Magallona v Ermita

Summary: 
This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic
Act No 9522 (RA 9522) adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline
regime of nearby territories. In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the
statute under scrutiny. The change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the
terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which the Philippines
ratified on 27 February 1984. Among others, UNCLOS prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and
contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines and sets the deadline for the filing of
application for the extended continental shelf. Complying with these requirements, RA 9522
shortened one baseline, optimised the location of some basepoints around the Philippine
archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the
Scarborough Shoal, as 'regimes of islands' whose islands generate their own applicable maritime
zones.
The petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, assail the constitutionality of RA
9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and
logically, the reach of the Philippine State’s sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987
Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties; and (2) RA 9522
opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and
aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s
nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.
In addition, the petitioners contend that RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as a 'regime of islands' not
only results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence
fishermen. To buttress their argument of territorial diminution, the petitioners facially attack RA 9522
for what it excluded and included - its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its
use of UNCLOS’s framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and
the Scarborough Shoal.
Commenting on the petition, the respondent officials raise threshold issues questioning: (1) the
petition’s compliance with the case or controversy requirement for judicial review grounded on
petitioners’ alleged lack of locus standi; and (2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition
to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, respondents defend RA 9522 as the
country’s compliance with the terms of UNCLOS, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or
Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine the country’s security,
environment and economic interests or relinquish the Philippines’ claim over Sabah.
Held: Petition denied.
The petitioners submit that RA 9522 'dismembers a large portion of the national territory' because it
discards the pre-UNCLOS demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related
treaties, successively encoded in the definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. The petitioners theorise that this constitutional definition trumps any treaty or statutory
provision denying the Philippines sovereign control over waters, beyond the territorial sea
recognised at the time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the United States. The
petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris’ technical description, Philippine sovereignty over
territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago, embracing
the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris.
The petitioners' theory fails to persuade us. UNCLOS has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss)
of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (ie,
the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from
the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental
shelves that UNCLOS delimits. UNCLOS was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among
United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the world’s oceans and
submarine areas, recognising coastal and archipelagic States’ graduated authority over a limited
span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS States Parties to mark
out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or
contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and
continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:
'Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone
and the continental shelf. – The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in
accordance with article 47.' (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS States Parties to delimit
with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to
the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas
within which States Parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over
territorial waters (art 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in
the contiguous zone (art 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the
exclusive economic zone (art 56) and continental shelf (art 77).
Even under the petitioners’ theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the
waters within the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines
would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the
baselines in conformity with UNCLOS. The baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other
portions of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the 'outermost islands and
drying reefs of the archipelago'.
UNCLOS and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as the
petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire
(or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, not by
executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with
the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land
features are outside UNCLOS, and are instead governed by the rules on general international law.
The petitioners next submit that RA 9522’s use of UNCLOS' regime of islands framework to draw the
baselines, and to measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG, 'weakens our
territorial claim' over that area. The petitioners’ argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine
territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522
itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines' continued claim of sovereignty and
jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:
SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises
sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as 'Regime of Islands' under the Republic of the
Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine
archipelago, adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a
breach of two provisions of UNCLOS. First, art 47.3 of UNCLOS requires that '[t]he drawing of such
baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the
archipelago'. Second, art 47.2 of UNCLOS requires that 'the length of the baselines shall not exceed
100 nautical miles', save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up
to 125 nautical miles. Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG
and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable
distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago, such that any straight baseline
looped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably 'depart to an appreciable extent from
the general configuration of the archipelago'.
The petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS, Congress was not
bound to pass RA 9522. We have looked at the relevant provision of UNCLOS and we find the
petitioners’ reading plausible. Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option belongs to
Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option comes at a very steep
price. Absent an UNCLOS-compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will
find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones
and continental shelf is measured. This is a recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open
invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and
submarine areas around our archipelago; and second, it weakens the country’s case in any
international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are consequences Congress wisely
avoided.

Arigo v Swift
Summary: 
This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Environmental Protection Order under r 7 of AM No 09-6-8-SC, otherwise known as the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, involving violations of environmental laws and regulations in
relation to the grounding of the US military ship USS Guardian over the Tubbataha reefs, a
UNESCO World Heritage Site.
Held: Although the petitioners have legal standing to file the present petition, it is not appropriate for
the Court to exercise its jurisdiction over the US respondents in their official capacity. Petition
denied.
UNCLOS is a multilateral treaty which was opened for signature on 10 December 1982 at Montego
Bay, Jamaica. It was ratified by the Philippines in 1984 but came into force on 16 November 1994
upon the submission of the 60th ratification. Warships enjoy sovereign immunity under UNCLOS
subject to the exceptions set out in in arts 30, 31 and 32. The fact that the US is not a Member State
of UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State
over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear 'international responsibility'
under art 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the
Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and trading partner, which
has been actively supporting the country's efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk
from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting our internal
waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising leadership in international affairs,
unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to co-operate in the global task to
protect and preserve the marine environment, as provided for in art 197 of UNCLOS.
The relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although the
treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the
latter's territorial sea, flag States shall be required to leave the territorial sea immediately if they flout
the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for damage caused by their
warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes under art 31.
In terms of remedies for the grounding, the Court defers to the Executive Branch on the matter of
compensation and rehabilitation measures through diplomatic channels. Resolution of these issues
impinges on our relations with another State in the context of common security interests under the
Visiting Forces Agreement between the US and Philippines governments. It is settled that '[t]he
conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive
and legislative' - the 'political' - departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be
done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.
CONCHITA ROMUALDEZ-YAP vs. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
G.R. No. 104226. August 12, 1993.

FACTS:

Petitioner is a special assistant with a rank of Second Assistant Manager at PNB. After several
promotions, she was appointed as Senior Vice President assigned to the Fund Transfer Department.
Starting 1 April 1986 up to 20 February 1987, petitioner filed several applications for leave of absence
(due to medical reasons) which were duly approved. While on leave, Executive Order No. 80 (Revised
Charter of the PNB) was approved. Said executive order authorized the restructure/reorganization and
rehabilitation of PNB. Pursuant to the reorganization plan, the Fund Transfer Department was abolished
and its functions transferred to the International Department.

As a consequence, petitioner was notified of her separation from the service in a letter dated 30 January
1987. The letter was received by petitioner’s secretary only on February 16. She filed an appeal to the
CSC questioned her separation which upheld by the CSC Chairman.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the reorganization of PNB, a government-owned or controlled corporation performing

ministrant functions is valid

HELD:

YES. Executive Order No. 80 conferred upon the PNB the authority to reorganize. The order was issued
by then Pres. Corazon Aquino on 3 December 1986 while she was exercising the powers vested in the
President of the Philippines by the Freedom Constitution. After 3 December 1986, what remained to be
done was the implementation of the reorganization.

There is no doubt as to the legal basis for PNB’s reorganization.

A reorganization whether in a government bureau performing constituent functions or in a government-

owned or controlled corporation performing ministrant functions must meet a common test, the test of
good faith.

PNB’s reorganization, to repeat, was by virtue of a valid law. At the time of reorganization, due to the
critical financial situation of the bank, departments, positions and functions were abolished or merged.
The abolition of the Fund Transfer Department (FTD) was deemed necessary. This was a management
prerogative exercised pursuant to a business judgment. A distinction can be made in ruling on the
validity of a reorganization between a government bureau or office performing constituent functions
(like the Customs) and a government-owned or controlled corporation performing ministrant functions
(like the PNB).

Constituent functions are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in
nature; ministrant functions are those undertaken by way of advancing the general interests of society,
and are merely optional. Commercial or universal banking is, ideally, not governmental but a private
sector endeavor. It is an optional function of government.

Fontanilla vs. Maliaman

FACTS:

On August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pick-up owned and operated by respondent National Irrigation
Administration, a government agency bearing Plate No. IN-651, then driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an
employee of said agency as its regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, son of
herein petitioners, and Restituto Deligo, at Maasin, San Jose City along the Maharlika Highway. As a
result of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla and Restituto Deligo were injured and brought to the San Jose
City Emergency Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later transferred to the Cabanatuan Provincial
Hospital where he died.

Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent National Irrigation Administration who, at the time of the
accident, was a licensed professional driver and who qualified for employment as such regular driver of
respondent after having passed the written and oral examinations on traffic rules and maintenance of
vehicles given by National Irrigation Administration (NIA) authorities.

Spouses Fontanilla instituted a civil case against respondent NIA for damages in connection with the
death of their son resulting from the aforestated accident.

ISSUE:

Whether or not NIA, a government corporation, be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent
acts of its driver.

HELD:

YES. The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government exercising proprietary
functions, by express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601. It is a government corporation with juridical
personality and not a mere agency of the government. Since it is a corporate body performing non-
governmental functions, it now becomes liable for the damage caused by the accident resulting from
the tortious act of its driver-employee. In this particular case, the NIA assumes the responsibility of an
ordinary employer and as such, it becomes answerable for damages.
This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon the existence of negligence on the part of
respondent NIA. The negligence referred to here is the negligence of supervision.

GOVERNMENTAL and PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS DISTINGUISHED:

Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by the government, are more or less
generally agreed to be “governmental” in character, and so the State is immune from tort liability. On
the other hand, a service which might as well be provided by a private corporation, and particularly
when it collects revenues from it, the function is considered a “proprietary” one, as to which there may
be liability for the torts of agents within the scope of their employment.

EDU VS ERICTA
FACTS:

Judge Ericta and Teddy C. Galo  filed suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction 
assailing the validity of enactment of the Reflector as well as Admin Order No. 2 implementing it, as
an invalid exercise of the police power for being violative of the due process clause. Galo followed
with a manifestation that in the event that Judge would uphold said statute constitutional, A.O. No. 2
of the Land Transportation Commissioner, implementing such legislation be nullified as an undue
exercise of legislative power.

ISSUE:
Whether Reflector Law and Administrative Order is constitutional and valid.

RULING:
Yes. Reflector Law is enacted under the police power in order to promote public safety and order.

Justice Laurel identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could
thus "be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort,
health and prosperity of the state." The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and
far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing
upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable
an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary
measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.

The same lack of success marks the effort of respondent Galo to impugn the validity of
Administrative Order No. 2 issued by petitioner in his official capacity, duly approved by the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, for being contrary to the principle of non-delegation
of legislative power. Such administrative order, which took effect on April 17, 1970, has a provision
on reflectors in effect reproducing what was set forth in the Act.

It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may
not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the
exception that local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be
delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the
test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the
legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the
inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does
not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the
scope of his authority.

It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land Transportation Code.
Republic Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis
on public safety which is the prime consideration in statutes of this character. There is likewise a
categorical affirmation Of the power of petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to
promulgate rules and regulations to give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental
purpose. His power is clear. There has been no abuse. His Administrative Order No. 2 can easily
survive the attack, far-from-formidable, launched against it by respondent Galo
Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. PCA
G.R. No. 110526 February 10, 1998
Mendoza, J.

Facts:

                PCA was created by PD 232 as independent public corporation to promote the rapid
integrated development and growth of the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects and
to ensure that coconut farmers become direct participants in, and beneficiaries of, such development
and growth through a regulatory scheme set up by law. PCA is also in charge of the issuing of
licenses to would-be coconut plant operators. On 24 March 1993, however, PCA issued Board
Resolution No. 018-93 which no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to
apply for licenses as a condition for engaging in such business. The purpose of which is to promote
free enterprise unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes. But
this caused cut-throat competition among operators specifically in congested areas, underselling,
smuggling, and the decline of coconut-based commodities.  The APCD then filed a petition for
mandamus to compel PCA to revoke BR No. 018-93.

Issue:

                whether or not PCA ran in conflict against the very nature of its creation

Held:

                Yes. Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have repudiated laissez-faire
as an economic principle. Although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it
nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the
general welfare. As such, free enterprise does not call for the removal of “protective regulations” for
the benefit of the general public. This is so because under Art 12, Sec 6 and 9, it is very clear that
the government reserves the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare
and when the public interest so requires.

Petitioner: Government of the Philippine Islands, represented by Executive Treasurer

Respondent: El Monte de Piedad Y Caja de Ajorras de Manila

FACTS: On June 3, 1863, a devastating earthquake in the Philippines took place. The Spanish dominions
provided $400,000 aid as received by the National Treasury as relief of the victims of the earthquake.
The government used the money as such but $80,000 was left untouched and was thus invested to
Monte de Piedad bank, which was in turn invested as jewelries, equivalent to the same amount.

In June 1983, the Department of Finance called upon the same bank to return the $80,000 deposited
from before. The Monte de Piedad declined to comply with this order on the ground that the Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance had the right to order the
reimbursement because the Philippine government is not the affected party. On account of various
petitions of the persons, the Philippine Islands brought a suit against Monte de Piedad for a recovery of
the $80,000 together with interest, for the benefit of those persons and their heirs. Respondent refuse
to provide the money, hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is authorized to file a reimbursement of the money of
the people deposited in respondent bank.

HELD: The Court held that the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint/reimbursement
against respondent bank in accordance to the Doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government is the sole
protector of the rights of the people thus, it holds an inherent supreme power to enforce laws which
promote public interest. The government has the right to "take back" the money intended fro people.
The government has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by virtue of its general
superintending authority over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it.

Appellate court decision was affirmed. Petition was thereby GRANTED. The Court ordered that
respondent bank return the amount to the rightful heirs with interest in gold or coin in Philippine peso.

CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM), petitioner,

vs.

EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a motion for mandamus praying that the respondent judge be ordered to continue the
proceedings in civil case no. 3012, which was initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the
Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation of the islands.
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings on the following
grounds: (1) the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944 by Gen. Mac Arthur had the effect of
invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines under
the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic established during the Japanese occupation;(2)
the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in
the courts of the defunct Republic in the absence of enabling law granting such authority; (3) the
government established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation was not a de facto
government.

ISSUES:

Whether the government established during the Japanese occupation was a de facto government.

Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts existing in the Philippines under the Phil.
Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid and remained so even
after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the US and Filipino forces.

Whether the proclamation issued by Gen. Mac Arthur declaring ―all laws, regulations and processes of
any other government in the Philippines than that of the Commonwealth are null and void and without
legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control has invalidated al
judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the said courts.

Whether the courts of Commonwealth, which were the same courts existing prior to and continue
during the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines may continue those proceedings in said
courts at the time the Philippines were reoccupied and liberated by the US and Filipino forces and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines were reestablished.

HELD:

YES. The government established under the names of Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of
the Philippines during the Japanese occupation was a civil government and a de facto government of the
second kind: that which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a
territory of the enemy in the course of war. The distinguishing characteristics of this kind of de facto
government are; (1) that its existence is maintained by active military power within the territories, and
against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government; and (2) that while it exists it must
necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in
submission to such force, do not become responsible, as wrongdoers, for those acts, though not
warranted by the laws of the rightful government.
YES. Being a de facto government, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the
courts of justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid,
and, by virtue of the well-known principle of postliminy in international law, remained good and valid
after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.

NO. The phrase ―processes of any other government is broad and may refer not only to judicial
processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional processes of the Republic of
the Philippines or other governmental agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese
occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, according to the well-known principles of
international law, all judgments and judicial proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of the
de facto government during the Japanese occupation were good and valid before and remained so after
the occupied territory had come again into the power of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed
that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of the Gen. Mac Arthur, in using the phrase
―processes of any government to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of
international law. The only reasonable construction of the said phrase is that it refers to governmental
processes other than judicial processes, or court proceedings, for according to a well-known statutory
construction, statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains.

YES. Although in theory, the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a
matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice, the invader does not usually
take the administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to
administer the laws of the country to which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented. If the
proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation had
been continued during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission and
the so-called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason the same courts, which become
reestablished and conceived of as having been in continued existence upon the reoccupation and
liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy, may continue the proceedings in
cases then pending in said courts, without necessity of enacting laws conferring jurisdiction upon them
to continue said proceedings.

Laurel vs. Misa, 77 Phil. 856

Absolute and permanent allegiance is not suspended during enemy occupation. Hence, adherence to
said enemy occupant, through giving them aid and comfort, is an act of treason punishable under Article
114 of the RPC.

FACTS

Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus and argued that a Filipino who adhered to the enemy,
giving the latter aid and comfort, during their (Japanese) occupation, cannot be prosecuted for the crime
of treason under Article 114 of the RPC because the sovereignty of the Philippines and the correlative
allegiance of Filipinos at the time were suspended.
ISSUE

Whether or not the allegiance of Filipinos suspended during enemy occupation.

RULING

No, the allegiance of Filipinos is not suspended during enemy occupation.

A citizen or subject owes absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists of fidelity and obedience,
to his government or sovereign. This kind of allegiance should not be confused with the qualified and
temporary allegiance whom a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein
he resides, so long as he remains there, in return for the protection he receives.

This absolute and permanent allegiance of citizens is not abrogated or severed by the enemy
occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby
to the occupier. Sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during enemy occupation; what may be
suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty, the same being passed temporarily to the
occupant. In effect, the allegiance of the citizens to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists,
hence, there is no such thing as suspended allegiance as theorized by Laurel.

RAMON RUFFY, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF, PHILIPPINE ARMY, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS:

During the Japanese occupation, herein petitioner, Ramon Ruffy, a Provincial Commander of the
Philippine Constabulary, retreated in the mountains instead of surrendering to the enemy. He organized
and led a guerrilla outfit known as Bolo Combat Team or Bolo Area. The said Bolo Area was a contingent
of the 6th Military District, which has been recognized and placed under the operational control of the
US Army in the South Pacific. Sometime later, Col. Jurado effected a change of command in the Bolo
Area. Major Ruffy who was then acting as Commanding Officer for the Bolo Area was relieved of his
position. Later on or on October 19, 1944, Lieut. Col Jurado was slain allegedly by the petitioners. It was
this murder which gave rise to petitioner‘s trial.

The trial court convicted petitioner and he now filed this instant petition with the contention that he
was not subject to military law at the time the offense for which he had been placed on trial was
committed. Petitioners contended that by the enemy occupation of the Philippines, the National
Defense Act and all laws and regulations creating and governing the existence of the Philippine Army
including the Articles of War, were suspended and in abeyance during such belligerent occupation. He
also assailed the constitutionality of 93d Article of War which provides that ―any person subject to
military law who commits murder in the time of war should suffer death or imprisonment for life, as the
court martial may direct. Petitioner argued that the said law was in violation of Article VII, section 2 of
the Constitution since 93d of Article of War fails to allow a review by the Supreme Court of judgments of
courts martial imposing death or life imprisonment.

ISSUES:

Whether petitioner was subject to military law at the time the alleged offense was committed.

Whether 93d of Articles of War was constitutional.

HELD:

YES, petitioner was subject to military law at the time the alleged offense was committed. The rule that
laws of political nature or affecting political relations are considered superseded or in abeyance during
the military occupation, is intended for the governing of the civil inhabitants of the occupied territory. It
is not intended for and does not bind the enemies in arms.

By the occupation of the Philippines by Japanese forces, the officers and men of the Philippine army did
not cease to be fully in the service, though, in a measure, only in measure, they were not subject to the
military jurisdiction, if they were not in active duty. In the latter case, like officers and soldiers on leave
of absence or held as prisoners of war, they could not be held guilty of breach of the discipline of the
command or of a neglect of duty x x x; but for an act unbecoming of a gentleman or an act which
constitutes an offense of the class specified in the 95th Article of War, they may in general be legally
held subject to military jurisdiction and trial.

Moreover, petitioners, by their acceptance of appointments as officers in the Bolo Area from the
General Headquarters of the 6th Military District, they became members of the Philippine Army
amenable to the Articles of War. x x x As officers in the Bolo Area and the 6th Military District, the
petitioners operated under the orders of a duly established and duly appointed commanders of the
United States Army and thus covered by Article 2 of the Articles of War which provides for persons
subject to military law.

YES, 93d of the Articles of War was constitutional. It does not violate Article VII, section 2 of the
Constitution, which provides that ―the National Assembly may not deprive the Supreme Court of its
original jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment.
Court Martial are agencies of executive character, and one of the authorities ―for ordering of courts
martial has been held to be attached to the constitutional functions of the President as Commander in
Chief, independently of legislation. Unlike courts of law, they are not a portion of the judiciary.

x x x court martial are in fact simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by Congress for
the President as Commander in Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and
enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military
representatives.

WHO vs. Aquino

G.R. No. L-35131; November 29, 1972
FACTS:

Petitioner, Dr. Leonce Verstuyft, was assigned on December 6, 1971 by the WHO to the Regional Office in Manila
as Acting Assistant Director of Health Services. He is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the Host
Agreement executed on July 22, 1951 between the Philippine Government and the World Health Organization.

When petitioner Verstuyft’s personal effects contained in twelve (12) crates entered the Philippines as
unaccompanied baggage on January 10, 1972, they were accordingly allowed free entry from duties and taxes.

The crates were directly stored at the Eternit Corporation’s warehouse at Mandaluyong, Rizal, “pending his
relocation into permanent quarters.”

Nevertheless, as above stated, respondent judge, Hon. Benjamin H. Aquino, issued on March 3, 1972 upon
application on the same date of respondents Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC) officers search warrant
for alleged violation of RA No. 4712 directing the search and seizure of the dutiable items in said crates.

Upon protest of March 6, 1972 of Dr. Francisco Dy, WHO Regional Director for the Western Pacific stationed in
Manila, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo, personally wired on the same date respondent judge
advising that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search.

The Office of the Solicitor General filed an extended comment stating the official position of the executive branch
of the Philippine Government that petitioner Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity. The Solicitor
General accordingly joined petitioner Verstuyft’s prayer for the quashal of the search warrant. Respondent judge
nevertheless summarily denied quashal of the search warrant.

Hence, the petition at bar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner Verstuyft is entitled “to all privileges and immunities, exemptions and facilities accorded
to diplomatic envoys in accordance with international law” under section 24 of the Host Agreement.

RULING:

Yes. It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic
immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the
executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the
executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of
immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this
case, or other officer acting under his direction.

Hence, even assuming arguendo as against the categorical assurance of the executive branch of government that
respondent judge had some ground to prefer respondents COSAC officers’ suspicion that there had been an abuse of
diplomatic immunity, the continuation of the search warrant proceedings before him was not the proper remedy. He
should, nevertheless, in deference to the exclusive competence and jurisdiction of the executive branch of
government to act on the matter, have acceded to the quashal of the search warrant, and forwarded his findings or
grounds to believe that there had been such abuse of diplomatic immunity to the Department of Foreign Affairs for it
to deal with, in accordance with the aforementioned Convention, if so warranted.
Republic vs. Villasor

FACTS:

A decision was rendered in a Special Proceeding against the Republic of the Philippines thereby
confirming the arbitration award of P1,712,396.40 in favor of respondent corporation. After the decision
became final and executory, respondent judge issued an order directing the sheriff to execute the said
decision, and the corresponding alias writ of execution was thus issued.

Hence the sheriff served notices of garnishment with several banks especially the monies due to the AFP
in the form of deposits sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the writ. PNB and Philippine
Veterans Bank received such notice. As certified by the AFP Comptroller, these funds of the AFP with the
said banks are public funds for the pensions, pay, and allowances of its military and civilian personnel.

The petitioner, in this certiorari and prohibition proceedings, challenges the validity of the Order issued
by Judge Villasor declaring the decision final and executory and subsequently issuing an alias writ of
execution directed against the funds of the AFP in pursuance thereof.

ISSUE:

May the writs of execution and notices of garnishment be sued against public funds?

HELD:

NO. Although the State may give its consent to be sued by private parties, there is corollary that public
funds cannot be the object of garnishment proceedings even if the consent to be sued has been
previously granted and the state‘s liability has been adjudged.

Thus in the case of Commission of Public Highways vs. San Diego, such a well settled doctrine was
restated in the opinion of Justice Teehankee. The universal rule that where the state gives its consent to
be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant‘s action only up to the
completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of the courts ends
when the judgment is rendered, since the government funds and properties may not be seized under
writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgment, is based on obvious considerations of public
policy. Disbursement of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriations as required
by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or
disrupted by diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific object is appropriated by law.

E. MERRITT, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendant-appellant.MERRITT vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

Merritt, while riding his motorcycle, was hit by an ambulance owned by the Philippine General Hospital.
A driver employed by the hospital drove it. In order for Merritt to sue the Philippine government, Act
No. 2457 was enacted by the Philippine Legislature authorizing Merritt to sue the Government of the
Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit. A suit was
then filed before the CFI of Manila, which fixed the responsibility for the collision solely on the
ambulance driver and determined the amount of damages to be awarded to Merritt. Both parties
appealed from the decision, plaintiff Merritt as to the amount of damages and defendant in rendering
the amount against the government.

ISSUE:

WON defendant, Government of the Philippines, waived its immunity from suit as well as conceded its
liability to the plaintiff when it enacted Act No. 2457.

HELD:

NO. By consenting to be sued, a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede
its liability to the plaintiff, create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not
previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a pre-existing liability and submit itself to the
jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.

The Government of the Philippines Islands is only liable, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees
when they act as special agents. A special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or
commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official. The special agent
acts in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust
confided to him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting
administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and
naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations. The responsibility of
the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite
order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the
claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with
some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid
down by the law of civil responsibility. The chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not
such an agent.

SEAFDEC vs. NLRC

GR Nos. 97468-70, September 2 1993, 241 SCRA 580
FACTS:

Two labor cases were filed by the herein private respondents against the petitioner, Southeast
Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC), before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch, Iloilo City.

In these cases, the private respondents claim having been wrongfully terminated from their
employment by the petitioner.

The petitioner, who claims to be an international inter-government organization composed of

various Southeast Asian countries, filed a Motion to Dismiss, challenged the jurisdiction of the
public respondent in taking cognizance of the above cases.

The private respondents, as well as respondent labor arbiter, allege that the petitioner is not
immune from suit and assuming that if, indeed, it is an international organization, it has,
however, impliedly, if not expressly, waived its immunity by belatedly raising the issue of
jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is immune from suit.

HELD:

The Court ruled for the petitioner.

It is beyond question that petitioner SEAFDEC is an international agency enjoying diplomatic

immunity.

It has already been held in Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture

Department vs. National Labor Relations Commission (G.R. No. 86773, 206 SCRA 283/1992).

Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-

AQD) is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC.

Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD), enjoys

functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is
located.

One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction,
i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country
where it is found.

The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the
local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in
their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization;
besides, such objection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge
its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states. 

Liwayway Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco, Corp.

 on 6:55 AM  in Case Digests, Civil Law 
 0

G.R. No. 141309, June 19, 2007

FACTS:

This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune against Liwayway as CIR.

On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally manufactured cigarettes
which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged an ad valorem tax of “55% provided that
the maximum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos per pack.” Prior to effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway
issued a rule, reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” (all manufactured by Fortune) as locally
manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654
was passed, these cigarette brands were already covered.

In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of the rule violated
its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal
protection of the laws.

For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no cause of action against
her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her
authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one
responsible for her acts. She also contended that the complaint states no cause of action for lack of
allegation of malice or bad faith.

The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who dismissed the case on the ground
that under Article 32, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith.

Hence this appeal.

ISSUES:

o Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done
in connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her office
o Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I,
Administrative Code

HELD:
On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may
suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks.
An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not
liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the
Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its consent. However, a public
officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which,
being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official
actions.

Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith,
malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book,
civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness or
negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional
rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts
were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.

Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for
acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1)
acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right
of the plaintiff.

On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special law, which
prevails over a general law (the Administrative Code).

Article 32 was patterned after the “tort” in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has been
defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some
injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property or reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated
that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and
there are circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The
reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and
not the act itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the
absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of another’s legal
right; that is, liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.

MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE and BUREAU of CUSTOMS, defendants-appellees.

18 SCRA 1120
December 17, 1966

FACTS:

Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad consigned to Mobil Philippines. The
Customs Arrastre later delivered to the broker of the consignee three cases only of the shipment.
Mobil Philippines Exploration Inc. filed suit in the CFI against the Customs Arrastre Service and
the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered cases plus other damages.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being a person
under the law, defendants cannot be sued.

After the plaintiff opposed the motion, the court dismissed the complaint on the ground that
neither the Customs Arrastre Service nor the Bureau of Customs is suable.

ISSUE:

Can the Customs Arrastre Service or the Bureau of Customs be sued?

HELD:

NO. The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery of the national government in the
operations of arrastre service, pursuant to express legislative mandate and a necessary incident of
its prime governmental function, is immune from suit, there being no statute to the contrary.

The Bureau of Customs has no personality of its own apart from that of the government. Its
primary function is governmental, that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from
imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines, and penalties. To
this function, arrastre is a necessary incident. Although said arrastre function is deemed
proprietary, it is necessarily an incident of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau
of Customs, so that engaging in the same does not necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit.
For otherwise, it could not perform its governmental function without necessarily exposing itself
to suit. Sovereign immunity granted as to the end should not be denied as to the necessary means
to that end.

BUREAU OF PRINTING, SERAFIN SALVADOR and MARIANO LEDESMA, petitioners,

vs.
THE BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (NLU), PACIFICO
ADVINCULA, ROBERTO MENDOZA, PONCIANO ARGANDA and TEODULO
TOLERAN, respondents.

1 SCRA 340
January 28, 1961

FACTS:

Bureau of Printing Employees Association filed a case against herein petitioners Bureau of
Printing, Serafin Salvador, and Mariano Ledesma. The complaint alleged that Salvador and
Ledesma have been engaging in unfair labor practices by interfering with, or coercing the
employees of the Bureau of Printing, particularly the members of the complaining association, in
the exercise of their right to self organization, and by discriminating in regard to hiring and
tenure of their employment in order to discourage them from pursuing their union activities.
Answering the complaint, Salvador and Ledesma denied the charges, and contended that the
Bureau of Printing has no juridical personality to sue and be sued.

ISSUE:

Can the Bureau of Printing be sued?

HELD:

NO. As a government office, without any juridical capacity, it cannot be sued.

The Bureau of Printing is an instrumentality of the government; it operates under the direct
supervision of the Executive Secretary. It is designed to meet the printing needs of the
government. It is primarily a service bureau. It is obviously not engaged in business or
occupation for pecuniary profit. It has no corporate existence. Its appropriations are provided for
in the budget. It is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations.

Any suit, action or proceeding against the Bureau of Printing would actually be a suit, action or
proceeding against the government itself. The government cannot be sued without its consent,
much less over its objection.
while the Bureau of Printing is allowed to undertake private printing jobs, it
cannot be pretended that it is thereby an industrial or business concern. The
additional work it executes for private parties is merely incidental to its
function, and although such work may be deemed proprietary in character,
there is no showing that the employees performing said proprietary function
are separate and distinct from those employed in its general governmental
functions. As an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical
personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued. Any suit, action or
proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit,
action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that
the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its
objection. 

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Department of Agriculture, petitioner

National Labor Relations Commission, et al., respondents
FACTS:

On April 1, 1989, the Department of Agriculture (DoA) office in Cagayan de Oro and Sultan Security
Agency (SSA) entered into a contract where the latter was to provide security services to the former.
On September 13, 1990, several guards from SSA filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-
payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, as well as for
damages, against DoA and SSA. Both the DoA and SSA were subsequently found guilty by the Executive
Labor Arbiter, which also held both of them liable for the payment of money claims amounting to
P266,483.91.

On July 18, 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution. As a response, the DoA filed a petition
for injunction, prohibition, and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction, before the
NLRC. The DoA's petition was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of its petition before the NLRC, DoA filed a petition before the SC arguing that:
(a) it was COA, not NLRC, that was supposed to have jurisdiction over money claims against the
Government pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 327 as amended by PD No. 1445; and (b) that NLRC
had disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not it was COA that has exclusive jurisdiction over money claims against the
Government.
2. Whether or not DoA, as an agency of the State, is covered by the principle of the non-suability of the
State.

HELD:

1. Yes, the Court ruled that money claims against the Government should be filed before the
Commission on Audit pursuant to CA Act No. 327 as amended by PD No. 1445. In the instant case,
underpayment of wages, holiday pay, overtime pay, and other similar items arising from the Contract
for Service clearly constitute money claims. As such, the writ of execution issued by the Labor Arbiter
and the resolution issued by NLRC were reversed by the Court in favor of DoA.

2. No, DoA cannot use the principle of non-suability of the State as an excuse not to be sued.

Section 3, Art. XVI of the 1987 Constitution states that "the State may not be sued without its consent."
This principle reflects a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation
of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of the courts. As per Justice Holmes,
a sovereign State is exempt from suits "not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but
on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes
the law on which the right depends."
YES. The basic postulate under Art. X section 3 of the Constitution that ―the State may not be
sued without its consent is not absolute for it does not say that the State may not be sued under
any circumstances. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys ―that the
State may not be sued without its consent. Its import then is that the State may at times be sued.
The State‘s consent may be given either expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made
through a general law waiving the immunity of the State from suit which is found in Act 3083,
where the Philippine government ―consents and submits to be sued upon any money claim
involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as basis of civil
action between private parties. Implied consent on the other hand, is conceded when the State
itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to counterclaim or when it enters into a contract.
In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other
contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. The rule relied upon by
the NLRC is not, however, without qualification. Not all contracts entered into by the
government operate as a waiver of its non-suability. Distinction must still be made between one
which was executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its
proprietary capacity. In the instant case, the petitioner has not pretended to have assumed a
capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract,
not that it could have in fact performed any act proprietary in character, but be that as it may, the
claims of private respondents arising from the contract for security services clearly constitute
money claims for which Act 3083 gives the consent of the state to be sued.

However, when the State gives its consent to be sued, it does not thereby necessarily consent to
an unrestricted execution against it. When the State waives immunity, all it does, in effect, is to
give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the state has any liability.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FREDERICK M. SMOUSE AND YVONNE REEVES,
Petitioners,

vs.

HON. ELIODORO B. GUINTO, Presiding Judge, Branch LVII, Regional Trial Court, Angeles
City, ROBERTO T. VALENCIA, EMERENCIANA C. TANGLAO, AND PABLO C. DEL
PILAR, Respondents.

G.R. NO. 76607

FEBRUARY 26, 1990

FACTS:

In the first case, the private respondents are suing several officers of the U.S. Air Force stationed
in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber
services in the base.

In the second case, private respondents filed a complaint for damages against private petitioners
for his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station.

In the third case, private respondent, who was employed as a barracks boy in a U.S. Base, was
arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the individual petitioners, officers of the
U.S. Air Force and special agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators. He then filed a
complaint for damages against the individual petitioners claiming that it was because of their acts
that he was removed.
In the fourth case, a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against the
private petitioners, for injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts of the
defendants. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and
unleashed dogs on them which bit them in several parts of their bodies and caused extensive
injuries to them.

These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. The
United States of America was not impleaded in the complaints below but has moved to dismiss
on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented. It is now
contesting the denial of its motions by the respondent judges.

ISSUE:

WON the Doctrine of State Immunity is not applicable thereby making the State liable.

HELD:

NO. While suable, the petitioners are nevertheless not liable. It is obvious that the claim for
damages cannot be allowed on the strength of the evidence, which have been carefully examined.

The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State
without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified;
they are constantly developing and evolving. In addition, because the activities of states have
multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them – between sovereign and governmental acts
(jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that
State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State
immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in Western
Europe.

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.
Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can
thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business
contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
In this case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base, which is devoted to the defense of
both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the
highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will be deemed to
have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or
private capacity, as in the cases at bar. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or
governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied. A State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent
to be sued only when it enters into business contracts.

The private respondents invokes Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which holds the government
liable if it acts through a special agent. The argument, it would seem, is premised on the ground
that since the officers are designated “special agents,” the United States government should be
liable for their torts.

There seems to be a failure to distinguish between suability and liability and a misconception
that the two terms are synonymous. Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued,
liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable
does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does
not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed
itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff
the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.

The said article establishes a rule of liability, not suability. The government may be held liable
under this rule only if it first allows itself to be sued through any of the accepted forms of
consent. Moreover, the agent performing his regular functions is not a special agent even if he is
so denominated, as in the case at bar. No less important, the said provision appears to regulate
only the relations of the local state with its inhabitants and, hence, applies only to the Philippine
government and not to foreign governments impleaded in our courts.

The complaints against the petitioners in the court below were aptly dismissed.

United States v. Ruiz - 536 U.S. 622, 122 S. Ct. 2450 (2002)
RULE:

The United States Constitution does not require the Government to disclose material
impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant.

FACTS:

Defendant refused a plea bargain that required she waive her right to evidence that could
potentially impeach witnesses. The Government withdrew the offer. Defendant later pleaded
guilty to a drug offense without a plea agreement. At sentencing, the Defendant asked for the
same downward departure the Government would have recommended had she accepted the
“fast track” agreement, but the United States District Court for the Southern District of
California denied her request, imposing a standard Guideline sentence instead. Defendant
contended that without disclosure of potential impeachment evidence her guilty plea under
the proposed plea agreement would not be knowing and intelligent. The Government argued
that providing such information to Defendant would result in the premature disclosure of its
case, which was not constitutionally required. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, vacating the District Court's sentencing determination and remanding
for determination of an appropriate remedy, held that Defendant was entitled to receive the
same impeachment information before entering into a plea agreement that they are entitled
to receive before trial. Moreover, the appellate court held that the Federal Constitution
prohibited defendants from waiving their right to that information, and the prosecutors'
standard "fast track" plea agreement was unlawful because it insisted upon that waiver. The
Government appealed the decision of the appellate court, contending that providing such
information to Defendant would result in the premature disclosure of its case, which was not
constitutionally required.

ISSUE:

Was the Government constitutionally required to disclose the potential impeachment

evidence against a defendant under the proposed plea agreement?

ANSWER:

No.

CONCLUSION:

The United States Supreme Court held that the United States Constitution did not require the
Government to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement
with defendant. According to the Court, the Government was not required to disclose its
potential case, and thus the value of the evidence impeaching the Government's case was
unknown. Further, defendant's guilty plea under the plea agreement, with its accompanying
waiver of constitutional rights, could have been accepted as knowing and voluntary despite
any misapprehension by defendant concerning the specific extent or nature of the
impeachment evidence. Finally, requiring disclosure of the evidence would improperly force
the Government to disclose witness information and engage in substantial trial preparation
prior to plea bargaining.
DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR, petitioners,
vs.
HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, as Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of
Zambales, Olongapo City, ANTHONY M. ROSSI and RALPH L. WYERS, respondents.

162 SCRA 88
June 10, 1988

FACTS:

Private respondents Anthony Rossi and Ralph Wyers (deceased) were both employed as game
room attendants in the special services department of the US Naval Station (NAVSTA). They
were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to permanent
part-time. Their reaction was to protect the conversion and to institute grievance proceedings.
The hearing officer recommended the reinstatement of private respondents to permanent full-
time status plus back wages.

In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Commanding Officer of Subic Naval Base, petitioner
Sanders, Special Services Director of NAVSTA, disagreed with the recommendation and asked
for its rejection.

Moreau, even before the start of the grievance hearings, sent a letter to the Chief of Naval
Personnel explaining the change of the private respondent‘s status and requested concurrence
therewith.

Private respondents filed suit for damages claiming that the letters contained libelous imputations
that had exposed them to ridicule and had caused them mental anguish, and prejudgment of the
grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights. They make it
clear that petitioners were being sued in their personal capacity. A motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction was filed by the petitioner and was denied.

ISSUE:

Were the petitioners performing their official duties when they did the acts for which they are
being sued for damages?

HELD:

YES. It is clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to
account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders as director of
the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel
including the private respondents and had a hand in their employment, work, assignments,
 discipline, dismissal and other related matters. The act of Moreau is deadly official in nature,
performed by him as the immediate superior of Sanders and directly answerable to Naval
Personnel in matters involving the special department of NAVSTA.

Amigable v. Cuenca
G.R. No. L-26400
February 29, 1972
VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. NICOLAS CUENCA, as
Commissioner of Public Highways and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
defendants-appellees
Facts:
Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in
Cebu City. She had a transfer certificate title issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu
on February 1, 1924. No annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest
in the property appears at the back of the certificate. Without prior expropriation or
negotiated sale, 6,167 square meters of land was used for the construction the Mango
and Gorordo Avenues.
On March 27, 1958, AMigable’s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines,
requesting the payment for her lot. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General and
was disallowed it in his 9thIndorsement dated December 9, 1958.
Amigable filed a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas
Cuenca in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of the
portion of the lot used. In answer, the defendants interposed the following defenses:
1.     The action was premature, the claim not having been filed first with the office of the
Auditor General
2.     The right of action for the recovery of the any amount which might be due to
Amigable had already prescribed.
3.     The action being a suit to the government, the claim for moral damages and other
costs have no valid basis since the government did not give its consent to be sued.
4.     Since it was only the province of Cebu who had misappropriated the lot, Amigable
has no cause of action against the defendants.
Issue:
Can Amigable properly sue the government?
Ruling:
Yes. In its decision, the Court cited Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu,
which also involved a claim for payment of the value of a portion of land used for the
widening of Gorordo Avenue in Cebu City. Where the government takes away
property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal
process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain
a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit without its consent.
 Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,

G.R. No. 78742

G-one T. Paisones

Facts:

G.R. No. 79777: The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four
tenants and owned by petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked
by four tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full
owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.

The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter
alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation
that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated
E.O. No. 228. The said measure is invalid also for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the
Constitution, for failure to provide for retention limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does
not conform to Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation.

In connection with the determination of just compensation, the petitioners argue that
the same may be made only by a court of justice and not by the President of the Philippines.
They invoke the recent cases of EPZA v. Dulay and Manotok v. National Food Authority.
Moreover, the just compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable in money or in
cash and not in the form of bonds or other things of value.

In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also
deprives the petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process. The equal
protection clause is also violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian
problems on the owners only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the
owners of other properties.

Solicitor General stresses that P.D. No. 27 has already been upheld in the earlier cases of
Chavez v. Zobel, Gonzales v. Estrella, and Association of Rice and Corn Producers of the
Philippines, Inc. v. The National Land Reform Council.  The determination of just compensation
by the executive authorities conformably to the formula prescribed under the questioned order
is at best initial or preliminary only. It does not foreclose judicial intervention whenever sought
or warranted. At any rate, the challenge to the order is premature because no valuation of their
property has as yet been made by the Department of Agrarian Reform.

G.R. No. 79310: The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the
Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental. Co-petitioner Planters' Committee, Inc. is an
organization composed of 1,400 planter-members. This petition seeks to prohibit the
implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.

The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President. Although
they agree that the President could exercise legislative power until the Congress was convened,
she could do so only to enact emergency measures during the transition period. At that, even
assuming that the interim legislative power of the President was properly exercised, Proc. No.
131 and E.O. No. 229 would still have to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions
on just compensation, due process, and equal protection.

Issue:

Whether or not R.A. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 is
unconstitutional (specially Section 18 of the said law).

Held:

No.
 

Ratio:

It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the payment of
just compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, has just compensation been
paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the traditional
excercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a
specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for
a specific and perhaps local purpose.

What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.

The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of
whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their
owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particular
community or of a small segment of the population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all
levels of our society, from the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its purpose does
not cover only the whole territory of this country but goes beyond in time to the foreseeable
future, which it hopes to secure and edify with the vision and the sacrifice of the present
generation of Filipinos. Generations yet to come are as involved in this program as we are
today, although hopefully only as beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfilling life we will
guarantee to them tomorrow through our thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it not be
forgotten that it is no less than the Constitution itself that has ordained this revolution in the
farms, calling for "a just distribution" among the farmers of lands that have heretofore been the
prison of their dreams but can now become the key at least to their deliverance.
MAGTAJAS V. PRYCE PROPERTIES                     G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994

FACTS:

PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of
chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.

PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of a building
belonging to Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the same, and prepared to
inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season.

Then Mayor Magtajas together with the city legislators and civil organizations of the City of Cagayan
de Oro denounced such project.

In reaction to this project, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City enacted two (2)
ordinances prohibiting the issuance of a business permit and canceling existing business permit to
establishment for the operation of casino (ORDINANCE NO. 3353) and an ordinance prohibiting the
operation of casino and providing penalty for its violation. (ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93).
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as
intervenor and supplemental petitioner.

Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their
enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision was denied against petitioners.

Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

WON Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are a valid exercise of police power.

HELD:

NO. The ordinances enacted are invalid. Ordinances should not contravene a statute. Municipal
governments are merely agents of the National Government. Local Councils exercise only delegated
powers conferred by Congress. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal powers higher than
those of the latter. PD 1869 authorized casino gambling. As a statute, it cannot be
amended/nullified by a mere ordinance.

As to petitioners attack on gambling as harmful and immoral, the Court stressed that the morality of
gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered
inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing
or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with
the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling
altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others
for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited  jueteng  and monte but
permits lotteries, cockfighting, and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its
own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said
that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the
political departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicability of
statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive
departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is
exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience
and the constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice.
Social Justice Society Officers v. Lim G.R. Nos. 187836 & 187916 , [November 25, 2014]
PONENTE: PEREZ, J.
DOCTRINE: The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that the Sangguniang
Panlungsod is vested with the power to “reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city”
subject to the pertinent provisions of the Code. It is also settled that an ordinance may be
modified or repealed by another ordinance.”

When the judiciary mediates, we do not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Manila
Sangguniang Panlungsod, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to the Court
by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them.

FACTS: These petitions are a sequel to the case of Social Justice Society v. Mayor Atienza, Jr.
(G.R. No. 156052), where the Court declared that the subject City of Manila Ordinance No.
8027, enacted during the term of Mayor Atienza, ordering the relocation and transfer of the
Pandacan oil terminals is constitutional.

On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of former Mayor Lim, who succeeded Mayor Atienza,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No. 8187.

The new Ordinance repealed, amended, rescinded or otherwise modified Ordinance No. 8027,
Section 23 of Ordinance No. 8119, and all other Ordinances or provisions inconsistent therewith
thereby allowing, once again, the operation of petroleum refineries and oil depots in the
Pandacan area.

The petitioners argue that the enactment of the assailed Ordinance is not a valid exercise of
police power because the measures provided therein do not promote the general welfare of the
people. They further argue that Ordinance No. 8187 is violative of Sections 15 and 16, Article II
of the Constitution of the Philippines on the duty of the State “to protect and promote the right to
health of the people” and “protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology.” Moreover, they argue that despite the finality of the Decision in G.R. No. 156052, and
notwithstanding that the conditions and circumstances warranting the validity of Ordinance No.
8027 remain the same, the Manila City Council passed a contrary Ordinance, thereby refusing to
recognize that “judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part
of the legal system of the Philippines.” Petitioners likewise claim that the Ordinance is in
violation of health and environment-related municipal laws, and international conventions and
treaties to which the Philippines is a state party.

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Respondents aver that petitions are based on unfounded fears; that the assailed ordinance is a
valid exercise of police power; that it is consistent with the general welfare clause and public
policy, and is not unreasonable; that it does not run contrary to the Constitution, municipal laws,
and international conventions; and that the petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of
validity of the assailed ordinance.

ISSUE: WON the enactment of the assailed Ordinance No. 8187 allowing the continued stay of
the oil companies in the depots is, indeed, invalid and unconstitutional.

HELD: YES, the Court saw no reason why Ordinance No. 8187 should not be stricken down
insofar as the presence of the oil depots in Pandacan is concerned.
The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that the Sangguniang Panlungsod is
vested with the power to “reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city” subject to the
pertinent provisions of the Code. It is also settled that an ordinance may be modified or repealed
by another ordinance.” These have been properly applied in G.R. No. 156052, where the Court
upheld the position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to reclassify the land subject of the
Ordinance, and declared that the mayor has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027, provided
that it has not been repealed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or otherwise annulled by the courts.
In the same case, the Court also used the principle that the Sangguniang Panlungsod is in the best
position to determine the needs of its constituents — that the removal of the oil depots from the
Pandacan area is necessary “to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in
case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals.”

We summarize the position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod on the matter subject of these
petitions. In 2001, the Sanggunian found the relocation of the Pandacan oil depots necessary.
Hence, the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027. In 2009, when the composition of the Sanggunian
had already changed, Ordinance No. 8187 was passed in favor of the retention of the oil depots.
In 2012, again when some of the previous members were no longer re-elected, but with the Vice-
Mayor still holding the same seat, and pending the resolution of these petitions, Ordinance No.
8283 was enacted to give the oil depots until the end of January 2016 within which to transfer to
another site. Former Mayor Lim stood his ground and vetoed the last ordinance.

In its Comment, the 7th Council (2007-2010) alleged that the assailed Ordinance was enacted to
alleviate the economic condition of its constituents. Expressing the same position, former Mayor
Lim even went to the extent of detailing the steps he took prior to the signing of the Ordinance, if
only to show his honest intention to make the right decision.

The fact remains, however, that notwithstanding that the conditions with respect to the
operations of the oil depots existing prior to the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 do not
substantially differ to this day, as would later be discussed, the position of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod on the matter has thrice changed, largely depending on the new composition of the
council and/or political affiliations. The foregoing, thus, shows that its determination of the
“general welfare” of the city does not after all gear towards the protection of the people in its true
sense and meaning, but is, one way or another, dependent on the personal preference of the
members who sit in the council as to which particular sector among its constituents it wishes to
favor.

Now that the City of Manila, through the mayor and the city councilors, has changed its view on
the matter, favoring the city’s economic-related benefits, through the continued stay of the oil
terminals, over the protection of the very lives and safety of its constituents, it is imperative for
this Court to make a final determination on the basis of the facts on the table as to which specific
right of the inhabitants of Manila should prevail. For, in this present controversy, history reveals
that there is truly no such thing as “the will of Manila” insofar as the general welfare of the
people is concerned.

If in sacrilege, in free translation of Angara by Justice Laurel, we say when the judiciary
mediates we do not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Manila Sangguniang Panlungsod,
but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to the Court by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in
an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.

The issue of whether or not the Pandacan Terminal is not a likely target of terrorist attacks has
already been passed upon in G.R. No. 156052. Based on the assessment of the Committee on
Housing, Resettlement and Urban Development of the City of Manila and the then position of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod, the Court was convinced that the threat of terrorism is imminent. It
remains so convinced.

It is the removal of the danger to life not the mere subdual of risk of catastrophe, that we saw in
and made us favor Ordinance No. 8027. That reason, unaffected by Ordinance No. 8187,
compels the affirmance of our Decision in G.R. No. 156052.

In striking down the contrary provisions of the assailed Ordinance relative to the continued stay
of the oil depots, we follow the same line of reasoning used in G.R. No. 156052. The same best
interest of the public guides the present decision. The Pandacan oil depot remains a terrorist
target even if the contents have been lessened. In the absence of any convincing reason to
persuade this Court that the life, security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila are no longer put
at risk by the presence of the oil depots, we hold that Ordinance No. 8187 in relation to the
Pandacan Terminals is invalid and unconstitutional.
CITY OF MANILA VS. LAGUIO
MARCH 30, 2013  ~ VBDIAZ

CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of

Manila, HON. JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the
City of Manila and Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, et.al vs.
HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and
MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005
FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a
corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging
houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel
although duly accredited with the DOT as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a
Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order7 with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein
petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and
the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the
Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited
establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said
Ordinance is entitled–

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF

BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT,
ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE
AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.
Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).

On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following
errors were committed by the lower court in its ruling:

(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair,
unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power;
(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 which
allows operators of all kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified
therein; and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.

ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.

HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in
declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and void.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held
that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of
the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an
enactment of the City Council acting as agent of Congress. This delegated police
power is found in Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause.
The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such
delegated power.

A. The Ordinance contravenes

the Constitution

The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is

unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with utmost observance
of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Due process
requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to
his life, liberty and property.

Requisites for the valid exercise

of Police Power are not met

To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment
of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not
only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means
adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals.60 It must be evident that no other alternative for
the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the
means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the
public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be
permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck
down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights a violation of the due process
clause.

The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the
social and moral values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the
objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City Council’s police powers,
the means employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly
oppressive.

The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the community’s
social ills can be achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be
attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing
down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses “allowed” under
the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes.
Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se
protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in
itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it
arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.

The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to
the moral welfare of the community. While a motel may be used as a venue for
immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone be punished. It cannot be
classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a
naked assumption.
If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other
social ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the
establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may
exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations; and it
may even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are other means to
reasonably accomplish the desired end.

It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement
of its purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional
guarantees of a person’s fundamental right to liberty and property.

Modality employed is
unlawful taking

It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be
used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a
taking of the property without just compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of the
private property rights of individuals.

There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A “possessory” taking
occurs when the government confiscates or physically occupies property. A
“regulatory” taking occurs when the government’s regulation leaves no reasonable
economically viable use of the property.

What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government

regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in
a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. When the owner of real
property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name
of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a
taking.
The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the “prohibited” establishments
three (3) months from its approval within which to “wind up business operations or to
transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to
other kinds of business allowable within the area.” The directive to “wind up business
operations” amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of
property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment
to accommodate an “allowed” business, the structure which housed the previous
business will be left empty and gathering dust. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves
no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with
reasonable expectations for use.
The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate
area or to convert into allowed businessesare confiscatory as well. The penalty of
permanent closure in cases of subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the
Ordinance is also equivalent to a “taking” of private property.

Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A

zoning ordinance, although a valid exercise of police power, which limits a
“wholesome” property to a use which can not reasonably be made of it constitutes the
taking of such property without just compensation. Private property which is not
noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed without
compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles of justice as we know
them. The police powers of local government units which have always received broad
and liberal interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.

Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to
close down establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its
execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the
unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which its validity
is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should have established a
rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. Similarly, the Ordinance
does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments “tend to disturb the
community,” “annoy the inhabitants,” and “adversely affect the social and moral
welfare of the community.”

The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible
standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions.

Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments

without infringing the due process clause. These lawful establishments may be
regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business.

B. The Ordinance violates Equal

Protection Clause

In the Court’s view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension
houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are
commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for
the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses,
hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The classification in the instant
case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred
and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions
bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.

The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of
motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment
does not become any less noxious if located outside the area.

The standard “where women are used as tools for entertainment” is also
discriminatory as prostitutionone of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banishis
not a profession exclusive to women. Both men and women have an equal propensity
to engage in prostitution. Thus, the discrimination is invalid.
C. The Ordinance is repugnant
to general laws; it is ultra vires

The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter merely
empowers local government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments
enumerated in Section 1 thereof.

With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses,
lodging houses, and other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council
to legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the general welfare. The
Code still withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the
establishment, operation and maintenance of such establishments.

It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare
clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet
applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and
property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can
not be said that motels are injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the
community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so
proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance
warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention.

Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the
provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already
converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree
allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments
except warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline
service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is
that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be
within the powers of the council to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or
repugnant to the general law.
Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and
impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes
statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently
detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not
to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance
and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.

Petition Denied.

Republic vs. La Orden De PP. Benedictinos De Filipinas, G.R. No. L-12792, February 28, 1961 The
Power of Eminent Domain Facts: To ease and solve the daily traffic congestion on Legarda Street, the
Government drew plans to extend Azcarraga St. (now Recto) from its junction with Mendiola St., up to
the Sta. Mesa Rotonda, Sampaloc, Manila. To carry out this plan it offered to buy a portion of
approximately 6,000 square meters of a bigger parcel belonging to La Orden situated on Mendiola St. Not
having been able to reach an agreement on the matter with the owner, the Government instituted an
expropriation proceeding. On May 27, 1957 the trial court valued the property in question at P270,000.00
and authorized appellant to take immediate possession upon depositing said amount. The deposit having
been made with the City Treasurer of Manila, the trial court issued the corresponding order directing the
Sheriff of Manila to place appellant in possession of the property aforesaid. In answer, the herein appellee
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on the grounds that: (1) the property sought to be
expropriated is already dedicated to public use and therefore is not subject to expropriation; (2) there is no
necessity for the proposed expropriation; (3) the proposed Azcarraga Extension could pass through a
different site which would entail less expense to the Government and which would not necessitate the
expropriation of a property dedicated to education. The trial court granted the motion, holding that the
expropriation was not of extreme necessity. Hence this present petition. Issue: Whether or not there is a
genuine necessity for the exercise of the Power of Eminent Domain. Held: It is the rule in this jurisdiction
that private property may be expropriated for public use and upon payment of just compensation; that
condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the public good and there is a genuine
necessity therefor of a public character. Consequently, the courts have the power to inquire into the
legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether or not there is a genuine
necessity therefor. It does not need extended argument to show that whether or not the proposed opening
of the Azcarraga extension is a necessity in order to relieve the daily congestion of traffic on Legarda St.,
is a question of fact dependent not only upon the facts of which the trial court very liberally took judicial
notice but also up on other factors that do not appear of record and must, therefore, be established by
means of evidence. The parties should have been given an opportunity to present their respective
evidence upon these factors and others that might be of direct or indirect help in determining the vital
question of fact involved, namely, the need to open the extension of Azcarraga street to ease and solve the
traffic congestion on Legarda street. WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is set aside and the
present case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.

CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY [40 Phil 349; No. 14355; 31 Oct 1919] Facts: The
City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion private cemetery for the
conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such public
improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and that the said lands are within their
jurisdiction. Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other
routes were available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create
irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves and
monuments that would have to be destroyed. The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was
not necessary on the particular-strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to
exercise the power of eminent domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine the
necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal. Issue: Whether or not the courts may
inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation. Held: The courts have the power of
restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the
purposes designated by the law. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the
authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for
conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is
admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is
exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a
question that the courts have the right to inquire to.

REPUBLIC VS. PLDT [26 SCRA 320; G.R. No. L-18841; 27 Jan 1969] Facts: The plaintiff Republic of
the Philippines is a political entity exercising government powers through one of its branches, the Bureau
of Telecommunication. Herein defendant, PLDT is a public service corporation holding a franchise to
install operates and maintains a telephone system. After its creation, the BOT set up its own government
telephone system by utilizing its own appropriations and other equipment and by renting trunk lines of the
PLDT to enable the govt offices to call privately. BOT entered into an agreement with the RCA
communications for joint overseas telephone service whereby BOT would convey overseas calls received
by RCA to local residents. PLDT complained to the BOT that it was a violation of the condition of their
agreement since the BOT had used trunk lines only for the use of government offices but even to serve
private persons or the general public in competition with the business of PLDT. Subsequently, the
plaintiff commenced suit against PLDT asking the court judgment be rendered ordering the PLDT to
execute a contract with the plaintiff, through the BOT for the use of the facilities of PLDT's telephone
system throughout the country under such conditions as the court may consider reasonable. The CFI
rendered judgment stating that it could not compel PLDT to enter into such agreement. Hence this
petition. Issue: Whether or Not PLDT may be compelled to enter into such agreement.

Held: Yes, the state, may, in the interest of national welfare transfer utilities to public ownership upon
payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the state may not require a public utility to render
services in the general interest provided just compensation is paid.
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 79310,
Jul 14, 1989,
175 SCRA 343 (1989)

Facts:
In G.R. No. 79777, the subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four
tenants and owned by petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland
worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants
were declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D.
No. 27.

Petitioners are questioning constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229.
Moreover, the just compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable in money
or in cash and not in the form of bonds or other things of value. However, in an amended
petition, petitioners contended that P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 (except Sections
20 and 21) have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657. Nevertheless, this statute
should itself also be declared unconstitutional because it suffers from substantially the
same infirmities as the earlier measures.

Section 18 of the CARP Law providing in full as follows:

SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. — The LBP shall compensate the
landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and
the LBP, in accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and other
pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court, as the just
compensation for the land.

The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of the
landowner:
(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions:
 (a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the excess hectarage is concerned —
Twenty-five percent (25%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial
instruments negotiable at any time.

(b) For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares and up to fifty (50) hectares — Thirty
percent (30%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments
negotiable at any time.

(c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below — Thirty-five percent (35%) cash, the
balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any time.

(2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP preferred

shares, physical assets or other qualified investments in accordance with guidelines set
by the PARC;

(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;

(4) LBP bonds

Issue:
Whether or not Sec. 18 of RA 6657 is unconstitutional insofar as it requires the owners
of the expropriated properties to accept just compensation therefor in less than money,
which is the only medium of payment allowed.

Held:
No. It cannot be denied from these case that the traditional medium for the payment of
just compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, has just compensation
been paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the
traditional excercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary
expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be
taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose.
What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of
whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed
their owners.
the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the just compensation
provided for in the afore- quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the
Constitution. We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has
influenced our decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a cloistered institution
removed from the realities and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its
enhancement.
Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be
made fully in money, we find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other
things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of
the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the
smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because the small
landowner will be needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger
balance in bonds and other things of value. No less importantly, the government financial
instruments making up the balance of the payment are "negotiable at any time." The
other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not
unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties
or assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just
compensation.