[G.R. NO.

162813 : February 12, 2007]

FAR EAST AGRICULTURAL SUPPLY, INC. and/or ALEXANDER

UY, Petitioners, v. JIMMY LEBATIQUE and THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.

PONENTE: QUISIMBING, J

FACTS:
 Petitioner Far East Agricultural Supply, Inc. (Far East) hired on March 4, 1996
private respondent Jimmy Lebatique as truck driver with a daily wage
of P223.50. He delivered animal feeds to the company's clients.
 On January 24, 2000, Lebatique complained of nonpayment of overtime work
particularly on January 22, 2000, when he was required to make a second
delivery in Novaliches, Quezon City. That same day, Manuel Uy, brother of
Far East's General Manager and petitioner Alexander Uy, suspended
Lebatique apparently for illegal use of company vehicle. Even so, Lebatique
reported for work the next day but he was prohibited from entering the
company premises.
 On January 26, 2000, Lebatique sought the assistance of the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) Public Assistance and Complaints Unit
concerning the nonpayment of his overtime pay. According to Lebatique, two
days later, he received a telegram from petitioners requiring him to report for
work. When he did the next day, January 29, 2000, Alexander asked him why
he was claiming overtime pay. Lebatique explained that he had never been
paid for overtime work since he started working for the company. He also
told Alexander that Manuel had fired him. After talking to Manuel, Alexander
terminated Lebatique and told him to look for another job.

ISSUES
(1) whether Lebatique was illegally dismissed; and
(2) whether Lebatique was a field personnel, not entitled to overtime pay.

ARGUMENTS of the PETITIONERS

(1) Lebatique was not dismissed from service but merely suspended for a day
due to violation of company rules
(2) Lebatique was not barred from entering the company premises since he
never reported back to work
(3) Lebatique is estopped from claiming that he was illegally dismissed since his
complaint before the DOLE was only on the nonpayment of his overtime pay.
(4) Lebatique is a field pesonnel and is not entitled to overtime pay since his time
outside the company premises cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.

ARGUMENTS of the RESPONDENT

Dionicio Eliza
BSP 3-A
(1) He was illegally dismissed and was not merely suspended, he neither refused
to work nor abandoned his job.
(2) He further contends that abandonment of work is inconsistent with the filing
of a complaint for illegal dismissal.
(3) He also claims that he is not a field personnel, thus, he is entitled to overtime
pay and service incentive leave pay.

RULING

(1) The records show that petitioners failed to prove that Lebatique abandoned
his job. Nor was there a showing of a clear intention on the part of Lebatique to
sever the employer-employee relationship. When Lebatique was verbally told by
Alexander Uy, the company's General Manager, to look for another job, Lebatique
was in effect dismissed. Even assuming earlier he was merely suspended for
illegal use of company vehicle, the records do not show that he was afforded the
opportunity to explain his side. It is clear also from the sequence of the events
leading to Lebatique's dismissal that it was Lebatique's complaint for nonpayment
of his overtime pay that provoked the management to dismiss him, on the
erroneous premise that a truck driver is a field personnel not entitled to overtime
pay.
(2) On the second issue, Article 82 of the Labor Code is decisive on the question
of who are referred to by the term "field personnel.

 As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, Lebatique is not a field personnel

as defined above for the following reasons: (1) company drivers, including
Lebatique, are directed to deliver the goods at a specified time and place; (2)
they are not given the discretion to solicit, select and contact prospective
clients; and (3) Far East issued a directive that company drivers should stay
at the client's premises during truck-ban hours which is from 5:00 to 9:00
a.m. and 5:00 to 9:00 p.m.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated

September 30, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76196 and
itsResolutiondated March 15, 2004 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to the
effect that the case is hereby REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for further
proceedings to determine the exact amount of overtime pay and other monetary
benefits due Jimmy Lebatique which herein petitioners should pay without further
delay.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Dionicio Eliza
BSP 3-A
 G.R. No. 119205 April 15, 1998

SIME DARBY PILIPINAS, INC. Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION (2ND DIVISION) and SIME DARBY SALARIED EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION (ALU-TUCP), Respondents.

PONENTE: BELLOSILLO, J

FACTS

 14 August 1992 petitioner issued a memorandum to all factory-based

employees advising all its monthly salaried employees in its Marikina Tire
Plant, except those in the Warehouse and Quality Assurance Department
working on shifts, a change in work schedule effective 14 September 1992

 The work and break time schedules of the Warehouse and QA

employees will be maintained as it is now.
 Private respondent felt affected adversely by the change in the work
schedule and discontinuance of the 30-minute paid "on call" lunch
break, it filed on behalf of its members a complaint with the Labor
Arbiter for unfair labor practice, discrimination and evasion of liability
pursuant to the resolution of this Court in Sime Darby International
Tire Co., Inc. v. NLRC.
 However, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint on the ground
that the change in the work schedule and the elimination of the 30-
minute paid lunch break of the factory workers constituted a valid
exercise of management prerogative and that the new work schedule,
break time and one-hour lunch break did not have the effect of
diminishing the benefits granted to factory workers as the working
time did not exceed eight (8) hours.

ISSUES

(1) Whether the act of the management (petitioner) in revising the work
schedule of its employees and discarding their paid lunch break
constitutive of unfair labor practice

ARGUMENT

(1) The public respondent declared that the new work schedule deprived the
employees of the benefits of a time-honored company practice of providing its

Dionicio Eliza
BSP 3-A
employees a 30-minute paid lunch break resulting in an unjust diminution of
company privileges prohibited by Art. 100 of the Labor Code, as amended.

RULING

We sustain petitioner.

The right to fix the work schedules of the employees rests principally on their
employer.

Even if... denominated as lunch break, this period could very well be considered
as working time because the factory employees were required to work if
necessary and were paid accordingly for working.

With the new work schedule, the employees are now given a one-hour lunch
break without... any interruption from their employer.

For a full one-hour undisturbed lunch break, the employees can freely and
effectively use this hour

Since... the employees are no longer required to work during this one-hour lunch
break, there is no more need for them to be compensated for this period.

We agree with the Labor Arbiter that the new work schedule fully complies with
the daily work period of eight (8) hours without... violating the Labor Code.

As shown by the records,... the change effected by management with regard to

working time is made to apply to all factory employees engaged in the same line
of work whether or not they are members of private respondent union. Hence, it
cannot be said that the new scheme adopted by management prejudices the...
right of private respondent to self-organization.

Every business enterprise endeavors to increase its profits. In the process, it may
devise means to attain that goal.

Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of the employees, it must also protect
the right of an employer to exercise what are clearly management...
prerogatives.

Further, management retains the... prerogative, whenever exigencies of the

service so require, to change the working hours of its employees. So long as such
prerogative is exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's
interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the...

Dionicio Eliza
BSP 3-A
employees under special laws or under valid agreements, this Court will uphold
such exercise.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.

[G.R. No. L-30452. September 30, 1982.]

MERCURY DRUG CO., INC., Petitioner, v. NARDO DAYAO, ET

AL., Respondents.

Caparas & Ilagan for Petitioner.

Gerardo P. Cabo Chan and Elias Banzali for Respondents.

Pontente: GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

FACTS

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations dated March 30, 1968 in Case No. 1926-V and the Resolution of the
Court en banc dated July 6, 1968 denying two separate motions for
reconsideration filed by petitioners and respondents. 

The factual background of Case No. 1926-V is summarized by the respondent

Court of Industrial Relations as follows: 

This is a verified petition dated March 17, 1964 which was subsequently amended
on July 31, 1964 filed by Nardo Dayao and 70 others against Mercury Drug Co.,
Inc., and/or Mariano Que, President & General Manager, and Mercury Drug Co.,
Inc., Employees Association praying, with respect to respondent corporation and
its president and general manager: 1) payment of their unpaid back wages for
work done on Sundays and legal holidays plus 25c/c additional compensation
from date of their employment up to June 30, 1962; 2) payment of extra
compensation on work done at night; 3) reinstatement of Januario Referente and
Oscar Echalar to their former positions with back salaries; and, as against the
respondent union, for its disestablishment and the refund of all monies it had
collected from petitioners. 

Dionicio Eliza
BSP 3-A
In separate motions, respondent management and respondent union move to
dismiss, the first on the ground that: 

I. The petition states no cause of action. 

II. This Court has no jurisdiction over the subject of the claims of petitioners
Januario Referente and Oscar Echalar. 

III. There is another action pending between the same parties, namely, Mercury
Drug Co., Inc., and/or Mariano Que and Nardo Dayao. 

while on the other hand, the second alleges that this Court has no jurisdiction
over the acts complained of against the respondent union. 

For reasons stated in the Order dated March 24, 1965, two Court resolved the
motions to dismiss, as follows: 

1. Ground No. 1 of management's motion to dismiss was denied for lack of

merit. 

2. Its second ground was found meritorious and, accordingly Januario Referente
and Oscar Echalar were dropped as party petitioners in this case. 

3. The third ground was denied, holding that there still exists the employer-
employee relationship between Nardo Dayao and the management. 

4. With respect to the fourth ground, the Court held that on the basis of section
7-A of C.A. No. 444, as amended by R.A. No. 1993, 'it can be safely said that, 

counting backward the three (3) year prescriptive period from the date of the
filing of the instant petition - March 20, 1964 - all-of petitioners' claims have not
yet prescribed.' 

5. In so far as respondent union's motion is concerned, the Court held that

'petitioners' cause of action against the respondent Association should be
dismissed without prejudice to the refiling of the same as an unfair labor practice
case.' 

Only the respondent management moved to reconsider the Order of March 24,
1965 but the same was denied by the Court en banc in a resolution dated August
26, 1965. Respondent submitted an answer to the amended petition which was
subsequently amended on January 6, 1966, containing some admissions and
some denials of the material averments of the amended petition. By way of
affirmative and special defenses,, respondents alleged that petitioners have no
cause of action against Mariano Que because their employer respondent Mercury

Dionicio Eliza
BSP 3-A
Drug Company, Inc., an existing corporation which has a separate and distinct
personality from its incorporators stockholders and/or officer, that the company
being a service enterprise is excluded from the coverage of the Eight Hour Labor
Law, as amended; that no court has the power to set wages, rates of pay, hours
of employment, or other conditions of employment to the extent of disregarding
an agreement thereon between the respondent company and the petitioners, and
of fixing night differential wages; that the petitioners were fully paid for services
rendered under the terms and conditions of the individual contracts of
employment; that the petition having been verified by only three of the
petitioners without showing that the others authorized the inclusion of their
names as petitioners does not confer jurisdiction to this Court; that there is no
employer-employee relationship between management and petitioner Nardo
Dayao and that his claim has been released and/or barred by another action and
that petitioners' claims accuring before March 20, 1961 have prescribed." (Annex
"P", pp. 110-112, rollo). 

After hearing on the merits, the respondent court rendered its decision. The
dispositive portion of the March 30, 1968 decision reads: 

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby resolves that: 

1. The claim of the petitioners for payment of back wages correspoding to the
first four hours work rendered on every other Sunday and first four hours on legal
holidays should be denied for lack of merit. 

2. Respondent Mercury Drug Company, Inc.. is hereby ordered to pay the sixty-
nine (69) petitioners: 

(a) An additional sum equivalent to 25% of their respective basic or regular

salaries for services rendered on Sundays and legal holidays during the period
from March 20. 1961 up to June 30, 1962; and 

(b) Another additional sum or premium equivalent to 25% of their respective

basic or regular salaries for nighttime services rendered from March 20, 1961 up
to June 30, 1962. 

3. Petitioners' petition to convert them to monthly employees should be, as it is

hereby, denied for lack of merit. 

4. Respondent Mariano Que, being an officer and acted only as an agent in behalf
of the respondent corporation, should be absolved from the money claims of
herein petitioners whose employer, according to the pleadings and evidence, is
the Mercury Drug Company,, Inc. 

Dionicio Eliza
BSP 3-A
To expedite the computation of the money award, the Chief Court Examiner or his
authorized representative is hereby directed to proceed to the office of the
respondent corporation at Bambang Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, the latter to make
available to said employee its records, like time records, payrolls and other
pertinent papers, and compute the money claims awarded in this decision and,
upon the completion thereof, to submit his report as soon as possible for further
disposition of the Court. 

Not satisfied with the decision, the respondents filed a motion for its
reconsideration. The motion for reconsideration, was however, denied by the
Court en banc in its Resolution dated July 6, 1968.

ISSUES
(1) Whether the allegation that the respondent Court erred in declaring the
contracts of employment null and void in contrary to law.
(2) Whether the petitioner-company reiterated its stand that under the
respective contracts of employment, the subject 25% additional compensation
had already been included in the latter respected monthly salaries.
(3) Whether or not the contracts of employment were null and void was not put
in issue, hence, the respondent court pursuant to the Rules of Court should have
refrained from the ruling that such contracts of employment were null and void.

ARGUMENT OF PETITIONER
(1) Petitioner insists that respondents’ case falls in none of these categories
because as held in two previous cases, night work is not overtime but regular
work; and that respondent court’s authority to try the case cannot be implied
from its ‘general jurisdiction and broad powers’ under Commonwealth Act 103
because Republic Act 875 precisely curbed such powers limiting them to certain
specific litigations, beyond which it is not permitted to act
(2) The petitioner’s contention that its employees fully understood what they
signed when they entered into the contracts of employment and that they should
be bound by their voluntary commitment’s is anachronistic in this time and
age.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

ARGUMENT OF RESPONDENT
Respondents alleged that petitioners have no cause of action against Mariano Que
because their employer is respondent Mercury Drug Company, Inc., an existing
corporation which has a separate and distinct personality from its incorporators,
stockholders and/or officers, that the company being a service enterprise is
excluded from the coverage of the Eight Hour Labor Law, as amended; that no

Dionicio Eliza
BSP 3-A
court has the power to set wages, rates of pay, hours of employment or other
conditions of employment to the extent of disregarding an agreement thereon
between the respondent company and the petitioners, and of fixing night
differential wages; that the petitioners were fully paid for services rendered under
the terms and conditions of the individual contracts of employment; that the
petition having been verified by only three of the petitioners without showing that
the others authorized the inclusion of their names as petitioners does not confer
jurisdiction to this Court; that there is no employer-employee relationship
between management and petitioner Nardo Dayao and that his claim has been
released and/or barred by another action; and that petitioners’ claims accruing
before March 20, 1961 have prescribed.

RULING
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. The decision and resolution
appealed from are affirmed with costs against the petitioner.

G.R. No. 149252. April 28, 2005

DONALD KWOK, Petitioners, 
vs.
PHILIPPINE CARPET MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Respondents.

Ponente: CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent corporation for the recovery of
accumulated vacation and sick leave credits before the NLRC. Petitioner clung to
the verbal contract with Mr. Lim, the President of the respondent corporation and
his father-in-law for his claims. Petitioner obtained favorable judgment. In their
appeal, respondent averred that the position the petition held was not entitled
cash conversions of vacation and sick leave credits. The decision of the Labor
Arbiter was reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the reversed decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the verbal contract in favor of petitioner is valid.

ARGUMENT OF PETITIONER:

Dionicio Eliza
BSP 3-A
(1) The petitioner posits that he had adduced substantial evidence to prove that
Lim, as president and chairman of the respondent corporation’s board of
directors, made a verbal promise to give him the cash conversion of his
accumulated vacation and sick leave credits upon his retirement (that is, benefits
at par with the number of days to which the officer next in rank to him was
entitled). According to the petitioner, his claim is fortified by the fact that his
successor, Raoul Rodrigo, has unlimited vacation and sick leave credits.
(2) The petitioner further asserts that he would not have accepted the positions
in the respondent corporation without such benefit, especially since his
subordinates were also enjoying the same. He posits that he was entitled to the
said privilege because of his rank. He, likewise, claims that, in contrast to the
evidence he has presented, the respondent corporation failed to adduce proof of
its affirmative allegations
(3) The petitioner further argues that his complaint was not time-barred since he
filed it on December 5, 1996. Even if this were so, he is, nevertheless, entitled to
the cash value of his vacation and sick leave credits for three years before his
retirement. Moreover, the evidence on record shows that officers belonging to
Category I had been granted the cash conversion of their earned leave credits
after the lapse of three years.

ARGUMENT OF RESPONDENT
(1) The respondent corporation, for its part, asserts that the petitioner failed
to adduce substantial evidence to the claims in his complaint. Even if Lim had
made such verbal promise to the petitioner, the same is not binding on the
respondent corporation absent its conformity through board resolution.
Moreover, the petitioner is not covered by the Memorandum dated November
6, 1981 because he had unlimited leave credits; hence, it cannot be gainsaid
that he still had unused leave credits to be converted. According to the
respondent corporation, the petitioner himself admitted that he was not
included in the Memorandum dated November 6, 1981; and even assuming
that he was covered by the said memorandum, the fact that his complaint
was filed only in 1996 precludes him from claiming the cash conversion of
such leave credits for the years 1966 to 1993.

RULING:

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs
against the petitioner.. It is true that for a contract to be binding on the parties
thereto, it need not be in writing unless the law requires that such contract be in
some form in order that it may be valid or enforceable or that it be executed in a
certain way, in which case that requirement is absolute and independent. (Art.
1356, NCC) But the court disbelieved petitioner’s testimony and gave credence

Dionicio Eliza
BSP 3-A
and probative weight to the collective testimonies of the employees and officers
of the respondent corporation, including Mr. Lim, whom the petitioner presented
as a hostile witness. Even assuming that the petitioner was entitled of such
benefits, there was no record to show the record of absences to arrive at the
actual number of leave credits. There was no conformity of such agreement with
the Board and if so, such claim was already barred by prescription under Article
291 of the Labor Code.

Dionicio Eliza
BSP 3-A