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Procedia Economics and Finance 33 (2015) 303 – 312

7th International Conference, The Economies of Balkan and Eastern Europe Countries in the
changed world, EBEEC 2015, May 8-10, 2015

Elenxis, an Effective Tool for the War Against Tax Avoidance and
Evasion
Elpida Tenidoua,Stavros Valsamidisa*, Ioannis Petasakisa, Athanasios Mandilasa
a
Department of Accounting and Finance, EMaTTech Institute of Technology
Agios Loucas, 65404,Kavala

Abstract

The problems of the shadow economy, tax evasion and tax avoidance are considered as a plague for decades in
Greek economy. They are considered among the root causes of the economical crisis we are experiencing nowadays.
Any efforts proved futile to control and effectively address these thorny problems. On the other hand, nowadays,
with the rapid growth of Information and Communications Technology (ICT), there is an increasing integration in
both the public and private sectors. The use of the Internet and the integration of IT systems is a revolution for the
enterprises and organizations. Also, with the development of e-government, the public agencies serve citizens and
businesses from a distance and thus they offer better service and satisfaction to citizens and businesses, and easier
and more effective management of the work of public services. Given the change in both the organization and the
functioning of businesses and public sector organizations on one side and the state control mechanisms on the other,
it is now easier and more efficient to address the problems of the shadow economy, tax evasion and tax avoidance.
The purpose of this paper is that the ELENXIS may prove an effective tool to address the aforementioned problems
through the accounting information systems and e-government. Initially, the usefulness and the objectives of the
accounting information systems and the e-government are presented. Then, the genesis and evolution of
TAXISNET, as a platform for citizens, enterprises and public sector organizations, is described. Subsequently, an
analysis of the pathogens of the economy with the major problems of the hidden economy, tax evasion and
avoidance, and how the specialized for auditing, information system ELENXIS, aims at fighting these weaknesses.
Finally, a research is presented. It consists of the analysis of 80 questionnaires, listing the views of tax consultants in
the areas of Evros and Kavala about combating tax avoidance and evasion.
© 2015
© 2015 Published
The Authors. Published
by Elsevier byThis
B.V. Elsevier
is an B.V.
open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of Department of Accountancy and Finance, Eastern Macedonia and Thrace Institute of Technology

* Corresponding author. Tel.: +30 2510 462370 ; fax+30 2510 462298.

E-mail address: svalsam@teikav.edu.gr

2212-5671 © 2015 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of Department of Accountancy and Finance, Eastern Macedonia and Thrace Institute of Technology
doi:10.1016/S2212-5671(15)01714-1
304 Elpida Tenidou et al. / Procedia Economics and Finance 33 (2015) 303 – 312

Keywords: Electronic Government; Accounting Information Systems; ELENXIS; Tax Avoidance and Evasion.

1. Introduction

The problems of the shadow economy, tax evasion and tax avoidance are considered as a plague for decades in
Greek economy (Kousoulakos et al., 1995; Pavlopoulos, 1987; Pavlopoulos, 2002). They are considered among the
root causes of the economical crisis we are experiencing nowadays (Leventi and Matsaganis, 2013a;.Leventi and
Matsaganis, 2013b). Any efforts proved futile to control and effectively address these thorny problems
(Vasardani,2011).
On the other hand, nowadays, with the rapid growth of Information and Communications Technology (ICT),
there is an increasing integration in both the public and private sectors (Avgerou, 2002). The use of the Internet and
the integration of IT systems is a revolution for enterprises and organizations (Emmanouilidis and Economides,
2010; Kaschek et al., 2008; Cordella and Iannacci, 2010).
Also, with the development of e-government, the public agencies serve citizens and businesses from a distance
and thus they offer better service and satisfaction to citizens and businesses, and easier and more effective
management of the work of public services(Evans and Yen, 2006; Gant and Gant, 2002; Chen, 2010).
Given the change in both the organization and the functioning of businesses and public sector organizations on
one hand and the state control mechanisms on the other, it is easier and more efficient to address the problems of the
shadow economy, tax evasion and tax avoidance (Gouscos et al., 2001).
Tax evasion is the illegal evasion of taxes by individuals, corporations and trusts. Tax evasion often entails
taxpayers deliberately misrepresenting the true state of their affairs to the tax authorities to reduce their tax liability
and includes dishonest tax reporting, such as declaring less income, profits or gains than the amounts actually
earned, or overstating deductions (Becker, 1968). Tax evasion is an activity commonly associated with the shadow
economy.
Tax avoidance is the legal use of tax laws to reduce one's tax burden (Miller and Pangbourne, 2010). Tax
avoidance is the usage of the tax regime to one's own advantage to reduce the amount of tax that is payable by means
that are within the law (Scott et al., 2010).
Both tax evasion and avoidance can be viewed as forms of tax noncompliance, as they describe a range of
activities that intend to subvert a state's tax system, although such classification of tax avoidance is not indisputable,
given that avoidance is lawful, within self-creating systems (Wenzel, 2002).
Tackling the problems of the shadow economy, tax evasion and avoidance proved not to be an easy job In
Greece. The last years, Accounting Information Systems (AIS) and e-government are the key pillars to resolve these
serious issues (Torres et al., 2005; Hahamis et al., 2005). As a key tool,a limited information system named TAXIS
designed, constantly expanded and improved. It became in integrated use, initially in web format and then in online
form, with the name TAXISNET (GSIS, 2014). TAXISNET, is a platform for citizens, enterprises and public sector
organizations. TAXISNET alone was not sufficient for full audit of economic activities and verification of declared
elements for both natural and legal persons. Thus the use of an additional AuditingInformation System with specific
audit functions was imperative. This new system is named ELENXIS and is now the spearhead of audit mechanisms
for the junction and verification discrepancies, errors, omissions and oversights that TAXISNET alone could not
detect(Elenxis1, 2014; Elenxis2, 2014; Elenxis3, 2014).
The purpose of this study is to analyse the experts' opinions for tackling the problems of the shadow economy, tax
evasion and avoidance. It includes the analysis of 80 questionnaires, listing the views of tax consultants in the areas
of Evros and Kavala about combating tax avoidance and evasion. The results support the assertion that ELENXIS
may prove an effective tool to address the aforementioned problems through suitable reforms.
 Elpida Tenidou et al. / Procedia Economics and Finance 33 (2015) 303 – 312 305

2. Literature Review

Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) present theoretical models that integrate avoidance and evasion into the overall
decision problem faced by individuals. Then they relate the behavior predicted by the model to what is known
empirically about the extent of evasion and avoidance, and how it responds to tax enforcement policy.
The links between corporate tax avoidance and the growth of high-powered incentives for managers are analyzed
in (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006). They prove that increases in incentive compensation tend to reduce the level of
tax sheltering, in a manner consistent with a complementary relationship between diversion and sheltering. These
results can help explain the growing cross-sectional variation among firms in their levels of tax avoidance, the
undersheltering puzzle, and why large book-tax gaps are associated with subsequent negative abnormal returns.
The interaction between corporate taxes and corporate governance is analyzed in (Desaia et al., 2007). They
present that the design of the corporate tax system affects the amount of private benefits extracted by company
insiders and that the quality of the corporate governance system affects the sensitivity of tax revenues to tax
changes.
An economic model of tax evasion, considering the interactions between tax authority and its sovereign
government is proposed in (Sangheon, 2008). It is proved that tax evasion is influenced by the government's
intention to control the economy, controlling for other determinants of tax evasion.
The theoretical hypothesis that taxpayers’ intrinsic attitudes to honesty and social stigma are influenced by the
taxpayers’ perceptions of the size of tax evasion as well as by their perceptions of the policy maker's effectiveness in
exercising control over the relevant macroeconomic variables and safeguarding the interests of citizens is supported
in (Dell’Anno, 2009).
Cerqueti and Coppier (2009) explore tax revenues in a regime of widespread fiscal corruption in a static
framework. They prove that the relationship between the tax rate and tax revenues depends on the relevance of the
“shame effect” of being detected in a corrupt transaction. In countries with a “low shame” effect, tax revenues grow
as the tax rate increases. Moreover, there is a critical tax rate where the growth rate of tax revenues begins to reduce.
In countries with a high “shame effect” tax revenues increase up to a threshold value and then decrease.
Cerqueti and Coppier (2011) also prove that the relationship between the tax rate and tax collection, in a dynamic
framework, is not unique, but is different depending on the relevance of the “shame effect”. They explore tax
revenues in a regime of widespread corruption in a growth model. They show that in all three cases — “low, middle
and high shame” countries, the growth rate increases as the tax rate increases up to a threshold value, after which the
growth rate begins to decrease as the tax rate increases.
The implications of corruptibility and the potential abuse of authority for the effects and optimal design of
(potentially non-linear) tax collection schemes are examined in (Hindriks et al., 1999). Amongst the findings are that
the distributional effects of evasion and corruption are unambiguously regressive under the kinds of schemes usual
in practice; and collecting progressive taxes without inducing evasion or corruption may require that inspectors be
paid commission on high income reports (but not on low), with the cost of this potentially creating what seems to be
a previously-unnoticed trade-off between equity and efficiency.
Self-employed individuals have arguably greater opportunities than wage earners to underreport their incomes.
Swedish income and expenditure data to examine the extent of underreporting of income among self-employed
individuals are presented in (Engström and Holmlund, 2009).
Murphy (2005) use longitudinal survey data to show that attempts to coerce and threaten taxpayers into
compliance can undermine the legitimacy of the Tax Office's authority, which in turn can affect taxpayers'
subsequent compliance behaviour. It is presented that they are designed to exploit loopholes in tax law which need
to be dealt with in a way that restores faith and equity to the system.
Cebula (2011) empirically investigates the determinants of aggregate federal personal income tax evasion in the
U.S. using the most current data available from the IRS. In 2010, the IRS released a new series on personal income
tax evasion data running through the year 2005. Using this new data, the study seeks to identify any new as well as
traditional determinants of domestic personal income tax evasion.
An early analysis for cultures consequences in international differences for work-related values is presented by
Hofstede (1980).
306 Elpida Tenidou et al. / Procedia Economics and Finance 33 (2015) 303 – 312

The relation between national cultural dimensions and tax evasion is presented by Richardson (2008). It is based
on data from 47 countries. The findings useful for government policymakers in assessing the likelihood of tax
evasion from cultural, legal, political, and religious perspectives, and in developing tax reform policies to reduce tax
evasion.
The previous study extends a previous one, developed by Tsakumis et al. (2007), where the influence of national
culture on tax compliance levels across 50 countries is investigated.

3. Approach

In order to ascertain the views of experts on the contribution of Information Systems and e-Goverment to combat
tax evasion and avoidance, the views of tax consultants in the areas of Evros and Kavala were recorded and
processed.
The self administrative questionnaire was chosen to collect the data for research. A 20-item questionnaire was
used in this study which was conducted in November 2014. It is consisted of two components: (1) The first five
concerning demographic data of the respondents (age, gender, education, employment-experience and income) and
(2) the last fifteen concerning the attitudes of respondents in relation to shadow economy, tax evasion and tax
avoidance.
In the questionnaire we chose closed questions for quick completing and data processing. Moreover, the questions
were multiple choice, where it is possible to choose among several predefined answers and most of them were
questions of scale or preference, where the degree of preference of the respondent stated. They are the most
important questions in a questionnaire, because they allow classification of the views or attitudes of respondents.
The chosen scales in this research are the Likert and the Gutman. In Likert scale, the attitudes have five response
categories "Totally agree" = 5, "Agree" = 4, " Neither agree nor disagree" = 3, "Disagree" = 2, "Totally disagree" =
1.In the Gutman scale the attitudes have two response categories "Yes" and "No".
Furthermore we attended the questionnaire marked by clearness and clarity. The questions were short and clear.
The negative questions were avoided because they are often misunderstood, since the negative keyword is ignored
and the respondent gives an answer that is contrary to his/her real opinion. Also we did not include questions with
double meaning, because they require the respondent to answer two separate ideas with a single answer.
The questionnaire was distributed to eighty six (86) people and was completed by eighty (80), so the response
rate was 93%. All statistical analysis was conducted with the application of the SPSS version 18 software package.
We pose the following hypotheses:
1. Increased taxation leads to an increase in tax evasion.
2. The accountants are jointly responsible for the tax evasion of their customers.
3. The tax mechanism constitutes responsible for tax evasion.
4. Laxity and lack of constant attitude in dealing with tax evasion.
These four hypotheses correspond to the four factors. We use the Factor Analysis with the method of Principal
Components and with varimax rotation, We try to investigate the relationship between a number of items and to
group them in factors. So, the four factors, based on 12 questions of our questionnaire, will be used for Factor
Analysis. Before we proceed, we shall check the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (KMO) value
to be suitable for Factor Analysis. Chi-Square value for Bartlett's Test of Sphericity will also be checked, to
continue the process of Factor Analysis.

4. Results

The sample consists of 80 accountants (52.5% women).The sample allocation according to their employment is
presented in table 1. Half of the participants in the sample are employing in private sector and about one out of four
is Freelancer.
 Elpida Tenidou et al. / Procedia Economics and Finance 33 (2015) 303 – 312 307

Table 1. Sample allocation according to their employment.

Employment Frequency Percent
Unemployed 2 2.5
Accountant employees in private sector 42 52.5
Accountant employees in public sector 4 5.0
Freelancer 18 22.5
Other 14 17.5
Total 80 100.0

In table 2 we can infer that more than half of the participants (57.5%) have previous experience as accountants
for more than 10 years, one out of four has experience for 6 to 10 years and only 17.5% of our sample have
experience less than 5 years.

Table 2. Sample allocation according to their previous experience.

Experience Frequency Percent
0-5 14 17.5
6-10 20 25.0
11-15 14 17.5
16-25 24 30.0
26+ 8 10.0
Total 80 100.0

Table 3 describes that almost all the participants (92.5%) believe that Information Systems is a way to address tax
evasion.

Table 3.Information Systems is a way to address tax evasion.

Experience Frequency Percent
Yes 74 92.5
No 6 7.5
Total 80 100.0

Questionnaire consist of 12 items in a 5-point Likert scale (1=Totally disagree to 5=Totally agree). Descriptive
statistics for these items is presented in table 4.

Table 4.Descriptive statistics of the 12 items in a 5-point Likert scale.

Items Totally Agree Neither agree Disagree Totally
agree nor disagree disagree
The successive completions affect the perpetuation of tax evasion 15.4% 61.5% 23.1% 0% 0%
The increasing taxation affects the perpetuation of tax evasion and the 25% 60% 12.5% 2.5% 0%
burgeoning of the shadow economy
The greater the taxable income, the more prone they are the taxpayers to tax 17.5% 55% 20% 7.5% 0%
evasion
Having a chaste control mechanism free from corporatism syndromes 27.5% 57.5% 10% 5% 0%
rigorously infringements would limit tax evasion
If specialized private companies undertake the monitoring and collection of 10.3% 35.9% 41% 7.7% 5.1%
taxes, it would have better results
In a discredited and corrupted state is finally acceptable for someone to tax 5.1% 46.2% 33.3% 10.3% 5.1%
evade
The co-responsibility of tax accountants act catalytically to reduce tax evasion 5.3% 55.3% 36.8% 2.6% 0%
If tax rates will be reduced and our country will be converted to a tax haven, 35% 27.5% 32.5% 5% 0%
there will be more investment to be growth and employment and therefore
more receivable taxes overall
308 Elpida Tenidou et al. / Procedia Economics and Finance 33 (2015) 303 – 312

The accounting advices tax accountant for legal tax avoidance, it is morally 5.3% 39.5% 39.5% 15.8% 0%
reprehensible for the profession of tax accountant
A nonnegotiable measure is to conduct all transactions electronically, so as 7.5% 42.5% 37.5% 10% 2.5%
actions the taxpayers have minimized natural "contacts" with the taxman
The release of the profession of tax accountant will help to reduce the scourge 0% 30% 40% 27.5% 2.5%
of tax evasion
Lower tax rates would reduce tax evasion 30% 37.5% 27.5% 5% 0%

Using Factor Analysis for the above 12 items in 5-point Likert scale with the method of Principal Components
and with varimax rotation we try to investigate the relationship between a number of items and to group them in
factors. We create four new factors, as presented in tables 5, 8, 10 and 12. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of
Sampling Adequacy (KMO) value is 0.610, that means data are suitable for Factor Analysis. Chi-Square value for
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity is 362.489 (p-value<0.001), so is proposed to continue the process of Factor Analysis.
That is to say there are items that are related to each other in a satisfactory level.

The first factor is associated with the belief that increased taxation leads to an increase in tax evasion and it
contains four items, as presented in table 5.

Table 5. Items that constitute the factor “Increased taxation leads to an increase in tax evasion”.
Increased taxation leads to an increase in tax evasion Factor loadings
The increasing taxation affects the perpetuation of tax evasion and the burgeoning of the shadow economy 0.785
In a discredited and corrupted state is finally acceptable for someone to tax evade 0.610
If tax rates will be reduced and our country will be converted to a tax haven, there will be more investment to be growth 0.911
and employment and therefore more receivable taxes overall
Lower tax rates would reduce tax evasion 0.865

After that, we create a new variable as the sum of the above items which consist the first factor “Increased
taxation leads to an increase in tax evasion”. That means values of the new variable greater than three denotes
agreement with the hypothesis that increased taxation leads to an increase in tax evasion. Table 6 presents
descriptive statistics for each one of the five category groups of experience, where we notice that accountants with
more than 26 years of experience believes to a greater extent than the others that increased taxation leads to an
increase in tax evasion. Using Anova with dependent variable the “Increased taxation leads to an increase in tax
evasion” and independent previous experience (F4,73 = 16.85, p-value<0.001) we conclude that the oldest and
experienced accountants are convinced to a significantly greater extent that this statement is true. In particular we
observe in Table 7 that the accountants with experience of more than of 26 years have a higher score on the belief
that increased taxation leads to an increase in tax evasion on average from 0.87 to 2.09 compared to those have 16-
26 year experience, from 0.7 to 2 compared to those with experience of 11-15 years, from 1.02 to 2.25 compared to
those have experience of 6-10 years and 0.39 to 1.69 in comparison with those who have experience 5 years or less.
Figure 1 describes graphically these differences.

Table 6. Descriptive statistics for previous experience.

Experience N Mean Std. Deviation
0-5 14 2.39 0.53
6-10 20 1.80 0.47
11-15 14 2.07 0.43
16-25 22 1.95 0.59
26+ 8 3.44 0.39
Total 78 2.17 0.69

Table 7. Bonferroni correction method for multiple comparisons.

Previous Experience Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
26+ 0-5 1.04464* .22546 .000 .3920 1.6973
 Elpida Tenidou et al. / Procedia Economics and Finance 33 (2015) 303 – 312 309

6-10 1.63750* .21281 .000 1.0215 2.2535

11-15 1.36607* .22546 .000 .7134 2.0187
16-25 1.48295* .21003 .000 .8750 2.0909

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Fig. 1. Compare of mean values of factor “Increased taxation leads to an increase in tax evasion” among the five
groups of previous experience.

The second factor of Factor Analysis is associated with the belief that “The accountants are jointly responsible
for the tax evasion of their customers”. We create a new variable as the sum of the items in table 8 which consist the
second called “The accountants are jointly responsible for the tax evasion of their customers”. Values of the new
variable greater than three denotes agreement with this hypothesis.

Table 8. Items that constitute the factor “The accountants are jointly responsible for the tax evasion of their customers”.
The accountants are jointly responsible for the tax evasion of their customers Factor loadings
The co-responsibility of tax accountants act catalytically to reduce tax evasion -0.694
The accounting advices tax accountant for legal tax avoidance, it is morally reprehensible for the profession of -0.774
tax accountant

At table 9 we present descriptive statistics of the factor “The accountants are jointly responsible for the tax
evasion of their customers”, separately by gender. Using Independent samples t-test method (t-value=2.53, degrees
of freedom=72, p-value=0.014) we conclude that men feel more strongly the feeling of co- responsibility
comparatively with women, at mean value between 0.7 to 0.58 units.
310 Elpida Tenidou et al. / Procedia Economics and Finance 33 (2015) 303 – 312

Table 9.Descriptive statistics of the factor “The accountants are jointly responsible for the tax evasion of their customers”,
separately by gender.
Gender N Mean Std. Deviation
Male 34 2.6765 0.52052
Female 40 2.3500 0.57957

The third factor of Factor Analysis is associated with the belief that “The tax mechanism constitutes responsible
for tax evasion”. We create a new variable as the sum of the items in table 10 which consist the third factor called
“The tax mechanism constitutes responsible for tax evasion”. Values of the new variable greater than three denotes
agreement with this statement. At table 11 we present descriptive statistics of the factor “The tax mechanism
constitutes responsible for tax evasion”, separately by gender. Using Independent samples t-test method (t-value =-
2.79, degrees of freedom =78, p-value=0.007) we conclude that women espousing to a greater extent than men (on
average higher score from 0.12 to 0.73 units) that tax mechanism constitutes responsible for tax evasion.

Table 10.Items that constitute the factor “The tax mechanism constitutes responsible for tax evasion”.
The tax mechanism constitutes responsible for tax evasion Factor loadings
Having a chaste control mechanism free from corporatism syndromes rigorously infringements would limit tax evasion 0.640
A nonnegotiable measure is to conduct all transactions electronically, so as actions the taxpayers have minimized natural 0.852
"contacts" with the taxman

Table 11.Descriptive statistics of the factor “The tax mechanism constitutes responsible for tax evasion”, separately by
gender.
Gender N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Male 38 2.0263 .55687 .09034
Female 42 2.4524 .77938 .12026

The fourth factor of Factor Analysis is associated with the belief that “Laxity and lack of constant attitude in
dealing with tax evasion”. We create a new variable as the sum of the three items in table 12 which consists the
fourth factor called “Laxity and lack of constant attitude in dealing with tax evasion” after reversing the values of
the third item since the factor loading is negative. Values of the new variable greater than three denotes agreement
with the statement “Laxity and lack of constant attitude in dealing with tax evasion”. At table 13 we present
descriptive statistics of the factor “Laxity and lack of constant attitude in dealing with tax evasion”, separately by
the belief that Information Systems is a way to tackle tax evasion. Using Independent samples t-test method (t-value
= -2.4, degrees of freedom =76, p-value=0.019), we conclude that those who believe that information systems are a
way of tackling tax evasion have on average a lower score between 0.09 and 0.97 units.

Table 12. Items that constitute the factor “Laxity and lack of constant attitude in dealing with tax evasion.
Laxity and lack of constant attitude in dealing with tax evasion Factor loadings
The successive completions affect the perpetuation of tax evasion 0.601
The greater the taxable income, the more prone they are the taxpayers to tax evasion 0.648
The release of the profession of tax accountant will help to reduce the scourge of tax evasion -0.795

Table 13. Descriptive statistics of the factor “Laxity and lack of constant attitude in dealing with tax evasion”, separately by
the belief that Information Systems is a way to tackle tax evasion.
Information Systems is a way to tackle tax evasion? N Mean Std. Deviation
Yes 72 2.0278 0.53295
No 6 2.5556 0.17213
 Elpida Tenidou et al. / Procedia Economics and Finance 33 (2015) 303 – 312 311

5. Discussion and Conclusions

The purpose of this study was to analyse the experts' opinions for tackling the problems of the shadow economy,
tax evasion and avoidance that have plagued the economy and consequently greek society for decades. Accounting
information systems and e-government considered to be the key pillars to resolve these serious issues. As a key tool,
a limited information system, named TAXIS designed, which constantly was expanded and improved and became in
integrated use, initially in web format and then an online form, named TAXISNET. TAXISNET alone, was not
sufficient for full control of economic activities and verification of declared items for both natural and legal persons.
Thus, the use of an additional accounting information subsystem with audit function was imperative. This new
system with name ELENXIS is now the spearhead of control mechanisms for the junction and verification
discrepancies, errors, omissions and oversights that TAXISNET alone could not detect.
The results with the analysis of the views of the experts on the subject are presented. Eighty (80) economists
from two different geographical areas of Northern Greece, specialised in tax consultation, expressed their views
freely in twenty (20) carefully worded questions of a structured questionnaire. The answers were analyzed using
special software.
All the hypotheses were verified:
1. Increased taxation leads to an increase in tax evasion.
2. The accountants are jointly responsible for the tax evasion of their customers.
3. The tax mechanism constitutes responsible for tax evasion.
4. Laxity and lack of constant attitude in dealing with tax evasion.
The results show that their positions conform to established beliefs for decades. But in some other cases, the
results are less expected and need more investigation to draw useful conclusions and offer a lot of food for
discussion.
Accountants with experience of more than of 26 years have a higher score on the belief that increased taxation
leads to an increase in tax fraud on average. On average, men feel more intensely feeling responsibility compared
with women jointly responsible for the tax evasion of their customers. Women believe to a greater extent than men
that tax mechanism is responsible for tax evasion. Those who believe that information systems are a way of tackling
tax evasion have lower average score in laxity and lack of constant attitude in dealing with tax evasion.
The research of this study in no way could be considered full, since the sample of respondents is small, on two
only areas and done under highly unfavorable for the country, economic conditions which dramatize and negatively
charge the views of citizens in issues related to the economy. Enlargement and reopening of the investigation in
future will pay more accurately the views of citizens in order to provide safer conclusions. The sample of
respondents will consist of many different areas. There will be a second questionnaire for non specialists
(accountants, economists) for a twofold evaluation. A causal model will be adopted which will explain the factors
which affect the tax evasion and avoidance. A confirmatory factor analysis will be performed in the model.
However eGovernment is a look into the future, while it can be a reality of everyday life. The implementation
and application of appropriate information systems, in our case accounting and auditing, can help to improve the
quality of both administrative actions and political activities and therefore should be used as a tool of public
administration in order to effectively achieve the objectives.

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