The Imagination of Reason Explores Philosophy's Creative Side

THE IMAGINATION
OF REASON
TWO PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
by
ERIC UNGER
DR.PHIL.
ROUTLEDGE&KEGANPAUL
Broadway House, 68-74 Carter Lane
London
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First published in 1952
by Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited
Broadway House, 68-74 Carter Lane
Lo·n don E.C.4
Printed in Great Britain
by the Oxonian Press Limited
Oxford
PART TWO
THE IMAGINATION OF REASON
PART 11
THE IMAGINATIO OF REASO
1. To philosophize is a general faculty of the human mind

- like understanding music. It is not in the first place a faculty
acquired through study, although it can be studied too-like
music. The study and profession of philosophy can just as
well promote as kill the faculty.
2. The main feature of the philosophical ability is not an
extraordinary subtlety of mind. Acuteness of mind is some-
times necessary in philosophy, but at other times it is com-
pletely useless. A merely acute mind never makes a great
philosopher. It may make a great lawyer or logician.
3. Philosophy does not consist of an enormous chain of the

most intricate reasoning, or of an immense structure of
syllogisms in which the slightest mistake at the foundations or
at any later stage makes all subsequent statements collapse.
4. Philosophy is not a hopeless muddle of undecidable con-

troversies. It is not the vain search for a truth which mankind
has, so far, failed to discover. The fact that there is not even
one great philosopher whose view is not contested by other
experts is no proof of the above thesis, but has a different
explanation.
5. It is an absurd hope-which leads to an ~ually absurd
disappointment-to expect that the phil~so.ph1cal truth for
which mankind has striven from the begmrung should have
been found by any philosopher o! his s~hool and should be
,c ontained in any book or any phtlosoph1cal system.
6. Philosophy is not the task of harmonizing. the r~sults of
·
t h e sciences
and of building up' out
. of the material which they
h
"d
prov1 e, a coherent structure which can be presented as t e
true picture of the world.
101 .
7. Philosophy is not a science. Philosophical truth is not

scientific truth. Philosophical truth and scientific truth cannot
contradict each other, because they do not meet on the same
plane, as must happen in every real contradiction.
8. Philosophy is a language in the making, the develop1nent
of which shows a continuous change. Science is a language of
comparative stability, the development of which shows a
rhythmical alternation of stability and change, each of which
leads to a comparatively long stage at a fixed level of
communication.
9. There is an intermediary zone where science passes into
philosophy. If conflicting views seem to arise in this zone they
do not represent a clash between science and philosophy, but
an encounter between different philosophical-scientific theories.
10. There are three regions : the known, the temporarily
unknown, the eternally unknown. All three together form the
All of Reality. The first two form what is called the' Universe'
as explored by science. Scientific problems determine the
transition-zone from the known to the temporarily unknown.
Philosophical problems determine the transition-zone from the
known to the eternally unknown. Eternally unknown does not
mean beyond the reach of any conception and does not exclude
the applicability of more or less appropriate conceptions.
Eternally unknown means impenetrable by the methods of
observation and induction or by the methods of science.
Eternally unknown therefore means unattainable by setting
out from what is given as an irrational entity. Eternally un-
known, consequently, means not accessible to knowledge, if
by knowledge is understood scientific knowledge. Scientific
knowledge means cognition with the degree of certainty usual
. .
1n science.
11. It is a completely arbitrary logical assumption to sup-
pose that by setting out from what is irrationally given-i.e.
by accepting unquestioningly the irrational character of the
given-the whole extent of the All of reality should be
reached; or that an idea of the All could be formed by
systematization of what happens to be given.
102
I T H E I M AG I N AT I 0
12. As science is not bound to

"-t
~" 0 F RE AS 0 N
eternally unknown, it is inclined to t~~~c~rn i~se~f with the

existent, or even to deny its existen At as if i.t were non-
relevance. ce. t least it denies its
13. As reality, on the other hand . .

science and its methodological ii~~t ~.ot des1g?ed. to fit
restricted cognition must fail to take an 1 a ions, scf1entific~lly
· · Y account o a possible
interconnection
. h of all that exists and of the determ1n1ng
. . influ-
.
ence wh ic the eternally unknown must th h
k F · . en ave on the
now~. . rom ~his springs the motive for regarding the three
domains in a d1fferent way.
14. The known, the temporarily unknown and the eternally

unkn~wn can als~ be viewed in an order, i.e. in a direction
opposite to .that in which science looks, starting from the
g1v~n. Starting. from the unknown and aiming at the given
obviously requires a procedure different from the method of
observation and induction.
15. Sometime~ in the history of thought the method of

deduction has been opposed to that of induction. But the
question arises: deduction from what? To this the answer
has been given: deduction from a complex of hypothetically
set-up general conceptions or principles, framed in order to
deduce from them a coherent system capable of answering the
questions which science cannot solve and of fitting the facts
of the given. Of this type are all great philosophical systems
of the past. From this arose a conflict as to which of the rival
sets of general principles was the true one.
16. It seems not difficult to understand that the realm of ·

the unknown is not necessarily a homogenr-ous region of sheer
non-knowledge: that there ca~ be de~r~es or shades of. things
which we do not know: certain qualities, e.g. of cosmic rays
which are not known are yet nearer to knowledge and to the
known than, say, the nature of life or the relation of mind to
matter or the whole past or the whole future of the world,
or the' predominant nature of th~ All. of reali~y. Although
not-knowing is not-knowing, there is a difference in the chances ·
103
r0f turning a particular unkno~n something. into a known

subject. There are, as it were, different. shades in. the blackness
.of ignorance. From this follows the epistemological considera-
tion: the deeper the unknown, the greater the variety of
possible sets of hypothetical conceptions from which in a
rdeductive way the land of the known may be reached. The
greatest possible variety of deductive ways to the known must
:start therefore from what has been termed the eternally
unknown.
17. In the measure in which the number of possible deductive

;attempts at interpreting the All of reality increases, the
methodological value of deduction as a vehicle leading to truth
.decreases. In the measure in which the value for truth, i.e. the
,deductive value of the original set of conceptions or principles
-decreases, their character as an instrument of deduction loses
importance and their character as a product; of pure con-
:Struction becomes significant. So we have now three cognitive
faculties of the mind: observation, induction, construction.
The method of philosophy is pure construction. ' Pure ~
·m eans: not aiming at interpreting the All of reality by any
:single construction or constructive set of principles.
18. There is only one faculty of the mind naturally related

·it o what is unknown : that is imagination.
19. Imagination can be completely arbitrary, directed by

,emotions or directed by sensations; it may also be not com-
pletely arbitra,ry,. i.e. it may be directed by reason. It can
.enter to almost any degree into a combination with the
reasoning faculties.
20. It is clear that the faculty of imagination which is applied

~and which participates everywhere in ordinary thinking, e.g .
.in forming concepts, comes into its own and is recognized
·the more as imagination proper, the less the so-called receptive
.and passive functions of the mind come into play, i.e. the
·scarcer the material becomes which these functions provide.
Characterizing a cognitive mental act as an act of sensation,
.Qf thought, or of imagination expresses only the preponderance
104
f one of these modes while, in fact, all three of them are

~resent in every single cognitive act •. to h?we~er ~mall a de~ree
the non-prominent ones may be implied in it. Sensation,
thought, and imagination, then, are only different forms and
names of one and the same underlying mental activity which
changes its character according to the object with which it has
to cope and which is either given or is to be inferred or to be
constructed. It should be noted that, in the first place, and in
the natural condition of things, even the full working of the
imaginative function is not a display of a purely subjective
inventive faculty dealing with its own non-existing products,
but is always related and always refers to unknown existence.
Construction, therefore, does not mean 'nothing but con-
struction ', but construction referring to and motivated by the
existence of unknown reality.
21. The share of the constructive element in thought and in

scientific theories is greater than in sensation and in common
sense perception, and is greater in philosophy than in science.
22. The required maximum activity of systematic imagina-

tion is attained in the adequate attitude of the mind in relation
to the most comprehensive object which includes the eternally
unknown reality.
-
23. In so far as the process of induction includes the formu-
lation of the hypothesis which is intended to fit the facts, i.e.
in so far as it includes constructive activity based on facts, the
relation between induction and construction can be regarded
as that of continuous passage of one principle into the other:
9onstruction can be interpreted as emerging from the ' limiting
case' of induction. For construction, too, is meant to be
related in the last resort to given or inferable reality. But this
relatedness to the given (in the wider sense of including also
what is inferable from it) assumes the character of construction
rather than of induction if the given fails to provide sufficient
guidance for the endeavour of understanding, i.e. if too many
explanatory possibilities are open to the mind and none of
them accounts for the whole nature of the given; in other
105
words. if the phenomenon to be experienced is too un-

detcrrnined and indefinite or the nu111ber of unknown factors
is too great. But this is just the case with that fragmentary
collection which is called the scientific universe.
24. The lin1it of thought is not what is conceivable by reason.

but \Vhat is conceivable by reasonable or systematic imagina-
tion. Reasonable imagination is reason in its comprehensive
sense.
25. The wider scope of reasonable or systematic imagination

compared with that of reason or rationality in the traditional
sense (in which it takes its orientation from the irrationally
given) lies in the circumstance that traditional reasonableness
tends to follow the lines indicated by the compound facts
as they happen to occur or to be given in experience, while
reasonable imagination tends to increase the phenomenology
which the given represents by either breaking up the compounds
into components and connecting them in a different way, or by
establishing relations between facts, or between facts and com-
ponents which the known experience does not show. To take
an example: if materialism says mind is ultimately a product
of matter, or if idealism says matter is ultimately a product of
mind, reasonable imagination has established a connection
between occurrences in an order that is different from the order
in which they are to be found in experience. For whereas un-
interpreted experience does not show mind as a product of
matter or matter as a product of mind, imagination does so
with the aim of tracing a continuation of the known into the
unknown. In an ultimate sense, imagination too is bound by
what is given in experience; but not by the · order of com-
position in which it is given.
Philosophy does not create new facts (or does so only by
stimulating science) but merely attempts to discern the nature
of an indescribable entity, the world, which it tries to make a
fact thereby. For the world is not a fact in the same sense as
all other facts which it contains. On a smaller scale, every
scientific advance follows the same principle: it creates new
facts by anticipating them or their alternatives in imagination.
106
2 •
THE IMAGINATION OF R .
EASON
26. The task of reasonable or systematic im . . .
determine the range of the All of reality. aginatton is to
The method of philosophy is reasonabl .
imagination. e or systematic
27. All that exists, anq only All that exists, defines the
meaning of existence or of ' to be '.
28. : To. be ' ~eans, in the first place : to belong to a system

of being in which alone an object is capable of being (has a
place). S? we cannot th~nk:, ~or instance, of ' a cat' existing
and nothing else. By saying, a cat exists' or 'this cat exists'
we mean to say that it belongs to a system of existence. By
asserting that something exists we must define the something.
But by defining the something we have to· refer to the system
to which it belongs. We cannot say, in the literal sense,' There
is something, we do not know what '. By using this phrase, as
we do in a loose way, we only mean to express: 'We do not
know in detail or exactly what~. If we mean it literally, i.e. if
we mean to assert the existence of something of which we do
not even know one single -feature referring to a system of such
features (if the non-knowledge is not merely a partial one
reserved for other features), the proposition becomes senseless.
To be and to be in a system of being belong together~
indeed, they are one.
29. Every system to which an existing ~omething belongs

requires a wider system of which the subord1~ate systei:i forms
a part. The wider system contains t~e r~tlo e~sendz of the
subordinate one (and, with some mod1ficat1on, vice versa).
· t' niverse of
30. The widest possible system is not the ex~s 1ng ~
what is scientifically given and inferable by induction.
3 l. The object of philosophy ~s the wide~t P~~~~~~ :~:~~~~.

this is in particular the system, wider tha~ t ~ e;.~c
1
certainty is
of which no knowledge of the degree 0
sci~ wn reality.
possible. In this sense it is the eternally un no
107
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32. ~ha~ there exists an eternally unknown reality wider than

th~ setent1 ~callfy expl~rable univ:rse follows from the concept
1
~n actua ity o experience, that 1s from the necessary assum .
tlon that the boundaries of experience are not the boundari~
of re~lity. Otherwise there would not be 'something' to b~
ex penenced.
33. Traditional philosophy passed rather too quickly from

the known to the ultimate basis of all reality, calling it God,
the Absolute, the One and All. It omitted to devote much
thought to the possible nature of the scientifically unknowable.
34. Where the guidance ends which thought, based on the
facts of the given and on what is inductively inferable from it,
provides, the only principle leading further is systematic con·
struction. This is the true meaning of what in former times
has been called a priori.
35. The difference between the a priori of traditional meta-
physics and constructive reasoning is that the a priori
consideration and the deduction based on the a priori had
been believed to lead to results of scientific certainty, while all
construction keeps within the domain of the possible only.
Pure philosophy is the exploration of the possible.
Pure philosophy is the exploration of the materially possible,
i.e. the possibility in the realm of content. Pure mathematics
is the scientific exploration of the formally possible, i.e. of pos·
sibility in the realm of form.
36. The innermost nature of thinking is to think existence.
The evolving of conceptions, which express the possible ' How '
of an existing something, belongs to thinking its existence.
Possibility belongs to existence. The nature of the realms of
existence beyond the reach of induction can be examined by
pure thought only. Pure thought represents being beyo_nd the
range of induction. This seems to be in agreemen~ with the
old a priori principle of metaphysics. But not a single con-
struction of pure thought is possible, beyond the range of
induction as an established certainty to the exclusion of others.
This seems ' to contradict the old a priori pnnc1p · · Ie of
metaphysics.
108
37.. ~ure thought ~n the sy?thetic ~ ~riori principle of

trad1t1onal n:ietaphys1cs means categones or conceptions as
free as possible from any content provided by sensation; it
means concepts like ' being ', ' negation ', ' essence '~ ' neces-
sity ', etc. ' Pure thought ' in a method of systematic imagina-
tion does not merely mean mental products which are free
from sensuous content. The 'purity', here, does not refer to
the absence of sensuousness but to the absence of the normal
order of the elements and qualities (of sensation) as they occur
in the known universe. Pure thought signifies the universe of
systematic imagination. The universe of imagination includes
the false, the senseless, the contradictory, and the non-existent.
It contains the possible. that is, that which will be real at some
time. If critical philosophy (in the Kantian sense) declares
that inevitably two constituents are needed to make knowledge
(whereby 'scientific knowledge' is meant), namely intuition
and thinking, and that without intuition no knowledge is
possible, the statement can be accepted with modification for
the sort of cognition which is pursued in philosophy: if
ordinary intuition provides the sensuous element for the know-
ledge of the understanding, imagination is the sensuous element
of reason as the organ of thought for ultimate reality. Without
imagination, indeed, reasoning is ' empty '.
38. Pure philosophy is not concerned with matter-of-factness.
39. The unknown reality shows in particular two different

aspects: one apart from the known universe, and the other in
connection with and including the known universe. . The known
universe can be interpreted as an island in the unknown reality.
The known universe itself, on account of its being embedded
within the unknown, is largely unknown. For a known entity
which forms part of a larger unknown entity is even as such
only very incompletely known. This is the reason for the
never-ending revision of the results of science by science itself.
The aspect of the unknown apart from the imperfectly
known universe is itself partial.
The aspect of the unknown including the imperfectly known
universe we call the All of reality.
109
The unknown as partial can only be conceived as containing

everything possible which is capable of becoming real and will
become real and which is different from the known universe
including its inductively inferable fringe. It contains in par-
ticular the unlimited continuation of the known universe into
past and future. The unknown as the All of reality can only
be represented by a structural conception or set of conceptions,
that is by conceptions for which the difference between
ultimateness and non-ultimateness is relevant.
40. The unknown as the All of reality is the object of all

constructions which are philosophical systems.
The unknown as partial is the domain of all constructions
which are concerned with possibilities of existence different
from those of the known universe in its inductively attainable
range. It represents unknown and possible experience not
according to its mere form, as space, time, causality, etc., but
according to its content, i.e. qualities · considered in a general
way, and according to the whole extension which has to be
attributed to or co-ordinated with space and time and their
contents in the All of reality. That is to say it represents
possible reality.
41. Traditional metaphysics has largely concentrated on

interpreting the unknown as the All of reality without paying
much attention to the realID: of the unknown as that of possible
reality beyond induction. It passed abruptly from the known
immediately to the All. It, therefore, formed a too narrow con-
ception of the ' All ', with the idea that one said enough if one
said' Infinity'. In other words, traditional metaphysics did not
approach the task which has been described as ' pure philo-
sophy'. There are, however, signs that, in recent philosophy,
a somewhat related task has been visualized, although only in
the field of pure logic and without any reference to reality:
these are the attempts of ' phenomenology ' and of the ' theory
of objects ' (Gegenstandstheorie) , the latter's method of
regarding things 'in abstraction from existence' (daseinfrei),
and the phenomenological description of ' pure consciousness '·
110
42. The ~oncept of 'possible reality' has to be regarded in

analogy with .the concept of actual e.xperienced reaJity, cx<.:ept
for the definiteness of .actual expe~1ence. 'Possible reality',
then, denotes the material of a possible experience rather than
possible experience itself. For the content of experience or
ordered experience can only be known by experience. But the
' material of possible experience ' is, even for constructi vc
thought, none other than the ' material of actual ex pcriencc ',
except for its order and composition. For even unrcstrjc.;tc<l
imagination can have no other material. But infinHeJy many
different orders are imaginable, an indefinite number of which
are ' possible ', i.e. are related to reality, or were or wiJJ be
real at some point of the whole time dimension. It belongs to
the task of pure philosophy to look for criteria for distinguish-
ing the merely or provisionally imaginable from the systematic-
ally imaginable or the possible.
43. The relation between the unknown as possible experience

and the unknown as the All of reality is parallel to the relation
between experience and the object of an ultimate philosophical
conception of the world.
44. The differences between the approach of pure philosophy

to the unknown as the material of possible experience and the
approach of science to the temporarily or as yet unknown
experience are mainly these: Science aims at definite, i.e.
ordered experience. Philosophy aims at the outlines of
possibility in general. Science aims at possible experience on
the verge of its becoming actual experience. Philosophy aims
at the general material (qualitative) contents of experience
extending through the whole expanse of past and future time
and never entering wholly the domain of actual experience.
Science explores the unknown immediately bordering on the
known. Philosophy explores some features of the whole .un-
known apart from the known. Science explores the poss1ble
immediately bordering on the actual. Philosophy explores .som.e
features of the possible within the whole unknown, 1:e. it
explores also the possible remote from the actual. Science
aims at an extension of known experience into the unknown,
11 1
at an additional experience which consists of definite particu-

lars and is at hand. Philosophy aims at very general (though
not merely formal) characteristi~s of ~11 past. and future
experienceable and inferable reahty which is diff~~en! ~rom
actual experience and can never show the most ind1v1dual
particulars. Philosophy aims at the contours and. some m~in
universal contents of an experience as a whole which remains
always in the far distance. .
In the perspective of science the unknown is but a small
annex to the known.
In the perspective of philosophy the known is but a small
annex to the unknown.
Science and science-directed philosophy (such as the Kantian)
look for the equalities of actual and possible experience. They
therefore accentuate the ' forms of every possible experience '.
Philosophy looks for the differences between actual and
possible experience. It therefore looks for some general
contents of possible experience. Science-directed philosophy
(such as the Kantian) mistakes the concept of the ' possible ' in
science for the concept of the ' possible ' in philosophy.
45. The unknown, so far as it is grasped by human thought,

can be nothing but a different order of the elements of the
known. The organ for representing the universe of all orders
different from the order of the known is imagination in so far
as it is not only unrestricted but spurred to the limits of its
productivity.
46. The symbolic evocation, however sketchy, of the universe

of all orders di.fferent from the order of the known is the first
st~p towar~s setting the general background for outlining the
w1~est J?Oss1ble system, which is not the existing universe (i.e.
~h1ch is not .what is scientifically given and inductively
inferable from it-Point 30).
47· The elements of the known and of the unknown orders

a~e co~tents : quantities and qualities, physical psychical or
b1ologicaI ' in
· h · · ' '
~ err possible combinations. These contain all
prod~cts of imagination, possible and impossible. They
contain, amongst other products, the ' continuum f ormarum ~'"
112
The totality of all products of imagination corresponds,

in the domain of qual'ity, to wh a t is,
48. . in . of quantity,
. the d oma1n .
th totality of all classes of numbers.
~re philosophy, therefore, is the examination of the task of
universal permutation and combination of contents with the
~iew to their relation to reality. Pure philosophy is the
mathematics of contents-with all modifications regarding
method, certainty and truth-concept that are due to the
difference between content and form.
Pure philosophy cannot, as science can, definitively reject
the simple question: Why does this exist rather than that? or:
Why does this not exist? To give an ever more definite answer
to this question is one of its aims.
49. The feature of reality which expresses an infinitely

increasing difference from the actual known experience is
time-be it in the interpretation of a real succession or in any
transformation whatever of the time-concept. Infinitely
increasing difference, then, from the actual known experience
is bound to occur somewhere and somewhen in reality.
50. Repetition or eternal recurrence is the expression of a

disproportion between the factor of time and its contents. The
ratio essendi of eternal recurrence itself must refer to non-
recurrence. That is to say, non-recurrence is more fundamental
than recurrence, as 'one' or undifferentiatedness is more
fundamental than ' two ' or differentiatedness. Difference of a
state of reality which is increasing in its otherness from known
experience in an unlimited degree would have to be traced,
then, to the domain of non-recurrence.
51. Pure philosophy, just as it is concerned with symbolically ·

unfolding the general background containing all the products
of unlimited imagination, is also concerned with examining
the criteria for narrowing down this area of universal
unrestricted imagination in order to approximate to the
boundary lines of the possible, which are the boundary lin~s
of reality. For everything which is possible must happen in
the course of unlimited change. This is a conclusion from .
the equation between existence and infinity.
113
TH E IMAGINATION OF REASON
.5 2. The n1ain criterion for excluding infinite series of

products of in1agination from the domain of the possible is
thnt of contradiction bet\veen the components of such a
product. It seems probable that all other criteria are ultimately
reducible to contradictoriness. Yet they are very important
.as provisional guides. By contradiction, however, no formal
contradiction is understood, that is, no contradiction in the
nominalistic sphere of mere logic. Logical contradiction is
only the final linguistic form which a contradiction assumes if
it is demonstrated as a definitely real contradiction. A real
contradiction, or a contradiction of existence (which nullifies
existence or is an expression of impossibility) is the incompati-
bility not of concepts but of different characteristics of the real,
-such as, say, the imaginative product of' a land animal posses-
sing fins '. There is neither a logical contradiction between
' land' and ' water ', nor is ' superfluity', at first sight, an ex-
pression of logical incompatibility. The logical contradiction as
the final seal of the real contradiction is, in this case for instance,
not brought out by referring to land-life or water-life or to
superfluity, but by discovering some different terms connected
with them which we feel vaguely but have not yet formulated.
A mere contradiction in terms is no proof of a real one-for
the terms must be 'true' ones in addition, i.e. describe reality
and be contradictory-nor is the real one easily transformed
into a logical one.
53. Therejs a zone of innumerable seeming contradictions or

of combinations which do not exist in the domain of known
experience, but which are nevertheless no real contradictions.
The appearance of contradiction results from the fact that
there are different strata of reality and that the realization or
·the occurrence in reality of a cqmbination may happen in a
.s tratum different from that in which it is imaginatively formed
.-and in which it represents a contradiction. If, for example,
the enormous difference is realized between the present evolu-
tionary stage of man and that feature of the universe which
·was responsible for the emergence of a human being, or that
in which it was implied, some hundreds of thousands of years
ago, and if a corresponding difference is considered between
what man is now and what he will be some hundreds of
114
'r H ,, 1 M A \j l N " T r0 N 0 F R r A s0 N
thousands of yeurs hence n the assun1ption that evolution

\vill not stop or retrn "its steps- there is little doubt that 1nany
n1vtht'k) 'icul cone "ptions, whose literal contents are full of
,.";ntnu.li ·tions. ' ill pro e capable of expressing reality in a
s 'n~' difY~rent fr tn their lnanifest content, i.e. in a stratum
-0f r~ality as different frotn that literally denoted as is the
n~roplanc front the itnac:e of a win hed sup rnatural being of
hun1u n fonn. T h' i 1n·1g ". if t~1 ken literally, 1nay ultin1ately
prov" contradi ~tory. t11e htunan form with wings being,
p ~rhnps. biologically contradictory. Expecting a possible
T"-.l lity to correspond lit rally to an itnaginative product is like
l oking for son1e particular reality at the wrong place. Simi-
larly. an ntity or state of affairs very often exists already but
is not recoc:nized
..... for what it is on account of the transformed
~1 spect which it offers to an enquirer who has only the literal
i111nge in tnind. So the nlythological crossings between human
and a nin1a1 forrns n1ay prove really illusionary, i.e. impossible,
n t because they do not occur in experience, but because
they do already occur in experience though in a stratum not
expected by and not n1anifest to the mythologically minded
obs n r , who is not aware of the fact that the human being
with all his possibilities is already actually a concentration of
all animal forn1s and may develop, in character and social
function, in the directions indicated by various animal-
n1a nifesta lions of life. There are ' beasts of prey ' groups of
men, 'flight-animal ' groups of men, activity groups, inactivity
groups and all sorts of groups of men making a part-feature
of life (i.e. an animal feature) their dominant characteristics.
The intrinsically ' human ' group is not their presupposition
and starting-point, but their evolutionary aim in a distant
future. So niythological conceptions can be transpositions in
the sphere of the senses, of reality at another level: as, e.g.•
Oscar Goldberg has interpreted the mythological animal-gods
of primitive groups in the sense explained above. The figments
of imagination, then, which turn out to be no real contra-
dictions have possible reality in the stratum in which they are
possible, and need not, as it were, occur doubly in reality.
54. As a criterion of a real contradiction necessarily

encounters the difficulties of conclusive proof in its application,
115
THE JMAGJNATJ O N OF R E A S ON
the human mind possesses some other indi~ato:s which may

ultimately reveal themselves to be mere denvat1ons from the
contradiction-principle, but which provisionally represent
autonomous criteria for denying possibility to large parts of
the universe of imagination. They have always been in tinc-
tively applied, but they are, it is true, mere subjective signpost.
to the frontiers of the possible in the universe of content ~
their constituent principle is: life and its unchangeable
impulses, relevance for life, meaningfulness, significance, sense
connectedness with a loose teleological system of reality which
makes ample allowance for a non-purposive course of events.
Now, the criterion which rules out innumerable multitudes and
classes of imaginative products from the realm of possible
reality is, at first sight, the complete absence of any of those
features in a product or in a class of products. Striking
senselessness is easily recognized or. rather, 'felt', but hard to
J
demonstrate. There is, however, a very important specification
of this principle for restricting the universe of imagination to
the domain of the possible: that is the criterion excluding
senseless repetition of existence (as e.g. the universe imagined
once, twice, three times, four times, n times). This principle
is connected with a general enquiry into the orders of
magnitudes of existing things. Another problem of pure
philosophy in this context is the relation of these criteria to the
principle of real contradiction.
S5. There is no difference between possible reality and

reality in the All of existence. That is to say, everything which
is possible is real in the ultimate sense of reality and is bound
to happen in the unrolling of the unlimited change which is
expressed by the whole dimension of time. There is everything
that can be there.
The conception of a ' real possibility ' or of a possibility
which is an existent entity in · ultimate reality has been put
forward by various philosophers in the course of the history of
thought. We name especially Leibniz and, in recent times, the
fragmentary philosophical remarks of Oscar Goldberg. It is
particularly from the ideas of this author on possibility and
infinity that the present considerations have started. ~be
conceptions of Goldberg have been stated in a philosophical
116
T II ' . IM A 0 I . AT I 0 H OP I~ A () ;
introduction to an otherwise n n-philo' phi aJ bo<-, f call ·

on account of it" mythological subj<X1. Th? R ?alit r1f the
Hebrews) an<l it ·is only this introductory ch· p ~r '
' Philosophical and Cosmological Founda ti n ' to ~th kh v ,.
refer. The author distinguishes between an infinite re· Ji y
which is the realm of all possible existence and the initc rcali J
which is the domain of all actually cxi ~ting thin' Op. ·it,,
p. I.>. Attributing reality als t p<:>!')~ibilitic; , he (.;( c C' r )
the view of Leibniz who maintain. that 'not Jy the cxi· t.c t
things which the world contains but alM' the thi g~ that arc
possible have their reality' <De rerum originatione radicali.
trans. by Mary Morris, Everyman\ Li brary, p. 37J. B
Goldberg goes one step farther by widening the noti n f th'"
possible. He says that 'All exist<> as real f which a real
concept exists ' (Op. cit. p. 4J. Through this exten ,j he
makes the compass of thought- instead of conclu si on ~ fr n
the given- the measure of the range f the po~~i le. ~rh i '
principle is accepted here, though the formula qu ted
m, . not seem to be fortunate. It i preferable to f rmulate th
thesjs in this way: Everything which can exist, exi t 5. A
)rincip e everything which i · not ultimately a real contratlicti n ca .
er of exist, and belongs t the All f reality. Thi ~ means, e 1er -
Jf p re thing which is not ultimately a real contradicti n, exist J.
· tot e exist is no chance occurrence, and no irrational datum.
There is another way of formula ti ng the connecti bet ti cen
po ssibility and reality in the Al1 f exi ·tence: The ultimate
conception in considering the problem f the Real is ot
a reality but possibility. The decisive reflec1i n,. then, v uld
be that if nothing were to exist at a1l, the possibility that . me-
thing or even All ~ho uld exist would be omitted. If, conversely.
the n thing is not a real contradiction (which it doe · not ~m
to be in aIJ it<j form s) its possibility ·would be omitted by the
existence of AJJ or of something. If · mething nly sh uld
exist, the possibilities of the All and of the othing would be
omitted. Therefore, Existence o r the Real must be · nceived
in uch a way as to alJow for the existence of the AH and f r
a n ntol gkal aspect which must be called ' othing' without
thereby constituting a reaJ contradiction (or bhcer unthink-
abilityJ. Just in order to eliminate the unquestioning assump-
tion that such a contradiction is bound to ari~ one m.ay reft..rr
117
to all those conceptions in the history of thought in which the

idea of Nothing has been interpreted not as absolute
non-existence but as the' indifferentiation of differences' or as
the neutralization of opposites which mutually cancel each.
other. The; resulting zero is not complete nothingness but
complete indeterminateness. The absence of all distinctness,
not the absence of reality, is thereby indicated. It is a Nothing
which, as conceived in Hegel's Logic, for example, is in fact
Being itself. In modern philosophy S. Friedlander gave an
original form to this idea in his work 'Creative Indifference~.
Likewise the existence of 'something' cannot be omitted
without reducing the full and complete scope of infinite-
possibility. From this a topography of the All of possibility
would follow in which' Nothing',' All of reality' and' actual
or limited reality' each have their place; and one of the factors.
for making this placing possible would seem to be time. Again,
we may refer to the chapter quoted above in which Goldberg
interprets time as ' ... the form of the entry of possibilities.
from infinite into finite reality ' in which they become actual.
That time is a factor which is responsible for the restriction
and selection of possibilities and that it is therefore a principle
of order is also expressed in Leibniz's statement: ' ... once·
it has been granted . . . that transition from possibility to
actuality is to take place, then, even if nothing further is deter-
mined, the consequence is that there exists as much as possible
in view of the capacity of time and place (or of the possible
order of existing)'. (De rer. orig. rad. p. 35). Two more con--
ceptions may be considered in this context, an ancient one and
a modern one. The first is the syllogism of Diodoros Kronos
(about 300 B.c.) in which he tries to prove the coincidence of
the real and the possible. This however is done in such a way
that it seems to mean the opposite of the position outlined
above, b~ca~se reality is made co-extensive with possibility not
by adjusting, i.e. widening the real to the ambit of an autono--
mous possible but by restrjcting the possible to the circum-
ference of the actual. Diodoros maintains that only the actual
is possible. But as he includes past and future actuality in the
domain of the actual, his conclusion that the possible is nothing
more than that which is, has been and will be, amounts,.
formally and without further qualification, to the converse·
118
proposition that all t~at which is essentially possible (and which

never was real and is not real at present) will be real in th
course of unlimited time. e
The second conception to be regarded is that of modern
physics, the view ?f a s~tic ' four-dimensional ' world in which
' past and future he, as it were, mapped out along with the near
and distant ' (Eddington) and in which ' only the consciousness
... experiences the detached piece which comes to meet it ...
as a process that goes forward in time and takes place in
space ' (Weyl)~
All this would amount to saying that, ultimately, possibility
and reality coincide. The main, first and fundamental guiding
principle to be satisfied in pure philosophy and reflection on
reality is possibility.
56. Nothing can exist but the All of existence. The highest
degree of unrestricted comprehensiveness is not ~ sum of all
that happens to be there, or a sum of the facts of the universe,
but is describable in its range only by a pure construction
which attempts to form an idea of this comprehensiveness by
calling up every power of the imagination to its systematic
limits. But that the content of this All-constrJiction, which
infinitely exceeds all known experience and its inductively
attainable extension, must . exist does not follow from the
ontological argument that by the subtraction of the predicate
of existence from the constructed All the latter would become
a smaller thing and not be the true All any more. It does not
follow from the meaning of ' All ', which would be, so to
speak, impaired and cancelled if it were deprived of the
predicate of existence, i.e. if it did not actually exist. It follo\vs
from the meaning of existence itself, that is from the intrinsic
relatedness of the meanings-i.e. actuality- of' existence' and
' system ' and from the illimitable pressing on of the principle
of' system' to the utmost and to complete comprehensiveness.
By saying that the existence of the content of the All of
existence follows from the meaning of existence, no ontological
trick is played : as if the meaning of existence were the sort of
' meaning ' of all other things, a mere product of the mind.
The meaning of existence is different from all other meanings
119
T H E I M A G I N A T J 0 N 0 P R E A S () N
in that it denotes real, not merely thought e:xistc n · . (Jtfr r...

wise, real existence would have no concept to den t i t. ff /1 ·
distinguish the concept of exjstence from al I oth · r ·ot1 · / 1 ,
(in the ontological proof it is treated on tho san1c Jcv I ~1 ; IJ
·other concepts) by calling it a 'that '-concept ex pres i11 ; 1h ,.
statement ' that there is something ' in contradjstin ·tic n t< :r
"how '-concept expressing the statement 'how somcthir ~{ i •
we see at once that Kant's objection to the ontoJogic' I pr 1 f
namely that the predicate 'to be ' (or the ' that ;-ch' rac d ·tic>
adds nothing to the content of a concept (which 1s a ~ ho"!-! ' ..
characteristic), would be correct but for one u nexpoctcd r ' ~,o
which nullifies the whole intention of his argument the r r Ji-
cate ' to be ' adds nothing to the content of a partjcular con · ~
as such, because it adds to it the contents of all o ther · n · "1 t · t
that is to say, because it puts the concept in question in o th

widest possible context which a]one is capable of re' 1 cxh en<; .
The ' infinity-feature ' of the concept 'existence' is .n i TC' n ~.cd .
whereas that fragment of system which is jn the 1rjp ,f <> 1r
sense-organs and of our ordering understan tUng absorb'~ dl 1
our attention. This raises the problem of a seeminr ly d v~ I

interpretation of existence which does not deal with o : ·, · i c
existence, but with existence based upon the con.·ciou';n' : ; ;f
an Ego.
56a. According to any sort of idea]i sm whc t is me' t r y

existence must ultimately have the form. of an E -'O. or of '
consciousness. The first proposition underJyjng every a . ~c r tion
of existence is 'I am'; and everything else exists only bc<.:au 'C
it is connected with the existence of myse1f, that is, with th ··
experience of myself (to which the experience bel ongs tha t
there are other selves). 'To be' or 'to exist', then, mea ns a. 1
much as ' to be sensed ' or ' to ce thought ', o r both; t he

coincidence of these with ' being ' derives from the co incidence
of sensing or thinking or both with being. Now, this rcducti n
of being to being experienced by a consciousness, or, rather,
by 'my ' consciousness would seem to represent an objection
against an inseparable nexus between the concepts ' existence '
and 'infinity' (or infinite growth of the system). F or a ny
conscious experience of any particular content by myself wo uld
seem to warrant at least the existence of a momenta ry menta l
120
.-: .ttn '' '*
1 1
. , •••
event of which no tendency towards infinity is observable. My

present awareness of a coloured patch or of a momentary
sensation is sufficient to guarantee that ' something exists ',
.even if it be an illusion and even if I do not go beyond it. The
inner experience of a moment is enough to correspond fully to
what is meant by ' to exist'. In this case it does not seem
necessary for reason to proceed from the isolated content of
such a single experience to the wider logical system to which
the content belongs and which serves to corroborate its
'objective' (mind-independent) existence. For every single
n1ind-dependent event, it is thought, implies in itself uncontra-
dictable, though perhaps only mental, existence. If this were
so, what has been called the ' infinity feature of existence '
would not hold good for existence implied in the experience of
a conscious moment. But it is not so. For there is no isolated
conscious mon1ent or momentary experience without a pre-
supposed Ego or at least a consciousness. This consciousness
which underlies and conditions any moment-experience is in
itself a systematizing faculty. The conscious experience of a
coloured patch does not need to be supplemented by any
' objective ' system of entities of which it forms a systematic
member-as is the case with objective existence-but it does
need to be made possible by a living and productive psychical,
i.e. spiritual substructure, the very nature of which is the
ability of evolving and moulding systems: in one word, it
does need a consciousness which cannot be momentary. The
existence-proving moment-awareness of any sensation does
not prove existence on account of this moment but on account
of a consciousness which is the mental potentiality of time-
and other systems-and which is responsible for the rise of
the momentary awareness. Hit should be demanded that the
momentary awareness should exist for itself, it would not rise
and would not exist. So it is no less than the whole conscious-
ness, stretched through time and potentially containing
systems, which, even on the presumption of idealism, yields
the idea and certainty of existence. The degree of the
systematizing faculty is in direct proportion to the height of
the consciousness in an evolutionary scale. But every con-
sciousness, however narrow, is ' on the way ' to the degree of
unlimited systematization, and the distinctness of and the
121
sensitiveness for existence or reality are in direct proportion

to the systematizing power of consciousness. The ' infinity
feature of existence' is also preserved in the idealist aspect.
It has a more intensive and potential character than in
existence judged as objective, where it shows a more extensive
and explicit character.
57. The basic assumption of science and its attitude to reality

is that nothing can be accepted as possible the possibility of
which has not been demonstrated.
The basic assumption of philosophy and its attitude to
reality is that nothing can be accepted as impossible the
impossibility of which has not been demonstrated.
Science must not hold anything to be possible in the area
of the unknown that is not near in its characteristics to actual
particular experience.
Philosophy must not hold anything to be impossible in the
area of the unknown which is remote from actual particular
expenence.
Science, taking its orientation from known experience, must
lay the burden of proof on the claim for the possibility of
something.
Philosophy, taking its orientation from the All of existence,
must lay the burden of proof on the claim for the impossibility
of something.
58. The All of existence is far more comprehensive than any

quantitative infinity. By ' quantitative infinity ' the endles
repetition of something is understood, that is a repetition in
which that which is repeated can be either ' the same ' or
' equal ' or with only an insignificant modification or difference
on each occasion. If, however, the members of an infinite
multitude are different from each other in such a way that the
specification and 'shades' of a quality are exhaustively con-
tained in that multitude, and if the characteristics of quality
itself, i.e. the difference of one quality from the next in order
and from all others, can be collected in an ordered infinity of
infinite multitudes, we pass to a qualitative infinity or to an
infinity of qualities. The All of existence is the most com-
prehensive qualitative infinity.
122
58a. In so far as our consciousness is limited, in so far is our

realization of what 'existence' means, or our consciousness
of existence as such, limited.
59. Existence, therefore, is not a mere form-concept ('form'
meaning: independent of content). For it depends on outlining
an area which requires taking into account and constructing,
in a general way, kinds or classes of content which fill and
determine that area.
60. Pure philosophy deals with the eternally unknown part
of the All of reality; science deals with the known and know-
able part oti the All of reality; philosophy deals with the
systematic relation and unity of known and unknown, that is
with the All of reality. The relation of pure philosophy to
philosophy is similar to the relation between scientific content
and scientific theory.
61. If even the known is overshadowed by the non-knowledge
of the eternally unknown with which it forms a unity, so much
more will the conception of this unity or of the All of reality,
in which the unknown predominates, remain obscure. Yet
some light will fall upon it from the whole of the known and
by exhausting the possible ways of our thought regarding the
unknown.
For there are two kinds of necessity in thought : the deduc-
tion from an evident axiom (which excludes innumerable, in
fact all, other axiomatic possibilities) and the exhaustive use
and recognition of all possibilities. It is only in view of
scientific experience that a choice between possibilities is
necessary, while it is the definition of qualitative infinity that
no choice between possibilities is permissible, because that
infinity consists of all of them. The demonstrated impossi-
bilities or real contradictions only can be excluded.
62. Regarding the world within the range of observation and
induction there is a prescientific and a scientific perception.
Regarding the world beyond the range of observation and
induction a sort of awareness analogous to prescientific
perception only is possible. There are, however, considerable
differences of degree in this quasi-prescientific approach. We
123
THE IMAGINATION OF REAS N
say qua i-prescientific in order t? ~ndi catc tha t ,

stage is Jikcly to foJJow. In fact, 1t J ~, ra~hf."T P. ' t c 1c
similar in truth value to the presc1cnt1 1c way f r cw r ·: ,,
thing , which, however, jn thi case i. capa~Jc .o f u · ·
progress without ever reaching the state of. ~1 en t1 1c
For, in philo ophy, thi would mean rca h1ng the tru h.
63. It i a consequence of the principle f systematic i · it·.

tion that not only the variety f the po . iblc intc rpreta ·ic ·, o
the AJI of reality is increased, i.e. the variety f the
phi lo. ophical 'world ~y tern ', but al the amo unt f
of which known and knowable experience f rm a p/·r' .
this 'content' cannot be as ~pecified r defi nite a ~ the o . c •
of actual experience. It can only be co n ei cd hyp h · 'Jf .:
and as a cla. s rather tha n as indi vidu J urrc CC\ ,; ·
n nc the Jc ~ , just as necc. ~ ry for retti ng an id·
a. t c actual experience. Thi s is . t ac' i · '
spc· kin' f' infinite content'. F r the mere pr . o
pci st and future of a lim . ted and fra gmentary · n ·
which observation and induction serve as the a ppr pd .
criteria. f exi tencc, i only a quantitative in 1nity. It
n t brin out the co~plcment of the given and t c i
inf rrcd which mu st be added to them in order t fill th e r'
of qualitative infinity whic.:h i the ultim· tc ritcrjr
cxi tcncc. Thew k of philosophy i inevita bly an an icipa.
one. Philosophy would be rendered imp i Jc by the d
to take it interpretati n of ' being ' from actua l e pcric cc
t p tpone it to the end ( experience. I s rel ' .ti .
experience is expressed by the principle of an incrc· g
differen~e f ont~nt from th f a tual experience, a t ~
wh le ttme-c ten 1 n f the w rid i · taken int ace unt. h' t
is to ay that c ntents which are bey nd the ran e f ~ ·rva-
ti n and indu~ti n be me conceiva ble a bein, p ·siblc. hey
arc constru t1on . As an example we may refer to Kant'
' a? nturc f rea son ', the idea f the earth a. an r a i · 1
in out f wh sc • womb' the livin ( rm ha c ri en

( ritiqu " of T1deol0Rica/ J11dg1nen1). -- he inc;c, . c f the
ntcnt. f P. i.blc c. pc~iencc i due to the u. c f the pri n ipie
or ~r~t . ma~• 1ma 1nat1 n. 1 he nlcanin of Bein' i. thr.
qualatatJvc infinity f content.
1...4
... . .... ... ~._.___ , • .... -~ •'t' o' !'t~ ht·• ..... . _ '~ H~~ • P ,. , _:-;r,'\! ••.: :•f•1. •~·?l ;~~· .~
,,
:11_•,.~
r~·· -
1
I
64. The range of the All of reality, the manifoldness of which

only fully exerted imaginative thought can visualize, is best
represented by realizing that, apart from logical and real
contradiction, no completely false statement about it is
possible. This is the comple1nentary feature to the circum-
stance that no completely true statement about it is possible
either. But the zero point of truth is not the relatively false
statement but no statement. The situation is comparable to the
difference beween utterly mistaking or misinterpreting son1e-
thing seen and not seeing. This is the legitimate and objective
reason behind the subjective conviction of all philosophers to
have seen some very notable truth.
65. There is ample cognition of truth in philosophy, though
no scientific knowledge of it. This sort of cognition is extensive
and is growing, in comparison with the primitive awareness
of the All C'f reality.
66. The truth concept of science is expressed by the corres-
pondence theory of truth. (Modern logic of science has tried
to refute the old objection against correspondence, i.e. the
argument that we cannot leave the sphere of statements in
order to compare statement with fact or to relate propositions
to occurrences). (cf. Russell, Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth,
ch. xxi).
The truth concept of philosophy is expressed by the
coherence theory of tr~th.
67. There is no concept in philosophy which could close the
widest possible coherent system required by the coherence
theory of truth. This system is for ever in the making. Yet
there is one approach to it closer than another as surely as
there is always one number greater than another, and one
system more comprehensive than another. The evolution of
the widest possible system means the continuous remaking of
all its parts grasped so far. All philosophical conceptions and
all historical philosophical systems are parts, ' points of view ',
· or material constantly to be reshaped for this widest possible
coherent system, but, even taken together, they do not form it.
They are but scattered and disconnected provisional points of
some of its structural lines.
125
THE IMAGINATJUN LJt• J<.l.:. A UN
68. The primary and fundamental characteristic of a phi lo-

sophical statement is that it is necessarily and without c~c. r-
tion an incomplete statement. It can be a comp.lctc propos1t1 n
only grammatically but not with rega.rd to its 1nca nin . A
scientific statement and a formal logical staten1cnt can b
complete statements, i.e. they can also be co.n1pletc with rc[)·l rd
to their meaning. If a scientific statement is also rega rded a.
an intrinsically incompletable statement, it is tra nsfonncd
thereby from a scientific into a philosophical statc1ncnt.
69. The incon1pleteness of a philosophical statement .i. one

of degree, which, however, cannot be measured by cornpa rin ~
a statement or set of statements with an ideal comp1etene .
but by comparing statements or sets of statements with one
another. Only a complete statement or a co1nplete ct f
statements can be true or false. Truth in philosophy cannot be
defined in terms of plausibility or probability but must be
derived from the principle of diminishing incompleteness. T he
principle of coherence has to be qualified, then, by saying that
there cannot be a single completely true philosophical state-
ment, i.e. one Wuich could stand for itself, and that the widest
possible coherent syste1n is not a finite one. Every philo-
sophical conception or system is true as far as it goes a nd
false in what it omits or excludes by implying the claim to be
the complete statement of the subject. That is to say: the
negatio of 01nnis deterniinatio in philosophy must always
remain a relative one and must never become definitive and
absolute.
The main source of falsity in philosophy, therefore, is the
claim of any conception or system to exclusiveness or finality.
69a. <?ne of the m~st conspicuous positions characterized by

the claim to exclusiveness or finality is agnosticism or the
denial of the possibility of philosophy.
70. In many'. perh~ps in every philosophical conception or

system, ~here is an innermost meaning and intention which
ca~not simply be read from its linguistic form nor from the
logical fra~ework. in ~hich the conception or system is pre-
Sf' ~ted. This meaning ts due to the light that falls upon it from
126
the interrelation between any philosophical conception or

-system and the rest of what is philosophically cognizable, or
to the state and stage of what is already there of the widest
possible system. It is the 'hidden or potential truth' or the
., true kernel ' which cannot be brought out by considering the
.conception or system in isolation or for itself or in relation to
the contemporaneous stage of the widest possible system only
(which, of course, does not amount to more than mere dis-
·connected material). A more interior meaning of a philo-
sophical position comes out, normally, long after it has been
formulated and differs, often considerably, from the language
and logical form of the first expression. It is this to which
Kant alluded by saying that it is possible to understand a
philosopher better than he understood himself. It is not only
possible, it is a goal which should be reached in every case,
although very often it is not. What a child means by his help-
less utterings the adult only can say, if he can manage to place
himself into the child's mind. This inner meaning has in-
definitely many phases through which it passes, so that almost
·every philosophical conception or system must be read anew
or restated in every stage of development of the widest
possible system. There is no definitive ' refutation ' of this
innermost meaning of a philosophical position. What can be
refuted is the linguistic form and the logical framework. What
is meant by restatement of a position is an alteration of
language and logical fofIDi and a preservation of the inner
n1ean1ng.
70a. To realize what is meant by laying bare and maintaining

the inner intention of a conception by a totally different one,
one may take the Biblical account of the creation of Man and
the modern view of Man's place in the universe. Everything
is different in these conceptions : the reference to God as the
cause of Man is omitted, the teleological aspect is discarded,
the geocentricity is abandoned, and with geocentricity the pre-
supposition that Man should be the' meaning of the universe'
is rejected in the rationalist outlook. Yet the latter, especially
in its scientific form, develops a certain line of thought which
tends to preserve the unique position of Man in the universe .,
!~
by arguments which underline the extreme rarity and ..

.I
.;:il
127 :n
:!:
··possible. Spinoza's attribute of. exten~io~, then, can be ~nter

.preted as corresponding to this sp~ti~hty: So, space 1s no
. attribute of ultimate reality, but spat1ahty 1s. Trans-sensuous-
ness as meaning purely abstract terms is insufficient for
·cognition. But spatiality is not completely n~n~sensuous and
·with it cognition is possible. All contradictions between
Spinoza's and Kant's positions, therefore, do not go to the
·innermost intentions of the system, they are merely linguistic
·contradictions, or contradictions of the alterable logical frame-
works of the respective conceptions; they do not touch the
.contents of their respective philosophies.
71. The popular assumption that most philosophical positions

·are essentially in contradiction of one another is an illusion
·arising from a point of view outside of philosophy proper. This
does not mean that there are not many philosophers, tending
·towards agnosticism or towards some other exclusive position,
who share this point of view. A sharper elaboration, however.
-of the concept of ' potential truth ' of a philosophic position
and of its difference from any of the actual logical frameworks
in which it happens to be expressed will show that the contra-
·diction between two positions will invariably be not final and
ultimate, that is. not a real contradiction, but one of language
·and provisional logical form. To give an example of a famous
supposed contradiction between two philosophical positions,
one may refer to the statement of Leibniz with regard to the
-conflict between his own philosophy and that of Spinoza,
saying that 'Spinozism would be true if there were not '-as
·he himself argues-' many substances' (letter to M. Bourguet).
Now, even a not too detailed analysis can make it plain that
the meaning of the word' substance' as used by Leibniz is far
fr~m identical with the meaning of this term as used by
Sp1no~a, ~ut that, in this as in any other case, the identity of
mearung is one of the indispensable conditions of real
contradiction.
72. ~n all philosophical conceptions the domain of the inner-

mo~t intention and meaning is the domain of possible truth,
while the realm of language and logic is the domain of possible
error.
130
11 E 1 MA j I l
1 The aim ~ phjJ - ·.

7. · f truth 1n ~ h
arn
· . unt .. .
hiu l nuim. th r- ~-r
phd h· 1 h. l
-;e :irJteJ fr fl! I. h. h J .
hi I cri ti J m \\' t u1
ri ici. m.
The pre alent tre laid n th r 1, 1
ph enc ur e the err ne u , ttitu
neral cultural pini n that th n1 in
phical work of mankind have en in in. _I . 1
to thi outl · k i. v hat n1 y be llcd th · n ati
r the a.. un1pti n that. in judninu all · 1il . phi
f the pa t and pr cnt, the 1nph i n1u t I id n 1r
f bity or unpr .enne . and that the 111att r uld t
th., t.
Th arch f r truth. h w 'r. and the n t
philo oph d n1 nd th J p it a titud ' hi h n a
that of ' con tru ti e .. ·epti i m ·. I t i 11 Ii
tion t11at in all phil ph. n ru li n. phil phi al tr th
i embodied, and that th d 1nain { f: l it i · itu· t 1t
·ere,' et'v\een th 1n, i . . in th n~t ru ti\ l cn1 t. r i n
1f the·r 1 gical interr lat dnc . r in th .. I
f the negl t f the r st f ' hat i hi I .
r f the All of r alit. .
74. A 1 12ical c ntradicti n bccom a real n if th p

term a um unambiuu u ly a crtain:tblc ullin1nt" 111 anin..,.
Thr t i t sa , a real c ntradi ti n tw "n ~ Ult 'Ill nt-.. in
far a the rec n id red a inc n1pl ·t . i in p ~· ibl . n-
tradicti n bet\ ccn . tat rn nts whi h , phi : p li ~ l ... tat -
men are in fact incomplete ut nr c n ~idl;n; . in kc pin"
with the traditional r lin~ui~ ti n1canin ·s onl . n if' hat th Y
manife tly contain were all. i a 1 i al r f rn1al c ntra i ti n.
It i ne er final rcQardintT the rclati n f the . tat n1cnt to
reality i.e. to ultimate reality.
7..ia.That which does not exi t. has never exi ted a~d .will
n~ver exist, be it a particular or a tructural product, coincides
With a real contradiction.
131
Th 1·nusion of a contradiction between philosop~1 i 1

75. .e or systems appears in particular if such co~cca ·
c.oncepttoynsstems which are, with regard to the possible ra~gp
t1ons or s , . . . . e
·dth of systematical 1mag1nation, separated by a ,
and w1 d. b t t t . . n
indefinite number of interme iary .u no ye existing concep-
tions or svstems, are regarded as if they referred to exactly
the same feature or featuresd.of the .
All of reality. In other
. d
s
WO rd ,
the illusion of contra 1ctonness
.
1s.
ue to .overlooking
the circumstance that the co~ceptton~ in q~estion do not
occupy the same or an immediately ne1ghbounng area in the
universe of systematic imagination, but are separated by vast
stretches which are not yet filled by any possible philosophical
constructions.
76. The neglect of the areas of the universe of systematic
imagination which are still unoccupied by possible or future
philosophical conceptions is the mistake of Eclecticism or
Syncretism. Eclecticism is the necessarily unsuccessful atten1pt
to make a systematic whole of what happens to exist of philo-
sophical conceptions or systems. It is similar and analogous
to the attempt to harmonize the chance products of scientific
knowledge and to create a scientific whole or system out of'
scientific system-fragments. To put it somewhat strongly: the·
syncretism of all conceivable philosophical conceptions would
be the truth, but the syncretism of what happens to be avail-
able of philosophical conceptions is a conglomerate brought
about by collecting, within a narrow logical outline, concep-
tions which belong to far distant realms of the widest possible
coherent system-an artificial substitute for it.
~7. The interpretation of the various philosophical concep-
tion~ or systems as ' perspectives ' or ' aspects ' of the widest
possible coherent system and the characterization of the doc-
trine of philosophical truth as 'perspectivism' or 'relativism~
does not account for the peculiar change of meaning which the
concep.t of perspective or of aspect would undergo if we had
to att~ibute to it reality or objectivity. Moreover, this inter-
pretation remains largely metaphorical as long as the
complete~ess' and 'continuity' of the perspectified appear-
ances, "":hich would combine to represent ultimate reality, is
not considered by any such theory. For it is this completenes,c
132
e aspects only which contains the rule ; e tile ob' ..

o f th . ' · · Jecttvtty.
Of a system of perspectives, a completeness which alo
. . bl ne cou 1d
remove. the .ob Je~tlo~a ~' namely the illusionariness and
arbitranness implied in this concept of relativisrn.
78. Every philosophical stat~ment can be taken as a static
entity. or as a ~base. of. a motion . . It .has, as a static entity. a
meaning enshrined 1n its terms~ but 1t has also, as it were
'signp~st.value' which cannot be taken fron1the 1nean.ing c~n~
tained 1n its terms alone, but from that meaning in combination
with.what is usuall~ ~ailed' reality' or, epistemologically, the
totality of all rema1n1ng statements, actual and possible; just
as the real signpost takes its value not only fro1n the relation
between the ' statement ' it represents and the place to which
· it points, but also from the existence of all the ren1aining
.country surrounding post and place. The signpost value or the
stimulating, moving power of a philosophical state1nent, the
power to change its own terms in order to maintain or specify
its intention if faced with different contexts, the defensive and
productive faculty of an insight never wholly e1nbodied but
- shown in a philosophical statement, the 'statement in action'
and in co-operation, its dissolubility or indissolubility into
other statements, its absorbability-all this is documentation
of its philosophical truth value, is the amount of the ' current '
-0f truth which runs through it. For philosophical cognition
refers to a living activity and process, not, as a critic would
like, to an arrested and dead one.
Every criticism which arrests-as it ne~~ssaril~ must. for !h~
sake of examination-the process of cognition with the implicit
or explicit intention of stopping a particular line of thought for
good and of arguing in favour of an agn~stic. ~e~ult moves
farther away from the truth than the content it cnttc1zes: Ev~r~
· . . which arrests the process of cogru·f1on .with the 1mphc1t
cntic1sm d'
· · · ·n in another irec-
Qt explicit intention of ~etting it going agat . ystem
1
tion in order to produce a different f eatu~e or inehoramsount
·of the structure of the All of real i.tY' may increase t e
-Of philosophical truth. ·d
. ortant reason best es
79. There is another a?d ~quall~ ~m~ bl activity of philo-
that of criticism for pausing in the ilhmttal t:10n of any stage,
:sophical cognition, namely the contemp a
133
-
ba se or system of philosophical vision for the sake of en·
p
ing its' truth. As the 1mmeasura
· ble ran~e o f t.he All of reality
Joy-
can, so to speak, afford th~t all possible philosophical con-
structions of at least some. inner coherence are true, though
to a varying extent, the enjoyment of the truth of one or the
other philosophic vision for its own sake is a legitimate
occupation of the cognitive mind. This gratification can be as
little robbed of its value by any criticism as can the pleasure
in a great work of art by the observation that there are still
greater ones. So, the nature and business of philosophy con-
sists not only in a constant being on the way, searching after
final truth, as if there were nothing real to contemplate before
the destination of the philosophical journey is reached; it is.
an equally valuable function of the philosophical mind to
arrest the glance at the forelands of the place of destination,.
because every vision will turn out to be a foreland, but one
that is wider than that of the previous stage. The enjoyment,
therefore, of an aspect of the world through any of the possible
constructions, be it on materialist, idealist, pantheist or any
other lines, can become as little ' out of date ' as the contem-
plation of the sunrise or of the starry sky or as the taste of
water can become ' old-fashioned '.
80. Philosophy is no Art. For not beauty and sensuoµsness

but truth, cognition and reality are its exclusive criteria.

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THE IMAGINATION

TWO PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS

THE IMAGINATION OF REASON

THE IMAGINATIO OF REASO

1. To philosophize is a general faculty of the human mind

3. Philosophy does not consist of an enormous chain of the

4. Philosophy is not a hopeless muddle of undecidable con-

7. Philosophy is not a science. Philosophical truth is not

12. As science is not bound to

eternally unknown, it is inclined to t~~~c~rn i~se~f with the

13. As reality, on the other hand . .

14. The known, the temporarily unknown and the eternally

15. Sometime~ in the history of thought the method of

16. It seems not difficult to understand that the realm of ·

r0f turning a particular unkno~n something. into a known

17. In the measure in which the number of possible deductive

18. There is only one faculty of the mind naturally related

19. Imagination can be completely arbitrary, directed by

20. It is clear that the faculty of imagination which is applied

f one of these modes while, in fact, all three of them are

21. The share of the constructive element in thought and in

22. The required maximum activity of systematic imagina-

words. if the phenomenon to be experienced is too un-

24. The lin1it of thought is not what is conceivable by reason.

25. The wider scope of reasonable or systematic imagination

28. : To. be ' ~eans, in the first place : to belong to a system

29. Every system to which an existing ~omething belongs

3 l. The object of philosophy ~s the wide~t P~~~~~~ :~:~~~~.

32. ~ha~ there exists an eternally unknown reality wider than

33. Traditional philosophy passed rather too quickly from

37.. ~ure thought ~n the sy?thetic ~ ~riori principle of

38. Pure philosophy is not concerned with matter-of-factness.

39. The unknown reality shows in particular two different

The unknown as partial can only be conceived as containing

40. The unknown as the All of reality is the object of all

41. Traditional metaphysics has largely concentrated on

42. The ~oncept of 'possible reality' has to be regarded in

43. The relation between the unknown as possible experience

44. The differences between the approach of pure philosophy

at an additional experience which consists of definite particu-

45. The unknown, so far as it is grasped by human thought,

46. The symbolic evocation, however sketchy, of the universe

47· The elements of the known and of the unknown orders

The totality of all products of imagination corresponds,

49. The feature of reality which expresses an infinitely

50. Repetition or eternal recurrence is the expression of a

51. Pure philosophy, just as it is concerned with symbolically ·

.5 2. The n1ain criterion for excluding infinite series of

53. Therejs a zone of innumerable seeming contradictions or

thousands of yeurs hence n the assun1ption that evolution

54. As a criterion of a real contradiction necessarily

the human mind possesses some other indi~ato:s which may

S5. There is no difference between possible reality and

introduction to an otherwise n n-philo' phi aJ bo<-, f call ·

to all those conceptions in the history of thought in which the

proposition that all t~at which is essentially possible (and which

in that it denotes real, not merely thought e:xistc n · . (Jtfr r...

that is to say, because it puts the concept in question in o th

our attention. This raises the problem of a seeminr ly d v~ I

56a. According to any sort of idea]i sm whc t is me' t r y

much as ' to be sensed ' or ' to ce thought ', o r both; t he

THE IMAGINATION OF REASON

event of which no tendency towards infinity is observable. My

··possible. Spinoza's attribute of. exten~io~, then, can be ~nter