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    Oakes, G. - Weber and Rickert. Concept Formation in The Social Sciences.

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    Weber and Rickert Concept Formation in the Cultural Sciences Guy Oakes The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachuseus, and London, England Contents Acknowledgments Introduction 1 Weber and the Problem of the Objectivity of the Cultural Sciet 1 Introduction 2 The Irrationality of Reality 3 The Sciences of Concrete Reality and the Constitution of Culture 4 Value Relevance 5 The Problem of the Objectivity of the Cultural Sciences 2 Rickert and the Theory of Historical Knowledge 1 The Problematic of the Southwest German School 18 18 21 26 32 41 al 2 Windelband and the Ideal of Iaiographic Knowledge sree 8. Lask’s Analysis of Concept Formation and the Irrationality of Reality 4 Rickert’ Project 5 The Problem of Concept Formation in History o 6 The Doctrine of Value Relevance 3 Rickert and the Objectivity of Values 1 The Objectivity of Value Relevance and the Objectivity of Values 2 The Analysis of Values 3 The Objectivity of Values 4 Critique of Rickert 1 Introduction 2 Critique of the Value/Valuation Dichotomy 3 Critique of the Transcendental Solution 4 The Incommensurability of Values 5 Concluding Remarks Notes Index 2 49 2 78 91 ‘Acknowledgments Preliminary drafts of this work were written while 1 was Max Weber Visiting Professor in the Insitute for Sociology at Heidelberg during the winter semester 1982-83. 1 am grateful {othe members of the Institute forthe congenial working condi tions I enjoyed there. I would especially like to thank Welfgang Schluchter for many conversations during the period I wrote my Max Weber Lectures on methodology and value theory, "Zur theoretischen Rationalitat der Kulturwissenschaften” (“On the ‘Theoretical Rationality of the Cultural Sciences") and Oxtmar Ohihausen for his patience in reworking the German text of these lectures. For comments on later drafts ofthis material and ‘many bibliographical suggestions, I am indebted to Gerhard Wagner. Thanks are also due to M. R. Lepsius for access to Weber's unpublished correspondence with Rickert and to Birgit Rudhard for her assistance with the Weber correspondence. Re: search on this work was supported by a grant from Monmouth College, New Jersey. Weber and Rickert Introduction This is a study of the philosophical underpinnings of Max Weber's methodology. Science is long and life—especally in academic science and scholarship, with its furious pace and exhausting tempo—is all too short. Weber wrote his first ‘methodological essay eighty-five years ago, and all his papers on ‘methodological isues were published by 1922. Thus it ip not ‘mere pedantry that dictates this inquiry should begin with the question of where we now stand in relation to Weber's meth ‘odology. On what grounds can it be claimed that his reflections fn the socialsciences ail deserve the effort that a serious analy: sis requires? Why are Weber's views in this area not merely more fr less interesting artifacts in the museum of the history of ideas? These questions become irresistible when we recall that it was Weber himself who wrote that science is "chained to the course of progress.” As a result of the immanent dynamic of the progress of science and the increasing sophistication of the divi sion of scientific labor, itis the “fate” of any piece of scientific research oF scholarship to become antiquated within fifty years of its production,’ Have we comprehended the import and con: sequences of Weber's methodology? Have its possibilities and limits been fully exploited, exhausted, and transcended? Some three generations after their original conception, the positions developed in Weber's writings continue to dominate discussion of the aims and methods of the social sciences. It is Weber's work thar sets the terms, defines the problems, and stablishes the limits ofthis province of contemporary scientific and scholarly discourse. If this claim seems extravagant, con: sider a profile of the main issues of current work inthe philoso Phy of the social sciences, Such an account would include the Felationship between the natural sciences and the socialsciences the interplay between theoretical and extratheoretical interests in defining the aims of a science; the relationship between sc ence and values and the status of a scence that conceives its subject matter as defined by reference to values; the question of whether the socialsciences should develop general and system atic theories, and the closely related isue of whether social phenomena can be accounted for in nomological terms; the rele vance of a theory of action to the development of socal theory: the relationship between the explanation of social phenomena and the interpretation of human action and its artifacts; the satus of alternative conceptval schemes in the social sciences and the problem of developing criteria for adjudicating their competing claims to validity; the issue of the universality and necessity of the standards of rationality that have developed in the occidental sciences; and the question of the privileged status of scientific rationality, which raises the problem of whether there isa plurality of irreducibly diferent but equally legitimate teria for rationality, each appropriate to its own sphere. ‘These are also the main themes of Weber's early methodological writings In 1903, Weber published his first purely methodological study, "Roscher's Historical Method? This irs installment of a three-part critique of the basic assumptions underlying the research program of the German historical school of economics Inwoduction ‘outlines Weber's views on the relationship between the natural sciences and the historical or cultural sciences, In 1904, this piece was followed by the famous programmatic essay on the ‘objectivity of social science’ Here Weber summarizes his er tique of positivism and comments on the relationship of the caltural sciences to human interests and values. He also develops his conception ofthe limits within which validity can be ascribed to the basic values presupposed by the cultural sciences and takes a position on historcist and retatvit arguments that at tempt to establish the contingency and variability ofthese values. In 1905 and 1906, Weber published the second and third parts of his critique ofthe historical school," providing the initial for ‘mulation of his views on the roe of interpretation in the cultural sciences and the link between a theory of interpretation and a theory of the meaning of action. The year 1906 also saw the publication of his critique of the methodological reflections of Eduard Meyer, the eminent historian of classical antiquity.” Here Weber elaborates his ideas on the place of interpretation in the cultural sciences and ties these ideas to an account of causal explanation in history. In 1907, Weber's intemperate critique of the neo-Kantan legal theorist Rudolf Stammler appeared In the context ofa savage attack on Stammler’s philosophy of social science, Weber outlines the fundamentals of his theory of action and the place of the interpretation of action in the development of social theory ‘The persistence of these Weberian problems in the subse quent debate about the presuppositions, aims, and methods of the social sciences, the ways these problems are framed, and ‘occasionally even the language in which they are articulated in- dicate how litte has changed in the philosophy of social science since Weber's death in 1920, To a remarkable degree, the main issues of Weber's methodology remain our probleme as wel tit ‘not surprising that major contributors to this debate generally find themselves obliged to come to terms with Weber and some {imes even employ a critical commentary om Weber asa vehicle forthe statement of their own position,” Of course this does not ‘mean that Weber's methodological writings occupy a status in the contemporary debate comparable to the Aristotelian corpus in the medieval academy: a collection of canonical texts that prescribes the range of problems, methods, and solutions that are regarded as acceptable within a certain sphere of discourse Its not to0 much to say, however, thatthe isues of Weber's methodological writings continue to define the space within which the problems of the philosophy of social science are located. Moreover, Weber himself—whether as authority pio eet, béte noire, whipping boy, or not infrequently, straw ‘man—remains the major figure in the contemporary debate, justas he did in the methodological controversies ofthe Weimar period. Since Weber's lifetime, philosophical fashions have shifted several imes. In the 1880s and 1890s, the philosophical idiom of neo-Kantianism established the original terms of the ‘methodological debate. When neo-Kantianison made the linguis- tic tum, the language of the debate changed accordingly. As & result, the more or less official idiom of the debate was trans- formed, first by the Viennese positivism of the 1930s, subse- quently by the philosophical analysis practiced at Cambridge and Oxford in the 1940s and 1950s, and most recently by the evelopment of a philosophical hermeneutics. These changes have not substantially altered the questions ofthe debate and the way they are understood, however, Talcott Parsons, reminiscing in the 1970s on his experience as graduate student at Heidel berg nearly fifty years before, observed that the German aca: demics and literati who engaged in the critique of Weber's ‘methodological writings during the 1920s would be astonished to discover how closely the issues ofthe debate today mirror the controversies of the Weimar period.* In this sense, itis not an exaggeration to claim that the philosophy of social science re: ‘mains a critique of Weber's methodology. Friedrich Tenbruck has recently observed that this critique, the seventy-year enterprise of coming to terms with Weber's methodology, has failed. Indeed, Tenbruck goes so far as to claim thatthe “core” of Weber's writings asa whole has not been discovered. As a result, his work remains so thoroughly alien and wnintellgible to us that we are unable o reach any conser sus about what it means. What is responsible for this failure? ‘According to Tenbruck, itis due tothe fact that we have not yet ound the “master key” that will unlock Weber's work, This is the key to a correct understanding of his methodology.” With some risk of oversimplification, it can be said that the literature more oF less explicly devoted to Weber's method ‘ological writings covers three different sorts of sues. First, a ‘great deal of effort has been expended on the analysis of specific concepts that Weber leaves unexplained or unexplored—ideas such asthe ideal type, the historical individual, value relevance, and value neutrality. Second, some work has been done on the larger question of the general methodological strategy in which these concepts are employed. This inquiry frequently focuses on Weber's intentions. Did he attempt to develop a general and systematic theory of method, or were his aims limited by the ‘more modest objective of resolving a local disciplinary crisis that ‘occurred in the social seiences a the end of the nineteenth cen: tury? The same inquiry is also concerned with the conditions under which this methodological strategy can be understood Are the premises essential oa comprehension of Weber's meth- ‘odological doctrines set out in his own writings? Or does an understanding ofthese doctrines depend upon ideas that Weber himself does not develop, but rather borrows, exploits, or takes for granted? In other words, i «satisfactory interpretation of inaodoction Weber's methodology possible on the basis of a textimmanent hermeneutic, or does it require a textextrinsie hermeneutic? Finally, some attention has been given tothe problem of how the validity of Weber's methodological doctrines can he established. ‘This inquiry is linked tothe question of whether an understand. ing ofthe methodological writings requires a textimmanent or & texteextrinsc interpretation. Can the considerations needed to demonstrate the validity of Weber's methodological postions be found in his own writings? Or does the validity of his methodol ‘ogy depend upon premises, arguments, or perhaps even a fully developed theory of method that must be drawn from other Suppose we consider these questions from Weber's own perspective. Does Weber himself indicate how understand specific concepts of his methodology, his general methodological srategy, and the conditions for its validity? Weberian scholars who have taken this path have not been disappointed. "I have Just finished Rickert,” Weber wrote to his wife from Florence in the spring of 1902. “He is very good." He was referring, of course, to the philosopher Heinrich Rickert, Weber's friend from his Freiburg period. Rickert (1863-1936) and Weber (1864-1920) had been colleagues since the time of Weber's pro: fessorship in economics at Freiburg (1894-97), where Rickert was a docent in philosophy. Rickert had completed his doctoral studies under Wilhelm Windelband (1848~1915) in 1888 with a monograph on the theory of definition."! He then moved «0 Freiburg for his Habltaion, che work that qualified the aspiring academic inthe German system of higher education for univer: sity teaching. Completed in 1891, this was a general introduction to the theory of knowledge written from a neo-Kantian perspec tive." When a professorship in philosophy at Freiburg fell vi ‘ant in 1896 upon Alois Riehl's departure for Kiel, Weber successfully supported Rickert’s candidacy. n the year that fo- Invoducion lowed his 1902 leter to his wife, Weber characterized his first and most ambitious methodological study asin part an attempt to test the value of Rickert’ ideas for his own methodological purposes." In fact, much of the philosophical vocabulary of Weber's methodological writings is borrowed from Rickert. The concepts ofthe irrationality of realty, the hiatus rationals between con cept and realty, the historical individual, and value relevance, for example, are all drawn from Rickert's work. In addition, Weber frequently relies upon lines of argument that seem to reproduce strategies employed in Rickert's writings. Weber's ci tique of positivism, his method of demarcatng the cultural sci- ences from the natural sciences, his distinction between value relevance and value judgments, and his conception of methodol- ‘oy asa theory of concept formation all appear to be based on arguments that are more fully developed in Rickert’s work, Fr rally, when Weber judges that systematic statement of his own Position is necessary of when he sets outa position without de veloping the arguments required for its support, he regulaely refers the reader to Rickert. Does this mean that Rickert's ph losophy provides the key to Weber's methodology, the means for understanding its concepts and its general strategy and the premises by means of which its validity can be established? It is evident that this question can be answered only through an analysis of Ricker's own work. ILis not possible to determine whether Weber's conception of the aims and methods of the cultural sciences depends upon positions taken in Ricker’ writ ings without examining the texts in which Rickert philosophy of the cultural aciences i et out, This is an argument in favor of suspending debate on Weber's methodology until a satisfactory understanding of Ricker’s work is achieved, The argument itself is logically flawless. However, the factors that motivate scientific interests and determine career tracks a8 well ag the historical dynamics that drive academic controversies render it utterly pointless asa practical proposal, The interruption of an ‘important branch ofthe Weber industry in contemporary schol arship and the interdiction of the careers supported by this in- ‘dustry cannot be expected simply because they are dictated as consequences of a valid argument. The ensuing investigation represents an alternative way of taking this argument seriously. examine Ricker’s work with a view to discovering whether i provides a satisfactory solution to the main issue of Weber's ‘methodology. Weber calls this issue the problem of the objec. tivity of social science. He conceives it as a question about the relationship between concept formation and experience or be: ‘ween knowledge and realty. In view ofthe infinite complexity of our experience of human action and its artifact, how can valid concepts ofthese objects be formed? In other words, under what conditions can objects of knowledge in socal science be constituted? Weber also represents this problem as a question about the relationship between knowledge and interests or be- ‘ween concept formation and values. The concepts of socal sc ‘ence rest on presuppositions that are subjective in the sense that they are anchored in the values of human agents or subjects. In light of ths consideration, how is it possible for these concepts to provide a valid definition of social phenomena as cognitive ob Jects? In other words, under what conditions can subjective values provide the basis for the conceptualization of social phe nomena as objects of knowledge? Chapter 1 explores the premises in Weber's methodological ‘writings that are responsible for generating thie problem, Chap. ces Rickert’s more systematic analysis ofthe same issue This calls for some remarks on the metaphilosophy and the theory of history developed by the Southwest German school, & circle of neo-Kantian philosophers in which Rickert had become the leading figure by the turn ofthe century. Most important, it ‘nwrodution requires a thorough discusion of Rickert’s theory of historical knowledge, which he conceives asa theory of concept formation for the cultural sciences, Rickert argues that the objectivity of concept formation in the cultural sciences depends upon the objectivity of the values in terms of which these concepts are defined. Chapter 8 provides an analysis of the elements of Rick- certs value theory on which his solution to the problem of the ‘objectivity of values depends. This solution is assessed in chapter 4, From this assessment, I conclude that Rickert fils o solve the problem of the objectivity of values. Since the objectivity of con ‘cept formation rests on the objectivity of values, this means that he fail to solve the former problem as well. also argue thatthe premises of Ricker’s value theory rule out 2 solution to the problem of the objectivity of values. Within the limits defined by these premises, no solution to this problem is possible. This sans that the problem of the objectivity of socal science cannot be solved by employing the conceptual apparatus and the argu ments of Rickert’s philosophy. Chapter 5 considers the more igeneral implications of thie critique for Weber's work, To the fextent that Weber's methodology depends upon these elements of Rickert's thought, the critique of Rickert also destroys the basis of Weber's methodology This book offers neither a complete analysis of Weber's methodology nor a full-scale exposition of Ricker’s philosophy ‘of history. To write heavy tomes on these matters, as Max Weber Jat have sai, I have no great inclination. The ensuing inves tigation is confined to the following territory: the basic problem ‘Weber poses in his methodological writings, Rcker's solution to this problem, the critique of this solution, and the consequences of this critique for Weber's though. In hie "Philosophical Autobiography.” Karl Jaspers offers an interesting account of a conversation he had with Rickert in Heidelberg only five days after Weber's death. As Jaspers tells in Incoduction the sory Ricken spoke rater condescending of Weber a his Dupland alluded, perhaps women dpargiogiy seth ied significance and intaence of hs woh, pers sens ses seabing "Do you mean tat anyone al lead yo ft fare fh happens il ede oly he a ne wihom he owes cerain loge ialghs” At this eens Jspesaconialy add, relation between Rite snd spel became strained" According o Jasper, Weber sesed ton some of the methodologial postions he had devdoped noe, pendenty were ao sto i Richer’ ling Wetes we Jaspers characterizes ss extavgarly and nay neti mater of wlenifc priory, ced Rickert whence ino ete dala ponons were a iee The reckon ang topeited ha "wme of hi dacusions merch ter ee Conmequences and sppletins of Rikers cee Bere Jape clams, thei Seasons represen hahing wove ae Imago gestarcon behalf aly fend nd ees calesgue I tne napa hat follows hee oases foe Biographical explanation of the relaioahip bemneen Weert methodology and Kickers philowphy it migaken The eorey OF his judgment onthe Notre! fae of Richens pulcceng however, has proved tobe justified. Alter Runes deh Understanding of Weber, Asa su the prin he anal of Rikers work has been the sendy Msn oe Weber's methodsigy Alexander von Seheing’ pioncerng sty wa he Git at tempto aly the reltonship between Weber netoony and Wickens phisophy ina ytemat tation Von enc, ing demonstated that Weber concn of metesotan froundd in Riches idea of loge of sconce, nad he shoved how Weber appropriates Ricker’ phisopy of ated eee a Invroduction as well as his transcendental strategy for posing the problem of the possibilty ofthe cultural sciences. Following Rickert, Weber conceives this problem as the question of how to conceptualize reality from the perspective ofa certain set of theoretical int cexts, The question of how the cultural sciences can be demat~ cated from the navural sciences is understood as a problem about the relationship between reality and the concepts of Science. In other words, itis treated asthe putative non-natur Rickertan problem ofthe limits of concept formation in natural science. In addition, von Scheling showed that Weber's critique ‘of positivist and intuitionist solutions to the demarcation prob- lem is based on Ricker’ critique of positivism and historicism, “Moat important for the purposes of this study, he established that Weber also conceives the problem of the objectivity of the cultural sciences in Rickertian terms: as a question about the validity of interpretations of cultural phenomena that ate con stituted as such by virtue of their relationship to values, More- ‘over, he makes the important observation that Rickert's solution to this problem depends upon the objectivity of the values in terms of which cultural phenomena are defined. He does not ‘examine Rickert’s solution to the problem of the objectivity of values, however, nor does he consider the consequences that would follow for Weber's conception of the objectivity of the cultural sciences if Ricker’ solution to this problem proved to be unsatisfactory. Von Schelting’s book remains a unique contribution to the secondary literature on Weber's methodological writings. His comprehensive treatment of the problems of Weber's methodol: ‘ogy easily surpassed the work of the Weimar era and set a stan dard for Weber scholarship that was not rivaled until after World War Il. The scope of his work has proved to be inimi- table. Von Schelting isthe only scholar who has undertaken to explore the full range of Weber's methodological writings and at Inredocion the same time o link these texts both to Weber's sociology and to ‘the main tendencies in philosophy, economic theory, and his: toriography during the Wihelmian era. No one writing on We- ber's methodology today could hope to produce a work of these ambitions and dimensions. Nor, given the inevitable superficiality of any attempt to cover the territory that von Schelting surveys, should anyone be tempted to do 80." In the postwar period, Thomas Burger was the frst student of Weber's methodology to go beyond the generalities of von Scheling’s work in order to produce a careful analysis of the relationship between Weber and Rickert.'® Burger demonstrates in detail the influence of Ricker’s philosophy of science on We- ber’s conception ofthe problem of the objectivity of the cultural sciences. By locating the underpinnings of Weber's methodol ogy in Ricker’'s philosophy, Burger is aso able to provide a coherent interpretation of the ideal type and the problem this ‘concept was intended to solve. Inthe course of his analysis, Bur ger presents a caustic and largely justified critique of the postwar secondary literature on Weber's methodology."® Although this literature exhibits a tiresome preoccupation with Weber's con ception ofthe ideal type and his views on value neutrality, it fails to illuminate the crucial link between these ideas and the prob- lem of the objectivity of concept formation. Moreover, Weber's understanding of this problem is frequently interpreted in a positivist Fashion, as if he were a precursor of Carnap and the problem of che objectivity of the cultural sciences were an issue about the verifiabiliy of explanations or theories.” The aims of Burger's book are expository and analytical. Hei concerned only with the premises of Rickert’ work that are essential to an understanding of Weber's doctrine of the ideal type. Although Burger argues that Weber's methodology posed problems for which Rickert developed systematic solutions, he does not attempt to determine whether these solutions are 1s inoduaion sound. For example, he does not assess the adequacy of Ricker's ‘olution to the problem of the objectivity of concept formation, nor does he consider what consequences would follow for the validity of Weber's methodology’ if Ricker’ solution to this problem proved to be indefensible. Burger also ignores the link between the objectivity of concept formation and the objectivity ‘of values. This is presumably why he thinks that Rckert’s value theory is irrelevant to Weber's methodology. Thus itis not sur- prising that his book does not consider the merits of Ricker’s solution tothe problem of the objectivity of values and the impli- cations of a critique of this solution for Weber's conception of the objectivity ofthe cultural sciences. Rainer Prevo's comments on Weber and Rickert are subject to the same strictures: Prevo points out the dependence of We- her's methodology on Ricker's theory of method. He also makes the important observation that this theory of method—which includes the doctrine of value relevance that is s0 crucial for ‘Weber's work—cannot be understood independent of the sys tematic theory of knowledge that Rickert develops in Der Gegen and der Erhenntnis, As Prevo correctly notes, this book has been largely ignored in the literature on the relationship between Weber and Rickert. Prevo explores Rickert's doctrine of value relevance far enough to demonstrate its dependence on what he calls a “systematic philosophy of values." He does not consider Ricker’ thesis ofthe objectivity of values, however, nor does he ‘examine the argument on which this thesis is based Most recently, Karl-Heinz Nusser has investigated Weber's conception of philosophy, the cultural sciences, and sociology by analyzing the connections between Weber's writings and Rick- fers philosophy, Nusser argues that Ricker’ theory of history provides abasic philosophical framework that Weber exploits in order to work outa “systematic theoretical possibility” implicicin Ricker’s work. In his critique ofthe secondary literature, Nus ser notes that Burger fails to establish the philosophical basis of the central Weberian concepts that can be traced to Rickert. Bur ier also ignores the reasoning that leads Rickert tothe doctrine of unconeitionally valid values and the way this doctrine is reflected in Weber's concepts. These same objections can be leveled with equal justice against Nusser’s own account. In his discussion ofthe principal features of Ricker's theory of history Nusser identifies neither the main problems that this theory attempts to resolve nor the fundamental philosophical theses that generate these problems, Nusser also fails to consider the main philosophical question wo which Ricker’s theory of history is addressed, the problem of the objectivity of concept forme tion, and he does not explore the ultimate issue on which the resolution ofthis question rests, the problem of the objectivity of values. Although he observes that Rickert dedicated carefully crafted and extensive analyses to the demonstration of the objec: tivity of concept formation, Nusser does not examine the writ ings in which these analyses are set out, nor does he consider whether Rickert’s demonstration is successful This tradition of commentary on the relationship between Rickert’ philosophy and Weber's methodology leaves several ‘major issues untouched. In order to sort out this relationship ina more satisfactory way than has been achieved thus far, i is necessary to distinguish the specifie doctrines and arguments that constitute Weber's methodology with a view to determining whether the import or validity of each distinctive postion taken by Weber depends upon ideas developed by Rickert. No instruc tive results can be expected as long as the diffuse concept of “Weber’s methodology” or “Weber's Winenichailehre” is em ployed as the unit of analysis. I is also essential to differentiate the various nonequivalent senses of dependence that may be at stake in assessing the relationship between Weber and Rickert Inrodton Consider, for example, the claim that Weber's concept of value relevance is dependent upon Rickerv’s concept of value rele vance. This may be understood as any of three quite different assertions, conflation of which can be expected to result only in confusion. Genetic dependence: It can be showin, as a matter of historical fact, that Weber appropriated the idea of value rele vance from Rickert. This is a purely historical connection. It does not establish that Weber's idea of value relevance can be understood only in terms of Ricker’ idea. The latter relation ship involves a second type of dependence, Hermeneutic dependence: Weber's concept can be understood only by un derstanding Ricker’ concept. This epistemic relationship does not entail that the acceptability or the soundness of Weber's doctrine of value relevance depends upon Ricker's doctrine. In assessing the validity of Weber’s postion, a third type of depen- dence is at stake. Logical dependence: The validity of Weber's doctrine depends upon the validity of Rickert’s doctrine. Put another way, Rickert’s doctrine provides the premises required to establish Weber's doctrine The fact that Weber borrowed a term like value relevance from Rickert does not show that Weber understood this concept in the same way Rickert did, nor does it show that we cannot understand Weber's concept without reading Rickert. Further, even if Weber's doctrine of value relevance cannot be under: Sood in a textimmanent fashion, it would not follow that the validity of this doctrine depends upon arguments that Weber himselF did not develop. The substantial secondary literature that covers the various alleged influences on Weber's methodol: ‘ogy is seriously compromised by a failure to make these distinc: tions. Moreover, this literature generally ignores the las ype of dependence, which locates the central question ofthis investiga tion. As result, three issues crucial to an analysis ofthe rela- a __ Incoducton tionship between Weber and Rickert have not been investigated: the premises of Ricker’s value theory and their bearing on the problem of the objectivity of concept formation; the validity of Rickert’ solution to the problem of the objectivity of values and the implications of an assessment of Rickert’s solution to this later problem for the fundamental doctrines of Weber's methodology ‘One of the more remarkable lacunae in the literature on ‘Weber and Rickert isthe absence of any analysis of the ultimate principles on which Rickert’s solution to the problem of the ‘objectivity of concept formation is based: the premises of his value theory. This is why I stress the connection between Rick e's theory of concept formation and his theory of values and the respects in which the conception of the objectivity of the cultural sciences that Weber draws from Rickert requires a solu tion to the problem of the objectivity of values. Ulimately, our inveresin Weber's methodology is determined by our judgment of whether is basic ideas are sound. Ths it isa curiosity that the literature on Rickert and Weber is virtually silent concerning the {question of the adequacy of Ricker’ solutions to Weber's prob: lems and the consequences of an appraisal ofthese solutions for ‘Weber's thought. Although the question ofthe relationship be tween Weber's methodology and Ricker’s epistemology has been posed repeatedly during the last seventy years, there has been no effort to determine whether the validity of Weber's position rests on Rickert's philosophical theses and, if %0, Whether these theses are sound, Put another way, although the question of the genesis and the interpretation of Weber's methodology has been tied to Ricker's philosophy, the question ofits validity has not been. We have been told that in order to understand Weber's basic methodological ideas we also need to understand Ricker’s philosophy. However, we have not been told whether the validity ofthese ideas also depends upon Rick: certs philosophy and, ifs, whether Rickert philosophical pos tion is defensible. The ensuing investigation focuses upon these crucial but neglected issues. 1 Weber and the Problem of the Objectivity of the Cultural Sciences 1 Introduction For many years, the locus clasicus for all discussions of method ological issues in the cultural sciences has been Max Weber's ‘essay * ‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Socal Policy.” An ex amination of the basic problem Weber outlines here may serve as an introduction to the principal issue of this investigation. Weber poses the general problem of the essay as a question about the sense in which there are ‘objective’ or ‘valid truths in the domain of the cultural sciences. It is the analysis of this 4uestion, its presuppositions, and is implications that forms the fundamental issue of his work in methodology." How should {his problem be understood? What is the argument within which an analysis ofthe problem is east? Like all Weber's methodologi cal writings, the 1904 objectivity essay imposes extraordinary demands on the reader. The links among the various themes of the essay are never clearly exposed and explained. They lie in several subterranean levels of Weber's text, and a laborious prof {ct of logical excavation must be undertaken to uncover these relationships. In addition, Weber does not always take the trou- ble to provide arguments in support of the main claims of the Weber andthe Problem of the Ofjciviy essay. Moreover, the arguments he does introduce are fre: {quently mere fragments, brielly sketched and incompletely de: veloped. Readers can eal love their way in the attempt o work through the maze of Weber's belabored polemical digression, in which the main purpose of the account is often obscured by the minutiae of provincial German academic controversies now ‘more than eighty years old. These difficulties are not mitigated by the English edition, the intelligibility oF which is compro imised by deletions, grammatical lapses, and editorial and trans- lation errors that render certain passages incomprehensible and ‘make it impossible to decipher some ofthe most important ideas of the essay Therefore, { will not attempt to elucidate Weber's conception of the objectivity ofthe cultural sciences by retracing the course he actually takes in the essay, with its many repetitions, omis: sions, rhetorical and polemical asides, ryptic parenthetical ob servations, and implicie premises. Instead, I will reconstruct the philosophical basis of the essay by means of a profile of the argument in which Weber's reasoning is grounded, That argu ‘ment is defined by four premises: the idea ofthe irrationality of reality; the concept of the cultural sciences as sciences of con crete reality the doctrine of vale relevance; and the problem of the objectivity ofthe cultural sciences that is generated by these premises 2 The tee jonality of Reality ‘Weber's conception of the irrationality of reality isa thesis about the relationship between theory and data, concepts and reality thought and being. This thesis maintains that reality cannot be reduced to any conceptual scheme. Weber specifies two reasons ‘why there is a hiatus irationals between concepts and reality Chapter 1 First reality is concrete, individual, and defined by reference to its qualitatively unique and distinctive properties. Thus what we regard as essential to reality qua realty is concrete, individual, and qualitative. Concepts, on the other hand, even “individual concepts” that refer to unique entities, are necessarily abstract. This is why any description of reality inevitably represents an abstraction from the manifold of its concrete properties. Be- «cause concepts are abstractions, they cannot reproduce the qual itaive individuality and concreteness of realty? Second, Weber accepts an epistemological assumption about realty that served a8 a common property of much German academic philosophy during the latter part of the nineteenth century. According to this assumption, we experience reality as infinitely complex. The complexity of reality is quantitatively or extensively infinite in the sense that itis impossible to provide an exhaustive descrip tion of reality as a whole. It is also qualitatively or intensively infinite in the sense that i is impossible to provide a complete description of any single aspect of reality. Because any such aspect is open to an infinity of qualitative distinctions, there is no facticity of reality represents is highest and its only law. How ver this actualy signifies the absence of any law. Even though individual existence falls under laws, it cannot be deduced from them. Even though it follows laws, it does not follow from them, Because of the anomi quality of realty, the law and reality, oF concept and reality, are “incommensurable quantities"! In light ofthe hiatus irrational, is there any strategy by means ‘of which the possibility of historical knowledge can be estab lished? 1c might seem that in order to succeed, any such strategy ‘would have to close the gap between concept and reality, In that ‘ase, there would have tobe some sense in which realty could be derived from concepts. Otherwise, how would it be possible to conceptualize an individual entity? Even if such a strategy were logically possible, which Lask denies i the case, it would be sell defeating asa solution tothe problem of historical knowledge because it would contradict the batic axiological assumption on which knowledge of individual entities depends. In developing this argument, Lask establishes a connection between the hats fnratimalis and a conception of value that restrits the attribution ‘of values to individual entities. Lask calls this conception of Values Wertindividuaita, or value individuality, and argues thet the hiatus iratonai is essential to this conception of value.” If every concrete phenomenon were nothing more than a repre sentative case of a general concept, there would be no basis for an interest in any given individual phenomenon. All individual entities would be axiologically indifferent, because values could be ascribed only to the general concepts or laws under which they were subsumed and not to concrete phenomena. Pat am other way, concrete phenomena could be object of imerest only to the extent that they qualified as representative cases of such concepts oF laws, Lask calls this thesis Wertuniorsaismus, or value universalism.” Value universaisi contradict the thesis of value individuality and thus destroys the basis of the historical ss _ idler and the Theory of Hiworial Knowledge interest. According to Lask, the interest in the individual charac ter of realty presupposes value individualism. However, value individualism presupposes the hiatus srrationals, ‘Therefore, solution to the problem of historical knowledge cannot be achieved by surmounting the hitur irrationalis and closing the sap between concept and realty, which is the path taken by Hegel nd the partisans ofthe emanationist theory. Lash’ analy sis entails chat this problem can be solved only by showing that historical knowledge is possible in spite of —or perhaps even on the basis of—the hiaws irationais, This is che path taken by Rickert. By employing the hiatus irationalis as a premise of his Philosophy of history, he attempts to show how historical knowl edge depends on the irrationality of reality. In Ricker’s thought, the hiatus iraionai is not a radical problem or an obstacle that precludes historical knowledge. It isan essential condition for the possibility of historical knowledge. 4 Ricker’s Project Ricker’s main purpose in Die Grenson isto solve the problem posed by the hiatus rationals, There are ive links in the chain of ‘easoning that leads him to solution: a conception ofthe imma- rence of reality, a critique of epistemological realism, a theory of ‘cognitive interests and methods, an analysis ofthe limits of con- ‘cept formation in natural science, and a demarcation criterion for distinguishing natural science from historical or cultural si 4.1 The Immanence of Reality Reality as an object of experience i an infinite manifold of single events and processes that has no identifiable emporal beginning or end and no discernible spatial limits. Moreover, it appea eA Ghaper® fn infinite number of combinations. There are two respects in ‘which realty asa whole is infinite, It is anendic, endless, in the Sense that it cannot be exhaustively incorporated into exper tence. And it is wniersehbar, without limits in the sense that iis impossible to survey reality in toto. Rickert calls this the exten- sive infinity of realy. In addition, each event and process within this extensively infinite manifold of experience is also infinitely ‘complex. This s not merely a consequence of the fact that every entity is related tall other entities in an infinite number of ways fr thatthe relations between a given entity and all other entities are endless and impossible co survey. Even ifa single perception is detached from alls relationships, it remains infinitely com plex in two respects, Fist, the number of parts into which any vent can be divided, othe number of elements that compos it fs alo unlimited in principle. Although we may scrutinize ex actly the smallest parts we can perceive, there is no guarantee that a more precise scrutiny will fal turn up even smaller parts that had escaped us, Rickert calls this the quantitative infinity of any given state or, process. I is based on the fact that there is no erterion by means of which we could determine what ‘would qualify asthe ulkimate element or the simplest constituent fof an event, Second, every such event and its parts can be suid to possess an infinite number of aspects, We can never have an exhaustive experience ora complete awareness ofthese aspect Put another way, every event can be described in terms of prop certes that each exhibit an indeterminate number of aspects, and there is no principle that can specify what would consitte & complete enumeration ofthese aspects. Because each ofits qual- ites is subject an infinity of discriminations, any given state or proces is also a qualitatively infinite manifold. Rickert calls this ‘quantitatively and qualitatively infinite manifold of single events and processes the intensive ininity of reality." Ricker and the Theory of Hisorial Knowledge “The thesis of the extensive and intensive infinity of realty holds not only for the corporeal world of physical objec but also for the psychological world of mental process. Even the realty of firstperson psychology—the ego's experience of its ‘own mental life—is infinitely complex. Because of the infinite profusion of mental life, ic is impossible for me to achieve 2 complete account of my peychic experience as 2 whole everything I have thought, wished for, hoped, intended, and so fon, Moreover, each individual mental process is also infinitely complex. No feeling exactly resembles any other, nor does any volition repeat itself exactly. Finally, each mental process is 2 temporal event that can be analyzed into an infinite number of stages." Thus realty a5 a whole is irrational because there is no criterion that can specify what would qualify as knowledge of this totality. And every element of reality is irrational because there is no criterion that can specify what would constitute a ‘complete description ofall is aspects Rickert stresses that this conception of the irationality of real ity nota theory about the nature of existence itself but rather a statement of fact about our experience of what exists. Thus it ‘could be said that this thesis ie a phenomenological claim, not an ‘ontological doctrine. In Ricker’ view, it would be a mistake to ‘suggest that his solution tothe problem of historical knowledge rests on an ontology that is commited (othe ultimate irrational: ity of reality. The thesis of the irrationality of realty is a claim about our consciousness of the world. It concerns our cognitive limits and our experience of these limits as an inability o pro vide an exhaustive account of reality. In fat, we perceive reality as infinite and thus beyond the cognitive powers of our finite ‘minds, Asa result, we are unable o achieve a complete grasp of the manifold of experience that realty present. Rickert’ analy sin of realty is cat in terms of a phenomenology rather than an ‘ontology because he accepts a postion that he calls the "thesis of 36 Chapiar 2 immanence”: Everything that is said to exist obtains only as a fact of consciousness” This thesis is inconsistent with a tran scendental realism that postulates realty independent of con sciousness, Transcendental realism is a metaphysics of two ‘worlds or two realities: the ontologically inferior world of phe- homens or appearances that are objects of consciousness and the world of authentic reality that transcends consciousness. For Rickert, phenomena or facts of consciousness constitute the sole reality, The idea ofa transcendent reality that lies beyond con: sciousnessis merely a figment of the metaphysical imagination ** 42 The Critique of Epistemological Realism ‘The second linkin Rickert’s reasoning isthe inference he draws from the thesis of the immanence of realty: a refutation of cpistemological realism. The idea of epistemological realism is employed quite informally in Die Grenzen, and Rickert never analyzes it with any care. His critique of this position is also somewhat confusing. Arguments are sketched in an incomplete and Reeting manner, and sometimes quite diferent objections to epistemological realism are conflated. Ricker's remarks, how- ever, make it clear that he conceives epistemological realism asa thesis about the nature of both knowledge and truth. According to this position, knowledge reproduces reality at we actually ex: perience it. A'proposition qualifies as a valid cognitive claim ingofar as it faithfully reproduces the properties ofits object Such a theory of knowledge requires a correspondence theory fof truth. A proposition is true if it corresponds to the facts it represents [tis false 1o the extent that it isa defective represen tation. In Die Grenzen, Rickert calls this epistemological position the picture theory of knowledge. It holds that the purpose of knowledge iso provide a picture of reality as we experience it In Der Gegensand der Brkewninis, Rickert provides 4 more am iicker and the Theory of Hinoral Knowledge plified, athough no more exact, exposition of epistemological Fealism by employing the philosophical idiom of David Hume* Experience comprises two different sorts of contents of con: sciousness impressions of physical and mental phenomena, and ideas that reproduce these impressions. On this view, knowledge is a correspondence between ideas and impressions. Ideas are ‘uve when they reproduce exacly the properties ofthe impres sions they copy. Rickert calls ths positon “empirical realism” or “the immanent picture theory." Tin light of the irrationality of realty andthe impossibly of cognitively reproducing ether realy 28 a whole oF any of its aspects, itis not surprising that Rickert finds epistemological realism unacceptable. Realty 8 we experience it cannot be re produced in any sent, ether extensively oF intensively *® The {ejection of epistemological realism is also required by two other constituents of Ricker’ theory of knowledge: his theory of eon- ‘cepts and his theory of judgments. Rickerian concepts should not be confused with ideas. Rickert regards ideas as nothing ‘more than mere facts oF phenomena of mental life. Concepts, however, are constructs that realize cognitive purposes, A con ceptis developed by abstracting specific characteristics fom the material of mental life and forming them into a coherent unity that constitutes the meaning of the concept. The content of a concept, which is fixed and determinate, differs from the con- tent ofan ide, which is variable and indeterminate. The idea is a diffuse perceptual manifold. The concept is defined by a set of statements or judgments. In Zur Lehre von der Definition, Rickert offers a preliminary account of the relationship between concepts and judgments All knowledge takes the form of judgments, and every know! ledge claim is a judgment. From the standpoint of its logical content, the completely defined or fully specified concept is the ss Chapeer Product of a judgment. In making this point about the depen dence of concepts on judgments and the essential propositional form of concepts, one of Rickert's purposes isto stree the die cursive quality of knowledge over its perceplual aspect, The object of a concept is not an idea or a percept. Its the set of relationships between ideas or percepts. These relationships are formed by judgments. They are not perceptual but rahe discursive” In Ricker’s account of the concept, he distinguishes concept formation, oF Begrifiildung, from concept analysis, or Beg zerlegung. The former isa process of synthesis in which there ponents of the material of experience that are regarded. ss essential are formed to define a concept. The latter iva protons of analysis in which the concept is broken down into ts compos ‘ent elements. The analysis ofa concept always takes the form ‘of a judgment. Rickert, unaware of the analytcalinguistic eve, luxiom in philosophy that was under way in Austria, England and even Germany as he published successive editions ot Zn Lehre between 1888 and 1929, conceives a judgment as the men tal event that corresponds to a statement or the mental proces that is intended by a declarative sentence. Conceptual analyse the analytical definition of «concept, transposes the concept ito & judgment or a sequence of judgments, The subject of the judgment isthe concept. Its predicates are the elements of the ‘material of experience that the synthetic definition species oo ‘essential, Thus the synthetic definition, in which elements ae combined to form a concept, is also a judgment that analyeis merely reverses in order to reduce the concept to its elements Concept formation, or the synthetic definition of a concep, i the movement from judgments to the concept they form, Pore

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