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The Indenite Dyad and Intelligible Matter in

Plotinus

John M. Rist

The Classical Quarterly / Volume 12 / Issue 01 / May 1962, pp 99 - 107

DOI: 10.1017/S0009838800011654, Published online: 11 February 2009

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0009838800011654

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John M. Rist (1962). The Indenite Dyad and Intelligible Matter in Plotinus. The
Classical Quarterly, 12, pp 99-107 doi:10.1017/S0009838800011654

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THE INDEFINITE DYAD AND INTELLIGIBLE
MATTER IN PLOTINUS
THE role and precise significance of Intelligible Matter in the philosophy of
Plotinus has been neglected or dismissed with many questions unanswered. In
view of the fact that, unless this role can be properly understood, the whole
doctrine of the procession of the Second Hypostasis must remain mysterious,
this paper is intended to shed light on two important aspects of that Hypo-
stasis : the nature of Intelligible Matter itself and the relation of that Matter to
the Forms. In order to show how puzzling these questions have appeared in the
past, I may quote from Professor Armstrong's The Architecture of the Intelligible
World in the Philosophy of Plotinus. Armstrong (pp. 66-68) finds many difficulties
in the Plotinian doctrine of Intelligible Matter and remarks as follows:

'This account [in Enn. 2. 4. 4] which makes of the intelligible world simply
a duplicate of the Aristotelian sense-world, with the differences as regards
permanence expounded in Chs. 3 and 5, is difficult to • reconcile with
Plotinus's ordinary account of the world of Novs. Novs here does not seem to
function as Mind. . . . The principle of unity in the intelligible world is
simply its matter. This is not only difficult to fit in with Plotinus's general
thought. . . .'
'This doctrine [that the Ideas are produced because when Novs contem-
plates the One, it sees it as a multiplicity], however,... will not enable us to
reconcile with Plotinus's normal thought the representation of the Ideas as
principles of division and multiplicity in Novs and "matter" as a principle
of unity.'

Throughout these pages Armstrong maintains that the difficulties that for
him arise in Enn. 2. 4. 4 are the result of a taking-over by Plotinus of various
Aristotelian ways of thinking which he is unable properly to assimilate to his
own thought. This paper is intended to show that, on these questions at any
rate, Plotinus is able to make use of his Aristotelian material in a way that
harmonizes most satisfactorily with the remainder of his philosophy.

To understand Plotinus' thought on Intelligible Matter, it is necessary to

make a few brief remarks on the process of generation of the whole hypostasis
of Novs. We may take it for granted that the One, in its super-abundance and
from its self-contemplation, displays the chief characteristic of perfection as seen
by Plotinus, namely creativity. It is our business here to consider the nature of
the effluence from the One when it first appears, before it has returned in
contemplation upon its source and become informed. We remember, of course,
that, although it is necessary to use temporal terms in describing this sequence
of events, those events are in fact only prior and posterior in a metaphysical
sense, since the Intelligible World is outside the command of Time.
The characteristic—if such it may be called—of this first effluence from the
One is Otherness (eVe^onys). In Enn. 2. 4. 5, Plotinus speaks of this 'otherness'
and 'motion' away from the First (the One) as Unlimited (dopioro?). The
 ioo J. M. RIST
expression 'otherness' is common throughout the Enneads1 and its aspect of
unlimitedness must be pressed so that it may be seen to mean 'neither simple
nor multiform'. It is most important at this stage not to regard this Unlimited
Dyad as itself multiplicity in the way that Speusippus appears to have done
when he replaced the Platonic phrase aopioros 8vds by his own term nXfjdos.
Sir David Ross has rather misleadingly implied2 by his remark that 'the
"great and small" is simply another name for what one of his [i.e. Plato's]
followers (probably Speusippus) called, perhaps more happily, nXfjdos, bare
plurality', that the difference between the views of Plato and Speusippus on
this point is only a difference of words. This impression is most misleading when
allowed to bear upon Plotinus. Plotinus does not speak of the Dyad or Intel-
ligible Matter as TrXfjdos. In this, as we shall see, he follows the doctrine of
Plato and rejects that of Speusippus, which is very probably distinct.
In Metaphysics ioo.ib3off., we read that the material principle must, ac-
cording to Aristotle, be bad, whether it be called nXrjdos or TO avurov K<XI fxiya
KOX jXLKpov. The 6ire . . . eire construction here leaves no doubt that 'plurality'
is the name given by one group of thinkers to what others call 'the unequal'
and 'the great and small'. Similarly in ioo,2bi we are told that one thinker re-
gards the One as the opposite of 'plurality' while another, neglecting the term
'plurality', uses the phrase 'the unequal'. Finally in io85b5 ff. it is said that the
generation of numbers is as difficult for those who speak of the One and the
Dyad as for those who speak of the One and Plurality. Admittedly Aristotle
here continues by saying that the two views have little to choose between them
since, whereas one party (Speusippus and his supporters) speak of Plurality in
general, the other (Plato and Xenocrates) select 'the first plurality, that is the
number two'. Here, however, Aristotle is led into misjudging the difference
between the parties by his belief that the Indefinite Dyad is two things, or, as
he often puts it, the Great and the Small. Had he realized that this was an
error, he would have recognized the greater importance of the distinction of
terms employed by Plato and Speusippus. For Plato the Great and Small was
neither two things, nor indefinite plurality, out the potentiality of plurality.
To call it vArjOos would thus be completely erroneous. Speusippus' position
differed from that of Plato on essentials. He may well have thought fit to use
the word -nXfjOos for his own purposes, but this is no help towards an under-
standing of what role Plato may have intended his Indefinite Dyad to play.
Normally, when speaking of the function of the Great and Small in the latest
Platonic theory, Aristotle refers to it as SUOTTOIOV.3 This is apparently in ac-
cordance with his own mistaken view of the Platonic generation of Ideal
Numbers. In io83 a i3, however, instead of SVOTTOIOV, we find the form TTOOO-
2
TTOIOV. This reading, given by Syrianus and E , has been rightly preferred by
Bonitz and Ross to TTOVOV TTOLOV and is most helpful. It shows that the function
of the Dyad was not to be plurality but to make plurality. The difference
between the views of Plato and Speusippus thus becomes clearer. It seems
extremely likely that the word iroocmoiov was used by Plato and his adherents,
but that Aristotle, misunderstanding the whole theory, thought the function
of the Dyad was 'doubling' and employed Bvonotov instead, under the mistaken
impression that he was giving a less woolly account.
Taking care then to avoid regarding the Dyad in Plato as plurality, and
1
Cf. Em. 6. 9. 8. (Oxford, 1953), p. 184.
2
W. D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas2 3 e.g. io82ai5, io83b36.
 DYAD AND INTELLIGIBLE MATTER IN PLOTINUS 101
recalling that Platonic usage should be a guide to the understanding of Plotinus,
we can now return to what we have described as an 'effluence' from the One in
the Enneads.
The most interesting account of the indefinite nature of this effluence is in
Enn. 2. 4. 3—and this must be given a detailed examination. Plotinus begins by
telling us that even the undefined must not be altogether disregarded, even if
its very nature implies that it is shapeless (apopfov), provided that it 'offers
itself' (nap€xei.v) to what is metaphysically prior to itself. By way of explaining
what he means by 'offers itself, he cites the relation between Soul and Novs.
The conclusion we are to draw is that the Indefinite Dyad—as we may describe
the effluence—returns to the One in a similar fashion and is informed by it.
In the chapter under discussion the Dyad is referred to as Intelligible Matter
and further information is given about it. We learn both that it has a certain
sameness about it—as Plotinus strangely puts it, it has the same 'form' (eiSos)—
and that it is in a sense all things at once, so that it cannot change into anything
which is not itself. These aspects make it the complete opposite of Plotinian
matter in the world of sense.
We are still very far from grasping the nature of this Matter or Dyad at the
moment of its generation, but we can now see that its importance lies in its
'offering itself back to its Source, in its being a kind of potency. Fortunately
we are helped to understand it further by the fact that Plotinus on several
occasions uses the same metaphor to describe it—the metaphor of sight.
Intellection, he says (5. 4. 2), which is the act of the hypostasis of Novs, is in-
determinate like sight (oiftis)—this last phrase is rendered by MacKenna as 'a
vague readiness for any and every vision'1—and is determined by its object.
Similarly in 5. 3. 11 we are told that the effluence—I use this word designedly,
though Plotinus speaks rather confusingly of vovs that is not vovs—sets out upon
its return to the One not as Novs but 'as sight (otfiis) which has not yet seen'.
And when it has seen the One it becomes an ot/iis ISovo-a (line 10), the meaning
of which will later be explored. For the present we can say that the Dyad in its
original state is like the faculty of seeing enclosed in a dark room. Although it is
a potency, it is a sight that has had no impression made upon it. It is OLTUTTOTOS,
as though staring into darkness, for all light and impression must come from
the One.
The Dyad or Matter then is a potentiality and, as 5. 3. 11 puts it, an e^eoxy or
proclivity. This proclivity may, I believe, be compared with what Plotinus
elsewhere describes as unconscious contemplation. In the eighth treatise of
Ennead 3 he asserts that all things, even down to the vegetable world, are
striving (the word is i<j>Uo6ai. which brings us back to e<f>ecris) after contempla-
tion. If such an urge is the symbol of existence even among inferior beings of the
world of sense, it would be foolish to deny it to the substrate (TO vTroKeifievov) of
the Second Hypostasis. The likelihood is that the Dyad or Matter betrays in its
€<j>eais towards the One that symbol of existence shared by all things with the
smallest claim to reality.
It may be objected that we have here reached a very strange conclusion if we
assert that Matter, even Intelligible Matter, in its simple state, is endowed with
some sort of contemplative force. And yet this is indeed the only kind of
distinguishing feature we can find for it, and distinguishing feature it must have,
for, as Plotinus tells us in Enn. 2. 4. 5, it has a life that is defined and intellectual
1
The Enneads, trans. MacKenna-Page2 (London, 1956), p. 401.
ioa J. M. RIST
(wpiafj.evrjv KO.1 voepdv). Thus we may say that this urge to contemplate, this
seeing that awaits a sight, is the fundamental aspect of the Dyad—an active
conception which underlies the whole Plotinian view of the Second Hypostasis.
With this grasp of the nature of the earliest 'moment' in the extra-temporal act
of the production of the Second Hypostasis, we should not be surprised that the
urge for the supreme is the metaphysically prior aspect of the whole complex
of reality which goes under the collective name of Novs. It is in the light of this
base that we should regard such passages as Enn. 5. 8. 12, where the Second
Hypostasis as Mind not only is regarded as prior to the Forms, but is actually
said to generate (yewdv) them.
Further evidence of an outlook where Novs is prior to ra vor/ra is given by
Enn. 3. 8. 11. Plotinus begins by again comparing the Second Hypostasis with
sight, and explaining that like sight it must have both Potentiality and
Actuality. Since it has these, he continues, it must be a complex of Form and
Matter, as are all kinds of seeing. The next piece of reasoning is the key to the
passage. The text reads vXr] Se eV vorjrols. There can be no doubt that this means
that the material element of the Second Hypostasis is not in Mind as seer but
in the Forms as the objects of vision. There can further be no doubt that this
again implies a certain priority of Novs to the vorjTa. As we have already sug-
gested, the Second Hypostasis regarded as Mind is in a sense the representative
at a more advanced stage of Intelligible Matter which itself looks back at the
One. Nevertheless, it is a curious though understandable reversal of terms to
associate TO. vor/rd, which must mean the Forms, with the material aspect of the
hypostasis. MacKenna's translation1 of the phrase v\r) Se iv VOTJTOIS as 'the
Matter in this case being the Intelligibles' is perhaps based on a text inferior to
that of Henry and Schwyzer, but nevertheless it brings out this reversal of
terminology, albeit in too heightened a form, for Plotinus does not say that
Matter is the Intelligibles, but that Matter is in the Intelligibles. The impor-
tance of the passage is simply that if the Second Hypostasis be studied as a
completed whole, the Forms stand in an inferior position to Mind.
The explanation of this superiority of the contemplative aspect of the
hypostasis lies not only in the fact that it is concerned more with the highest
entity, the One, but also that the Dyad, the metaphysically 'earlier' aspect of
the whole hypostasis is, if anything, purely active, and a subject rather than an
object of contemplation. In more general terms, if for the purposes of argument
we regard the One, Novs, and the Forms as all admitting of analysis 'them-
selves by themselves', we may say that the contemplation of the One by Novs
in the form of Intelligible Matter is the cause of the very existence of the
Second Hypostasis, whereas the contemplation of the Forms by Novs is simply
a description of the essence of that hypostasis. And for Plotinus the cause of
existence is always more important than the essence, except in the case of the
One in whom a quasi-existence and essence coincide, since he (or it) is sui causa.
When the Dyad, the Intelligible Matter, turns towards the One, it has, we
are told (5. 3. n ) , some vague presentiment (<j>dvracTiMa) of the Unity it seeks,
but is unable to grasp this unity and succeeds only in making for itself a vision
of multiplicity out of what is eminently simple. The Dyad receives the One
•w\r)6v6ii.evov (the reading of Henry and Schwyzer); it itself is the cause of this
•nrXfjOos (eirXridwev). It appears that, although the Dyad is not irXfjOos, it is the
cause of the element of multiplicity in the Second Hypostasis merely by being
1
MacKenna, op. cit., p. 249.
 DYAD AND INTELLIGIBLE MATTER IN PLOTINUS 103
'other' than the simplicity of the One. Here we should recall our remarks about
the role of the Indefinite Dyad in Plato, which we saw as an element bringing
an end to the simple and introducing the multiplex. Further, we should empha-
size that in the case of Plotinus to call the Dyad 'plurality' is doubly mislead-
ing. The objections to the term formulated with reference to Plato are also valid
for Plotinus, while in addition the Plotinian Dyad is said to be in a sense every
real thing and thus to retain a shadow of the unity of the One which is its
source. Even plurality, for the Second Hypostasis, comes from the One. In
Ennead 6. 7. 15 it is said that the One gives what it does not itself possess:
multiplicity. The Dyad, in its attempt to return to Unity, cannot support the
Unity it is permitted to see. It can only accept this Unity in the form of
multiplicity, thus allowing the NOVS-VOTJTO. complex, that is the fully developed
Second Hypostasis, to come into existence. The sight that sees no impressions
now sees the One, but only through the medium of its own 'otherness', and
thus not as pure Unity but as the World of Forms.
It appears then that, in a sense, both the complex of Forms taken as a whole
and the One may be described as TO VOTJTOV. This becomes clearer if we look
again at Enn. 3.8. 11. We recall that in this chapter the operation of the Divine
Mind is compared with that of sight. Plotinus points out that, for the act of
seeing to take place satisfactorily, there is required an object of sight (TO
aiadrjTov). One would suppose that, since he has previously been discussing the
relationship between the Divine Mind and the Forms, he would here say that
for the act of intellection to take place satisfactorily, the Forms are required as
objects of Intellection. But instead of speaking of the Forms, he says that it is
the Good (i.e. the One) that is needed. This should remind us that the One is
the real object of the Divine Mind's Intellection and that the Forms are only
a second-best. Novs sees the One as the Forms, but the intelligibility of those
Forms is supplied by the One.
This notion of the One as source of intelligibility is the normal Plotinian
version of Platonism, and that may be thought to account for it sufficiently.
Nevertheless the whole passage from 3. 8. 11 is strongly tinged with Aris-
totelianism, and it seems no coincidence that Alexander of Aphrodisias had
interpreted certain doctrines of the De Anima of Aristotle in a manner which
would have suited Plotinus very well. In his De Anima Alexander offers a very
novel and unorthodox interpretation of the vovs VOLTJTLKOS. On pp. 88—89
(Bruns) he expounds his view that the role of the vovs TTOI^TLKOS is to give what
is intelligible its intelligibility. In other words he holds that the vovs VOLTJTIKOS
exerts its effects not on the seeing mind, but on the objects of intellection. That
the doctrine of Alexander is not Aristotelian has long been recognized; the
account of it given here is that of Moraux, to whom I may refer for further
elucidation.1 As Moraux explains, the theory is an erroneous expansion of
Aristotle's suggestion that the vovs TTOLTITIKOS may be compared with light (De
An. 3. 43o a i5-i7). Nevertheless, put the comparison with light together with
Alexander's interpretation that the vovs nonqriKos is a light which shines on the
objects of intelligence and makes them intelligible, and we have a doctrine very
much to Plotinus' liking. With his quite obvious delight in seeing as much
agreement between Platonism and Aristotelianism as can be made consistent
with a fundamentally Platonic approach, he would find Alexander's account of
1
P. Moraux, 'Alexandra d'Aphrodise, theque de la Fac. de Phil, et Lettres de I'Univ. de
Exegete de la Noelique d'Aristote', Biblio- Liege ic (1942), esp. pp. 87-93.
 M
104 J- - RIST
•the vovs iroirjTiicosfittingin very well with his own interpretation of the role of
the Platonic Form of the Good in relation to the other Forms. Even the analogy
with light would be shared by both Alexander and Plato. Clearly, in Plotinus'
view, Alexander is in error in his belief that the source of intelligibility is a vovs,
but with the replacement of this by the One Plotinus can turn Alexander's
interpretation of Aristotle to his own purposes.
To revert to more general questions, it is plain that the return of the Dyad
to the One is the cause of the existence of the Second Hypostasis. In 5. 1. 5 it is
said that from the Dyad and the One arise the Numbers that are Forms—the
word oipis again occurs here—and in 5. 4. 2, a quotation from Aristotle's
Metaphysics corroborates this. What is important at this point is to try to
establish the condition of the Dyad when it has been 'informed' by its return to
the One, for here lie the solutions to the difficulties before us of seeing how the
Aristotelian Intelligible Matter is associated with the Platonic Indefinite Dyad.
The Dyad, as has been observed, can only grasp the One as multiplicity.
This multiplicity constitutes the World of Forms, and these Forms can be said
to define the previously undefined Dyad. The cause of the Dyad's being denned
is the One (2. 4. 5), but what existentially defines it are the Forms. Hence
Plotinus' elliptical statement in Enn. 5. 1. 5 that the Second Hypostasis is
shaped in one way by the One and in another by itself becomes somewhat
clearer. Armstrong1 has observed that this double 'informing' of the Matter of
the Intelligible World can be seen by placing the teachings of 2. 4. 4 and 2. 4. 5
side by side, and professes himself baffled by it. Our previous discussion should
have shown that this apparent paradox is normal Plotinian doctrine. We must
now proceed to show that it is neither contradictory nor muddle-headed.
We have seen how, in the timeless sequence of the procession of the Second
Hypostasis, the Forms are in a sense posterior and the products of Intelligible
Matter. This means that Matter in the Intelligible World is in some respects in
a very different position vis-d-vis Form from matter in the world of sense. This,
however, is what Plotinus tells us to expect, for in Enn. 2. 4. 3 he says that there
are ways in which the natures of the two kinds of matter are opposite to each
other. Intelligible Matter, we recall, has within itself the presentiment of
Unity. Perhaps we may say that, although it is dopiarov, it is one aopiarov, and
that an all-embracing one. As such it must to some extent be a principle of
unity in the Intelligible World, where the Forms stand for differences and
differentiations. This view of the roles of Intelligible Matter and Form, when
found by Armstrong in 2. 4. 4, is held to be hard to reconcile with Plotinus'
normal thought about the Second Hypostasis. Since, however, we have found it
to be a valid account of Plotinus' doctrine in a selection of tracts excluding 2. 4.
4, we can turn to that disputed essay with more confidence.
We have observed that Forms arise from the One and the Dyad, and 2. 4. 4
begins by taking their existence for granted and asking what conclusions are
to be deduced from it. If there are Forms, we read, these Forms must have both
an element in common and a particular characteristic which distinguishes
them one from another. The distinguishing characteristic is, says Plotinus, the
feature of shape {fxop<j>ri). And if they have shape, he continues, there must be
something to receive the shape—plainly this is the common element men-
tioned above—and this 'something' must be matter or substrate. Thus it has
1
A. H. Armstrong, The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus
(Cambridge, 1940), p. 67.
 DYAD AND INTELLIGIBLE MATTER IN PLOTINUS 105
become clear that, if there is Form in the Intelligible World, there must be
Matter too, and the argument has, admittedly, been Aristotelian. The con-
clusion is backed up by a second argument which suggests that, since the world
of sense is an image of the Intelligible World and is based on matter, there
must be Matter in the Intelligible World likewise. A third argument holds that
an ordered system involves both Form and a place wherein Form may be
lodged, while a fourth—most relevant to the present discussion—adds that,
since in a sense the Intelligible World is diversified, there must be a basic
shapelessness which can be the 'unity' which accepts diversification, and that
this 'unity' must be Matter. We may take it as proven, therefore, that a simple
analysis of the status quo of the Intelligible World, which makes no allusion to
the cause of generation of that World or to the Dyad, reveals that, since Forms
are 'there', Matter too must be in evidence.
The last of the arguments cited above is particularly instructive, since it
states that the divisions in the Intelligible World are an experience (nddos) of
Matter. The element that undergoes transformations is Matter—certainly an
Aristotelian doctrine and again in direct opposition to Plotinus' account of bare
matter in the sensible world, where vXrj is more akin to Aristotelian prime
matter than to anything more real.
After all the arguments Plotinus tells us in passing that in a sense Matter is
the principle of unity in the Intelligible World. This remark, however, must be
seen in its context. Plotinus is not examining at this point the generation of the
Second Hypostasis, but the constitution and elements of it once it has been
generated. Armstrong's remark that 'Novs here does not seem to function as
Mind' 1 is irrelevant, for the role of the hypostasis as Mind is not under dis-
cussion. We can thus say that Plotinus thinks of Intelligible Matter in two
aspects, and that these aspects must be kept apart. First, it is that effluence from
the One which we may call the Dyad, from whose return to its Source is
generated the 'fully-fledged' Second Hypostasis; secondly, it is that same
Matter now viewed as the base of the World of Forms constructed on semi-
Aristotelian lines as a complex of Form and Intelligible Matter. Provided one
accepts the theory taught by Plotinus to explain the generation of the Second
Hypostasis from the One, these two aspects of Intelligible Matter are thus seen
to be not contradictory but complementary.
The feeling of uncomfortableness about the doctrine of 2. 4. 4 is, despite our
arguments, liable to centre itself around the idea that in making Matter the
principle of unity, Plotinus, led astray by Aristotelian analogies, is being false
to his own general thought. We shall therefore add two further arguments: the
first will show that in the Intelligible World Matter has a specifically Plotinian
claim to a certain precedence over Form; the second will discuss the role of
vXrj VOTJTTJ in the Aristotelian tradition and show how, in the sphere of Intel-
ligibles, Aristotelianism and Plotinism are not as divergent as is frequently
supposed.
The first point is soon evident. Intelligible Matter, the first effluence from
the One, possesses by its very indeterminacy a kinship with the One which the
Forms do not possess. As we read in Enn. 2. 4. 3, Matter 'there' is everything at
the same time. It has nothing into which it can change, for it already possesses
everything. This indeterminacy which can, on its return to its Source, yield
any one of the eternal Forms, has of itself something more akin to the One
1
Armstrong, op. cit., p. 66.
106 J. M. RIST
than have these later determinations. The Forms are perfectly what they are;
they are perfect Being. Intelligible Matter has a shadow of the superiority of
TO eireiceiva in its potential of becoming all Real Beings.
Turning now to the Aristotelian account of V\TJ vo-q-rq, we find an unfor-
tunately small number of texts that help our inquiry. The phrase occurs in
three passages only: two in Met. Z (iO35ag, iO37a4) and the other in Met. H
(iO45a34, 36). Alexander identifies it with extension (510. 3, Hayduck), and
Ross1 admits that this explanation would cover the examples from Met. Z.
The passage in Met. H, however, is clearly, as Ross points out, of a different
kind. Here intelligible matter is the generic aspect of a definition, as, in the
example given, the intelligible matter of the circle is 'plane figure'. Ross
rightly concludes that V\T) vorfrq 'in its widest conception is the thinkable
generic element which is involved both in species and in individuals, and of
which they are specifications and individualizations'. Accepting this account as
correct, and recalling that the Plotinian Form is more akin to an Aristotelian
species than to a sensible individual, we can proceed to the assumption that,
if we understand the relation in the philosophy of Aristotle between genus and
species, we may well shed some light on the importance of Plotinian Intel-
ligible Matter. Fortunately this relation is not in doubt.
Just as one reason why the right angle is prior to the acute is that it is in-
volved in the definition of the acute, while the latter is not involved in its
definition {Met. io84b7), so a genus, whose definition does not involve a dis-
cussion of its own species, is prior to those species, since their definition must
involve a reference to their genus. The priority of genus to species is stated
directly in the Categories (13. i5 a 4), where the genus 'animal' is regarded as
intelligible even if there is no species 'aquatic animal', while conversely the
intelligibility of this latter species depends on the genus 'animal'. Similarly in
the Topics species is said to partake of genus while genus does not partake of
species.2 The implication is that genus is prior.
It might seem at first sight as though this doctrine were contrary to the
general trend of Aristotelian thought. As it is, it introduces a rather curious
paradox, for, if genus is prior because it is prior in definition, one might sup-
pose that it is prior not only to species but to individuals as well. Although
Aristotle is certain that the individual does not admit of definition {Met.
iO36a5), it can only be discussed philosophically in terms of its species, and
more widely of its genus. Hence one might suppose a superiority of both genus
and species to the individual. This is not, of course, the way in which Aristotle's
mind works. Genus and species are one thing, individuals another. Philo-
sophical rules about priority by definition do not apply to individuals, which
are in a realm where definitions do not exist. Hence Aristotle draws a sharp
distinction between individuals and what Plotinus would regard as Forms.
Above this line, that is in the realm of universals, priority of definition means
priority per se. Genus being thus prior to species, and intelligible matter being
the generic element present in a species, there is surely a sense at least in which
intelligible matter is prior to the species of which it is the base.
For Plotinus, therefore, looking at the Aristotelian doctrine as expounded
above, and regarding many of what Aristotle would call species as Forms, the
natural conclusion would be to follow Aristotle in allowing a certain priority
1 2
W. D. Ross, A Commentary on Aristotle's Topics 4. 1. 121M2. Cf. Topics 4. 5.
Metaphysics2 (Oxford, 1953), p. 199. I26 a i8.
 DYAD AND INTELLIGIBLE MATTER IN PLOTINUS 107
to the vXrj vo-qrq. What for Aristotle is the relation between vXrj VOTJTTJ (re-
presenting genus) and species thus becomes for Plotinus the relation between
11A77 vorj-rq (representing the first effluence from the One and now seen as the
base of Form) and Form itself.
There remains one minor difficulty. It has already been observed that
Alexander of Aphrodisias regarded the Aristotelian vX-q vorjr-q not as the generic
element in species, but as extension (Bidaracns) • As Ross reminds us in the
passage already cited,1 this account of Alexander's is careless and inadequate in
that it neglects the clear implications of Met. H 1045*34 ff. It would not take
much acumen for a careful reader of Aristotle to realize that Alexander, in the
two passages where he alludes to intelligible matter (510. 3 ; 514. 27 Hayduck),
has not understood the doctrine fully. The problem is, how carefully did
Plotinus read Aristotle?
Fortunately light has been shed on this question in a recent article by Fr.
Henry.2 Henry has shown how certain passages make it clear that Plotinus
must have studied Aristotle and Alexander's comments simultaneously. He
further shows that Plotinus sometimes rejects Alexander's manner of treating a
problem and returns to the Aristotelian original. The conclusion of all this is
that there is no reason to assume that Plotinus must have accepted Alexander's
erroneous interpretation of vXq vorj-rrj, even if other Aristotelians knew no
better. Plotinus would certainly have been only too pleased to have found in
Aristotle an account of the relation of VXTJ votyrq and species which so well
tallied with his own view of the relation of the Dyad and the Forms. We have
noticed earlier how Alexander's doctrine of the vovs nonp-iKos probably pleased
Plotinus more than the Aristotelian original. With both Aristotle and Alexan-
der at his disposal, Plotinus could select what best suited his own thought.
It may be said in conclusion that Ennead 2. 4. 4 offers no serious difficulties
to an understanding of Plotinus' view of the Indefinite Dyad or Intelligible
Matter. On this topic the thought of Plotinus is consistent. It is skilfully woven
together from sources both Platonic and Aristotelian in such a way as to be, if
not exactly straightforward, at least defensible within the framework of ancient
metaphysical theory.
University College, Toronto JOHN M. RIST
1
Ross, Commentary, p. 199. tote, Alexandra et Plotin', Entretiens Hardt
2
P. Henry, 'Une Comparaison chez Aris- v (Vandceuvres-Geneve :96o), 429-49.