Baybayan v. Aquino G.R. No.

L-42678

Facts:

On 19 January 1960, the Paduas, all claiming to be the nephews and nieces of one Vicente Oria who
died intestate, filed a petition for the summary settlement of the decedent's estate in the then Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan. A writ of execution was subsequently issued pursuant thereto. A writ of
possession was also issued sometime thereafter, and the private respondents were placed in possession
of their respective shares. However, when a representative of the private respondents went to cultivate
the portion adjudicated to said private respondents, he was prevented by Jose Diaz and Cipriano
Evangelista. Pedro Baybayan, Cipriano Evangelists, and the spouses Bartolome and Consuelo Baybayan
(petitioners), claiming to be the registered owners of the lots involved, filed a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan. The court dismissed the complaint of the petitioners and ordered the
petitioners to amend their complaint since "it is necessary that an amended complaint be filed by Pedro
Baybayan in order to determine whether or not the property in question is part of the property under the
special proceeding, inasmuch as it is now the property claimed by him”.

Issue:

Whether the court order is proper

Ruling:

No. The respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in
dismissing the complaint filed by the petitioners, for their alleged failure to amend their complaint to
exclude there from the lot which the respondent Judge found in the probate court, to be owned by the
petitioners Cipriano Evangelists and Consuelo Baybayan. The findings of the respondent Judge as to the
ownership of the lot after the hearing conducted in the special proceeding do not justify the order to
amend the complaint since the determination of the ownership of the said lot by the respondent Judge
presiding over a court exercising probate jurisdiction is not final or ultimate in nature and is without
prejudice to the right of an interested party to raise the question of ownership in a proper action.

“When questions arise as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of a deceased
person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from
the deceased, but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be
determined in the courts of administrative proceedings. The Court of First Instance, acting, as a probate
court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the Court of First
Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a court of first instance.”

Petition was granted and a writ issued, setting aside the orders issued by the respondent Judge.
Lachenal et al v. Salas G.R. No. L-42257

Facts:

When Victorio Lachenal died on 1969, his son, Ildefonso Lachenal, was named executor of his will.
Among the properties included in the inventory of his estate is a fishing boat called Lachenal VII. The
executor filed in that proceeding a motion to require the spouses Lope L. Leonio and Flaviana Lachenal-
Leonio to pay the rentals for the lease of Lachenal VII and to return the boat to Navotas, Rizal for
drydocking and repair. Mrs. Leonio, who was a daughter of the testator, opposed the executor's motion.
She countered with a motion to exclude the fishing boat from the decedent's estate. She claimed that she
is the owner of the boat because she purchased it from her father in 1967. The executor opposed the
motion for exclusion.

Executor and the testator's other children named the Caloocan Court of First Instance an action (Civil
Acion) against the Leonio spouses and the other three children of the testator named Crispula, Modesto
and Esperanza, for the recovery of the motorboat Lachenal VII, together with back rentals and damages.
Plaintiffs filed in the probate court their own motion to exclude the said motorboat from the decedent's
estate on the ground that the, probate court has no jurisdiction to decide the question as to its ownership
because that matter has to be resolved by the Caloocan court where civil case is now pending.

The probate court denied that motion.

Issue:

Whether the Court’s denial is proper

Ruling:

No. The title to the fishing boat should be determined in the pending Civil Case because it affects the
lessee thereof, Lope L Leonio, the decedent's son-in-law, who, although married to his daughter or
compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with respect to his estate. "The administrator may not pull
him against his will, by motion, into the administration proceeding". Where a party in a probate proceeding
prays for the inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property, the court may
provisionally pass upon the question without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action.
Rentals allegedly due to the decedent's estate may not be collected by the administrator by filing a motion
in the testate proceeding. The said rentals do not constitute property in the administrator's hands and are
not thus within the effective control of the probate court. The proper procedure in collecting such rentals is
to file an independent action in the Court of First Instance so that the right of the estate thereto may be
threshed out in a full-dress trial on the merits.

Here the executor seeks to recover not only the rentals but also the leased property itself, as to which the
wife of the lessee had asserted adverse title.

Normally, it is expedient and convenient that the question of title to property, which arises between the
decedent's estate and other persons, should be adjudicated in a separate action because such a question
requires the presentation of appropriate pleadings (complaint, motion to dismiss, answer, counterclaim
and reply). A resort to the modes of discovery may be necessary so that the issues may be clearly
defined and the trial may be expedited. Those matters can be effectively accomplished in an ordinary
action rather than in the testamentary or intestate proceeding. The court may also have to resolve
ancillary issues as to damages and counterclaims for money or property. Ultimately, execution has to be
issued. The execution of a judgment is usually made by the Court of First Instance in an ordinary action
and not in a special proceeding.

The probate court's orders of asserting its jurisdiction to decide the title to the fishing boat, Lachenal VII,
are set aside.
Testate Estate of Vito Borromeo, Jose Junquera v. Borromeo et al G.R. No. L-18498

Facts:

Vito Borromeo died on 1952 without forced heirs but leaving extensive properties in the province of Cebu.
Of the same year, Jose H. Junquera, filed with the Court of First Instance of said province a petition for
the probate of a one page document as the last will left by said deceased, devising all his properties to
Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo, in equal and undivided shares, and designating
Junquera as executor thereof.

Teofilo Borromeo filed an opposition to the probate of the will. Vitaliana Borromeo, a niece of the
deceased, filed her own opposition to the probate of the will, on the ground that the signature "Vito
Borromeo" appearing thereon was a forgery. Tomas, Amelia and Fortunato Borromeo, on behalf of the
"Cebu Arcade Company", filed a motion to exclude from the inventory of the Estate thirteen parcels of
land alleging that during his lifetime the deceased testator had sold said lots to them. After due hearing,
the court, in its order of July 16, 1954, denied the motion for exclusion, ruling that movants' remedy was
to file a separate accion reivindicatoria against the administrator.

Trial court refused to believe the testimony of the attesting witnesses and, as a result, denied the petition
for probate.

Issue:

Whether the lower court erred in denying the petition for probate.

Whether the court’s denial of movant’s motion for exclusion is proper.

Ruling:

Yes. It must be conceded that in this jurisdiction, the subscribing witnesses to a contested will are
regarded as the best witnesses in connection with its due execution. It is similarly true, however, that to
deserve full credit, their testimony must be reasonable and unbiased, and that, as in the case of any other
witness, their testimony may be overcome by any competent evidence — direct or circumstantial. It is
also an appellate practice to accord great weight to the findings of fact made by the trial court and not to
disturb them unless said court had failed to consider material facts and circumstances or had given undue
weight to, or misconstrued the testimony of particular witnesses. The reason for this being that the trial
judge had full opportunity to hear and observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying
and was consequently in a better position than the reviewing court to determine the question of their
credibility. In the case the witnesses were found to have interest in the will and that their testimonies
contradict each other. The Court cannot see their way clear to holding that the trial court erred in refusing
to give full credit to the testimony of the three subscribing witnesses.

Yes. We believe, and so hold, that the resolution of the lower court on this matter is correct because said
court, acting in its capacity as a probate court, had no jurisdiction to determine with finality the question of
ownership involved. That such matter must be litigated in a separate action has been the established
jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, except where a party merely prays for the inclusion or exclusion from the
inventory of any particular property, in which case the probate court may pass upon provisionally, the
question of inclusion or exclusion, but without prejudice to its final determination in an appropriate
separate action.”

The decision appealed from is affirmed

Pio Barretto Realty Development Corp v Court of Appeals GR 132362

Facts

Nicolai Drepin died testate on 1972. He left behind three (3) parcels of titled land. Since the filing of the
petition for probate of the Drepin’s will 9 offers had been made for the purchase of the Drepin lands,
among them, that of GM Management Phils through its President Honor P. Moslares. Moslares alleged
that on October 9, 1970, Despin executed a deed of sale with mortgage executed by the decedent in his
favor. He also alleged that on June 25, 1971, Drepin and Moslares entered into a "Joint Venture
Agreement" where it was agreed that Drepin shall be the registered "owner" of the lots and denominated
Moslares as "developer" tasked with converting the lands into a residential subdivision. But before the
agreement could be implemented, Nicolai Drepin died.

Upon learning of the existence of the Special Proceeding, Moslares informed the Judicial Administrator
that he is already the owner of the properties made subject matter of the Special Proceedings and
proposed that he be permitted to pay the balance on the sale with mortgage in accordance with the terms
of his written proposal. On September 25, 1979, with the court’s permission, a Deed of Undertaking was
entered into by Moslares and the Administrator to implement the Contract of Sale with Mortgage. Such
deed provided for the mode of payment which Moslares was to follow.

Moslares failed to pay as agreed. Thus, the administrator reported the matter to the probate court which
approved the sale of the property to Pio Barretto Realty, Inc. The deed of sale was duly registered.
Mosrales filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was not acted by the probate court. Under
the theory of Moslares, it is insisted that the probate court has no authority to cancel his unfulfilled offer to
buy, notwithstanding the fact that he failed miserably to comply with the terms of his own offer to buy. On
May 18, 1981, Pio Barreto Realty filed Civil Case No. 41287 before the CFI of Rizal to determine title and
ownership over the Drepin lands.

Issues

1) Can the Court of Appeals act upon the issue of exclusion of properties in the estate when it is not
passed upon by the court a quo?

2) Can the probate court order the execution of the deed of sale with Pio Barreto?

Ruling

1) No. The question of whether the properties sold by Drepin to Petitioner should be excluded from
the probate proceedings cannot be determined with finality because the Supreme Court is merely
reviewing the acts of the respondent CFI as a probate court. Any ruling by the probate court to
include those properties "is only provisional in character and is without prejudice to a judgment in
a separate action on the issue of title or ownership". It is fitting and proper that this issue be
ventilated and finally resolved in the already instituted Civil Case even as We hold that
respondent court's act of not excluding the lots involved did not constitute grave abuse of
discretion. In view of this limitation, We need not resolve the issue of whether there was novation
of the Deed of Sale with Mortgage.

2) Yes. Actions of the probate court, in the case at bar, do not refer to the adjudication of rights
under the contract entered into by the deceased during his lifetime. It is to be noted that the
dealings of the respondent with the court arose out of the latter's bid to sell property under its
authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber property of the estate to pay or settle against
the estate. Thus, by estoppel, respondent bound himself under an agreement with the court
separate and distinct from that which he had with the decedent. In rescinding such contract, the
court merely seeks to enforce its right to put an end to an agreement which had ceased to be a
working proposition. Surely, this is well within the power of the probate court. Moreover, the
respondent is not without remedy if truly his claim of ownership is proper and meritorious. Since
the probate court has no jurisdiction over the question of title and ownership of the properties, the
respondents may bring a separate action if they wish to question the petitioner's titles and
ownership.
Virginia Fule v. CA GR L-42670

Facts

Virginia G. Fule (illegitimate sister) filed with the CFI of Laguna a petition for letters of administration
alleging “that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in
the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places,
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court.” At the same time, she moved ex parte for her appointment
as special administratix over the estate. Judge Malvar granted the motion. A motion for reconsideration
was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia, the surviving spouse of the deceased, contending that the decedent
“resided” in QC for 3 months before his death as shown by his death certificate and therefore have an
improper venue and the CFI of Calamba lacks jurisdiction over the petition.

CFI denied the motion.

CA reversed and affirmed making Preciosa the administratix. Hence, Fule elevated the matter to the SC
on appeal by certiorari.

ISSUES:

1) Are venue and jurisdiction the same? How can it be determined in the present case?

2) What does the word “resides” in Revised Rules of Court Rule 73 Section 1 Mean?

3) Who is entitled as special administratix of the estate?

Ruling

1) No, jurisdiction is defined as the authority to try, hear and decide a case base on the merits or the
substance of the facts. It is a substantive aspect of the trial proceeding. It is granted by law or by the
constitution and cannot be waived or stipulated.
On the other hand, Rule 4 of Rules of Court define venue as the proper court which has jurisdiction over
the area wherein real property involved or a portion thereof is situated. Venue is the location of the court
with jurisdiction. It is more on convenience purposes. It’s more on procedural aspect of the case. In some
cases it may be waived or stipulated by the parties.
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: “If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance
of any province in which he had estate.

2)“Resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in
a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s
domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be
more than temporary.
 
3)In the present case, SC ruled that the last place of residence of the deceased should be the venue of
the court. Amado G. Garcia was in Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna base on his death
certificate. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his
death.
 

Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule’s petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Therefore Preciosa
B. Garcia was granted as a special administratix.
VDA. DE RODRIGUEZ V. CA GR No. L-39532

Facts

The issue in this case stems from the ruling of the probate court, in the intestate proceedings of the
estate of Jose Valero, excluding the two lots owned by Mrs. Rustia, and declaring further that the said
properties can no longer be subject to collation. Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the CA
contending that the 2 San Lorenzo Village lots were really conveyed to Mrs. Rustia by way of donation
because the consideration for the sale was allegedly only one-fifth of the true value of the lots. Mrs.
Rodriguez further contended that the order was final in character. The CA affirmed the RTC decision and
held that the order of exclusion was interlocutory and that it could be changed or modified at any time
during the course of administration proceedings. It further held that it is immaterial whether the two
lots were donated or sold to Mrs. Rustia because only compulsory heirs are required to make collation
for the determination of their legitimes, and only heirs are involved in questions as to advancement. 

Issue

1) Whether the RTC order of exclusion is final?

2) Whether the order of collation is proper

Ruling

1) No, the order of the RTC is not final and merely interlocutory. The prevailing rule is that for the
purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory,
the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the
parties. 

2. No, the order of collation is not proper and premature. The Court held that the dictum of the Court of
Appeals and the probate court that the two disputed lots are not subject to collation was a
supererogation and was not necessary to the disposition of the case which merely involved the issue of
inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of the testator's estate. 

The issue of collation was not yet justiciable at that early stage of the testate proceeding. It is not
necessary to mention in the order of exclusion the controversial matter of collation. Whether collation
may exist with respect to the two lots and whether Mrs. Rustia's Torrens titles thereto are indefeasible
are matters that may be raised later or may not be raised at all.