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Roman Influence on the Northern Barbarians:
Two Contrasting Examples
Doug Welch
CLAS 335 Roman Empire: Rulers and the Ruled
December 8, 2016
While Mediterranean people under Roman hegemony had been civilized for centuries,
some pre‐dating the founding of Rome herself, the barbarians north of the Alps were
considered horrifying and savage. Once Rome became allied to Massilia during the Punic
Wars, it gained permanent contact with these northern barbarians. The ancient authors
broadly divided the northern barbarians as the Celts and the Germanics. These people were
warlike, comparatively impoverished, physically larger and fairer than their southern
neighbors and were considered socially and culturally backward compared to Hellenistic
peoples.
Yet these people would either become Roman subjects or would later invade and become
inheritors the Roman Western Europe. One group almost entirely became Roman while the
other was heavily engaged with the Roman state, economy and society before eventually
overrunning it. The issues we will be investigating here will be: What was the long‐term
reaction of these transalpine societies to Roman contact and Roman encroachment?
Regarding the relationship these societies had with Roman culture, why was Roman
culture adopted? What benefits did Romanization bring? If Rome did not directly occupy a
region, could it still exercise influence over it?
Our primary sources will be exclusively Roman as no account of from the Germanics or
Celts exists. However later thinking on anthropology and imperialism leads modern
scholars to consider the primary classical histories to be biased, especially in their
depiction of Rome’s barbarian neighbors.
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Agricola Develops Hearts And Minds In Britannia
In Tacitus’ Agricola, chapter 21, we encounter a Roman governor making the Britons Roman1.
Instead of treating the subjugated people like captives, he invests in building Roman-style cities
The action described is a “Hearts and Minds campaign” in the later First Century where Agricola
attempts to Romanize the Britons and the effort is succeeding. Britons have adopted Roman
fashion and seek the comforts of the Roman lifestyle. This is echoed in colonial techniques of
creating a class of native elites who mimic the lifestyle of the colonial power from British India
to contemporary Afghanistan. Roman hegemony had much to offer in terms of stability and
consequently the economic growth that can only happen under stable and secure market
conditions. Agricola insures that future generations of Britons will continue the trend by
educating them in the Classical manner. Their loyalty has been transferred to a foreign power.
This passage is revelatory in that by the end of the second century there was a known formula for
Romanization of the provinces. It involved allowing the natives to participate in and develop a
taste preference for a lifestyle that was identifiably Roman and that the adoption of such lifestyle
would engender a rejection of barbaric ways and an enduring preference for Roman civilization.
Romanization
But what constitutes this process of “Romanization”? At what point is a recently gained province
3
Of course this brings up Tacitus’ discussion of the adoption of Roman dress, Roman architecture
as well as the desertion of hilltop oppida for crossroads market towns in flat plains, the adoption
of Roman agriculture and possibly the economic transformation from subsistence to production
Greg Woolf makes a case in point of the creation of a new Roman-modeled city, Augustodunum
and the subsequent abandonment of the old and much storied Celtic hillfort at Bibracte, some
sixteen miles away. He uses this as a point to reflect on the cultural differences each location
represents.2
Bibracte, the scene of two key events in Caesar’s Gallic War was a late La Tene style
oppidum, complete with walls of the Murus Gallicus style Caesar described. It was home of
the Aedui, a tribal confederation that allied with the Romans. The new Roman city of
Augustodunum by contrast, has all the markers of a Roman planned city. It sits on major
trade routes, it possesses the cardo and decumanus of a Roman colony, with houses
arranged in an orthogonal street pattern and a forum as if Agricola himself were in charge.
This new city was populated by local Gauls, while neighboring Bibracte was abandoned in
the span of a single lifetime. Clearly the Gauls in the area favored a Roman lifestyle over
their previous fortified position. Peace and stability have rendered living in a hillfort
pointless and undesirable under Roman rule.
But Woolf also talks about the benefits of Romanization. As his book is a lengthy
redefinition of Romanization, he defines it very narrowly and so eschews the term
“Romanitas” or “civilization” and instead uses humanitas as the preferred cultural end state
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of subject peoples. He also discusses an intermediate level between being a Roman subject
and being a full Roman citizen, called Latinitas.
That vision of Rome’s civilizing vocation had practical consequences through
its impact on the ways Roman rulers exercised their power. Romans
discriminated positively as well as negatively – in favor of civilization as well
as against barbarism – and Gauls learned from the experience of this
discipline. …
Latinitas was no doubt valued for the prestige it conferred on provincial
communities, but it was also offered a series of more tangible benefits.
Members of Latin communities were bound by their own laws and had their
own political institutions, modeled in practice on those of Rome. But one of
the most important privileges incorporated in the Latin right was that the
magistrates, or more rarely all the town councilors, of Latin communities
acquired Roman citizenship. Latin communities thus operated ‘automatically’
to disseminate Roman citizenship among provincial elites. Latins also had the
right of commercium, the ability to enter into contracts with Roman citizens,
a valuable privilege for traders. In this, and in other respects, Latins had
access to Roman law, even if Roman law was in practice probably often
interpreted in the light of local traditions. Practically and in symbolic terms,
then, Latins were privileged among Rome’s subjects.
The utility of humanitas was patent. Its possession offered access to the
patronage networks that articulated the empire and might even provide an
entitlement to more formal privileges. Exposed to such institutionalized
discrimination in favour of the civilized, it would not have been surprising if
provincial aristocrats had sought to cultivate themselves for purely
pragmatic and material reasons. … The civilizing process did not simply offer
rewards, then, but also had the power to enchant and beguile, indeed neither
conquerors nor conquered were immune to their charms.3
So indeed, Roman‐ness had its physical advantages in terms of creature comforts,
but also its intellectual pursuits as well as the ability to make money by selling
materials the Romans found valuable. Furthermore, becoming Roman afforded
access to the system of patronage that actually ran the empire.
5
In the end, the barbarians northwest of Italy accepted Roman rule and became
Romanized. The fate of the western Roman Empire was the fate of the descendants
of the Gauls subjugated by Caesar.
According to John Haywood:
The Gallic provinces were divided up into administrative districts called
civitates and elective magistracies and other Roman institutions of civil
government were introduced. The native aristocracy was encouraged to
seek public office by the offer of Roman citizenship, which brought many
legal privileges, as a reward.4
Thus Celtic aristocrats became provincial elites in the Roman empire, essentially
continuing their previous dominance in the new guise of Roman magistrates.
The Germans
Tacitus not only wrote about the pliable Britons who succumbed to the perks of
Romanization, he followed The Agricola with The Germania. While the Britons were
interested in adopting Roman ways, the Germans maintained their distinctive
lifestyle.
Tacitus’ Germania, written at the end of the second century, is the most widely read ancient
ethnography. Tacitus tells the reader that Germany is dismal to behold for anyone not born
there5, essentially that the lands beyond the Rhine and Danube were not worth the blood of
a single Roman soldier. Goodman, in outlining the operation of the Roman Empire in its
conquered provinces explains: “Areas too poor to be worth crushing were often left
unconquered…”6 consequently with the perceived poverty of German territory and the long
history of German military effectiveness, it is believed that overall Roman emperors had
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little desire to conquer Germania. Marcus Aurelius sought to add Germania and Sarmatia,
two new provinces north of the Danube, to create a buffer zone after the exertions of the
Marcomannic wars. These annexations were ceded by Commodus and no future emperor
pursued the issue. The conclusion we can draw is that the strategic cost of acquiring and
maintaining this territory outweighed any benefit in the minds of the Romans.
German Elites And The Gift Economy
In Germania, Tacitus mentions a kind of elite gift‐giving phenomenon where Germans
receive manufactured goods and weapons from their social superiors7, specifically family
superiors and chieftains, the latter whom he says remunerate the service of their warriors
with banquets where gifts are distributed. It is this gift economy that was very much aided
by Roman contact.
Frank Kulikowski outlines a process by which Rome intervened in the affairs of the
Germanic tribes on its borders from the second to the fifth centuries. Kulikowski also
points out that many phenomena mentioned in Tacitus have been confirmed in the
archaeological record.
We can conceive of Roman cultural influence as a series of concentric circles
radiating out beyond the Roman frontier. In the band nearest to the frontier,
it can be difficult to distinguish the archaeological culture of the natives from
their neighbors on the Roman side of the frontier, at least below the level of
the social elite…. Further away from the frontier, the differences became
starker. Roman export goods, where they could be found at all, were luxury
items and Roman coins circulated as bullion, not money. Still further out, …
only the most portable of Roman goods are visible…. Even here, however, one
finds traces of Roman economic power imposing itself on the indigenous
population… and it is likely that supplying the economic needs of the Roman
empire helped to organize political units far beyond the Roman frontier.…
7
Be that as it may, economic and political interdependence is strikingly visible
closer to the imperial frontier, particularly in the context of the Roman army.
From the first century onwards, many barbarians served in the Roman
army… The benefits of service in the army to a barbarian from beyond the
frontier were substantial‐ not only did the service in an auxiliary unit pay
well, it brought with it Roman citizenship after honorable discharge and
often a substantial discharge bonus. … Service in the Roman army had
profound effects on Rome’s neighbors, and not just those who enlisted. Many
barbarians who served in the army were entirely acclimatized to a Roman
way of life… Others, however, returned to their communities beyond the
frontier bringing with them Roman habits and tastes, along with Roman
money and products of different sorts. Their presence contributed to the
demand for more Roman products beyond the frontier, which helped
increase trade between the empire and its neighbours. Roman installations
on the frontiers found a ready market among barbarians close to the frontier,
and Roman coins that found their way out into barbarian lands often found
their way back through trade.
Depending upon one’s political standpoint, this sort of economic influence
may seem quite sinister or it might seem benign. Either way, it certainly
presents what modern commentators call ‘soft power’. Rome’s ‘hard power’
was equally enormous, and could have a painfully severe impact on its
neighbours when they were exercised…. The empire and its army were thus
in and of themselves an ongoing spur to social change in the barbarian
societies that flanked the imperial provinces: barbarian leaders had every
incentive to make themselves more potent militarily.…
Paradoxically, this drift towards greater military competence amongst the
barbarians was only exacerbated by direct Roman interference in barbarian
life.8[Italics mine, DW]
Kulikowski has shown us evidence of a kind of remote control extended across the
Rhine and Danube where Roman gifts and Roman raids were both used to influence
behavior of tribes that were otherwise not interested in becoming Roman, but liked
Roman goods and gifts. They also desired to participate in Roman markets.
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German Access To Markets And Roman Manipulation Of Germans
From Reinhold and Lewis, chapter 11, we see Marcus Aurelius’ efforts on the Danube9. Cassius
Dio wrote in the first quarter of the third century, about forty years after the events in this
selection, but the Germanic threat had only gotten worse between the era of Tacitus and his own
time.
In this selection, Dio puts forth the impression that the Germans are dangerous and outlandish
savages. Even Germans who are friendly to the Romans are wild people as evidenced by a
reveals a far more complex relationship between the Germans and Romans.
An interesting theme in this piece is that the Germans could be dealt with as atomized units and
turned against each other. Dio describes Marcus Aurelius’ strategy of acquiring German allies,
In this piece, the Quadi are detached from their alliance with the Marcomans and the prize of the
right to attend Roman markets is dangled as a potential reward, which reveals less a desire to
destroy civilization, but to participate in its wealth. Aside from explaining a “divide and
conquer” mechanism, this passage sheds a light onto a much more nuanced and far more
complicated relationship between Rome and the Northern Barbarians; one that is not entirely
based on armed conflict but one where barbarians are willing and desirous of participating in
Rome’s markets. These barbarians wanted Roman goods, their chieftains wanted luxury goods
and the Romans supplied them with such for a number of reasons. Rome distributed money and
goods to barbarians whose elites distributed them amongst their retainers, as Kulikowski details:
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In order to keep barbarian leaders in a state of mutual hostility, Roman
emperors frequently subsidized some kings directly. This support built up
royal prestige and hence governing capacity, while reducing in importance of
those leaders who were denied the same support. This type of interference
allowed emperors to manage not just relations between barbarians and the
empire, but also the relationships among different barbarian groups. Along
the barbarian fringe of the empire, access to luxury goods‐ whether coin or
various items that could be made from the same precious metals as coin‐ was
often as important as the items themselves. The ability to acquire wealth
meant the ability to redistribute it, and to be able to give gifts enforced a
leader’s own social dominance. In other words, conspicuous wealth
translated to active power. For these purposes, gold and silver were
especially important, and were the dominant medium for storing wealth.
Distribution patterns of silver coinage beyond the Roman frontier tend to
vary according to the political importance of particular regions at particular
times: In Germania, for instance, we find huge concentration of 70,000 silver
denarii in just a few decades between the reigns of Marcus Aurelius and
Septimius Severus, when campaigning along that frontier was regular and
intense. What that and other evidence demonstrates, is that emperors and
their generals regularly manipulated political life in the barbaricum through
economic subsidy. Yet this strategy, however necessary it might seem within
the mental paradigms of Roman government and however effective it might
be, was also fraught with dangers.10
So there seems to be every reason for those kings and chieftains favored by Rome to
continue acting favorably to Rome. But there seems also to be a price to be paid for non‐
cooperation, the deprivation of access to Roman markets and the threat of Roman military
intervention. Here again, we see the gift economy mentioned by Tacitus in action. In a way
the Roman subsidies are paying for economic entrenchment and political consolidation of
their favored chieftains, who are consequently able to raise larger armies more cohesively
organized around these beneficent leaders. Kulikowski points out that the cultivation and
military centralization of these tribes bordering Rome was not a strategic oversight, he
spends a good portion of his book talking about the possibility that Rome enriched the
Marcomans and Quadi with an eye on containing more remote, less civilized and
controllable tribes and tribal confederations such as the Goths.
10
In conclusion, the Romans exercised a demonstrably real if very different influence on
these two groups of northern barbarians. Among the Celts, the Romans were able to
subjugate and then assimilate them with the stick of military force and the carrot of the
promise of a materially easier life, if only for the elites. After realizing that Gaul and Britain
possessed rich farmlands and mineral deposits they desired, the Romans occupied their
territory and then began to inculcate them to Roman ways. The centuries‐old Gallic menace
had been brought to heel and the Gauls themselves had become Romans. The Celts
themselves benefited from the relationship and deserted their oppida to participate in the
common wealth of the Mediterranean.
In the case of the Germans, the Romans may have not desired territorial expansion into
their turf due to a lack of any obvious wealth in their lands combined with the fierceness of
German resistance. Nevertheless, the Romans did indeed extend influence into that region,
an attenuated influence of buying off nearby tribes; attempting to use those nearer tribes
as allies to fight off or otherwise harass more distant tribes as well as rewarding friendly,
neighboring Germanics with access to Roman markets combined with subsidies and gifts of
luxury goods to Germanic elites. These gifts were themselves used to strengthen the
political position of those selected elites within their own societies, which led to the
coalescence of Germanic tribes into ever‐larger tribal confederations. Although Germanics
in our period of study may not have shown any inclination toward Romanization, they did
desire Roman goods and would later participate in Roman civilization on Roman territory
itself from the end of the fourth century and into the Middle Ages.
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Notes:
1 Tacitus, p. 73, 74.
2 Woolf, p. 10.
3 Woolf, p. 66, 67.
4 Haywood, p.89.
5 Tacitus, p. 102.
6 Goodman, p. 109.
7 Lewis and Reinhold, p.27.
8 Kulikowski, p. 33‐37.
9 Reinhold and Lewis, p. 40, 41.
10 Kulikowski, p. 37.
Bibliography
Caesar. The Conquest of Gaul. London: Penguin Books. 1982.
Goodman, Martin. The Roman World: 44 BC‐AD 180. Second Edition. London:
Routledge. 2012.
Haywood, John. The Celts: Bronze Age to New Age. Harlow: Pearson. 2004.
Kulikowski, Michael. Rome’s Gothic Wars from the Third Century to Alaric. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. 2007.
Lewis, Naphtali, Reinhold, Meyer editors. Roman Civilization: Selected Readings Volume II:
The Empire. New York: Columbia University Press. 1990.
Tacitus, The Agricola and the Germania. London: Penguin Books. 1981.
12
Wells, Peter. “The Ancient Germans” In The Barbarians of Ancient Europe: Realities and
Interactions edited by Larissa Bonfante, 211‐232. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2011.
Woolf, Greg. Becoming Roman: The Origins of Provincial Civilization in Gaul. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. 1998.
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