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 CAPE LAW JOURNAL.
CONTRACTS OF MINORS.

In testing the validity of a contract one of the first things to be

determined is whether the parties to it have the necessary legal
capacity to bind themselves by such ,t transaction. For, as is
generally known, the legal capacity to contract varies very much
according to individuals ; in some existing only in a limited degree
and in others being entirely absent. The most ordinary examples
of persons possessing but limited capacity to contract are lunatics,
women, and minors ; and it is with the contracts of these last that
I now purpose dealing.
In order that the affairs of minors-who have any estate-
may be managed to the best advantage, curators or guardians are
appointed by the law for their administration;(') and the contracts
entered into by these authorised guardians on behalf of their wards,
or by the wards themselves assisted by their guardians, are gener-
ally speaking valid and binding on the minors. But if the minor
can show that he has suffered lesion by a contract thus entered
into he will be entitled to the benefit of resti/ttio i ienfeqnm,( 2) an
equitable relief which will be considered later on.
It may te broadly stated and accepted as correct that the con-
tracts entered into by minors without the assistance of their
guardians are not binding upon them. ]Jowever, since there is
hardly any rule without ,n exception, it will be found that this
proposition is by no means universally true, but that it is subject
to exceptions both numerous and important.(:') The enumeration
and consideration of these-or at all events the most prominent of
them-forms the chief part of the task I have set tefore me.
That minority affords a ground of relief in law under certain cir-
cumstances is a proposition so fully recognised by all legal systems
(1) Ord. 105, of 1833. M Cens. Forens., 4, 43; Voct, 4, 4. (') Voet 14, 5, 1.
VOL, R-.
 THE CAPE LAW JOURNAL.

as not to require the production of any authority in its support.

The reason of this privilege of youth is not far to seek-indeed it
stares the enquirer in the face. For to the majority of persons
wisdom, if at all, and to everyon experience, comes but with
years; consequently the law very properly and justly regards
youth as being at a disadvantage in business dealings with those
of mature age, and very considerately takes it under the protection
of a sheltering wing. But it may be objected to the assertion of
the wisdom and justice of this maternal conduct of law, that
although youth may be at a disadvantage in business matters during
its earlier periods, yet after these are past it frequently has been
in a position to acquire, and has acquired, sufficient knowledge of
business and of the world to place it on an equal footing, as regards
contracts, with those of more advanced years. That this is true in
some instances admits of no reasonable doubt ; but that it is untrue
in the majority of cases is equally clear. And as law exists for
the people as a whole, it is therefore only natural and just that the
greater number of persons who conform to the reason of a law by
which they are protected should not lose this privilege merely
because the precocity of the lesser number has in their own cases
caused the cessation of the grounds on which the doctrine is based.
But the real force of the objection which I have noticed appears
to depend on an excessive extension of the term of minority. The
remarks made above in dealing with the objection had reference
solely to 21 years as the age at which majority commences. But
although in England and inthis Colony we are so accustomed to
regard the twenty-first birth-day as necessarily marking the coming
of age, it must not by any means be supposed that 20 years has
been recognised as the limit of minority by all systems of law, or
indeed even by our own. Thus under the 1oman law majority
was reached on completion of the twenty-fourth year, a period
which was adopted by the continental systems, including that of
IHolland,( 4) which provides this Colony with its common law. But
in 1829 the legislature of this Country very wisely fixed the age of
attaining majority at 21 years,(r) at which-it is perhaps super-
fluous to add-it at present stands. The IRoman law divided the
period of minority-as we understand the term at the present day-
Grotius 1, 7, 3,
(1) (0) Ord. 62 of 1829,
 CONTRACTS OF MINORS.

into various stages according to the physical and mental growth of

individuals. Thus persons were up to their eighth year termed
infants, and were considered by the law to be without capacity to
act or power of understanding. Between this period and the age
of 15 in males, and 13 in females, at which ages puberty was con-
sidered to commence, persons were regarded as being near to
infancy or to puberty (hit]ntie aid j)/berati protini.y). Puberty
was of two kinds, (1) common already referred to, and (2) full,
which was reached by males at 18 and females at 14. And finally
those who had reached full puberty were divided into majors and
minors. All these distinctions, marking the different stages
between birth and majority, were originally adopted by the law of
Holland,( ) but appear subsequently to have been expressly
abandoned.(7) In any case, however, they have no practical bear-
ing on the subject we have in hand and need not therefore be
further considered in this paper.
Although as a general rule minors arc not bound by contracts
entered into without the assistance of their guardians, yet it is by
no means the ease that persons of full age with whom they contract
can repudiate the transaction by reason of its being entered into
with a minor. For this privilege of avoidance is accorded by the
law solely in the interests of those under age, consequently where
such persons enter into contracts-which are clearly for their
benefit-with those of full age, the latter will be bound thereby.0)
In other words, minors may, by stipulating for something to their
own advantage, bind others without themselves being bound. But
it must not be imagined that a minor can in all cases actually reap
the benefit of a contract without becoming liable to perform his
share thereon. Such an inequitable doctrine is not recognised by
the law, and indeed, should it receive any countenance, would
assuredly defeat its own ends. For in such a case a minor would
have considerable difficulty in getting the necessaries of life for
which, as the law now stands, he (if they have actually been supplied)
is held liable, and indeed for any benefits which he has actually
enjoyed under a contract. From what has been already stated it
will be gathered that the contracts of minors may, by reason solely
(6) Cens. Foren., 2, 8. (1) Van der Kees. Th., 111. (11 Grotius 1, 8,
38 ; 3, 1, 297 ;Cens. Forens., 1, 17, 10,
 THE CAPE LAW JOURNAL.

of minority, be absolutely null and void, merely voidable, or valid

and binding. There exists a not uncommon impression that con-
tracts entered into by persons under age without the assistance of
their guardians are il)so ficto null and void. And indeed isolated
passages are to be found in the authorities to support this view.
But a fuller examination of the works of these authors discloses
that in these particular passages they are referring to contracts by
which minors are damnified, and that a minor cannot contract to
his own prejudice is clearly established law, which however still
leaves the question open as to contracts of a non-prejudicial nature.
And it seems to me that the better view to take concerning these
latter contracts is that previous to the minor's receiving any actual
benefit under them, they are voidable at his option. Thus we
learn from a great authority on the law of Scotland which is
based on the Roman law that where a minor has curators his deeds
are not effectual to bind him without their consent; yet.in so far as
he derives any benefit from his deeds they will be binding on those
with whom he contracts.(')
In a case('0 ) decided in the Supreme Court of this Colony in
1829 we find an instance of a contract null and void by reason of
minority, and which was sought to be enforced without avail. The
action was for a breach of promise to marry, and although the de-
fendant had in consequence of this promise succeeded in seducing
the plaintiff, yet as his parents had not given their consent to his
marriage-he being a minor at the time the promise was made and
also at the time the action was brought-the Court on the authority
of Voet(n) held, that such an agreement was, in consequence of the
absence of the parents' consent, ipsojare null and void, and there-
fore could not be enforced. The Court, however, as we learn from
the report, expressed a very strong opinion that if the action had
been delayed until the defendant bad attained his majority, the
performo.nee of the contract would have been decreed, on the
ground that the defendant, should he then oppose on the plea of
minority, would only be entitled to the relief of restitidio in irte-
gratto, i.e., the being placed in precisely the same position as he was
before making the promise, by first relieving the plaintiff of the
)
C9)Bell's Dict. laws of Scot., p, 569. ( Greef vs. T'erreaux, 1 Menz. 151
(11) 23, 2, 11.
 CONTIRACTS OF MINORS.

consequences of such promise-viz., the loss of her virginity-which

of course he would be unable to do. At the time this case was
heard the sponsi(lia or bethrothal gave rise under certain circmn-
stances to an action for the solomnisation of the marriag('2) ; but
this action was abolished by the order in Council of September,
1838(13), and since then an action for damages has been the sole
remedy for a breach of promise to marry. The contract of mar-
riage-which must not be confounded with the contract to marry
-stands on a different footing to most other contracts, because by
the -mero fact ot its completion an alteration in status is immedi-
ately created ; consequently it is, if entered into by a minor with-
out the consent of his parents or guardians, i)8o ,/tre null and
void("1 ). But by the marriage law of this Colony-the order in
Council above mentioned-an appeal is allowed from the refusal
of consent by parents to the Chief Justice of the Colony, who,
after examining into the case, may give his order that such mar-
riage is proper and may forthwith be celebrated, and a marriage
solemnised in accordance with this decisiowis as valid as one to
which the consent of parents or guardians had been obtained. As
I have already intimated, persons under age may for various
causes forfeit the privilege of minority, and find themselves placed
in such a position as to admit of their being bound by the contracts
into which they have entered unaided. Without guaranteeing the
absolute exhaustiveness of the five following grounds on which
minors may be made liable on their contracts, it may fairly be
claimed that they are the most usual and important to which the
Roman Dutch law gives sanction. The defence of minority will
be of no avail where the minor
(1) Ilas been emancipated,
(2) Is publicly trading or practising a profession on his own account,
(3) Has falsely represented himself as of full ago,
(4) Has had the beiiefit of the contract,
(5) Has ratified the contract on attaining majority.
It will be desirable to discuss these cnditions seriatim both in
order to show their recognition by the accepted authorities on the
law, and also generally for their better understanding.
(') Van der Linden, p. 72. ( ) Setions. 19, 20. (M) Vau der Kees,
Th. 75, Cons. Furens. 1, 13, 9.
 THE CAPE LAW JOURNAL.

(1.) Emancipation is the freeing of a minor from the pt(dria-pot~e-

fas or parent's control. Under the early Roman law it took place
by means of three fictitious sales of the son by the father. Each sale
wason its completion cancelled as amatter of courseby the purchaser,
and the son thereby again came under parental control; except after
the third cancellation, when he became sui jttri.s. Justinian substituted
for this cumbrous and artificial process a declaration by the father
before the Magistrate of his son's emancipation.0'") This latter
method was adopted by the Roman-Dutch law, but after a time fell
into disuse and gave way to the application for the cenia (eta/is. 11
The venia wiuti1s is a dispensation granted by the sovereign power
to a male of not less than 20, and a female of not less than 18
years, by means of which nearly all the rights of majority are ac-
quired.('-) Itwas in respect of dealing with immovable property
that the cnidaiwtatis failed to invest minors with rights equal to those
which attached to full age. But we learn on the great authority of
Voet(s) that in his days the granting of the ctia(ct(datis usually car-
ried with it the power to deal with the whole estate, immovable
as well as movable. This dispensation or indulgence was, under
the Roman law, granted by the princeps alone. But under the
Roman-Dutch law the sovereign power appears to have delegated
its authority in this matter to inferior bodies. Thus Grotius('5 )
says that the power could be granted by the Court of Holland or
any other Court legally empowered thereto. From Van der Keessel
we learn that the application for the renia tatis came, in the first
instance, before the Magistrate, who, after hearing the minor and
his guardians, made a report to the sovereign, in whose hands the
final decision lay.( 2 0) Bint subsequently in Holland the full power
of refusing or granting the favour was vested in the Provincial
Department but oi report from a Magistrate as before(21 . This
indulgence was only granted in cases where special reasons were
shown to exist22). A minor who had obtained the venda aft(tti,
could be sued without the assistance of his curator,(22) and was no
longer entitled to claim re.4ittio in intoyno. It was a matter of
dispute among the Dutch Jurists as to whether this dispensation
(15) Just. i, 12,-6. (11) Van der Kees, Tb. 110 ; Van der Linden, p. 95.
(17) Grotiu8 1, 10, 47; Voet 4, 4, 3. Os) 4, 4, 4.("a) 1, 10, 47. (2.1)Thesis 161.
('21)Van der Linden, p. 95. (22)Voct 2, 4, 4.
 CONTRACTS OF MINORS.

had any force outside the territory where it had been conceded.
Some among them, of whom the most notable was Johannes
Voet,(2 1) held the opinion that it only held good where granted, but
the great weight of authority is in favour of the contrary vicw
(vide Decker's note to Van Leeuwen's Roman-Dutch law-Koctze's
trans., p. 88). In this country the venia alati(i8 is never granted
now; but there is no good reason for supposing the power has
ceased, although its exercise has long since fallen into disuse.
Emancipation of children is further brought about by their mar-
riage. Thus by this means minors are by our law-which in this
respect differs from that of Rome-freed from parental control.(2-1)
This result is based entirely on the parent's consent to the nuptials,
without which, as has been already shown, no minor could contract
a lawful marriage.
The final express mode, of which the bare mention will now
suffice, of acquiring freedom from patria-potestas is by attaining to
the years of majority.
But emancipation may also be tacitly accomplished; as for
instance when children live apart from their parents and en gage in
business on their own account.("3 ) We learn from Vot,(6) that in
regard to the duration of absence necessary to constitute this tacit
emancipation, the better opinion of Jurists was that if a minor had
been absent from his house a year and a day, he would from that
time forth be regarded as emancipated. But such a result would
not follow if the absence was clearly due to the minor's*being
engaged in travelling, or being occupied with study. The most
important effect which emancipation, however acquired, exerts on
the legal condition of minors, is the allowing them to administer
their own affairs, and to sue and be sued without the assistance of
their guardians(2 7).
(2) Pitblic trading. This exception (which includes that of the
practice of a profession by a minor) to the rule of a minor's non-
liability on the contracts into which he has entered unaided
may perhaps be regarded as coming fairly within the .scope of that
tacit emancipation which his already been noticed. But even if
(-') 4, 4, 8. ("') Ccns.1"urens, 1, 9, 9. ("3) Grotins 1, 6, 4 ;Van Lecuwen's
Romnan-iDutch law, p. 89; Catirucross vs. De Vos, Buch., 1876, p. 6. (u') 1, 7, 12.
(21) Grotius, 1, 6, 4 ; Fouce vs. D Villicrs, 3 Buch., E.D.C., 147.
 THE CAPE LAW JOURNAL.

this be so yet seeing that it produces but a qualified freedom finom

parental control the effects of which are strictly limited, and seeing
lso that it has no place in the text books under the heading of
emancipation, it has therefore been thought better to treat of it
here as affording a distinct means for rendering a minor liable on
his contracts. The tacit emancipation already considered is con-
stituted by the minors carrying on business on their own accouut
coupled with their living apart from their- parents. But to bring
a minor within the exception with which we are at present con-
corned, no sel.arate establishment is required, no express authority
in Itoman-Dutch law-so far as I have been able to ascertain-
can be pointed to as indicating the effects for which I am now
contending on contracts entered into by minors i/bolt Mhe (1.6i5St(Ice
qf their gardian.-'. But notwithstanding my inability to give
chapter and verse in smpport of my proposition, I venture to think
that both from a consideration of the analogous case of feniale
traders, and also by the direct authority of learned writers on other
systems of law which claim the civil law as a parent, I shall be
able to establish the position I have taken up. Now the case of
m:arried women seems to me to present a decided analogy to that
of minors; both because most of the reasons in respect of which the
law affords it protection to the fairer but possibly weaker sex, are
identical with those which exert their influence in favour of youth;
and also because by the mere fact of contracting a legal marriage,
a womuan, whatever her age, becomes a minor in the eye of the
law. And as a woman's lcgal position is assimilated by mar-
riage in nearly all respects to that of a minor, it can scarcely be
thought unreasonable to assume that where the one can contract a
valid obligation, the other will equally be bound, and that a woman
who is'publicly carrying on a trade or business can be made liable
oa the contracts which she has independently entered into in the
course of that trade or business seems abundantly clear(2 ). Grotius
expresses himself thus on this point: "So that now a married
woman openly carrying on any trade or business may validly con-
tract all matters connected with such trade or business, and may
consequently bind herself and her husband, and sell and encumber
the stock of the business."(2-) The law of France on this subject
(2-)Van Leeuweu, Roman-Dutch law, p. 43 ; Voet 23, 2, 44. (29)1, 5, 2.3.
 CONTRACTS OF MINORS.

is laid down by the Code Civile in these words: "If the wife be a
public trader she shall be competent to contract in matters re-
lating to the trade, without being thercunto authorised by her
husband, provided there exist community of goods between
them."( ') Now the ground on which this doctrine of a woman's
liability on her contracts entered into in the course of a business
which she is publicly carrying on, is her husband's implied consent
to her engaging in this particular trade. As, it is argued, it would
be impossible for her to carry on any business publicly without her
husband's consent, therefore this authority ought to be presumed and
with it the necessary power to do everything necessary to
the proper carrying on of the trade. And this appears to
me to be the grond on which the doctrine ought
to be extended to the case of a minor trader who
lives with his parents. For as a minor carr}ing on business away
friom his parents is presumed to have obtained the consent neces-
sary for emancipation, so a minor who lives at home but carries on
business on his own account ought to be considered as having ob-
tained freedom from patria-potcsla8in connection with his particular
trade or calling. In the view I take, the difference between the
two states is entirely one of degree. In the former the emancipa-
tion is absolute, in the latter it is limited. But when the subject
is looked at from this point of view, as I maintain it ought to be,
then it becomes a matter of importance to enquire if a minor is
entitled to claim the restitutio in integrim against contracts wVhieh
have reference solely to his independent business. Re tiitio in
, is a relief granted by law to minors against serious loss
integra,
and injury which they have sustained from contracts entered into
either by their guardians on their behalf, or by themselves assisted
by their guardians. But a minor who has no guardian will not
thereby be deprived of this privilege. Other important features of
this doctrine are, that it cannot be put into operation until full age
has been reached, that it has no force after four years from majority,
and that it only exerts its influence on transactions by which
minors have suffered serious loss or detriment, and then only if
no other remedy in law be available(1 ). Voet in treating of this
equitable but extraordinary remedy expressly states that those
(11) Art. 220. (11)Ceus. Forens, 1, 43.
 THE CAPE LAW JOURNAL.

who had publicly practised a profession or engaged in business on

their own account while under age were, so far as contracts connected
with their business were concerned, excluded from the bene-
fits of restitution("). For, as the learned author pointedly remarks,
the ,rai.ondYtre of restitution being inexperience and unfitness for
business, the public carrying on of a trade is wholly inconsistent
with such inaptitude. Van Leeuwen without referring expressly
to the case of a minor trader in this connection states generally that
minors who follow a profession are not entitled to restitution
against their acts in connection with the practise of such profes-
sion ; and by way of illustration mentions the case of a juris-con-
sult whose ignorance of law has subjected him to liability.(33 ) So
that on the ground I have mentioned I consider myself abundantly
justified in concluding that the absence of express consent on the
part of guardians, where any, would not be sufficient to relieve
minor traders from liability in connection with contracts having
reference to their independent business. The law of France as
contained in the Code Civile entirely supports this view, as does that
of Scotland. Thus Air. Bell in his commentaries on the law of Scot-
land, says: " But when a minor acts as a trader and hold himself
out to the world as such his dealings are on the same footing with
a major." But the proof of trading must be clear. No mere
boyish and isolated transactions will suffice(").
(3.) Where the minor has fisely rqpes;ented linsey'a.s beiag of
fidl age. A mere false representation on the part of the minor as
to his age is not in itself sufficient to bring a case within this
exception. The statement must be made dole male, or as it is
generally expressed fraudulently, that is, with the intention of
deceiving; and furthermore, the other party to the contract who
seeks to hold the minor liable will have to show that lie acted on
the false representation, and that he was actually misled by jt. 3 ")
Indeed it is apprehended that if such a person had or ought to have
had reasonable grounds for doubting the accuracy of the statement,
and had it in his power to ascertain the tuith or otherwise of such
statement, but made no attempt to do so, he would not be allowed
(3') 4, 4, 51; Gericke vs. l7cyter, Buch., 1879, p. 147. (1a)Cens. Forens, 4, 43, 5.
t31 Auret vs. Hind; 4 Buch., E.D.C., 283. (11)Voet 14, 6, 7; Christin. Decis.,
vol. 2, p. 131.
 CONTRACTS OF MINORS.

to profit by such negligence, but that the defence of minority would

still prevail.
(4.) Wlwre the viinor ha.s eijoyed the befit /q' the contract.
As has been previously stated in this paper, minors may under
certain circumstances bind others without themselves being bound;
but where they have received any benefit under such a transaction
they thereby become liable to the extent of the advantage they have
reaped.06 ) Thus if in performance of an agreement of this nature
a minor had parted with the physical possession of a thing, he
could recover it back; but in respect of what he had received he
7
would only be bound in so far as lie had profited thereby.( ) This
8
doctrine, which is in complete accord with Roman law,(s ) appears
but seldom to have formed the basis of a decision in the Courts of
this Colony; indeed the case in which the contracts of minors
have formed the subject present but a meagre array in the law
reports of the Colony. But in Ioqfneyr vs. T/u!eymaut(3') provisional
sentence was given against a minor on a promissory note, the price
of some cattle purchased by the defendant without his guardian's
consent. As the report-like too many of those Mr. ioscoe has
compiled-is chiefly remarkable for its brevity, the exact grounds
of the decisimu can only be gathered incidentally. Thus the
plaintiff's counsel appears to have based the defendant's liability on
the ground of his having had the benefit of his purchase; while
the defence was that the minor could not enter into such a trans-
action without the consent of his guardians, the Board of Executors.
40
In contradistinction to this case is that of Gant- vs. lVagenaar,( )
in which the Supreme Court refused provisional sentence for rent
of a house on a lease executed by a minor assisted by his mother,
who was, however, not his legal guardian. AM[xzi iEs, J., dissented on
the ground that lesion of the minor was not even alleged. Now
this case does not conflict with the law as I have stated it, for it
merely decided that minority was under the circumstances a good
defence to a provisional claim. But if the principal case had
been gone into, and it had been proved that the minor had had
the beneficial occupation of the house under the lease, I cannot

01) Grotius 1, 1, 5; 3, 1, 26 ; 3, 6, 9. () Van der Keessel, Th., 529.

(38) Just. 2, 8, 2 ; Dig. 12, 6, 13. :1C)2 Roscoe, p. 4. (0) 1 M nz., 92.
 THE CAPE LAW JOURNAL.

help thinking that the defendant's plea of minority would have

been of no avail.
(5.) 1?abfication bp minor. Ratification is the adoption by a
person of an act previously done by him but not so as to be pro-
ductive of a subsisting legal obligation, or done by a stranger
having at the time no authority to act as his agent. Thus a con-
tract entered into by a minor without his guardian's consent is
made valid and binding by the subsequent imposition of the
guardian's authority.0') To have any binding effect the ratifica-
tion of a contract by a minor must be made after attaining majority.
It can arise either from express words, or from a tacit acquiescence
in past acts. But if obtained by fraud, or through clear mistake
as to his position on the part of the minor, if has no force.(41) It
can be applied effectually to contracts for the validity of which
during minority a decree of the Court was necessary.(a) But due
ratification by a minor is a complete bar to receiving the relief of
restitution in case of lesion.
It now remains to make but a few remarks on minor's contracts
in which guardians take part. Generally speaking, such transac-
tions are valid and binding, saving however to minors the right to
impeach them for lesion on coming of age. To those giounds
already noticed on which a minor becomes disentitled to restitution
against contracts thus concluded, must be added that of fraud.
Thus where a person falsely holds himself out as of full age and
thereby induces another to contract with him, the law will afford
him no relief against such contract by reason of his minority.(44 )
But lawfully appointed curators and guardians have not full power
and control over all matters connected with the adminisiration of a
minor's estate under their charge. Thus it is expressly provided
by an enactment of this Colony( -) that no tutor or curator, &c.,
shall alienate any immovable property belonging to a minor with-
out the authority of the Supreme Court or a Judge thereof. But
it was decided by the Chief Justice in the Circuit Court at Queens-
town that an alienation made without such consent is not iso .ure

(') Cens. Forens, 1, 17, 10; Vuet 2G, 8, 1. (42) Boll's Comm. Law of Scot-

land, p. 138 ; Voct 4, 4, 44. (3) Sande Decis., 2, 9, 15. (14)Cons. Forens, 4
43, 7; Voet 4, 4, 43. (45) Ord. 105 of 1833, J 24.
 CONTRACTS OF MINORS.

null and void but might and would be enforced by the Court if
found to be clearly for the minor's benefit.
As a minor has no personi stmidi in .udicio he cannot be sued,
even on a contract which is for his benefit, without the assistance
of his guardian.(-"') But when lie has been emancipated he requires
no such help.(47 )
The result of our inquiries into the law of contracts of minors
may thus shortly be summarised. ]Finors cannot contract unaided
to their prejudice, but cau make their position better and thereby
bind others without themselves being bound. But should they
become emancipated from parental control they acquire the rights
and privileges of majority and become equally subject to its responsi-
bilities. And if, while still unemaneipated, they have, in execution
of a contract to which their guardians are not parties, acquired
anything of a beneficial nature, they will be bound to the extent
of such advantage, and equally will they be held liable if they
have induced another to contract with them by means of a false
statement as to their age. Also by due ratification they will be
made liable on contracts maide while under age whatever be their
nature, and as guardians are supposed to supply those capacities,
to tie lack of which minor's privileges are due, their participation
in the ward's contract is sufficient to render it valid and binding,
except in the case of the alienation of immovable property to which
they must first get judicial consent, neither is the cloak of a
guardian's authority allowed to be used otherwise than as a. pro-
tection, so that acts to which they have given their countenance
may, on the minor's complaint, be invalidated for lesion or serious
detriment. The whole gist of the law's interference in the affairs
of this particular class of persons is to afford protection to those,
and those alone, whose youth require it. Consequently, by ascer-
taining whether a minor's contract has brought, or is likely to bring,
him any benefit, a great stride will at once be made to a know-
ledge of its legal effect.
H. F. B.

(,) Voet 2, 4, 4; Van der Kees, Th., 127. (1) Fouchee vs. Do Tillie s,
3 Buch. E.D.C., 147,