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GURU GHASIDAS CENTRAL UNIVERSITY, BILASPUR

(A central University established by the Central University Act, 2009 No.25 of 2009)

SCHOOL OF LAW

IMPOSITION OF PRESIDENT RULE IN STATES

ARYAN RATHORE
GGV/18/2018
18001010
B.A.LL. B
2022-23
SEMESTER – 9TH
Email – aryanrathore881@gmail.com
8770712515

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ABSTRACT

The Imposition of Presidents Rule is a kind of Emergency provided in Part XVIII in


Chapter IV of the Constitution of India. The Emergency Provision deals with the three
kind of Emergencies one out of those is Article 356, which talks about the provisions
in case of the failure of constitutional machinery in States. Article 356 was added in
the constitution by the constitution framers with the vision of implementing this
provision in the rarest case, and when there is no other alternative. The president Rule
is sometimes also known as State Emergency.
The paper highlights and overviews the procedure of imposing the President Rule, the
proclamation, the revocation and the aftermaths of the imposition of the President
Rule, also what is the role of Governor appointed in the state during the Emergency,
and the various roles of the Union. The paper also analyses the Constitutional
Provisions relating to the President Rule, also the history and background of the
making and development of the particular provision. Article 356 has also been
critically examined and all the occasions when the President Rules was imposed has
been listed.
The Emergency Provisions in Indian Constitution has been borrowed from the
German Constitution to check and control the uncertain situation arisen in the country.
The provisions provided in Article 356 can be considered to be taken from the
Government of India Act, 1935. The imposition of President Rule has been made over
all the states except the state of Chhattisgarh and Telangana.
Many cases have been played an important role in giving shape to the applicability of
president rule and its limitations, some the cases have been analysed in the paper.

Keywords: Emergency, Constitutional Provisions, President Rule, Constitutional


Machinery

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INTRODUCTION

The Parliamentary System is the most widely accepted form of representative and
constitutional government and India is one of the largest democracies in the world,
which gives the responsibility to the authorities to maintain the prestige and honour of
the nation in the global platform. To achieve the parliamentary governance in the
newly formed nation the constitution framers ensured that the nation shall have a
democratic set-up, hence the broad outlines of the social and economic system
required to be reflected in the Parliament, the nation in order to give the people a
sense of satisfaction that their voice would via means of their representatives, heard in
the legislature.
The constitution framers had a serious task to provide such powers to the central
authority of the nation i.e., the Union to take control over the states if they fail to
perform as per the constitution has provided or if by any reason the state faces any
constitutional breakdown or any situation of failure of the constitutional machinery.
In India, the concept of President’s Rule refers to such condition when a state's elected
government is suspended, and the Union government takes direct control. According
to Article 356 of the Indian Constitution, the Union government may directly take
control of the state government, if a state government is unable to function in
accordance with constitutional requirements. Subsequently the power of the executive
authority is handed over to the Governor of the State appointed by the Union and has
power to name additional administrators to assist him.
The main motive behind adding this provision in the Constitution by the framers of
the constitution was to check and give power to the Union to get the control of the
states if any states fail to perform as per the constitutional provisions. The nation at
the time of framing the constitution was divided in several states which had their own
elected government and all the government had their function machinery, there was no
interference of union in their functioning but it was considered necessary that the state
shall not misuse their powers and use the same against public policy and to provide a
check and control to the Union Government the power to President Rule was provided
to the President of the nation who is also Constitutional head of the Union, to keep an
eye over the sates and their functioning.
The President can proclaim President Rule under Article 356 of the Indian
Constitution only after the approval of both the Houses of the Parliament i.e., Lok
Sabha and Rajya Sabha by simple majority.
The Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir is currently under Presidents Rule since
31st October 2019. The first proclamation of President Rule was made on 20 th June
1951 in Punjab.
A President's Rule proclamation made in accordance with Article 356 of the
Constitution is valid for six months. This period can be prolonged incrementally for

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up to three years. The President has the authority to revoke President's Rule at any
time without the consent of the Parliament.

Research Questions
1. Why the provision in Article 356 is important?
2. How the President Rule can be misused?
3. What role does a Governor play in President Rule?

HISTORY

India from its very early ages has been divided in number of states or provinces, at
early ages they were controlled by different sovereign kings and many other kingdoms
and their rulers, it was seen that there was a lack of central administration, all the local
rulers were just interested in their territorialising and expansion process none of them
had any interest to unite and form a central power to resist the foreign invaders, this
was a major reason that our local dynasties faced a lot of invasions from foreign
invaders, the feel for nationalism doesn’t existed.
In ancient era some great and prestigious dynasties like Mauryas, Guptas, and after
them in medieval era Delhi Sultanate, Mughals, etc tried to make a central power of
administration and commanded over a big territory in the Indian Subcontinent, they all
were basically Monarchs, who had direct control over all of their territory, hence they
did not require any kind of written provisions to take control of any of their sub-
ordinate states.
After the advent of British colonizers, they also tried to create a central power of
administration and they divided Indian subcontinent in number of states or provinces
which and appointed various Governors to head the states and later appointed
Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners to assist them, the Governors were
headed by Governor General who later called as Viceroy of India, was directly
appointed by the Crown of Britain. The Viceroy used to play the role of Central
Administrator at the British rule and had control over the Indian Subcontinent.
The Britishers made many Acts, Charters, etc. to rule over the Indian Sub-continent in
the series, they also enacted Government of India Act 1935, under which they focused
to establish a proper working and central administrative machinery. In the particular
Act of 19351, the Section 93 in Chapter VI which stated about Provisions in case of
Failure of Constitutional Machinery.

1
The Government of India Act 1935

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Article 356, obviously is inspired by the Section 93 of Government of India Act 1953.
This section provided that if a Governor of a province was satisfied that a situation has
arisen in which the government of the province cannot be carried on in accordingly
the provisions of the Act of 1935, the Governor, by declaration, assume to himself all
or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by a provincial body or authority
including the Ministry and the Legislature and to discharge those functions in his
discretion. There was an exception under the section 93 that the Governor could not
encroach upon the powers of the High Court. It is clear that the two provisions were
incorporated in the Act of 1935 to meet certain purposes and exigencies. The Act of
1935, for the first time, allocation of certain powers of governance to the Ministries
formed by Indian political parties and constitution of legislatures elected, no doubt, at
that period there was a limited franchise. The colonial powers were not inclined to
trust these Ministries even with limited powers probably in view of the fact that not
only the political parties in India were ambiguous regarding entering in Legislatures
and Ministries created under the Government of India Act 1935 but some of them
were also proclaiming that even if they entered the Ministries, they would try to break
the governments from within. The Section 93 of the Government of India Act 1935
therefore provided that if any time the Governor or Governor General felt that the
Ministry in the province or at the centre was not acting in accordance with the
provisions of said Act, he could resume their powers and exercise the same in his
discretion.
After the independence of India, when the Constituent assembly was constituted, they
had a major task to add such provisions for the nation to provide the control of the
states to the Union in case of some unconstitutional situation arises, but keeping in
mind that the provision shall not be used thoroughly and shall not be misused, Dr. B.
R. Ambedkar the Chairman of the Drafting Committee quoted in this regard that,
“This provision of the Constitution shall be kept as a dead letter” 2, in short he tried to
convey that this provision shall be used as the last resort to any situation arisen.
Worries and doubts were expressed in the constitution assembly that this power in the
hands of the chief executive might be misused by the centre against the states for
biased ends when the parties ruling at the centre and at the states would be different.
The Constituent Assembly passed this provision and kept it in Part XVIII ‘Emergency
Provisions’. When deciding the extreme circumstances under which the President may
declare an emergency, the Constitution's founders were faced with a challenge due to
Casteism, communalism, and religious hostility were all detrimental throughout
India's pre-independence era.
Socialist governments were emerging in India after independence, and the workers'
and farmers' communist movements in South India were becoming more widespread.
In order to shield legislative processes from severe emergencies and to assure safety,
Article 356 was enacted.

2
Constituent Assembly Debates Vol. IX

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Uttar Pradesh is the state in India where the President Rule has been imposed most of
the time that is 9 times, followed by Bihar as this provision has been imposed in Bihar
8 times.
On the other hand, Chhattisgarh and Telangana are the states where the president rule
has never been imposed.
Indira Gandhi is the prime minister under whose government this provision has been
used most of the time that is 50 times, whereas Morarji Desai led government has
imposed 16 times.
Prior to 2019, the state of Jammu and Kashmir had its own constitution and has a
provision under section 92 similar to Article 356 of Indian Constitution, section 92 of
Jammu and Kashmir Constitution had a provision of Governor’s Rule. This provision
in Jammu and Kashmir that is the Governor’s Rule was imposed for a span of 6 years
(19 January 1990 - 9 October 1996), and this is the longest one the country has
witnessed. Currently the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir is under President
Rule as there has been no election of its legislative assembly had taken place since
2019.
So, it is clear that the President Rule is imposed in India for several of times due to
failure of constitutional machinery.

THE SARKARIA COMMISSION REPORT, 19873


Despite the safeguards outlined in Article 356, the Centre repeatedly referred to the
Article because of uncertainties in its wording. Only in 1987, when the Sarkaria
Commission's report was delivered, was some of the obscurity surrounding Article
356 dispelled. The Commission, led by Justice R.S. Sarkaria, was established in 1983
and conducted four years of reform-related study.
The Sarkaria Commission observed this issue in Chapter VI of its report. It pointed
out in the first case that the use of Article 356 has been rising with the channel of
time. Whereas between 1950 and 1954, it was invoked only on 03 occasions, it was
invoked on 09 occasions between 1965 and 1969; it rose to 21 occasions during the
period 1975-1979 and to 18 during the period 1980-1987. The commission observed
the historical background to Articles 355 and 356 and explained that the said
provisions are not extraordinary. It referred to similar provisions in U.S. Constitution
and in the Government of India Act, 1935. It also quoted the speech of Dr.Ambedkar
pointing out that the possibility of misuse cannot be a background for not
incorporating such a provision and hope expressed by him that the said two Articles
will never be called into operation and that they would remain a dead letter. Despite
the hopes and expectations so emphatically expressed by the framers, in the last 37
years, Article 356 has been bought into action no less than 75 times”. The commission
then examined the scope and effect of Article 355 as well as Article 356. While
3
https://indianculture.gov.in/reports-proceedings/sarkaria-commissions-report

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examining Article 355, it referred to similar provisions in the Swiss and the West
German Constitution as well. It then opined that where a State is confronted with
external aggression or ‘internal disturbance’, it is open to the Union to adopt all the
alternative courses available to it to perform its duty of protecting the State. So far as
the last-mentioned duty in Article 355 is concerned, the Commission opined that it has
to be discharged in accordance with Article 356. It then examined the scope and effect
of Article 356 and pointed out that it is necessary in the first instance to understand the
true import and ambit of this provision. The Sarkaria Commission noted that it is not
each and every departure from the provisions of the Constitution that attracts the said
Article but only a situation where it can be said that there has been a ‘failure of
constitutional machinery’. A liberal interpretation of Article 356, the Commission
pointed out, will reduce the states to mere dependencies and would cut at the root of
the democratic, parliamentary, federal form of government. The Commission then
pointed out that ‘failure of constitutional machinery’ can be examined under four
heads, (a) political crisis, (b) internal subversion, (c) physical breakdown and (d) non-
compliance with constitutional directions of the Union Executive.
It examined each of the said situations and opined that in case of political crisis, it
would be the duty of the Governor to explore all possibilities for installing a viable
government and if he finds that it is not possible to do so, and if fresh elections can be
held without avoidable delay, he should ask the outgoing Ministry to continue as a
caretaker government provided it was not defeated on the grounds of mal-
administration and corruption; he should then dissolve the Assembly. The commission
also warned that invoking Article 356 for solving the political crisis in the ruling party
was an instance of misuse. Regarding internal subversion, it said that if any State
government deliberately pursues an unconstitutional policy, it would be a case calling
for the invocation of this power but after giving due warnings and opportunity for
corrective measures. It then gave instances of physical breakdown such as internal
disturbance leading to the paralysis of the State administration, and natural calamities.
Coming to non-compliance with constitutional directions of the Union Government,
the commission pointed out that if the state Government does not comply with any
directions issued under Article 256, 257 or 339(2) – or under Article 353 during an
emergency – in spite of due warnings, it may invite the power under Article 356.
Similarly, the Commission pointed out, if a public disorder of a significant magnitude
endangering the security of the State takes place, it is the duty of the State
Government to inform the Centre of such development and if it fails to do so, it may
again invite Article 356, subject of course to prior warnings.
The Commission set out certain illustrations where it can be said that it is a case of
improper invoking of Article 356. It then dealt with the wholesale dismissal of
Assemblies in 1977 and 1980 and also analysed the decision of the Supreme Court in
State of Rajasthan. So far as the recommendation made by the Sarkaria Commission
are concerned, there are being dealt with elsewhere.

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The views of the Sarkaria Commission that the extraordinary provisions contained in
Article 356 would be called into operation rarely, in extreme cases, as a last resort
when all the alternative correctives fail find echo in the views expressed by the
founding fathers. The abuse of this Article can be prevented only by way of reverting
to the narrow sense in which it had been explained and understood by them.
In situations involving the interpretation of constitutional provisions, the Supreme
Court supports the opinions expressed in the Constituent Assembly and reaffirmed by
the Sarkaria Commission.

CONCEPT OF PRESIDENT RULE

According to Articles 356 and 357, if a situation results from a state's constitutional
machinery failing, the President, upon receiving a report from the Governor, and if he
is "satisfied" that the situation results in the state's government being unable to carry
out its duties in accordance with the Constitution's provisions, and the President
declares:
A. assumes to himself all or any of the function of the State Government or the power
of the Governor or anybody authority in the State other than the state legislature.
B. provides that the powers of the State Legislature are to be exercised by Parliament.
C. make such incidental provisions as may appear to him necessary or desirable for
giving effect to the provision of proclamation.
Article 357 adds to the meaning of Article 356(1)(b) which provides that when the
State legislature does not have a power to make laws under 356(1)(b) the power is
transferred to the Union Parliament
Article 357 provides the manner in which the legislative powers of a state which under
the President’s proclamation are declared to vest in Parliament, are to be exercised. It
states that the union Parliament may delegate the power to make legislations for the
state to the President or to any other authority specified by him in this behalf. Power is
given to the President when the Lower House is not in session, to authorize
expenditure from the Consolidated Fund of the State pending sanction of such
expenditure by Parliament. The President can also issue Ordinances for the State
under Article 123.
At the deliberation stage of the Draft in the Constituent Assembly, the Scheme
offering protections against the failure of the state's constitutional machinery received
three significant changes.
In the First place, Article 188 was removed with the result that now it is the President
alone who can, in case of a breakdown of the constitutional machinery in a State,

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assume the functions of the government of the State. Article 356 as originally
proposes provided that the Governor of a State should have the power to take over the
administration of the State by proclamation for two weeks and then communicate to
the President of the Union that the constitutional machinery had failed and that he had
issued a proclamation taking over the administration. Only on the report made by the
Governor could the President act under Article 356.The change was introduced by the
drafting Committee because it was felt that no useful purpose would be served if there
was a real emergency in which the President was required to act by giving to the
Governor, in the first instance, the power of suspending the Constitution merely for 2
weeks, if the President was ultimately to take the responsibility of entering into the
State’s field in order to suspend the constitution, it was much better that the President
should come into the field right at the very beginning.
In the second place, the power of the president under the new Article can be exercised
on a report of the governor of a state or on his own initiative. Under the original
Article, he could not issue a proclamation taking over the administration of a state
except on a report from the Governor preceded by a Proclamation by the Governor
under Article 188.
Under the present Article 356 the president may act forthwith, if he is satisfied that
such events have occurred in a state which involve the special responsibility placed
upon the Centre to maintain the constitutional order in a State
Thirdly, under the original Article Parliament was not authorized to confer the powers
of the legislature of the state on the President. The authority and powers of the
legislature of the state were exercisable only by Parliament. The change has been
affected, as explained by the chairman of the Drafting Committee, because Parliament
may have too much work to attend to be able to deal with legislation for a State whose
legislature had been suspended.
Duration- The duration of a proclamation issued under Article 356 is two months.
The proclamation must be authorised by the Parliament if it is to be prolonged after
two months. Where Parliament has ratified a proclamation, it will be an operation for
six months and further continuance should be sanctioned by Parliament. As amended
by the forty- fourth Amendment, a proclamation under Article 356 will continue for
six months from the date of its issue, any may subsequently be extended for another
six months. However, for further extension beyond the expiration of one year a
resolution may not be passed by either House of Parliament unless a proclamation of
emergency is in operation and it is certified by the Election Commission that it is
necessary for such a proclamation to continue in view of the difficulties in holding
elections in the State. An outside limit of three years is prescribed.
What is failure of Constitutional Machinery?
The party with the majority forms the government when the elected votes clearly
support a single party. A hung assembly, however, is one in which no one party
receives a clear majority of the vote. Since no party is able to get the required

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majority, this circumstance is referred to as the constitutional mechanism failing to
establish a government.
An analogy between Article 356 and Sections 45 and 93 of the Government
of India Act 1935-
The provisions dealing to the breakdown of the constitutional machinery under the
current Constitution and the powers covered by Sections 45 and 93 of the Government
of India Act, 1935, differ in a few important ways.
First, the 1935 Act gave the Governor-General authority to address a breakdown in the
Centre’s constitutional machinery (Section 45). Additionally, it gave the Governor-
General authority to handle a comparable circumstance in a Province (Section 93).
However, the current Constitution does not seek to suspend a State's Constitution;
rather, it gives the President the authority to intervene in this matter, albeit he must do
so after receiving a report from the Governor or Ruler of the State.
Second, the Governor may assume, at his discretion, the administrative and legislative
functions of a State under Section 93 of the 1935 Act. The President assumes
executive powers under the current Constitution, while the Union Parliament assumes
legislative powers.
Grounds for Imposing President Rule:
The President's Rule has been observed to be implemented if any of the following
events has taken place:
1. The state legislature is not able to elect a leader as the Chief Minister for a time
prescribed by the state’s governor.
2. Failure of a coalition in the state government results in the Chief Minister
receiving support from only a minority of legislators, and the Chief Minister is
unable to prove his majority within the governor's allotted time.
3. a legislative assembly no-confidence vote, that results in a majority loss
4. Postponement of elections owing to unavoidable reasons such as a natural
disaster, epidemic or war.
5. Any other circumstances the Governor is satisfied.

JUDICIAL REVIEW AND ITS GROUNDS


The judiciary has played a significant role in preventing the abuse of this clause.
Before the State of Rajasthan v. Union of India4 case, the high court held that the
satisfaction of the President could not be subject to judicial scrutiny. The main issue in
State of Rajasthan v. Union of India was the extent of the President's power under
Article 356 and the court's competence to examine it. The court believed that it may
conduct "limited judicial review" if the administration utilised its power improperly
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AIR 1977 SC1361

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despite the 'ouster provision' that was included by the 38th Amendment but eliminated
by the 44th Amendment. It was made specific that the court could interfere with
overtly mala fide exercise of power or exercise on irrelevant considerations.
According to Justice Chandrachud, the use of discretion cannot be evaluated if the
justifications for it are not made public. If the reasons were made public, judicial
review may be used with the specific aim of determining if there was a logical
connection between the reasons made public and the action suggested.
Justice Bhagwati and Justice Gupta, supported review on grounds of mala fides or
unnecessary or irrelevant grounds. Chief Justice Beg, also upheld the power of the
court to examine jurisdictional questions. He was rather careful in advocating any
interference with the exercise of discretion under Article 356 unless it was shown to
be grossly perverse and unreasonable as to constitute a patent misuse of power or an
excess of power on admitted facts.
The Supreme Court decided few matters in S.R Bommai v. Union of India 5 where a
nine-Judge Bench produced seven different opinions. About the imposition of
President’s Rule in Karnataka and in some of the other States the court held that it was
in violation of the constitution and the court would have invalidated it and restored the
original position but for the fact that the fresh election had taken place in the
meantime and new governments had been installed in those States. Almost all the
judges emphasized that the constitution provides for a federal structure. Some of them
also held that federalism is the basic structure of the constitution. President’s power
under Article 356 must be read in that context. It cannot be exercised at will. Article
356 specifically provides the conditions which should be satisfied before the President
exercises power under it. Though the satisfaction of the president is subjective, it has
to be based on objective facts. For this reason, all the Judges unanimously held that
the exercise of power under Article 356 was subject to judicial review. They were
unanimous that the satisfaction of the President must be formed on relevant materials.
It can be struck down by the court if it is based on wholly irrelevant or extraneous
grounds. The action could also be struck down if it was found to be mala fide. The
President is under an obligation to produce the material on which the action under
Article 356(1) is based. The court could not go into the correctness of the material or
its adequacy but it could see whether it was relevant to the action. Article 74(2) should
not come in the way of the court in making such an enquiry. If the court came to the
conclusion that the President’s action was unconstitutional it could restore the
dismissed government to its office and revive and reactivate the Legislative Assembly
whether it was dissolved or kept under suspension.
The court heavily relied on Justice Sarkaria Commission Report for the purpose of
determining the circumstances and the conditions subject to which President could act
under Article 356. The commission in its report has broadly classified the instances of
failure of constitutional machinery into

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AIR 1994 SC1918

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a) political crisis where it is not possible to form a government in the State,
b) internal subversion where for example a government is deliberately acting against
the Constitution and the law or is fomenting a violent revolt or revolution,
c) physical breakdown where the government wilfully refuses to discharge its
constitutional obligations endangering the security of the State, and
d) non-compliance with constitutional directions of the Union Government, for
example under Articles 256, 257, 339(2) or 353.
The report also illustrated improper exercise of power under Article 356 such as
i. maladministration in a state,
ii. non-exploration of the possibility of installing an alternative government in case of
resignation or dismissal of a government in State,
iii. removal of a government which has not been defeated at the floor of the House and
has not been given a chance to prove its majority,
iv. massive defeat of a political party in Lok Sabha elections such as in 1977 and
1980,
v. internal disturbances not amounting to internal subversions or physical breakdown,
vi. exercise of the power without prior warning except in case of extreme urgency
leading to disastrous consequences,
vii. stringent financial exigencies of a State,
viii. allegation of corruption against a ministry and
ix. exercise of power for a purpose extraneous or irrelevant to the one for which it has
been conferred by the Constitution.
It is also recommended suitable amendment of Article 356 to ensure that the State
Legislative Assembly is not dissolved before the proclamation has been laid before the
Parliament and considered by it and safeguard similar to those under clauses (7) and
(8) of Article 352 should also be incorporated in Article 356 providing for the review
of the continuance of the proclamation.
Most of these recommendations were incorporated in the Court’s judgment in S.R.
Bommai case where the court also held that though on the proclamation under Article
356(1) a State Government has to go, the State Assembly should be dissolved only
after the Parliament approves such proclamation. In case Parliament fails to approve
the Proclamation, the Assembly should get restarted. One of the important aspects of
the case is the unanimous recognition by the court that Secularism is one of the basic
features of the Indian Constitution and any State Government which acts against
secularism acts against the constitution against which Article 356 may be invoked.

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CONSEQUENCES OF PRESIDENT RULE
During the President’s rule in a Sate under Article 356(1) the Legislative Assembly
may either be dissolved or suspended. If the Legislative Assembly is dissolved, steps
are taken to have fresh elections for constituting a new Legislative Assembly in the
state. The Legislative Assembly may also be suspended as it happened, for example,
in 1996 in Punjab, in 1967 in Rajasthan, in 1968 in Uttar Pradesh, in 1969 in Bihar, in
1974 in Gujarat and in 1975 in Nagaland and so on. During this period, by virtue of
clause (1) of Article 356, Parliament is empowered:
(i) to confer powers on the president for making laws for the state and to
authorize him further to delegate such power to any other authority,
(ii) to authorize the President or any other authority on his behalf for making
laws and imposing duties upon the Union or its officers or other authority,
and
(iii) to authorize expenditure from the consolidated Fund of State when the
House of People is not in session.
So far, the practice has been for the President to enact laws for a state during the
President’s rule in consultation with the members of Parliament from the State. The
administration is delegated by the President to the Governor of the State, who
discharges his responsibility with the help of advisors. During this period, the
ministers do not stay in office, or else they may be dismissed from their office. Article
356 itself enables the President to make incidental or consequential provisions. These
provisions are such as may appear to the President to be necessary for giving effect to
the objects of the Proclamation. Under the terms of clause (c) of Article 356(1), their
validity or legality is not justiciable being a matter entirely for the subjective
satisfaction of the President.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Under Article 356(1) of the Constitution of India if the President, on the receipt of
report from the Governor of a State or otherwise is satisfied that a situation has arisen
in which the government of the State cannot be carried in accordance with the
Provisions of the Constitution, the President may by proclamation:
(a) Assume to himself all or any of the functions of the government of the State and
all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by the Governor or anybody or
authority in the State other than the Legislature of the State.
(b) Declare that the powers of the Legislature of the State shall be exercisable by or
under the authority of the Parliament.

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(c) Make such incidental and consequential provisions as appear to the President to be
necessary or desirable for giving effect to the objects of the Proclamation, including
provisions for suspending in whole or part the operation of any provisions relating to
anybody or authority in the State.
The proviso to Article 356 (1) rules out the assumption of the powers of the High
Court. The proclamation of dissolution has to be ratified within 2 months by both
Houses of the Parliament.
Although it is an emergency provision, the power under Article 356 (1) is not
unrestricted. The President's pleasure as envisioned by Article 356 is the requirement
for the authority, which is conditional. As a result, the President may only use this
authority in exceptional situations since an emergency is defined as an abnormal
situation that necessitates quick response. However, it's noteworthy that Article 356
never mentions the word "Emergency."
The Article 356 may be elaborated as follows:
‘On the receipt of a report from the Governor or otherwise'
According to Article 163, the Governor, like the President, must operate with the
assistance and counsel of the Council of Ministers (1). The Governor's report about
the imposition of President's rule will come within the Constitution's Article 163(2)
discretionary power. Due to the Council of Ministers' inability to provide advise that
would be detrimental to their own interests, the Governor is unable to act in line with
their recommendation.
According to the phrase "or otherwise," the President may take action based on the
information he or she receives from sources besides the Governor's report. Reports
from the Council of Ministers or from a Union Minister are included in this. Only the
Council of Ministers' recommendations are binding on the President. The dissolution
may also be ordered if it is determined that the circumstances have changed such that
the State's government cannot function in conformity with the Constitution's
provisions. The President may be satisfied with the report from the State Governor,
with other information, or only with the report itself. The President may dissolve the
meeting even in the absence of a report by considering other pertinent information.
Therefore, the term "or otherwise" has a fairly broad bounty. The Governor, however,
lacks the power to make decisions in accordance with Article 356. According to
Article 174 of the Constitution, the Council of Ministers will review his report before
the President makes the final decision.
‘A situation has arisen in which the government of the State cannot be carried in
accordance with the provisions of this Constitution'
The phrase "failure of constitutional machinery in States" appears in the marginal note
to Article 356 but the phrase "cannot be carried on in line with the provisions of the
Constitution" appears in Clause (1). The latter phrase has a fairly broad connotation
and refers to a failure to uphold all of the Constitution's provisions. According to the

14 | P a g e
majority opinions in State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, which were written by Chief
Justice Beg (see paras. 28, 39, and 40), Justice Chandrachud (see para. 124), Justice
Bhagawati (see para. 137), and Justice Fazl Ali (see para. 209), the phrase "breakdown
of the constitutional machinery" has a broader meaning. The interpretation will be
thoroughly addressed in light of the court's ruling in the S.R. Bommai and Rameshwar
Prasad cases.

‘Satisfaction’
The word "satisfaction" refers to a valid conclusion that may be made from the
information that has been presented to the President, not to his personal gratification.
The Council of Ministers is happy with this satisfaction. According to Article 74(1),
the President must follow the Council of Ministers' recommendations and assistance.

ROLE OF GOVERNOR
The Governor is the State Government's constitutional head. One of the major
concerns in Union State relations has developed as the Governor's function. After
Independence, one party dominated the Indian political landscape for a while. The
Governor had very little opportunity to use his discretionary powers because most
issues that emerged in the functioning of Union-State relations were problems for
resolution in the intra-party forum. Most of the Governor institution remained
dormant. The function of the Governor was somewhat prominentised by events in
Kerala in 1959, when President's authority was installed, but after that it received little
attention for a while. Following the Fourth General Elections in 1967, a significant
transformation took place. The ruling party in a number of States was distinct from
that of the Union. Political party division and the creation of new regional parties
occurred in the next decades. For the goal of creating administrations, political parties
and organisations underwent regular, occasionally unforeseen realignments. In
numerous State Governments, these events led to a persistent state of instability. The
Governors were thus need to use their discretionary powers more regularly. The way
they carried out these duties directly affected how the Union and the States relate to
one another. The number of points of contention between the Union and the States
grew.
Strong resentment has been sparked by the role that certain governor played,
particularly when they recommended President's rule and reserved States Bills for the
President's consideration. The prestige of this post has been diminished by the
frequent removals and transfers of governors before the completion of their terms. The
Union Government has been under fire for allegedly using the Governor's for its own
political purposes. Many governors began to see themselves as agents of the Union as
they looked forward to holding more office under the Union or playing an active part
in politics once their terms were up.

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Under Article 356, the Governor has a very important function. His report often serves
as the foundation for the President's decision to grant the satisfaction required under
Article 356. The Governor's report is often followed by the implementation of Article
356. The Governor therefore has a significant impact. The first attorney general of
India, M.C. Setalvad, provided a clear explanation of his function in his Tagore Law
Lectures on "Union State Relations" in 1974.
Since the Constitution's inception, the President's powers under Article 356 have been
regularly used. The circumstances for its use highlight not only how crucial the power
is to preserving stable administrations in the State but also how crucial the Governor's
role is in allowing the Union Executive to use the authority granted to it by Article
356. A State's constitutional framework may not work properly in a number of
different ways. Political impasses can occur when, for instance, a Ministry resigns and
the Governor is unable to form a replacement government. They can also occur when,
for whatever reason, the party with the majority in the Assembly declines to form a
Ministry and the Governor is unable to find a coalition Ministry that can command a
majority. The government of a State may not be operating in conformity with the
Constitution if a Ministry, despite being duly established, violates constitutional
requirements or attempts to exercise its authority for unconstitutional objectives while
the Governor unsuccessfully calls the Ministry to order. A breakdown in the
constitutional machinery might also occur if the Ministry disregards orders
legitimately given to it by the Union Executive while acting in accordance with its
constitutional authority. The Governor holds a crucial position in regard to these
circumstances, and the serious responsibility of his duties in the matter of reporting to
the President under Articles 355 and 356 of the Constitution is shown by the very
statement of some of the situations that may lead to the use of the machinery provided
by that Article.

ROLE OF THE UNION


The Constitution's framers felt it necessary not to obligate the Centre to act under
Article 356 on the Governor's report because Article 355 requires the Centre to ensure
that each State Government is carried out in accordance with the Constitution and
Article 356 is designed to strengthen the Centre's hands in carrying out this obligation
and protecting a State. 15 When the president is in charge, the Parliament has
authority under Article 357. The President may then be granted the authority of the
State Legislature to enact legislation after the proclamation under Article 356(1) is
made and the State Legislature's powers are to be exercised by or under the control of
Parliament.
The President may also be authorised by Parliament to grant the authority granted to
him, subject to any restrictions the President may apply, to any other authority he
chooses.

16 | P a g e
When the Lok Sabha is not in session, the President may approve State Consolidated
Fund expenditures pending approval by Parliament. A legislation passed under these
provisions by the President, the Parliament, or another body with the authority granted
by Article 357(1) (b). A legislation of this nature remains in force long after the
proclamation has ceased, to the degree that it could not have been passed absent the
issuance of the proclamation under Article 356(1).
The State Legislature has the authority to amend, repeal, or change such a statute.
When the proclamation is repealed, the Law does not instantly terminate. The laws
passed during the proclamation's duration continue to be in effect until they are
changed or repealed by the State Legislature, even though the Union's ability to make
laws for the State concerned on the subject listed in the state list ends as soon as the
proclamation under Article 356(1) ends.

RELEVANT CASE LAWS

S. R. Bommai v. Union of India ([1994] 2 SCR 644 : AIR 1994 SC 1918 :


(1994)3 SCC1)
The Supreme Court issued a historic decision in the SR Bommai case in 1994, in
which the court extensively explored the terms of Article 356 and associated Issues.
The Centre-State Relations were greatly impacted by this case. After this ruling,
Article 356's misapplication was halted.
Facts: Between 1988 and 1993, multiple court cases were brought to overturn the
president's power over the state governments of Karnataka, Meghalaya, Himachal
Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Nagaland. The Supreme Court decided to
hear the case in October 1993 with a bench of 9 judges as a consequence.

Questions came in front of Supreme Court was:


1)Whether the Presidential Proclamation under Article 356 was justifiable and if so,
up to what extend?
2) Whether president has unfettered powers to issue Proclamation under 356 (1) of the
Constitution?
In response to the first query, the Supreme Court declared that Article 356 (1) is
subject to judicial review. The validity of a proclamation issued by the president
according to section 356(1) is judicially reviewable to the degree necessary to
determine whether it was legitimately issued or if the exercise of authority was mala
fide. If the declaration is determined to be fraudulent or to be founded on entirely
unrelated or extraneous grounds, the Supreme Court or High Court may invalidate it.

17 | P a g e
Regarding the second issue, the president's power is conditional rather than absolute.
This satisfaction may be made based on the Governor's report, based on the
information he has received, or based on both. The prerequisite for the development of
satisfaction is the presence of pertinent content. Only when it is essential to fulfil the
intent of the proclamation can the legislative Assembly be dissolved. The two
chambers of Parliament must approve the power's usage before it may be used.
In the Bommai Case, the supreme court noted the growth of regional parties to argue
that it is no longer the responsibility of the Union government to assess the
effectiveness of a separate party's rule, which was certain to create questions.
The Supreme Court issued some guidelines to secure Article 356 from being misused:
 The majority that the council of ministers has will be put to the test on the
House floor.
 The state should get a warning from the centre with a week to respond.
 The Court may challenge the evidence supporting the President's satisfaction,
but it may not contest the advice provided by the Council of Ministers to the
President. Hence, Judicial review will involve three questions only:
1. Is there any material behind the proclamation?
2. Is the material relevant?
3. Was there any mala fide use of Power?
 The Court will offer redress if Article 356 is used improperly.
 It is the President's authority's restriction under Article 356(3). Therefore,
unless the proclamation is accepted by the parliament, the president may not
act in an irreversible manner, i.e., he may not dissolve the assembly.
 Only when the constitutional apparatus, not the administrative machinery, fails
is Article 356 acceptable.
 Article 356 must be employed with caution by the Centre; otherwise, it risks
uprooting the constitutional framework that unites the Centre and the State.

State of Rajasthan vs. Union of India AIR 1977 SC1361


The following facts led to the State of Rajasthan case: After the 1977 elections, the
Janata Party took control of the Centre, but none of the States had it. On April 18,
1977, the Union Home Minister sent letters to the chief ministers of nine states,
including Bihar, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Orissa,
Rajasthan, U.P., and West Bengal, requesting that they advise their governors to
dissolve their state legislatures in accordance with Article 174(2)(b) of the
Constitution and call new elections. Because they were defeated in the most recent
Lok Sabha elections, these governments no longer had the support of the populace.
A constitutional bench of 7 judges heard the case. The defeat of the incumbent party
in these States did entail that the State's administration could not be carried out in
conformity with the requirements of the Constitution, and the Supreme Court affirmed

18 | P a g e
the Centre’s action and declared it to be a lawful exercise of Article 356. However, it
constituted a significant deviation from the opinions of the several High Courts
regarding the legality of judicial review of proclamations in specific situations. At
paragraph 144 of the decision, Justice Bhagwati and Justice Gupta expounded on the
limited reasons.
As a result, the Court permitted judicial review on specific grounds. The distinction
between "satisfaction" and "presence of satisfaction" in Article 361(1), which offered
immunity for Presidential action, was particularly important since the latter could not
be based on malicious or irrelevant justifications. The study will conduct a critical
analysis of the choice.
Following the Rajasthan case, the Guwahati and Karnataka High Courts were asked to
explore whether the Presidential Proclamation may be subject to judicial review under
Article 356. Defection was used as justification for dissolving the Assam Assembly.
This was contested in Vamuzo v. Union of India at the Guwahati High Court. [20]
Chief Justice Raghaur and Justice Hansaria had different perspectives on this matter.
The former did not permit, while the later believed that Article 356 allows for judicial
review
When the Presidential Proclamation was contested before the court in S.R. Bommai v.
Union of India, the High Court of Karnataka extensively explored the law. To impose
President's Rule in the State, the Governor submitted a report to the President of India.
The Karnataka High Court heard a case challenging the imposition of President's Rule
in Karnataka on April 29, 1989, and the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly based
on the Governor's report and "other information." The Full Bench decided that a
presidential proclamation might be legally challenged.
However, the High Court ultimately dismissed the case, stating that it was not possible
to claim that the information in the Governor's report was unimportant. The
Governor's credibility was undisputable, and his satisfaction was based on a fair
evaluation of all the circumstances. The Court further decided that using the floor test
was not required, required, or a need for delivering the report to the President. The
President and the President only are to be satisfied.
These opinions culminated in Sunderlal Patwa v. Union of India 6, a landmark decision
by the Madhya Pradesh High Court.
After the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya was demolished on June 12, 1992, the President's
Rule was established in M.P., and this was contested in the High Court. In a departure
from previous rulings, the Madhya Pradesh High Court ruled that the Presidential
Proclamation is subject to legal challenge. The Court determined that the removal of
clause (5) of Article 356 following the passage of the 44th Amendment to the
Constitution broadened the purview of judicial review.

6
AIR 1993 MP 214

19 | P a g e
Therefore, the Presidential Proclamation is subject to judicial scrutiny on the grounds
of unreasonableness, illegality, improperness, or mala fide, or, to put it another way,
on the basis of abuse of authority. The Court held that, given its federal structure,
Article 356 should only be applied in limited circumstances. For the first time, the
Court invalidated a presidential proclamation because it was unconstitutional.

LIST OF INSTANCES7

STATE Date of Invocation Date of Duration


Revocation
Andhra Pradesh 1. 18/01/1973 10/12/1973 327 Days
2. 28/02/2014 08/06/2014 100 Days
Andhra State 15/11/1954 29/03/1955 134 Days
Arunachal 1. 3/11/1979 18/01/1980 76 Days
Pradesh 2. 25/01/2016 19/02/2016 26 Days
Assam 1. 12/12/1979 05/12/1980 359 Days
2. 30/06/1981 13/01/1982 197 Days
3. 19/03/1982 27/02/1983 345 Days
4. 28/11/1990 30/06/1991 214 Days
Bihar 1. 29/06/1968 26/02/1969 242 Days
2. 04/07/1969 16/02/1970 227 Days
3. 09/01/1972 19/03/1972 70 Days
4. 30/04/1977 24/06/1977 55 Days
5. 17/02/1980 08/06/1980 112 Days
6. 28/03/1995 05/04/1995 08 Days
7. 12/02/1999 09/03/1999 25 Days
8. 07/03/2005 24/11/2005 262 Days
Delhi 14/02/2014 11/02/2015 362 Days
Goa 1. 02/12/1966 05/04/1967 124 Days
2. 27/04/1979 16/01/1980 264 Days
3. 14/12/1990 25/01/1991 42 Days
4. 09/02/1999 09/06/1999 120 Days
5. 04/03/2005 07/06/2005 95 Days
Gujrat 1. 12/05/1971 17/03/1972 310 Days
2. 09/02/1974 18/06/1975 1 year 129 Days
3. 12/03/1976 24/12/1976 287 Days
4. 17/02/1980 08/06/1980 112 Days
5. 19/09/1996 23/10/1996 34 Days

7
President's rule - Wikipedia

20 | P a g e
Haryana 1. 21/11/1967 22/05/1968 183 Days
2. 30/04/1977 21/06/1977 52 Days
3. 06/04/1991 23/07/1991 108 Days
Himachal Pradesh 1. 30/04/1977 22/06/1977 53 Days
2. 15/12/1992 03/12/1933 353 Days
Jammu & 1. 26/03/1977 09/07/1977 105 Days
Kashmir (State) 2. 06/03/1986 07/11/1986 246 Days
3. 19/01/1990 09/10/1996 6 year 264 Days
4. 18/10/2002 02/11/2002 15 Days
5. 11/07/2008 05/01/2009 178 Days
6. 09/01/2015 01/03/2015 51 Days
7. 08/01/2016 04/04/2016 87 Days
8. 19/06/2018 30/10/2019 1 year 133 Days
Jammu & 31/10/2019 Till Present More than 2 years
Kashmir (Union till now
Territory)

Jharkhand 1. 19/01/2009 29/12/2009 344 Days


2. 01/06/2010 11/09/2010 102 Days
3. 18/01/2013 12/07/2013 175 Days
Karnataka 1. 19/03/1971 20/03/1972 1 year 1 day
2. 31/12/1977 28/02/1978 59 Days
3. 21/04/1989 30/11/1989 223 Days
4. 10/10/1990 17/10/1990 07 Days
5. 09/10/2007 11/11/2007 33 Days
6. 20/11/2007 27/05/2008 189 Days
Kerala 1. 31/07/1959 22/02/1960 206 Days
2. 10/09/1964 06/03/1967 2 year 177 Days
3. 01/08/1970 04/10/1970 64 Days
4. 01/12/1979 25/01/1980 55 Days
Madhya Pradesh 1. 29/04/1977 25/06/1977 57 Days
2. 18/02/1980 08/06/1980 111 Days
3. 15/12/1992 07/12/1993 357 Days
Maharashtra 1. 01/02/1980 08/06/1980 112 Days
2. 28/09/2014 31/10/2014 33 Days
3. 12/11/2019 23/11/2019 11 Days
Manipur 1. 12/01/1967 19/03/1967 66 Days
2. 25/10/1967 18/02/1968 116 Days
3. 17/10/1969 22/03/1972 2 year 157Days
4. 28/03/1973 03/03/1974 340 Days
5. 16/05/1977 28/06/1977 43 Days
6. 14/11/1979 13/01/1980 60 Days
7. 28/02/1981 18/06/1981 110 Days
8. 07/01/1992 07/04/1992 91 Days
9. 31/12/1993 13/12/1994 347 Days
10. 02/06/2001 06/03/2002 277 Days

21 | P a g e
Meghalaya 1. 11/10/1991 05/02/1992 117 Days
2. 18/03/2009 12/05/2009 55 Days
Mizoram 1. 11/05/1977 01/06/1978 1year 21Days
2. 10/11/1978 08/05/1979 179 Days
3. 07/09/1988 24/01/1989 139 Days
Nagaland 1. 20/03/1975 25/11/1977 2years 250Days
2. 07/08/1988 25/01/1989 171 Days
3. 02/04/1992 22/02/1993 326 Days
4. 03/01/2008 12/03/2008 69 Days
Odisha 1. 25/02/1961 23/06/1961 118 Days
2. 11/01/1971 03/04/1971 82 Days
3. 03/03/1973 06/03/1974 1year 3Days
4. 16/12/1976 29/12/1976 13 Days
5. 30/04/1977 26/06/1977 57 Days
6. 16/02/1980 09/06/1980 113 Days
Patiala & East 05/03/1953 08/03/1954 1year 3Days
Punjab States
Union (PEPSU)

Puducherry 1. 18/09/1968 17/03/1969 180 Days


2. 03/01/1974 06/03/1974 62 Days
3. 28/03/1974 02/07/1977 3year 96Days
4. 12/11/1978 16/01/1980 1year 65Days
5. 24/06/1983 16/03/1985 1year 265Days
6. 04/03/1991 03/07/1991 121 Days
7. 25/02/2021 07/05/2021 71 Days
Punjab 1. 20/06/1951 17/04/1952 302 Days
2. 05/07/1966 01/11/1966 119 Days
3. 23/08/1968 17/02/1969 178 Days
4. 14/06/1971 17/03/1972 277 Days
5. 30/04/1977 20/06/1977 51 Days
6. 17/02/1980 06/06/1980 110 Days
7. 10/10/1983 29/09/1985 1year 354Days
8. 11/05/1987 25/02/1992 4years 259Days
Rajasthan 1. 13/03/1967 26/04/1967 44 Days
2. 29/04/1977 22/06/1977 54 Days
3. 16/02/1980 06/06/1980 111 Days
4. 15/12/1992 04/12/1993 354 Days
Sikkim 1. 18/08/1978 18/10/1979 1year 61Days
2. 25/05/1984 08/03/1985 287 Days
Tamil Nadu 1. 31/01/1976 29/06/1977 1year 149Days
2. 17/02/1980 08/06/1980 112 Days
3. 30/01/1988 26/01/1989 362 Days
4. 30/01/1991 23/06/1991 144 Days
Travanacore- 23/03/1956 05/04/1957 1year 13Days
Cochin

22 | P a g e
Tripura 1. 01/11/1971 20/03/1972 140 Days
2. 05/11/1977 05/01/1978 61 Days
3. 11/03/1993 10/04/1993 30 Days
Uttar Pradesh 1. 25/02/1968 26/02/1969 1year 1day
2. 01/10/1970 18/10/1970 17 Days
3. 13/06/1973 08/11/1973 148 Days
4. 30/11/1975 21/01/1976 52 Days
5. 30/04/1977 23/06/1977 54 Days
6. 17/02/1980 09/06/1980 113 Days
7. 06/12/1992 04/12/1993 363 Days
8. 18/10/1995 21/03/1997 1year 154Days
9. 08/03/2002 03/05/2002 56 Days
Uttarakhand 1. 27/03/2016 21/04/2016 25 Days
2. 22/04/2016 11/05/2016 19 Days
Madhya Pradesh 08/04/1949 13/03/1952 2years 340Days

West Bengal 1. 01/07/1962 08/07/1962 7 Days


2. 20/02/1968 25/02/1969 1year 5Days
3. 19/03/1970 02/04/1971 1year 14Days
4. 28/06/1971 19/03/1972 265 Days
5. 30/04/1977 21/06/1977 52 Days

CRITICISM

If public disturbance broke out and the state administration lacked the tools to put a
stop to it, Article 356 provided the federal government the authority to impose its rule
over the state. One of the provisions that helped give the Indian constitution some of
its unitary characteristics is this one. Although the main goal of this Article is to
provide the central government more authority in order to maintain the nation's unity
and integrity, the ruling parties at the centre frequently abuse it. It has been used as an
excuse to overthrow political rival state governments. As a result, many consider it to
be a danger to the federal-state system. The federal government has utilised this
provision several times since the 1950 ratification of the Indian Constitution to
overthrow elected state governments and impose president's rule.
On June 20, 1951, Punjab saw the first use of the provision. It was also used to depose
the democratically elected Communist state government of Kerala on July 31, 1959, in
the states of Patiala and the East Punjab States union (PEPSU), and then again during
Vimochana samaram. State administrations led by opposition parties were nearly
always dismissed by the federal government in the 1970s and 1980s. This approach
was well-known under the Indira Gandhi administration and the post-emergency

23 | P a g e
Janata Party. Between 1966 and 1977, the administration of Indira Gandhi is reported
to have imposed President's rule in 39 states. Similar to how Janta Dal used
emergency authority, it is reported to have imposed president's rule in nine states that
were under congress-controlled government.
The abuse of Article 356 wasn't stopped until the landmark decision in the S. R.
Bommai v. Union of India case in 1994. The Supreme Court created stringent rules for
enforcing President's rule in this case. The Supreme Court's subsequent rulings in
Jharkhand and other states have reduced the potential for abuse of Article 356 even
further. As a result, since the beginning of the 2000s, there have been far fewer
instances of President's rule being imposed.
Rameshwar Prasad vs Union of India (2006) SCC 1
Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India was the Supreme Court's longest ruling on
Article 356 in recent years. The following facts led to the case: No party was able to
establish a government on its own after the 2005 Bihar Legislative Assembly
elections. As a result, on July 3, 2005, a notice was made according to Article 356
establishing President's control and keeping the Assembly in suspended animation.
This was supposed to be a passing thing. Later, it was stated in a report by the
governor dated 27-4-2005 that there is a chance of horse trading and significant
defections with the aim of seizing control. Furthermore, it was said that controlling the
situation would not be possible without allowing the populace another chance to
express their will through a new election. The Governor reiterated his previous
opinion in a report dated May 21, 2005, in which he stated that it would be in the
State's best interest to dissolve the Assembly, which had been kept in suspended
animation, to give the electorate one more chance to ask for their vote at a suitable
time that would be determined in due course.
The Assembly was dissolved on 23 May 2005 as a result of this report. This was
contested, and the Supreme Court was presented with the following issues for
discussion:
1. Can the Legislative Assembly be dissolved pursuant to Article 174(2)(b) of the
Constitution without a first meeting?
2. Does the declaration violate the law and the constitution?
3. Is it required to direct status quo ante as of 7/3/2005 or 4/3/2005 if the answer to the
aforementioned question is, yes?
4. To what extent does Article 361 provide the Governor immunity?
The Supreme Court declared the dissolution to be illegal in an interim order dated 7-
10-2005, but stated that it was unable to reinstate the dissolved Assembly due to the
ongoing election process to create a new Assembly. The current situation was unique
in that, even before the Legislative Assembly's first sitting, its dissolution had been

24 | P a g e
mandated on the grounds that efforts were being made to illegally put together a
majority and assert a claim to establish the State's administration.
As a result, the Court's initial concern was whether Article 356(1) of the Constitution
may be invoked to order the dissolution of the Assembly. The validity of the
dissolution even before the Assembly convened for the first time following its proper
formation and members' taking of oaths was a related topic. Even though they agreed
with the petitioners' claims, the majority maintained that the governor had no such
authority. A power like that would go against the democratic ideals of majority rule. If
the governor and/or president were given such authority, the results may be horrifying,
would spark a wave of dissolutions, and would have far-reaching, disturbing, and
dangerous repercussions. It might also be used as a lever to prevent post-election
realignments and alignments on the grounds that doing so would be immoral and force
the nation or the state to have fresh elections. It further ruled that the governor had no
material, much less anything meaningful, on which to base a recommendation for
dissolution, and that the radical and extreme action of dissolution cannot be justified
on the basis of the governor's whims or ipse dixit alone.
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice K.G. Balakrishnan found that the dissolution
of the assembly was not malicious and that the facts in the Governor's report that some
horse trading was taking place and some MLAs were being won over by allures were
unquestionably facts the Governor should have taken into account. "The government
cannot be referred to as a democratically elected administration if it is established by
any unethical means. If the Governor has cause to believe that such unethical tactics
are being used by the political parties to gain the majority, then these are undoubtedly
issues that should be brought to the President's attention and are, at the very least, not
unimportant issues. The power to make decisions does not lie with the Governor.
According to Article 174 of the Constitution, the Council of Ministers would review
his report before the President made a final decision. As a result, it is impossible to
claim that the decision to dissolve the Bihar State Legislative Assembly was made in
bad faith and on wholly unrelated grounds.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Pasayat deemed the Governor's own presumptions to
be true. He said that when the democratic process is messed with unfairly, the
governor cannot stand by and do nothing. The Governor cannot permit the installation
of such a government when the only goal was to seize power at any costs, even using
what appear to be unjust and corrupt methods. "The Governor's image might not be
accurate. But it is his responsibility to stop the installation of a Cabinet whose
majority has been put together in the aforementioned way. It could be a bad idea in a
certain situation, but it's not irrational, pointless, or unimportant. In actuality, the
governor had not stopped anyone from asserting their rights. Nobody disputes the fact
that a claim was made.
Misuse of the Article 356

25 | P a g e
A quick scan of the data reveals that this has not been the case at all. It has been used
more than 100 times since independence, according to the Sarkaria Commission.
Sometimes perfectly lawful state officials have been removed from office in order to
get them to submit or to offer the Union government's own party a chance to take over
the state. Union administrations have taken on the very role that Dr. Ambedkar
thought they would in order to establish their legitimacy—that of being the ones who
determine the effectiveness of state governance. The most malicious application of
Article 356 occurred throughout the 1970s and 1980s, which will be remembered. It
was used 59 times between 1971 and 1984, with the majority of those uses occurring
between 1977 and 1979 during the Morarji Desai cabinet. The post-emergency Central
government utilised it as a weapon in its vengeance against state governments headed
by the Congress. Following her return to office in 1980, Indira Gandhi later paid it
forward, using it 17 times between 1980 and 1984.
Even though Jawaharlal Nehru had abused Article 356 to overthrow Kerala's majority
Communist government, Indira Gandhi is remembered for using it as a weapon
against state governments. After 1967, when the Congress party lost control of
numerous Indian states, its frequency drastically increased. In actuality, Indira Gandhi
blocked the courts' ability to examine the president's emergency proclamation to enact
the 38th constitutional Amendment, which stifled Article 356. However, the original
Article 356 as intended by Dr. Ambedkar was reinstated courtesy to the 44th
Constitutional Amendment Act, which was proposed in 1978 by Morarji Desai. The
most frequent use of Article 356 has been in Manipur. Long stretches of bloodshed
and the states profoundly fractured internal politics have compelled the Union
administration to force its will on the State. Along with Manipur, the politically
significant States of UP and Bihar have long been on the centre’s radar despite their
fractured political systems.

CONCLUSION

The Government of India Act of 1935 served as the pari materia source for Article
356. According to the Indian Constitution, this Article should only be used in the
rarest of circumstances, yet as we have seen, it has been misused more than 100 times
as of this writing.
In an interview with the Indian Express, the former attorney general Soli Sorabjee
said, "The Governor's report is a significant document in the case. President's Rule is
not only justified, but also necessary, if the report is not affected by unrelated factors
and presents a convincing case of the state's constitutional machinery failing.

26 | P a g e
The Indian Constitution is meant to be somewhat federal. Article 356 is not intended
to be used to undermine the states' autonomy. The Supreme Court said in the SR
Bommai case that Article 356 should only be used in severe circumstances where the
constitutional machinery has failed totally and gave guidelines for its improper
application. It must be applied correctly or the Indian Constitution's fundamental
elements, including its federal structure, would be damaged and it will turn into a
unitary constitution. It was important to realise that, in contrast to a mindset of
superiority and domination, only the spirit of "Cooperative federalism" can maintain
the equilibrium between the Union and the State and advance the welfare of the
populace. No entity may assert dominance under our constitution.
The Constituent Assembly debated and discussed Article 356 of the Constitution the
most. The Founders foresaw that if and when it was to be abused, it would contradict
not only the federal nature of the polity they had envisioned but also make a farce of
democratic values. It appears that they were adamant that the Article's clause would
not be applied to further corporative federalism but rather to end the ministerial crisis
in the State.
It must be remembered that the success or failure of constitutional provisions
ultimately rests more on how they are implemented than on the elegant language in
which they are drafted, essential though that may be. Article 356 can serve national
interests when utilised appropriately and in the right spirit, but if it is abused and
misused for other reasons, it will act as a tool of tyranny. 40 There are clearly
insufficient protections in place to prevent the misuse of Article 356 of the Indian
Constitution.
Because the Party in power at the Centre often controls Parliament with a majority
vote, the safeguard of "parliamentary approval" - specified in Article 356(3) - of a
Proclamation under Article 356(1) might be prejudiced. Furthermore, even a vote in
Parliament stating that a specific use (or non-application) of the President's Rule was
improper cannot repair the harm already done. There are currently no protections in
place in India to prevent the misuse of Article 356 of the Indian Constitution.
A safety of "parliamentary consent" is specified in Article 356 (3), however despite
this, Proclamation under Article 356(1) may be prejudiced because the party at the
centre typically dominates the will of the Parliament due to its majority, and as a
result, misuse of Article 356 is still quite common. However, as we have seen since
the S.R. Bommai ruling, the intended purpose for including this Article is now being
met. Additionally, the central government's function remains unchanged, but it is now
less arbitrary. This means that for the time being, we will have to make do with
sporadic protests against the Union Executive sheathing or failing to sheath, at its
delicious leisure, that double-edged weapon known as Article 356.

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SUGGESTIONS

After all the above discussions, it can be noted that the provision given in Article 356
of the Indian Constitution, has been misused many times in the past and can be
misused in the upcoming future too.
The Judiciary has played an important role in curbing the misuse of this provision by
the Union, and the Judiciary shall keep an eye on the use of this provision. But more
laws and regulations are needed to be made to halt the misuse of this provision.
After the critical analysis of the provision, according to me there should be some
amendment made in regards to Article 356 of the Indian Constitution.
But on other hand some group of thinkers and jurists opine that this particular Article
shall be deleted from the constitution, but after all the analysis, I do not support the
opinion of deleting this Article, as this will damage the federal structure to the nation
and will make the states more autocratic.
This Article plays an important role to check the states working machinery by the
Union. Only the fact that the previous history of misusing this provision doesn’t mean
that this provision shall be deleted absolutely.
As learning from the past instances, the centre government should stop misusing this
provision as a weapon to demolish the state government and meet the centre’s
political satisfaction.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

 Indian Polity by M. Laxmikant


 Spectrum Modern History by Rajiv Ahir I.P.S
 The Constitution of India by Allahabad Law Publication
 Lawmin.nic.in
 Durga Das Basu, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA,
Wadhwa and Company Law Publishers 13th Edition
 Sarkaria Commission Report – Chapter VI ‘Emergency Provision’
 Advocatekhoj.com
 Lex-warrier.in
 M. P. Jain, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 www.constitutionofindia.com
 www.wikipedia.org
 www.indianculture.gov.in

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