows that the women recognized the risks that they faced before they allowed the per-
petrators to do as they wished. Even though they were physically surrounded and
threatened, they were aware enough to make an assessment and take subsequent
action. Realizing that the sex workers who did resist were being killed, the women
who survived acted strategically by submitting to the demands of their aggressors
and not fighting back.
In occupied areas, death was not just an empty threat, but a real possibility. There
are many examples of women who rejected the advances of armed actors and lost their
lives. A mother from Tarazá, a paramilitary occupied region in Antioquia, shared the
tragic story of her daughter, Sara, who disappeared in 1990:

My daughter was called Sara. […] There was a paramilitary leader who was in love with
her, and my daughter did not accede to his advances. She was very direct [about saying
no]. One day, they had an argument and the armed actor threatened that he was going to
shoot her. My daughter disappeared in Tarazá. (Ruta Pacífica, 2013, p. 57).

For women living in occupied communities, the threat of death was established by
cases like that of Sara, demonstrating that resistance was not an option. For this
reason, women had to resort to other strategies, such as submission, in order to
protect themselves.

Long-Term Strategic Submission

While some women acceded to unwanted sexual relationships in the short term to
avoid imminent death, others felt so threatened that they made a long-term commit-
ment to their rapists for protection. In occupied communities, civilian women some-
times acceded to long-term sexual relationships with armed actors and became their
concubines. Andrea shared details of forced relationships that she observed in paramil-
itary occupied communities:

The only defense strategy that [women] could resort to was to become the girlfriends [of
the armed actors], particularly if they [the armed actors] already found them to be attrac-
tive or if they threatened them to become their girlfriends. (Ruta Pacífica, 2013, p. 376)

Andrea’s testimony suggests that women in occupied zones acknowledged the dangers
that they faced and made choices to prioritize their lives over their long-term sexual
freedom. They highlight that the threats were widely recognized within their commu-
nities. For women deemed attractive in occupied communities and wartime
3496 Violence Against Women 28(14)

environments, beauty was an even greater burden. It caused them to be singled out,
threatened, and victimized by armed actors.
Women in occupied communities also acceded to long-term sexual relationships
with higher-ranking armed actors to avoid being sexually abused by multiple lower-
ranking men. Adriana, a young woman from Buenos Aires, Cauca, made this clear
in her testimony. In June 2000, approximately 200 paramilitaries from the Bloque
Calima occupied her community and began to make demands of the residents.
While many women were forced to cook and clean for them, Adriana’s statement
shows that they also faced pressures to engage in unwanted sexual activity with the
armed men:

Clavijo sent four men to come and get me at my house. They told me that the commander
had sent for me. I knew what he wanted. I wasn’t in love with him because I didn’t even
know him. […] [In retrospect], I think this was a survival strategy, because in that moment
I thought it was better that the commander was interested in me than to be at the mercy of
so many lower ranking troops [occupying the town]. There were so many men and so few
women that it couldn’t be avoided. When I arrived [at the camp], there were around 30
men. […] When I arrived they greeted me and invited me to go to a room. […] They
were drinking. […] I could tell that Clavijo was uninhibited because of the alcohol. He
approached me and I already knew what would happen. I did not resist. During the
sexual act I felt used because I didn’t feel anything. (Verdad Abierta, 2014a, 2014b)

Although Adriana acceded to a sexual relationship with the armed commander, she
acknowledged that she did so because she felt threatened. Not only did she fear
abuse from lower-ranking armed actors, but she also recognized the risk to her own
life. If she had fought back or rejected the commander’s advances, she could have
lost her life. Unfortunately, members of Adriana’s community did not recognize her
sacrifice. After the fact, she said that they “stigmatized her” and called her “the com-
mander’s woman” (Verdad Abierta, 2014a, 2014b).

Societal/Legal Conundrum Surrounding Strategic Submission

The women above faced two violent alternatives: (1) resist and suffer violence, abuse,
or death; or (2) submit to rape. Both alternatives involve agency. In the first case,
agency is obvious. Agency is less obvious in the second case, but also the most stra-
tegic means of seeking protection against more violent outcomes for the victims and
their families in the Colombian armed conflict. This second decision, however, led
to societal discrimination: after acting to reduce harm to themselves and others,
these women faced prejudice in their communities and were even accused of consent-
ing to these sexual relations.
After strategically submitting to rape, women have been re-victimized by both
society and the law. Unlike those who risk their lives by screaming, fighting back,
or calling the police, they do not usually visibly confront their perpetrators or seek
outside assistance. They are not “classic” stories of resisting rape. Until the 1990s,
women were not legally recognized for their strategically submissive responses and
Stallone 3497

faced legal injustices (Abrams, 1998; Mardorossian, 2014). The failure to show resis-
tance or a visible reaction to rape was even interpreted as consent by courts of law
(Abrams, 1995). Even if a victim could prove that she was at a disadvantage due to
size and strength and could have been harmed by resisting, she was considered com-
plicit in the violation (Abrams, 1995). As such, women who were unable to demon-
strate physical resistance, verbal objection, or an attempt to escape were excluded
from legal redress in criminal prosecutions (Abrams, 1995).
Today, both Colombian and international legal bodies recognize acts of strategic
submission to rape. They provide comprehensive definitions for rape that account
for the various circumstances that could cause a victim to submit to rape. For
example, the International Criminal Court adopted the following progressive definition
of sexual violence in 2011:

An act of a sexual nature against one or more persons or caused such person or persons to
engage in an act of a sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that
caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power,
against such person or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive
environment or such person’s or persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent.
(Elements of Crimes, 2011)

By acknowledging that force, coercion, and the threat of force can cause a person to
engage in an act of a sexual nature, the above definition recognizes that women do
not necessarily need to resist sexual violence in order to be considered victims. The
definition also applies the qualifier “genuine” before the word consent, which demon-
strates that consent is a disputed term, thereby facilitating a meaningful discussion of
what may make consent genuine.
In addition to the international law noted above, the Colombian Victims Law (2011)
clarifies that consent cannot be determined by the lack of physical resistance. It lists
conditions of non-consent and focuses on the situational contexts that could lead a
woman to verbally accede to rape and not to resist:

Consent cannot be inferred from any words or conduct of the victim where force, the
threat of force, coercion or taking advantage of a coercive environment inhibit the
victim from giving voluntary and genuine consent; Consent cannot be inferred from
any words or conduct of the victim when she or he is unable to give voluntary and
genuine consent; Consent cannot be inferred from silence or the lack of resistance of
the victim in the face of the alleged act of sexual violence.

Law 1236 of the Colombian Penal Code of 2008 makes a similar clarification about
resistance, supporting the particular victim circumstances discussed in this article
(Ley, 1236, 2008). Such definitions highlight advances by legal bodies to create com-
prehensive understandings of rape. Unfortunately, the adoption of this comprehensive
understanding on a societal level is more difficult and has not yet occurred in many
parts of Colombia (Auto 009/15, 2015). Although a legal structure now exists to
support women who have strategically submitted, society continues to discriminate
3498 Violence Against Women 28(14)

against them. In other words, women may be able to seize limited agency by making
rational decisions about their victimization in order to save their lives, but they may
still face stigma for those strategic reactions after the fact.
According to the Colombian Constitutional Court, public officials still are not prop-
erly trained to handle the cases and special needs of these victims (Auto 009/15, 2015;
C-335-13, 2013). The Court notes the “persistence of disrespectful or inappropriate
treatment by some officials responsible for attending to survivors and carrying out
investigations” (Auto 009/15, 2015). Police officers stigmatize women who do not
seem to fit the typical understanding that they have of what it means to be a rape
victim, questioning their credibility (Auto 009/15, 2015; Ruta Pacífica, 2013).
Researchers and community leaders verified this failure during my interviews. They
explained that policemen and local prosecutors continue to expect women to show
such agency as physical resistance and to bear bodily evidence of it. They ask
victims if they screamed for help or fought back. They doubt them if they arrive at
the police station without bruises. Some even laugh at women who come in to
report aggression (Ruta Pacífica, 2013).
Elvira survived rape during Colombia’s conflict and subsequently formed an orga-
nization to prevent future violations and provide support to women victims of armed
conflict sexual violence and domestic violence. She has worked with over 400
women in the region where she lives, and knows many women who have had negative
experiences with public officials who questioned them about resistance while they
attempted to report their sexual violence cases:

What does one hope for [by reporting sexual violence]? One hopes that justice will be
served, that they will arrest whom they have to arrest, but above all, that the truth will
be known. [Instead] they continue to stigmatize us, to re-victimize us, and it is worse.
That is why there are many women who stay silent and that is why there are many
women who prefer not to do it-—not to report. […] They don’t believe us. One goes
to file a report and they don’t believe us. [They say:] “Why didn’t you come that same
day? Why didn’t you bring the evidence? What were you doing in that place? Why
didn’t you resist? Why didn’t you shout? Or why were you alone at that time of night?"**

These claims made by victim-leader Elvira are verified by studies. Research shows that
women do not denounce sexual violence crimes if they feel that they will be accused of
complicity. In a victimology study, Weis and Borges concluded that the rape victim is
unlikely to report or go to court “the more she feels incapable of disproving the antic-
ipated allegation that it was not rape and that she should in fact take the blame herself”
(Weis & Borges, 1973, p. 77). The Colombian Constitutional Court similarly found
that Colombian women are unlikely to report if they predict that they will “be
accused of complicity for not having resisted enough” (C-335-13, 2013). Family
members, community members, and even victims themselves contribute to and perpet-
uate this discrimination (C-335-13, 2013). It is therefore likely that the low levels of
conflict sexual violence reporting in Colombia (between 18% and 22%) can be
explained in part by the stigmatization of victims who cannot prove that they fought
Stallone 3499

against or challenged the perpetrators of their crimes (ABColombia, 2017; C-335-13,

2013). Until Colombian society (and especially those receiving victim reports) accepts
alternative victim responses to rape, there will be difficulties in providing women with
support, justice, and remedy for the sexually violent acts that occurred during the con-
flict. Although the written laws aim to protect rape victims, the implementation of the
laws on the ground must be improved significantly and consistently across Colombia.

Conclusion
Through looking at the strategic objectives and limited agency of the victim, this anal-
ysis of sexual violence in Colombia contributes to the body of literature on rape as a
weapon of war by addressing another dimension of sexual violence occurring during
armed conflict (Baines, 2015; Boesten, 2010; Theidon, 2012; Utas, 2005). Rape is
not solely a strategic weapon wielded by the enemy: rape victims, too, can be strategic
in their responses to unwanted sex in war (Abrams, 1995; Bart & O’Brien, 1984). The
female victim is not simply a recipient of violence; she can make constrained strategic
choices even within her victimization (Mahoney, 1991; Picart, 2003).
While rape victims can show many forms of agency—most often as physical resis-
tance to rape—this analysis has shown that a less studied form of agency surfaces in
situations of armed conflict. Rather than risk their lives by resisting rape, certain
women will prioritize survival and strategically submit to rape when the threat of
worse violence is salient. Using testimonies from female victims from the
Colombian conflict, this article has demonstrated that women may strategically
submit to sexual violence to protect themselves and others from death or severe
forms of abuse.
Problematically, even though women may be able to seize limited agency to protect
themselves and others by submitting to rape, many face a judgmental backlash from
society in the aftermath of violation, because they did not resist rape. Even with legal
changes to support the particular circumstances of victims who strategically submit, soci-
etal attitudes remain discriminatory. In response to discrimination and victim blaming,
women are unlikely to declare rape if they feel that they will be persecuted for strategic
submission. This will continue to hinder data collection, and will prevent the Colombian
government from providing victims with legal or reparative support.
The law alone will not be enough to address rape victims’ needs. Rape and the dis-
crimination surrounding it are not individual issues, but rather collective societal prob-
lems. In order to reconstruct an accurate history and representation of the atrocities that
occurred during Colombia’s conflict and to provide victims with reparations, the
Colombian government must ensure that women are able and willing to declare
crimes of sexual abuse. In the short term, this means implementation of community-
level campaigns about rape and against victim blaming, focusing on police training
and societal awareness. A more long-term solution lies in setting up educational pro-
grams countrywide, with the ultimate goal of changing gendered stereotypes of femi-
ninity and the different violent masculinities that can lead to rape, both in conflict and
in post-conflict society (Hamber, 2007). As the Colombian government moves forward
3500 Violence Against Women 28(14)

with the implementation of the peace accords, it should take advantage of the oppor-
tunity to discuss such reforms.
Recognition of the strategic, yet tragic nature of the choices that women make in
conflict sexual violence situations must be understood to prevent discrimination.
Unless there is broader comprehension of the various forms of strategic submission
in these settings and also beyond and outside of armed conflict in domestic and non-
domestic realms, women who demonstrate this atypical form of agency will continue
to be judged and stigmatized.

Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Leigh Payne for her guidance and support during this project. I would also like to
extend thanks to Robert Braun, Juliana Burgos, Carolina Casas, Laura Enriquez, Charlotte
Forbes, Chloe Hart, Mara Loveman, Elisabeth Wood, Julia Zulver, and the anonymous reviewer
of this piece. Thank you to the Colombian Victims’ Unit for allowing me to accompany various
victim-focused projects and events throughout Colombia. Finally, I wish to thank to all the
women who patiently shared their time, life stories, and understanding of Colombia’s conflict.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
article.

ORCID iD
Kiran Stallone https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3090-6829

Notes
1. Other forms include domestic sexual slavery; genital cutting; sexualized torture; and
forced prostitution, sterilization, pregnancy, and abortion (Auto 009/15, 2015).
2. Victims of wartime rape are discussed as numbered statistics or passive recipients of vio-
lence in UN reports on sexual violence. In these UN reports, women from Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the Central African Republic, Colombia, Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Liberia, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Syria are mentioned
as numbered statistics. They are discussed as passive objects in terms of how they were
“used,” “sold,” and “forced,” and “attacked” (United Nations Office of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, n.d.).
3. Victim testimonies are cited to support arguments about particular perpetrator strategies in
literature on rape during the Rwandan genocide, the war in the former Yugoslavia, and
World War II, among others. In Rwanda, victim testimonies proved that HIV-positive
Hutu fighters raped Tutsi women to forcefully pass them the disease so that they would
die out (Sharlach, 2000, p. 98). In Bosnia, victim testimonies allowed researchers to deter-
mine that Bosnian Serbs raped Bosnian Muslim women with the goal of impregnating
them and “breeding out” the Bosnian Muslim population (Tompkins, 1994, p. 868).
Stallone 3501

Similarly, testimonies from Korean women enabled investigators to learn that the Japanese
military set up forced brothels or “comfort stations” during World War II, where Korean
women were raped and forced to service Japanese troops (Kim, 2012, p. 199).
4. This figure is also problematic because it does not distinguish between rape, forced abor-
tion, sexual mutilation, and other sexually violent acts. These different forms of sexual
violence often have very different motivations and different effects on victims and
should not be lumped together into one figure.
5. Sadly, they are not wrong to believe that the justice system is ineffective; impunity for
sexual violence crimes in Colombia remains “near total,” especially if the perpetrators
were part of an illegal armed group (Auto 009/15, 2015).
6. These include the Christian Marxist National Liberation Army (ELN), the Maoist Popular
Liberation Army (EPL), and the anti-governmental M-19 (April 19 Movement). The M-19
demobilized in 1990 and the FARC did so in 2017, while the other groups remain active.
More recent and much smaller criminal bands include the Aguilas Negras, Clan del Golfo,
La Local, and La Empresa.
7. In 2012, the FARC had approximately 67 different fronts and 10,000 members
(STRATFOR, 2012). The AUC paramilitaries were also composed of approximately 16
different regional blocs, which were further divided into an unknown number of smaller
groups (Verdad Abierta, 2014a, 2014b).
8. Wood found that variation in sexual violence can be explained by the behavior of
armed group leaders, who may make explicit decisions to prohibit, promote or tolerate
rape (Wood, 2009, p. 137). In her forthcoming book on Colombian violence with
Gutiérrez-Sanín, Wood will look at the variation of sexual violence across paramili-
tary groups.
9. See Verdad Abierta, 2014a, 2014b. This research think tank presents limited data and case
studies on the variation of paramilitary sexual violence across occupied AUC regions.
10. My own interviews are asterisked (**), while references are provided in the text for sup-
plemental interviews.
11. Her testimony is also an example of why those receiving declarations need to be sensitive
to the different ways that rape victims talk about sexual violence. For instance, during my
entire interview with Carolina, she never used the word rape; instead, she stated that the
armed actors “did not let [her] rest at night.”

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Author Biography
Kiran Stallone is a PhD candidate in the Department of Sociology at UC Berkeley.