ro A Contested Term: What is “Aesthetic”? 7 The Aesthetic Attitude Jerome Stolnits Aesthetic perception will be explained in terms of the aesthetic attitude. Ivis the attitude we take which determines how we perceive the world. An attitude is a way of directing and controlling our perception. We never see or hear every thing in our environment indiscriminately. Rather, we “pay attention” to some things, whereas we apprehend others only dimly or hardly ar all. Thus attention is selective ~ it concentrates on some features of our surroundings and ignores others, Once we recognize this, we realize the inadequacy of the old notion that human beings are simply passive receptors for any and all external stimuli Furthermore, wha: we single out for attention is dictated by the purposes we have at the time. Our actions are generally pointed toward some goal. In order to achieve its goal, the organism watches keenly to learn what in che environ- ment will help and what will be detrimental. Obviously, when individuals have different purposes they will perceive the world differently, one emphasizing certain things which another will ignore. The Indian scout gives close attention to markings and clues which the person who is simply strolling through the woods will pass over. Thus an attitude or, ast is sometimes called, a “set,” guides our attention in those directions relevant to our purposes. It gives direction to our behavior in still another way. It prepares us to respond to what we perceive, to act in a way ‘we think will be most effective for achieving our goals, By the same token, we suppress or inhibit those responses which get in the way of our efforts. A man intent on winning a chess game readies himself to answer his opponent’s moves and thinks ahead how best to do this. He also keeps his attention from being diverted by distractions, Finally, to have an attitude is to be favorably or unfavorably oriented. One can welcome and rejoice in what he sees, or he can be hostile and cold toward . The Anglophote is a person whose attitude toward all things British is nega- tive, so that when he meets someone with a British accent or hears “Rule Brittania,” we expect him to say something disparaging or cynical. When one’s attitude toward a thing is positive, he will try to sustain the object's existence and continue to perceive it; when negative, he will try to destroy it or avert his attention from it To sum up, an attitude organises and directs our awareness of the world. Now the aesthetic attitude is not the attitude which people usually adopt. TheTHE AESTHETIC ATTITUDE artirude which we customarily take can be called the attitude of “practical” perception. We usually see the things in our world in terms of their usefulness for promot- ing of hindering our purposes. If ever we put into words our ordinary attitude toward an object, it would take the form of the question, “What can I do with ie, and what can it do to me?” I see the pen as something I can write with, I see the oncoming automobile as something to avoid: I do not concentrate my’ at- tention upon the object itself. Rather, itis of concern to me only'so far as it can help me to achieve some future goal. Indeed, from the standpoint of fulfilling ‘one’s purposes it would be scupid and wasteful to become absorbed in the object itself. The workman who never gets beyond looking at his tools, never gets his job done. Similarly, objects which function as “signs,” such as the din- rer bell or traffic light, are significant only as guides to future behavior. Thus when our attitude is “practical,” we perceive things only as means to some goal which lies beyond the experience of perceiving them, “Therefore our perception of a ching is usually limited and fragmentary. We sce only those of its features which are relevant to our purposes, and as long as it is useful we pay litte attention to it. Usually perception is merely a rapid and momentary identification of the kind of thing ic is and its uses. Whereas the child has to learn laboriously what things are, what they are called, and what they can be used for, the adult does not. His perception has become econo- mised by habit, so that he can recognize the thing and its usefulness almost at once, If intend to write, [ donot hesitate about picking up the pen rather than 1 paper clip or the cigarette lighter. It is only the pen’s usefulness-for-writing- swith, not its distinctive color or shape, that I care about. (....] If we stop to think aboutit, ics astonishing how little of the world we really see, We “read the labels” on things to know how to act with regard to them, but wwe hardly see the things themselves. As I have said, itis indispensable to getting ‘on with the “work of the world” that we should do this. However, we should not assume that perception is always habitually “practical,” as it probably our culeure. Other societies differ from our own, in this respect. But nowhere is perception exclusively “practical.” On occasion we pay atten- tion to a thing simply for the sake of enjoying the way it looks or sounds or feels. This is the “aesthetic” attitude of perception. Itis found wherever people become interested in a play or a novel or listen closely to a piece of music. It occurs even in the midst of “practical” perception, in “casual truant glances at our surroundings when the pressing occupations of practical effort either tire us, or leave us for a moment to our own devices, as when in the absorbing business of driving at forty or fifty miles an hour along a highway to get to a destination, the tourist on his holiday glances atthe trees or the hills or the ocean.” It will forward our discussion of the aesthetic attitude to have a definition of i. But you should remembe: that a definition, here or in any other study, is only a point of departure for further inquiry. Only the unwary or intellectually 79JEROME STOLNITZ lazy student will rest content with the words of the definition alone, without secing how it helps us to understand our experience and how it can be em: ployed to carry on the study of aesthetics. With this word of caution, I will define “the aesthetic attitude” as “disinterested and sympathetic attention £0 and contemplation of any object of awareness whatever, for its own sake alone.” Let us now take up in turn each of the ideas in this definition and see what they mean precisely. Since this will be a piecemeal analysis, the truth of the account must be found in the total analysis and nov in any single part of it The first word, “disinterested,” is a crucially important one. It means that we do not look at the object out of concern for any ulterior purpose which it may serve, We are not trying to use or manipulate the object. There is no purpose governing the experience other than the purpose of just having the experience. Out interest comes to rest upon the object alone, so that itis not taken as asign of some frture event, like the dinner bed, or asa cue to future activity, like the traffic light. Many sorts of “interest” are excluded from the aesthetic. One of them is the interest in owninga world of art for the sake of peide or prestige. A book collec- tor, upon seeing an old manuscript, is often interested only in its rarity or its purchase price, not its value as a work of literature. (There are some book col- lectors who have never read the books that they own!) Another non-aesthetic interest is the “cognitive,” ic., the interest in gaining knowledge about an ob- ject. A meteorologist is concerned, not with the visual appearance ofa smoking cloud formation, but with the causes which led ro it. Similarly, the interest which the sociologist or historian takes in a work of art [...] is cognitive Further, where the person who perceives the object, the “percipient,”? has the purpose of passing judgment upon it, his attitude is not aesthetic. This should be kept in mind, for, as we shall see later, the attitude of the art critic is signifi cantly different from the aesthetic attitude. We may say of al these non-aesthetic interests, and of “practical” perception generally, that the object is apprehended with an eye to its origins and conse- quences, its interrelations with other things. By contrast, the aesthetic attitude “isolates” the object and focuses upon it—the “look” of the rocks, the sound of the ocean, the colors in the painting. Hence the object is not seen in a feagmen- tary or passing manner, as itis in “practical” perception, e.g., in using a pen for writing, Its whole nature and character are divelt upon. One who buys a paint- ing merely to cover a stain on the wall paper does not see the painting as a delightful pattern of colors and forms. For the aesthetic attitude, things are not to be classified or studied or judged They are in themselves pleasant or exciting to look at. It should, then, be clear that being “disinterested” is very far from being “un-interested.” Rather, as all of us know, we can become intensely absorbed in a book or a moving picture, so that we become much more “interested” than we usually are in the course of our “practical” activity. ‘The word “sympathetic” in the definicion of “aesthetic attitude” refers to the way in which we prepare ourselves to respond to the object. When we appreTHE AESTHETIC ATTITUDE hend an object aesthetically, we do so in order to relish its individual quality, whether the object be charming, string, vivid, or all of these. If we are to appreciate it, we must accept the object “on its own terms.” We must make ourselves receptive to the object and “sex” ourselves to accept whatever it may offer to perception. We mus: therefore inhibie any responses which are “un- sympathetic” to the object, which alienate us from it or are hostile to it. [..] {Alay of us might reject a novel because it seems to conflict with our moral beliefs or our “way of thinking.” When we do so, we should be clear as to what we are doing. We have not read the book aesthetically, for we have interposed moral or other responses of our own which are alien to it, This disrupts the aesthetic attitude. We cannot then say that the novel is aesthetically bad, for we have not permitted ourselves to consider it aesthetically. To maintain the aes- thetic attitude, we must follow the lead of the object and respond in concert with ic This is not always easy, forall of us have deep-seated values as well as preju- dices. They may be ethical or religious, or they may involve some bias against the artist or even against his native country. (During the First World War, many ‘American symphony orchestras refused to play the works of German compos crs.) The problem is especially acute in the case of contemporary works of art, which may treat of disputes ard loyalties in which we are deeply engaged, When they do so, we might remind ourselves that works of art often lose their topical significance with the passing of time and then come to be esteemed as great works of art by later generations. Milzon’s sonnet “On the Late Massacre in Piedmont” is a ringing protest called forth by an event which occurred shortly before the writing of the poem, Bur the heated questions of religion and poli- tics which enter into it seem very remote to us now. People sometimes remon- strate with a friend who seems to reject offhand works of art of which they are fond, “You don’t even give ita chance.” To be “sympathetic” in aesthetic expe- rience means to give the object the “chance” to show how it can be interesting to perception We come now to the word “attention” in our definition of “aesthetic att rude.” As has been pointed out, any attitude whatever directs attention to cer tain features of the world. But the element of attention must be especially underscored in speaking of aesthetic perception. For, as a former teacher of mine used to say, aesthetic perception is frequently thought to be a “blank, sowslike stare." Icis easy to fa into this mistake when we find aesthetic percep. tion described as “just looking,” without any activity or practical interest. From this i is inferred that we simply expose ourselves to the work of art and permit it to inundate us in waves of sound of color. Bu this is surely a distortion of the facts of experience. When we listen to a thythmically exciting piece of music which absorbs us with its energy and move: ment, or when we read a novel which creates great suspense, we give our ear- nest attention to it to the exclusion of almost everything els in our strroundings. To be “sitting on the edge of the chair” is anything but passive. In taking the aesthetic attitude, we want to make the value of the object come fully alive in ur experience. Therefore we focus our attention upon the object and “key up” alJEROME STOLNITZ our capacities of imagination and emotion to respond to it. (...] Attention is always a matter of digrec, and in different instances of aesthetic perception, attention is more o* less intense. A color, briefly seen, ora little melody, may be apprehended on the “fringe” of consciousness, whereas a drama will absorb us wholly. But to whatever extent it does so, experience is aesthetic only when an object “holds” our attention. Furthermore, aesthetic attention is accompanied by activity. This is not the activity of practical experience, which seeks an ulterior goal. Rather itis activity which is either evoked by disinterested perception of the object, or else is re~ quired fort. The former includes all muscular, nervous, and “motor” responses suchas feelings of tension or rhythmic movement. Contrary to what some snobs would have us believe there is nothing inherently unaesthetic about tapping one’s foot in time to the music. The theory of empathy points oue that we “feel into” the object our muscular and bodily adjustments. WVe brace ourselves and ur muscles become taut in the face of a sculptured figure which is tall, vigorous and upright. This does not occur in aesthetic experience alone, and it does not occur in all aesthetic experience, but when it does, it exemplifies the kind of activity which may be aroused in aesthetic perception. The direction of atten- tion itself may not improperly be called “activity.” But even overt bodily move- ment and effort may be required for aesthetic perception, We usually have to walk round al sides of a sculpture, or through a cathedral, before we can appre- ciateit. We would often reach out and touch sculptured figures ifonly museum guards would permit us to do so. Bur focusing upon the object and “acting” in regard co it, is not all that is meant by aesthetic “attention.” To savor fully the distinctive value of the ob- ject, we must be attentive to its frequently complex and subtle details. Acute awareness of these cetails is discrimination, People often miss a good dealin the experience of art, n3t only because their attention lapses, but because they fail to “see” all that is of significance in the work. Indeed, their atrention frequently lapses for just this reason. They miss the individuality of the work, so that one symphony sounds like any other piece of “long-haie” music, and one lyric poem. is indistinguishable ftom another, and all are equally boring. If you have had the good fortune to study literature with an able teacher, you know how a play or novel can become vital and engaging when you learn to look for details to which you were previously insensitive. But awareness of this kind is not always easily come by. It often requires knowledge about allusions or symbols which occurin the work, repeated experience of the work, and even, sometimes, tech- nical training in the art-form, Aswe develop discriminating attention, the work comes alive to us. Ifwe can keep in mind the chief themes in the movement ofa symphony, see how they are developed and altered in the course of the movement, and appreciate how they are played off agains: each other, then there is a great gain in our experience. The experience has greater richness and unity. Without such discrimination it is thin, for the listener responds only to scattered passages or to a patch of striking orchestral color. And it is disorganized, for he is not aware of the structure which binds the work together. His experience may be said to be intermittently 2 ‘Wit ear emnsintnntantnnrnnTHE AESTHETIC ATTITUDE and to a limited degree aesthetic, but it is not neaely as rewarding as it might be. Everybody knows how easy itis to start thinking of other things while the music is playing, so that we are reilly aware of it only now and again. All the more reason, then, why we should develop the capacities for appreciating is richness and profundity. Only'so can we keep our experience from becoming, in Santavana’s famous phrase, “a drowsy revery relieved by nervous thrils."* Ifyou now understand how aesthetic atcention is alert and vigorous, then itis safe f0 use a word which has often been applied to aesthetic experience - “con: templation.” Otherwise, there is the great danger that this word will suggest an aloof, unexcited gaze which, we have seen, is untrue to the ficts of aesthetic experience, Actually, “contemplation” does not so much add something new to our definition as it sums up ideas which we have already discussed. It means that perception is directed to the object in its own right and that the spectator is not concerned to analyze it or to ask questions about it. Also, the word con- notes thoroughgoing absorption and interest, as when we speak of being “lost in contemplation.” Most things are hardly noticed by us, whereas the object of aesthetic perception stands out from its environment and rivets our interest. ‘The aesthetic attitude can be adopted toward “any object of awareness what ver.” This phrase need not, striccly speaking, be included in our definition. We could understand the aesthetic attitude as the kind of perceptual attention we have been talking about, without adding that “any object whatever" may be its object. Buc definitions are flexible to an extent. We can choose to include in them even what is not strictly necessary to identify the term being defined. The great and even limitless scope of aesthetic experience is one of the most interest ing and important things about it. ‘The definition permits us to say that any object at all can be apprehended aesthetically, ic., no object is inherently unaesthetic. [...] Notes 1 D.W. Prll, Aesthetic Judgment (New York: Crowell, 1929), p. 31. 2. This is a clumay and largely outmoded word, but it is more convenient for our purpose then words of more limited meaning such as “spectator,” “observer,” “lis fenct,” and is accordingly used here and elsevhere in the text. 3. CE Herbert, Langfeld, The Aesthetic Atsieude (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1920), chaps. V-VI; Vernon Lee, “Empathy,” in Melvin Rader, ed., A Modern Boot of Exhetcs,rev. ed. (New York: Holt, 1952), pp. 460-3 4 George Santayana, Reason in Ars (New York: Scrioner’s 1946), p. 51 3