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E-International relations
Queen Elizabeth II’s Soft Power and Britain’s Place in a Post-Elizabethan Age
Richard J. Cook and Alaric Searle
Oct. 16 2022

The sun has now set on the Second Elizabethan age. Former UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson,
in a speech in the House of Commons, dubbed her ‘Queen Elizabeth the Great’, perhaps fitting
as she was revered by monarchists and republicans alike across the UK, ‘Her’ realms and
territories, and even beyond (Casalicchio, 2022). She has been described as a constant
throughout a reign that saw a multitude of changes in both British and global affairs. Her 70-year
reign, the longest of any British monarch, and second longest in history (second only to King
Louis XIV of France, the famed Sun King), saw the (a) last vestiges of the British Empire slip
into history, (b) Britain navigate its imperial hangover, (c) the modernization of monarchy and,
of course, (d) Brexit.

She possessed no formal powers beyond ceremony despite the masquerade of grandeur,
spectacle, ceremony and traditional symbolism. In essence, she relied exclusively on Soft Power
and used it to great effect. Her soft power certainly acted as a unifying force within the United
Kingdom and the Commonwealth, and was an effective tool for the British state when
conducting international diplomacy. For many, the Queen and the Royal Family appeared to be
public diplomats for the United Kingdom, and a public relations boon as British cultural icons,
giving the impression of a mystical throw-back to Kings and Queens; they have also provided a
platform for a ‘soap opera of royal family life’ which has created an ‘insatiable appetite for
foreign publics’ (Hill and Beadle, 2014: 33). Former President Barrack Obama once quipped to
Prince Charles: ‘The American People are quite fond of the royal family. They like them much
better than their own politicians.’ (Elam, 2018) Opinion polls have attested to the broad
popularity of the Royal Family and the Queen (IPSOS, 2018). This has more recently been
backed-up by the popularity of the hit Netflix series The Crown. Likewise, many of the UK’s
most notable tourist attractions and products have maintained their appeal because of their links
to the monarchy and the Queen herself.

With her passing, the United Kingdom has lost its greatest soft power asset, and her funeral will
likely come to be seen as a significant moment in the history of Britain’s place in the world. A
degree of soul searching for the British appears likely in the post-Elizabethan age, as questions
surrounding the continuation of the monarchy, the status of the Commonwealth and the very
existence of the United Kingdom as a unitary state become more pressing. Yet, what was the
nature of Queen Elizabeth II’s soft power and how was it utilized? Equally, does her funeral
truly represent a historic punctuation mark for Britain as a major power in the world? To address
these questions, we provide a brief explanation of soft power and how it is exercised, before
analysing the Queen’s soft power and its significance. In conclusion, we argue that the Queen’s
funeral marks the symbolic end of an era, and the loss of her soft power will further impact
Britain’s declining place in the world.
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E-International relations

Opinion – Brazil 2022: A Constitutional Election in Disguise

Felipe Antunes de Oliveira

Oct 17 2022

The 2022 elections in Brazil are much more than a regular exercise in liberal democracy. On the
surface, the 156 million Brazilians registered to vote are choosing their candidates for state
congresses, both houses of the Brazilian national congress, governors of all the 27 federative
units, and, of course, the president of the republic. Similar national elections have been
happening regularly since 1989. A few candidates win, many lose, some are happy, and some are
disappointed. This is liberal democracy working; you would be excused to think. Underneath the
surface of a functioning liberal democracy with representation challenges and bitter political
disputes like any other, a seismic change is happening. We Brazilians are not simply deciding
between alternative political platforms or voting for our favourite candidates. We are choosing
between two irreconcilable ways of doing politics. We are deciding on what to expect from the
state. And, crucially, we are voting over conflicting views of the Brazilian identity. This is a
constitutional election in disguise. We are deciding whether to keep trying to fulfil the promises
of the 1988 Constitution, or to empty it to the point of unrecognition, and eventually ditch it
altogether.

The constitutional order inaugurated in 1988 has slowly crumbled over the last six years. The
protracted political and economic crisis included dramatic moments such as the betrayal of the
former vice-President Michel Temer, who openly plotted to remove the then President Dilma
Rousseff from power; a concerted media campaign to destroy the Worker’s Party (PT) and its
leadership; and the fraudulent conviction of Lula by a judge later found to be biased by the
Supreme Court for colluding with the prosecution. Under Bolsonaro’s administration,
constitutional principles such as public transparency, efficiency, and the impersonal rule of law
have been attacked. The federation has been weakened by the active sabotage of the president of
the republic against common sense public health measures put in place by state and local
authorities to fight covid-19. Even the voting system itself has been subject to constant attacks
by Bolsonaro, who took a page directly from Trump’s playbook and repeatedly undermined the
elections with unsubstantiated fraud allegations as insurance against possible electoral defeat.

Unfortunately, the roots of the fragility of the Brazilian constitutional order are much deeper than
the contemporary crisis. Emerging out of the trauma of a capitalist dictatorship that in its heyday
delivered some economic growth at the cost of violent repression of dissent, the genocide of
indigenous peoples, wage compression, and galloping debt – the 1988 Constitution is a generous
letter of intent. It dares to propose a welfare state in a dependent country, at the periphery of
global capitalism. It recognises indigenous rights. It sets a vision for Latin American integration
and an independent international role for Brazil as a bridge between the former Third World and
the Global North. It establishes the institutional basis for an idealised state at the service of a fair
society.
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E-International relations

Opinion – Factors Giving Rise to Xi Coup Rumours in China

Klaus Heinrich Raditio

Oct 11 2022

In late September 2022, rumours of Xi Jinping being overthrown in a military coup and placed
under house arrest circulated in the online media. This unconfirmed information sparked a frenzy
of speculation ahead of China’s 20th National Party Congress (NPC) – which is set to kick off on
16 October. Apparently, an account associated with the Beijing-banned Falun Gong movement is
responsible. Nevertheless, the rumours circulated quickly and to some extent fed the netizen
appetite for speculation.

Plots to oust the Party leadership are not a baseless fabrication but rather have been publicly
stated by Party’s authorities. The dismissal of Bo Xilai from the office of Chongqing party
secretary months prior to the 18th National Party Congress, for instance, was not a mere matter
of “serious disciplinary violations”. Bo was believed to be Xi’s main rival for the CCP
leadership and particularly, his ties to the military worried Xi’s political allies.

Following Bo’s downfall, Zhou Yongkang – who was a member of the Politburo Standing
Committee – was also arrested and jailed for life. The Supreme People’s Court ruled Zhou guilty
for his involvement in “unofficial political activities”. He became the highest-ranking party
official in the post-Mao era to be sentenced to prison. Together with Bo, Zhou was rumoured to
be plotting a coup ahead of the 18th NPC. Later, this rumour was implicitly confirmed by Xi
Jinping himself who spoke in 2016 of “political plot activities” aim at destroying and dividing
the party. Vice President Wang Qishan in 2017 also warned that some senior officials sought to
“seize party and state power”.

Apart from Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang, Xi’s leadership also purged senior military officials
like that of former Central Military Commission Vice Chairman General Guo Boxiong and his
fellow General Xu Caihou. The official Chinese People Liberation Army website claimed that
these two generals violated CCP’s “political bottom line”. The party’s authoritative figures never
rule out coups as a means to challenge the leadership. They explicitly mention about the “plot” to
“seize party and state power”. In other words, a coup is a possible outcome of political struggle
within the Party.

The public knows about Xi’s ‘glorious’ past compared to his previous Chinese leaders, thanks to
the party’s publication of Xi’s thoughts and biography. However, little that we know about
sensitive issues such as Xi’s doctoral thesis in Marxist theory, which he completed at Tsinghua
University while leading Fujian Province. Moreover, Xi does not have a media team or a press
secretary. His absence from the public eye for certain periods often sparks rumours about his
well-being.
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E-International relations

European Crises and Right-Wing Populism: The Case of Lega Nord

Irene Viparelli and Evanthia Balla

Oct 10 2022

The link between post-truth and right-wing populism has been investigated under various lenses,
such as through populist discourses, social media and global politics. In the European Union,
populism, despite not being a new phenomenon, has gained an alarming share of the electorate
during the continent’s long period of crises and distress in recent years following the Eurozone
crisis, the refugee crisis and the Brexit disintegration challenge. Under this prism, a series of
questions arise: What is the relationship between the rise of right-wing populism and the
European crises? How has the post-truth contributed to the increase of right-wing populism in
Europe? This chapter first demonstrates the legitimacy gap, and the related distrust of the
European project, which heightened during the aforementioned crises and offered a ‘fruitful
field’ for right-wing populism to gain greater relevance and influence by openly using anti-EU
rhetoric. Secondly, it argues that while in a ‘regime of shared truth’, right-wing populism never
succeeded in gaining a broader consensus. Yet, in the post-truth age, it offered an array of
unrestrained ‘truths’, extensively using social media as a key platform for direct communication
with the public, threatening democracy itself.

This study adopts a threefold narrative. Firstly, it offers a conceptual analysis of right-wing
populism in a post-truth age. This section focuses on the definitions and links between European
right-wing populism and the post- truth. The second section discusses the relationship between
the crises, the rise of populism and the post-truth age. It shows that since the beginning of the
twenty-first century, the European Monetary Union’s (EMU) weaknesses, as well as the
financial and refugee crises were capitalised by right-wing populist parties. Populist right-
wingers thus took advantage of this decline of trust to mobilise economic polarisation and
nativist sentiments, spreading a particular anti-EU rhetoric. However, in a post-truth
environment, right-wing populist parties have been able to spread their political rhetoric as never
before, extensively using social media as a platform for direct, yet unrestrained, communication
with the public. This has resulted in unprecedented electoral success at national and European
levels – further challenging democratic values and the European project itself. The third part
focuses on a case study of the Italian Lega Nord – which was not originally a right-wing populist
party, instead belonging to a populist and ethno-regionalist party family rooted under a pro-EU
and anti-statism ideology. However, in order to respond to the challenges of European
integration, the party has progressively loosened its original features and joined the right-wing
populist party family. Therefore, Lega Nord’s transformation helps shed light on the link
between the accretion of right-wing populism and the European crises. Lega Nord’s Matteo
Salvini has been the European leader that has used social media the most in his political
campaigns over recent years, reaching more than 3,000,000 followers in 2018 (Cervi 2020).
Such a successful strategy has allowed Lega to reach the best electoral results in its history in the
national election of 2018 and in the European elections of 2019. In this vein, Lega shows how
the post-truth age has allowed the spreading of right- wing populist ideology as never before,
threatening European democratic values and the European Union political project.
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E-International relations

The State of Japan’s Soft Power After the 2020 Olympics

Daniele Carminati

Aug 13 2022

This article is part of a trilogy aimed at better understanding East Asia’s most prominent powers,
from a soft power perspective. In 2020, I attempted to demystify the state of China’s soft power.
This article covers Japan, and a forthcoming third one will deal with South Korea’s burgeoning
cultural appeal and beyond.

Japan is an island country (or should I say archipelago) in East Asia that is often recognized as
quirky, fascinating, and somewhat ‘exotic’, even by some of its neighbors. These traits are what
generally defines its international appeal. The capacity to attract foreign countries and their
audiences can be referred to as soft power, intended as the activation of attractive national
features through policies towards favored outcomes, or at least beneficial ones.

Japan has been called a soft power superpower in multiple instances, such as in comparison with
the United states in a dedicated volume discussing the specific features and ability to attract
internationally, or when recognizing its achievements as an “artistic, culinary and cultural
superpower.” In 2009, Foreign Policy published an article recognizing and praising Japan’s
“gross national cool.” A term that eventually helped shaping Tokyo’s policy–the “Cool Japan”
strategy–to further promote the national appeal while strengthening the ability to take advantage
from this attractive portfolio.

Before assessing whether this arguably formidable portfolio has actually been successful or not,
it is necessary to have a look at what resources and tools define Tokyo’s soft power. In other
words, one needs to ask where the soft power of a certain country originates from. To do so, it is
convenient to divide this portfolio in three subcategories–sociocultural, political, and economic,
although it should be noted that this division is for the sake of simplification and in real life these
categories are likely to overlap more often than not.

With that said, what are the most evident and discussed resources of Japanese soft power’s
portfolio? And which ones are less discussed but deserve more credit in defining the country’s
appeal? Japan is more widely known for its rich and varied culture, often seen as a masterful
blend of traditional and modern features. These include aspects such as its globally renowned
animation (anime), comics (manga), cuisine (sushi, ramen, …), and reputation as a
technologically advanced, innovative, and somehow futuristic nation in the main cities
contrasting with the laidback countryside and ancient temples scattered around the archipelago.

Beyond these common features, some might also be aware of Japan’s economic influence and
the ensuing attraction. The country has been a major promoter of development across East and
Southeast Asia and beyond, through aid and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). The provision of
scholarships, traineeships, technological know-how, and funds paired with the completion and
supervision of critical infrastructure such as powerplants, bridges, and railways generally
resulted in recognition and long-lasting goodwill towards Tokyo. To name one specific example,
Japan has been advancing its Partnership for Quality Infrastructure since 2015 which was well
received in the developing neighborhood substantiating the country’s commitment.
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E-International relations

Opinion – Reflections on the American Revolution at Almost 250

Mark N. Katz

Jul 24 2022

As we approach the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence in 2026, there is deep
polarization in the United States about what sort of nation America is and should be. This current
polarization, though, largely stems from how the American Revolution itself can be (and has
been) viewed in contradictory ways. Just what kind of revolution was it? How one answers this
question very much informs how one regards what kind of country America has been, is now,
and should be in the future.

On the one hand, the American Revolution can be seen as a democratic revolution similar to—
indeed, serving to inspire—other such revolutions elsewhere. This democratic vision of the
American revolution is one of a secular republic enshrining the rule of law and guaranteed rights
enjoyed equally by all individual citizens and thus allowing for protection of minorities against
the “tyranny of the majority.”

On the other hand, the American Revolution can also be seen as a European settler revolution
which threw off colonial rule and established democracy for the European settlers, their
descendants, and even subsequent European immigrants, but did not do so for non-European
populations in their midst who were often regarded not just as unequal but as a threat, and who
were ruled over in an all too often forceful, discriminatory manner. In this European settler (or
White nationalist) vision, the American revolution resulted in rule by White Americans to whom
the country “rightfully belongs” over non-Whites who are “not really” equal citizens due to their
non-White heritage; a negative view of how, when, or why they immigrated to the United States;
or just the presumption that they tend to vote Democrat and not Republican. White fear of, and
unwillingness to pay, the presumed demands for reparations from non-Whites for past (and
present) mistreatment by Whites may also motivate this vision. An authoritarian, “White
nationalist” vision of Christianity also serves to justify why non-Whites somehow do not deserve
and thus cannot be allowed to fully participate in the American democratic process.

These two visions are clearly very different from each other. They did, though, co-exist for many
years because the majority of Americans were (and still are) White. Majority rule meant White
rule even when Congress enacted, the President enforced, and the Supreme Court upheld laws
that favored civil (that is, minority) rights.

But America’s demographics are changing. It has been widely reported that by the mid-2040s,
America will become a majority minority country—in other words, there will no longer be a
White majority. Indeed, this has already happened in several American states: Hawaii,
California, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Maryland . It is also true for the population under
age 18 nationwide. For minority groups in America (Hispanics, Blacks, Asians), this impending
demographic transition holds out the prospect of greater political influence for them. For White
Americans whose vision of the U.S. is rooted in the democratic view of the American
Revolution, this impending demographic transition is not particularly worrisome. They are
willing to cooperate with people from different racial/ethnic groups, and envision that people
from these groups will also want to cooperate with them on issues of common concern.
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E-International relations

Opinion – Shinzo Abe’s Murder and Japan’s History of Political Assassination

Martin Duffy

Jul 8 2022

The murder on 8 July 2022 of former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe while campaigning
for upcoming elections in the historic city of Nara, shocks both Japan and the world at large.
Doctors fought to save Mr Abe’s life, but despite a few moments of consciousness after the
shooting, the former PM was described as being continuously comatose during desperate efforts
of medical resuscitation. Responding to this apparent act of political violence, PM Fumio
Kishida condemned the attack, saying: “It is barbaric…and it cannot be tolerated.” The Fire and
Disaster Management Agency had earlier confirmed that Mr Abe had a bullet wound on the right
of his neck, and also suffered subcutaneous bleeding under the left part of his chest. Mr Abe was
said to be responsive in the minutes after the attack, but the 67-year-old’s situation later
deteriorated. Eyewitnesses saw a man firing twice at Mr Abe from behind. Security officers
detained the attacker, who made no attempt to run, and seized his weapon – reportedly a
handmade gun.
The suspect has been identified as Nara resident Tetsuya Yamagami. Local media reports say he
is believed to be a former member of Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Forces, and that it was an
improvised firearm. Explosives have subsequently been found at the suspect’s home. On
Japanese social media, the hashtag, “We want democracy, not violence” was trending, with
many social media users expressing their disgust towards the incident.
Politically hawkish, Shinzo Abe favoured revision of Japan’s pacifist constitution, and honoured
the Yasukuni Shrine, itself controversial primarily because its Book of Souls contains the names
of more than a thousand war criminals from WW2. Naturally, world leaders are stunned by
Shinzo Abe’s murder. Japan’s own Foreign Ministry and several prominent politicians in Japan
and abroad warned of ‘attacks on supporters of democracy everywhere’. British PM Boris
Johnston described his murder as “despicable”, while French President, Emmanuel Macron said
it was “an atrocity”. Antony Blinken, US secretary of state, described the shooting as a “very,
very sad moment”,” speaking from the G20 in Bali, Indonesia. Former US president Donald
Trump called it “a tremendous blow to the wonderful people of Japan”. Japan’s fellow Quad
members, Australia, India and the US, were among the first to respond after the shooting.
China’s foreign ministry also expressed “shock” at Abe’s shooting and extended condolences to
his family. Kevin Rudd, the former Australian PM, called it, “a sober reminder to all our
democracies of how precious our freedoms are…. an attack on supporters of democracy
everywhere.”
Post WW2, as Japan metamorphosed into a democracy, political violence lessened, but even so
there were still outbreaks of riots and assassinations. In 1960 Otoya Yamaguchi stabbed to death
Mr Inejiro Asanuma, leader of the Japanese Opposition Socialist movement. In 2007, Nagasaki’s
Mayor, Iccho Ito, a fervent opponent of nuclear weapons, was shot dead by a right-wing group.
Prior to this was the stabbing to death of Koki Ishii, an outspoken member of the opposition
Democratic Party of Japan. These events show that Japan does to an extent possess a submerged
history of political violence, uncannily in a country known for its post-WW2 pacifism and high
level of public safety. Japanese citizens will surely question the fragility of their democracy as
Abe will be laid to rest in public ceremonies.
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E-International relations

Reflecting on Chinese and Indian Negotiation Styles

Oorja Tapan
Jul 2 2022

Today, China is proving to be India’s biggest security dilemma – be it in the Indo-Pacific or on

the land frontier. The era of China’s ‘peaceful rise’ is, practically, seeming to be over; as seen by
its ‘wolf-warrior diplomacy’ phase kicking in under Xi Jinping’s rule. There is a need for India
to understand Chinese negotiators better. The government of India has had its fair share of
negotiations with the Chinese officials since independence of the two nations – be it the
recognition of People’s Republic of China by Government of India in December 1949, the
Agreement on trade between India and Tibet region of China in 1954, Chinese reaction to Indian
nuclear tests in 1998, China’s formal recognition of Sikkim in 2005, setting up of special
representative mechanism for border negotiations since 2013 (and so on). The challenge of
mutual understanding becomes great between the two countries – not only due to differences in
terms of capabilities (military or economic) but also due to differing perceptions, approaches and
international postures. Culture might also play a role in contributing towards a mismatch
between Indian and Chinese negotiations. However, such cultural differences play a greater role
between the West and the Chinese on the negotiation table.

Indian and Chinese cultures both have a greater focus on ‘the collective’, rather than the
‘individualistic’ Western societies. But, Indian civilisation goes a step further in balancing both
individual and collective interests. Most of the culture-based negotiation style assessments are
made by Western scholars. For example, when an American or European instrument to measure
assertiveness in negotiation is translated into Japanese, it retains Western idea of assertiveness. A
Japanese concept of assertiveness that included avoidance as an adaptive strategy could be easily
overlooked, labelled as unassertive because of cultural assumptions about the natures of assertion
and avoidance (LeBaron, 2003). Due to the dearth of balanced, intercultural and good studies
deploying a multitude of currencies in developing such research itself (as well as an absence of a
multicultural team to carry it out), any generalisations post such research are, usually, limited.

This paper seeks to focus on the informal summits at Wuhan (2018) and Mammallapuram (2019)
to analyse the nature of Chinese negotiation style with the Indians. This paper also divulges in to
corroborate any pattern in the Chinese nature of ‘psychological warfare’ with India and its other
neighbours to keep testing waters. Also, this paper hopes to decode possible solutions for the
changes required in Indian negotiation style with the Chinese to further improve its standing on
the global high table.

The Chinese Style of Negotiation

The Chinese people are bound by four threads of culture throughout their business or political
negotiation style – Agrarianism, Confucian Morality (combined with Taoism), Chinese
pictographic language style and finally, a wariness about foreigners (Graham and Lam, 2003).
The roots of Chinese culture can be traced to their traditional agrarian roots of peasant farming
for millennia. It is communal, (not individualistic) and familial hierarchy binds the community
together. Survival depends on group cooperation, loyalty and harmony. Many of China’s city
dwellers were raised in the country and thus, they have retained their agrarian values. Similarly,
the second factor of morality based upon the Confucius benevolent moral code (of 2000 years)
and Lao Tsu’s concept of ‘yin yang’ shaped the traditional Chinese thought.